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Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 25X1 25X1 ML YH 1811 ! 0 / Q A3U L1 N Cie, Imp SStt1a A38 SmId -S7- SSa19 D1100 3dA1 Id0 -77-" dISDD 91110 31 v0 A38 / 000 7- N13 fl S3OQ 3 '101 Of?N ,:3U1OJ CIN F~ ibr `c g 'ON Hof. W z LU 0 J J LU 1-- z J o~c 1- z W u 25X1 25X1 25X1 SECRETI For Release 2005/03/15 :CIA-RDP78T03 0001-0 All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Training, or any other organizational component of the intelligence: community. WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE EDITORIAL POLICY Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doc- trinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence. The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Edito- rial Board. The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the litera- ture of intelligence. EDITORIAL BOARD SHERMAN KENT, Chairman LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK L.4:VRENcs R. HOUSTON Additional members of the Board represent other CIA components. SECRET! Approved For Release 2005103115: CIA-RDW~ 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005103115: CIA-R908~00040001-0 CONTENTS CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 2013 R & S Building I and need not be coordinated or submitted through channels. They should be typed in du- plicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified through Secret. For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk, I For back issues and on other questions call the Office of the Editor, CLASSIFIED ARTICLES The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich . R. C. Jaggers Inside story of how the Hangman met his death at the hands of Czech intelligence. SECRET Page 1 The Interpreter as an Agent . . . . . . Francis Agnor 21 Advantages and drawbacks of a timeworn mas- querade. SECRET The Identi-Kit . . . . . . . . . . Herman E. Kimsey 29 A conjuror's pack for remote-controlled identifica- tion. SECRET Credentials-Bona Fide or False? . . David V. Brigane 37 The unmasking of amateur and professional de- ceivers through scrutiny of their documentation. SECRET Hypnosis in Interrogation . . . . . Edward F. Deshere 51 Nature of the trance and applicability in and against interrogation. OFFICIAL USE ONLY Classified Listing of Articles in Volume III . CONFIDENTIAL MORIIHRP THIS PAGE SECRETI Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-901 T777 2&X1 SECRET] UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Page From the CIA Cornerstone Ceremonies . . . . . . . 69 The. Symptoms of Scientific Breakthrough R. R. Scidmore 73 Characteristic patterns as guidelines for the fore- caster of scientific advance. Publicizing Soviet Scientific Research Lawrence M. Bucans 87 The intelligence community's hand in a Commerce Department service to the scientific public. Portuguese Timor: An Estimative Failure Thomas F. Conlon 91 An assumption about enemy intent and its sad sequel. Intelligence in Recent Public Literature Military intelligence in World War II . . . . . . 97 In the American Revolution . . . . . . . . . . 101 The Soviet intelligence services . . . . . . . . . 109 Espionage and paramilitary tales . . . . . . . . 117 Evasions and escapes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Miscellany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-R~0 194A0001 A tyrant's death at patriots' hands revealed as Operation Salmon of Czech Intelligence in exile. Approved For Release 2005/0 THE ASSASSINATION OF REINHARD HEYDRICH R. C. Jaggers On the twenty-ninth of May, 1942, Radio Prague announced that Reinhard Heydrich, Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Mo- ravia, was dying; assassins had wounded him fatally. On the sixth of June he died. Though not yet forty at his death, the blond Heydrich had had a notable career. As a Free Corpsman in his teens he was schooled in street fighting and terrorism. Adulthood brought him a commission in the German navy, but he was cashiered for getting his fiancee pregnant and then refusing to marry her because a woman who gave herself lightly was beneath him. He then worked so devotedly for the Nazi Party that when Hitler came to power he put Heydrich in charge of the Dachau concentration camp. In 1934 he headed the Berlin Gestapo. On June 30 of that year, at the execution of Gregor Strasser, the bullet missed the vital nerve and Strasser lay bleeding from the,neck. Heydrich's voice was heard from the corridor: "Not dead yet? Let the swine bleed to death." In 1936 Heydrich became chief of the SIPO, which included the criminal police, the security service, and the Gestapo. In 1938 he concocted the idea of the Einsatzgruppen, whose busi- ness it was to murder Jews. The results were brilliant. In two years these 3,000 men slaughtered at least a million per- sons. In November of that year he was involved in an event that in some inverted fashion presaged his own death. The son of a Jew whom he had deported from Germany assassinated Ernst von Rath in Paris. In reprisal Heydrich ordered a po- grom, and on the night of November ninth 20,000 Jews were arrested in Germany. In 1939 the merger of the SIPO with the SS Main Security OfTice made Heydrich the leader of the Reichssicherheits- hauptamt. In this capacity he ordered and supervised the SECRET 1 MO INIMPiAWfe e Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 "Polish attack" on Gleiwitz, an important detail in the stage setting for the invasion of Poland on September first. It was he who saw to it that twelve or thirteen "criminals" dressed in Polish uniforms would be given fatal injections and found dead on the "battlefield." It was probably he who chose the code name for these men-Canned Goods. At this time Bohemia and Moravia had already been raised from independent status to that of Reichsprotektorat, with Baron von Neurath, Germany's now senile former foreign min- ister, designated the Protector-of the Czechs from them- selves, presumably. But a greater honor was in store for them. On 3 September 1941 von Neurath was replaced by SS Ober- gruppenfuehrer Heydrich. The hero moved into the Hrad- cany Palace in Prague and the executions started, 300 in the first five weeks. His lament for Gregor Strasser became his elegy for all patriotic Czechs: "Aren't they dead yet? Let them bleed to death." He had come a long way in thirty-eight years. The son of a music teacher whose wife was named Sarah, Reinhard had gone on trial three times because of Party doubts about the purity of his Aryan origin. Now, as chief of the RSHA, which he continued to run from Czechoslovakia, he was Hangman to all occupied Europe. His power was such that he could force Admiral Canaris to come to Prague and at the end of May, 1942, sign away the independence of the Abwehr and accept subordination to the Sicherheitsdienst. It was his moment of sweetest triumph. A few weeks later he was dead, and Himmier pronounced the funeral oration calling him "that good and radiant man." So much for the story we all know, and on to questions left unanswered by it. Who were Heydrich's assassins? Who could successfully plan his death? Was the motive simply revenge for suffering? How was it accomplished? And the hardest question of all, was it a good thing? Here, for the first time, are the answers to all these but the last, and on that question stuff for pondering. Need Mothers an Invention When Heydrich took charge of Bohemia and Moravia, the Czechs learned what it means to live under a master of sup- pression. The war fronts were far away: it was the period of smashing German successes in the Balkans, Scandinavia, France, and the USSR. The Czechs heard little that Heydrich did not want them to hear. Their underground movement was systematically penetrated and all but destroyed. On Oc- tober third of 1941, for example, the capture of a single Czech radio operator by Heydrich's men led to the arrest of 73 agents working for Moscow. Underground radio contact with London was monitored. The Czechs were losing heart. In London the strength of the resistance in all occupied countries was periodically reviewed, and the countries were listed in the order of the assistance each gave the Allied cause. In 1941 Czechoslovakia was always ranked at the very end. Eduard Benes, its president-in-exile, was deeply embarrassed. He was also gravely concerned that the Allies, if his people failed to fight, might give short shrift to any Czech claims after the war. He told his intelligence chief, General Fran- tisek Moravec, to order an intensification of resistance activity. But it was difficult enough to get even a parachuted courier or coded radio message past the wary Heydrich. Nothing hap- pened in response. Then President Benes hit upon the idea of contriving to assassinate a prominent Nazi or Quisling inside the tight