STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 268
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1960
• Content Type: SINT

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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of
Training, or any other organizational component of the
intelligence: community.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
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article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
L.4:VRENcs R. HOUSTON
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
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CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors
may come from any member of the intelligence community or,
upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be
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For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your
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For back issues and on other questions call the Office of
the Editor,
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich . R. C. Jaggers
Inside story of how the Hangman met his death at
the hands of Czech intelligence. SECRET
Page
1
The Interpreter as an Agent . . . . . . Francis Agnor 21
Advantages and drawbacks of a timeworn mas-
querade. SECRET
The Identi-Kit . . . . . . . . . . Herman E. Kimsey 29
A conjuror's pack for remote-controlled identifica-
tion. SECRET
Credentials-Bona Fide or False? . . David V. Brigane 37
The unmasking of amateur and professional de-
ceivers through scrutiny of their documentation.
SECRET
Hypnosis in Interrogation . . . . . Edward F. Deshere 51
Nature of the trance and applicability in and against
interrogation. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Classified Listing of Articles in Volume III .
CONFIDENTIAL
MORIIHRP THIS
PAGE
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UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
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Page
From the CIA Cornerstone Ceremonies . . . . . . . 69
The. Symptoms of Scientific Breakthrough
R. R. Scidmore 73
Characteristic patterns as guidelines for the fore-
caster of scientific advance.
Publicizing Soviet Scientific Research
Lawrence M. Bucans 87
The intelligence community's hand in a Commerce
Department service to the scientific public.
Portuguese Timor: An Estimative Failure
Thomas F. Conlon 91
An assumption about enemy intent and its sad
sequel.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
Military intelligence in World War II . . . . . . 97
In the American Revolution . . . . . . . . . . 101
The Soviet intelligence services . . . . . . . . . 109
Espionage and paramilitary tales . . . . . . . . 117
Evasions and escapes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Miscellany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
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194A0001
 A tyrant's death at patriots'
hands revealed as Operation
Salmon of Czech Intelligence
in exile.
Approved For Release 2005/0
THE ASSASSINATION OF REINHARD HEYDRICH
R. C. Jaggers
On the twenty-ninth of May, 1942, Radio Prague announced
that Reinhard Heydrich, Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Mo-
ravia, was dying; assassins had wounded him fatally. On the
sixth of June he died.
Though not yet forty at his death, the blond Heydrich had
had a notable career. As a Free Corpsman in his teens he
was schooled in street fighting and terrorism. Adulthood
brought him a commission in the German navy, but he was
cashiered for getting his fiancee pregnant and then refusing
to marry her because a woman who gave herself lightly was
beneath him. He then worked so devotedly for the Nazi Party
that when Hitler came to power he put Heydrich in charge
of the Dachau concentration camp. In 1934 he headed the
Berlin Gestapo. On June 30 of that year, at the execution of
Gregor Strasser, the bullet missed the vital nerve and Strasser
lay bleeding from the,neck. Heydrich's voice was heard from
the corridor: "Not dead yet? Let the swine bleed to death."
In 1936 Heydrich became chief of the SIPO, which included
the criminal police, the security service, and the Gestapo. In
1938 he concocted the idea of the Einsatzgruppen, whose busi-
ness it was to murder Jews. The results were brilliant. In
two years these 3,000 men slaughtered at least a million per-
sons. In November of that year he was involved in an event
that in some inverted fashion presaged his own death. The
son of a Jew whom he had deported from Germany assassinated
Ernst von Rath in Paris. In reprisal Heydrich ordered a po-
grom, and on the night of November ninth 20,000 Jews were
arrested in Germany.
In 1939 the merger of the SIPO with the SS Main Security
OfTice made Heydrich the leader of the Reichssicherheits-
hauptamt. In this capacity he ordered and supervised the
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"Polish attack" on Gleiwitz, an important detail in the stage
setting for the invasion of Poland on September first. It was
he who saw to it that twelve or thirteen "criminals" dressed
in Polish uniforms would be given fatal injections and found
dead on the "battlefield." It was probably he who chose the
code name for these men-Canned Goods.
At this time Bohemia and Moravia had already been raised
from independent status to that of Reichsprotektorat, with
Baron von Neurath, Germany's now senile former foreign min-
ister, designated the Protector-of the Czechs from them-
selves, presumably. But a greater honor was in store for them.
On 3 September 1941 von Neurath was replaced by SS Ober-
gruppenfuehrer Heydrich. The hero moved into the Hrad-
cany Palace in Prague and the executions started, 300 in the
first five weeks. His lament for Gregor Strasser became his
elegy for all patriotic Czechs: "Aren't they dead yet? Let
them bleed to death."
He had come a long way in thirty-eight years. The son of
a music teacher whose wife was named Sarah, Reinhard had
gone on trial three times because of Party doubts about the
purity of his Aryan origin. Now, as chief of the RSHA, which
he continued to run from Czechoslovakia, he was Hangman
to all occupied Europe. His power was such that he could force
Admiral Canaris to come to Prague and at the end of May,
1942, sign away the independence of the Abwehr and accept
subordination to the Sicherheitsdienst. It was his moment
of sweetest triumph. A few weeks later he was dead, and
Himmier pronounced the funeral oration calling him "that
good and radiant man."
So much for the story we all know, and on to questions left
unanswered by it. Who were Heydrich's assassins? Who
could successfully plan his death? Was the motive simply
revenge for suffering? How was it accomplished? And the
hardest question of all, was it a good thing? Here, for the
first time, are the answers to all these but the last, and on
that question stuff for pondering.
Need Mothers an Invention
When Heydrich took charge of Bohemia and Moravia, the
Czechs learned what it means to live under a master of sup-
pression. The war fronts were far away: it was the period of
smashing German successes in the Balkans, Scandinavia,
France, and the USSR. The Czechs heard little that Heydrich
did not want them to hear. Their underground movement
was systematically penetrated and all but destroyed. On Oc-
tober third of 1941, for example, the capture of a single Czech
radio operator by Heydrich's men led to the arrest of 73 agents
working for Moscow. Underground radio contact with London
was monitored. The Czechs were losing heart.
In London the strength of the resistance in all occupied
countries was periodically reviewed, and the countries were
listed in the order of the assistance each gave the Allied cause.
In 1941 Czechoslovakia was always ranked at the very end.
Eduard Benes, its president-in-exile, was deeply embarrassed.
He was also gravely concerned that the Allies, if his people
failed to fight, might give short shrift to any Czech claims
after the war. He told his intelligence chief, General Fran-
tisek Moravec, to order an intensification of resistance activity.
But it was difficult enough to get even a parachuted courier
or coded radio message past the wary Heydrich. Nothing hap-
pened in response.
Then President Benes hit upon the idea of contriving to
assassinate a prominent Nazi or Quisling inside the tight dun-
geon of the Protectorate; such a bold stroke would refurbish
the Czech people's prestige and advance the status of their
government in London. The German retaliation would be
brutal, of course, but its brutality might serve to inflame
Czech patriotism.
Who should be the target? General Moravec first nomi-
nated the most prominent of the Czech collaborators, an ex-
colonel whose fawning subservience to his Teutonic masters
left the London Czechs nauseated and ashamed. The general
also had a personal reason for his choice: the name of the
Czech Quisling was Emanuel Moravec, a coincidence that had
plagued the general for years. But Emanuel, called the
Greasy, was not the right man for the purpose. He was not
well known abroad, and Czech prestige would not be raised
significantly by crushing a worm. The Germans, too, were
likely to regard his death as no great loss; he was only a min-
ister of education, easy to replace, and even the Nazis despised
traitors.
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Heydrich was totally different. His unique combination of
brilliance and brutality had no peer even in the Third Reich.
He had been personally responsible for the execution of hun-
dreds of Czechs and the imprisonment of thousands. The shot
that killed him would be heard in every capital of the world.
There could be no other choice. General Moravec so recom-
mended, President Benes agreed, and the planning of Opera-
tion Salmon began in tense secrecy.
Wanted: Men for Martyrdom
The first problem was finding one or two men who could
and would do the job. It must have seemed to General Mora-
vec, at least at the outset, an almost impossible task. The
many Czech politicians in London were preoccupied in the un-
ending scramble for posts in the provisional government.
There were quite a few Czech businessmen in England, but
most of them were too busy making a fast koruna to be in-
terested. There were brave and patriotic Czechs serving in
fighter and bomber wings attached to the Royal Air Force,
but the Air Ministry would never let them go. And so the
choice narrowed to the single infantry brigade of about 2,500
men encamped near Cholmondly.
This pool of prospects had its own disadvantages. An en-
campment of 2,500 is like a town of that size: everyone knows
everyone else and is full of curiosity about everything that
anyone does. Here this inquisitiveness was also undissipated
by outside contacts, the Czech soldiers speaking little or no
English and having few interests beyond the limits of the
camp. Each transfer, trip, or trifle thus became news, some-
thing to discuss and analyze.
For screening purposes the personnel files of the brigade
contained only what each man had told about himself or, in
rare instances, about others whom he had known earlier, at
home. There was no way to check police files, run background
or neighborhood checks, or otherwise obtain independent veri-
fication of loyalties. Under such circumstances it is a tribute
to General Ingr, Minister of Defense in the exiled government,
to General Moravec, and to their subordinates that of 153 para-
chutists flown from England and dropped into Czechoslovakia,
only three proved turncoats.
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How many people would have to know? President Benes,
General Ingr, General Moravec and his deputy, Lt. Col. Strag-
mueller, and Major Fryc, chief of operations. Of these, Presi-
dent Benes and General Ingr needed to know only the purpose
of the operation and the names of the men chosen to carry it
out. Others, required for instruction, would necessarily know
that certain men were entering Czechoslovakia to carry out
a clandestine action, but not their precise intent. Four in-
structors would be needed, experts respectively in parachute
work, in the terrain of the area, in cover, documentation,
clothing, and equipment, and in commando techniques.
Several British officers, representatives of MI-6, would par-
ticipate in this training. The crew of the plane carrying the
men into Czechoslovakia would know where and when they
were going, though not their identities or mission. And
finally, a large number of men in the brigade personally ac-
quainted with the candidates could be expected to make guesses
of varying degrees of accuracy as the preparations for assassi-
nation progressed.
Because the number of persons who would be partly or fully
informed was so unavoidably much too large, it was essential
that the men finally chosen should be as discreet as they were
brave. Of the 2,500 Czech soldiers in the brigade some 700,
most of them volunteers, were already engaged in parachute
training under British instruction. Two officers were assigned
to the brigade, one to the parachutists And the other to the
ground troops, ostensibly as aides but actually as spotters.
These two officers knew only that they were to choose the best
candidates for a dangerous assignment.
Men recommended by the spotters were interviewed singly
by Lt. Col. Stragmueller. Some were asked whether they
would volunteer for special training. Almost all those asked
agreed, and they were sent in groups of ten for vigorous physi-
cal conditioning and thorough schooling in commando tac-
tics-the use of a wide assortment of small arms, the manu-
facture of home-made bombs, ju-jitsu, cover and concealment,
and the rest. During this intensive drilling the ten-man teams
were kept under close observation. It was essential to dis-
cover not only the bravest and most capable but also-it hav-
ing been decided that the assassination was a two-man job-
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those who worked best in pairs. Other considerations also
came into play; men from Prague, for example, were auto-
matically eliminated because of the danger of recognition after
arrival.
By now the choice had narrowed to eight men in half as
many groups. General Moravec visited these four groups,
along with all the others, on a regular schedule. On his orders
the instructors drew the eight candidates aside one at a time
and passed each a piece of juicy, concocted information with
the warning not to mention it to anyone. Each tidbit was
different. Soon two new rumors were circulating, and two
men were eliminated. One of the remaining six was disquali-
fied by marriage; another was suddenly incapacitated by
illness.
General Moravec interviewed the remaining four. Two of
them, non-corns, met all tests and were also good friends.
Their names were Jan Kubis and Josef Gabcik. Kubis was born
in Southern Moravia in 1916. After some ten years of school-
ing he had gone to work as an electrician. He had been in the
Czech Army since 1936 and had fought in France in 1940. His
excellent physical condition made his 160 pounds, at 5'9", look
lean. Slow of movement, taciturn, and persevering, he was
also intelligent and inventive.
Gabcik was a year younger than Kubis. An orphan from
the age of ten, he too had left school at sixteen. After work-
ing as a mechanic for four years, he had entered the Czech
Army in 1937. He had been given the Croix de Guerre in
France in 1940. He was strong and stocky, an excellent soccer
player, and like Kubis lean for all his 150 pounds on a 5'8"
frame. His blue eyes were expressive, and his whole face
unusually mobile. Talented and clever, good-natured, cheerful
even under strenuous or exasperating circumstances, frank
and cordial, he was an excellent counterpoise for the quieter,
more introverted Kubis.
Both men had gone through the arduous training without
illness or complaint. Both spoke fluent German. Both were
excellent shots. General Moravec spoke separately to each of
them. He explained that the mission had the one purpose of
assassinating Heydrich. He stressed to each of the young
men the great likelihood that he would be caught and executed.
Escape from encircled Czechoslovakia after Heydrich had
been killed would be practically impossible. And the survival
of either, hiding inside the country until the war ended, was
extremely unlikely. The probability was that both would be
killed at the scene of action.
Although neither man had relatives or friends in Prague,
both had relatives in the countryside; and the general re-
minded them of what had happened to the family of a Czech
sent from London on a successful clandestine mission to Italy.
Somehow the Gestapo had learned his identity and executed
all of his relatives in Czechoslovakia, even first and second
cousins. "Please understand," General Moravec told each of
them, "that I am not testing you now. You have proved that
you are brave and patriotic. I am telling you that acceptance
of this mission is almost certainly acceptance of death-per-
haps a very painful and degrading death-because I do not
believe that the man who tries to kill Heydrich can succeed
if the awful realization that he too will die comes too late,
and unnerves him. I have another reason, too: if you make
your choice with open eyes, I shall sleep a little better."
First Gabcik and then Kubis agreed, thoughtfully but with-
out hesitation or bravado. Both were quietly proud to have
been chosen. The general then brought them together and
explained that from that moment on they would be separated
from all the rest, the final preparations would be made in
strictest seclusion. If at any moment either man felt that
he could not go through with the assassination, he was bound
in duty and honor to say so immediately, without false shame.
They glanced at each other. "No," said Gabcik. "We want
to do it." Kubis just nodded.
Dress Rehearsal and Curtain Up
Some training was still needed. Kubis had to learn to ride
a bicycle. Both had to know Prague as though they had spent
years walking its streets and alleys. Both needed instruction
in withstanding hostile interrogation. Both had to memorize
all the details of separate cover stories which could be "con-
fessed," after initial resistance, to the Gestapo. On the last
day of training they were each given a lethal dose of cyanide
and told how to conceal it on their persons. it was the last
defense against torture.
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"One more point," General Moravec told them. "Under no
circumstances-and I mean none at all-is either of you to
get in touch with the underground, directly or indirectly.
You are absolutely on your own. The underground dsis infested
job.
with informants; Heydrich has done his usual -
For this reason we have not sent out one word about you, even
to the most trusted leaders there. If anyone appr t rovoca
and says that he comes from the underground, he is a p
teur. Treat him as such."
The men nodded.
"Don't forget," the general insisted. "And now, a review.
Kubis, where does Heydrich have his office?"
"Prague Palace."
"Show me on the map.
Kubis did so without hesitation.
"Gabcik, where do you land?"
"Here, sir," said Gabcik, pointing to another spot some 50
kilometers southeast of Prague, an area chosen because it was
wooded, rolling, and offered good approaches to the city.
"Kubis, what do you do first, after touching ground and re-
moving parachutes?"
"We destroy all traces of the descent, sir."
"Do you proceed to the palace, Gabcik?"
"No. It is too heavily guarded. All visitors are thoroughly
checked."
"His private residence?"
"The same, sir."
"Kubis, where do you go?"
"Here, sir." Kubis' finger pointed to a spot half way be-
tween Prague and the village of Brezary.
"Gabcik, when does Heydrich pass this spot?"
"Daily, sir, going into the city, and at night on his return.
We shall observe the time."
"Why have sea chosen this particular spot on the road?"
sharp curve. His car and the motorcycles
"Sir, there must slow down to twenty kilometers."
"How many motorcycles, Kubs?"
"Probably two, sir. We'll find out."
"Good. Now remember-don't rush it. Don't use pistols in
any case. If there is any chance that you can't bring it off
with the bomb or the machine gun on first try, wait and pick
a better spot for the next day. But don't delay too long.
Now, a last dry run."
The two men left. General Moravec waited for ten min-
utes, summoned his car, and asked to be driven down a cer-
tain country road at normal speed. He sat in the back, with
binoculars, closely scanning all the foliage and other cover
wherever the car slowed for a curve. Then he drove back and
waited. Soon Gabcik and Kubis reappeared.
"Well?" the general demanded. "Did you
"Yes, sir."
"Are you sure?"
"Yes, sir."
Icrl".Vj $7
The escape was planned with equal care. The men would
make their way, mostly on foot, to Slovakia, where the Ger-
man pressure was far less severe. Gabcik, who knew the
mountains of Slovakia well, had chosen a safe area where none
of his friends or relatives lived. For food they were on their
own.
Early April was all fog, wind, and rain. Normally Czech,
Polish, and Canadian crews took turns flying paratroopers
over Czechoslovakia, but General Ingr had made sure that a
Czech team, Captain Anderle and his crew, would be rested
and ready for a good day. The fifteenth, at last, dawned clear
and still. General Moravec walked to the plane with his two
chosen men. They stood at the bottom`of the ramp. He
looked at them, and they at him, in silence. No speeches, no
cheek-kissing, no wet eyes. Gabcik and Kubis seemed as impas-
sive as two farmers starting the day's work. They shook
hands briefly.
The general went into the plane and briefed its captain and
crew. When he came out, he found Gabcik suddenly flustered.
"Sir, may I speak to you for a moment in private?"
So, the general thought sadly. Well, better for it to hap-
pen now. We shall have to send him to the Isle of Man until
the war ends. "Of course, Gabcik," he said, and moved some
yards away.
Gabcik followed, uncomfortable. He said, "Look, sir, I don't
know how to tell you this, I'm ashamed. But I have to tell
you. I've run up a bill at a restaurant, the Black Boar. I'm
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afraid it's ten pounds, sir. Could you have it taken care of?
I hate to ask, but I haven't got the money, and I don't want
to leave this way."
"All right," Moravec managed. "Anything else?"
Gabcik was relieved. "No, sir," he said, "except don't worry.
We'll pull it off, Kubis and I."
They climbed in, then, and the plane started down the run-
way. The general thought of all the courageous men he'd
known. "No," he said out loud. "None of them were braver."
He felt full of pride and pain.
Death Rides in Spring
Captain Anderle came back on schedule. He reported that
the two men had teased his crew about having to go back to
the strangeness of England instead of coming home. At the
command they had jumped unhesitatingly.
So the waiting started. Gabcik and Kubis had not taken a
transmitter or any means to report back: if they were suc-
cessful everybody would know it. None of the anxious witting
talked about the operation. On the tenth day Captain An-
derle was shot down and killed in an air battle at Malta.
"I am not a superstitious man," General Moravec told himself.
Two weeks, three weeks, four. It must have gone wrong.
"If they failed," said General Ingr, "let us hope they failed
completely, without getting anywhere near Heydrich."
Six weeks, and May 29, Friday afternoon. Prague radio, in-
dignant, reported that Reichsprotektor Reinhard Heydrich had
been severely wounded by murderers in a criminal, dastardly
attempt upon his life that very morning. They had thrown
a bomb into the Protector's car. Two men had been seen leav-
ing the spot on bicycles. The search for them was under way.
They would be found.
The news exploded in the international press. At home and
abroad, Czechs stood a little straighter. Several "authentic
inside stories" were printed. The favorite was that the Czech
underground had struck. Scarcely less popular was the tale
that the Abwehr had killed Heydrich because of the humiliat-
ing agreement he had just forced Canaris to sign.
At Cholmondly the brigade buzzed.. she absent Gabcik and
Kubis were talked about, of course; but they had been gone
for a long time. And so had many more paratroopers dis-
patched on one mission or another. There was no reason to
pick out these two over others who had never returned. Lieu-
tenant Opalka, for example. He had been gone for five months
now. And three men had left the camp just a week before
Heydrich was killed.
The battalion talked of little else. One sergeant, a little
older than the others, was convinced that the man who took
care of Heydrich was a non-com named Anton Kral.
"Kral?" repeated one of the others. "Why Kral? He's been
gone as long as Opalka."
"I don't know," the sergeant answered. "It's just a feeling.
Remember how tall and dark he was, and silent?"
"And brave," said another. "He fought well in France."
"Well," shrugged a third, "it could be anybody."
Perhaps the sergeant knew more than the others about
Anton Kral. Kral had been picked by General Moravec to be
parachuted with Lieutenant Opalka into an area northeast
of Prague. Their mission was to get in touch with the under-
ground there to deliver instructions. Nothing had been heard
from either of them since their departure, and they were pre-
sumed lost.
In Prague, Heydrich was dying. The three physicians sum-
moned from Berlin-Gebhardt, Morell, and Brandt-tried
hard, but could not save him. Himmler was there too, full of
public sorrow, privately perhaps rejoicing. He had his funeral
oration down pat before the sixth of June, when Heydrich
died. And he seized the chance to direct personally the search
for the assassins and the massive reprisals.
First, martial law was proclaimed over all Bohemia and Mo-
ravia. A rigid daily curfew at sundown was imposed.
Throughout the land public announcements proclaimed. that
anyone who harbored the assassins or otherwise aided them
in any way would be executed summarily and without trial.
The illegal possession of arms and even approval of assassina-
tion in principle were declared capital crimes. Himmler's chief
executive in the subsequent action was the notorious Sudeten
German, Deputy Reichsprotektor Karl Hermann Frank.
The mass arrests and mass executions began. Czechs were
killed without investigation, without trial, even without in-
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terrogation, usually on the basis of some vague or distorted
denunciation. For twenty days the slaughter continued. But
neither terror nor the special Gestapo details dispatched to
Prague could bring the assassins to light.
Then Himmler and Frank had a new idea. Quite arbitrarily
they chose a small settlement near Kladno, fifteen miles
from Prague. On 9 June Colonel Rostock marched a military
detail into this village of the now memorable name, Lidice.
Every male not unquestionably a child was slaughtered. Even
the few who chanced to be absent were run down and killed-
two hundred men and boys in all. The women were driven into
concentration camps. The children were shipped off to Ger-
many. Everything above ground, all structures, were razed,
and the ground was ploughed. Lidice became a blank, a field
of regular brown furrows.
And still there was no trace of the killers of Heydrich. So
they did the same thing to another hamlet, Lezaky, in south-
western Bohemia.
The killers were not found.
On 24 June Frank officially announced that if the assassins
were not turned over in 48 hours, the population of Prague
would be decimated. He also used a carrot-1,000,000 marks
ure
for anyone giving information leading to the death or c June
of the wanted men. This worked, apparently. 25
Radio Prague reported that the culprits had been discovered
in the basement of the St. Bartholomeus Orthodox Church on
Reslova Street. Encirclement was under way and capture only
a matter of hours. In London the listeners knew that Gabcik
and Kubis were fighting back.
The following day the radio said the fight was over; the
assassins were dead. There were four of them, the announcer
said flatly, one Gabcik, one Kubis, a certain Opalka, and a man
known as Josef Valcik.l
In England Opalka was known, of course. So was Valcik,
a reliable member of the Prague underground. But what were
they doing in the same cellar with Gabcik and Kubis, sharing
their hopeless last stand? General Moravec, at least, felt cer-
' There are conflicting records of this name; the New York Times
gives Walicikoff.
tain that his men would not have violated his orders and made
contact with the underground. And no word had gone to the
underground about Gabcik and Kubis? Perhaps the two
teams had met by chance at the church, driven to the same
sanctuary because the priests were known to be patriotic and
because all four were desperate.
Even now the Nazis went on murdering. The paralytic SS
General Kurt Daluege succeeded Heydrich. During the trial
that preceded his execution in Prague in 1946, he admitted
that 1,331 Czechs were executed, 201 of them women, in " re
prisal. From another source it has been established that, ghetto this period 3,000 Jews were taken from the Terezin ghe
and exterminated. No one knows how many died in concen-
tration camps. A sober estimate is that at least 5,000 Czechs
were killed to avenge the death of one murderous Nazi. Among
them were all the priests of St. Bartholomeus, not one of whom
would say a word about their guests.
Was It Worth This Price?
In London the jubilation of the Czech leaders gave way to
doubt as the murderings continued, and then to recrimina-
tion. At first President Benes would have none of it. He lis-
tened to Radio Prague as day after day, and several times a
day, the numbers and names of the executed were methodi-
cally announced. "Why don't they fight?" he asked his staff.
"Why don't they die as partisans and men, in the forests and
the mountains, taking as many Germans with them as they
can? Look at the Poles, the Yugoslavs, the French. They
2In an unpublished manuscript, War Secrets in the Ether, Wilhelm
F. Flicke asserts, "The attempt upon the life of Heydrich had been
planned and directed over [the Czech underground to London] net-
work. That was a big mistake on the part of the English and
Czechs because it afforded the German radio defense a complete
disclosure not only of the plot itself and those directly participating
but also of all the connections within the Czech resistance move-
ment." This statement is almost wholly wrong. It is true that
Heydrich and his spies had penetrated the Czech underground
thoroughly. But radio was not used for Operation Salmon, and
the network inside Czechoslovakia had no hand in planning or
directing Heydrich's assassination. The Germans had no advance
warning. And it was not merely an "attempt"; Gabeik and Kubis
did kill Heydrich.
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don't line up at the scaffold, waiting patiently like sheep."
He was unmoved by arguments about the terrain, the prox-
imity of France to England, the density of the population in
Bohemia and Moravia. "Why don't they fight?" he asked
again. "It's their duty." Whatever the answer, it was plain
by now that one of the hoped-for results, the stiffening of the
Czech will to resist, had not been achieved.
In Czech political circles the intensity of criticism mounted
in direct ratio to the mounting toll of German reprisals at
home. Although President Benes remained privately con-
vinced that the execution of Heydrich had been both justified
and necessary, he began to feel a need for modifying his views
publicly. He reacted to the pressure, finally, by announcing
that General Moravec had planned and supervised the assassi-
nation; and the accusations of irresponsibility from the politi-
cal group were turned on the intelligence chief. Those who
had lost relatives and friends at home were especially bitter.
As the war went on, General Moravec found that his mind
would not stop mulling over the profound questions of right
and wrong that attend all action but become sharpest, most
nagging, when the action has terrible consequences for others.
There was no doubt that the killing of Heydrich had served
its intended prestige purpose. In this sense it had been a
major success. For a time, at least, Czechoslovakia had
jumped from last place to first in the esteem of all the anti-
fascist world. Even the suffering of the people, even Lidice
and Lezaky, served this cause. But the aim of awakening re-
sistance had been a mirage. The people were not fighting,
were not earning the acclaim. They would be remembered as
martyrs, not heroes, even though there were heroes-Gabciks
and Kubises and Opalkas-among them.
Who had killed these 5,000 civilians? The Germans? Gen-
eral Moravec himself? The civilians at home, inviting
slaughter with their meekness? As the toll of war dead
mounted into the millions, the 5,000 shrank to perspective
and seemed almost insignificant; the war killed thousands
every day, women and children as well as soldiers. Yet right
and.wrong are not a matter of quantity. The same questions
would have come whispering in his ear at night, like old ghosts,
if only the brave assassins had died because of Reinhard Heyd-
rich's death.
Modern war, total war, kills everyone indiscriminately;
women and children drop as fast as soldiers. Millions were
dying to destroy the German instruments of war. And clearly
Heydrich had been one of the most effective of those instry-
ments. When Hitler escaped the twentieth-of-July bomb in
1944, the general wondered whether the German anti-fascists
would have been able to strike even this unsuccessful, blow if
Heydrich had been alive to trap them before they could act.
Was it wrong to have assassinated Heydrich and right to try
to kill Hitler? No one who believed that fascism had to be
destroyed felt anything but admiration for the Yugoslav parti-
sans, the French Maquis, the brave Norwegians and Poles-for
all the people who fought and killed Germans. The Czechs
at home were not fighting, so the Czechs abroad had to do the
job for them.
It might have been wrong if the target had been the one
he first considered, Emanuel Moravec. This would have had
the taint of personal motives. But there was no such taint
in the assassination of Heydrich, and it had the official and un-
qualified approval of President Benes. Of course, the general
thought wryly, I cannot proclaim this fact today. It is the
duty of subordinates to step back when their plans succeed
and come forward into the limelight if their plans fail.
Finally, before the war ended, the self-questioning, the drill-
ing inside, apparently hit bed rock. General Moravec found
a firm position, he later explained, in the truth that no one
ever gets something for nothing. If Czechoslovakia had re-
jected the Chamberlain capitulation at Munich, a real under-
ground would have been born of its thus-affirmed integrity.
Men must die that countries live. If enough of them die at
once, the country may be lucky enough to coast for a `few
generations. But coasting builds no muscles. The cost of
the free ride is strength, and the cost of sapped strengths
freedom. So in the last analysis you have to kill a Heydrich
not because he needs killing but because coasting along with
his kind will kill you and everybody else.
By the time the war was over, General Moravec felt 'sure
that the assassination of Heydrich was not a sombre page of
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history. It was a page that he could turn back to with satis-
faction, he and his countrymen and all the rest of us. Turn
back.to, read again, and know that it was right.
Dregs of the Bitter Cup
At last the war ended, and General Moravec went home to
Prague. Everywhere in the. city was a kind of gladness; it
was over now, and all were thinking of the future. Every-
where, it seemed, except at General Moravec's home, where
the callers apparently could not forget the past. They asked
why their fathers and mothers had been executed. They
wanted to know if the former general still thought he'd done
the right thing. His doubts returned. These people saw him
not as the executioner of Heydrich but as the killer of their
kin. This post-war period in Prague, he said later, was the
most miserable of his life. The men who, now that the war
was over, called themselves the leaders of the underground
also came to ask questions and pronounce judgment. They
said that the Heydrich operation was conceptually faulty.
They said they should have been consulted in advance, they
never would have permitted so blatant an error. The general
asked them to give a detailed account of their underground
activities and a signed estimate of their contribution to the
war against fascism, and they went away.
One day a different caller came. He said that the traitor
who delivered Gabcik and Kubis to the Gestapo had been dis-
covered and interrogated. He had confessed to a revolutionary
tribunal, but he stubbornly refused to give details. His name
was Alois Kral.
Kral! So the general's careful choice of men had produced
two heroes, and one villain to seal their fate. He put on
his coat; he would visit the man in prison and talk to him.
He recognized Kral as soon as he saw him; the four full years
had not changed him. Tall, swarthy, taciturn, he squinted
up at Moravec and said, "Greetings, brother."
"Brother?"
"I killed two Czechs. You killed five thousand. Which of
us hangs?"
So it went throughout the questioning. Kral kept most of
his secret to himself, not to save his neck but because he
knew he couldn't. Besides, the revolutionary tribunal was
not predisposed to patient inquiry. It consisted of one profes-
sional lawyer and four lay judges on the bench, a prosecutor,
and a defense attorney appointed ex officio. All of them had
been chosen by the Citizens' Committee, which in turn was
dominated by the Communists. Each actor in the play had
memorized his part, knowing that the function of the court
was not to serve justice but to kill Kral. The hand-picked audi-
ence was fanatical, a lynch mob. Neither actors nor specta-
tors cared about the fate of Gabcik and Kubis; they were all
preoccupied with the million marks Alois Kral had collected
for his act of betrayal. While their closest relatives and
friends were dying and they themselves were suffering, Kral
had been living like a king. There was the unforgivable
crime-not murder or treachery, but his comfort in the midst
of their pain.
In France Kral had fought well. In England he could not
have been serving as a German stool-pigeon, because two op-
erations he knew enough about to wreck had been successful.
There was even evidence that he had not betrayed Lt. Opalka
to the Gestapo, or any of his underground contacts. Why had
he turned traitor at the end? General Moravec went to see
him several times. The best he could get was a fuller record
of events.
Kral said that Gabcik threw the bomb, Kubis covering with
the machine gun. Then the two rode their bicycles straight
to the church, where they were given sanctuary. The pres-
ence of Lt. Opalka and Valcik was accidental. The four hoped
that the storm would subside, and when the intense search-
ing Was called off they could escape to Slovakia. Kral hinted
that he found out about the fugitives from a prostitute; he
Was vague at this juncture.
'But why did you tell the Nazis?" asked the general.
"Maybe for the million marks," said Kral. "Or maybe I
thought it was better that two men die than two thousand.
What does it matter?"
At the church, the Gestapo had shouted to come out, to
Surrender. The men answered with the machine gun, and
later with their pistols. The cellar of the two-hundred-year-
old church was a fortress not to be breached or taken by
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storm. Finally the Germans flooded it. It was then that all
four men, out of ammunition and near drowning, swallowed
their cyanide. The Gestapo officers reported the great victory.
Alois Kral was paid his million marks and lived in luxury for
three years.
The next morning General Moravec got up early. He
wanted to have a last talk with Kral and get the rest of the
story, how Kral found out and why he informed. But before
he could leave the house a member of the Citizens' Commit-
tee, a leading Communist, came to see him.
"Let's have a little chat," the visitor said, removing his coat.
"I was just leaving."
"It's no use," said the Communist, sitting down and lighting
a cigarette. "We've given orders that you're not to be ad-
mitted at the jail any more."
"Why?"
"Why do you want to talk to Kral? You have no status
in this matter."
"I want to find out the truth."
"We know what you want. You want to keep your glamor-
ous story of the Heydrich case alive. Don't try to pretend
that you care about Gabcik and Kabis, or whatever their
names were, or Kral either. You just want people to believe
that your so-called government in London was a band of
heroes and patriots. You're not getting away with it. Keep
away from the jail, or we will let you in. There's still room."
The general did not say anything.
"And stop sniffing around trying to get records and names
of other people to talk to." The visitor got up. "In fact, for-
mer General Moravec, it would be a very fine idea for you to
get out of here. I think we understand each other?"
"I understand you," the general said. "Good day."
He knew it was no use to go to the jail, but he did anyway.
He was turned away so rudely that he was surprised to be
admitted to the trial. It lasted about five minutes. Gabcik
and Kubis were scarcely mentioned; Kral was tried and con-
demned for collaboration with the Gestapo. It was a mario-
nette show. But just at the end an impromptu line brought it
momentarily to incongruous life.
"Why did you do it?" the chief justice recited. "For their
rotten German marks?"
"One million of them," Kral retorted. "How much are the
Russians paying you?"
They killed him, of course; General Moravec watched the
execution. He could not help thinking that Kral was dying
for the wrong reason-not for his crime, but for Communist
ends. Maybe that's really what keeps bothering me about
Heydrich's death, he reflected. Did we kill him and trigger
5,000 other deaths in a just cause, or out of political ambition?
Is any human motive ever untainted?
At least the two who did the killing, Gabcik and Kubis, came
close to purity of motive. They had been healthy young men,
not born martyrs in search of death. They had not killed
for pride, greed, envy, anger, or ambition. They had killed like
dedicated surgeons removing a cancerous mass. They must
have felt deeply that the play had to unfold and that their
business was not to choose the actors or criticize the choice
of theater but only to play their ordained parts as best they
could. Of all forms of courage, theirs was the highest because
it is the most humble.
As he walked away, General Moravec met the Communist
functionary who had forbidden him to visit Kral.
"Will you please tell me where Gabcik and Kubis are bur-
ied?" he asked politely.
"Nowhere," came the sardonic answer. "There are no
graves. You foot-kissers of the British are not going to have
that excuse to build a statue and hang wreaths. Czech heroes
are Communists."
General Moravec felt tired. There were more Heydrichs
than a man could destroy. Fascist Heydrichs died and Com-
munist Heydrichs took their places and there was no end to
it, as long as people coast.
Some day, perhaps, the wheel would turn and Czechs would
grow strong again, and be free to remember the strength of
Josef Gabcik and Jan Kubis.