dun- geon of the Protectorate; such a bold stroke would refurbish the Czech people's prestige and advance the status of their government in London. The German retaliation would be brutal, of course, but its brutality might serve to inflame Czech patriotism. Who should be the target? General Moravec first nomi- nated the most prominent of the Czech collaborators, an ex- colonel whose fawning subservience to his Teutonic masters left the London Czechs nauseated and ashamed. The general also had a personal reason for his choice: the name of the Czech Quisling was Emanuel Moravec, a coincidence that had plagued the general for years. But Emanuel, called the Greasy, was not the right man for the purpose. He was not well known abroad, and Czech prestige would not be raised significantly by crushing a worm. The Germans, too, were likely to regard his death as no great loss; he was only a min- ister of education, easy to replace, and even the Nazis despised traitors. SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SECRET The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Heydrich was totally different. His unique combination of brilliance and brutality had no peer even in the Third Reich. He had been personally responsible for the execution of hun- dreds of Czechs and the imprisonment of thousands. The shot that killed him would be heard in every capital of the world. There could be no other choice. General Moravec so recom- mended, President Benes agreed, and the planning of Opera- tion Salmon began in tense secrecy. Wanted: Men for Martyrdom The first problem was finding one or two men who could and would do the job. It must have seemed to General Mora- vec, at least at the outset, an almost impossible task. The many Czech politicians in London were preoccupied in the un- ending scramble for posts in the provisional government. There were quite a few Czech businessmen in England, but most of them were too busy making a fast koruna to be in- terested. There were brave and patriotic Czechs serving in fighter and bomber wings attached to the Royal Air Force, but the Air Ministry would never let them go. And so the choice narrowed to the single infantry brigade of about 2,500 men encamped near Cholmondly. This pool of prospects had its own disadvantages. An en- campment of 2,500 is like a town of that size: everyone knows everyone else and is full of curiosity about everything that anyone does. Here this inquisitiveness was also undissipated by outside contacts, the Czech soldiers speaking little or no English and having few interests beyond the limits of the camp. Each transfer, trip, or trifle thus became news, some- thing to discuss and analyze. For screening purposes the personnel files of the brigade contained only what each man had told about himself or, in rare instances, about others whom he had known earlier, at home. There was no way to check police files, run background or neighborhood checks, or otherwise obtain independent veri- fication of loyalties. Under such circumstances it is a tribute to General Ingr, Minister of Defense in the exiled government, to General Moravec, and to their subordinates that of 153 para- chutists flown from England and dropped into Czechoslovakia, only three proved turncoats. 4 AIS d For Releaso O T03115 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 How many people would have to know? President Benes, General Ingr, General Moravec and his deputy, Lt. Col. Strag- mueller, and Major Fryc, chief of operations. Of these, Presi- dent Benes and General Ingr needed to know only the purpose of the operation and the names of the men chosen to carry it out. Others, required for instruction, would necessarily know that certain men were entering Czechoslovakia to carry out a clandestine action, but not their precise intent. Four in- structors would be needed, experts respectively in parachute work, in the terrain of the area, in cover, documentation, clothing, and equipment, and in commando techniques. Several British officers, representatives of MI-6, would par- ticipate in this training. The crew of the plane carrying the men into Czechoslovakia would know where and when they were going, though not their identities or mission. And finally, a large number of men in the brigade personally ac- quainted with the candidates could be expected to make guesses of varying degrees of accuracy as the preparations for assassi- nation progressed. Because the number of persons who would be partly or fully informed was so unavoidably much too large, it was essential that the men finally chosen should be as discreet as they were brave. Of the 2,500 Czech soldiers in the brigade some 700, most of them volunteers, were already engaged in parachute training under British instruction. Two officers were assigned to the brigade, one to the parachutists And the other to the ground troops, ostensibly as aides but actually as spotters. These two officers knew only that they were to choose the best candidates for a dangerous assignment. Men recommended by the spotters were interviewed singly by Lt. Col. Stragmueller. Some were asked whether they would volunteer for special training. Almost all those asked agreed, and they were sent in groups of ten for vigorous physi- cal conditioning and thorough schooling in commando tac- tics-the use of a wide assortment of small arms, the manu- facture of home-made bombs, ju-jitsu, cover and concealment, and the rest. During this intensive drilling the ten-man teams were kept under close observation. It was essential to dis- cover not only the bravest and most capable but also-it hav- ing been decided that the assassination was a two-man job- SECRET The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 those who worked best in pairs. Other considerations also came into play; men from Prague, for example, were auto- matically eliminated because of the danger of recognition after arrival. By now the choice had narrowed to eight men in half as many groups. General Moravec visited these four groups, along with all the others, on a regular schedule. On his orders the instructors drew the eight candidates aside one at a time and passed each a piece of juicy, concocted information with the warning not to mention it to anyone. Each tidbit was different. Soon two new rumors were circulating, and two men were eliminated. One of the remaining six was disquali- fied by marriage; another was suddenly incapacitated by illness. General Moravec interviewed the remaining four. Two of them, non-corns, met all tests and were also good friends. Their names were Jan Kubis and Josef Gabcik. Kubis was born in Southern Moravia in 1916. After some ten years of school- ing he had gone to work as an electrician. He had been in the Czech Army since 1936 and had fought in France in 1940. His excellent physical condition made his 160 pounds, at 5'9", look lean. Slow of movement, taciturn, and persevering, he was also intelligent and inventive. Gabcik was a year younger than Kubis. An orphan from the age of ten, he too had left school at sixteen. After work- ing as a mechanic for four years, he had entered the Czech Army in 1937. He had been given the Croix de Guerre in France in 1940. He was strong and stocky, an excellent soccer player, and like Kubis lean for all his 150 pounds on a 5'8" frame. His blue eyes were expressive, and his whole face unusually mobile. Talented and clever, good-natured, cheerful even under strenuous or exasperating circumstances, frank and cordial, he was an excellent counterpoise for the quieter, more introverted Kubis. Both men had gone through the arduous training without illness or complaint. Both spoke fluent German. Both were excellent shots. General Moravec spoke separately to each of them. He explained that the mission had the one purpose of assassinating Heydrich. He stressed to each of the young men the great likelihood that he would be caught and executed. Escape from encircled Czechoslovakia after Heydrich had been killed would be practically impossible. And the survival of either, hiding inside the country until the war ended, was extremely unlikely. The probability was that both would be killed at the scene of action. Although neither man had relatives or friends in Prague, both had relatives in the countryside; and the general re- minded them of what had happened to the family of a Czech sent from London on a successful clandestine mission to Italy. Somehow the Gestapo had learned his identity and executed all of his relatives in Czechoslovakia, even first and second cousins. "Please understand," General Moravec told each of them, "that I am not testing you now. You have proved that you are brave and patriotic. I am telling you that acceptance of this mission is almost certainly acceptance of death-per- haps a very painful and degrading death-because I do not believe