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The assignment of an inter-
preter with slightly ulterior mo-
tives for selected international
visits yields a net gain.
THE INTERPRETER AS AN' AGENT
Francis Agnor
The rather obvious time-honored practice of using inter-
preters assigned to international exchange delegations as in-
telligence agents (or, conversely, of getting intelligence per-
sonnel assigned as interpreters) has both advantages and dis-
advantages. If the interpreter makes the most of his intelli-
gence mission, however, and observes some common-sense
rules of behavior, there can be a net advantage both in the
direct yield of information from such an assignment and in
the improvement of an asset in the person of the interpreter.
The advantage in immediate information is likely to be limited;
the improvement of personal assets can be considerable.
. In discussing these advantages we shall assume that the
interpreter can be given adequate intelligence training and
briefing (or that the intelligence officer is competent as an
interpreter, and not compromised). We shall ignore the tech-
nical aspects of the interpreter's art and the occupational dis-
eases, nervous indigestion and undernourishment, contracted
in his attempts to gulp food while translating banquet con-
versations. We shall examine his domestic and foreign as-
signments separately: the advantages and disadvantages of
assignment at home and abroad often coincide, but there are
also important differences.
Gains on Home Ground
Let us look first at the domestic assignment, where the in-
terpreter is on his own native soil, attached to a group of for-
eign visitors or delegates. As the communications link be-
tween the visitors and their strange surroundings, he pos-
sesses a strong psychological advantage in his available option
to confine himself strictly to the business portions of the trip,
leaving the visitors to fend for themselves in their spare time.
Even if they have their own interpreter along, there are a
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number of matters-shopping, local customs, the availability
of services-in which it would be convenient for them to have
his help.
Recognizing their dependence on his cooperation for the
smooth progress of their visit, they will usually do their best
to establish, if not a cordial friendship, at least a good working
relationship. A great deal depends on the interpreter him-
self, of course, but normal friendly overtures on his part will
usually be met at least half way by the visitors. Just by being
relaxed and perhaps willing to do a small extra favor here
and there, he can become accepted as an indispensable mem-
ber of their family group. An excellent way to break down
reserve and promote a free exchange of ideas is to invite the
group to his home. (It does not pay for him to be so obliging
that he becomes a valet, and it is advisable to establish this
principle early in the game.)
Continued friendly gestures are likely to result in time in
the establishment of a genuine rapport, with its attendant
benefits. If the interpreter is knowledgeable in the field of
the official discussions which he is interpreting, he can clarify
in private discussions with the visitors some of the ambiguous
or contradictory statements made during the official talks.
Without appearing too curious or asking too many questions
of intelligence purport (he should be particularly circumspect
at the outset of a trip, when his bona fides is subject to great-
est suspicion), he will sometimes be able to get definitive state-
ments in private which are lacking in the confusion and in-
terruptions of official discussions. It is here that he may
bring to bear his training or natural bent for elicitation,
whether for official purposes or for his own education.
At the same time the interpreter himself is the target of
numerous questions which reveal both intelligence and per-
sonal interests on the part of his charges. Their intelligence
questions may indicate gaps in their own service's informa-
tion, and their personal ones are more broadly useful in show-
ing the preconceived picture of this country that the visitors
have brought with them. Although they often realize that
their questions betray a lack of sophistication, they are will-
ing to sacrifice dignity to satisfy their burning curiosity. Hon-
est, natural answers, despite the apparent rudeness of some
of the questions ("How much do you make? How much are
you in debt?"), strengthen the interpreter's position and may
lead to even more revealing questions. If the visitors are from
a controlled society the very opportunity to put certain kinds
of questions is a luxury they cannot afford at home. And
when one of them is alone with the interpreter he often shows
eagerness to ask questions of a kind not brought up in group
discussions.
In all these discussions the interpreter is gaining knowledge
which no academic training can give him. First, he is given a
glimpse of his own country through the warped glass of for-
eign misconceptions and propaganda. The image will not be
fully that which hostile propagandists have sought to fix, but
it will show where they have succeeded and where they have
failed. Second, he learns how to get ideas across to these
representatives of another culture, learns where he must ex-
plain at length and where he can make a telling point in just
a few words. Finally, as a sort of synthesis of his experience,
he can arrive at some conclusions concerning the visitors'
inner thought processes, often quite alien to his own.
In addition to gaining these insights, the interpreter makes
what may prove to be useful contacts in future assignments.
How potentially useful depends on the spirit in which he parts
company with the visitors, but anything short of outright
hostility is likely to make them of some value.
Drawbacks and Limitations
The chief disadvantages of domestic assignment for the
agent-interpreter lie in the shallowness of his cover. Visitors
from Communist countries, in particular, start with a strong
presumption that any interpreter is at least working hand in
glove with local intelligence or security groups if he is not
actually a member of one. The barrier thus imposed in the
initial stages of a trip may break down as rapport is estab-
lished, but there always remains a lurking suspicion that the
interpreter is not what he seems, and the visitors are always
on guard against the slightest hint of prying or propaganda.
Furthermore, they collect a large file of biographic information
on him in the course of their association, material which is
certainly delivered to their own security forces. Matching
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this up with some earlier trace they may have of him may
blow his organizational connections.
Another limiting factor is that foreign delegations, particu-
larly from Bloc countries, are drawn from the elite and so
not typical of the peoples they represent.. The impressions
the interpreter receives concerning their beliefs and feelings
may not be applicable to their countrymen at home. Though
the delegation members may not be as orthodox abroad
adhave
their home ground, where conformity is obligatory, they
a more compelling stake in the regime than the average citizen.
t on
The last disadvantage to be noted depends in large p
the capabilities and limitations of the interpreter himself. It
lies in the difficulty of retaining facts and figures in one's
head while performing the complicated task of translation.
It is possible to store in one's mind only a limited number of
figures before the whole delicate structure of memory dis-
integrates into a jumble of confused statistics which are of no
use to anyone. While it is permissible to take notes during
long speeches where it is obviously impossible to remember
everything said between pauses, this device is not appropriate
for short conversations. If the interpreter is caught franti-
cally scribbling notes immediately after a visitor has casually
let drop the annual production of some electronic gadget, his
usefulness to intelligence has largely evaporated. Further-
more, he has pinpointed an area of intelligence interest. A
dash to the toilet after some particularly significant slip on
the
g, but too frequent use of this dodge excites embarrassing
taking, commiseration or, more often, suspicion.
On the Opponent's Home Field
The foreign assignment differs in many respects from the
domestic. On the profit side, in addition to getting the same
in-
terpreter intelligence take as the domestic interpreter, the
tabroad can be an observer, reporting on things which
have nothing to do with his linguistic job. If he has had proper
training, such observations can be quite valuable. Further-
more, he can acquire a feeling for the country and a sense
of what intelligence activities can be undertaken and what
cannot. He may, for example, attempt photography in areas
on the borderline of legitimacy just to test reaction, or take
a stroll before going to bed in order to check surveillance
patterns. If he is an area specialist, the trip provides an edu-
cation which no amount of book learning could give. He con-
firms certain of his preconceptions while discarding others,
and he returns with a far more solid grasp on his specialty
than he had previously. The confidence thus gained from first-
hand experience is a very valuable asset if he is to be involved
in operations against the country in the future.
On the negative side we find all the disadvantages noted in
the domestic assignment: the interpreter accompanying a dele-
gation abroad is, if anything, under sharper scrutiny as a prob-
able agent, and should be prepared for a more or less clan-
destine search of his baggage; his memory is still strained to
hold on to useful data; his official foreign contacts are the
most loyal stalwarts of the regime; his digestion deteriorates.
In addition, he finds himself a prisoner of his cover profession.
Whereas the foreign delegation's dependence on him during
his domestic assignment led to enlightening discussions, his
own party's need for his help, not only on official matters but
on everything that requires communication during every wak-
ing hour, now obliges him to spend all of his time with his
own countrymen. He becomes a communications machine,
unable to introduce any of his own ideas or queries into the
conversations. Contacts are pretty well limited to those which
the hosts have thoughtfully provided for about eighteen out
of every twenty-four hours, and a delegation of six-foot Amer-
icans accompanied by watchful hosts is not the sort of group
which a dissident member of a closed society is likely to ap-
proach in order to unload his true feelings about the regime.
Finally, even the diffident admissions of ignorance implicit
in questions put to the interpreter on his own home ground
are lacking when he goes abroad. Particularly in Communist
countries the officials he contacts need to show that they have
not been contaminated by his ideology; each tries to out-party-
line the rest, less as an effort (usually counter-productive) to
influence the visiting delegation than as a demonstration of
his own orthodoxy for the benefit of his comrades. This com-
pulsion precludes any serious discussion about either the hosts'
or the visitors' country. During such exhibitions of chest-
beating the interpreter is put on his mettle to hold his temper
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and restrain himself from active participation in the conversa-
tion.
Criteria and Other Considerations
From the foregoing we may conclude that the principal in-
telligence value of the domestic assignment lies in the psy-
chological field-exploration of mental attitudes, blind spots,
thought processes, strength and weakness of beliefs-whereas
the value of the foreign assignment derives from first-hand
experience in the country and from the collection of observ-
able operational and positive intelligence. It is perhaps un-
necessary to warn that the interpreter can not fulfill the
classic agent roles of recruiting spy nets, agitating for revolu-
tion, or personally stealing the master war plans. He will
pay his way by less dramatic acts.
Here are some of the factors that should be taken into con-
sideration in recruiting an interpreter for an intelligence
mission or utilizing an existing intelligence asset in inter-
preter capacity. First, it must be borne in mind that almost
any interpreter will be the target of intense scrutiny by the
opposition, particularly in Bloc countries. The prevailing po-
litical climate today, however, is such that the interpreter's
official position as part of a delegation protects him from
arbitrary arrest, except perhaps in Communist China. The
rest of the Bloc is so committed to. East-West exchanges that
it would not jeopardize the program for one rather insignificant
intelligence fish.
Second, the interpreter should not be the only briefed mem-
ber of the delegation going abroad. As we have shown, the
interpreter has his hands full with his official duties and has
little opportunity for taking notes. The official delegate, how-
ever, has good opportunities and excellent cover for taking
notes. In addition, being presumably an expert in the field
of the discussions, he can recognize significant material better
than the interpreter.
Third, the size of the delegation is an extremely important
factor affecting the usefulness of both domestic and foreign
interpreter assignments. A delegation of more than six or
seven people imposes such a burden on the interpreter that
he has no time for an intelligence mission. He is kept con-
"`tinually busy rounding up strays, making travel reservations,
getting people settled in hotels, and generally playing nurse-
maid. The best possible delegation would consist of one very
lazy man who neither demanded nor rejected the presence of
the interpreter.
Finally, the itinerary itself must be considered. On do-
mestic assignments the most important thing is a relaxed
schedule which will give the visitors enough spare time to ob-
serve their surroundings and ask questions about non-official
matters. On the foreign assignment perhaps the most im-
portant consideration is the previous accessibility of the areas
to be visited. If the area is completely off the beaten track
or had previously been closed to foreigners, there is excellent
reason to employ a trained observer as interpreter. Even
the standard tourist trips, however, may provide useful in-
formation if the interpreter is alert.
This paper has been oriented primarily towards the inter-
preter-agent question as it obtains in visits to or from the
Soviet Bloc, but many of the same factors are valid for neu-
tralist or uncommitted areas. With the steady increase in
cultural and professional exchanges among most countries of
the world, opportunities for placing interpreters have also ex-
panded. The expansion is not only making more experience
and training available but is affording better cover for in-
terpreters with intelligence objectives. Perhaps more of them
should be given such objectives, despite the drawbacks we
have noted.
SECRET SECRET
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 Approved For Rell ase 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
Anatomy of a scientific bag of
tricks to conjure up the likeness
e
n
n
.
own fac
k
of an, u
THE IDENTI-KIT
Herman E. Kimsey
One of the most difficult problems in human communica-
tion is that of exactly duplicating in another mind the visual
image one has in one's own. Language is not adequate to the
job: the range of variant concepts corresponding to each de-
scriptive word, not to mention their inevitable emotional and
imaginative colorings, create inaccuracies, distortions, and
downright false impressions. Man has therefore had to re-
sort to comparing such an image or its elements with ac-
cepted common physical standards, which reach their ultimate
precision in the standard units of measurement. This proce-
dure leaves no room for the vagaries of individual interpreta-
tion.
This communications problem has always been particularly
acute between the describers of absent persons and those
whose job it is to identify the subjects described-notably
the police-and the identification world has therefore been
using for more than a hundred years some system of 'com-
paring individual characteristics with physical standards. The
rather startling Identi-Kit herein presented, which provides' a
set of such standards, must then be considered the product
of a development and evolution whose basic principles "have
been thoroughly proven. The Kit itself is no untested or con
troversial invention: it has withstood continuous testing and
retesting for the past five years in both experimental and
practical on-the-job applications.
The Identification Process
.The. basic premise of all identification systems is the fact
that nature never creates two identical individuals. The
problem is to record the identifying charactertics; and then
to catalog them objectively in some system by which they
can be communicated from person to person and from place
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MORIIHRP PAGES 29-35
 The Identi-Kit SECRET
X~ie fdenti Kit
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to place. In identification by fingerprints and other similar
means the recording is done by taking a physical impression
of the characteristic features. Systems have been developed
to catalog and communicate these with accuracy. But cir-
cumstances do not always allow for the taking of these
physical impressions.
Identification by facial appearance gives us a wider range,
requiring as it does mere visual contact with the subject, if
only we have some method to crystallize out of the fluid mem-
ory of the observer an objective image of the subject's ap-
pearance and some way to code or tabulate its identifying
characteristics. The Identi-Kit provides such a method of re-
cording and cataloging. It has limits, however, short of posi-
tive identification, limits inherent in human ability to observe
and remember.
If every natural mark and line in a human face could be
visually compared with its antecedent image, complete and
positive identification would be possible. Such positive identi-
fication is not practical because the human eye and brain,
even with minute observation of all the natural marks and
lines on a person's face, could not retain the memory of their
exact location well enough to recreate a perfect image of it.
But given the impossibility of an infallible system of visual
identification, we can nevertheless make a practical and utili-
tarian approach to the identification problem through a proc-
ess of elimination. In this process visual comparison can elim-
inate great numbers of possible persons who fail to qualify
for likeness to the subject sought, and so reduce the possi-
bilities to a few individuals, and frequently to a single one.
The elimination process can begin with the gross physical
features of age, sex, race, height, weight, build, etc., and pro-
ceed from there to the finer distinctions of facial appearance.
The Kit
It is in pinpointing these finer distinctions that we run into
trouble when questioning a witness in order to build up an
'image of the absent person. And this is where the Identi-Kit
comes in. The kit breaks a full-face image up into component
parts-hair, brows, eyes, nose, lips, chin-line with ears, and
age lines, plus beard, hat, and glasses, if any. It contains
several dozen transparent slides picturing each of these com-
ponents with different types of contours, 500 slides in all,
with five notches on the side for different placements of each
feature. Each slide is coded with a letter for the facial com-
ponent illustrated and a figure for the particular configura-
tion. The witness is given a catalog showing all these slides
and asked to pick out the brows, nose, chin-line, etc., which
most nearly suit the person he saw.
The witness, not accustomed to recognizing a pair of eyes
with the brows removed or a mouth with no face around it,
will find the going difficult at first. No matter: he will soon
be able to study the whole reconstructed face and make ad-
justments. As he makes his tentative selection of components
the slides are assembled on a make-up pad and the composite
image displayed. Is the nose too fat? Pick a bonier one. Are
the brows too prominent? Rearrange the pile of slides, putting
the brows at the back and the eyes farther forward. Is the
forehead too high? Slip the hair slide down by one or two
from the normal third notch. Is the hair parted on the wrong
side? Reverse the slide.
The witness is at last satisfied; he recognizes this man. It
is not a finished portrait, but a good line-drawing of the right
type of person. Figure 1 shows what a close resemblance to
a well-known face can be assembled with the kit. In the first
129 operational cases in which the kit was used (by four dif-
ferent operators), the witness was able to produce a recogniz-
able likeness of all but nine subjects. It took him anywhere
from five minutes to several hours, averaging perhaps between
thirty minutes and an hour.
There is one further refinement illustrated in Figure 1: if
there are moles or scars on the remembered face, a grid of
numbered lines is placed over the composite image and the
positions of the marks are noted in this frame of reference.
The scar grid is shown in Figure 2.
One of the advantages of the kit is the ease with which its
coding permits a face to be recorded or transmitted to a dis-
tant location through almost instantaneous assembly from
another kit there. A face is contained, for example, in the
code message
All N21X1 C30 E79 L16 D55 H92X4R SV40 81120
Appr v r Releast2 5103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
SAR
 SECRET
-Approved For Re
C D E
14 S
H
9 9~
C D E
i9 n
H e N
FIGURE
1
/1 JO OI ~ N 0 M >4 W 09 r~ l9 _
The. Identi-Kit SECRET
which means "Age lines slide 17, nose slide 21 two notches
below normal, chin and ear slide 30, eye slide 79, lip slide 16,
brow slide 55, hair slide 92 reversed and one notch above
normal, mole under right eye at vertical 40 horizontal 20, no
beard, glasses, or hat."
The number of such facial combinations that can be formed
from the Identi-Kit is too astronomical to be conveniently
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SEC
 SECRET
The tdenti-Kit The ldenn-Nn
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S
55
some variation of a police technique, a relationship reflected
in the identity in many small countries of the police with
the intelligence service. The kit was actually a product of
'intelligence effort later released for police use, and it is being
applied in an ever growing number of operational intelligence
cases to the problem of identifying the "third man."
The effectiveness of the kit, thoroughly tested by both in-
telligence and the police, has produced startling results in
areas where it has been properly applied. In fewer than one
percent of police cases is it identification by fingerprints that
leads to an arrest. In the several hundred Identi-Kit cases
on record the kit has led to a whopping 35 percent of the
arrests. Most of these identifications were accomplished by
cross reference of the witness's reconstruction with "mug"
files of known criminals which were classified in the Identi-Kit
system. This process was possible in 100 of the first 129 cases,
with an average file search time of 40 seconds.
One must remember, however, that the Identi-Kit system
is not intended to supplant any of the identification systems
in present use. It is simply an additional tool in the inter-
rogation kit, a special wrench that enables you to get at a
formerly inaccessible spot and work there effectively. You
still need your other tools, and you have to be a good me-
chanic in the first place: the kit needs the control of a skilled
interrogator, who can master this additional instrument
with the help of a special one-week course of instruction. A
child can make mechanical faces from the kit; but only ex-
perience and training can develop the right images from the
mind of a person who had no particular reason to remember
them until the questioning began, or perhaps does not want
to remember them at all.
The potential uses and performance of the Identi-Kit sys-
tem have barely been touched upon in this article. Exten-
sive files must be developed and many operators trained be-
fore the full benefit of the system will be apparent. But the
intelligence officer will feel the power of a conjuror when he
can take the codes from a face his agent has built up to the
nearest telephone or communications center, notify a dis-
tant file of his problem, and get back the required identifica-
tion, complete with details, in a matter of minutes more than
the communications lag.
FTGVas 2
written. These assemblages are rather like passport or other
identity photographs in reproducing physical contours with-
out reflecting "personality.". Although they thus fall short of
portrait-type likenesses, they are sufficient when compared
feature by feature with known persons to weed out quickly
all but one or a few that each could represent.
We have been treating the kit as a police device, but its
application in intelligence is obvious. One might almost say,
in fact, that virtually every technique used in intelligence is
34 SECRET
SECRET 35
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 es into the meticulous
of those who examine
' papers for forgery or
CREDENTIALS-BONA FIDE OR FALSE?
David V. Brigane
The use of false documents, traditional in espionage, has re-
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sponded like all else in the profession to the modern trend
of expansion, organization, and technological advance. As
intelligence activities have multiplied, the demand for docu-
ments has grown, and increasing effort has gone into their
procurement and manufacture. On the defensive side, the de-
tection of false documents has undergone a parallel growth in
importance.
Those not familiar with false documentation would be
amazed to see the elaborate techniques that go into the
making of a high-grade reproduction and startled by the per-
fection of the results achieved. German World War U re-
productions of British pound notes were so accurate that a
Swiss bank, asked by German agents to check them as pos-
sible forgeries, had no reservations about declaring them au-
thentic. The bank had not been remiss: it had made a care-
ful examination and cabled London to verify the serial num-
bers and dates. After an extended period of use it was no
physical flaw but merely the unavoidable duplication of exist-
ing serial numbers that ultimately gave them away. More
recently a Western security service accepted a reproduction
of its country's passport as genuine even after the question
of forgery was raised.
But false documentation is an uneven business. Require-
ments on it are unpredictable, its raw materials often un-
:'available, and the time interval between demand and delivery
can be appallingly short. The perfection of high-grade re-
'productions is no less astonishing than the crudity of make-
shifts sometimes used even by the intelligence services of ma-
world powers. Documents prepared by the German secret
services during World War II have been described as being in
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 SECRET
Credentials Credentials
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many instances "beneath contempt", and "veritable death war-
rants to their unhappy holders." 1 Japanese documentation
specialists, examining German reproductions of the Russian
basic identity document, noted that the multi-colored cloth cover was too
the printing ink too glossy, noticeably
ground tint made by the. Zammel printing press
brighter than it should be, and the place-of-issue indicator
identical in all copies.
Soviet Agent Documentation of
The Russians themselves have not been above using some
the crudest devices known to the forger's trade. In reproduc-
ing rubber stamps for the German military travel permit,
they economized by making a separate stamp for the center
emblem and combining it with various reproductions of the
outer portion, which showed the place of issue. The composite
cachets, of course, did not reflect the individual variations
characteristic of the originals, did not have the emblem in
proper alignment with its encircling legend, and even showed
al-
inking differences from the separate imp r .ode But
the
though the Soviet services have thus improvised
pressure of operational needs, especially in wartime, gambling
that their makeshifts will escape close scrutiny, they are
nevertheless journeymen at the documentation trade, having
long since passed their apprenticeship.
The Soviet emphasis on clandestine and deep-cover activi-
ties has historically made documentation of its agents a mat-
ter of prime importance. As Don Levine's new book recalls,2
a false Canadian passport was successful in establishing an
identity for Trotsky's killer, even though the NKVD has mis-
spelled the name as "Jacson." Richard Sorge used forged
passports to conceal his travel to Moscow, and his radio op-
erator, Max Klausen, traveled on three passports, Italian, Ca-
nadian, and German.3 Documents were a major concern to
Alexander Foote and other members of his net. Rudolf Abel
used an altered American passport for entry into the United
States and two birth certificates to create different identities
1 Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies, p. 102.
'The Mind of an Assassin, reviewed in this issue.
' See Willoughby's The Shanghai Conspiracy (New York: 1952).
r_ i,
.,after his arrival; his assistant, Hayhanen, built an elaborate
'identity structure on an original American birth certificate
'apparently confiscated from a U.S. citizen who had emigrated
-.to Estonia 4 Khokhlov,5
false identties a But Wifl documents ents were relied on
documents to support
of critical importance in these famous cases which now hap-
pen to be in the public eye, imagine the documentation re-
quirements created by the countless throng of subordinate
agents and couriers, the proletariat of Communist espionage
hierarchies.
To meet this continual demand, the Communists have al-
ways devoted a major effort to document collection and forgery.
Even in the early thirties they operated a documentation
unit in Moscow, one in Berlin, and a third in the United
States.6 Of these three the German Pass-Apparat was the
most elaborate, with six workshops and agencies all over
Europe. In Germany alone there were agents for document
collection in each of 24 districts. Their sources were varied.
Communist sympathizers sometimes offered their own per-
sonal documents. A cleaning woman at Berlin police head-
quarters stole blank passports for the Party from time to
time. Two engravers at the Stempel-Kaiser plant provided
duplicates of rubber stamps manufactured for the German
government. Two Saarland police officers formed a partner-
ship in passports, one supplying the blanks, the other the
stamps. Once during these years a Communist raid on a
Czech police office yielded 1500 Czech passports as a by-
product, but the richest document hauls in the thirties came
from the International Brigade in Spain. Later, during World
War II, Max Habijanic, a Swiss police officer in Basel, was a
reliable source of backstopped Swiss passports. Currently
the Soviet intelligence services use documents of their own
Bloc extensively to authenticate defector and refugee cover.
They also maintain a systematic watch within the Bloc for
foreign identity documents held by returned emigres.
'See W. W. Rocafort, "Colonel Abel's Assistant," Studies, III 4, p. 1.
'See his book, in the Name of Conscience, to be reviewed in the spring
issue of the Studies.
'David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage, p. 92.
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As a corollary to these Communist activities, Western in-
telligence services have given increasing attention to the coun-
terintelligence aspects of documentation. Techniques of docu-
ment analysis developed in scientific criminology have been
combined with world-wide intelligence resources to serve
the investigative needs of intelligence organizations. Docu-
ment analysis has been found increasingly effective as an aid
in the investigation and detection of enemy agents, in the
surveillance and control of one's own agents and verification
of their intelligence reports, in the screening of refugees and
defectors, and in developing biographic information and es-
tablishing the bona fides of individuals of intelligence interest.
Enemy Agents
Among the odds and ends of intelligence debris deposited
during World War II by the tide of battle in Burma was a
Japanese document bearing the title "CERTIFICATE OF RE-
LIABILITY." It contained a detailed description of the
bearer, followed by this text: "Please extend every assistance
to Mr. Aung since he is employed by us as a spy." Although
a spy's normal documentation does not resemble the forth-
right Mr. Aung's in advertising his profession, it often holds
hidden evidence against him. Document analysis can play a
key role in uncovering enemy operations.
The nature of this role can be illustrated in the case his-
tory of a Soviet escapee, whose documents and statement, in
accordance with standard practice, were subjected to analysis
and evaluation. During examination of the documents for
format, an abnormally small spacing between the abbrevia-
tion "No." and the serial number of his basic identity docu-
ment, the pasport, attracted attention. No pasport from the
same place of issue being available for comparison, an analysis
of the imprint was undertaken. It was determined that the
serial number had been added after the document was printed
and bound, contrary to all normal procedures for manufactur-
ing the pasport. Then the signatures came under suspicion,
two signatures by each of two officials, because both pairs
showed undue similarity. Subjected to handwriting analysis,
all four proved to be traced forgeries.
Now the pasport was checked against the escapee's military
reserve document, and an irregularity in the photographs be-
7came apparent. Normally the photos in the two documents
ould have been taken on different occasions and would show
`
w
different poses, clothing, and lighting. It does sometimes hap-
pen that prints for both documents are made from the same
negative, but then the print used in the pasport is differenti-
ated by a white corner. In this case it was found that the
photo in the military reserve document had been copied from
that in the pasport but enlarged and cropped to eliminate
the white corner. Such rephotographing from another docu-
ment, generally inconsistent with legitimate issuance, may be
necessary when a forged document should show the person at
an earlier age or when because of time, distance, or security
considerations the subject is not available to the forger for
photographing in person.
In addition to these evidences of forgery, discrepancies were
found between the information given in the documents and
biographic data supplied by the escapee himself. In the use
made of these discoveries this case was a typical one. While
the results of document analysis did not prove conclusively
that the man was a Soviet agent, they showed that his docu-
ments had not been issued legitimately, disproved his general
story, and opened up specific lines of interrogation and in-
vestigation.
As a tool in the investigation of enemy agents, document
analysis can be used to great advantage not only in mak-
ing an initial detection but in the handling of known agents,
inducing them to talk and confirming or refuting their state-
ments. The material evidence from documents has a strong
psychological impact in corroborating or disproving an agent's
story, and can be effective in destroying his self-confidence
and eliciting confession.
Agent Control and Other Applications
Document analysis is not reserved for enemy agents; it can
be equally valuable in determining the reliability of one's own
agents and in assessing their reports and missions. A Far
Eastern case will serve as illustration, one wherein an agent's
report and the authenticity of a Chinese Communist docu-
ment on which it was based were tested by analysis.
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As evidence of mission accomplished, the agent had also pre-
sented, along with the questioned document, the forged travel
permit supplied him for use in the target area, now bearing
a Chinese Communist cachet stamped on, by his account, at a
checkpoint in the area itself. There were no known authentic
exemplars with which to compare either the questioned docu-
ment or this precise checkpoint cachet, but the cachet was
compared with others from the same general area. It ap-
peared to follow the normal pattern; several of the examples
on hand were similar in format. One of them, however, was
especially similar, to the point of suspiciously close likeness.
Photographic comparison proved that both cachets had been
stamped with the same instrument, and the place names sep-
arately imprinted.
Legitimate use of the same stamp in two different localities
was out of the question. Fraudulent use of an authentic
stamp in Chinese Communist hands was also out; this agent
had no such capability. The answer was obvious: both cachets
were forgeries. Since the exemplar cachet had been obtained
from another agent travel permit, all papers connected with
the mission this one had been used for came under scrutiny.
Among them was a document, allegedly procured in another
target area, which bore a small cachet of receipt in a Chinese
Communist office. Here again economy of effort betrayed the
forger's hand. This cachet proved to be identical with a re-
ceipt cachet on the questioned document in the current case,
although the receiving offices could not have been the same.
It was clear that neither of the reported missions had been
carried out and that the documents allegedly acquired in the
target areas were fabrications.
In a similar but simpler case, an agent presented a letter
which bore a postal cancellation as proof that he had been
in a certain city. This time, however, many authentic ex-
amples of postal cancellations from the city in question were
available for comparison. Examination of the lettering, dat-
ing, inks, and indicators conclusively proved that the cancel-
lation was a forgery.
Document analysis is useful in many other kinds of personal
investigation-for establishing the bona fides of refugees, for
surveying the activities of target personalities, for clearing
prospective recruits, etc. Sometimes it is not a question of
establishing authenticity, but only of developing informational
ontent. An itinerary analysis from a passport, for example
,
provides detailed information on a person's movements which
may not be procurable from any other source. Culling in-
formation of this type might appear to be a simple matter of
reading the record, not involving analysis; yet it requires
'thorough familiarity with travel regulations and the custom-
ary passport entries to get the maximum amount of in-
formation. In one recent case where little proved biographic
information was available on a person, his detailed record dat-
ing back to 1931 was built up through documents.
Spotting Forgeries
False documents are brought to attention through observa-
tion of some defect in them, through improper use, or through
suspicion about the situation or activities of the bearer.
Analysis can come only after the initial spotting, and rela-
tively poor documentation can frequently escape detection
if used in an ordinary way under circumstances which do not
attract attention. Anyone who has experienced the harried
formalities of an international port of entry must be aware
that a passport flaw could well be passed. For where the vast
majority of the documents are genuine and the circumstances
of use normal, only an obvious flaw will give the document
away.
The obviousness of a flaw, however, is relative to the acuity
of the checker. The human mind and senses make astonish-
ingly fine distinctions, often unconsciously, in dealing with
familiar things. And the results of analysis can be used to
increase the checker's sensitivity and so play a part in the
initial spotting.
Checklists of irregularities indicative of forgery have long
been a counterintelligence tool. During World War II Soviet
intelligence prepared a list of indicators for reproductions
made by the German Abwehr. One of the salient signs was
the use of rustproof staples in the Abwehr reproduction of
the Ukrainian basic identity document, a gleaming evidence
of forgery. More recently such checklists have been useful
in screening Hungarian refugees. In another part of the
world, analysis of South Korean documents reproduced for
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North Korean agents has revealed characteristic flaws and
even made it possible to differentiate among those forged by
different North Korean intelligence units. patterns in the
Aside from characteristic individual flaws, p
documentation of enemy agents can be detected by analysis
and set up as spotting devices to be used in screening large
groups of people. Some underlying pattern is likely to reflect
the basic constants in operational needs and aims and the
limitations of human imagination and material resources for
support of operations. For one thing, there is a tendency to
simplify false documents, since greater variety and complexity
mean greater chance of error in detail. The resultant simpli-
fication may lead to the establishment of more specific de-
tectable patterns. Take for example the question of showing
a military career. A fictitious military background is complex
and would require elaborate training to maintain under in-
terrogation. The simpler solution of giving no military back-
numerous
ground has been noted in the documentation therefore
Soviet agents. Lack of military background may
be one element of pattern.
The effort to conceal information of value to the opposi-
tion may account for other elements of pattern. When the
Communists use defector or refugee cover, the agents' docu-
ments themselves are of considerable value to Western in-
telligence. The Communists, operating under the assumption
that these Bloc documents will be exploited by Western intel-
ligence services, have introduced slight defects in them, pre-
sumably in the hope that these will be reproduced in docu-
ments for Western intelligence operations and thus serve to
identify Western agents.
One of these defects is the separate imprinting of the pas-
port serial number noted in the case of the Soviet "escapee"
we examined earlier. Other deception devices have been an
added letter, asterisk, or period, differences in printing impres-
sion, fabricated registration and deregistration cachets, and
an additional dry seal not used in legitimate documents. One
Communist service has shown a pattern of suppressing seri-
alization information by not recording the number of a previ-
ous document as "basis for issuance."
But the Communist services risk being trapped in their own
?
'dialectic. This technique has been noted and turned anti-
thetically to counterintelligence profit by the West: inten-
tional'irregularities are carefully watched for and when found
incriminate the document holder. And their detection is fa-
cilitated by their tendency to follow a general pattern.
J; If,.on the other hand, the Communists use the documenta-
tion of a neutral or enemy country, the limitations on their
resources for such documents may set a noticeable pattern.
After the Communist raid on the Czech police office back in
the thirties, the windfall of Czech passports was used freely
until French police became aware of the pattern of Czech pass-
port holders unacquainted with their native language.
For all these potential aids to document checkers, it must
be admitted that the counterintelligence function of provid-
ing them data for the identification of forgeries has in gen-
eral not been well developed. This is evidenced by the fact
that the average official whose duties include checking per-
sonal documents is surprisingly uninformed even about the
characteristic features of domestic documentation. The sys-
tematic Japanese do go so far as to provide police with pocket-
sized booklets listing the blocks of numbers assigned to prov-
indes for Japanese Alien Registration Certificates and describ-
ing some elementary characteristics of forgeries; but these
rudimentary aids did not prevent the Tokyo Metropolitan Po-
lice from being taken in by a Tokyo-issued Alien Registration
Certificate carried by a self-acknowledged North Korean agent.
Only the agent's insistence that he brought the document
from Korea led the police to request an analysis by Printing
Bureau experts, which proved the document a forgery.
Another Far Eastern country, less methodical, is also per-
haps more typical in its lack of attention to the counterin-
telligence aspects of documentation. It gives its police of-
ficers little or no assistance in detecting forgeries of the basic
identity document of its capital city, although an excellent
device is at hand. Genuine documents in use in the city have
come from thirty or more different printing plates made up
from, time to time when additional stocks have been needed
and the old plates were no longer available. No attempt ap-
pears to have been made to turn this diversity to benefit by
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SECRET
is-
maintaining accurate records of the districts and dattes of is-
sue of the different printings. At the same time,
undergone have reproductions of the document ~ by the security forces, and
only the most elementary rY expected, has piaved a
documentation, as might therefore be expvery minor role in the spotting of infiltra-
against Communist
tion the long-continued struggle infiltrators.
tion and subversion, this counterintelligence function de-
serves much greater attention.
Analytic Procedures
Analysis of documents is essentially
item with an authentic ex-
But it is not simply comparing ing an examples of
ample in order to detect discrepancies. Take two a -given signature: they will not be identical lsis unless
one of
both have been forged. So the process f
double comparison. First the two signatures are compared
and points of similarity and difference noted. Then these dif- ards
of ac ferences are compared at least mentally with stand t has es
ceptable variation we i? t X atiioonto g large numbers of
tablished through p principles based
handwriting specimens and through study of
on similar experience by others. The most laborious part of
the job, the establishment of norms, has therefore been ac-
e two mould not havesbeee tuestabli hedvwithout large
And norms c
numbers of handwriting specimens available.
Essentially the same process is applied in all stages of. docu-
ment. analysis, and invariably one of the greatest difficulties
volume of material extensive enough to de-
is to build up a judgment are needed on all the
termine norms. Standards of j agin and
innumerable details relating to format, alterations, g5
ondi-
applicability and use of the document under varying
tions.