that the man who tries to kill Heydrich can succeed if the awful realization that he too will die comes too late, and unnerves him. I have another reason, too: if you make your choice with open eyes, I shall sleep a little better." First Gabcik and then Kubis agreed, thoughtfully but with- out hesitation or bravado. Both were quietly proud to have been chosen. The general then brought them together and explained that from that moment on they would be separated from all the rest, the final preparations would be made in strictest seclusion. If at any moment either man felt that he could not go through with the assassination, he was bound in duty and honor to say so immediately, without false shame. They glanced at each other. "No," said Gabcik. "We want to do it." Kubis just nodded. Dress Rehearsal and Curtain Up Some training was still needed. Kubis had to learn to ride a bicycle. Both had to know Prague as though they had spent years walking its streets and alleys. Both needed instruction in withstanding hostile interrogation. Both had to memorize all the details of separate cover stories which could be "con- fessed," after initial resistance, to the Gestapo. On the last day of training they were each given a lethal dose of cyanide and told how to conceal it on their persons. it was the last defense against torture. Ap?R ed For Releaa26D5103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SECRET SECRET The Assassination of Reinhard Hey Approved For ReleThe Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich ase 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 "One more point," General Moravec told them. "Under no circumstances-and I mean none at all-is either of you to get in touch with the underground, directly or indirectly. You are absolutely on your own. The underground dsis infested job. with informants; Heydrich has done his usual - For this reason we have not sent out one word about you, even to the most trusted leaders there. If anyone appr t rovoca and says that he comes from the underground, he is a p teur. Treat him as such." The men nodded. "Don't forget," the general insisted. "And now, a review. Kubis, where does Heydrich have his office?" "Prague Palace." "Show me on the map. Kubis did so without hesitation. "Gabcik, where do you land?" "Here, sir," said Gabcik, pointing to another spot some 50 kilometers southeast of Prague, an area chosen because it was wooded, rolling, and offered good approaches to the city. "Kubis, what do you do first, after touching ground and re- moving parachutes?" "We destroy all traces of the descent, sir." "Do you proceed to the palace, Gabcik?" "No. It is too heavily guarded. All visitors are thoroughly checked." "His private residence?" "The same, sir." "Kubis, where do you go?" "Here, sir." Kubis' finger pointed to a spot half way be- tween Prague and the village of Brezary. "Gabcik, when does Heydrich pass this spot?" "Daily, sir, going into the city, and at night on his return. We shall observe the time." "Why have sea chosen this particular spot on the road?" sharp curve. His car and the motorcycles "Sir, there must slow down to twenty kilometers." "How many motorcycles, Kubs?" "Probably two, sir. We'll find out." "Good. Now remember-don't rush it. Don't use pistols in any case. If there is any chance that you can't bring it off with the bomb or the machine gun on first try, wait and pick a better spot for the next day. But don't delay too long. Now, a last dry run." The two men left. General Moravec waited for ten min- utes, summoned his car, and asked to be driven down a cer- tain country road at normal speed. He sat in the back, with binoculars, closely scanning all the foliage and other cover wherever the car slowed for a curve. Then he drove back and waited. Soon Gabcik and Kubis reappeared. "Well?" the general demanded. "Did you "Yes, sir." "Are you sure?" "Yes, sir." Icrl".Vj $7 The escape was planned with equal care. The men would make their way, mostly on foot, to Slovakia, where the Ger- man pressure was far less severe. Gabcik, who knew the mountains of Slovakia well, had chosen a safe area where none of his friends or relatives lived. For food they were on their own. Early April was all fog, wind, and rain. Normally Czech, Polish, and Canadian crews took turns flying paratroopers over Czechoslovakia, but General Ingr had made sure that a Czech team, Captain Anderle and his crew, would be rested and ready for a good day. The fifteenth, at last, dawned clear and still. General Moravec walked to the plane with his two chosen men. They stood at the bottom`of the ramp. He looked at them, and they at him, in silence. No speeches, no cheek-kissing, no wet eyes. Gabcik and Kubis seemed as impas- sive as two farmers starting the day's work. They shook hands briefly. The general went into the plane and briefed its captain and crew. When he came out, he found Gabcik suddenly flustered. "Sir, may I speak to you for a moment in private?" So, the general thought sadly. Well, better for it to hap- pen now. We shall have to send him to the Isle of Man until the war ends. "Of course, Gabcik," he said, and moved some yards away. Gabcik followed, uncomfortable. He said, "Look, sir, I don't know how to tell you this, I'm ashamed. But I have to tell you. I've run up a bill at a restaurant, the Black Boar. I'm Appo For Releas? /03115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 afraid it's ten pounds, sir. Could you have it taken care of? I hate to ask, but I haven't got the money, and I don't want to leave this way." "All right," Moravec managed. "Anything else?" Gabcik was relieved. "No, sir," he said, "except don't worry. We'll pull it off, Kubis and I." They climbed in, then, and the plane started down the run- way. The general thought of all the courageous men he'd known. "No," he said out loud. "None of them were braver." He felt full of pride and pain. Death Rides in Spring Captain Anderle came back on schedule. He reported that the two men had teased his crew about having to go back to the strangeness of England instead of coming home. At the command they had jumped unhesitatingly. So the waiting started. Gabcik and Kubis had not taken a transmitter or any means to report back: if they were suc- cessful everybody would know it. None of the anxious witting talked about the operation. On the tenth day Captain An- derle was shot down and killed in an air battle at Malta. "I am not a superstitious man," General Moravec told himself. Two weeks, three weeks, four. It must have gone wrong. "If they failed," said General Ingr, "let us hope they failed completely, without getting anywhere near Heydrich." Six weeks, and May 29, Friday afternoon. Prague radio, in- dignant, reported that Reichsprotektor Reinhard Heydrich had been severely wounded by murderers in a criminal, dastardly attempt upon his life that very morning. They had thrown a bomb into the Protector's car. Two men had been seen leav- ing the spot on bicycles. The search for them was under way. They would be found. The news exploded in the international press. At home and abroad, Czechs stood a little straighter. Several "authentic inside stories" were printed. The favorite was that the Czech underground had struck. Scarcely less popular was the tale that the Abwehr had killed Heydrich because of the humiliat- ing agreement he had just forced Canaris to sign. At Cholmondly the brigade buzzed.. she absent Gabcik and Kubis were talked about, of course; but they had been gone for a long time. And so had many more paratroopers dis- patched on one mission or another. There was no reason to pick out these two over others who had never returned. Lieu- tenant Opalka, for example. He had been gone for five months now. And three men had left the camp just a week before Heydrich was killed. The battalion talked of little else. One sergeant, a little older than the others, was convinced that the man who took care of Heydrich was a non-com named Anton Kral. "Kral?" repeated one of the others. "Why Kral? He's been gone as long as Opalka." "I don't know," the sergeant answered. "It's just a feeling. Remember how tall and dark he was, and silent?" "And brave," said another. "He fought well in France." "Well," shrugged a third, "it could be anybody." Perhaps the sergeant knew more than the others about Anton Kral. Kral had been picked by General Moravec to be parachuted with Lieutenant Opalka into an area northeast of Prague. Their mission was to get in touch with the under- ground there to deliver instructions. Nothing had been heard from either of them since their departure, and they were pre- sumed lost. In Prague, Heydrich was dying. The three physicians sum- moned from Berlin-Gebhardt, Morell, and Brandt-tried hard, but could not save him. Himmler was there too, full of public sorrow, privately perhaps rejoicing. He had