One of the first things normal one, as determined from eon ginals,
photosmeat's, format is the
covering issuance and use, and informa-
s of many types. All characteristics of the docu-
Lion report rinting, dry seals, cachets, serial
meat must be considered-p dt g style of entries, termi-
ments must be subjected also to technical analysis, a special-
ized field requiring separate treatment.'
Interestingly enough, format analysis can be applied very
successfully to Soviet agent documents issued by the Russians
themselves. It is sometimes assumed that when an intelli-
gence service requires the documents of its own country for
its operations, it will make use of the genuine article, docu-
mentation invulnerable to counterintelligence analysis. This
is by no means true. Even if an agent document is issued by
the normal issuing office, it will frequently show peculiarities
arising from the operational needs of the case. Most notably
there is the problem of the date of issue: the agent cannot be
equipped with birth certificate, school diploma, military regis-
tration document, occupational papers, and basic identity
document all issued with a current date. But the blank docu-
ments appropriate to the required date may long since have
been replaced by new forms, and the normal issuing official,
not being a documentation specialist, will probably back-date
the document as required without departing from current is-
suance procedures. The resultant discrepancies can be re-
vealed by format analysis.
A Seaman's Passport carried several years ago by a Commu-
nist agent is a case in point. The document itself was genuine,
duly issued by the appropriate Harbor Master, but it had been
back-dated one year to meet operational requirements. Its
serial number therefore corresponded to those of issuances
a year later than the date shown, in other words to the actual
rather than ostensible date of issue. It also bore a cachet
which did not come into use until several months after its
Purported date and omitted the fingerprint which had been
included up to and for approximately eight months after that
date.
In addition, the document lacked the two dry seals normally
placed over the photo. The logical explanation of this irregu-
larity appears to be that it was received from the Harbor Mas'
ter's office with serial number, issuance cachets, and signa-
tures, but otherwise blank. The seal could not have'been in-
cluded with the issuance cachets since it had to be stamped
'See Wilson K. Harrison's Suspect Documents-Their Scientific EX_
2.
numbers,. signatures and han amination, reviewed in Studies, III
etc. Some of these ele-
nology, photos, inks, paper, binding,
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on-the still absent photo. For reasons of security or con-
com-
venience, the intelligence office did not see fit to
auhave thority.
pleted document stamped later by the issuing
'.'t'hese various flaws in format could be detected because
the availability of document intelligence reports and a l- number of photocopied Seaman's Passports from which norms
could be established. These made it possible to determine the
approximate dates on which the new cachet was trod odu sed
and the use of fingerprints discontinued, and through rial number sequence shown in the photocopies to pinpoint
the exact date on which the questioned document was actually
issued.
. In addition to flaws in format, the Seaman's Passport con-
tained certain biographic inconsistencies. It recorded a
change of position from radio operator to apprentice, a retro-
gression violating the normal occupational pattern; and it
indicated that the seaman had made no voyage for a full year
after the document was issued. An even more damaging rfact
turned up in the photocopies of Seaman's~~Iotsentlh with
the bearer had held a second such different mission.
the questioned document, apparently and distinguishing fur-
tive difficulty of establishing norms however7 by human un-
of-
predictability, violations of them is compounded, the best established of-
predictability, which can easily
ficial procedures. Irregularities do not per se prdove fraud
e. A
document held by a Hungarian refugee is a g
aroused immediate suspicion b ed o e the photo did not cor
respond in the dry seal impressed
respond to the number in the cachet of the issuing
This irregularity, however, was the legitimate result of an
unusual chain of events. Involved ma bicycle ac ciiden tiin
Budapest, the bearer had had to present
document for police check. The Budapest police
she adrobs ved
that the dry seal was missing-something
never noticed-and checked with the issuing office in another
town. When the authenticity of the document was confirmed,
the woman was allowed as a matter of convenience to have
the dry seal entered in Budapest, where she was then staying,
although the Budapest office with
dthe number in
not correspond, as in principle it
the issuance cachet.
In another refugee case, analysis disclosed entries in civilian
documents inconsistent with the refugee's reported military
record. Further interrogation of the subject satisfactorily
explained these inconsistencies, drawing his exasperated com-
ment that if there had been anything wrong with his docu-
ments, he wouldn't have presented them. This comment of a
sensible man caught in the toils of a suspicious bureaucracy
seems logical, but its logic is not shared by those who have
something to conceal. The risk of having no proof seems
greater to them than the risk of defective proof. They are
generally not aware of the amount of information their docu-
ments will yield, and are prone to suppose that officials un-
familiar with them will fail to detect flaws.
One such hopeful deceiver was a Hungarian refugee whose
documents were used to check his political background, es-
pecially with regard to whether he had served in the State
Security Authority, the AVH. The man denied that he had,
maintaining that he had been employed in the civil police only;
but his documents told a different story. His Military Re-
serve Document recorded his police service in the space pro-
vided for military experience, and only service in the AVH, not
in the civil police, is counted as military service. Further-
more, the Military Reserve Document was not issued until the
termination of his police service, which therefore must have
been considered the equivalent of military duty. This is one
of the many cases in which documents that are themselves
genuine serve on analysis to betray the bearer's falsifications.
Document analysis is a valuable tool in counterintelligence,
but it is one tool only, to be used in combination with other
investigative techniques. And since documents do not exist
in a vacuum, intelligence data on many apparently unrelated
subjects may enter into document evaluation. On one occa-
sion, Navy reports on coastal Chinese weather corroborated
the travel route shown on a Chinese Communist document,
confirming other evidence of its authenticity. Furthermore,
the dependence for analytic effectiveness on intelligence re-
sources, document information and exemplars requiring con-
stant collection effort, make this activity an integral part of
intelligence processes, one that cannot be carried on in isola-
tion from the whole.
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A priori considerations preju-
dicing successful interrogation
by `trance induction suggest a
possible variant technique.
HYPNOSIS IN INTERROGATION
Edward F. Deshere
The control over a person's behavior ostensibly achieved in
hypnosis obviously nominates it for use in the difficult proc-
ess of interrogation. It is therefore surprising that nobody,
as the induction of "Mesmeric trance" has moved from halls
of magic into clinics and laboratories, seems to have used it in
this way. A search of the professional literature shows at
least that no one has chosen to discuss such a use in print,
and a fairly extensive inquiry among hypnosis experts from a
variety of countries has not turned up anyone who admits to
familiarity with applications of the process to interrogation.
There is therefore no experimental evidence that can be cited,
but it should be possible to reach tentative conclusions about
its effectiveness in this field on the basis of theoretical con-
siderations.
The Nature of Hypnosis
Experimental analysis has gradually given us a better un-
derstanding of hypnosis since the days of Mesmer 6 and his fol-
lowers, who held that it results from the flow of a force called
animal magnetism from hypnotist to subject. Nevertheless,
although no present-day investigator shares the lingering lay
Opinion that hypnosis is in some way an overpowering of a
Weak mind by a superior intellect, there are still many di-
vergent theories propounded to account for the accumulating
Clinical observations. Some of these have significantly dif-
ferent implications with respect to the susceptibility of a
hypnotized person to purposeful influence.
The view that hypnosis is a state of artifically induced sleep
bas been widely held since Braid 7 invented the term in mid-
th-century. Currently Pavlov 20 takes a similar posi-
UOn in maintaining that cortical inhibition, sleep, and hyp-
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subject is motivated a priori to cooperate with the hypnotist,
usually to obtain relief from suffering, to contribute to a sci-
entific study, or (as in a stage performance) to become a
center of attraction. Almost all information currently avail-
able about hypnosis has been derived from such situations,
. to -
and this fact must to situations idifferenttfromtthese.p
ply the data
essentially identical. This view is now held thro5 p
nosis are -
out those parts of the world where Pavlovian theory eri-
cepted as creed, but to the American investigator tBassxp for
mental evidence against it appears overwhelming efiex, which
- kneecaWells 29
example, has shown that he Patellar W
disappears in sleep, is not diminished hypnosis-
and hanom can
others have demonstrated that all hypnotic p p a pan
be elicited in a state bearing no r lhat sleep-like as-
formance which suggests the hypothesis
hypnosis are not intrinsic to the hypnotic state but
90
pects of to
result from the hypnotist's suggestion that his subject
sleep. Barker and Burgwin 2 have shown that the electroen-
cephalographic changes characteristic Of sleep do not Occur
The
hypnosis except when true sleep 18 hypnotically induced. The
findings of two Russian papers which dispute Sion, affirming that the EEG rhythm characteristic of hyp-
p, have not
nosis resembles that of drowsiness and ight.
been verified by replicating their exp to
The concepts of suggestion and suggestibility as applied hypnosis, introduced been developed and refined in modern
nosis osis investigators, , have 1o concluded that hypnosis
times. In a major monograph Hull
a state of heightened suggestibility and has the
is primarily it becomes increasingly easy
state that
for a subjeect ct too enter habit
of hypnosis after he has once
for done it. subj Welch,26 in an ingenious application of the condition-
done
ing theory, pointed out that trance induction begins with sug-
p
gestions which are almost certain to take effect and
does
to more difficult ones. While the concept of suggestion normal provide a bridge between tthe he hoftt e gyps tic proc g
state, it does not explain peculiarity
ess or the causes of the state trance- which might be called
Several more recent approaches,
osis, hold that achievement of
motivational theories of hypn ,
to enter such a state-
trance is related to the cshunblcec~ts desire
the motivational
Experimentalists and
view-including the present writer, whose conclusions onli he
subject of this paper are undoubtedly colored by it-
that it accounts best for the major portion of the clinical
data. Trance is commonly induced in situations where the
Hypnosis of Interrogees
The question of the utility of hypnosis in the interrogation
in-
of persons unwilling to divulge the information sought
volves three issues: First, can hypnosis be induced under con-
compelled can be so
ditions of interrogation? If so, can the information be
to reveal information? And finally, if
obtained,
to o induce or without
induce e trance either again b the subject's a
his being aware of it.
The. Subject Unaware. Hypnosis has reportedly been ef-
fected without the subject's awareness in three
eonsitua-
tions-in sleep, in patients undergoing p Ydubjtat
tion, and spontaneously in persons observing another
being hypnotized.
The older'literature is replete with references to somnam-
bulistic hypnosis induced by giving suggestions to sleeping
subjects in a low but insistent voice. No case records are cited
to support these statements, however; and they appear,
many others in hypnosis literature, to have been carried over
from one textbook to another without critical evaluation. In
a recent study Theodore X. Barber 1 found considerable similar-
ity between subjects' compliance with suggestions given dur-
ing sleep and their reactions to ordinary hypnotic techniques.
Since Barber had asked them for permission to enter their
rooms at night and talk to them in their sleep, however, it is
reasonable to assume that most if not all of them perceived
that trance induction was his purpose. They cannot therefore
be regarded as truly naive sleeping subjects. Casual experi-
mentation by the present writer has failed to demonstrate the
feasibility of hypnotizing naive sleepers. The sample con-
sisted of only four subjects, three of whom awakened to ask
belligerently what was going on. The fourth just continued to
sleep.
5j0314fi :6 RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 53
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It is frequently possible for a therapist to perform hypnosis
with the patient unaware. Advising the patient to relax, sug-
gesting that he would be more comfortable with his eyes
closed, and so on, the practitioner may induce a deep le term
m
trance in a relatively brief time without ever using
hypnosis. Even though the subject has not explicitly
sented to be hypnotized, however, his relationship to the hyp-
notist, here a man of reputation and prestige, is one of trust
and confidence, of justifiably anticipated help.
Observers of hypnotic demonstrations may papents has re-
ported enter trance. One of my own psychotherapy
that she went into a trance while watching me demon-
strate hypnotic phenomena on television. This spontaneous
hypnosis occurred despite the fact that the patient was in the
company of friends and it was therefore a source of embar-
rassment to her. But here again we are dealing with a sub-
ject in sympathy with the purposes of the hypnotist and one
who feels himself to be in a safe situation. It has been noted
clinically that persons with negative attitudes about hypnosis
are not susceptible to spontaneous trance. conducted by
The Subject Antagonistic. Ins experiments subjects making an effort
Wells,29 Brenman, and Watkins, to resist trance induction were unable to fight it off. Space
does not permit a full review of these experiments here, but in
all three the subject had had previous trance experiences
with the hypnotist, which, we may assume, initiated a positive
relationship between subject and hypnotist. The subject was
instructed to resist hypnosis, but in the context of partici-
pating in an experiment to test this issue. It seems possible
that his response was one of compliance with a supposed im-
plicit desire on the part of the experimenter that he collabo-
rate in demonstrating that trance can be induced in the face
of resistance. The demand characteristics of the situa-
tion-those influencing the subject to partake of the experi-
menter's purposes--may have been such that his prescribed
attitude of overt resistance was unable to prevail over the more
fundamental attitude of cooperation in an experiment to show
that trance can be brought on against a subject's will.
Orne IS has shown that the demand characteristics of an
experimental situation may greatly influence a subject's hyp-
Hypnosis FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
It is clear that at some level any cooperative
tic behavior
v
.
a
subject wishes an experiment to "work out," wishes to help
he exp -
aura.,. ,
-
pose of the experiment or the bias of the experimenter, he is
disposed toward producing behavior which will confirm the ex-
tide in a hyp-
ticularl
i
y
s par
This
perimenter's hypothesis.
notic relationship.
We are led to the conclusion that the many apparent cases
of hypnosis without the subject's awareness or consent all
seem to have depended upon a positive relationship between
subject and hypnotist. The most favorable situation is one in
.which the subject expects to derive benefit from his associa-
tion with the hypnotist and trusts in the hypnotist and his
ability to help. This would not be the situation in an interro-
gation wherein the hypnotist is seeking to extract informa-
tion which the subject wants to withhold. The possibility of
using hypnosis would therefore seem to depend on success in
the slow process of nurturing a positive relationship with the
interrogee or in perpetrating some kind of trickery.
Obedience in Trance
Assuming that an interrogator has circumvented these
problems and hypnotized a subject who wants to withhold in-
formation, to what extent might the subject retain control
of his secrets even in deep trance? This is an area where
wide disagreements prevail among authorities and where ex-
perimental evidence is highly contradictory. Young,30 for ex-
ample, reports that subjects resist specific hypnotic sugges-
tions if they have decided in advance to do so, while Wells 2S re-
ports that none of his subjects were able to resist a prear-
ranged unacceptable command or indeed any other.
Most work on this problem has focused on the more specific
;,question of whether a person can be induced under hypnosis
_110 commit some antisocial or self-destructive act. Supporting
?'the negative view is the classic experiment by Janet," who
'asked a deeply hypnotized female to commit several murders
;'before a distinguished group of judges and magistrates, stab-
bing some victims with rubber daggers and poisoning others
;With sugar tablets. She did all this without hesitation. As
the company dispersed, however, she was left in the charge of
some young assistants, who took a notion to end the experi-
5 FCI&AiDBSBTONt94A000100040001-0
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ments on a lighter note. When they old her that she was
now alone and would undress she promptly awak. murders were play-acted, the W0111
d the been reseal;
and the subject 'had no difficulty iff.
Wells 29 on the other hand, caused a subject to commit the
past-hypnotic theft of a dollar of his actiofrom the n and denied vehement y
The subject was unaware argues that other fail-
that he had stolen the money. Wells the possibility of do-
ing to compel such acts do not disprove
ing it, whereas even one success emons~ce that t itbehavior can be
done. Schneck and Watkins, also, cite by hypnosis.
can be
i
me
ordinarily constituting a cr
Schneck 22 inadvertently caused a soldier t t desert
notis action.
order to carry out a suggestion for posYp
Watkins 24 induced a soldier to strike a superior officer by sug-
gesting that the officer was a Japanese soldier, and he ob-
tained from a hypnotized WAC some information classified
"secret" which she had previously told him she would not re-
there
veal. convincing)
Although these demonstrations appear
are deficiencies in their experimental conditions. Since both
Schneck and Watkins were Army officers, the offenses com-
mitted could not possibly result in any serious damage. At
t have been aware of this. This
some level, the subjects mus
same reasoning applies in experiments requiring a subject to
hurl acid at a research assistant or pick up a poisonous snake:
the participants are protected by invisible glass, a harmless
and so forth. The
snake is substituted for the poisonous one,
situations are clearly experimental and the hypnotist who re-
reputable self-destructive behavior is known to
quests the homicidal or
the subject as a From real life there are a fair number of cases Gcases on record
dating before 1900, particularly among the peoples, claiming hypnotically induced criminal behavior, uate
sci mostly sex offenses. dat hard
was trelativhese
of the
entifically at this late ; that charged hyp-
hyp-
subject, rather than the offender himself,
notic influence. Within recent is esaid to have played aorole
Release 2005103115: CIA-RDP78TO31 4,AQQ1 O90~a' 1Y
rVK UAL
'Hypnosis
14 and Reiter 21 These three cases have a common ele-
er
M
,
ay
ment: in each a dissatisfied person found gratification through
It
notist
h
i
yp
.
ng
the individual who later became his seduc
will be sufficient to examine one of them.
the case reported by Kroener a young and sensitive un-
I
n
married male schoolteacher came under the hypnotic influ-
ence of a neighbor. Beginning with neighborly hospitality, the
neighbor built up the relationship to the point where he was
ive
to
h
g
er
able by hypnotic suggestion to get the schoolteac
t of his
t
es
or lend him small sums of money and goods. As a
power he then implanted the post-hypnotic suggestion that
the schoolteacher would shoot himself in the left hand. The
schoolteacher actually did shoot himself in the left elbow, sub-
l
1~* jectively perceiving the event as an accident. Finally the hyp-
notist caused his victim to confess to crimes that he himself
had committed. Throughout the entire affair, lasting five
years, the schoolteacher had no recollection of the hypnotic
sessions. He was convicted on the basis of his post-hypnotic
confession, but through a chance remark began to suspect
the nature of his relationship with his neighbor. After many
appeals, he was recommended for examination to Kroener,
who eventually uncovered the true course of events by re-
hypnotizing him and causing him to remember the hypnotic
experiences with his neighbor.
to . the vinterrogator~ hoping to extract secrets by hypnosis.
When the relationship between two individuals is marked by
"intense feelings and a strong tendency in one to comply with
it is in fact
the other
b
,
y
'Whatever requests are made of him
,hardly necessary to invoke hypnosis to explain the resultant
behavior. In the interrogation setting this emotional relation-
i
t
t
o ex
s
.
aTup of subject to hypnotist is not likely
Accuracy and Veracity
however, that an interrogee has been hypnotized
Supposing
,
end" induced to divulge information: how correct is this in-
ormation likely to be?
Accuracy in Recall. A great deal has been written, espe-
lp in the press, about the perfect memory and unfailing ac-
se 20051 11p5:tlA RDPy 8T03194A0001 00 0001-0 have
mented cases in which hypnosis y 6o~ed For,
in criminal behavior have been reported b
.~.~ nrnr-AI I1SF f1NLY
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
nyth
frequently been made about their ability to read according
that has happened to them even while infants, is a
to some even prior to birth 12 Hypnotic age-regression Lanis fro uently used for this purpose. The subject is
meal en - to, the age of six. begins to act, talk, and
"taken back a " to, say, ' ear-old. He hal-
to some extent think in the manner of a six-year-old-
details about
lucinates the appropriate environment and g'
people sitting next to him in school, his teacher's name, the
color of the walls, and so on. His actions are exceedingly con-
tht an actual
vincing, and it has frequenly been d assumed ed gic age compo-
regression in many psych gi
nents to the suggested year takes place.
There is little evidence for the genuineness of hypnotic age-
regression, even though there have be31 end bard that per,
-
mostly based on single cases. Young ro riate to the per-
mostly
formance on intelligence tests was not app P
e? Unhypnotized control subjects were more su
ci-
hypnosis in simulating
essful than subjects under deep a study of
rwife
S, demonstrated
age. Using the Rorschach test and ts
ated
hypnotic age-regression in ten subj non-regressive
that while some regressive changes appeared, resent, and changes toward regression
elements were also p ect. The drawings to subj
showed no consistency from s ix-year-olds, being characterized
did not resemble the work of5histicated oversimplification."
by Karen Machover as p e of six by one subject were
s actually done at the age
Drawings there was not even a superficial
the
available for comp often gave with great conviction
resemblance. Subjects one they had had at a later age?
name of the wrong teacher, Y
d Stephenson,23 and McCranie, Crasilneck,
Studies by True an
and Teter 15 failed to find in electroencephalograms taken dur-
ing hypnotic age-regression any change in the direction of a
childhood EEG. Similarly they report no increased heart
rate, as characteristic of infants, or other changes in electro-
cardiograph tracings.
Hypnotic y qty. Considerably less data is available
on the veracity of information furnished in trance. I have
been able to find in the professional literature only one
deals with prevarication under, hyp-
author-Beigel a ' 5 w ho
l communication that people
persona
nosis. He writes in a person
F
pp FOR OF ICIAL USE q6I a
hypnosis
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
may lie, refuse to answer, or wake up when asked direct ques-
tions on sensitive matters. Our own clinical work has amply
bjects are capable of lying
pnotized su
convinced us that hy When they have reason to do so. 12__ w+ninor1 from an
sible that
ore pos
It is theref
osis would be either deliberate prevarica-
gee by by n
interrotion or an unintentional confusion of fantasy and reality.
ation so obtained would thus
f any inform
The correctness o h.
have to be established by independent criteria.
l
prophylactic Hypnosis
ai, 4
estions have been made by Estabrooks 9 for what
Three sugg
might be called defensive uses of hypnosis. He proposed that
nosis-nroof on capture
h
e
yp
d to
r -
1L. m1911L Lit; use
y the enemy, to induce in them amnesia for sensitive ma-
.b terial in the event of capture, or to help them resist stress,
i
ca
ti
- .
n
p
particularly pJaln,
As we have seen, there is little or no evidence that trance
ainst a person's wishes. Proofing personnel
d
ag
can be induce
against hypnosis attempts which they could successfully re-
sist without this conditioning would seem a practice of doubt-
ful utility. The hypnosis undertaken in order to suggest that
they resist trance induction upon capture might in fact pos-
sibly precondition them to susceptibility. It might be better
simply to warn them of the techniques of trance induction
t
i
.
inform them that they can prevent
and
on capture
u
i
p
a
l- Providing by hypnotic suggestion for amnes
an intriguing idea, but here again we encounter technical
problems. It is well ]Flown bnai, vile -- -
Fence of hypnotic suggestion is directly related to the con-
b'.. suggestions such
has; blanket amnesia have unpredictable effects even on very
st that
good subjects. Moreover,. even if it would work to sugge
umber
l
i
,
n
a
'a soldier remember only his name, rank, and ser
there is the serious question whether this might deprive him
tivit0 It would arti-
V_. .... _ ca
p
i
g -
W1V1niCH1V11 Pu- w ---- -
p
induce a state of severe psychopathology, which if
aall
y
tive to his situation in some respects might be extremely
la
p
bing in others. The impoverishment of his knowledge
k i
distur
er
y
end his, loss of ego-control would give his interrogator a v
1@FF&*k18 M4A000100040001-0
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Hypnosis
Approved For Releao
effective means of controlling him, possibly leading to a quasi-
therapeutic relationship in which the captive would turn to
the interrogator for "treatment" to relieve his distress.
This method has other serious drawbacks: cooperation aaction mong
such as attempts to escape or scheme for p
prisoners to obstruct interrogation, would be severely handi-
capped. It could be far safer to rely on the soldier's own ego-
control to decide what information ought not to be re
vealed to an enemy than to make this decision for him in ad-
vance by hypnotic means.
individuals not to feel stress, particularly pain,
Conditioning ?
would seem to hold promise of protecting a have demon-
strated to interrogation. Laboratory experiments strated that although subjects under hypnotic analgesia con-
tinue to respond physiologically much as they do in the It appear-
ing state, they do not report experiencing pain. that
effect situations
the anxiety comp anxiety t od
has its best in
probably pain. particular in-
stances, a procedure might be undertaken in pr Only
stances, but probably is not feasible as general practice.
a relatively small number of individuals will enter a suffi-
ciently deep somnambulistic state to produce profound anal-
gesia. Furthermore, though major surgery has been per-
formed under hypnosis proper, I am unaware that major surgi-
cal procedure has ever been undertaken during po yp this
In some individuals, I am sure, s
esia
l
g
ically induced ana
. would be possible, but clinicians working with hypnosis gen-
erally believe that the hypnotic state itself is more effective
than post-hypnotic inductions. of suggestion should the
If this should be tried, what type subject be given? The post-hypnotic suppression of all pain
might be dangerous to the individual, since pain serves as a
physiological warning signal; and it is doubtful that such a
blanket suggestion would be effective anyway. It would be
better to focus the suggestion on inability to feel pain at the
hands of captors. Even this suggestion, however, would rap-
idly break down if the captured subject felt any pain at all,
as is likely in all but a very few instances. The soldier who
had been taught to rely on hypnosis as an analgesic and
60 FOR OFFiCply%f06ft&a
Hypnosis rvR vrg ,..
t.
found it ineffective in certain situations might be considerably
in the first
i
ce
worse off than if he had not trusted this dev
e.
pseudo-Hypnosis as Interrogation Aid
People do undergo physical and mental suffering to with-
hold information from an interrogator. Without attempting
Ito discuss the psychodynamics of capture and interroga-
tion--which obviously will vary widely from captive to.cap-
of their
th
e core
tive-we would hazard the suggestion that at
r
iiresistance is the sense of extreme guilt which would be ac-
'_.
_t,oatPrl by collaboration with the enemy while-still in contro
ull
se of
se
f
~, ?---__,
g
n
this
~`of one's faculties. The alleviation o
might be extremely useful to the interrogator. Both the
'fore
,
hypnotic and the hypnoidal states induced by certain drugs
are popularly viewed as ones in which a person is no longer
master of his fate. This fact suggests the possibility that the
hypnotic situation, rather than hypnosis itself, could be used
to relieve a person of any sense of guilt for his behavior, giv-
ing him the notion that he is helpless to prevent his manipula-
tion by the interrogator.
A captive's anxiety could be heightened, for example, by
rumors that the interrogator possesses semi-magical tech-
f;?.niques of extracting information. A group of collaborating
jcaptives could verify that interrogees lose all control over
their -actions, and so on. After such preliminary condition-
ing, a "trance" could be induced with drugs in a setting de-
i
scn'bed by Orne 19 as the "magic room," where a number of
F
devices would be used to convince the subject that he is re-
ponding to suggestions. For instance, a concealed diathermy
machine could warm up his hand just as he receives the sug-
gestion that his hand is growing warmer. Or it, might be
to him that when he wakes up a cigarette will taste
Uter, it having been arranged that any cigarettes available
bn would indeed have a slight but noticeably bitter taste.
ith ingenuity a large variety of suggestions can be made to
true by means unknown to the subject. Occasionally
manipulations would probably elicit some form of trance
Imenon, but the crucial thing would be the situation, not
incidental hypnotic state. The individual could le-
94A0001 00040001-0
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
AppV4998s or Rel
risibility for divulging information,
gtjmafely renounce responsibility
much as if he had done it in delirium*
however, would
The correctness of information tonobt i ed from hypnosis
be no surer than that of inform a=-o
Further, the interrogator would have to act in his
itself. e h he were confident that
relationship with the captive
as he could detect falsehoods with
it was all correct, el, t would increase the sub-
certainty. Any doubt he betrayed
's 'feeling of control and so decrease the effectiveness
1ect ation,
the hypnotic situation. Cr Ct formation ordinarily de-
of his success in deriving once the prisoner loses his feel
pends, would be denied him. behavior, he also is relieved of re-
ing of responsibility for his beh he al information.
onsibility for giving accurate and pertinent
sp ainst this hypnotic situation, as
An effective defense against by raising the level of
against hypnosis, could be provide
be exposed to it. Even one
sophistication of those who might,
of possible devices to trick them
or two lectures warning them notossi could show them that
believing themselves hyp
t their will and cannot be
nt
o
i
gains
yl of be hypno~ed a ll".la people cane nosis to tell the truth or to follow
compelled even under hY to their beliefs.
y
contrar
ll
y
ns rea
suggestio
Findings
l
In summary, it appears extremely doubtfbue that
possible to hyP-
be induced in resistant subjects. It may
person without his being aware of it, but this would
notize a notist and subject
require a positive relationship between ation setting. Disre-
not likely to be found in this d ubtful that proscribed be-
garding these difficulties,
havior can be induced against the subject's wishes, though we
must admit that crucial eopee evidencesalso indicates that
have not yet been perform ac
info curate
information obtained during hypnosis need not bsu rate
in fact contain untruths, despite hypnotic and may
tions..to the contrary-
Hypnosis as a prophylaxis against interrogation, whether
ca tors, to condition against stress
information, would
revent hypnosis by P e
to
p
and pain, or to create amnesia fo emechan ism with the sen-
artificial repressive
n as an
functio Approved For Release 20051QFFIEI.JLRSPdW~'94AO00100040001-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
)5103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0
of diminishing the captive's mastery of the
disadvantage
rather than hyp-
bigi
ituation
i
,
c s
hypnot
a{ipn. Finally, the
re effective instrument in
be amo
is'`itself, seems likely to
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barber, T. X. Hypnosis as perceptual-cognitive restructuring: IU?
+ ~,?nnosic. J. Psychol.,1957, 44, 299-
t ? S. Brain wave patterns accompanying
2; Barker, W., and Burgwlri, ,. f
lness daring hypnosis. Psychosom.
u
Med., 1948, 10, 317-326. sleep-
'Bass, J. Differentiation of hypnotic trance from normal
M. ,A QQ9_so4
hol
- Xxper. rayc
., _ hypnosis.
'.4. Beigel, H. C. Prevarication under
J. clip. exp. Hypnosis,
5. Beigel, H. C. The prooiem ui y~~~~? _-_-_ _
1953,15, 332-337.
Living
il
,
y
and Fam
r5 Marriage ,,6. Boring, E. G. A history of experimental psychology.
950
I
nc.,
` Appleton-Century-Crofts,
7. Braid, J. Neurohypnology. London: George Redway, 1899.
8. Brennan, M. Experiments in. the hypnotic production of anti-
Psychiatry, 1942, 5, 49-61.
ior
h
av
social and self-injurious be
. 9. Estabrooks, G. H. Hypnotism. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.,
Inc., 1943. New York: Appleton-Cen-
10. Hull, C. Hypnosis and suggestibility-
tury-Crofts, 1933. historical and clinical study.
11. Janet, P. Psychological healing, a
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1925.
12. Kline, M. V. A scientific report on "the search for Bridey Murphy."
New York: Julian Press, 1956.
Cohen. Wiltshire,
13. Broener, J. Hypnotism and crime. Trans. J.
Hollywood, 1957. Munchen: J. F. Lehman,
&14. Mayer, L. Das verbrechen in hypnose.
1937.
15. McCranie, E. J., Crasilneck, H. B., and Teter, H. R. The EEG In
hypnotic age regression. Psychiat. uae .1119555, 29, 85 8. sleep. bain In i 16: Nevsky, M. P. Bloelectrical activity
Neuropatologia: psikhiatriia,1954, 54, 2642. age regression: an ex-
perimental Orne, M. T. The mechanisms of
perimental study. J. abnorm. soc. ch 1951, 46d213s 25. J.
18. Orne, M. T. The nature of hypnosis: abnorm. soc. Psychol.,1959, 58, 277-299.
19. Orne, M. T. Hypnotically induced hallucinations. A. A. A. S. sym-
posium on hallucinations, December, 1958, in press.
20. Pavlov, I. P. The identity of inhibition with sleep and hypnosis.
aria anQ
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Hypnosis
Approved For Release 2
21. Reiter, P. J. Antisocial or criminal acts and hypnosis: a case
study. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1958.
J. New
22. Schneck, J. M. A military offense induced by hypnosis.
ment. Dis.,1947,106,186-189.
23. True, R. M., and Stephenson, C. W. Controlled experiments corre-
lating electroencephalogram, pulse, and plantar reflexes with
hypnotic age regression and induced emotional states. Person-
ality, 1951,1,252-263.
24. Watkins, J. G. Antisocial compulsions induced under hypnotic
trance. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,1947, 42, 256-259.
25. Watkins, J. G. A case of hypnotic trance induced in a resistant
subject in spite of active opposition. Brit. J. Med. Hypnotism,
1941,2,26-31.
26. Welch, L. A behavioristic explanation of the mechanism of sug-
gestion and hypnosis. J. abnorm. soc. P 1947, 42, 35t9 o 4.
27. Wells, W. R. Experiments in "waking hypnosis"
purposes. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1923, 18, 239-404.
28. Wells, W. R. Ability to resist artificially induced dissociation. J.
abnorm. Psychol.,1940, 35, 261-272. hypnotic production of crime.
29. Wells, W. R. Experiments in the hJ. Psychol.,1941,11, 63-102.
30. Young, P. C. Is rapport an essential characteristic of hypnosis?
J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1927, 22, 130-139.
31. Young, P. C. Hypnotic regression-fact or artifact? J. abnorm.
soc. Psychol.,1940, 35, 273-278.
L~UNHUENTIAL4
F p i%V`~oV eleasLe 2005/03/15 : CIARDL 78T03194A 00100040001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
 ~iPr rand book reviews on the, following pages are un-
authors of articles are identified in the taoie or unwunw
editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr.
Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA. Historical Intelli=
Lter
,
current public literature for in-
ce Collection, in scanning M
a ; ed ; book reviews for this issue of the Studies. Most
oteworthy. in this respect are tine iuuuwu~g.
I e'
Intelligence in World War II .. Lyman Kirkpatrick
eAmerican Revolution ............ Walter Pforzheimer
bm's?. The Secret World ...............
by Levine- and Wolfe on Trotsky..... .
card's Les Dessous de i'Espionnage.......
'sBe Not Fearful...;. ........:....
Approve i e,2005/ 15 : CIA-RDP78T A000100040001-0
Approved F ;103/15 : CI8ELR7
 Appro
ed For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
 Approved For Release 3115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0
-DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
MORI/HRP PAGES 69-7
FROM THE CIA CORNERSTONE CEREMONIES
America's fundamental aspiration is the preservation of
peace. To this end we seek to develop policies and arrange-
In war nothing is more important to a commander than
is a proud one.
u.Because I deeply believe these things, I deem it a great
and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the
task of the organization of which you are a part.
No task could be more important.
Upon the quality of your work depends in large measure
the success of our effort to further the nation's position in the
international scene.
By its very nature the work of this agency demands of its
members the highest order of dedication, ability, trustworthi-
ness and sel ftessness-to say nothing of the finest type of
courage, whenever needed. Success cannot be advertised;
failure cannot be explained. In the work of intelligence, he-
roes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own
fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism-their
reward can be little except the conviction that they are per-
forming a unique and indispensable service for their country,
and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their
efforts. I assure you this is indeed true.
The reputation of your organization for quality and excel-
lennce, under the leadership of your Director, Mr. Allen Dulles,
'hey deal with conditions, resources, requirements and atti-
tudes prevailing in the world. They are essential to the de-
velopment of policy to further our long term national security
,In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature.
of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts.
"'the facts concerning the strength, dispositions and intention
privilege to participate in this ceremony of corner-stone lay-
',,#Z9 for the national headquarters of the Central Intelligence
$gency. On this spot will rise a beautiful and useful structure.
Jf(Lyit long endure, to serve the cause of peace.
 Approved For fReI a 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
The laying of this cornerstone marks an important stage in
the growth of the Central Intelligence Agency. We will soon
have a home of our own, in these inspiring surroundings high
above the Potomac.
The Agency was established 12 years ago by the same Act of
Congress which created the National Security Council and
the Department of Defense. Thus the Central Intelligence
Agency was recognized as one of the important elements in
our national security structure.
World War II and its aftermath and the international com-
munist threat had already brought home to us that our vital
interests were at stake in places as distant as Korea and Laos,
in Africa and the Islands of the Pacific, as well as in this
Hemisphere and in Europe.
Since then, our country's ever expanding responsibilities
have increased the need for better information from the four
corners of the earth and for sound analysis of that informa-
tion.