his funeral oration down pat before the sixth of June, when Heydrich died. And he seized the chance to direct personally the search for the assassins and the massive reprisals. First, martial law was proclaimed over all Bohemia and Mo- ravia. A rigid daily curfew at sundown was imposed. Throughout the land public announcements proclaimed. that anyone who harbored the assassins or otherwise aided them in any way would be executed summarily and without trial. The illegal possession of arms and even approval of assassina- tion in principle were declared capital crimes. Himmler's chief executive in the subsequent action was the notorious Sudeten German, Deputy Reichsprotektor Karl Hermann Frank. The mass arrests and mass executions began. Czechs were killed without investigation, without trial, even without in- A dVffi For Relea ee 65103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 The Assassination of Reinhard proved For Release 200 SECRET Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich 5103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 terrogation, usually on the basis of some vague or distorted denunciation. For twenty days the slaughter continued. But neither terror nor the special Gestapo details dispatched to Prague could bring the assassins to light. Then Himmler and Frank had a new idea. Quite arbitrarily they chose a small settlement near Kladno, fifteen miles from Prague. On 9 June Colonel Rostock marched a military detail into this village of the now memorable name, Lidice. Every male not unquestionably a child was slaughtered. Even the few who chanced to be absent were run down and killed- two hundred men and boys in all. The women were driven into concentration camps. The children were shipped off to Ger- many. Everything above ground, all structures, were razed, and the ground was ploughed. Lidice became a blank, a field of regular brown furrows. And still there was no trace of the killers of Heydrich. So they did the same thing to another hamlet, Lezaky, in south- western Bohemia. The killers were not found. On 24 June Frank officially announced that if the assassins were not turned over in 48 hours, the population of Prague would be decimated. He also used a carrot-1,000,000 marks ure for anyone giving information leading to the death or c June of the wanted men. This worked, apparently. 25 Radio Prague reported that the culprits had been discovered in the basement of the St. Bartholomeus Orthodox Church on Reslova Street. Encirclement was under way and capture only a matter of hours. In London the listeners knew that Gabcik and Kubis were fighting back. The following day the radio said the fight was over; the assassins were dead. There were four of them, the announcer said flatly, one Gabcik, one Kubis, a certain Opalka, and a man known as Josef Valcik.l In England Opalka was known, of course. So was Valcik, a reliable member of the Prague underground. But what were they doing in the same cellar with Gabcik and Kubis, sharing their hopeless last stand? General Moravec, at least, felt cer- ' There are conflicting records of this name; the New York Times gives Walicikoff. tain that his men would not have violated his orders and made contact with the underground. And no word had gone to the underground about Gabcik and Kubis? Perhaps the two teams had met by chance at the church, driven to the same sanctuary because the priests were known to be patriotic and because all four were desperate. Even now the Nazis went on murdering. The paralytic SS General Kurt Daluege succeeded Heydrich. During the trial that preceded his execution in Prague in 1946, he admitted that 1,331 Czechs were executed, 201 of them women, in " re prisal. From another source it has been established that, ghetto this period 3,000 Jews were taken from the Terezin ghe and exterminated. No one knows how many died in concen- tration camps. A sober estimate is that at least 5,000 Czechs were killed to avenge the death of one murderous Nazi. Among them were all the priests of St. Bartholomeus, not one of whom would say a word about their guests. Was It Worth This Price? In London the jubilation of the Czech leaders gave way to doubt as the murderings continued, and then to recrimina- tion. At first President Benes would have none of it. He lis- tened to Radio Prague as day after day, and several times a day, the numbers and names of the executed were methodi- cally announced. "Why don't they fight?" he asked his staff. "Why don't they die as partisans and men, in the forests and the mountains, taking as many Germans with them as they can? Look at the Poles, the Yugoslavs, the French. They 2In an unpublished manuscript, War Secrets in the Ether, Wilhelm F. Flicke asserts, "The attempt upon the life of Heydrich had been planned and directed over [the Czech underground to London] net- work. That was a big mistake on the part of the English and Czechs because it afforded the German radio defense a complete disclosure not only of the plot itself and those directly participating but also of all the connections within the Czech resistance move- ment." This statement is almost wholly wrong. It is true that Heydrich and his spies had penetrated the Czech underground thoroughly. But radio was not used for Operation Salmon, and the network inside Czechoslovakia had no hand in planning or directing Heydrich's assassination. The Germans had no advance warning. And it was not merely an "attempt"; Gabeik and Kubis did kill Heydrich. AppSEypdTor ReleasjE@Qp103115 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 13 I The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 don't line up at the scaffold, waiting patiently like sheep." He was unmoved by arguments about the terrain, the prox- imity of France to England, the density of the population in Bohemia and Moravia. "Why don't they fight?" he asked again. "It's their duty." Whatever the answer, it was plain by now that one of the hoped-for results, the stiffening of the Czech will to resist, had not been achieved. In Czech political circles the intensity of criticism mounted in direct ratio to the mounting toll of German reprisals at home. Although President Benes remained privately con- vinced that the execution of Heydrich had been both justified and necessary, he began to feel a need for modifying his views publicly. He reacted to the pressure, finally, by announcing that General Moravec had planned and supervised the assassi- nation; and the accusations of irresponsibility from the politi- cal group were turned on the intelligence chief. Those who had lost relatives and friends at home were especially bitter. As the war went on, General Moravec found that his mind would not stop mulling over the profound questions of right and wrong that attend all action but become sharpest, most nagging, when the action has terrible consequences for others. There was no doubt that the killing of Heydrich had served its intended prestige purpose. In this sense it had been a major success. For a time, at least, Czechoslovakia had jumped from last place to first in the esteem of all the anti- fascist world. Even the suffering of the people, even Lidice and Lezaky, served this cause. But the aim of awakening re- sistance had been a mirage. The people were not fighting, were not earning the acclaim. They would be remembered as martyrs, not heroes, even though there were heroes-Gabciks and Kubises and Opalkas-among them. Who had killed these 5,000 civilians? The Germans? Gen- eral Moravec himself? The civilians at home, inviting slaughter with their meekness? As the toll of war dead mounted into the millions, the 5,000 shrank to perspective and seemed almost insignificant; the war killed thousands every day, women and children as well as soldiers. Yet right and.wrong are not a matter of quantity. The same questions would have come whispering in his ear at night, like old ghosts, if only the brave assassins had died because of Reinhard Heyd- rich's death. Modern war, total war, kills everyone indiscriminately; women and children drop as fast as soldiers. Millions were dying to destroy the German instruments of war. And clearly Heydrich had been one of the most effective of those instry- ments. When Hitler escaped the twentieth-of-July bomb in 1944, the general wondered whether the German anti-fascists would have been able to strike even this unsuccessful, blow if Heydrich had been alive to trap them before they could act. Was it wrong to have assassinated Heydrich and right to try to kill Hitler? No one who believed that fascism had to be destroyed felt anything but admiration for the Yugoslav parti- sans, the French Maquis, the brave Norwegians and Poles-for all the people who fought and killed Germans. The Czechs at home were not fighting, so the Czechs abroad had to do the job for them. It might have been wrong if the target had been the one he first considered, Emanuel Moravec. This would have had the taint of personal motives. But there was no such taint in the assassination of Heydrich, and it had the official and un- qualified approval of President Benes. Of course, the general thought wryly, I cannot proclaim this fact today. It is the duty of subordinates to step back when their plans succeed and come forward into the limelight if their plans fail. Finally, before the war ended, the self-questioning, the drill- ing inside, apparently hit bed rock. General Moravec found a firm position, he later explained, in the truth that no one ever gets something for nothing. If Czechoslovakia had re- jected the Chamberlain capitulation at Munich, a real under- ground would have been born of its thus-affirmed integrity. Men must die that countries live. If enough of them die at once, the country may be lucky enough to coast for a `few generations. But coasting builds no muscles. The cost of the free ride is strength, and the cost of sapped strengths freedom. So in the last analysis you have to kill a Heydrich not because he needs killing but because coasting along with his kind will kill you and everybody else. By the time the war was over, General Moravec felt 'sure that the assassination of Heydrich was not a sombre page of Apprlf or Releasa0AQ03115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 history. It was a page that he could turn back to with satis- faction, he and his countrymen and all the rest of us. Turn, read again, and know that it was right. Dregs of the Bitter Cup At last the war ended, and General Moravec went home to Prague. Everywhere in the. city was a kind of gladness; it was over now, and all were thinking of the future. Every- where, it seemed, except at General Moravec's home, where the callers apparently could not forget the past. They asked why their fathers and mothers had been executed. They wanted to know if the former general still thought he'd done the right thing. His doubts returned. These people saw him not as the executioner of Heydrich but as the killer of their kin. This post-war period in Prague, he said later, was the most miserable of his life. The men who, now that the war was over, called themselves the leaders of the underground also came to ask questions and pronounce judgment. They said that the Heydrich operation was conceptually faulty. They said they should have been consulted in advance, they never would have permitted so blatant an error. The general asked them to give a detailed account of their underground activities and a signed estimate of their contribution to the war against fascism, and they went away. One day a different caller came. He said that the traitor who delivered Gabcik and Kubis to the Gestapo had been dis- covered and interrogated. He had confessed to a revolutionary tribunal, but he stubbornly refused to give details. His name was Alois Kral. Kral! So the general's careful choice of men had produced two heroes, and one villain to seal their fate. He put on his coat; he would visit the man in prison and talk to him. He recognized Kral as soon as he saw him; the four full years had not changed him. Tall, swarthy, taciturn, he squinted up at Moravec and said, "Greetings, brother." "Brother?" "I killed two Czechs. You killed five thousand. Which of us hangs?" So it went throughout the questioning. Kral kept most of his secret to himself, not to save his neck but because he knew he couldn't. Besides, the revolutionary tribunal was not predisposed to patient inquiry. It consisted of one profes- sional lawyer and four lay judges on the bench, a prosecutor, and a defense attorney appointed ex officio. All of them had been chosen by the Citizens' Committee, which in turn was dominated by the Communists. Each actor in the play had memorized his part, knowing that the function of the court was not to serve justice but to kill Kral. The hand-picked audi- ence was fanatical, a lynch mob. Neither actors nor specta- tors cared about the fate of Gabcik and Kubis; they were all preoccupied with the million marks Alois Kral had collected for his act of betrayal. While their closest relatives and friends were dying and they themselves were suffering, Kral had been living like a king. There was the unforgivable crime-not murder or treachery, but his comfort in the midst of their pain. In France Kral had fought well. In England he could not have been serving as a German stool-pigeon, because two op- erations he knew enough about to wreck had been successful. There was even evidence that he had not betrayed Lt. Opalka to the Gestapo, or any of his underground contacts. Why had he turned traitor at the end? General Moravec went to see him several times. The best he could get was a fuller record of events. Kral said that Gabcik threw the bomb, Kubis covering with the machine gun. Then the two rode their bicycles straight to the church, where they were given sanctuary. The pres- ence of Lt. Opalka and Valcik was accidental. The four hoped that the storm would subside, and when the intense search- ing Was called off they could escape to Slovakia. Kral hinted that he found out about the fugitives from a prostitute; he Was vague at this juncture. 'But why did you tell the Nazis?" asked the general. "Maybe for the million marks," said Kral. "Or maybe I thought it was better that two men die than two thousand. What does it matter?" At the church, the Gestapo had shouted to come out, to Surrender. The men answered with the machine gun, and later with their pistols. The cellar of the two-hundred-year- old church was a fortress not to be breached or taken by A @Kpo For Releaa,B15103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 storm. Finally the Germans flooded it. It was then that all four men, out of ammunition and near drowning, swallowed their cyanide. The Gestapo officers reported the great victory. Alois Kral was paid his million marks and lived in luxury for three years. The next morning General Moravec got up early. He wanted to have a last talk with Kral and get the rest of the story, how Kral found out and why he informed. But before he could leave the house a member of the Citizens' Commit- tee, a leading Communist, came to see him. "Let's have a little chat," the visitor said, removing his coat. "I was just leaving." "It's no use," said the Communist, sitting down and lighting a cigarette. "We've given orders that you're not to be ad- mitted at the jail any more." "Why?" "Why do you want to talk to Kral? You have no status in this matter." "I want to find out the truth." "We know what you want. You want to keep your glamor- ous story of the Heydrich case alive. Don't try to pretend that you care about Gabcik and Kabis, or whatever their names were, or Kral either. You just want people to believe that your so-called government in London was a band of heroes and patriots. You're not getting away with it. Keep away from the jail, or we will let you in. There's still room." The general did not say anything. "And stop sniffing around trying to get records and names of other people to talk to." The visitor got up. "In fact, for- mer General Moravec, it would be a very fine idea for you to get out of here. I think we understand each other?" "I understand you," the general said. "Good day." He knew it was no use to go to the jail, but he did anyway. He was turned away so rudely that he was surprised to be admitted to the trial. It lasted about five minutes. Gabcik and Kubis were scarcely mentioned; Kral was tried and con- demned for collaboration with the Gestapo. It was a mario- nette show. But just at the end an impromptu line brought it momentarily to incongruous life. "Why did you do it?" the chief justice recited. "For their rotten German marks?" "One million of them," Kral retorted. "How much are the Russians paying you?" They killed him, of course; General Moravec watched the execution. He could not help thinking that Kral was dying for the wrong reason-not for his crime, but for Communist ends. Maybe that's really what keeps bothering me about Heydrich's death, he reflected. Did we kill him and trigger 5,000 other deaths in a just cause, or out of political ambition? Is any human motive ever untainted? At least the two who did the killing, Gabcik and Kubis, came close to purity of motive. They had been healthy young men, not born martyrs in search of death. They had not killed for pride, greed, envy, anger, or ambition. They had killed like dedicated surgeons removing a cancerous mass. They must have felt deeply that the play had to unfold and that their business was not to choose the actors or criticize the choice of theater but only to play their ordained parts as best they could. Of all forms of courage, theirs was the highest because it is the most humble. As he walked away, General