The law creating the Agency was voted by a Congress in
which there was a Republican majority. It was sponsored and
signed by a Democratic President. For the past crucial years
it has had the unfailing support of a Republican President
and a Democratic Congress.
Facts have no politics.
Our charter, in the carefully drafted provisions of the Na-
tional Security Act, has undergone no change. It provides
that, under the direction of the President and of the National
Security Council, the Agency shall correlate and evaluate in-
telligence relating to the national security, and perform such
additional services of common concern in this field as the Na-
tional Security Council may direct.
Wisely this legislation provides that we should have no do-
mestic internal security functions. Yet the scope of the juris-
diction granted is ample. Our work is broad and comprehen-
sive enough to enlist the interest and to inspire the devotion
of those who choose, and are chosen, to enter upon it.
Laws can create agencies of government; they cannot make
them function. Only the high purpose and dedication of all
serving them can weld them into effective instruments for
our national security.
Approved F
In this work of intelligence we must not forget that human
beings are largely the creatures of their beliefs
As individual
.
s
we tend instinctively, and sometimes wistfully, to become at-
tached to causes, to theories, to solutions.
If they be sound and enduring, based on the deep moral
strivings of man and the highest conception of our national
interests, let us cling to them. But in the field of our rela-
tions with our fellowmen abroad
let us assure oursel
,
ves,
through accurate intelligence, that our attachments to poli-
cies are soundly based.
It is the particular duty of this Agency to help perform
this function in a world where change is the rule rather than
the exception. This task must be carried out fearlessly, with-
out warping to meet our prejudices or our predilections or
even the tenets of existing policy.
As we build a new edifice in which to house, to concentrate
and coordinate our work, we must rededicate ourselves to this
high purpose.
The guiding motto to be inscribed on the face of this build-
ing will be the words taken from the Gospel according to St.
John: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make
you free."
The President of the United States has graciously consented
to lay the cornerstone.
-ALLEN W. DtrLLEs
 The editors particularly invite readers to offer
suitable manuscripts based on their own work or
experiences. These need not be ambitious pieces, but
may for example simply describe some not well known
methodology, suggest or tell of procedural innova-
tions, discuss successes or frustrations in getting
efficient working relationships along some production
line, show the complexity of an administrative process
peculiar to intelligence, or supply some bit of intelli-
gence history that should be recorded. The views of
intelligence officers about the problems they live with
are likely to be more useful than the constructions of
those who theorize about them.
Approved For
Manifest characteristics of cli-
:max in scientific research which
may betray areas of future
breakthrough.
THE SYMPTOMS OF SCIENTIFIC BREAKTHROUGH
Scientific intelligence has the responsibility for guarding
this country from scientific or technological surprise
and to
,
that end tries within practical limits to maintain constant
'surveillance over all foreign research and development. The
evaluation of what is actually being done or published in a
scientific field is certainly the best basis for detecting the
imminence of a breakthrough there. But it is clearly impos-
sible to keep all the many facets of modern scientific research
under constant surveillance, and intelligence analysts must
in practice confine their work to the major fields of obvious
importance. A significant advance in some obscure field of
basic science may thus go unrecognized until its application
brings it to the forefront of world attention.
There may be a way, however, to mount a less exhaustive
watch which would have some chance of uncovering research
of potential breakthrough caliber even in obscure fields. If we
can identify a group of common factors-general attributes of
the research, of the scientists involved, of the environ-
ment-which characteristically tend to be associated with sci-
entific breakthrough, we could set these up as tentative
criteria for areas in which breakthrough ma
be im
di
y
pen
ng.
Research seeking to identify such common factors was done
at
Teachers College, Columbia University, in 1957-58 by six
Ph.D. candidates in the physical and natural sciences. This
article summarizes the results of their study.'
sMethodolvgy
The researchers selected for stud
t
y cer
ain breakthroughs
In four fields-biology, medicine, chemistry, and phys-
'Entitled A Study of Patterns Which Have Characterized Certain
Major Scientific Breakthroughs of the Twentieth Century, by Lau-
rence J. Grassman, o.S.B., Eugene V. Petrik, John H. Rosengren,
Mrs. Esther B. Sparberg, Herbert H. Stewart, and the author.
099 p 73
005103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A00010004MORIIHRP PAGES 73-85
 The Symptoms Of Scientific Bre Ap
r
p
oghd Fort R
ics-which came to fruition during the twentieth century and
have had a marked effect upon western culture. From lists
of major scientific discoveries, some assembled from reference
works and some submitted by members of a panel of 15 ex-
pert consultants, they made their final selection with an eye
both to the apparent importance of.the discoveries and to the
availability of detailed information on them. The four break-
throughs selected were the following: relativity and the
quantum theory; atomic energy; chemotherapy; and plant
1 i auxins..
tical ad-
theor
~
The first of these comprised three majorn
The
l~VJ a..u ~~~~
and general theories or reiatiivny in
The others were all characterized by successful experimenta-
tion. The atomic energy breakthrough was viewed as the re-
sult of the concentrated experimental work done by some 30
scientists between 1939, when Hahn and Strassman identified
barium among the products of neutron-bombarded uranium,
A
-
and 1942, when Enrico Fermi and others working under
thur Compton constructed the first chain-reacting pile.
Chemotherapy began with Ehrlich's discovery of salvarsan in
1910, and 14 scientists figure prominently in its development
up through Waksman's production of streptomycin in 1944.
The discovery of the first plant auxin-growth hormone-was
the work of one young botanist, Frits Went, in 1926. Alto-
gether, 50 contributions by 47 different scientists can be dis-
tinguished in these four breakthroughs.
The case histories of these contributions were reconstructed
by studying the scientific papers reporting them, by examin-
ing published accounts, at first or second hand, of the cir-
cumstances surrounding them, by assembling biographical
and autobiographical material, and in some cases by corre-
sponding with the responsible scientists or their associates.
A description of the approach, techniques, and equipment used
in:. the course of a breakthrough development was supple-
mented by analyzing the scientific climate at the time, the
stream of scientific ideas which converged at the breakthrough
point, the public environment outside the scientific world,
the nature and vigor of support for the scientist in.. his re-
search; and the personal characteristics and circumstances
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The Symptoms Of Scientific Breakthrough
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of the scientist. The fifty cases were then compared and their
common features identified and assembled into a pattern
which might have predictive value for use in intelligence...,
The results, not startling to anyone well acquainted with
scientific activity, do constitute a methodical confirmation
and logical presentation of the characteristics of scientific ad-
vance, which may serve to dispel some popular misapprehen-
sions about scientists and their work. Since the case histories
were all taken from the Western world, some of their features
will not be applicable to other societies, notably the Soviet.
But refinement in dry-run and live application, with adjust-
ments where necessary to Communist conditions, might make
them a first step toward a predictive methodology. They.can
be grouped for summary in categories-the general: state: of
affairs in science, the state of the particular scientific,art, the
sociological environment, the attributes of the scientist, and
the immediate circumstances of the breakthrough.
The State of Scientific Affairs
The contributions to breakthrough were not made in isola-
tion from other progress, past and contemporary, in re-
lated-sometimes not obviously related-fields. The quantum
and relativity theories of the first two decades of this 'cen-
tury, with their widespread effects in all scientific fields, were
in particular one of the preconditions for the nuclear physics
breakthrough. Planck and Einstein, in turn, traced their own
ideas which flowered in these theories back through many.sci=
entists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to their
foundation on Newtonian mechanics and optics. Fleming
owed his penicillin and Waksman his streptomycin to Ehrlich,
Koch, Pasteur, and ultimately Galen. Went found his auxin
with the help of Darwin, Loeb, Fitting, and others. The in-
terrelations among sciences and the cumulative nature of sci-
entific advance thus illustrated create one necessary condi-
tion for breakthrough-the free communication of scientific
information. Secrecy failed to retard the military applica-
tion of atomic energy only because the basic discoveries had
already been made in open collaboration by scientists of many
nations-New facts turned up by a scientist in one. corner of
the world' were subjected to scrutiny. and verification :in an-
 ..._ _,...1-._...- _- ---- Approved For R
other, led to new questions asked of the universe in a third,
and stimulated new answers in a fourth.
A related circumstance notable particularly in the many
contributions to the achievement of nuclear energy release
and to the development of chemotherapy was the part played
by a corps of inconspicuous. scientists and technicians con-
scientiously gathering and patiently checking data in a series
of unspectacular advances toward the goal. The scientists
who became famous all acknowledged their indebtedness to
the many who toiled in obscurity to make possible the
eventual giant stride. Another condition favoring break-
through, therefore, especially in experimental fields, is the
presence of a great army of scientific workers doing lesser jobs.
We shall discuss later the attributes of the breakthrough
scientist, but one of them seems universal and important
enough to include as a third element in the general state of
scientific activity: the scientists studied were clearly all men
driven strongly toward some goal, usually characterized by the
urge to reduce complexity to a unitary understanding of the
environment. The third general condition favoring break-
through is then the presence of inspired men devoting their
lives to a compelling scientific purpose.
The State of the Art
The breakthroughs were all made when the stage, so to
speak, was set for them, and in fact it is something of a truism
to say that a necessary condition for breakthrough is that the
state of the art be such as to provide some important un-
answered questions and a theoretical foundation, mathe-
matical tools, equipment, and techniques to answer them.
Viewed thus, the breakthroughs seem but the next logical
step in a series of lesser advances-the relativity theory, in
answer to Michelson-Morley's fruitless attempt to detect an
ether drag on light, going one step beyond Lorenz and Poin-
care, whose steps in turn led back to Maxwell and Faraday,
the fathers of field theory; the nuclear breakthrough reached
in logical progression from the first exploration of the new
worlds of radioactivity and the cathode ray tube, backed by
the quantum theory and Einstein's mass-energy equation;
the antibiotics developed by systematic experimentation; the
auxins found by application of newly developed techniques to
The Symptoms Of Scientific Breakthrough
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the old problem of phototropism, once teleological explana-
tions no longer satisfied the scientist.
This logical quality in scientific advance has led some
schools of thought to say that a ready state of the art is not
only a necessary but a sufficient condition for breakthrough,
that an advance is inevitable when the time is ripe for it; and
these people quote Einstein to the effect that the special
theory of relativity would have been born about the time
it was even if he himself had not. Einstein, however, thought
that the same statement would not be true about the 1915
general theory of relativity; and the study of these selected
cases does not support the logical inevitability hypothesis. It
would have been more logical to arrive at the quantum theory
through an extension of Helmholtz' work than through
Planck's thermodynamics. The mathematical tools which
converted the special to the general theory of relativity had
been there, unused, before. The potential of penicillin lay
unrecognized for a dozen years. There is no logical reason
why the plant auxin could not have been isolated by Loeb or
Fitting, ten or twenty years before Went found it. The state
of the art made the breakthroughs possible and likely, but
did not bring them about.
The Sociological Environment
!Scientific activity thrives or sickens according to the kind
of society in which it lives, and a generally thriving science is
of course a condition favoring breakthrough. The influence
of society is felt in science through education, facility of com-
munication, financial support, and moral support or stimulus.
These factors are examined with reference to the cases under
study and, more broadly, to their influence on twentieth-cen-
tury science as a whole.
Education. The nineteenth-century extension of education
to the middle classes, broadening the personnel base of scien-
tific activity, is reflected in the fact that almost all the 47 sci-
entists here studied came from the middle classes. The con-
tinued democratization which has now opened the universities
'to all classes must be counted a principal factor in the geo-
metric progression of scientific advance in this century.
Communication. Easy communication among scientists we
established above as a condition favoring breakthrough. The
 mptoms Of Scientific Breakthrough The symptoms ut Jcientitic Breakthrough
The S
y
Approved For Rele4
5I03115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
proliferation of media for scientific communication in today's
society provides for this intercourse as never before. On the
other hand, national antagonisms and especially wars tend to
bind it with requirements for secrecy.
Support. The universities furnished not only the person-
nel base but also the facilities and financial support in most
of the cases studied, as in scientific activity generally during
this period. The funds came in large measure from govern-
ment, but the use of academic institutions as disbursing agents
left them free from specific controls. The current trend
toward industry-supported research was illustrated in some
measure in dye and drug firm help toward the development
of chemotherapeutic agents. Support from industry here,
like the support from government in the nuclear break-
through, was predicated on the development of applications
rather than aimed at basic research. An adequate level of
support for basic research appears to be independent of gen-
eral prosperity or depression; the poverty of the thirties seems
not to have retarded the mounting flood of scientific discov-
eries. Perhaps the surplus of resources available to science
in prosperity tends to be squandered in hectic technological
development.
Moral Stimulus. Basic science appears indifferent also to
popular acclaim or disapproval. Whether idolized as the hero
of technocracy in the twenties, hooted down as the creator
of depression in the thirties, or tolerated as an impractical
wizard in the forties, the scientist stuck to his laboratory,
stimulated by his own goals. An obstacle in public doubt and
suspicion was noted only in the early history of the work on
chemotherapy. The stimulus of national aims is generally
not strongly felt by the notoriously unnationalistic scientist,
but great causes may spur him on: the refugee scientists who
contributed to the nuclear breakthrough were moved not only
by their scientific purposes but by bitterness toward Naziism
and apprehension of a German breakthrough in atomic energy.
That social needs may provide a stimulus was evident in the
development of chemotherapy and in the work on plant
growth substances. And finally the great stimulator of so-
ciety, war, galvanizes science too, mostly toward technological
applications but with repercussions on basic research, as seen
jJWthe course of nuclear energy development. The cold war,
th. its less urgent demand for immediate applications, is bet-
than hot war in this respect as in others.
summary, we can say that sociological conditions favor-
ffig breakthrough include the following: universal education;
hence of political inhibitions on scientific intercourse; ade-
quate funds administered by an agency, such as the universi-
ties, interested in knowledge for its own sake; compelling so-
of international competition without a division of knowledge
into national compartments.
Attributes of the Scientists
The 47 scientists studied included three women, two in medi-
cine and one in atomic energy. Eighteen were born before
equal probability that the family was in moderate to com-
fortable financial circumstances or better. The chances may
beashf hasAt 1t1, tth
o
1900, the other 29 between 1900 and 1920. They were of many
nationalities. Statistical studies of available data on them
yield the following results.
Family Background. The chances are at least 2 to 1 and
probably as high as 4 to 1 that at least one of the break-
through scientist's parents was well educated. There is an
g
a e scientist was reared in a religious
against his being an only child. The boys born to the sci-
either the youngest or the oldest of the children but 18 to 1
ffi,entists' parents outnumber the girls 3 to 2. The chances are
for was their own interest. In choosing their fields of re-
rte me from their teachers, the greatest single motivating fac-
Although many received encouragement in the choice of this
vocation from their family, friends, relatives, associates, and
scientific hobbies and showed exceptional ability in childhood.
became interested in science early in life. Many engaged in
-
~r Choice of Vocation. The great majority of the scientists
profession.
perhaps 4 to 1 in favor of its having others engaged in some
rather high. against the family's having another scientist, but
;search, their own recognition of the need for development of
some field, the presentation of an opportunity, and the guid-
Approved For Relea 2005103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 79
fI
 The Symptoms Of Scientific Breakthrough
Approved F
ance of teachers seem to have been factors of equal impor-
tance.
Education. No significant pattern was found at the ele-
mentary school level, but the chances are 3 to 1 that the
scientist's undergraduate school was a large one, the same
that it was state-supported, and 2.5 to 1 that it was both.
More than half of them left their undergraduate school to
enter a large graduate institution. All 47 attended some grad-
uate institution; the chances are 9 to 1 that it was a large
one, better than 3 to 1 that it was state-supported, and al-
most 2 to 1 that it was both. Most of them had a Ph.D. or
the equivalent at the time of their major contribution. A
few were actively engaged in their doctorate research. At
least half had continued their research studies past the doc-
tor's degree.
Private Life. The scientists' marital status conformed to
the normal pattern for the population. Their economic sta-
tus followed the normal pattern for college graduates: most
of them were at least moderately well off. No significant pat-
tern was found either in their religious or in their political
affiliations. Most of them were reported to be in good health.
Some were active in athletic sports.
Age at Time of Contribution. This study confirmed other
evidence 2 that advances are made with the greatest frequency
by scientists between 30 and 39 years old. There is a sharp
decline from these to the next most prolific age group, 20 to
29 years old, which is then followed closely by those 40 to 49
years old. Eighty-six percent of the contributions were made
before the scientists reached their fiftieth birthday.
Professional Standing at Time of Contribution. The data
from these 50 cases yield a zero probability that a major sci-
entific advance should be made by anyone except a scientist
actively engaged in research. The probability is also almost
nil that a major advance should have been made by a scien-
tist whose talent was not recognized at least by his immedi-
ate colleagues or the person directing the research. The prob-
ability is extremely high that the scientist who made a major
2Se e Harvey Christian Lehman, Age of Achievement (published for
the American Philosophical Society by the Princeton University
Press, 1953).
ease 2 6 ? 91 kNOTA Md 6*100040001-0
Ir,
discovery had already published the results of previous re-
search. The chances are better than 2 to 1 that he was in
fact an acknowledged authority in his field. The large ma-
jority of the breakthroughs were made while the scientists
were engaged in their regular research in their usual places
of employment. Almost all of them were connected with aca-
demic institutions; only about 10 percent were connected in
any way with industrial organizations, and only 2 percent
were working solely in industry.
Composite Type. The study thus gives a composite portrait
of the typical breakthrough scientist as a person who early in
life became interested in science and in adolescence had a
scientific hobby. He came from an educated, middle-income
family, where he led a normal childhood life, probably getting
more than average encouragement in his choice of science as
a career. He attended the usual elementary and secondary
schools but showed a decided preference for the larger gradu-
ate institutions, and more than likely he continued his studies
after receiving the doctorate. He became a professor or fel-
low actively engaged in research at an academic institution.
He published a number of scientific articles, and by the time
he made his major discovery he was well known, although still
probably only about 35 years old. He was fortunate in hav-
ing chosen a field ripe for major advances, and fortunate also
in his choice of associates. He seems to have led a normal
and reasonably happy life, having the intellectual rewards
of achievement in his chosen field and not much worry over
Circumstances of the Breakthrough
In an effort to arrive at a corresponding picture of the
typical breakthrough situation, the data from the 50 con-
tributions were analyzed and tabulated under two heads:
at, nature and origin of the contribution, whether theo-
etical or experimental, whether arising out of diffused ad-
ance along a broad front or from a concentrated push on a
arrow front, whether lying in the scientist's own field or not.
econd, organization and support of the research work,
Nether done by an individual, working alone or with assist-
:ts, or a team, by whom paid for, whether hindered by lack
funds, whether controlled by the sponsor, whether helped
 The Symptoms Of Scientific Bor R
or hindered by location, space, or equipment, and whether
helped or opposed by other scientists.
Nature and Origin. Six of the contributions were classi-
fied as pure theory, and the remainder divided about equally
between pure experiment and experiment plus theory. The
pure theories advanced science along a broad front, most of
the others on a narrow front. One, the penicillin spore on
Fleming's bacterial culture, could be classified as an accident
under propitious scientific circumstances. All the other ex-
periments which led to contributions were planned, many of
them to clarify the unexpected result of a previous experi-
ment. None of the contributions lay outside the scientist's
major field of interest or a closely related one.
Organization and Support. Team projects outranked
of in-
dividual research, with or without assistants, by a ratio 0
to 1. About 76 percent of the scientists got all or part of their
financial support from academic institutions and private
foundations. About 14 percent got some government funds,
but only about 2 percent were entirely supported by the gov-
ernment. Industry helped finance about 8 percent, but en-
tirely supported only about 2 percent. Probably fewer than
10 percent of the scientists had what might be called gen-
erous budgets, but about 80 percent were receiving adequate
financial support. Another 8 to 10 percent produced their
contributions under very meager financial circumstances.
Little or no control was exercised over the funds made avail-
able.
Physical conditions for the research were in general ade-
quate. The favorable location of many of the laboratories
may have been an important factor. New techniques were a
factor in 50 percent of the contributions, new materials in
16 percent, and new or improved equipment, in conjunction
with new techniques or materials, in 10 percent. About 85
percent of the scientists, all those on whom this informa-
tion could be obtained, had the benefit of some kind of en-
couragement from other scientists. About 15 percent, before
World War I, were hindered by some form of professional op-
position. Scientific discoveries of the rank under discussion
are never ignored by other scientists.
6810 ' 't.?ftA-WD?79qt#9 1 fA 'f0 40001-0
"atterns for Prediction
In assembling these common elements into patterns which
telligence might use as criteria for indicating the break-
hrough potential of any particular piece of current research,
e should recognize that no one can predict a specific break-
through in the sense of anticipating its essential features.
uch a predictor would create the breakthrough itself. We
only hope to define the conditions that make some kind of
breakthrough likely in a given area, much as hurricane pre-
diction, although it cannot foresee a particular hurricane
arising at a precise point in space and time, can at least set
a twenty-four hour watch on any area where certain defined
'conditions have been found. When the patterns which have
been associated with past scientific breakthroughs are found
to characterize any field of current scientific research, that
area should bear watching.
General State of Science. As we have seen, a major ad-
vance, irrespective of field, is most likely to be made when
there is free and untrammeled interchange of the accumu-
lated knowledge of all the sciences, and when the leaders of
science, each dedicated to his particular goals, are supported
by a large corps of ordinary scientific workers and technicians.
The State of the Art. If the experimental research in some
field appears to have reached a plateau whereon old data are
being refined and more precise measurements made but no
new evidence generated which cannot be explained satisfac-
torily by current theories, where the tools of the trade are
being fully used and are giving satisfactory results, and where
the scientists believe they know all the answers or at least
what to do to get the answers, no major advance is likely to
be in the offing. But when scientists in a field are developing
Patterns and cannot be explained satisfactorily by present
theories, and realize that they are dealing with new evidence
,
not "experimental error," then the science will begin to ad-
'ance to the extent that techniques, instruments, and the
materials required become available (sometimes from the de-
Vveloping state of another science), and a major advance is
el tht
y ase nex logical step in a series of lesser advances.
Characteristics of Current Research. No major advance will
made in an area of science where little or no basic re-
 The Symptoms Of Scientific Bre,Rppro?vd For
search is being done, and there is bound to be some. correla-
tion between likelihood of breakthrough and quantity of cur-
rent research. Intelligence analysts can get some idea of the
amount of research being conducted in a given field by merely
counting the number of scientific papers produced. The fear
that many research papers may be unpublished seems not
to be well founded: the results of basic research seem always
to get published in some journal or other, since military se-
crecy, beginning to operate only after the breakthrough is al-
most accomplished, cannot even then dam all the flow. And
peripheral areas not readily recognized as pertinent often hold
the key to breakthrough.
Sheer quantity, of course, is no assurance of impending
breakthrough. The features common to the advances we have
studied show that research most conducive to scientific break-
through will be conducted by a group of scientists working
as a team in their major field of competency, with capable
technical support, to advance scientific knowledge along a nar-
row front. It will have adequate financial support free from
control, and moral support from other scientists. It is likely
to consist of experiments designed to clarify the unexpected
result of previous experiments, and to feature the use of new
techniques, new materials, improved equipment, or all three.
The Scientists. The most common and outstanding char-
acteristic of breakthrough scientists, we have seen, is youth
combined with experience in the field in question. The
scientist 30 to 39 years old will have had 10 to 20 years of
research experience. The one who makes a great discovery,
most common at this age, will almost invariably have worked
in it for some years during and after his study for the doc-
torate. He will have published articles concerning his past or
present research. He is likely to be attached to an academic
institution or non-profit foundation, a recognized authority
in,his specialty. He almost invariably has attended large,
well-known academic institutions, at least for his doctorate
work.
As breakthrough scientists have not appeared suddenly
from total obscurity, so they have not come, either, from
the lower economic strata of society nor been freaks or even
infant prodigies. They have come from homes of moderate
;2005103f15 :CIA RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0
to comfortable financial circumstances, with one or perhaps
both parents well educated. They grew up without peculiari-
ties except an early interest in science. They lead the normal
'family lives of well educated, upper-middle-class society.
society is in sympathy with scientists and their effort and does
not create artificial restraints or barriers to their inter-
~communication or try to make them the mere providers of
comforts. The favorable economic situation is one in which
adequate funds can be made available for basic research-
necessarily times of greatest prosperity, which may
be too busy developing previous discoveries to feel the need for
further basic work. Politically also, the need for basic re-
`"-search must be recognized, whatever the circumstances
'that bring it to attention. Some nations foster scientific re-
',search in time of war (the United States) and some do not
(Nazi Germany). Some governments favor research in time of
depression and forget about it in time of prosperity. One
country (the USSR) incorporates it into its national phi-
losophy, and another (the United States) fosters it to keep
ahead of the other. Finally, scientific advance is most likely
when education is widespread and scientific education broad,
not a mere training of technicians for the development of
applications.
Approved For R
Check-List of Criteria
The five most critical of the conditions described above
might be listed in abbreviated form as a kind of prospector's
,wand to be tested by intelligence analysts for its value in
locating a subsurface breakthrough in any current field:
1. New experimental evidence that cannot be satisfactorily
explained by present theories is being discovered at a
rapid rate.
2. New techniques, new materials, and new or improved
equipment are being brought to bear on an old problem.
3; A group of scientists is assembled to make concentrated
?.! attack on the problem.
A4. This group is composed of relatively young men well
qualified in this specific field.
The group has adequate technical and financial support
and professional encouragement.
 .nit of the Department of
ommerce now serves the scien-
fic public with an intelligence
rc~mmunity product.
PUBLICIZING SOVIET SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
after Sputnik I jarred the nation on 4 October
tl
Sh
y
or
1957, people began looking for someone to blame; they rapidly
settled upon the Government and charged it with a total
tall
th
e
neglect of Soviet scientific information, spreading
tale that Soviet scientific periodicals were gathering dust
If the nation's
on the shelves of the Library of Congress.
E,. _-_ _ r-_.i4.
f ^TTornTn PYlt.
f th
e
o
that was the wrong charge, as previous articles in the Studies
con-
ti
ons,
have shown.' Some half million pages of transla
fi
c
densations, and abstracts from Bloc-mostly Soviet--scienti
literature had been issued by the intelligence community
since the beginning of 1949.
t The Government's fault, if there was one, with respect to
this literature, aside from its general disposition to encourage
public disrespect for propagandistic Soviet emanations, was
the, lack of vigorous measures to acquaint the U.S. scientific
telligence community, however, for all that its responsibilities
elfish reasons begun efforts to repair this omission even be-
ore the epochal earth satellite was launched. In 1958, thanks
utnik's lubrication of Congressional purse strings, these
efforts reached full fruition.
ntelligence Doffs the Veil
The history of the community's treatment of information
om Soviet scientific literature is one of progressive relaxa-
ion of restrictions, ending almost in an active peddling to the
te
i
t
R
c
es
r
nblic. Up through 1949 this material was stamped
..eva ge La. a -5--Y ->
nail, "The Exploitation of Russian Scientific Literature for Intelli-
}:gene Purposes," 1 13, p. 45.
05/03115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 87
MORI/HRP PAGES 87-9
 Publicizing Soviet Scientific Research
Approved For
when it was pure dead-pan translation, Secret when it was
tailored to meet intelligence requirements. It was not just
from force of habit that such stamps were applied: the So-
viet security laws of 1948 throttled the flow of Soviet scien-
tific periodicals to the United States until it reached an all-
time low of B9 titles in the winter of 1949-1950, fewer than
forty of them of intelligence value, while a full hundred un-
classified Soviet periodicals were unobtainable outside the
USSR.
In 1950, however, this trickle began the steady increase
which has brought it to its present flood tide, and the in-
telligence community now recognized the periodical litera-
ture as its major and indeed only encyclopedic source of in-
formation on Soviet scientific organization, activities, and per-
sonnel. The need for classification faded with the softening of
Soviet security practices, and it began to be more and more de-
sirable for community purposes to issue this information in
unclassified reports. The reasons an unrestricted availabil-
ity is desirable lie in the difficulties of scientific intelligence
production: the range of subjects that must be covered is all
out of proportion to the number of scientific hands available in
the community. A tremendous number of pin-point specialists
in numerous divergent disciplines are required to evaluate the
foreign data. Scientific intelligence, in fact, seems to be best
served when all U.S. scientists are well informed about re-
search conducted abroad, notably in the USSR, in parallel
with their own specializations.
The reports were therefore declassified in 1950, and in 1953
came the first diffident move to make them publicly available:
they were anonymously deposited in the Library of Congress,
the Department of Agriculture Library, the Crerar Library
in Chicago, and some others. This was a step in the right
direction, but the producers of scientific intelligence, whether
in Air Force, Army, Navy, AEC or CIA, still had difficulty
getting the translated data to all the many scientists and con-
tractors assisting them. Two or three years later the Na-
tional Science Foundation, acting for the U.S. scientific com-
munity, began to help: in 'cooperation with several learned
institutions it sponsored translations. to be sold by subscrip-
tion at a modest fee. The National Institutes of Health began
a parallel program for medical translations, and together the
Approved For
P 0i z3 Soviet Scientific Research
2a00 0315 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
r , wo now offer more than 50 Soviet scientific periodicals trans-
fated from cover to cover. The intelligence .community ad=
ised and assisted in setting up both these programs.
r I.n the sear ch -for a more comprehensive solution a meeting
of the, various processors and users of Soviet scientific data
kwasheld under National Science Foundation auspices on 3
October 1957, one day before Sputnik I. The Department of
me. -technical information to the public but had no appropriar
tion.. tor. handle the massive quantities of Soviet scientific lit-
erature, was invited to send a representative. It was unan-
imously agreed at this meeting that the intelligence commu-
nity should make the material available, unclassified, to Com-
merce's Office of Technical Services, and that the Department
should request from the Congress the funds to publish and
disseminate it. In due course, with help from the Sputnik,
OTS got the money, and since 1958 U.S. scientists have at a
nominal cost had access through this channel to large volumes
of data translated from Bloc sources.
The OTS intake, in its second year now, is a huge and
growing one. The intelligence community's product has
grown seven-fold from its low in 1948 to nearly 150,000 pages
ofabstracts and translations in 1959. To this flow contribute
eight principal intelligence components-Air Force's Air In-
formation Division in the Library of Congress and its Air Tech-
nical Intelligence Center, Army's ACSI, Corps of Engineers,
Signal Corps, and Ordnance Corps, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, and CIA's Foreign Documents Division. Yet an-
other 50,000 pages are supplied from outside the community
by the translation programs of the NSF, the NIH, the Joint
Publications Research Service, the Consultant's Bureau, Per-
gamon Press, and others.
For controlling and researching this total of some 200,000
pages of translated Bloc studies arriving annually, OTS sells
a - semi-monthly listing of "Technical Translations" done in
and out of government and the semi-monthly "Scientific In-
formation Report" produced by CIA, which presents the high-
lights of research published in nearly a thousand Sino-Soviet
Bloc periodicals. Complete tables of contents of Bloc periodicals
C.
 Publicizing Soviet ScientiAPllWeetkffor
are contained in the "Monthly Index of Russian Accessions"
and "Monthly Index of East European Accessions" available
at the Library of Congress and in the "Current List of Medi-
cal Literature," at the National Library of Medicine. Finally,
CIA still produces the venerable "Consolidated Translation
Survey," now in its eleventh year. Not generally available to
the public, to be sure, it is nevertheless unclassified and may
be sent to individual scientists when government needs are
thereby served.
The intelligence community, which has neither the func-
tion nor the funds to publish reports for the general public,
has thus in its own interest done the next best thing-
helped arrange and supported appropriations for others to
disseminate the information, making available all its unclassi-
fied production on a regular basis for public use.
4. historical object-lesson on
the consequences of letting ill-
considered intelligence assump-
tions determine a course of
PORTUGUESE TIMOR: AN ESTIMATIVE FAILURE
reparation of U.S. intelligence estimates has become
The
p
an organized and methodical process. In response to a change
re
th
a mo
in the international situation or in accordance wi
or less regular schedule, an estimate is laid on by the USIB.
Terms of reference are circulated to members of the intelli-
gence community, agency contributions are made, and a com-
posite draft is produced by an estimates staff. After considera-
tion and revision by representatives of the agencies, a final
draft is presented to the USIB for concurrence in the National
Intelligence Estimate of a given situation, provided to guide
American military and political policy. Under special condi-
tions this process is shortened, but not essentially changed.
IA similar process goes on in the governments of a number of
'Western countries, and we can probably assume that equivalent
iet Part
S
th S
y
o
ov
joint intelligence exercises are undertaken by e
and Government.
This unhurried and systematic mobilization of available in-
telligence resources to bear on a given problem is a relatively
be
gun
recent phenomenon, one which can be said to have
during World War II. Before that time intelligence estimat-
ing in most countries was a pretty haphazard affair. Strategic
intelligence as a function distinct from policy-making was
usually regarded as superfluous to the extent that it was re-
in
ld War II
W
t
,
or
o
garded at all. Accordingly, until well in
telligence estimates appear to have played only a very modest
role in the making of political and military decisions.
~$. Of the many examples that could probably be drawn from
trou
di
s
sas
the earlier years of World War II to show the
consequences that followed from operational plans based on
i
g-
inadequate intelligence consideration, one of the most po
n of Portu-
ti
o
nant, it seems to me, was the Dutch-led occupa
-
-
guese Timor, the isolated overseas territory of neutral Far
05/03/154: CIA-RDP78T03194A 18A?A Va93ES 91-96 91
 :;k ... .....
wc%
gal. This rather sparsely inhabited eastern half of Timor, the
easternmost large island in the Lesser Sundas,, lies ahnot
2,000 miles southeast of Singapore but only about 500 miles
from the north coast of Australia. Its proximity to Australia
gave the otherwise remote and unimportant territory a dis-
proportionate strategic value which, in the fall of 1941 and
early, 1942, brought it. an unwelcome, prominence not, known
.
before, or since
The "Estimate"
The nature and extent of Japanese interest in Portuguese
Timor in 1941 are not fully known. At that time, however,
Japanese interest in the East Indies was primarily attracted
to Sumatra, Borneo, and Java, where major sources of strategic
raw-materials were to be found; and the fact that Japanese
operational plans in Southeast Asia prepared in 1941 did not
originally envisage, a landing in Australia removed what would
have been the principal attraction.for them in the Portuguese
territory.
Dutch archives for this period are ? not open to the public,
and we are therefore thrown back on official histories to shed
some light on this recondite corner of the history of o the
War II strategic planning. A- Dutch official history period, Nedertands-Indic Contra Japan,' states that Japanese
interest in an air service with Portuguese Timor
aroused great concern among the Allies. Timor, indeed, formed
a very important link in the defense chain which linked Malaya,
the Netherlands Indies, and Australia. A Japanese air base in
Timor could form a -very- dangerous starting point for further
actions against Dutch and Australian territory.
The Dutch history goes- oni to note that-Dili, the capital of
Porte ese Timor, "which lent itself so well to the establish-
ifent of a base for amphibious-uircraf-t; was on1y7weakly held
by the Portuguese, iargely--vvith`nativetToops " The Portuguese
"garrison," in fact, consisted of a company of indigenous
latoon of "Frontier Police" appar-
st'outs=cazres ana platoon-
the Dutch tern-
alon
t
g
ies
assiged to imnu anon
to du
entryl border. . , .._
Historical Scion Geteiai Staff of the Royal Netherlands Army'
~J(Bandung,195d). Vo1,II, pp. 230-232;
PortugueseJimor
The Dutcb1iistory continues:
These troops were not in. a secure enough Jppanese attacker The
with their own small strength
nme to was thereby faced with a. difficult
Netherlands Indies Governor anese ocI" _ 3-
the decision: On n
o hand he otherg hand occupation of #hiS
h
e
l
m
T
tern of Portuguese ession against the territory of a friendly
territory by us s meant. aggr
tically with certainty; that
Tac
power. Since it could be be foreseen p t Of' Japan-would-not hesitate to aim at Timor-Dili as the Poinplace with
port, it. was decided in November, 1941, to occupy
Dutch and Australian troops and thereafter to offer the Porte.-
geese Government protection for that territory.
This November decision was apparently contingent upon all
fi
c.
,actual outbreak of war in the Paci
lear whether any
a
The Dutch history does not make c
detailed intelligence estimate was formulated on this p
Given the relatively primitive development of intelligence es-
urea
timating at the time, it seems unlikely Fa d withe an question
considered at any great le g
Japanese assault in great force on the. Netherlands Indies-
the failure of I which seemed virtually inevitable oe low i g
n
t e Dutch a the
hutch-Japanese trade talks in ,
ould opt simultaneously
to have assumed that the Japan-se.
en to them and attack
for all the strategic alternatives p
across the board, from Sumatra to Tenor..
of -4 aan and 1941
ade
d
r
Yet in the economic a-n
r 7 t emphasizing
the Japanese had shown ^little i interest
plieso of the raw ma
d
terials produced in Sumatra, Borneo, ~
Portuguese Timor by the
t i
tt
n
of Japanese interes
se
history hardly constitute convincing evidence o
Nor do other available sources
o
ry.
tent to occupy the territ
anese economic inter-
Ja
di
p
ng
provide such evidence in recor
l Portuguese source, Timor Partu-
-
officia
ests there. Asemi
n
s,R states that Japanese firms began to invest capital on-
934 and that in 1938 a Japanese
Portuguese Timor in 1
sulate was opened in Dili. There is no indication that these
commercial. Por
l
y
Japanese interests were more than pure
roducer of modest consequence
i
s a p
tuguese Timor was and
'By Capt. Helo Felgas, Agencia Geral do Ultramar (Lisbon, 1956)
pp. 287-288.
 of high-quality Arabica coffee. After the opening of the Japa-
nese Consulate in Dili an Australian Consulate was also es-
tablished there.
Even the efforts made by the Japanese to obtain landing
rights in Dili need not have been considered particularly omi-
nous, for an air route from Japan to Australia via the Palaus
and Portuguese Timor is fairly direct, avoiding the long detour
to the west through Hong Kong, Singapore, and Batavia.
Moreover, an airline operating from Japan to Australia via
Singapore and Batavia would have faced heavy from the British-owned Imperial Airways, particularly on the
Singapore-Australia segment. The Dutch estimate of Japanese
intentions towards Portuguese Timor, therefore, appears
have been both hurried and poorly done. The extent of Aus-
tralian participation in this estimate and the consequent de-
cision to occupy the neutral territory is not known, but Aus-
tralian agreement to the action must have been obtained.
The Action
If the estimate was poorly done, the operational response
was even worse. After the outbreak of hostilities to occupy
em-
ber 8, the Royal Netherlands Indies Army prepared
Portuguese Timor. The action was carried out on December
17 by a combined force of about 600 Dutch-led Indonesian
troops and some 300 Australians. The combined force was
equipped with four 75-millimeter field guns, six sections of
machine gunners and three squads of light mortars, in addi-
tion to the usual small arms with which infantry companies
were then equipped. The force had no tanks, no anti-tank
guns, no provision for air or sea support.
This action was undertaken at a time when the forces avail-
able for the defense of the far mere important islands of Java,
Sumatra, and Borneo were already much too slender to op-
pose the avalanche of Japanese troops pouring into Southeast
Asia. The size and weight of the forces already poised to
attack the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies
were reasonably well known to the Dutch and the other Allied
countries, and against this background the absurdity of the
unsupported and ill-equipped 1,000-man expedition to occupy
Portuguese Timor stands out clearly.
'~Nl ~'ro@fA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
? The Portuguese response to the Dutch-Australian invasion
was non-violent, but the Portuguese Prime Minister, Dr. Sala-
zar, immediately protested to the British government. He ap-
parently sought British assurances that the Allied invasion
`African troops to be dispatched from Lourenco Marques in
Mozambique to reinforce the Timor garrison.
'he Aftermath
Whatever the arrangements between the Portuguese and
the Allied nations, the presence of an Allied force in Portu-
guese Timor inevitably drew the attentions of the Japanese.
As their invasion forces moved deep into the Netherlands In-
lies in late 1941 and early 1942, they undertook preparations
or the assault on Timor. On February 20, 1942, simultane-
usly with a landing near Kupang, capital of Dutch Timor,
'apanese troops of the 228th Infantry Regiment, supported by
ance. The Dutch troops withdrew towards Dutch Timor,
here they were eventually forced to surrender, and the Aus-
tralians retreated to the center of the island. From there
they carried out guerrilla operations throughout 1942, but in
'ebruary 1943, after suffering heavy casualties, they were
withdrawn to Australia by submarine.
From a faulty intelligence estimate to an ill-considered op-
erational plan, the Allied occupation of Portuguese Timor pre-
sents a sorry spectacle. Much the worst of it is the fact that
,this performance probably brought on the Japanese invasion
f the territory. It cannot be said with certainty that the
apanese would otherwise not have taken action, but it should
noted that they respected the neutrality of another Por-
guese territory in the Far East, Macau, which remained
holly in Portuguese hands throughout the war. Although
British consul was resident in that territory during the
'ar years, no Allied troops were ever stationed there. Given
Fts relatively few attractions, it seems reasonably plausible
that the Japanese would have left Portuguese Timor alone
so, if the Allied nations had not been the first to occupy it.
For the balance of the war a fairly large Japanese occupa-
on force remained in Portuguese Timor. This force, in turn,
resented an attractive target to Allied bombers, based less
05103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
i
 than 500 miles away in Darwin-Australia: Dili was virtually
flattened by Allied bombardments. Late in 1942 the Governor
of. the. territory, Sr. Manuel Ferreira de Carvalho, ordered Por-
tuguese citizens (as distinguished from the indigenous "pro-
tected persons") in Timor to concentrate in an area west of
Dili, on the north coast. There, he felt, he could provide them
some measure of defense against the depredations of the oc-
cupation force and the indigenous bandit gangs encouraged
by the Japanese. While this move gave them some protec-
tion, their supplies of food, medicine, and clothing steadily
dwindled in quantity and quality throughout the rest-of the
war, and eventually 50 of them, out of a total of some 300 in
the territory, died. Several thousand indigenous inhabitants
died, from causes directly or indirectly connected with the
Japanese occupation.
Although the certificates of death issued for these people
(if, indeed, any certificates were made) may have given ma-
laria, beri-beri, or complications of dysentery as the imme-
diate cause of death, the real cause they might have cited
was "Bad intelligence estimate."
INTELLIGENCE,. IN- RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II
THE LONGEST DAY. By Cornelius Ryan. (New York: Si-
mon and Schuster. 1959. Pp. 350. $3.95.)
D Day. By David Howarth. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1959.
Pp. 251. $4.95.)
INVASION: 1944. By John Froyn Turner. (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons. 1959. Pp. 248. $3.95.)
The fifteenth anniversary of the greatest triphibious as-
sault in history was marked by the publication of these three
books devoted exclusively to the events of that sixth day of
June, 1944. By far the best written, most concerned with in-
t to-
ll
y pu
telligence aspects of the action, and most skillfu
gether is Ryan's The Longest Day. Like Howarth, Ryan bases
his story largely on the personal accounts of participants, but
by concentrating on fewer individuals and developing some
new material he has produced a better narrative.
The Longest Day tells how the senior German commanders
were scheduled, ironically, to attend a Kreigsspiel at Rennes
on 6 June to war-game the theoretical invasion of Normandy.
OBBC to notify the French underground that the invasion had
begun-how Admiral Canaris had learned of the code phrases
.. . . -`-I ---- L...... T4
Col. Hellmuth Meyer, intelligence officer of the German Fif-
Iteefith Army, picked them up when broadcast, and how the
ifteenth Army was thus put on the alert while the Seventh
Army, which held Normandy, was not. It shows how, after
n its evaluation, some believing it a feint to draw the defend-
s away from the Pas de Calais, the real objective of the main
Ts away
M Howarth's D Day describes in greater detail the individual
battles fought at the sites of air drops and on the beaches,
'
s book. Al-
supplying fewer personal anecdotes than Ryan
MORIIHRP PAGES 97-98
05103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 97
 though Howarth pays less attention to intelligence, he gives
several pages to a description of British beach reconnaissance:
in the preceding months men had been secretly landed on some
30 French beaches to determine the precise characteristics of
the landing areas.
Turner's Invasion: 1944, "The First Full Story of D-Day in
Normandy," is much more detailed than the other two, but
far less interesting. Turner concentrates on logistic aspects
of the operation, devotes the first half of his book to planning
and preparations, and has little to say about intelligence.
BATTLE: The Story of the Bulge. By John Toland. (New
York: Random House. 1959. Pp. 400. $5.00.)
This is a superbly organized and excitingly written book
about the battle in the Ardennes, from 15 December 1944 to
23 January 1945, in which three German armies smashed
through a lightly held Corps sector of the United States First
Army and were ultimately thrown back by the First and Third
U.S. Armies plus a British Corps. Mr. Toland indicates that
he travelled a hundred thousand miles and talked to more
than a thousand participants in order to write this hour-by-
hour account of the engagement. He has done a magnificent
job in making a cohesive picture of the multitude of clashes
(between units ranging in size from patrols to armored divi-
sions) that collectively were the Battle of the Bulge-a strug-
gle in which there was seldom a defined front and where knowl-
edge of the enemy's location was certain only upon contact
with him.
The author gives short shrift to the controversial question
of whether the initial success of the Germans in the Ardennes
was the result of a major breakdown in the Allied intelligence
effort. At the beginning of his story he notes that on the
night of 15 December "no Allied commander seriously feared
a major German attack." A woman who came through the
lines of the 28th Division did report having seen a mass of
German tanks behind the Siegfried Line, and she was sent
to Corps and then to Army to tell her story. Col. Dickson at
First Army predicted there would be an all-out German of-
fensive, and in the Ardennes; but his associates said he was a
notorious pessimist, and overworked. The 12th U.S. Army
13fgl%
0! Ik fkt5I.T8T03194A000100040001-0
p said attrition was sapping the German strength. Mont-
gomery was of the opinion that the Germans "cannot stage
;Germans were all but finished.
After describing the 38-day battle that caused 75,000 cas-
es, Mr. Toland concludes:
Much has been written of the failure of American G-2 officers
to foresee the battle. The rather primitive, naive American intel-
ligence system, based largely on procedures used by the Pinkertons
in the Civil War, was not at fault; the sophisticated British system
was just as blind. The blame should not even fall on Hodges,
Bradley and Eisenhower, nor on the architects of strategy, Roose-
velt and Churchill. The entire Allied world must share the blame.
On the night of December 15, 1944, it breathed the air of com-
placency, optimism and self delusion.
Although Mr. Toland's graphic description of one of the
decisive battles of movement in modern warfare is fascinat-
ing reading, particularly for those who fought in the Bulge,
the estimative failure and a presentation of some wchallen
-
g
ing situations for the combat intelligence officer.
`EE CLOCK WITH FOUR HANDS. By James Leasor. (New
York: Reynal & Company. 1959. Pp. 314. $5.00.) Pub-
lished in England under the title, "War At The Top."
With some interpolations by Mr. Leasor, this book is in ef-
fect the diary of Sir Leslie Hollis, who was in an exceptionall
y
advantageous position to observe the making of high British
"'
cy before and during World War II: as one of the secre-
6,000 meetings of that body. Unfortunately, the book does
^
ot live up to the potential of that experience, either in depth
using but all highly opinionated, tied together by the
..a -r,_._, - - -
Quld be expected of it than appears here, or if he still had
r to publish his own memoirs.
There are, however, some interesting tidbits here for the
!rofessional intelligence officer, telling for example how the
?rit
ish Government in the thirties refused to listen to intel-
005103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A00010004M1iRIHRP PAGES 99-100
 ligence reports on the growing strength of Germany, and how
its surprise at the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor equaled
that in the United States. British intelligence correctly pre-
dicted the German attack on Greece. On. the other hand, it so
exaggerated. German industrial production (which actually
was less than British) that it seriously inhibited the planning
for ,the second front.
A useful chapter devoted to topographical intelligence, and
the organization of the Inter-Service Topographic Department
describes the way it had to scrounge for information. There
was scarcely enough to brief the R.A.F. for a raid on the Dort-
mund-Ems Canal. When the army had to be evacuated from
Dunkirk so little data was available about the beaches that
travel agencies were asked for brochures, and then destroyers
were sent for an on-the-spot look. The BBC broadcast an
appeal for photographs taken by tourists, expecting to get
eight or ten thousand, and were inundated by nine million.
"Know Thine Enemy." By Captain J. V. Heimark. (U.S. Na-
val Institute Proceedings, Vol. 85, No. 8, August 1959. Pp.
65-71.)
Shows how good intelligence-primarily reconnaissance-
on the part of the U.S. forces at Midway and ignorance of the
enemy's whereabouts at Pearl Harbor, in the Coral Sea, and
in the Philippine Sea had a decisive influence on the outcome
of these naval actions.
MORI/HRP PAGE 100
100
COATS, TRAITORS AND HEROES. By John.Bakeless.
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. 1959. Pp. 406. $6.50.)
In the past twenty years, since the publication of Morton
ennypacker's General Washington's Spies on Long Island and
in New York' and Carl Van Doren's Secret History of the
American Revolution,2 more and more facts and documents
concerning British and American intelligence in the Ameri-
can Revolution have come to light. Colonel Bakeless' mis-
leadingly titled book is the first attempt to synthesize this
new material with the old in a comprehensive intelligence his-
tory of the Revolutionary War.
The generally conceded fact that American intelligence on
a large and organized scale dates only from World War II
should not be allowed to obscure the wealth of espionage ac-
tivity which the Revolution developed from casual and amateur-
ish beginnings until it reached a point of considerable sophisti-
cation, with backed-up cover, secret writing, couriers, cut-
outs, double agents, and deception operations. It is evident
that George Washington himself was a masterful intelligence
officer. He gave close personal attention both to the opera-
tional- details of espionage and to the reports of his agents,
whom. he sometimes called "my intelligencers.7. He had a
preference for spies "who live with the other side; whose local
circumstances, without subjecting them: to suspicions, .give
;hem an opportunity of making observations"; he noted that
t was "necessary to be circumspect with double spies."
Washington had competent intelligence staff officers, but
le himself planned many operations and made his own evalu-
ation of the product. Colonel Elias Boudinot. recalls bow,
after reporting some newly arrived intelligence, he repeated
his own interpretation of it three times to the apparently
;uncomprehending General Washington, who then gave it a
diametrically opposite evaluation.. When the General proved
'Brooklyn: Long Island Historical Society, 1939.
2 Garden City: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1941.
2005103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040WPJIHRP PAGES 101-108
I
 it
Recent Books: Amer'
,d&V BP R
to have been correct, "I then said," wrote Colonel Boudinot in
admiration, "that I never would again set up my judgment
a
i
t h
"
ga
ns
is
. Washington initiated many intelligence deception opera-
tions, planting false strength figures and other information
which he often compiled himself, advising his agents what
could be safely passed along. The hero of the cherry tree
legend could tell some whoppers. He made a practice of plant-
ing the same false story in several widely separated places,
thus providing the enemy with "independent confirmations."
One such plant was so successful that when a British intelli-
gence officer laid the facts before General Howe, the British
commander treated him "with contempt & Severity" for such
bad reporting.
General Washington's view of intelligence as a matter to
be kept "as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success de-
pends in most Enterprises of the Kind . . ." is illustrated in
the realistic American use of cover. Agents sent into the Brit-
ish lines as Tories and deserters were officially listed as such,
rewards were sometimes offered for their capture alive, and
their families often suffered public opprobrium. In 1781, after
five years of being hoodwinked, the British ordered no further
protection for deserters; but then it was too late.
Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes attempts with indifferent
success to tell its history chronologically, beginning in the
fall of 1774 with Paul Revere and his friends in the Boston
area, "the first American intelligence net," real amateurs. A
little later, the Americans in Georgia are shown perpetrating
a deception: they intercepted a letter from the Royal Gov-
ernor there to the British commanders in Boston and substi-
tuted forged documents of contrary purport before sending
it on. At Lexington and Concord, American intelligence was
not bad; the British was probably better. And even the
French introduced a couple of agents into the Boston area to
see how the American cause was progressing.
By 1776, when the American Army had suffered many re-
verses, intelligence was improving; and an espionage-deception
operation now brought a victory. John Honeyman, sent by
102
Approved Fo
2AMIXWkfi r , Tg 1,000I000a000I-o
ashington into Trenton as a butcher and horse trader-3 dar-
gly brought back critical intelligence on the defenses of
enton. Then, "escaping" from Washington's headquarters
,
le returned to Trenton and assured the Hessians that no ac-
tion was to be expected from the Americans. It was with
intelligence preparation that Washington crossed the Del-
a
ware on Christmas night to the victory at Trenton.
11,
General Washington's most important intelligence net was
probably that of the "Culpers" in British-occupied New York
Townsend (Culper, Jr.) sent reports by courier (usuall
Aus-
y
tin Roe) to Samuel Woodhull (Culper
Sr.) on Long Island
,
.
There
they were transferred to Caleb Brewster whose whale
,
boats took them across Long Island Sound to Fairfield Con-
,necticut, to one of Washington's finest intelligence offic
r
e
s
,
Major Benjamin Tallmadge, a Yale classmate and friend of
Nathan Hale.
These reports, Colonel Bakeless indicates
were handled als
,
o
by Alexander Hamilton, on Washington's staff. The book
gives nothing further on Hamilton's intelligence activities, the
.extent of which has yet to be revealed. They may in fact
have been negligible; but some historians say he served as an
intelligence staff officer, and this reviewer has seen one docu-
ment which reports the dispatching of spies, "Agreeable to
well-kept secret for a century and a half, until Pennypacker
established it. Culper, Jr.
continued to mas
uerad
i
N
,
q
e
n
ew
;York as a Tory merchant until the war's end Th
e British
. knew that intelligence was leaking from New York that
many
, of the reports were written in secret ink and that C
l
b
a
e
, Brewster's whale boats ferried them across the Sound but
, were unable to catch Brewster or discover the sources.
Colonel Bakeless adds comparatively little to what Penny-
?acker wrote about the Culper net
and he contrib
t
,
u
es noth
-
g material to the history of Hercules Mulligan,4 the Arnold-
In
meffi t
aar, orhe case of Nathan Hale. But he does help
* See "A Spy for Washington," in American Heritage, Vol. VIII, No. 5,
August 1957, pp. 58-64.
O'Brien, Hercules Mulligan: Confidential Correspondent of General
Washington. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1937.
'
 unravel: the threads of, another American intelligence net,
that established from. New Jersey by Joshua Mersereau to
operate behind the lines in Staten Island, showing among
other things that there was a third Mersereau in addition
to. the two previously known. Joshua Mearser fob is cited in
re-
General Washington's account books as paid
wards of himself & others (whom he was obliged to employ)
to open & carry on a Correspondence with persons within
the Enemy Lines by the way of. Staten Island." But money
was sometimes short and agents complained. One wrote to
Mersereau from Staten island:
as soon as you fulfil that Request of mine, a regular Corre-
spondence shall take place & unless you indulge me in that, I could
not resume my Pen on a Subject of this Nature with any degree of
s
Propriety; for give me Leave to remark that aitho my Brea t thro bs
with the purest & most fervent Love to my country,
to Noble actions, & banishes from my Soul every lucrative Pas loon;
ro-
Yet a laudable Country; e'er I enter on So dange ous ant Undertaking
tion of my my C Country;
. Before I bid you farewel, I must beg it as a particulor favour
that you will be careful of my Letters, as you value the Safety of
your Friend ...
Colonel Bakeless also relates in detail for the first time the
role of an intelligence agent at the Battle of Saratoga. It
will be recalled that the first battle for Saratoga was fought
with inconclusive results in mid-September 1777. Then on
October 7 the British attacked at Bemis Heights, were re-
pulsed, and withdrew to the plain at Saratoga, where they
surrendered ten days later. There has now come to light an
affidavit made in 1852 by one Daniel Bryan, recounting the
role played by his father, Alexander, in the battle of Saratoga.
Alexander Bryan is said to have been asked by the American
commander, General Gates,. to go into General Burgoyne's
lines and get information "as to the heft of the artillery" and
the strength and contemplated movements of the enemy. In-
side the British lines, he "purchased a piece of cloth for a
trowsers when he went stumbling about to find a tailor and
that thus he soon learned thestrength
1 as the. plan. to take
the. number of the Army
Bemis Heights the next day With this. intelligence, General
Gates was able to fortify himself on Bemis Heights and then
_,-r-..4 4 - Rritish
e-50 pi 5a" -- b YO9794A000100040001-0
There seems little reason to doubt this story, and if it is
easonably correct Bryan's venture was a one-shot espionage
job which may have changed the course of history. Saratoga
is generally considered one of the decisive battles in world
ory: had the British won, the colonies would have been
F'
split in two at the Hudson River, and the American victory was
an important factor in the French decision to enter the war.
It is nevertheless difficult to go along with Colonel Bakeless'
nomination of Bryan as "the most successful spy in history"
"and "the man who really won the American Revolution." The
author, in this reviewer's opinion, also errs in dating Bryan's
first in nclus
th
tle
? w .
e
espionage in September before
Saratoga. The internal evidence seems to place it before the
second battle, fought on October 7. And Benson J. Lossing,
in his Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution,, describes how a
sergeant arrived at the headquarters of the American com-
mander, General Gates, just before the British attack of Octo-
ber 7, "with intelligence of the movement of the British
army." This sergeant may have been Alexander Bryan.
Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes also treats the activities of
British intelligence in America during the Revolution. There
were many (including Benjamin Franklin's son William, Royal
Governor of New Jersey) whose loyalty to the British Crown
was not shaken by rebel activities, and many loyalists were
fruitful sources of intelligence. Even before the Revolution
broke out, the British had established a high-level penetration
of patriot activities in Boston. Their agent was Dr. Benjamin
Church, Jr., a member of the Massachusetts Provincial Con-
rgress, privy to the patriots' innermost councils, and ultimately
,General Washington's Director General of Hospitals, whose
.Ong successful operations show up the early lack of American
counterintelligence. But finally an indiscreet ciphered letter
from him fell into patriotic hands; his courier-mistress, "an
-Washington himself and forced to reveal her principal's
'
s specialists.
name; and the cipher was broken by Washington
Historians of the period have noted before that Dr. Church
ust have begun to feel shaky, for he had found out that an
erican spy deep in Cabinet levels in London, whose name
' New York: Harper Brothers, 1851. Vol. I, p. 60.
 Approved For
Recent Books: American Revolution
has never come to light, was learning the identities of British
agents in America. In November 1774, Paul Revere had been
advised that there was a leak somewhere high in the patriot
group. Still suspicion was not fixed on Church, even when
it was observed in 1775 that he was spending beyond his ap-
parent means and keeping a mistress. he showed Re-
vere his blood-stained stocking day after the
't
Lexington, Revere was fully convinced of his loyalty; hours
did didn't
stop to think that the Doctor had had twenty-four
to clean stockings. American security had not come
of age, and the full extent of Church's treason was not known
until General Gage's papers became available in the Clements
Library at the University of Michigan in 1930. Much of Colo-
nel Bakeless' account had already been told in Allen French's
General Gage's Informers.6
of Boston,
General Gage had numerous agents working out ton,
and his intelligence for Lexington and Concord was g
"There is one evil that I dread," wrote General Washington of
the British, "and that is, their spies." And again of the Brit-
ish commander in New York: "General Howe has every Species
of Intelligence he can wish for ...) One oofHagents
New
was James Moody, who doubled as a guerrilla Jersey and published a book about himself of eTe ah ddsr 7side in
Women were not overlooked as agents by
the Revolution. One of the must successful was n Bates,
who worked for the British under peddler cover. (This
ch
spy Enoch
also the cover occasionally used by the American s
p
Crosby," the prototype of James Fenimore Cooper's Harvey
Birch in The Spy). Colonel Bakeless' superlatives for Ann-
"the most successful female spy in history"-are attributable
to the fact that she remained anonymous until his own re-
searches identified her as "tie Woman" in British General
Sir Henry Clinton's intelligence files.
' Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1932.
Lieut. James Moody's Narrative of his Exertions and Sufferings in
the Cause of GovernmSince ent,
orhMemoirs 7of Enoch Crosby, alias
a Barnum, The Spy S1nJ
Harvey Birch.... New York: J. & J. Harper, 1828.
Recent Books: American Revolution
f the intelligence work for General Clinton was di-
Much o
whose ability in this field seems
r John Andre
M
,
ajo
reeted by
have been high until he took to the road himself and
ies were quite effective, but
's s
t
p
on
hanged for his pains. Clin
the American Army,
i
n
two of them turned out to be captains
d
'
Even at
errs.
s or
working for the British on Washington
e h
er ?
this late dat
,'wrote to a friend who had seen an early draft of his book:
I have had to do a great deal of re-writing since I saw you Part,
of it because one of Sir Henry Clinton's prize agents turned out
ththe rank ink of Sir o Henry's.
to have been working for all thew e. If my face is red ando it with
is well qualified in the subject of his book.
Colonel Bake,--o
He had military experience in both World Wars, much of it
ent
s
h
t
p
e
er;
in intelligence work; he is a good scholar and wri
four years of intensive research on this work, and his exami-
n fairly exhaus-
b
ee
nation of primary sources appears to have
ve access to the exten-
t h
a
:tive. it is too bad that he did no
van had
D
ono
sive files which the late General William J.
amassed in the hope of writing on intelligence in the American
Revolution.
Yet the most evident weaknesses of Turncoats, Traitors and
Heroes stem not from scarcity of sources but from the wealth
rise
of insufficiently integrated material. ,it was . . . a surp
to find," Colonel Bakeless writes in his preface, "how
,.- ,--, a....,,,.,onte raally
the
- - , , -
embarrassingly auw-.,---
were ... it became necessary to reduce the scope of the work
inated the story of
li
m
Ave times." The author sensibly e
in
l
ume
British and American espionage overseas, another vo
f Benjamin
itself. (The British intelligence penetration o
? __ .. .w? 9 and no one
Am satisfactorily done the story, for example, of James Aitken
ainte
_ ----
sabotage in Great Britain during the Revolution, who was
fire to naval stores and
tried and hanged in 1777 for setting
See Bemis, "British Secret Service and the French-American Alli-
April
No
3
XXIx
l
v
.
,
,
.
o
ance," In The American Historical Review,
1924, pp. 474-495.
 the Rope House in Portsmouth Navy Yard)1O He also has
limited his coverage of well-known figures like Nathan Hale and
of the Andre-Arnold affair, on which a good book already
exists. 11
Even so, the book is often choppy and uneven; at times it
becomes almost a mere catalog, as the author crams in names
and incidents in indigestible profusion. It wavers uncertainly
between the chronology of the War and the sequence of action
in different espionage operations; perhaps it might have been
more easily organized around General Washington's headquar-
ters, as a focal point from which most of the remaining ma-
terial would drop into place. Nevertheless it is an important
book, the first to deal comprehensively with the material now
available on its subject; and future treatments of this ma-
terial should be the better for it.
1? [AITKEN]. The Trial (At Large) of James Hill.... London: G.
Kearsley and Martha Gurney, [1777].
Flexner, The Traitor and the Spy. New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1953.
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THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
THE SECRET WORLD. By Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney.
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 1959. Pp. 334. $4.50.)
Here is another book about Soviet intelligence, about the
men who make it tick, and about those who-for one reason
or another-get tired of the ticking and defect to the West.
Its world is really not so secret any more, thanks to books
like this which publicize its objectives and techniques, remind-
ing any readers who need it that the KGB is still very much
with us, whatever we may think of Mr. K's real intentions.
Lay readers having no special knowledge of Soviet opera-
tions, if they have not been habitual devotees of cloak-and-
'dagger stories, may derive a good bit of new information from
this book. Certainly they will be impressed, even if they real-
ize that no intelligence service falls in the Sunday school cate-
gory, with the repulsiveness of the Soviet system of internal
intelligence; and the achievement of this effect was appar-
ently the main aim of the authors.
The book describes Deriabin's early life in the Altai region
of southwest Siberia, traces his teen-age career in various So-
et youth oganizations, crowned by appointment to a politi-
cal post with the Army, shows him in action in the Battle of
Stalingrad and, after the war, working for State Security in
Siberia. In a chapter entitled "The Shape of Terror" there
~r .
factual material which the professional reader will recog-
as authentic on the internal structure of the KGB and
e scope of its activities.
Deriabin's transfer to Moscow occasions some good passages
ascribing life in the Soviet capital from the vantage point
a security officer. A list of numerous security installations
Moscow is also conveniently supplied, and something is told
ut Soviet interrogation techniques. Soviet foreign intelli-
ce is portrayed as the "cleanest" part of the security or-
ation, being staffed by "some of the most intelligent,
hnically accomplished and sophisticated members of Soviet
X2005/03/15: CIA-RDP78TO3194A00010004D00111~RP PAGES 109-112
 A chapter on the "Hidden War in Germany" tells of the
Linse kidnapping and the Otto John case, and one entitled
"Cold Storage Agents and Satellites" devotes quite a bit of
space to Allen Dulles. Deriabin is said to have noted, in a
pamphlet on American intelligence he edited, that "in 1944,
Dulles already foresaw the breakdown of the anti-Hitler coali-
tion and . . . began to make plans for intelligence activity
against the Soviet State." Another old Soviet pamphlet is said
to treat the CIA, the CIC, Naval and Air Force Intelligence,
and even the FBI as components of a single organization.
There are a number of chapters on the misdeeds of the So-
viet upper crust-"Moscow Executive Suite," "The New Class,"
"Soviet Immorality," and the struggle of the Stalin succes-
sion. Khrushchev is pictured as no great improvement over
Stalin, it being suggested that Malenkov might have made a
more reliable co-existence partner. A chapter on "Vienna" has
much authentic quadripartite flavor, and one entitled "Agents
and Escape" tells about Austrian operations involving emigres
and would-be returnees. Deriabin himself escaped in 1954.
The book has four appendices, one illustrating the develop-
ment of a Soviet surveillance case, one on provocation tech-
niques, one a lengthy and tedious discussion of "some pitfalls
of Socialist `legality,"' and a fourth giving the organizational
diagrams of the several elements of the State Security or-
ganization.
For the professional reader the shortcomings of The Secret
World are obvious-the sensationalism of its "terrifying re-
port," its deceptive cloak of authorship, its exaggerations and
misstatements of fact. It isn't a book by Deriabin and Gibney
or even one by Deriabin "as told to" Gibney. For all Mr. Gib-
ney's protestations to the contrary, it is a book by Frank
Gibney about Deriabin and several other things, including
what Mr. Gibney thinks of the Soviet Union-which evidently
isn't much.
Here are some examples of his purposeful extravagances.
On Soviet morality:
[On] the high level of the "New Class" Soviet society ... debauch-
ery is organized and beyond criticism.... A clinical study of Soviet
social life might easily dwarf The Lost Weekend and make the
Kinsey Report look like a Parents Magazine anthology.
Mt, o9ldfAS0, 71lr(Y4A000100040001-0
escribing Stalin's exits from the Kremlin:
The only warning ... would be the amber lights blinking ...
and the sudden screaming cavalcade with Colonel Kirilin of the
Guard shrieking obscenities and frequently spitting in the faces
of passers-by.
On the right of the Soviet voter to cross out names of candi-
dates he doesn't like:
Compared to the Soviet voter, even a Negro voter in Mississippi
could be said to enjoy a thoroughly democratic franchise.
... this huge and sensitive Russian subsidiary.
On housewifely Mrs. K.:
It is doubtful if Mrs. Khrushchev has seen the working end of a
kitchen for a good many years.
The author's sense of mission also leads him into oversimpli-
fications and some substantial errors in fact:
At the beginning of the Revolution and for some years thereafter
. the reins of leadership were held by intellectuals of bourgeois
or even noble background, like Lenin and Trotsky.
Trotsky a Russian nobleman!
Admiral Canaris' Abwehr ... was strongly anti-Hitler until it
was absorbed by the Gestapo after Canaris' arrest and execution.
One of [Deriabin's] teachers . . . had managed to keep a large
library from the old days.... So it was that The Last of the
Mohicans, Tom Sawyer, and Huckleberry Finn became a part of
one young Russian's education, although he scarcely included them
on his Komsomol reading lists.
The exceptional Russian student would be the one not
acquainted with these books.
The decision to "de-sanctify" Stalin was probably taken late in
1955 by Khrushchev, who was aware of the void left by the great
dictator. Just as people in the early Stalin period had grumbled
that "things wouldn't be like this if Lenin were alive," a tendency
had grown to look wistfully back to the Stalin era whenever the
regime showed shortcomings.
nostalgic concept, the good old days of Stalin.
 Recent Books: So)lAotfmor
Mr. Gibney's views on foreign policy and estimate of the
Soviet Union can be illustrated by two final quotations from
his work:
[During] the Time of Troubles, from 1953 to 1956 ... had the
USSR been faced with an aggressive American diplomatic policy
on the international scene, the Party leaders might have been
in real trouble.
American tourists can come back from Moscow with stories of a
society straining at its old controls. Cultural exchanges can multi-
ply. The Soviet people can inch a few more steps forward toward
a better and freer life. But in the last analysis, all efforts to pro-
duce a real thaw in the USSR will fail as long as State Security
maintains its position as the ultimate executive arm of the regime.
History will have to tell us whether even Soviet-style intelli-
gence can so decisively govern a nation's course.
THE MIND OF AN ASSASSIN (The Man Who Killed Trotsky).
By Isaac Don Levine. (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Cudahy. 1959. Pp. 232. $4.50.)
THE GREAT PRINCE DIED. By Bernard Wolfe. (New York:
Scribner. 1959. Pp. 398. $4.50.)
Whether assassination is the same thing as murder de-
pends, as the saying goes, on where you are sitting and what
cards you hold. For those who hold Communist Party cards,
the assassinations which have been carried out all over the
civilized world by the "organs of State Security" have merely
executed the sentences of competent judicial organs without
benefit of the legal nicety of extradition. But even the Com-
munist who sees them in this light must admit that there
have been some spectacular remote-controlled executions in
the history of Soviet jurisprudence.
The execution of the death sentence passed by the Soviet
organs on Ignace Reiss, the Soviet senior spy in Western Eu-
rope who broke in revulsion over the Moscow show trials of
the late thirties, brought an exaggerated bit of Chicago to a
quiet Swiss country road. Reiss' body was literally cut to
pieces by heavy machine-gun fire. The case of General Walter
Krivitsky, Soviet espionage boss in Western Europe who fled to
safety in the United States after breaking at about the same
time as Reiss, is a classic illustration of the homely proverb
MORI/HRP PAGES 112-116 Approved For Rel
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21005103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
of the State Security apparatchiks that anyone can commit
id
i
e.
c
a murder, but it takes a real artist to arrange a good su
cide note by his side, shortly after he had told a friend never
ever kill himself. Lev Davidovich Trotskiy is probably the
only man in history to die by ice axe in execution of a death
kentence passed by a court.
The tradition of this form of retribution against traitors
to the movement is so strong that the widow of Richard Krebs
Jan Valtin) told a friend in 1958 that she was not
Night, as
at all certain Krebs had died the natural death officially pro-
nounced by Maryland doctors at New Year's 1951. Clara
Krebs was born and raised on the Eastern Shore and never
had anything to do with Communism, but almost lost her
the
J
ex-Communists and some professional anti-Communists, spent
looking for clues and speculating about an assassination in
his case.
Those who would like to believe that assassinations of this
sort belong to the age of Stalinism should note that the de-
nunciation of Stalin crimes (or "errors") has been confined
to those committed against good comrades, not against trai-
tors. And they might usefully contemplate the mysterious
death of Stefan Bandera, the legendary anti-Soviet Ukrainian
)artisan leader. Bandera was poisoned in Munich, Germany,
in October 1959, in this age of peaceful coexistence.
The murder of Lev Davidovich Trotskiy, popularly known as
Leon Trotsky, was not a case of "whodunit," but of "whobeit."
['he mystery was not who committed the murder, but who
the murderer really is. The best published study of the Trot-
l
S
a-
a
sky assassination has been that by Leandro A. Sanchez
zar, the Mexican police official who conducted the investiga-
On.1 Latterly the impending release of the killer, whose
venty-year sentence will have been served on 20 August 1960,
apparently at least partly responsible for the appearance of
ese recent books by Isaac Don Levine and Bernard Wolfe.