Moravec met the Communist functionary who had forbidden him to visit Kral. "Will you please tell me where Gabcik and Kubis are bur- ied?" he asked politely. "Nowhere," came the sardonic answer. "There are no graves. You foot-kissers of the British are not going to have that excuse to build a statue and hang wreaths. Czech heroes are Communists." General Moravec felt tired. There were more Heydrichs than a man could destroy. Fascist Heydrichs died and Com- munist Heydrichs took their places and there was no end to it, as long as people coast. Some day, perhaps, the wheel would turn and Czechs would grow strong again, and be free to remember the strength of Josef Gabcik and Jan Kubis. ApprovqgdkVt Release 2 /05 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Approved For Release,, 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 The assignment of an inter- preter with slightly ulterior mo- tives for selected international visits yields a net gain. THE INTERPRETER AS AN' AGENT Francis Agnor The rather obvious time-honored practice of using inter- preters assigned to international exchange delegations as in- telligence agents (or, conversely, of getting intelligence per- sonnel assigned as interpreters) has both advantages and dis- advantages. If the interpreter makes the most of his intelli- gence mission, however, and observes some common-sense rules of behavior, there can be a net advantage both in the direct yield of information from such an assignment and in the improvement of an asset in the person of the interpreter. The advantage in immediate information is likely to be limited; the improvement of personal assets can be considerable. . In discussing these advantages we shall assume that the interpreter can be given adequate intelligence training and briefing (or that the intelligence officer is competent as an interpreter, and not compromised). We shall ignore the tech- nical aspects of the interpreter's art and the occupational dis- eases, nervous indigestion and undernourishment, contracted in his attempts to gulp food while translating banquet con- versations. We shall examine his domestic and foreign as- signments separately: the advantages and disadvantages of assignment at home and abroad often coincide, but there are also important differences. Gains on Home Ground Let us look first at the domestic assignment, where the in- terpreter is on his own native soil, attached to a group of for- eign visitors or delegates. As the communications link be- tween the visitors and their strange surroundings, he pos- sesses a strong psychological advantage in his available option to confine himself strictly to the business portions of the trip, leaving the visitors to fend for themselves in their spare time. Even if they have their own interpreter along, there are a SECRET 21 Approved For Release 2005103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000109MMO P PAGES 21-27 The Interpreter As Agent The Interpreter As Agent SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 number of matters-shopping, local customs, the availability of services-in which it would be convenient for them to have his help. Recognizing their dependence on his cooperation for the smooth progress of their visit, they will usually do their best to establish, if not a cordial friendship, at least a good working relationship. A great deal depends on the interpreter him- self, of course, but normal friendly overtures on his part will usually be met at least half way by the visitors. Just by being relaxed and perhaps willing to do a small extra favor here and there, he can become accepted as an indispensable mem- ber of their family group. An excellent way to break down reserve and promote a free exchange of ideas is to invite the group to his home. (It does not pay for him to be so obliging that he becomes a valet, and it is advisable to establish this principle early in the game.) Continued friendly gestures are likely to result in time in the establishment of a genuine rapport, with its attendant benefits. If the interpreter is knowledgeable in the field of the official discussions which he is interpreting, he can clarify in private discussions with the visitors some of the ambiguous or contradictory statements made during the official talks. Without appearing too curious or asking too many questions of intelligence purport (he should be particularly circumspect at the outset of a trip, when his bona fides is subject to great- est suspicion), he will sometimes be able to get definitive state- ments in private which are lacking in the confusion and in- terruptions of official discussions. It is here that he may bring to bear his training or natural bent for elicitation, whether for official purposes or for his own education. At the same time the interpreter himself is the target of numerous questions which reveal both intelligence and per- sonal interests on the part of his charges. Their intelligence questions may indicate gaps in their own service's informa- tion, and their personal ones are more broadly useful in show- ing the preconceived picture of this country that the visitors have brought with them. Although they often realize that their questions betray a lack of sophistication, they are will- ing to sacrifice dignity to satisfy their burning curiosity. Hon- est, natural answers, despite the apparent rudeness of some of the questions ("How much do you make? How much are you in debt?"), strengthen the interpreter's position and may lead to even more revealing questions. If the visitors are from a controlled society the very opportunity to put certain kinds of questions is a luxury they cannot afford at home. And when one of them is alone with the interpreter he often shows eagerness to ask questions of a kind not brought up in group discussions. In all these discussions the interpreter is gaining knowledge which no academic training can give him. First, he is given a glimpse of his own country through the warped glass of for- eign misconceptions and propaganda. The image will not be fully that which hostile propagandists have sought to fix, but it will show where they have succeeded and where they have failed. Second, he learns how to get ideas across to these representatives of another culture, learns where he must ex- plain at length and where he can make a telling point in just a few words. Finally, as a sort of synthesis of his experience, he can arrive at some conclusions concerning the visitors' inner thought processes, often quite alien to his own. In addition to gaining these insights, the interpreter makes what may prove to be useful contacts in future assignments. How potentially useful depends on the spirit in which he parts company with the visitors, but anything short of outright hostility is likely to make them of some value. Drawbacks and Limitations The chief disadvantages of domestic assignment for the agent-interpreter lie in the shallowness of his cover. Visitors from Communist countries, in particular, start with a strong presumption that any interpreter is at least working hand in glove with local intelligence or security groups if he is not actually a member of one. The barrier thus imposed in the initial stages of a trip may break down as rapport is estab- lished, but there always remains a lurking suspicion that the interpreter is not what he seems, and the visitors are always on guard against the slightest hint of prying or propaganda. Furthermore, they collect a large file of biographic information on him in the course of their association, material which is certainly delivered to their own security forces. Matching 22 W1863ved For RAWaNT2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 23 The Interpreter As Agent The Interpreter As Agent Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 this up with some earlier trace they may have of him may blow his organizational connections. Another limiting factor is that foreign delegations, particu- larly from Bloc countries, are drawn from the elite and so not typical of the peoples they represent.. The impressions the interpreter receives concerning their beliefs and feelings may not be applicable to their countrymen at home. Though the delegation members may not be as orthodox abroad adhave their home ground, where conformity is obligatory, they a more compelling stake in the regime than the average citizen. t on The last disadvantage to be noted depends in large p the capabilities and limitations of the interpreter himself. It lies in the difficulty of retaining facts and figures in one's head while performing the complicated task of translation. It is possible to store in one's mind only a limited number of figures before the whole delicate structure of memory dis- integrates into a jumble of confused statistics which are of no use to anyone. While it is