'Murder in Mexico (London: Seeker and Warburg. 1950).
 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
Recent Books: Soviet Services
Don Levine is a vigorous anti-Communist and a man who
b producing and ghosting books that will sell
makes his living by ob1jective and metic-
racterized by
h
a
vain to
well, not necessarily ones c
ulous scholarship. Richard Krebs, after trying
sell Out of the Night to a number of publishers e the r it d
States, finally gave the manuscript and all ed of a num
to Levine fora pittance. Later Krebs complain- from
act which ly before s Krebs' stemmed death
ber of inaccuracies andQt errors
short
Levine, and it was
that a personal reconciliation of the two m n for effected.
Pub-
on the other hand, Levine has been responsible
memoires by Com
lication of a number of highly interesting ,s In ytCom-
munist defectors (among them Walter Krivitsky
ce 2 and for bringing some of these defectors
together r fui } ral together for the intellectual and o~ h e husl~asm of a
changing ideas. Krebs has spoken
night he spent at Levine's home talking without
e ufascinating
through the night and into the morning
let-up t
Krivitsky after Levine had helped them overcome their mutual
mistrust.
The mind of an Assassin does not live up to wha atever
ood story,
givings one may have about the a to dr. The is
factual errors
well researched and interesting y
(insistence, for example, that Vittorio Vidali's real n amg as
Carlos Contreras) are neither so frequent nor so glaring
to disturb the knowledgeable reader greatly. Levine makes
too much at this late date of the mystery of the killer's iden-
tity, which has not really been a mystery for the past five
years or so, but he does perform a useful job in pulling to-
gether some of the scattered material on the subject which interestin has appeared over the years, and he makes a her Speaks g
new contribution in the final chapter,
This last chapter is a communication which Levine says he
received unsolicited from Enrique Castro Delgado after the
manuscript for the book had gone to the printer. Castro was
lived in Moscow
a hero of the Spanish Communist movement,
after the Spanish Civil War, broke with Communism in 1944,
and after a number of very precarious months managed
escape from the USSR. While in Moscow, Castro heard from
s New York: Harpers. 1939.
the lips of the assassin's mother, an old-time Spanish Commu-
e says in his letter to Levine that he had never told it to
anyone before.
more
nt m
--
It
is evide
-
-
assassin than with Trotsky. Two of the chapters,
th
t
e
h
i
w P
ainst Psychologist" and "Portrait of an Assassin,"
r a
i
g
sone
r
deal with the years-long analysis of the murderer by Mexican
ted to borrow a
m
t
i
p
e
s
rdoetors and psychologists. Here one
played Freud, Freud lost. These chapters are boring and ap-
the
g
hed (e
t
f
f
.
.,
c
e
ar-
pear to a non-professional somewhat
as able to kill
h
er, w
killer idolized his mother, hated his fat
f
Trotsky as a father-symbol). Not so, however, the story o
s
othe
n
d
+
y
ma
the murderer, the role played by his mother an
-
h
as Lou=.. ---
--
(sUc
masterminding of the execution by Soviet General Leonid
Eitingon, and related stories like that of the death of Trotsky's
S
i
+
enetration agents
-1
the
ov
e
p
nd
a
in the Trotsky movement, Jack Soble and Mark Gborovsxy.
From former close associates of Trotsky we know that dur-
ing the whole period of his exile in Turkey, France, Norway,
and Mexico the father of the Red Army was a hunted man.
1938
r
b
F
,
y
rua
e
ter his son died mysteriously in Paris in
seemed to wait more resignedly for his own end. His
otsk
y
idow Natalia is quoted by Levine as having written, "Both
latonic
s not
t
p
wa
knew that the verdict of the Moscow cour
d that it would be carried out in one way or another." The
h
'
s book, althoug
y it was carried out is well told in Levine
e titular mind of the assassin has eluded him.
.Bernard Wolfe, for reasons best known to himself, has
osen to tell parts of the story of Trotsky's Mexican exile in
ctional form. permits him, it is true, to deviate from
_ .
ly doesn't) or when the truth is neither stranger than
f
Ction nor as interesting. Because its hero Victor Rostov
fa ,So thinly disguised Trotsky, The Great Prince Died is both
Ltalizing and frustrating for a reader familiar with the story
the Mexican exile.
103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
 Wolfe, who as a young man did spend some time at Trot-
sky's exile headquarters in Mexico, has developed the hypoth-
esis that Trotsky's later years were plagued by a gnawing
sense of guilt regarding his role in suppressing the Kronstadt
uprising. Wolfe suggests that Trotsky was struggling with an
increasingly strong awareness of his own betrayal of a revo-
lution. It is interesting as a hypothesis, but others who were
closer to Trotsky in this period have seen no traces of this
struggle of conscience.
If The Great Prince Died could be read as straight fiction,
it would not be a bad book. The story is well told, the writing
tight and professional. There is plenty of suspense to hold
the reader's attention. For this reviewer, however, it has not
been possible to achieve the necessary detachment from his
knowledge of true events to read it as straight fiction, and
such a conflict within the reader spoils the whole book. The
only part which could be read under these circumstances with-
out any trace of annoyance is the section entitled "Author's
Notes," pp. 383-398. This is not enough to compensate for
the frustrations of the rest of the work.
ESPIONAGE AND PARAMILITARY TALES
DESSOUS DE L'ESPIONNAGE: 1939-1959. By Robert
Boucard. (Paris: Editions Descamps. 1958. Pp. 249.
750 frs.)
M. Boucard, who has published several books on intelligence
subjects and services, dedicates this one to the memory of
Rene Dubois, formerly Attorney General of Switzerland, who
took his own life in 1957 after the clandestine contacts of
high Swiss officials with an attache in the French Embassy
were publicly exposed. The promise in its title of the inside
story of espionage for the past twenty years, however, is
poorly to indifferently fulfilled. Although it presents vi-
gnettes from many interesting cases, both details and material
'substantiating its purported revelations are sadly lacking.
In summarizing the story of the famous German agent
Cicero, for example, the author says that the Turkish secret
service arranged his employment by the British Embassy in
Ankara and helped him in his project with the ambassador's
01
secret papers. It would be good to know whether there is
rome evidence other than presumptive indications in his op-
rations that Cicero worked for the Turkish service. Else-
here, as when he offers "the truth about the Gleiwitz affair,"
wherein the Nazis had prisoners in Polish uniforms attack a
German transmitting station to give pretext for the invasion
V Poland, Boucard's exposes are sometimes quite old hat.
One of the most tantalizing stories in Les Dessous is that of
`Japanese general, military attache in Ankara, Sofia, Madrid,
d Stockholm, whom Boucard calls Yamato Ominata. The
erican authorities, it is said, discovered in the
idlemst archives a message, No. 39,)B-,M from Stockholm to
rlin, in which Ominata, under the cryptonym "Eierkopf,"
posed to "Senior" (Himmler's nom de guerre) the sale of
an, Portuguese, Turkish, Vatican, and Yugoslav codes
28,000 Swedish crowns or 20,000 U.S. dollars. Boucard says
t Ominata was also in contact with Admiral Canaris, the
tish service, and OSS. These bits of information strongly
005103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001i01ORI/HRP PAGES 117-1
 Recent Books: ftl For
suggest that Yamato Ominata is none other than Major Gen-
eral Makoto Onodera, Japanese military attache in Stockholm
with responsibility for espionage in the Scandinavian coun-
tries from February 1941 to the end of the war. A Swedish
newspaper article which appeared on 11 January 1953 when
Onodera was on a business trip to Sweden mentioned that he
had been known to the Germans as "Eierkopf" and had made
a large amount of money selling foreign codes to the Germans.
A PERSON FROM ENGLAND (and Other Travellers to Turke-
stan). By Fitzroy MacLean. (New York: Harper. 1959.
Pp. 314. $5.00.)
Bokhara, Samarkand, Khiva and Merv are here brought
back in a series of true episodes which make good bed-time
reading for romantics, lay historians, and connoisseurs of bold
and curious men. A rabbi's son who astounded the Emir of
Bokhara by arriving from England to demand single-handed
the release of two of his countrymen, a gifted Hungarian
linguist disguised as a dervish from Turkey, a New York re-
porter who caught up with the Russian forces in time to enter
Khiva with General Kauffmann, and a British correspondent
elected Khan of Merv as human symbol of the British Crown to
stay the Russians-these were four who lived to describe their
adventures in forbidden territory during the Great Game be-
tween England and Russia in Central Asia.
The story of the fifth, a British colonel for whom Bolshevist
Tashkent became too dangerous in the fall of 1918, is of par-
ticular interest to collectors of intelligence tales. After wear-
ing thin an astonishing variety of disguises he enrolled as an
Albanian lepidopterist in the Bolshevik intelligence service and
was sent to spy on briefly independent Bokhara, where fifteen
previous agents had vanished without a trace. He managed to
obtain asylum there until he could escape with other refugees
in a hazardous desert trek to the Persian border, where the
Bolsheviks claimed to have killed him in a skirmish at the
river crossing. He reported to the British command at
Meshed in January 1920.
Approved For
@MS/Bab1fs:: E3 idd9ff8T03194A000100040001-0
CAME IN THE NIGHT. By Brede Kiefos. (Greenlawn,
New York: Harian Publications. 1959. Pp. 207. $3.75.)
This is the personal account of a young Norwegian cadet's
bntribution to his country's liberation from the Nazis. It
eludes what he could observe in Norway of the growth of
esistance from spontaneous impudences to an organized and
curity-minded movement, his confession to a naive venture
military espionage in Stockholm, and details on his com-
ando training in Scotland. Intelligence officers may find
ese items useful; more likely they will want to use them as
an excuse to read an honest and unglamorized story of exalted
uman enterprise in the service of a cause, followed by inevi-
table disillusionment when the cause is won.
h,
,
 Approved For Rel
EVASIONS AND ESCAPES
BE NOT FEARFUL. By John Furman. (London: Anthony
Blond, Ltd. 1959. Pp. 224. 18/-.)
This account of a British army officer's escapes and pro-
longed evasion in Italy during World War II, in some respects
a story much the same as many previously published, is unique
in its pertinence to organizational aspects of large-scale eva-
sion activities and for the light it throws on wartime intrigues
in and around the Vatican.
Mr. Furman was one of the many Allied prisoners of war
who escaped from camps in Italy during the brief period of
confusion in 1943 between the Italian surrender and the con-
solidation of German authority in northern Italy. Aided by
sympathetic Italians, thousands of these men remained at
large behind German lines, moving southward in the hope of
reaching Allied-controlled territory. Opportunities for cross-
ing the front were limited, however, and caution, inertia, and
official directives encouraged the escapees to remain where
they were until the front overran them: "It will only be a
matter of days or at most a few weeks," they said. But as
the weeks rolled into months and food became scarce, evaders
found it increasingly difficult to keep alive and in hiding.
To meet the exigencies of this situation, a Roman Catholic
priest, Mgr. O'Flaherty, organized from the Vatican a supply
and billeting service in which the Italian-speaking Furman
became a key Rome coordinator. At the peak of its activity
this group provided aid to some 3,000 evading ex-POW's within
a forty-mile radius of Rome, among other things dispensing
subsistence money at a rate that reached some 4,000 tire per
man per month. The records of the organization remained
within the safety of the Vatican along with its director, an
arrangement that raised and still raises some thorny ques-
.ions of law, ethics, and policy. Eventually captured by the
Gestapo, Furman escaped from a train conveying him to Ger-
many and made his way back to Rome, where he resumed work
for the O'Flaherty organization. He continued with this op-
eration until Allied forces entered the city.
MORI/HRP PAGES 120-121
Approved For Rel
A%0ke1,&78T03194A000100040001-0
Successful clandestine activities require luck; and Furman
d his cohorts had a full, almost too full, share. Neverthe-
ss the author's two breaks from POW captivity, both of
em conceived, planned, and carried to completion in a mat-
r of hours, are classics of quick thinking and good timing.
d it was not a matter of luck that he achieved fluency in
Et< iian in a relatively short time by taking advantage of his
idence in Italian households.
Be Not Fearful fills gaps in the open-source history of eva-
on during World War II. Its not having been published until
fifteen or sixteen years after the events it describes is probably
due in part to the delicacy of its revelations about the war-
PIMPERNEL IN PRAGUE. By Donald Campbell-Shaw. (Lon-
don: Odhams Press. 1959. Pp. 192. 18/-.)
H Leisurely account, generous with relevant and irrelevant
'detail, of how the author arranged privately for the 1950 es-
'cape of his wife's relatives from Czechoslovakia, hoodwinking
not only the Communists but also a number of would-be help-
ers, including officers of the American CIC. Of mild interest
m illustrating the border-crossing activity of that time.
Some of its solemn dissertations on peripheral matters-the
evolution and functions of the several Soviet and U.S. intelli-
gence services, for example-are amusing in their ingenuous-
 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
MISCELLANY
B Charles W. Thayer. (New York: Harper and
DIPLOMAT y
Brothers. 1959. Pp. 229. $4.50.)
This casual compendium on the workings of diplomacy in-
.
eludes a quick look at intelligence as certain others see it.
elements of
Chapters XII, XIV, and XV combine taken from
tory of intelligence-the Black Chamber, OSS, CIA,
sources-with The anecdotes or has reservations sab u dip-
standard n-
lomat extraordinary. of socio-anthropologists, with their new
teiligence in the hands
scientific methods. He sees the research ands a ~ iengaged
in their isolated tower in State high-level speeches and re-
analyzing gathering materials for hig - public
analyzing foreign newspapers long since scrutinized in foreign
our embassy staffs." He asks how the new "scien-
capitals by
tific" expert can "take into ric he erationhe naer felt to on t he
smile he never Saw or a
new concept of national estimates he quotes Churchill's on-that "
any
attem tempt of "collective e wisdom" of " severallrrimds must end by re-
fleeting to the synthesize the products
product of none.
But he concedes that specialists in intelligence are useful
support of the Diplomat, the only true intelligence officer.
in the Diplomat has
As the general practitioner in~gtheence, mass of information
a requirement for specialists to bring numbers for men
under encyclopaedic control by substituting in intelligence to
tal capacity. Above all, he needs specialists safeguard his communications.
MORI/HRP PAGE 122
122
 Approved 005/03/15': CI I T03194A0
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SPRING 1960
AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
 authors. They do not necessarily represen#,the fRcia
views of the Central Intelligence AnryeCeof
Training, or any other organaational component of the
intelligence community
WARNING`S
This material contains ;information affecting the National
Defense of the United States; within' the meaning of the
Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
espionage laws, Title 18 USC, person
mission or revelatioA of, which to an unauthorized is
prohibited by law.
SECRET
EDITORIAL POLICY
TUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
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trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
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The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
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 25X1 SECREI1
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of an intelligence asset. CONFIDENTIAL
sign for Jet-Age Reporting . . . . . William Earling 7
New look in speed and guidance for routine informa-
tion reports from overseas. SECRET
tes on the CRITIC System . . . . William A. Tidwell 19
informal progress report on the procedure for urgent
intelligence flashes. SECRET
ti-Soviet Operations of Kwantung Army Intelligence,
1931-39 . . . . . . . . . . . Richard G. Brown 25
Critique of Japanese methods and results in Man-
churia. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Le U.S. Hunt for Axis Agent Radios
George E. Sterling 35
Story of the FCC's Radio Intelligence Division dur-
ing World War II. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
)05/03/15: CIA-RDPggff 40001-0
 UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Page
Operation Portrex . . . . . . . . . Edwin L. Sibert Al
Intelligence and unconventional warfare in a
combat exercise.
The Last Days of Ernst Kaltenbrunner
Robert E. Matteson All
Capture and trial of the chief of the Nazi RSHA.
The Lohmann Affair . . . . . . ... James H. Belote A31
Clandestine German operations in the twenties.
A39
Communication to the Editors . . . . . . . . . .
intelligence in Recent Public Literature
Espionage and Counterespionage .... . . . .
Resistance Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services . . . . . . .
Psychological Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . .
25X1
SECREJ
e 2005103115: CIA43194A00010004 001-0
CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
yman B. Kirkpatrick is Inspector General of the Central In-
telligence Agency.
111iam Earling is a member of a CIA group established to
explore new systems for linking the overseas collector of
information with his consumer in Washington.
illiam A. Tidwell is Chairman of the USIB's Critical Commu-
nications Committee.
rge E. Sterling, who had played a part in the beginnings
of Signal Corps radio intelligence with the AEF in the
first world war, organized and directed FCC's Radio In-
telligence Division during World War II. He retired
after serving from 1948 to 1954 as a Federal Communica-
s;
jor General Edwin L. Sibert, after seven years of G-2 work
culminating in duty as a CIA assistant director, in 1949
and 1950 commanded the U.S. Army Forces Antilles.
~bert E. Matteson is a member of the Board of National Esti-
mates.
es H. Belote is a CIA current intelligence analyst and a
student of modern European history.
 25X1
SECRET
THE INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE AWARD
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant
contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for
publication in the Studies. The prize may be divided if the
two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal
merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently
outstanding.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year,
articles on any subject within the range of the Studies' pur-
view, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the
award. They will be judged primarily on substantive original-
ity and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Mem-
ders of the Studies editorial board and staff are of course ex-
eluded from the competition.
Awards will normally be announced in the first issue (Win-
ter) of each volume for articles submitted during the preced-
welcome
ing calendar year. The but editorial
nominations for awards,
petence in the decision.
25X1
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
se 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
A former G-2 officer gives some
ersonal views on how to mul-
tply the value of a military in-
Uigence asset.
COGNIZED POTENTIAL IN THE MILITARY
ATTACHES
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
The system of U.S. military attaches, a worldwide liaison
service which today is accredited to 75 countries, including five
a..
of the Government's intelligence arms. Probably because of
is lack of understanding its great potentialities remain rela-
vely untapped.
The military attaches have produced and are producing
-
arge amounts of intelligence information, and certain at
-2che reports have been of significant strategic value. The
Army attache in Tel Aviv correctly interpreted the Israeli
d
i
ne
mobilization of October 1956 as a war measure and determ
vo-
a key item in the intelligence which enabled the Watch
it
2
X, Committee to alert the President to the impending Suez War,
e uid be counted by itself a sufficient justification for the at-
om behind the Iron Curtain has also been of incalculable
alue, and that from many, other areas has provided informa-
on of importance.
As the attache systems become recurrently the target of
economy drives in the Department of Defense, however, the
roduce for the intelligence community grows apparent. At-
he reports are not often singled out for distribution to
gh departmental policy levels. Most of them are incon-
sieuous elements of the routine reporting which keeps each
ilitary service up to date on the corresponding services of
ante'' of the encyclopaedic National Intelligence Surveys; but
Ocers at the policy level are unlikely ever to look at an NIS
F, r.VVJ1 VJI IJ . VIM-RUr I U I
VJ IJ4MVVV IVVV4VVV 1-V
'ONFIDENTIAL MORIIIIRP PAGES 1
 CONFIDENTIAL
The MilifaryA @d For
until, when a crisis hits, they have an immediate need for
data on the Lebanese army or the Indonesian navy, and even
then they do not necessarily remain conscious of the fact that
it was the attaches who supplied these data. Nor is it always
obvious at the policy level that there is a significant
from the military attache system in nearly every Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate.
It seems clear that the social rather than intelligence as-
pect of the military attaches' work is weighed too heavily at
certain levels in the Pentagon. Hence the attaches are criti-
cized as "cookie-pushers" assigned to duty on the cocktail cir-
cuit. It is true that the nature of the job in many capitals
requires considerable social activity. In Washington itself,
the papers abound with accounts of parties for or attended
by the service attaches of the various foreign embassies. It
may also be true that the attache staffs occasionally include
some too socially conscious or ambitious officers who devote
themselves too assiduously to the kind of intelligence collec-
tion that is done over a glass. But that sort of thing can
happen in any organization; it is something that can be reme-
died quite quickly and easily by command action.
It is important that a new dignity be given to the attache
system and a deserved respect accorded it. It is important
that the still untapped reservoirs of information needed by
the Government which are available to military attaches be
recognized and exploited. There are new areas that need to
be covered, and old ones that should be covered better. There
are new horizons of opportunity, and new approaches
can be used to obtain intelligence of utmost value.
Coverage and Cross Accreditation
Today there are 761 U.S. staff personnel serving in the at-
tache systems of the Army, Navy, and Air Force overseas,
The Army has 429 (143 officers, 212 enlisted men, and 74
civilians), the Navy 161 (157 officers), the Air Force 171 (145
officers, 22 enlisted men, and 4 civilians). There are army at-
taches accredited to 73 countries, air attaches to 69, and
naval attaches to 58. Army attaches are actually stationed
in 69 countries, air attaches in 53, and naval attaches in 45,
Approved For R
CONFIDENTIAL
Obgf A5 f& kDP78T03194A0001000400U'I=OFIDENTIAL
It has been the policy to accredit one attache to more than
ne country in order to economize in manpower, because the
Gtivities of some countries in some military fields are limited.
or example, there are army attaches in Costa Rica, El Sal-
dor, Honduras and Nicaragua; but Air Force interests in
ese four countries are handled by the air attache in Guate-
ala, and naval matters in all five republics plus British Hon-
liras are the responsibility of the naval attache in Mexico
City. There are other variations in service practices around
the Caribbean. A naval attache is stationed in the Dominican
w?
Republic, but the air attache accredited to Ciudad Trujillo is
tationed in Venezuela, and the army attache comes over from
tba. Haiti, on the other hand, has an army attache in Port
u Prince but is covered by the air attache from Caracas and
e naval attache from Havana.
While there is certainly not enough work under present
auditions in many, of these places to keep separate attaches
illy occupied, the system of cross accreditation does create
me peculiarities. Thus in Havana, where the Air Force rep-
`sentative covers only Cuba, the Navy's covers Haiti in ad-
toii Rbli Oilitr
in, and the Army's the Domncanepuc.ur may
ise on the Dominican Republic is partitioned among
udad Trujillio, Havana, and Caracas; a regional conference
Auld have to be called to get the consensus of our on-the-
t representatives about the over-all strength of the Trujillo
e.
Sometimes the changing currents of international relations
sate some curious situations in this representation from
tside, and changes have to be made in accreditation. At one
Mt the United States had no service attaches in the Sudan,
representatives of all three services in Egypt being ac-
ted also to Khartoum. With the Sudanese more than a
e suspicious of Nasr's designs on their struggling young
tion, this doubling raised obvious problems. Today there
p army attache in Khartoum-a most important, assign-
ent with a military junta running the Sudan-and air affairs op,
e are covered by the air attache in Ethiopia.
actory in certain instances. But we should be aware
in this era of rising nationalism the armed services of
5103/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194AO00100040001-0
FIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL
not accorded resident attaches may consider
those countries and coopera-
themselves slighted and so feel more kindly- resi-
tive-toward the major powers that do keep attaches in
deuce. It would be wasteful, to be sure, to assign naval at-
taches to the Sudan or Switzerland, but the most powerful aff
and influential nation on earth should be able co ry?T that
least one appropriate service attac own every aunt will a
has a military force, however embryonic.
more than enough to keep such officersactive demonstrate. will employed I hope the following paragraphs
New Horizons of countries where the
One need only look at the number Position,
military are today in full control, hold a dominant P?
or at least exercise considerable political influence, in order to
see the ascending potential of the role of the service the mhre
Taking the world region by region and noting only
important examples of this situation, we find in Europe Gen-
eral de Gaulle master of France, General Franco running
and Marshal Tito ruling Yugoslavia, all of them de-
Spain, support from the army;
pendent in one degree or another on in the Middle East Egypt's Nasr and Iraq's Kasem, army of-
ower by military coups; in Africa Haile Se
ficers brought top on the loyalty of his imperial body
lassie of Ethiopia relying a military junta; in Asia the
guard and the Sudan run by and Burma subject to the will
governments of Laos. Paean' pivoting on the key position of
of the military and Indonesia not the dominant fac-
the army; in Latin America theermi n from the rule.
for in domestic politics only by P military may
In such countries, and in count i i al force, ethe officers of es where in future emerge as a powerful p Olit
he military services become a prime intelligence source and
target. The U.S. service attache has as his first obligation,
of course, the development of contact with officers on the
d
chief-of-staff level of the service to Cthe need
But the circumstances of the coup in Iraq Point up of-
for getting to know also the ambitious and rising achieve p omr
ficers who through ability or good fortune may
nence at some future time. The of all future could by this mean
insure, not an advance warning
there would be fewer surprises.
eTT60Md&Pf :' 9kS P78T03194A00010004000'f2NFIDENTIAL
It is acknowledged that in many countries a too obvious or
aggressive cultivating of friendships with military personnel
by U.S. attaches would be viewed with disfavor-and prob-
ably recognized for the surreptitious probing that it was.
Some ingenuity and long-range planning would be required
here. Initially the attache might be able only to spot up-
coming young officers who should be approached later, per-
haps by others, particularly since in many countries those
that carry a political thrust are kept in provincial garrisons
away from the capital. Sometimes the embassy, using the
country-team system, could have people outside the attache's
immediate office make the initial contact, develop the neces-
sary rapport, or maintain a relationship which had been es-
tablished.
But a main avenue of long-term approach to future wielders
of power starts in the United States. Every year hundreds
of foreign military officers attend U.S. service schools. Per-
haps not all of these will reach chief-of-staff level, but the
expectation that they will achieve senior rank is implicit in
their selection for the expensive visit to the United States.
Consider, for example, that Admiral Larrazabal, who headed
the junta that governed Venezuela between the overthrow of
the Perez Jimenez regime and the election of Betancourt, had
attended the U.S. Naval War College at Newport.
We have thus an ideal opportunity to establish personal
relationships that could in the future keep us informed on
;affairs of critical intelligence interest. I am not talking about
ruitment of these officers as agents; it is a matter of de-
eloping the conviction in a foreign officer that his, your, his
entry's, and the United States' interests are all identical,
'o,'r;; so very close that it would be to his country's advantage,
or; at least not to its detriment, for him to confide in you.
First, there should be a thorough, methodical system at
-e school for developing biographical data on each individual
7ficer--not just the usual personal history statement or bio-
phial sketch, but knowledge of the likes and dislikes of
man and what makes him tick. Did his father fight with
Rhalifa against Kitchener at Omdurman? Does he drink
oily, have occasional sprees or amatory adventures? Is he
d he can't afford a better home, feel he can't enter-
/03/15:ALA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0
FIDENT
 CONFIDENTIAL
The MilitaryAVpmdaeed Fo
taro Americans? What are his cultural inter c,
Goethe, chess? Has he been discriminated against because
his race? Where does he want to end his career-as chief of
staff? as constitutionally elected president? as dictator') ear
as a professional officer who has served his country
And how does he see the future development of his own coun-
try? Which great powers does he think can best help it?
faculty
Much of this information can be assembledbyn the
a man's
of the school in question. But intimate insight that
character, and especially the establishment of a rapport
would yield continuing intelligence dividends, would require
that as often as feasible and practical the U.S. officer destined
to be assigned to a country become a classmate of its poten-
tially influential studenisasat~a~ creates a strong bond iden-
tity of interest among
If a foreign officer attends a U.S. school it can be assumed
that his English is passable. But this should not lead to any
relaxing of the attache's effort to acquire fluency in the an-
guage of the country to which he is assigned. The psycho-
logical advantage of knowing the language is tremendous. An
intelligence officer's objectives are much easier to reach if his
foreign contact senses in him not a superficial, self-seeking
interest but a true and deep understanding based upon knowl-
edge of the country's language, history, and customs and an
im-
appreciation of its people. Such specialization, it is question.
plies a relatively long assignment at the post in The full implications of this long-range approach for the
personal career of a military attache may appear rather for-
t
midable in terms of present-day concepts. A year or two spent
learning language, area, and customs, a year
service school to cultivate the friendship of a foreign officer,
and at least a double tour of duty in one country-these may
add up to a third or a half of the U.S. officer's entire active
military career. But if we are serious about our intelligence
effort, this is a way to give new significance and worth to the
attache system, and the long-term benefits should certainly
be high.
Approved For
CONFIDENTIAL
radical proposal for control-
g the substance of routine in-
ormation reports from over-
4e ds and getting them promptly
consumers.
DESIGN FOR JET-AGE REPORTING
William Earling
'ransmitting information from its variegated and far-flung
:collectors to users in the complex intelligence community is
ecessarily a tremendously complicated business. In our pres-
ent situation the natural complexity is compounded by our
having been content to handle nonpriority materials by
means evolved with little change from communication systems
of the archaic past in separate departments and agencies.
1900 the few copies of dispatches from abroad required in
'ashington could be supplied by carbon copies typed in an em-
assy and forwarded by ship pouch. The only improvements
we have introduced for routine reports since then are to use
,ts or stencils instead of carbon paper and to forward them
air instead of by sea.
Given the vastly increased volume of reporting, this speed-up
;means of transportation has not been able to prevent a
et slow-down in the flow of information. Dispatches are
directed back to parent departments in Washington
ugh many separate channels. There are departmental
ews, revisions, retypings, reproduction. man rooms and
retariats distribute them to other interested departments
d agencies, which in turn route them by messenger to sub-
nate components. At every stage they queue up in front
logs and registers. The average transmission time for
tine reports has come to. be measured in months, and some
'documents take more than a year to make their way
Pugh the maze.
is true that the community is not suffering critically
delay in receipt of priority information transmitted by
and cable. Although much of our rapid communica-
system is also archaic, radical improvements have been
MORI/HRP PAGES 7-17
03115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 7
 SECRET
made in some segments. Others are needed and possible, but
this article will limit its concern to routine dispatches and
information reports. For them we need a new, much faster
system, though not necessarily so fast or so expensive as for
cables.
The model intelligence reporting system would connect all
components of the community through one integrated com-
munications network. This network would have the capac
ity to move all intelligence from reporter to consumer within, auto say, 24 hours. It would have standard, at bstream eneds of the
matic procedures for handling information
Personal procrastination, or
line, with no room for backlogs, p
processing delay.
This model is something we can aim at, but we must begin at
some modest and practical beginning. Let us then examine
the design of a not too expensive system to speed the sluggish
flow of information reports from overseas perhaps not fifty-
fold but ten. Most analysts would find it not bad to be sure
of getting all routine information, down to the lowest priority,
within a week of its dispatch.
Triplicate Problem
The time required for the many processing steps that inter-
vene between reporter and consumer, a time exponentially
increased with volume as each report
e but it is not the
problem,
processing station, is central to our
whole problem. If we concentrate on the mechanics getting
possible withou
pieces of paper from point to point as fast as p one
out
considering their substantive purport we are ignoring
of the coin. That the current volume of reporting is outgrow-
ing our ability to handle and use it effectively is manifest not
only in unacceptable delays but in consumer complaints that
they receive too many reports they do not need while failing
to receive information they do need. Collecting components
retort that consumers fail to let them know through standard
evaluation procedures which of their reports are useless anto keep them informed through the standard placing of re-
quirements precisely what is needed. A lack of communica-
tion between the two elements is evident.
03A5Re8?A!AP78T03194A000100040001-0
Lt is clear that better guidance would improve the quality
d reduce the volume of reporting; and this smaller volume
;better material could in turn be handled more speedily.
ormal collection requirements alone cannot do the job: the
angry analyst writes his requirements loosely in order to
sure of getting everything that bears on his subject, and
e avid reporter in the field will find some bearing on some
uirement in almost everything. Nor is the present ton-
er evaluation procedure sufficient to the purpose: in all of
1958 CIA, for example, received only 25 spontaneous eval-
tions of its CS reports, and of those rendered on particu-
`request most were too slow coming-from an average six
oaths up to almost two years in instances-to be useful as
basis for corrective action. What is needed is some new sys-
edm for rapid and frequent user criticism of individual reports
order to point up good material and weed out at the source
my information below the level of significance for the intelli-
ence community.'
A third facet of our problem, bearing both on the delay of
'ormation and on the analyst's dissatisfaction with what
es show up in his in-box, is the practice of successive dis-
ation through organizational channels, through office
tral mechanized dissemination direct to individuals would
tomatic system 2 indicate that a great deal of excess paper
;pumped into the mill by a straight-faced, undiscriminating
e presented with imprecisely defined user require-
ts. If we can find some way to pinpoint in machine lan-
e exactly what each individual analyst requires, we can
him more nearly what he wants and give it to him faster.
f'a'ding of Intelligence Collection," Studies III 1, p. 37, and Lowell
Dunleigh, "Spy at Your Service, Sir," Studies 11 12, p. 81.
cribed by Paul A. Borel, "On Processing Intelligence Informa-
1," Studies III 1, p. 32. For other aspects of mechanized Air In-
gence information handling see two articles in the series on
velopments in Air Targeting," Outten J. Clinard's "Data Han-
g Techniques," Studies III 2, p. 95, 'and Kenneth T. Johnson's
gress and Future Prospects," Studies 111 3, p. 53.
3115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
 SECRET
The problem is then a three-fold one-to speed transmission
and processing of reports, to improve by guidance the quality
of reporting, and to make dissemination faster and more re-
sponsive to precise individual wants- These needs are inter-
related in something of a vicious circle: delayed and indis-
criminate distribution of reports to users breeds delay in get-
ting evaluations of them back to the originators; user disin-
terest in outdated information extends to disinterest in com-
-
menting on it; lack of evaluative comment means m4oe~e
discriminate reporting and disseminate Weri greater
ignifioantle
of reports produces still more ~time and better tailor
cut the transmission and processing
our dissemination, users will better recognize thoe the n in-
terest in feeding back substantive app clm
tor; and the collector will be enabled bonprompt user marginal and to stop wasting his precious manpower
submarginal operations and spurred to concentrate it on pro-
ductive enterprises.
Design for Speed cope with
The design here exhibited of a new sytem on the
this triple problem was developed for experimentation
CS reports of CIA. One of its central features is a roll of per-
forated paper tape. In its most familiar form it is the tape
produced by the perforator unit of a standard M-19 teletype
machine, with its rows of up to five holes in different p~c ed
combinations, each representing a letter or function punch
fed o
pethis rforation is
produces
on the keyboard of edistrib for each When
the M-19 transmitter -distributor
tion, and these an electrical impulse in a channel corresponding to its p
impulses are used to key a page printer, or if
desired produce an identical tape, at the other end of a tele-
phone line or radio circuit.
A postwar development, the fiexowriter, has adapted the
tape communicator principle to the electric
increase typewriter Wthe
sef in the
its richer keyboard and smaller print.
number of impulse channels and corresponding p
positions on the tape permits enough additional combinations
to carry both capital and lower-case letters and some char-
acters and functions, such as semicolons and tabulation, that
the teletype machine cannot perform. Experimentally We
Approved FQr eI
10335 PA 78T03194A000100040001-0
can use either the M-19 or a modified flexowriter in our design,
ut the M-19 is a bit crude for finished reports and the ad-
antages of the fiexowriter are largely vitiated by our need
:
to' stick to five channels in order to keep the tape compatible
~: .
th other communications equipment. Both machines are
too noisy. New tape-producing typewriters are being devel-
oped which will suit us better than either of these.
It is not that we are proposing electric transmission of all
routine information reports, not yet at any rate. But we
are borrowing many features, from cable procedure, and our
stem will if necessary be immediately convertible, in whole
'or in part, to one using electric means.
The prepared tape can be automatically scrambled into a
quite meaningless pattern of perforations. Thus encrypted,
it is secure for radio transmission or, in our design, for air-
ailing by whatever means is fastest. In practice, this means
will probably be the unaccompanied State Department pouch
without waiting for other material to accumulate: the State
uch cannot be bumped by the air lines and is not held up
In customs. The tape should take sometimes as little as one
day to reach its consignee, rarely more than three.
In the experimental procedure, then, a routine CS report
typed in the field, beginning with its operational cover sheet,
on a tape-producing typewriter. The report will be in the
'orm, a compromise between cable and dispatch format, in
'hich the analyst will in a few days, we hope, find it on his
desk; the first manual typing will be the only one in all but
Pceptional instances. Form headings and other repetitive
aerial need not be so typed even here: a standard tape
Tying them can simply be run through. Carbons or a
t in the printer will take care of local dissemination and
ord copies.
Encrypted and pouched, the tape bypasses in effect all
gistries in the field and in Washington-a carbon by the
ual accompanied pouch will satisfy their needs-and is de-
'ered with only a pause for automatic decryption to the CIA
able Secretariat. The Secretariat operates day and night
th its own courier service and whatever staff is necessary
RET
 to get cables to their users within an hour or two of receipt.
It has developed exceedingly effective procedures, and this
bit of borrowing on our part from cable usage will be impor-
tant both materially and psychologically. In the Secretariat
the unscrambled tape is run through a printer, typing original
and carbons of the operational cover sheet, mat and carbons
of the report.
Responsibility for releasing the report, however, still rests
with the controlling area desk, and that for indicating its dis-
semination belongs jointly to the desk and to CIA Central
Reference. A Central Reference expert will be on duty in the
Secretariat, and as soon as the mat is typed he will read it
against user requirements and note on its face the proper
recipients, as far as possible individual analysts. In the mean-
time carbons of the report, along with the original and carbons
of its cover sheet, have gone to the area desk. If it can be
released without further ado, it goes back immediately, as-
signed a number and showing the addressees prescribed by
the desk, to be added to Central Reference's designations. If
it requires consultation, comment, or correction, it is held up,
possibly a day or so, for these. There will be check-up and
inquiry about overdue releases.
Back in the Secretariat, the report number, dissemination
instructions, desk comments, and minor corrections can
easily be added either on the mat or to the tape, and the
tape can either type a new mat or be fed by teletype to the
consumer. At some future date the whole community may
be sufficiently linked in a secure teletype network that most
of the distribution can be accomplished by feeding the cor-
rected tape into it. Considering the usual need for a courier
at the receiving end of the teletype line, however, courier
service from the Secretariat direct to individuals like that in
present use for cables might be at least as fast for many ad-
dressees. When there are a large number of recipients at one
location, as at the Pentagon, the tape and teletype might be
used to print a mat at a central cable center there, say the
Army Staff Communications Office, which could then make
distribution to Army, ASA, Air Force, Joint Chiefs, and Secre-
tary of Defense offices.
iEh'i11 pG)ltty DP78T03194A000100040001-0 SECRET
Field preparation of the tape may have taken a day, trans-
~rttation as much as three, Secretariat processing possibly
blother, desk release and distribution perhaps a couple more.
en the user analyst gets his information it will probably
no more than a week old. He could get it faster only with
large-scale and costly introduction of new radio and cable
ireuits with advanced terminal equipment. Field offices and
sporting but also their considerably greater volume of opera-
onal correspondence all moving at this speed.
_Design for Guidance and Coordination
This speed alone will help feed back to the source an opinion
,-,
on the usefulness of his information, but as we have shown,
new medium is needed for communication from user analysts
!procedure, centered on a form bearing a deadline for return.
4.1........,1?0+
f the v~h,P
-- - . ' ------`--,
o
by
credibility, and adequacy of each report in meeting his require-
ments, with ideas on how it could have been made more useful.
We should like eventually also to get here the analyst's com-
ti
me
ments on its subject-coding, information which should in
build up to yield greater precision in stating requirements,
g dissemination, and retrieving documents from stor-
e.
Comments on subject-coding would not be possible under
resent procedures: information reports as now disseminated
ye not yet been coded. But in our system the Central
derence expert on duty in the Cable Secretariat who reads
report to determine its proper recipients could also assign
ISC and area codes. If the interposition of this step before
urination seems an added complication when we are try-
gto get a report to its users as fast as possible, it would not
y take extra time, and the pay-off in getting analysts to
ik in terms of the codes and in making Central Reference
re of analysts' criteria for coding should be enormous.
e evaluation form will accompany reports sent to those
ysts whose feedback is worth exploiting, the specialists
corned with the subject matter reported, those responsible
ms~
writing collection requirements on it, those whose work
5103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
 SECRET
will, suffer if information is not adequately retrievable because
of imprecise coding. It stands to reason that their coopera-
tion will be quickly rewarded by receipt of fewer reports
which are of no interest to them, by retrieval of filed mate-
rials they need in research, and by the more direct and effec-
tive contact with collectors made possible lebw1 their responses.
The form will be designed for simple
multiple- checks both for the convenience of the analyst and than
facilitate later processing. In past
half of the elaborate old evaluation forms are returned with
For
check marks only, no subst~ hi~ o~ p~~ Processing of the new
the most part, therefore, p
forms will eliminate carbon or reproduced copies and obviate
manual sortings and distribution. One operator can punch All derived
six to eight hundred forms onto cards a day.
comment.
products, except those including analyst
will be tailor-made machine tabulations.
Feedback for Coders
Every theoretical discussion of retrieval problems brings
out the inevitable human limitations in the coding process .3
Central Reference document analysts are not omnis icuuni-
versal geniuses; in assigning the apparently pertinent
they are bound to overlook or not to be aware of angles under
which retrieval might in the future become necessary. This
is the primary criticism leveled at the present lib arryde ystem
espe-
by personnel using it. The Intelligence Subject
cially with the refinement of its current revision, will be a
which
splendid instrument, useful exactly tood r which to which
coders properly foresee the headings ln material
may need to be recovered, but no further.
The better and more widely known the ISC, the more it is
directly used and contributed to by experts
better the retrieval system. If when its revision its
fields,
,
complete we could provide a space on the evaluation form for
analysts to suggest coding in other categories than those as-
signed by Central Reference, analysts would become more fa-
' S roes ff example George W. Wright, "Toward a Federal Intelligence
Memory," Studies 11 3, p. 7, and Paul A. Borel, "On Processing Intel-
25
.
ligence Information," Studies III 1, p.
Design For Reporting
e 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
and any analyst who received
ith the coding systems
,
ar w
nuu a report could take care of his own interests by thus nomi-
nating the appropriate codes. 1^
Central Reference coders in weekly tabulations. These could
ach
f
,
or e
show report numbers, the additional codes proposed
could be
Th
ey
and the names of the contributing analysts.
order
t
ever
arranged by document or ISC number or in wha
stem
the s
i
t
y
o
n
wwould be most conducive to integrating them
roponents.
ith the
p
after any necessary discussion w
this feedback process had been under way for some
O
nce
time and analysts had become used to it, it is hoped they
-
uld
develop sc-- ----
wo
;particularly as wmechanization provides increasingly reliable
eed that they would
th
ey n
and rapid service-to retrieve what
_ ._ _r ai,...:,. ......, hnlrlinAC of
--
o
b
.....p ..
I Wuuaas
e
indexed documents. Without participation in the coding
d
!
.
process we believe this confidence could not be establishe
Feedback for Disseminators
re to achieve the speed and efficiency of mechanical
If
we a
dissemination from a central point direct to individual
analysts, their individual requirements, as we have noted, will
have to be stated with precision and kept up to date by a
feedback system suitable for mechanization. Under such a
des
t
,
co
system, dissemination can take place by ISC subjec
ort would automatically
__
.,
e
r
p
des to
of
ll
iAdicate its dissemination. But coded requirements as we
as coded reports are a prerequisite for such a mechanized
process.
st will
-
he
l
r
-i - -
y
aaaa
II
can ever be fully stated in machine language, and certainly
94 - __,._ -gin i...,.... t
in hsmaiprl nit-
o
side any mechanical system. But most requirements can be
reat routine bulk of
f th
e g
sufficiently- codified to take care o
st's require-
anal
f
y
an
d statement o
dissemination. A codifie
tabulating his
b
y
rents may be derived in the first instance
uestions on
k
t
ey q
o
response over a period of some months
d along with
i
`
ve
e fll the reports he rece
evaluation formor a,
sts could trans-
nal
t
y
a
Documen
sir assigned subject codes.
115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 15
 late this tabulation into a tentative Statement of Require-
ments, to be refined in discussion with the analyst concerned.
The resultant agreed Statement of Requirements would be
used as the basis for current dissemination to him, and
his
could be kept up to date by the continuing feedback of evaluations. tend to give the
This feedback system, properly used, will analyst and his supervisor direct control over the volume
of information delivered to his in-basket. The supervisor is an
interested party because of his responsibility for an equitable
distribution of workload to his subordinat~e~ pra ice a mast
difficult task. Most supervisors carry
and do not inspect their subordinates' in-baskets at regular
d
intervals. Tabulations of the evaluation convenient int melcould
provide them every week or at any
a list of the reports their subordinates ook in and their
aid re-
actions to them. This tool might be a considerable proper workload distribution.
Feedback for Collectors
Most of the questions on the form will be designed to guide
the collector. Headquarters can use the answers, incorpo-
rated into punched card systems covering operational data,
sources, project numbers, and lists of requirements, to fur-
nish. the field, in tabulations bbystation aloi bof their ase and source
cryptonym, the evaluations placed
matched up against requirements levied on the station. Head-
quarters desks and staffs will be able, in their planning and
control functions, to use not only these but other tabulations,
for example listings by project and source of reports and
their evaluations, lists by requirement numbers of evaluated
reports responsive to requirements, and a variety of statisti-
cal compilations. If evaluations run consistently high on a
low-cost source; there will be little question about the renewal
of his operation. Adverse reactions will provide an indication
to the desk and staff
that a situation be drowned in the stato be looked ck of paper sur
faced User rejections will not
faced once a year in the project renewal process, but will lead
to an examination of all pertinent facts and the prompt clos-
ing of marginal operations. Desk and staff personnel will be
ApproveeEfRel
Design For Reporting
eed from the routine bookkeeping chores now required to
,pep track of field reporting.
From Prototype to Production Model
This design for speed and guidance has undergone limited
tests on the reporting of a major field station, and it has been
ound to produce at least the short-term benefits antic-
Ipated. It is still in the prototype stage, however, subject
to modification in more extensive testing planned as equip-
ment becomes available. It may be that new technological
developments, for example photographic or magnetic tape en-
processes now being investigated, will make major
changes desirable. In any case it will require adaptation to
varying local needs in the field before it can be generally ap-
lied to the reporting of even this Agency.
There will be many obstacles to the integration of the re-
porting of the whole community in a single system. They
will have to be tackled slowly, and piecemeal. The easiest be-
ginning will probably be on the receiving end, with the ex-
tension of rapid dissemination and the application of some
better evaluation system in those agencies, notably Air In-
telligence, that employ the Intelligence Subject Code. Ef-
forts are now under way to standardize the format of all com-
unity reporting. For all its tentative and limited nature,
our design does provide a basic concept and may embody some
specific features that can lead to an ultimate integrated re-
rting system.
1115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0
 Approved For Release 15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
agniflcant advance and recal-
rc' rant bugs in the procedure
or urgent intelligence flashes.
NOTES ON THE CRITIC SYSTEM
William A. Tidwell
"A true critick ought to ... communicate to the world
h things as are worth their observation."
Joseph Addison's job description in 1712 could also be the
Otto for a special CRITIC set up by the intelligence com-
unity in mid-1958, the reporting system responsive to a di-
yective that critical intelligence be communicated from the
eld to the "highest authorities" in "speeds approaching ten
utes." CRITIC does communicate rapidly to this high
ecutive world things that are worthy of their urgent at-
tion, specifically indications of international crisis or im-
ding military hostilities. If, in its present state of develop-
eut and with the communications hardware now in use,
ere are relatively few occasions on which a CRITIC message
y moves from reporter to intelligence user in ten min-
' time, the establishment of the system has nevertheless
e radical changes in the flow of critical intelligence to
Washington, and messages handled under it take only a frac-
of the average time required for similar messages before
;inauguration.
blishment and Performance
e intelligence community has always been concerned
the rapid reporting of urgent items, but a systematic
unity-wide assault on the problem did not get under
until the autumn of 1957. At that time a study of the
'sting related to the Turkish-Syrian crisis and certain
ted indicators of Soviet military activity demonstrated
t'many critically important items were being handled in
utine manner and that they frequently required more
24 hours to reach the White House. In terms of aver-
a message containing information such as is now han-
in the CRITIC system would take nine hours and a half
Approved For Release 2E'IA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
 SECRET
The CRITIC System
Approved For
to move from the field reporter to the intelligence user in
Washington.
The results of this study were given to the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities,
which, with the concurrence of the IAC, recommended to the
President that the problem be attacked with the utmost vigor
by the intelligence community. This recommendation was
approved by the President, and the community initiated ac-
tion on two fronts, that of facilities and that of procedures.
The first resulted in the promulgation of NSCID No. 7, desig-
nating the Department of Defense as executive agent for
creating and managing a world-wide communications system
for the transmission of critical intelligence. The second led
to the establishment of the CRITIC system of procedures for
rapid reporting over this world-wide communications net.
From the beginning it was obvious that the initial decision
as to whether an item of information is of critical nature
would have to be made by the field reporters. At the same
time it was clear that field reporting personnel, not always
apprised of all the related information available in Washe ng
might err in their judgments. It was necessary,
fore, while giving as much guidance as possible to the field,
to reserve to intelligence headquarters in Washington
opportunity for final evaluation of CRITIC items before pass-
ing them to the White House.
Critical intelligence was therefore defined as "information
indicating a situation or pertaining to a situation which af-
fects the security or interests of the United States to such
an extent that it may require the immediate attention of the
President," and in DCID No. 1/8 specific categories of infor-
mation considered to fall under this definition were listed.
Field reporting personnel of all intelligence agencies were di-
rected to prefix the indicator CRITIC to all messages con-
taining information under these headings and to forward
them under high precedence by the most rapid communica-
tions means available. It was arranged that in Washington
messages carrying this indicator would receive simultaneous
electrical dissemination
Tactical Air Commands. sys em
the Strategic and the
was put into effect on 21 July 1958.
Approa 1o
The CRITIC System
2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
Like most new undertakings, the CRITIC system operated
with a certain amount of creaking and groaning during the
Est few months, but its effect on the speed of reporting
immediately apparent. CRITIC messages already moved
m field reporters to intelligence users in Washington in an
average of about an hour and a half, as against the 91/2-hour
a erage during the Turkish-Syrian crisis. The Critical Com-
iunications Committee, monitoring the system on behalf of
the USIB, spent a great deal of time refining the interpreta-
on of various categories in the CRITIC list and unsnarling
rocedural problems as they were identified. By the end of
Pe first year of operations the average transmission times
h
ad dropped to an hour or less, an accomplishment made
Inj.
possible by improvements in the hardware and operating pro-
cedures of the supporting communications services along with
better handling of the traffic in the intelligence agencies.
ersistent Problems
The progress achieved by the CRITIC system has thus been
excellent, but a number of problems remain to be overcome
before it can reach full efficiency. For one thing, it can func-
ion perfectly only if the messages are kept short, but field
eporting personnel have not all learned yet to be as concise
.s possible. It is still not unusual for a message to contain
hundreds of groups, and one even reached the 3,000 mark. It
obvious that these messages cannot be put through in ten-
4
m
inute service by present communications equipment, operat-
vi~
g at 60 or 100 words per minute. Long messages to de-
ibe a complex situation could often be obviated by a series
short messages sent as the situation develops.
Some headquarters personnel have been misled by the defi-
tion of critical intelligence as matter for "the immediate at-
tion of the President" into thinking that each CRITIC
~e should in itself be something of an earth-shaker.
t there are a number of categories of CRITIC items, indi-
tors of Soviet hostile intent, which become critical only as
eY form a critical pattern. The pattern, however, can be
erred only in Washington, by the combination of its sev-
elements; and field reporters without access to the rest
the pattern must therefore give CRITIC handling to in-
103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 21
 SECRET The CRITIC System
Approved For
dividual elements, items which may prove in Washington to
be isolated events of relatively little significance.
Some reporting personnel have not understood that the
handling of CRITIC messages in Washington is organized on
a community-wide basis, that the CRITIC designator is less a
communications precedence indicator than an addressee
group which automatically ensures immediate distribution
by electrical means to all appropriate addressees in the Wash-
ington area. Their consequent designation of multiple ad-
dressees has increased handling and processing time and de-
layed delivery to intended recipients. One reporter even ad-
dressed a CRITIC message to the Chairman of the awakened Joint Chiefs
of Staff, causing General Twining to be middle of the night and blocking delivery of the message to its
proper recipients until he could authorize its release.
Such shortcomings as these, however, are probably inevi-
table when a large number of widely dispersed people are called
upon to learn a new system of operation; experience and fur-
ther training of both intelligence and communications per-
sonnel should greatly improve performance in these respects.
More recalcitrant is a problem arising from a communica-
tions fact of life: in a number of highly important countries
of the world, including those behind the Iron Curtain, the
U.S. Government cannot maintain its own communications
facilities and is dependent upon commercial facilities or the
monopolies of the governments concerned, which of course
do not recognize the comparative precedence assigned a mes-
sage within the U.S. Government systems. Some of these
governments might be willing on a reciprocal basis to grant
us the right to operate our own communications, but the
granting of such rights in the United States is contrary to
U.S. policy. Communications from these forbidden areas are
generally the responsibility of CIA and the Department of
State. Both organizations are hard at work on the problem,
and there is some hope that improvements can be effected.
In the communications systems operated by the U.S. Gov-
ernment, considerable additional improvements are planned
or under way. We have good reason to believe that CRITIC
messages handled by these facilities can achieve average
22 ApprWe_WPO
The CRITIC System ____ SECRET
reds of 10 minutes or less within the very near future. Nu-
erous test messages transmitted in substantially less than
kif,
minutes prove that the goal of "speeds approaching ten
utes" is attainable under the right conditions. The
?CRITIC system will become a "true critick," however, only by
e of alert and efficient support from a great number of
telligence and communications personnel in many agen-
es of the Government. Great strides have been made, but
 Approved Fc se 2005103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A0CQf6kW4600F0 ONLY
critical review of prewar Jap-
e military intelligence op-
ations in Manchuria.
I-SOVIET OPERATIONS OF KWANTUNG ARMY
INTELLIGENCE, 1931-391
Richard G. Brown
Japanese military intelligence operations against the Soviet
uon in the Far East became of prime importance after
an took over Manchuria in 1932. Before that she had no
s
t need for intelligence on the Soviet forces in the Far
p
ary; with the U.S.S.R. on the continent, the Chinese being in
[fit. _
-- , ?L LL .. L;w... nF +ti,n TI~,]Y,_
of of
c44hurian incident the Japanese nevertheless had potentially
N~~F?
strong operational intelligence assets in numerous inhabit-
into Soviet territory with relative ease so long as So-
security remained generally lax. In addition, there were
umerous anti-Communist White Russians in northern Man-
e, h'uria willing and able to engage in intelligence activities
1a, sabotage, counterintelligence, and what was to be-
cy in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, included propa-
the Japanese.
e intelligence operations of the principal Japanese
aphy of the area. The means it employed included the
me a major collection effort on the Soviet army and the
atch of secret agents into Soviet territory, the intercep-
s and defectors, and the establishment of border ob-
rp of radio communications, the interrogation of Soviet de-
article is based on historical data compiled, with the assistance
tpersonnel of the Japanese Kwantung Army, by the Military His-
the Office of Military History, Department of the Army. The
Approved For 005103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
Manchuria, issued in June 1955 under the title "Japanese Intel-
Bence Planning Against the USSR." MORI/HRP PAGES 25-34
CIAL USE ONLY 25
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwantung Army Intelligence
Approved F
From the first the Kwantung Army and the Army General
Staff in Tokyo were alert for indications of Soviet reaction to
the Manchurian incident, and after Kwantung Army ele-
ments moved into the Soviet sphere of influence the surveil-
lance of Soviet actions in the Far East, particularly any mili-
tary movements, was intensified. Yet Japanese military
headquarters felt that the Soviet Union had no intention of
intervening in the situation, and so devoted its attention not
to immediate countermeasures but to consolidating the Japa-
nese position in Manchuria and developing an extensive in-
telligence network as Kwantung Army units advanced toward
the Soviet border. This intelligence effort was intensified as
Soviet border defenses improved: aerial photography during
the summer of 1933 revealed extensive fortifications designed
to check Japanese military operations against Soviet terri-
tory.
Agent Infiltration
The principal field intelligence units under the Intelligence
Section of the Kwantung Army staff were eight Army Special
Services Agencies. Of these it was the unit in Harbin which
played the major role in the Manchurian operations. The
Harbin ASSA used White Russians for espionage missions,
and these were the best of the agents available. The border
area ASSA's occasionally used White Russians, but relied
mainly on local Chinese and Koreans. These agents were in-
filtrated into Soviet territory to carry out espionage. Occa-
sional deserters from the Soviet army were also exploited for
information.
The Soviets commenced to bolster border security during
1935. They increased the number of border garrison units,
ordered the evacuation of border area inhabitants, and insti-
tuted constant patrolling. A Soviet counterespionage network
in Manchurian territory, especially in the border area, regu-
larly observed and reported on the movements of Japanese
agents. The White Russians, while more reliable and compe-
tent than other agents, being most of them ardent anti-Com-
munists, were more easily detected. Many were shot in at-
tempting to cross the border, and the majority did not re-
turn, thanks to effective Soviet security. A deadlock in trans-
border operations resulted.
OFFICIAL USPWe
Kwantung Army Intelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
se 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
The standstill in intelligence operations was quite embar-
rassing to the Kwantung Army's headquarters Intelligence
Section, which therefore came increasingly to take over the
t1icularly of the ASSA units. Efforts were made to improve
techniques of agent infiltration, to take more pains in forging
credentials, to pay more attention to dress, baggage, and lan-
guage, to give better training for missions and reporting
At
.
tention was also given to other means of intelligence collec-
tion-communications, publications, and telescopic observa-
Communications Intercepts
Soviet communications in the Far East relied mainly on
wireless; the wire network had failed to keep pace with the
mushrooming military and industrial expansion. A very con-
siderable number of Soviet message circuits were thus vul-
erable to interception. In order to learn the techniques for
breaking codes, the General Staff in Tokyo had sent several
technical officers to Poland in 1933 and 1934: the Polish Army
anese to be among the best in the world. When the first con-
'tingent of these officers returned from Poland in 1935, a small
unit for studies on radio interception and the breaking of So-
Eventually this unit was expanded and became known as the
Communication Intelligence Group, operating directly under
the supervision of the Kwantung Army intelligence service.
The interception and analysis of Soviet plain-text messages
was not undertaken until 1936, when the Soviet Union began
ent
o sup
l
,u
vats
--o-'-----
p
Trans-Siberian Railroad. The BAM line was a matter of grave
concern to the Japanese General Staff, but the Kwantung
Intlli Sti h
egenceeconad no means of observing the prog-
's8; Of construction on it. The Operations Section th
ere
-
ore took the initiative and asked the Japanese-controlled
Its Communications Research Department in Harbin. This
ch was charged with intercepting plain-text wireless mes-
es concerning construction on the BAM line and with
LcL10SJ88113NII31A-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
 Kwantung ArmyAllg g@@cFor R ;, [iQ9 54re Afi 4%TW194A00010006"0bQL 0 0 USE ONLY
V 3
Y F O
y
_
a H
a =a
s
0
~~
~
of
o s
I
. k y<
1 r
0
d d
x }
E ma
z
G~ Y
~- U
a a s
`
m
o
X -E
Y i. 0
/Y N I V
N, aZ
~~~ , ~ 1,
r"
I
Y
t
a
0
o
x
Z_
"-
1,
It
f - _
o
104
\
I o
?
~
?
~Y 0 !\~
t ~
`
0 iq
, kr n
ysis of the intercepted data with respect to selected sub-
bets. Although this installation supplied data to the intel-
gence network through the very active Harbin ASSA the
act that it was conceived and supervised by the Operations
Section became an irritant in this Section's relations with the
telligence Section. The success of the Railway Company's
ceptions with clear text intercepts, which were thereafter
o
rwarded on ticker tape to the Harbin ASSA for analysis by
is:Document Intelligence Division.
ocument Analysis
The importance of available Soviet publications, primarily
ewspapers published in the Far East, had somewhat belatedly
analysts originally assigned to the Harbin ASSA had been aug-
is staff included a large number of White R
i
i
t
uss
an
n
ellec
foals, as well as Japanese competent to interpret and anal
ze
y
Soviet documents, publications and messages. Periodicals,
id even personal notebooks collected by the various intelli
ter, when it became difficult to obtain documents
greater
grear
,
1Portance was attached to Soviet radio broadcasts
l
, a
ong
th the intercepted clear-text wireless messages
But th
.
ere
ere still documents obtained by agents, papers carried by
e o
ccasional defectors from Soviet territory, and in one
plane which made a forced landing in Manchuria in 1938.
`der Observation
I
n- the early thirties the military units of the Kwantung
Z T7
each front-line unit had a few lookout posts equipped
lt
u
ies 111
'gene collection became acute in 1934, the intelligence
-- ----- .,j.,.,H... - ....
lligence activity. The observation posts were organized
Soviet side of the border under surveillance day and night,
OFFICIAL USE ONLY ICIAL USE ONLY
Approved Fo
~
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwantung Army IAjf#i9vwd For
recording in detail the movement of even a single soldier,
horse, or vehicle. The posts were each manned by approxi-
mately one squad. They used telescopes of various types,
ranging up to one of 150 power obtained from the Navy for
night use. The front-line Army commands were ordered
to make use of any suitable points in their respective sectors
for this purpose, and to train and supervise the personnel
to make the observations. Nevertheless, up until 1938 these
teams were often composed of inferior personnel and occa-
sionally even lacked telescopes.. Some of their more impor-
tant reports were on the arrival and departure of ships in
Vladivostok harbor, as observed from posts at Wangchaoshan
and Tumentzu, and on the arrival and departure of aircraft
at Voroshilov, as seen by posts at Suifenho and Tungning.
Achievements and Failures
By mid-1939 the Kwantung Army's intelligence agencies had
scored considerable progress in improving their operations.
In 1935 the communications intelligence Research Unit had
succeeded in breaking the simple codes used by the Soviet
border forces, and constant study brought later successes
against Soviet army codes of three and four letters. Although
these codes were not commonly used for important messages,
the Research Unit was nevertheless able to learn the organi-
zation and disposition of some border garrisons and the loca-
tion and movements of some air units. It also did traffic
analysis, compiling statistics on the origin and volume of So-
viet radio messages.
The interception and study of plain-text messages by the
South Manchurian Railway's Communications Research De-
partment yielded considerable information about the progress
of construction on the BAM line. The Kwantung Army's Re-
search Unit was also able to obtain from plain-text intercepts
some valuable indications about particular military situations
in Asiatic Russia. Analyzing this data, the Document Intel-
ligence Branch of Kwantung Army intelligence was able to
reach conclusions about the disposition of units, changes in
units, their commanders, their numerical designations, the
arrival of new personnel, and their places of origin, as indi-
cated by messages of safe arrival sent home. Messages in the
30 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved
antung Army Intelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ear also supplied many fragmentary details about industrial
dl economic conditions in Asiatic Russia, and these often
r
t
ibuted to important findings.
91 r
hewn,..e piecemeal data compiled by the Harbin Document In-
.. T_..
elons in making estimates of the enemy's
+
000 Soviet officers in the Far East, for example, contributed
cantly to ascertaining the order of battle for Soviet
y forces in eastern Asia. An unusual o
erati
n
-
p
on u
der
en, by the Division was the examination of
postal matt
r
e
the Soviet mail plane which made a forced landing in Man-
tula in 1938. The mail had to be secretly opened, sorted,
plom
f
---_?? negotiations
o the
turn of the airplane and its crew were being carried on,
'
e analysis of the material was completed within a month.
The observation teams engaged in telescopic surveillance of
e not notably successful. They provided details on S
i
t
ov
e
unification improvements in parts of the border zone and
ho
e
b
hi
C
u
s
e
nd the
ortifications, and they compiled statistical data on vehicle
... tl(1Tta ennrnr+;nn. +L.,, e_..c,,,_ , _
A's to penetrate Soviet territory with spies were
nearly
,failures, but their interrogation of fugitives from Soviet
__--
Ak~~'~r,rtest of the Kwantung Army's intelligence services was
which began in may as a series of clashes between Soviet
and Manchuria. By June it had become a
major engage.
divisional magnitude and in August a failure for the
ese. This operation disclosed several serious defects of
iite -'g --.y intelligence,
of its significant improvement since 1931
I
.
n gen
fit: showed itself still not sufficiently modernized and sys=
tied to be effective. It also showed marked differences
g
em and procedure among its several components.
,CIAL USE ONLY
2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwantung ArmAilpw6gor
Deficiencies at Nomonhan
The chief defects of the Kwantung Army's headquarters
Intelligence Section arose from its having assumed over a
period of years complete control of all the ASSA's. Its own
functioning had consequently become extremely complex and
its real aims were often lost from sight. Properly a policy
planning staff, the Section had been transformed into an op-
erating agency, and the detail arising from its domination of
the ASSA's constantly obstructed it. As the discharge of its
normal responsibilities became careless under these stresses,
the headquarters Operations Section lost confidence in it and
tended to make its own estimates, arbitrary and independent,
drawn from scanty information and often from untested
sources. The Intelligence Section was unable to halt this
trend, and it became more pronounced with the passage of
time.
This headquarters involvement with the ASSA's was aggra-
vated by an organizational weakness in the coordination of
these units which prevented them from being utilized sys-
tematically. The ASSA's had failed to systematize liaison
and cooperation among themselves. The Harbin ASSA, which
had the greatest experience and capacity in Soviet intelligence
and a staff more comprehensive and diversified than any of
the others, was kept on an equal footing with the other seven,
so that the benefit of its knowledge and expert guidance was
not imparted to them. With all eight operating independ-
ently under the direct control of the Intelligence Section, the
administrative burden became too great during the Nomon-
han incident.
A serious procedural defect in the handling of information
was illustrated by an incident which produced a minor crisis
in relations between the Intelligence and Operations Sec-
tions. The Harbin ASSA had obtained through a contact in
the office of the Soviet consul general there a file purporting
to be extracts from message traffic between Moscow and
Khabarovsk. Initially this correspondence seemed authen-
tic and important, but developments after the outbreak of
the Nomonhan incident convinced the Intelligence Section
that it was false and deceptive. The Operations Section, how"
ever, which had obtained a copy of it from the Harbin ASSA,
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wantuna Armv Intelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
!ssumed that it had been acquired by interception and deci-
herment, and. reproduced it under highest security classifica-
ature of this correspondence to the Operations Section,
'hick therefore tended to be misled by it in some phases of
e Nomonhan operations.
It was not until the last stages of this engagement, as the
Kwantung Army was concentrating its strength for an
attack, that the communications intelligence Research Unit
achieved some moderate success in learning the disposition
Soviet and Mongolian troops in the Far East; and even
limited accomplishment was made from the vantage point
Changchun-almost 500 miles from the scene of battle.
e Kwantung Army's inadequacies in the communications
_ telligence field were strikingly apparent in its failure to
f battlefield information transmitted by wireless in either
ode or plain text, for the Soviet army often transmitted in
clear text in situations demanding speed, and the increase in
number of coded communications for combat purposes
uld have facilitated the solution of the Soviet code. Com-
unications facilities in the vastness of Outer Mongolia, the
rocale of this conflict, were so patently poor that a significant
~_aa n++t,o
ntbreak of hostilities. Japanese interception equipment was
nately trained to tap this source of intelligence. Another
usive use of the intelligence services; the secret missions
t did get into Soviet territory were often therefore
aced.
9! committee of officers from Kwantung Army headquar-
g Army's performance during the Nomonhan incident
fact that the operations staff officer had insufficient con-
ce in the estimates of the enemy situation made by the
Bence staff officer, and as result was inclined to form
own estimates on an inadequate intelligence foundation,
times even basing his decisions exclusively on the peace-
1 31Rt CJDP78T03194A000100040001-0 33
f
 time situation. Another was the preoccupation of intelligence
officers with peacetime intelligence problems to such an ex-
tent that they failed to develop a war mobilization plan and
thus were unable to exploit enemy activity during the No-
monhan hostilities. A third was the fact that improvements
in techniques were insufficiently taken advantage of, and that
there was a great need for systematizing operations and pro-
cedures. The committee recommended that major improve-
ments be made in. the peacetime operation of the intelligence
services and in preparing. them for wartime activity, so that
intelligence estimates, as well as other intelligence products,
would enjoy the full confidence of operations officers and be
accorded full weight.
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005103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0
ov FCC's routine policing of
ether became in World War
u multi-purpose defense serv-
`and a far-flung counter-
ge operation.
THE U.S. HUNT FOR AXIS AGENT RADIOS
George E. Sterling
I hope that this country, particularly its intelligence agen-
es, has become better organized to handle a national emer-
'ency than it was in 1941. When the war, after slowly creep-
uddenl
h
y
ores, s
for two years from Europe toward U.S. s
s had to be undertaken in desperate haste and with
thin
g
t times disorderly improvisation. Many agencies were giver.
sing equipment approximating what was needed for the war-
rdi-
t
rao
e work. That they by and large discharged these ex
vely toward the gradual readjustment of temporarily as-
rtici-
gned functions, is something in which all those who pa
ated can take pride.
The Federal Communications Commission, because it had
olice the domestic airwaves, was given its full share of
ties not called for in its job description. It ran a rescue
k.
t
r hors weather.
blac
ou
o
ting them by their radio signals and furnishing them their
_ e -L:-L -....,,7.7 n+U,ar_
have been really lost, were given FCC emergency fixes
Air Force personnel were trained, with our help,
ore Arm
y
take over the job. It monitored enemy commercial radio
ith
.nits and furnished the Board of Economic Warfare w
dreds of leads useful in the preclusive buying program.
meet requirements of the Eastern, Gulf, and Western de-
e commands, the Commission's legal responsibility for ap-
ending unlicensed radio stations was extended to sur-
e of the coast by radio patrols for signs of surrepti-
e 15j UOWP78TO3194A000100040001-0 35
MORIIHRP PAGES 35-5
 tious communication with enemy submarines. The network
intercepted foreign weather traffic for our air forces. It mon-
itored foreign radio broadcasts, setting up the organization
which now has become the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, and published texts and analyses of broadcast news
and propaganda for a variety of government consumers. It
trained OSS personnel in radio methods and procedures and
built equipment for their use.
For a year and a quarter the FCC's Radio Intelligence
Division, as the monitoring network was known, carried the
full load of military radio intelligence in Alaska, where the
Army was not able to station a radio intelligence company
until late in 1942 and got a monitoring station in operation
only in the spring of 1943. It radio-patrolled the Alaskan coast
by sea. It also participated at Army request in military in-
telligence elsewhere, most notably in Hawaii and on the west
coast. In San Francisco it set up an Intelligence Center
where officers of the military services were on duty around
the clock. It identified and tracked the radio-equipped bal-
loons which the Japanese launched against our west coast.
It discovered and established the location of a Nazi weather
station on Greenland, which the Coast Guard was then able
to destroy. It trained the military personnel who eventually
took over most of these duties, prepared instructional book-
lets and monitoring aids for them, and supervised their work
until they became competent enough to operate without help.
The RID even participated from afar in the guerrilla move-
ments in the Philippines. This activity began when one of
our monitors picked up a signal using the call, PK1JC, of an
amateur in the Dutch East Indies, where no amateurs could
operate. We fixed its origin in northern Luzon. PK1JC sent
a message coded, we determined, with a prewar Signal Corps
cipher disk, giving the name and serial number of an unsur-
rendered American soldier trying to establish contact with
MacArthur's headquarters. He requested acknowledgement
by a signal from General Electric's powerful KGEI transmit-
ter near San Francisco. The Signal Corps arranged for this
acknowledgement and asked us to continue copying all his
messages. Later, when the landing of transmitters by sub-
marine created quite heavy traffic from the Philippine guer-
6~f5 Ralf%aRDP78T03194A0001001 J I40 USE ONLY
villas, a primary monitoring station at San Leandro, Cali-
fornia, was exclusively devoted, at Signal Corps request, to
copying it and expediting it by private teletype circuit to
Washington.
Policing the Domestic Ether
Although these spirited improvisations requested and sup-
ported by the military services lay far outside the Commis-
'sion's proper charter, the Communications Act of 1934, they
were undertaken eagerly when required and relinquished later
gracefully but with reluctance by our radio men and women
anxious to contribute to the war effort in any way they could.