permissible to take notes during long speeches where it is obviously impossible to remember everything said between pauses, this device is not appropriate for short conversations. If the interpreter is caught franti- cally scribbling notes immediately after a visitor has casually let drop the annual production of some electronic gadget, his usefulness to intelligence has largely evaporated. Further- more, he has pinpointed an area of intelligence interest. A dash to the toilet after some particularly significant slip on the g, but too frequent use of this dodge excites embarrassing taking, commiseration or, more often, suspicion. On the Opponent's Home Field The foreign assignment differs in many respects from the domestic. On the profit side, in addition to getting the same in- terpreter intelligence take as the domestic interpreter, the tabroad can be an observer, reporting on things which have nothing to do with his linguistic job. If he has had proper training, such observations can be quite valuable. Further- more, he can acquire a feeling for the country and a sense of what intelligence activities can be undertaken and what cannot. He may, for example, attempt photography in areas on the borderline of legitimacy just to test reaction, or take a stroll before going to bed in order to check surveillance patterns. If he is an area specialist, the trip provides an edu- cation which no amount of book learning could give. He con- firms certain of his preconceptions while discarding others, and he returns with a far more solid grasp on his specialty than he had previously. The confidence thus gained from first- hand experience is a very valuable asset if he is to be involved in operations against the country in the future. On the negative side we find all the disadvantages noted in the domestic assignment: the interpreter accompanying a dele- gation abroad is, if anything, under sharper scrutiny as a prob- able agent, and should be prepared for a more or less clan- destine search of his baggage; his memory is still strained to hold on to useful data; his official foreign contacts are the most loyal stalwarts of the regime; his digestion deteriorates. In addition, he finds himself a prisoner of his cover profession. Whereas the foreign delegation's dependence on him during his domestic assignment led to enlightening discussions, his own party's need for his help, not only on official matters but on everything that requires communication during every wak- ing hour, now obliges him to spend all of his time with his own countrymen. He becomes a communications machine, unable to introduce any of his own ideas or queries into the conversations. Contacts are pretty well limited to those which the hosts have thoughtfully provided for about eighteen out of every twenty-four hours, and a delegation of six-foot Amer- icans accompanied by watchful hosts is not the sort of group which a dissident member of a closed society is likely to ap- proach in order to unload his true feelings about the regime. Finally, even the diffident admissions of ignorance implicit in questions put to the interpreter on his own home ground are lacking when he goes abroad. Particularly in Communist countries the officials he contacts need to show that they have not been contaminated by his ideology; each tries to out-party- line the rest, less as an effort (usually counter-productive) to influence the visiting delegation than as a demonstration of his own orthodoxy for the benefit of his comrades. This com- pulsion precludes any serious discussion about either the hosts' or the visitors' country. During such exhibitions of chest- beating the interpreter is put on his mettle to hold his temper Approv%g Release,J&tM3/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 The InterpreterAPPrApfit For Releas)h0D Q I4fx Q - 78T03I94A000100040001-0 SECRET and restrain himself from active participation in the conversa- tion. Criteria and Other Considerations From the foregoing we may conclude that the principal in- telligence value of the domestic assignment lies in the psy- chological field-exploration of mental attitudes, blind spots, thought processes, strength and weakness of beliefs-whereas the value of the foreign assignment derives from first-hand experience in the country and from the collection of observ- able operational and positive intelligence. It is perhaps un- necessary to warn that the interpreter can not fulfill the classic agent roles of recruiting spy nets, agitating for revolu- tion, or personally stealing the master war plans. He will pay his way by less dramatic acts. Here are some of the factors that should be taken into con- sideration in recruiting an interpreter for an intelligence mission or utilizing an existing intelligence asset in inter- preter capacity. First, it must be borne in mind that almost any interpreter will be the target of intense scrutiny by the opposition, particularly in Bloc countries. The prevailing po- litical climate today, however, is such that the interpreter's official position as part of a delegation protects him from arbitrary arrest, except perhaps in Communist China. The rest of the Bloc is so committed to. East-West exchanges that it would not jeopardize the program for one rather insignificant intelligence fish. Second, the interpreter should not be the only briefed mem- ber of the delegation going abroad. As we have shown, the interpreter has his hands full with his official duties and has little opportunity for taking notes. The official delegate, how- ever, has good opportunities and excellent cover for taking notes. In addition, being presumably an expert in the field of the discussions, he can recognize significant material better than the interpreter. Third, the size of the delegation is an extremely important factor affecting the usefulness of both domestic and foreign interpreter assignments. A delegation of more than six or seven people imposes such a burden on the interpreter that he has no time for an intelligence mission. He is kept con- "`tinually busy rounding up strays, making travel reservations, getting people settled in hotels, and generally playing nurse- maid. The best possible delegation would consist of one very lazy man who neither demanded nor rejected the presence of the interpreter. Finally, the itinerary itself must be considered. On do- mestic assignments the most important thing is a relaxed schedule which will give the visitors enough spare time to ob- serve their surroundings and ask questions about non-official matters. On the foreign assignment perhaps the most im- portant consideration is the previous accessibility of the areas to be visited. If the area is completely off the beaten track or had previously been closed to foreigners, there is excellent reason to employ a trained observer as interpreter. Even the standard tourist trips, however, may provide useful in- formation if the interpreter is alert. This paper has been oriented primarily towards the inter- preter-agent question as it obtains in visits to or from the Soviet Bloc, but many of the same factors are valid for neu- tralist or uncommitted areas. With the steady increase in cultural and professional exchanges among most countries of the world, opportunities for placing interpreters have also ex- panded. The expansion is not only making more experience and training available but is affording better cover for in- terpreters with intelligence objectives. Perhaps more of them should be given such objectives, despite the drawbacks we have noted. SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Approved For Rell ase 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Anatomy of a scientific bag of tricks to conjure up the likeness e n n . own fac k of an, u THE IDENTI-KIT Herman E. Kimsey One of the most difficult problems in human communica- tion is that of exactly duplicating in another mind the visual image one has in one's own. Language is not adequate to the job: the range of variant concepts corresponding to each de- scriptive word, not to mention their inevitable emotional and imaginative colorings, create inaccuracies, distortions, and downright false impressions. Man has therefore had to re- sort to comparing such an image or its elements with ac- cepted common physical standards, which reach their ultimate precision in the standard units of measurement. This proce- dure leaves no room for the vagaries of individual interpreta- tion. This communications problem has always been particularly acute between the describers of absent persons and those whose job it is to identify the subjects described-notably the police-and the identification world has therefore been using for more than a hundred years some system of 'com- paring individual characteristics with physical standards. The rather startling Identi-Kit herein