Our people had enough of their own proper work to do, for
after Pearl Harbor the regular job of the Radio Intelligence
Division took on a new and grimmer aspect. It was now not
just a question of tracking down maladjusted transmitters,
unshielded diathermy apparatus, or even the illegal communi-
cations of pranksters, smugglers, and racetrack tipsters, but
of sealing the country's leaky ether against loss of war
secrets over the radio circuits of enemy agents. Hitherto,
with commercial communications to foreign countries free of
surveillance, spies in this country had had no need to risk
secret transmitters; now these commercial facilities were
'closed or censored and the whole spectrum had to be patrolled
or furtive whisperings in Morse cipher. The RID was under
challenge to live up to its initials.
The Division's equipment, personnel, and physical deploy-
ment were adequate to the task. During the state of national
emergency that preceded Pearl Harbor the FCC had been au-
orized to begin an expansion of its radio detection faciu-
ti s; which were ultimately stabilized in twelve primary moni-
ring stations, about sixty subordinate monitoring posts, and
nt ninety mobile units distributed through the United
tes, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska. The fixed stations
d many of the mobile units were linked by instantaneous
(ommunications. They were organized into three major net-
erks based on radio intelligence centers respectively in
sshington, near San Francisco, and in Honolulu; but in fix-
the location of a source of radio signals the three net-
Mks were fused into one and directed from Washington.
05103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
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 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis ,AppiiogediSnr Re
Each primary station, in addition to its complex of rhombic
and other antennae and its receiving and recording equip-
ment, had at least one Adcock direction finder, a large rotat-
ing antenna sensitive to the direction of shortwave signals
bounced off the ionosphere; this device had been invented in
England, but was refined and improved by RID engineers. At
short range, say within a few miles, a simple loop antenna
can pick up the ground-wave component of a signal and deter-
mine its direction; our disguised mobile units included these
in their equipment. And finally, for locating transmitters at
really close quarters, we developed what we called a "snifter,"
a signal-strength meter that a man could carry in the palm
of his hand while inspecting a building to determine which
room a signal came from.
In the routine day-and-night operation of a monitoring sta-
tion, the patrolman of the ether would cruise his beat, passing
up and down the frequencies of the usable radio spectrum,
noting the landmarks of the regular fixed transmissions,
recognizing the peculiar modulation of a known transmitter
or the characteristic fist of a familiar operator, observing an
irregularity in operating procedure and pausing long enough
to verify the call letters, or finding a strange signal and re-
cording the traffic for close examination, and then sometimes
alerting the nation-wide net to obtain a fix on the location of
its source. More than 800 such fixes would be made in an
average month, requiring the taking of some 6,000 individual
bearings. For although mathematically the intersection of
two bearings provides a fix, the 1% error that must in prac-
tice be allowed in the angle of a bearing, even when it is cor-
rected for variations in propagation and site conditions, be-
comes considerable at distances that may run to thousands
of miles; and at least four bearings are needed for a reason-
ably reliable long-range fix.
Radio Spies in the United States
With respect to Axis agents in the United States and its
territories this close vigilance was almost purely prophylactic,
and effective in its prophylaxis: out of respect for it enemy
agents, as far as we ourselves were able to discover, made
only two attempts during the entire war to establish radio
communications across our ethereal frontiers, and in both cases
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1,69M# : I'1 DP78T03194A0001000 fAL USE ONLY
'ailed to get a single message through. The stories of these
,two, although they have been told from other viewpoints else-
Ohere,2 are worth summarizing here.
The first took place in the spring of 1940, long before Pearl
Harbor had roused us to hunt for radio spies here in earnest
.
Our routine monitoring turned up an unidentified transmit-
s-
ter carrying on coded traffic with a distant station which used
the call AOR. We asked the Army and the Navy if it might
-
LL----_ r...
_
one of
hd
a
ought it might be a St. John, New Brunswick
station
But
,
.
Our direction finders showed it to be on Long Island, and its
correspondent AOR near Hamburg, Germany
We re
orted
.
p
to the FBI.
The Bureau told us in confidence that it was indeed a Ger-
man agent radio, but under their control. A German-Ameri-
can, William Sebold, had revealed that he was recruited b
y
the Nazis and instructed to set it up. The FBI built and now
Were manning the station for him
feeding Hambur
fals
,
g
e or
nnocuous information and identifying its agent sources. The
deception continued for more than a year under our joint
a
+.
geuw
whom the traffic had furnished leads were arrested. At
ei til th
rraat fall, when the defense tried to maintain that
OR was not a German station but an FBI entrapment device
the United States, RID engineer Albert McIntosh produced
shi th fi
owngex on Hamburg. His public testimony
ust have been one factor in the German decision not to risk
nt transmitters in the United States.
They did try it once more, though, right after Pearl Har-
r, apparently on local initiative, impromptu
In the
ene
l
.
g
ra
srt which followed that shocking Sunday morning we had
gton streets. These were equipped not only with loop di-
finders btith di
u w aevce we called the watch-dog, an
i~Pilhehn Hoettl, one of the German foreign intelligence area chiefs,
,firmed during his interrogation b
3rd A
i
y
rmy
n June 1945 that th
e
Sicherheitsdienst had not been able to establish a single wireless
06ao1y in Don Whitehead's The FBI Story.
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 Axis AgeAp g?d For ?x2g0~aenltl a I1-RDP78T03194A0001000~ 0001' 0llcr! ^~v
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aperiodic receiver we had developed which would sound an
alarm when it received a strong signal on any of a wide range
o
f frequencies. (It was patented by two RID engineers and
O i
later used by OSS and the Navy.) In the wee hours of Tues-
day, December 9, one of these watch-dogs was triggered b
y
signals on a transatlantic frequency. At the same moment
three thousand miles away our monitors in Portland
Oregon
,
,
heard them too-station UA briefly and vainly calling a dis-
ant control center. Five other direction-finding stations were
t to watch the frequency; and when a few hours later UA
tried it again, they reported the bearings projected on the
chart in Figure 1. This fix confirmed the uncertain supposi-
tion of the watch-dog that the transmitter was in Wash-
ington.
Now three mobile units were given the scent, and they
juickly narrowed down the location to the German Embassy
,
as shown in Figure 2. It was a problem to pin-point the
transmitter without entering the Embassy because the an-
~
enna was stretched between two buildings, with equal signal
trength at each end and apparently lead-in wires to both
uildings. This problem was solved in a pre-dawn conference
pith the FBI, who arranged, in cooperation with the Potomac
lectric Power Co., that we could go down into a manhole in
he street and cut the power to each building separately in
urn when UA began to call. In the end, however, because
he State Department was afraid for our own diplomatic mis-
on still in Germany, we did not seize UA but simply set up
vo jammers to drown him out if he should try once more.
:e never did.
This beginning was the end for Axis radio agents within
zr borders; any German agents picked up by the FBI there-
`ter were found to have been using secret ink or some other
!mmunications than radio to get information out of the
try. And we learned that some Japanese agents who re-
tested their headquarters' permission to set up a transmitter
re were turned down on the grounds that the FCC would
tb them as soon as they got on the air. Outside our own
ates and territories it was a different story, one in which
so the RID became intimately concerned.
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F
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY AxiAplHeSRe le
The Portuguese Net
One day in September 1941, monitors at the secondary RID
post in Miami heard a station using irregular procedures and
signing the call UU2, one not in conformity with those used
on commercial and other authorized circuits. it was there-
fore made a case for investigation. Bearings fixed its loca-
tion near Lisbon, Portugal; and as it continued to call almost
nightly without receiving a reply, RID units were instructed
to be on the lookout for the answering station. After more
than a month monitors at the secondary posts in Pittsburg
and Albuquerque simultaneously picked up the answer from
a station signing CNA; bearings were taken which located this
transmitter in South Africa.
A few days later another station using the UU2 procedure
was intercepted, this time with the call BX7. It was also in
Lisbon, and the characteristics of its signal showed that with-
out question BX7 was the same station which had previously
signed UU2, apparently the control station of a network. After
a week an answer with the call letters NPD was picked up by
our Rhode Island monitoring post. This station proved to
be in Portuguese West Africa.
The messages exchanged between the Lisbon control UU2'
BX7 and the two out-stations in Africa were of course en-
ciphered. RID did not maintain a cryptanalysis laboratory,
decipherment being the responsibility of the FBI, of the
Army's Signal Intelligence Service, and, on behalf of the Navy,
of the Coast Guard; but in order to facilitate the identifica-
tion of intercepted traffic we had interested a couple of our
staff in cryptanalytic work. These men attained a consider-
able skill and in some cases were able to furnish leads for the
FBI decipherment. The Lisbon cipher was one of these cases.
It was an up-and-down transposition whose key length varied
from day to day.
The texts of the messages showed this network to be one
channel by which German agents in the neutral countries
and colonies of Africa reported on the movements of ships,
troops, and materiel and on political events. On March 26,
1942, for example, the South Africa station reported ship sail-
42 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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jjOX/J& 9hJcP78T03194A00010004 1 AL USE ONLY,
gs and the concentration of Allied troops which later took
agascar. As translated from the Portuguese:
TWENTYSIXTH. AMERICANS "NISHNAHA" AND "SOLONTU-
SHAW" SAILED WITH ORE FOR NEW ORLEANS, ALSO ENGLISH
"CITY OF N. CASTLE"; "ANGOLA" AND ENGLISH "ISIPIEGO"
FROM DURBAN ARRIVED WITH PASSENGERS. TROOPS STILL
CONCENTRATED; TRYING TO LEARN DETAILS.
From Portuguese West Africa an agent with the code-name
do sent similar information intermingled freely with
iperational reports. On December 4, 1941:
ARMANDO REPORTS ENGLISH CONSUL RECEIVED LONG EN-
CIPHERED TELEGRAM RELATIVE ENFORCING STRICT VIGI-
LANCE AGAINST ESPIONAGE. OFFICIALS CLAIMED ENGLISH
STILL COMMAND CAPE VERDE SUBMARINE CABLE. MANY
MEN GO TO FREETOWN OWING APPROACH TEN CONVOY
SHIPS, LARGE TROOPS, AMMUNITION AND TANKS. HOW-
EVER INFORMER DOES NOT KNOW IF THEY REMAIN LAGOS
On January 7, 1942:
WEST INDIA ARRIVED BATHURST FOURTEEN WITH PILOTS
AIRCRAFT MECHANICS DISASSEMBLED TANKS ANTIAIRCRAFT
MACHINE GUNS MUNITIONS LARGE QUANTITY GASOLINE
CAMPAIGN TENTS. NEXT MONTH WE WILL HAVE REGULAR
CONNECTION DAKAR THROUGH INTELLIGENT NATIVE GOLD-
SMITH AUTHORIZED TO ENTER COLONIAL SERVICE UNDER
GOVERNOR TO HELP MY WORK. ARMANDO
On February 5:
CHIEF OF POLICE LIEUTENANT UNDERCOVER IMPRUDENTLY
WORKS FOR ENGLISH. CONVENIENT TO OBTAIN HIS RE-
TURN LISBON. BE CAN DAMAGE US. ARMANDO
But the Germans were growing dissatisfied with Armando's
ork. The Lisbon station radioed him on February 11:
SAID THERE IS TO BE DISEMBARKMENT ENGLISH AMERICAN
TROOPS DAKAR NEXT FIFTEEN DAYS. WHY NO REPORTS
MOST URGENT.
On February 12:
DISEMBARKATION TROOPS FREETOWN NOT DAKAR. I OR-
DER YOU INVESTIGATE. NOT SATISFIED REPORTS WHICH I
CALL FOR. HAVE RECEIVED BETTER REPORTS FROM OTHER
PERSONS.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
 E ONLY Axis Agent Radios
OFFICIAL US
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And most indiscreetly,. on 27 March:
SECURE EXPEDITIOUSLY RECENT REPORTS DAKAR FREE-
TOWN RELIEVE CAROLINA OF. HIS DU TM.
PERSONALLY NEW
POR-
TER BEARER SHOULD DELIVER LETTERS
HOTEL DUAS HACOES VICTORIA STREET FOR. MR.
OR-
GANIZATION TWO MORE MONTHS. USE YOUR BEST REPORTS
FOR MY VINDICATION.
The organization did not in fact last much longer than
two more months, but it was not the Germans who termi-
nated it. Revelations like this one enabled Allied intelligence
officers to clean out the Portuguese group in the summer of
1942.
Nazi Agent Training and Procedures
Having thus demonstrated its capability in the European
theater, the RID was approached early in 1942 by its British
counterpart, the Radio Security Service, with a request for
the establishment of regular liaison and exchange of informa-
tion. From then on to the end of the war we maintained
a most harmonious and fruitful relationship which served to
build up a pretty complete picture of the German diplomatic
and espionage networks and their activities. The characteris-
1 rators were
e
d
ua ap
tics of individual transmitters and mdivi
recorded and catalogued so that they could be recognized
when they were used on a different circuit. Nearly all the
codes and ciphers were broken, and the great bulk of the clan-
destine traffic could be promptly read. During the most criti-
cal period of the war in Europe the RID was monitoring 222
frequencies used in clandestine intra-European circuits.
After the Lisbon net was closed down the Germans had five
major networks, with control centers in Berlin, Hamburg,
Bordeaux, Madrid, and Paris. The out-stations were located
in practically every European country, in Africa and the At-
lantic, and in the western hemisphere. The operators of these
out-stations were in general not skilled radiomen, we learned
from captured spies, but agents who had been trained in radio
and codes and ciphers along with other tradecraft-for
ample photography and microfilm, secret writing, explosIYes
and demolition-at a school near Hamburg. Their radio
OFFICIA>.p(Wt9b* R
20~05A0~3115 RCIA-sRDP78T03194A00010004001&IA USE ONLY
training embraced the use of International Morse and the
construction and operation of transmitters and receivers.
Student operators were required to achieve the modest
transmitting speed of twelve words a minute (as compared;
nr example, with our Merchant Marine requirement of 20-25
ords a minute). Then they would make a five-minute sample
transmission on a device which recorded graphically their
ed, touch, and characteristic fist. On the basis of this
ph they were assigned a permanent transmitting speed
and given another week's training at this speed. Then a sec-
ppnd graph was made as each operator graduated, this one to
filed as a specimen signature against which his later mes-
ges would be verified as genuine and not the deception of
enemy counterespionage. This procedure was apparently
dopted after the Germans learned that the FBI had fooled
them with the Sebold station on Long Island.
The agents were furnished portable transmitters and re-
livers, usually of the type built into a suitcase, complete with
antenna wire, tools, and all the accessories necessary for going
to immediate operation. They were given precise instruc-
.ons for constructing a directional antenna which would af-
ord a maximum signal to their control center and amini-
in to eavesdroppers. Then they were dispatched to their
by neutral ship, by submarine, by parachute, or over
The first sign of their safe arrival would be their call let-
on the air; and this would signify their presence to us,
for it is difficult to disguise an agent radio's call. At one
k when the control of one of the German nets passed
the Abwehr to the Gestapo, its transmitters adopted
.
e%, tcall letters and frequencies of commercial stations in
~ I
America; but other characteristic procedures of clan-
e traffic still betrayed them, and this device was later
coned.
;being able to disguise their calls, the agent networks
eta practice of changing call letters, usually every day,
effort to spoil continuity for their pursuers. But very
r,d a rota which remained nonrepetitive for a year, say,
We, were able to work out in advance the call letters
many espionage transmitters would be using on any
AJ.I USECIA- P78TO3194A000100040001-0
ONT
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY AxisAp~rovecf or Rele
particular future day; sometimes we even caught the out-
stations making mistakes in their own system. Some worked
with a list of 31 different calls which repeated itself every
month. Some had two such lists, one for odd and one for
even months. One system was worked out with such little
forethought that a spy once had to call with the international
distress signal, SOS. This was one of the systems that deter-
mined call letters in connection with the cipher key for the
day, a connection that sometimes led our part-time crypt-
analysts into the decipherment of messages.
One-group, we learned from one of its indiscreet first mes-
sages sent blind, based its calls and transposition cipher on
the Albatross edition of Axel Munthe's The Story of San
Michele, a book excluded by copyright arrangements from the
British Empire and the United States, using a different page
each day. The page to be used was determined by adding to
a constant number assigned each agent the number of the
month and that of the day in question. The last line on
this page contained the calls to be used-the first three let-
ters, reversed, for the control center and t o he last three, reversed, for the out-station. An example procedure
may be of interest.
Shortly before midnight, eastern standard time, on March
12, 1942, one of our monitors at Laredo, Texas, copies the fol-
lowing slow hand-keyed message on 11,220 kilocycles.
VVVV EVI EVI EVI
IWEOF WONUG IUVBJ DLVCP NABRS CARTM IELHX YEERX
DEXUE VCCXP EXEEM OEUNM CMIRL XRTFO CXQYX EXISV
NXMAH GRSML ZPEMS NQXXX ETNIX AAEXV UXURA FOEAB
XUEUT AFXEH EHTEN NMFXA XNZOR ECSEI OAINE MRCFX
SENSD PELXA HPRE
We know from our analysis of previous messages that the
call EVI is due to be used by an operator of the San Michele
group whose assigned constant number is 56. Checking, we
add the month and day-this would be March 13 by Green-
wich Mean Time-and turn to page 72 of the novel. The last
word on the page is "give," so EVI is right. The first word on
the last line is "like"; the control center will sign KIL. The message sent in the early hours of March 13 was prob-
ably enciphered on March 12, so we go back to page 71, shown
here opposite, for the key. Here the first line reads, "I would
is Agent Radios OFFICIAL USE ONLY
x510315: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
I would have known how to master his fear, and would have
been the stronger of the two as I have been in later years
more than once, when I have stayed a hand clutching a
revolver in fear of life.
When will the anti-vivisectionists realize that when they
are asking for total prohibition of experiments on living
animals they are asking for what it is impossible to grant)
them? Pasteur's vaccination against rabies has reduced the
mortality in this terrible disease to a minimum and Behring's
anti-diphtheric serum saves the lives of over a hundred
thousand children every year. Are not these two facts alone
sufficient to make these well-meaning lovers of animals
understand that discoverers of new worlds like Pasteur, of
new remedies against hitherto incurable diseases like Koch,
Ehrlich and Behring must be left to pursue their researches
unhampered by restrictions and undisturbed by interference
from outsiders. Those to be left a free hand are besides so
few that they can be counted on one's fingers. For the rest
no doubt most severe restrictions should be insisted upon,
perhaps even total prohibition. But I go further. One of
the most weighty arguments against several of these ex-
periments on living animals is that their practical value is
much reduced, owing to the fundamental difference from
a pathological and physiological point of view between the
bodies of men and the bodies of animals. But why should
these experiments be limited to the bodies of animals, why
should they not be carried out on the living body of man
as well? Why should not the born criminals, the chronic
evil-doers, condemned to waste their remaining life in
prison, useless and often dangerous to others and to them-
selves, why should not these inveterate offenders against our
laws be offered a reduction of their penal servitude if they
were willing to submit under anesthetics to certain experi-
ments on their living bodies for the benefit of mankind? If
the judge, before putting on the black cap, had in his power
to offer the murderer the alternative between the gallows
and penal servitude for so and so many years, I have little
doubt there would be no lack of candidates. Why should
not Doctor Woronoff, the practical value of his invention be
ye known how to master his fear" etc. We take the first
e letters and number them in sequence:
I W 0 U L D H A V
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tJALC*-FL8I'T03194A000100040001-0
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY AxAp,%@NPq&dfsR
Substituting these figures in the first four groups, with nulls
for any missing letters, we get
IWEO F WONUG IUVB J DLV(:p
1 2 x 3 x 2 3 x 4 x 1 4 9 x x 6 5 9 x,
or "12 March, 2304 hours, 149 letters in 659th message fol.
lowing." There are actually 154 letters following, but the
first group of five is simply a special indicator identifying the
agent.
This is as far as the RID needed to go for its own purposes
before turning the message over to the FBI. But the text
could be worked out from the same page of the novel. Lay
out a blank message in lines of twenty letters each, keep-
ing the columns straight. 149 letters in rows of 20 make nine
columns of eight letters each followed by eleven columns of
seven each. Write across the top the first twenty initial let-
ters of the lines on page 71, skipping indented lines. Number
these in alphabetical sequence, and then go down the columns
in the indicated order with the encrypted text. This arrange-
ment gives the clear German text:
8 4 9 14 1 2 16 10 3
S P R U C H x S E
V E S T A x A N x
N x M A R Y x Q U
x E L F T E N x E
MEZxMEZxV
AM P E I R 0 x C
H O E H E x R E C
GEMELDET.x
17 15 19 11 5 20 6 7 12
C H S N U L L X V
S T E I N x x Q U
E E N x M A R Y x
I N S A C H T x U
O N DAMP F E R
A M P E IRO x A
I F E x R E C I F
P t
13 18
0 N
E E
A M
H R
X C
U F
E X
In English:
TEXT SIXTY FROM VESTA TO STEIN. QUEEN MARY Rs-
PORTED OFF RECIFE BY STEAMSHIP CAMPEIRO ON ELEV-
ENTH AT EIGHTEEN O'CLOCK MIDDLE EUROPEAN TIME-
The Latin American Infestation
The Queen Mary message, from an agent in Rio de Janeiro,
came at a moment of climax in RID's most active and critical
theater of counterespionage operations, Latin America,
There were in March of 1942 six agent transmitters in l
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For,
6AF,WAJFDP78T03194A0001000'tSPAKL USE ONLY
iand three of them reported the Queen Mary's arrival
eb,twelfth. The espionage messages were full of news
er until after she sailed on March 20, but these were
t messages most of the agents sent. By the time she
ain in mid-Atlantic on a safely altered course, the Bra-
authorities had arrested some 200 of the German spie&
ry behind this roundup is first of all an RID story.
of the Nazi effort to create an espionage base in
America began to be apparent as early as the fall of
On October 27 our primary station at Allegan
Michi-
,
picked up a strange maritime signal using the unregis-.
' Ca
ll BCNL Othiti
.er monorng posts were alerted, and
--r- Of Mexico and Caribbean Sea. The FCC's Tampa office
firm called Gough Bros. and controlled by a coastal sta-
9e Command, after developing evidence that thi
fl
t
s
ee
being used to refuel German submarines and pass infor-
ring and was able to arrange a trap for nineteen others
litlg the ringleader prominent British shi
i
pp
ng execu
-
George Gough, in Belize.
while in Mexico a German Spy was sending out intelli_
in
private code over Cnapultepec Radio, the
anslnitter used for clandestine communication with
Ing the first world war .3 After Pearl Harbor, when
f
o
code on commercial facilities was prohibited in
this man, a properly registered amateur resort
d t
e
o
, 4 clandestine radio
but made the mi
t
k
f
,
s
a
e o
cornrrlullf
-
Brst with the FBI's deception station on Long Island.
man driv
abli
h
~o wv
s
radio agent nets
. hemisphere however and
t
our s
,,
ruggle against them
in the spring of 1941. One of our monitors at Millis,
'.USett
s detected th fi
,eant signals of a station that
e. circuit operating on the same frequency. It was
E
.,, -
, out the signal sounded quite
t fitof AOR, the FBI-operated Sebold transmitter's re-
Q. Yardley's The American Black Chamber.
.USE ONLY
15: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
j
"
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
spondent. Other monitoring stations, asked to help identify
the suspicious and noise-shrouded signal, discovered that
when REW paused to listen a station on a different frequency
would start sending the can letters PYL. The two transmit-
ters put on the same performance at the same hour the next
day, and for several days; they were apparently trying with-
out success to communicate with each other. One of our
monitors became so engrossed that he wanted to go on the
air and help them out. Our fixes showed that REW was in-
deed in, Hamburg, and PYL in Valparaiso, Chile, an espionage
station discovered before it could make contact with its base.
For the present, however, there was nothing that could be
done about agent radios outside U.S. jurisdiction except to
listen in, and more and more of them began to appear, setting
up in a half dozen of the Latin American republics. Chile
and Brazil held the principal concentrations at this time.
There were three main agent networks in Brazil, centered
on transmitters that we designated LIR, CEL, and CIT, from
the call signs they were using when first heard; the EVI of
our decipherment example was LIR. Evidence of the damage
they could do began to mount.
The German control stations, for example, sent exhaustive
lists of requirements for naval information, asked PYL in
Chile if it could "place a suitable man for us among students
going to the United States for air training," complimented
agents as "exceptionally correct" in their reports on tech-
nical details of English and American 'cruisers' equipment,
and assigned agents to investigate "USA parade and air bases
Colombia and Venezuela" and "air units Trinidad and Lesser
Antilles and flights via those places to West Africa; airplane
types, movement, dates." The agent radios sent back reports
like these:
5 JULY. NINE BOEINGS FLEW WITH MIXED CREW ENGLISH
AND AMERICANS. IN NEXT FEW WEEKS 20 MORE TO HE
FLOWN ACROSS. DETAILS FOLLOW.
19 JULY. LM REPORTS 15 LOCHIINED HUDSONS FLEW
ACROSS. ENGLISH REGISTRY AND CANADIAN-AUSTRAIdAN
CREW. BOEING CLIPPER LEFT NATAL ON SEVENTH AIJEG-
EDLY FOR BOLANO WITH 19 LOCKHEED MECHANICS AND 11
CREW.
Axis Agent Radios USE ONLY
7 AUGUST. USA STEAMER URUGUAY ON LAST VOYAGE ' TO
UNITED STATES LEFT RIO 25 JUNE. WAS CONVOYED BY
BRITISH AUXILIARY CRUISER CARNARVON CASTLE TO TRIN-
IDAD. TRIP TAKES 7 DAYS. CRUISER TRAVELED SOME-
TIMES AHEAD SOMETIMES ASTERN OF SS URUGUAY.
8 OCTOBER. BMM REPORTS SEVERAL HUNDRED US AIR-
CRAFT OF VARIOUS TYPES AND 8000 SPECIAL TROOPS AL-
LEGEDLY LANDING CORPS BEING ASSEMBLED PORT OF
SPAIN.
In November PYL identified a network courier as "daughter
Clarke, secretary in USA embassy Quito since 1 November."
d ten days after Pearl Harbor an agent offered details on
the torpedo safety nets with which ships were being equipped
htwo or three large armed English ships ... without any sus-
-/ -----
sinking, nothing in advance." The control station in Germany
'
interesting." Reports on plane production also now began
1 JANUARY. CURTISS COLUMBUS FACTORY WILL BEGIN
MASS PRODUCTION SERIES SB2C SINGLE SEATER STUKA FOR
NAVY. ARMAMENT ONE CANNON FIVE MACHINE GUNS, MO-
TOR 1700 HP WRIGHT. BUILT FOR 2000 HP WRIGHT IN EX-
PERIMENTAL STAGE. PRODUCTION S03C BEGUN IN COLUM-
BUS FACTORY AT BEGINNING DECEMBER. EMPLOYEES ALL
CURTISS AIRCRAFT FACTORIES DECEMBER TOTAL 27000.
PROPELLER PRODUCTION NOVEMBER 1042.
Our Government finally took action. On January 15, 1942,
e Rio conference of foreign ministers of the American re-
ublics recommended immediate measures to eliminate the
andestine stations. An Emergency Advisory Committee for
olitical Defense was established with headquarters in Uru-
y, and under its auspices we dispatched some of the best
monitoring officers to the six countries where we knew
ent radios to be operating (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Cuba,
inique, Paraguay). They had a two-fold mission-to 1o-
to the hide-outs of known agent transmitters with mobile
ection-finding equipment they took along, and to help the
gvernments of these countries establish monitoring net-
.rks which could keep them free of radio spies in the future.
91 bSECL5 9P78T03194A000100040001-0
57
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios
Approved For Relea
For this second purpose we sent men also to six other coun-
tries (Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay).
Forty men from eighteen Latin American republics were at
the same time brought here for training at our school in
Laurel, Maryland.
The man we sent to Brazil was Robert D. Linx. He helped
lay the groundwork for that arrest of 200-odd spies after the
Queen Mary left her dock in March. This roundup appar-
ently cleaned out the LIR and CIT organizations, the latter
led by a man named Christiansen; they were never heard
again. Some members of the CEL net escaped to the in-
terior, but two series of arrests after they ventured twice at
intervals to reactivate their transmitter put an end to them
too. By mid-year Brazil was permanently cured of its agent
radio infestation. Linx stayed on to direct the establish-
ment of the monitoring service, and became known as "the
father of Brazilian monitoring."
Although our men in Latin America worked quietly by them-
selves as much as possible, the German agents were not al-
ways unaware of what was going on. We heard one of them
telling his control that he knew at least six Yankee direction
finders were beamed on him and he was going to cool off in
the woods for a while. (He cooled off in a Central American
jail.) In Chile, the PYL organization took the precaution of
establishing a stand-by transmitter to assure continuity of
communication if one should be seized. On March 9 PYL
sent a message informing Hamburg that "Pedro," whom they
had employed to operate the new transmitter, would be ready
to get on the air the following day. On March 10, although
RID had not yet received the decrypted text of this message,
our monitors picked up Pedro's test transmission with the
call GES and fixed his location in Antofagasta.
The arrival of our man, John de Bardeleben, in Valparaiso
on March 19 was the signal for the main PYL transmitter
to go mobile. De Bardeleben spent weeks tracking its chang-
ing locations in the area within a ten-mile radius of Valpa-
raiso. It developed that every second week, however, a trans-
mission would be made from the house at Avenida Alemana
5508, Cerro Alegre. This house belonged to one Guillermo
Zeller, a radio technician and licensed amateur who was often
52 OFAE 8vU6EH6*lea
is Agent Radios OFFICIAL USE ONLY
103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0
een in the company of Hans Blume, manager of the Valpa-
aiso branch of the German company Transradio. In April
941, shortly before PYL was first heard trying to contact
, Blume had bought from the radio supply store Casa
idow a complete set of transmitter parts and two Halli-
r receivers. A tan was now placed on the Zeller tele-
,I ..... .r
hone.
,The Chilean authorities were persuaded to raid the Zeller
Buse on June 25. Their perfunctory search discovered no
itter, but Zeller was indiscreet enough to telephone
terwards to one of his agent colleagues and report his nar-
ow escape: "Lucky they didn't search very good, especially
the basement." With some trouble and delay another
earth warrant was obtained, again to no avail; the officers
id It bother to open a box they noticed in the basement
urporting to contain a sewing machine. PYL went off the
air after this, and nothing could be done until after many
eeks De Bardeleben found the transmitter in its sewing-ma-
e box stored in a grocery on Cerro Alegre. Finally, on
October 23, most of the agents of the PYL organization were
sted; but the -man who actually operated the main trans-
itter and operator Pedro at Antofagasta had disappeared.
Neutralist Argentina, which did not participate in the
ergency Advisory Committee, posed a delicate diplomatic
roblem with respect to the elimination of clandestine enemy
ismitters, and one of critical importance as the clean-up
Brazil and Chile made the Argentine the main base for
ionage activity in this hemisphere. Not only agent radios
Lut the powerful Argentine commercial transmitters were
g quantities of compromising information to Italy, Ja-
an, and Germany, and we could only copy their transmis-
ons, hundreds of messages daily. Many of these were at
eels too high for manual copy; we recorded them on tape
d trained selected typists to put them into page form. A
ng memorandum from the U.S. Government on January
1943, enabled us to send two men to Argentina to try to
b' what we had done in Brazil and Chile, but our earlier sue-
es were not repeated here. The agent operations had be-
me much more sophisticated. While our men were taking
rings on a signal the transmission would be cut on at
)L4-031 94A000100040001-0
p
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY AxApfgoj*dccRelea
that location and picked up by another transmitter several
miles away. And the cooperation of Argentine officials under
the Castillo and Ramirez-Peron regimes was less than eager.
They finally became so resentful of U.S. Government pres-
sures that we had to withdraw our men.
One spy who escaped in Chile, however, did not get as far
as Argentina. Almost a year after the incomplete catch of
the PYL ring in Chile, monitors at three different RID posts
heard a new station with the call PQZ, and all three were sure
they recognized the fist of operator Pedro of the GES sta-
tion at Antofagasta. Bearings placed the transmitter at
Santiago, Chile.
De Bardeleben's successor in Chile, William Fellows, was
notified, and he picked up the signal the next time it came on
the air. Working alone, he had to move around and take bear-
ings from different locations in order to get a fix; but after
two more PQZ transmissions he had the house located. To
my considerable personal satisfaction the operator Pedro, a
graduate of the Hamburg spy school, who had the effron-
tery to use my own initials as his clandestine call, was arrested
and his equipment seized. With this postlude there ended,
except for the Argentine hold-out, the story of radio spies in
the Americas.
54 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For
3115: CIA-RDPZP~k D100140001-0
es and book reviews on the following pages are un-'
and may for convenience be detached from the clan:
y of the Studies if their origin therein is protected.
.
,ors of articles are identified in the table of contents
itors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr
.
Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intern-
ouection, in scanning current public literature for in-
e{materials, and of the many intelligence nmcers,.,,
o
book reviews for this issue of the Studies. Most
`
yin this respect are the following:
The Panther's Feast ...........
"Ir
Live intelligence ...............
`SHM...
ther's Executive overseas .........
eapan on the Wall .....
........: .
the Hungarian AVH .............
'Grivas and the EOKA .............. Roger G. Seely
SECRETI
45: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0
,
 roved For R ^3115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
RE d~l0ORN', .A,-p For Relea 03115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0
 etligence, deception, and un-
jiodox stay-behind opera-
in a combined and cut but
-war combat exercise.
OPERATION PORTREX
Edwin L. Sibert
truth in the gibe that a war's first
d to be some
ere use th the weapons and techniques (includ-
intelligence tec qu
'previous war. Now, however, the practice of conducting
;,, +;mP of peace, incor-
Les are fought -
11-1 es} of the final engagements of the
ting new developments not only in weapuffo arrr. -w~
aramilitary de-
nd
l
p
a
also in intelligence, psychologica
,- - . __iii --
f the nPVt. War
o
51
ith the methods of the last maneuvers
t
w
t be fough
at leas-
e such war game in which i participated during mili
War TT and the Korean War
e
an
auuwv
a particularly stimulating illustration of how r
,
l limitations on realism
practica
ise can be made, of some
ventional
of the extent to which deception and uncon
rations can be worked in. Y ?c
sn'
t
wa
erasion ror rex
ut all elements of the armed forces-ArmY ^ Navy, Air
- -
nd
k
----
-
par v, .,
11'larines_ oO
and guerrillas. It was staged in the
ts
undercover agen
, quarter of 1950 on the island of Vieques, atwenty-mile
It e-
to Rico
m
of land some ten miles east of Puer
. ar
a-
a period of more than two months devoted to prep
or a three-day assault action.
f the exercise was the recapture of a hypo-
,
op"'
problem o
Usi ~cal major Caribbean island which the enemy had occu-
?. a nnri am-
to
-
V.U. force .were
-
us assault on its southern beaches, represented by those
ues, and clean out the ten-square-mile maneuver area
-
isl
i
n Ursa. .... ?..-- ___
af.U
t the enemy defenders, who had available in the beach
rovi-
kM-y a regimental combat team reinforced by a p
 Operation Portrex
Operation Portrex
Approved For Rel
05103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0
`$TI
-
bnal armored reconnaissance unit, an engineer company, and
fixed battalion of anti-aircraft artillery, with light avia-
and the support of a weak fighter wing. The invading
force consisted of the 3d Infantry Division reinforced by
attalion of the 82nd Airborne Division and a marine Corps
nnaissanee company. It had the support of a strong
ttalion, adequate sea lift for the ground forces, and naval
MANEUVER AREA
I~tT?
RED
EACH
FttTa
Y Ylal yyr.
BLUE
BEACH
' PORT
MOSQUITO
ISABELA
SEGUNDA
DETAIL FROM
Isla de
VIEQUES
PUERTO RICO
0 2 Miles
commanded the land forces of the enemy defense, Puerto
an regulars. In mid-December 1949 I was permitted to
them to Vieques. First we had to construct a tent camp
~