presented, which provides' a set of such standards, must then be considered the product of a development and evolution whose basic principles "have been thoroughly proven. The Kit itself is no untested or con troversial invention: it has withstood continuous testing and retesting for the past five years in both experimental and practical on-the-job applications. The Identification Process .The. basic premise of all identification systems is the fact that nature never creates two identical individuals. The problem is to record the identifying charactertics; and then to catalog them objectively in some system by which they can be communicated from person to person and from place Approved For Releas 103115 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 29 MORIIHRP PAGES 29-35 The Identi-Kit SECRET X~ie fdenti Kit Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 to place. In identification by fingerprints and other similar means the recording is done by taking a physical impression of the characteristic features. Systems have been developed to catalog and communicate these with accuracy. But cir- cumstances do not always allow for the taking of these physical impressions. Identification by facial appearance gives us a wider range, requiring as it does mere visual contact with the subject, if only we have some method to crystallize out of the fluid mem- ory of the observer an objective image of the subject's ap- pearance and some way to code or tabulate its identifying characteristics. The Identi-Kit provides such a method of re- cording and cataloging. It has limits, however, short of posi- tive identification, limits inherent in human ability to observe and remember. If every natural mark and line in a human face could be visually compared with its antecedent image, complete and positive identification would be possible. Such positive identi- fication is not practical because the human eye and brain, even with minute observation of all the natural marks and lines on a person's face, could not retain the memory of their exact location well enough to recreate a perfect image of it. But given the impossibility of an infallible system of visual identification, we can nevertheless make a practical and utili- tarian approach to the identification problem through a proc- ess of elimination. In this process visual comparison can elim- inate great numbers of possible persons who fail to qualify for likeness to the subject sought, and so reduce the possi- bilities to a few individuals, and frequently to a single one. The elimination process can begin with the gross physical features of age, sex, race, height, weight, build, etc., and pro- ceed from there to the finer distinctions of facial appearance. The Kit It is in pinpointing these finer distinctions that we run into trouble when questioning a witness in order to build up an 'image of the absent person. And this is where the Identi-Kit comes in. The kit breaks a full-face image up into component parts-hair, brows, eyes, nose, lips, chin-line with ears, and age lines, plus beard, hat, and glasses, if any. It contains several dozen transparent slides picturing each of these com- ponents with different types of contours, 500 slides in all, with five notches on the side for different placements of each feature. Each slide is coded with a letter for the facial com- ponent illustrated and a figure for the particular configura- tion. The witness is given a catalog showing all these slides and asked to pick out the brows, nose, chin-line, etc., which most nearly suit the person he saw. The witness, not accustomed to recognizing a pair of eyes with the brows removed or a mouth with no face around it, will find the going difficult at first. No matter: he will soon be able to study the whole reconstructed face and make ad- justments. As he makes his tentative selection of components the slides are assembled on a make-up pad and the composite image displayed. Is the nose too fat? Pick a bonier one. Are the brows too prominent? Rearrange the pile of slides, putting the brows at the back and the eyes farther forward. Is the forehead too high? Slip the hair slide down by one or two from the normal third notch. Is the hair parted on the wrong side? Reverse the slide. The witness is at last satisfied; he recognizes this man. It is not a finished portrait, but a good line-drawing of the right type of person. Figure 1 shows what a close resemblance to a well-known face can be assembled with the kit. In the first 129 operational cases in which the kit was used (by four dif- ferent operators), the witness was able to produce a recogniz- able likeness of all but nine subjects. It took him anywhere from five minutes to several hours, averaging perhaps between thirty minutes and an hour. There is one further refinement illustrated in Figure 1: if there are moles or scars on the remembered face, a grid of numbered lines is placed over the composite image and the positions of the marks are noted in this frame of reference. The scar grid is shown in Figure 2. One of the advantages of the kit is the ease with which its coding permits a face to be recorded or transmitted to a dis- tant location through almost instantaneous assembly from another kit there. A face is contained, for example, in the code message All N21X1 C30 E79 L16 D55 H92X4R SV40 81120 Appr v r Releast2 5103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SAR SECRET -Approved For Re C D E 14 S H 9 9~ C D E i9 n H e N FIGURE 1 /1 JO OI ~ N 0 M >4 W 09 r~ l9 _ The. Identi-Kit SECRET which means "Age lines slide 17, nose slide 21 two notches below normal, chin and ear slide 30, eye slide 79, lip slide 16, brow slide 55, hair slide 92 reversed and one notch above normal, mole under right eye at vertical 40 horizontal 20, no beard, glasses, or hat." The number of such facial combinations that can be formed from the Identi-Kit is too astronomical to be conveniently Approvac%gr ReIeaseSNft?403115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 33 SEC SECRET The tdenti-Kit The ldenn-Nn Approved For Release 05/03/15: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 S 55 some variation of a police technique, a relationship reflected in the identity in many small countries of the police with the intelligence service. The kit was actually a product of 'intelligence effort later released for police use, and it is being applied in an ever growing number of operational intelligence cases to the problem of identifying the "third man." The effectiveness of the kit, thoroughly tested by both in- telligence and the police, has produced startling results in areas where it has been properly applied. In fewer than one percent of police cases is it identification by fingerprints that leads to an arrest. In the several hundred Identi-Kit cases on record the kit has led to a whopping 35 percent of the arrests. Most of these identifications were accomplished by cross reference of the witness's reconstruction with "mug" files of known criminals which were classified in the Identi-Kit system. This process was possible in 100 of the first 129 cases, with an average file search time of 40 seconds. One must remember, however, that the Identi-Kit system is not intended to supplant any of the identification systems in present use. It is simply an additional tool in the inter- rogation kit, a special wrench that enables you to get at a formerly inaccessible spot and work there effectively. You still need your other tools, and you have to be a good me- chanic in the first place: the kit needs the control of a skilled interrogator, who can master this additional instrument with the help of a special one-week course of instruction. A child can make mechanical faces from the kit; but only ex- perience and training can develop the right images from the mind of a person who had no particular reason to remember them until the questioning began, or perhaps does not want to remember them at all. The potential uses and performance of the Identi-Kit sys- tem have barely been touched upon in this article. Exten- sive files must be developed and many operators trained be- fore the full benefit of the system will be apparent. But the intelligence officer will feel the power of a conjuror when he can take the codes from a face his agent has built up to the nearest telephone or communications center, notify a dis- tant file of his problem, and get back the required identifica- tion, complete with details, in a matter of minutes more than the communications lag. FTGVas 2 written. These assemblages are rather like passport or other identity photographs in reproducing physical contours with- out reflecting "personality.". Although they thus fall short of portrait-type likenesses, they are sufficient when compared feature by feature with known persons to weed out quickly all but one or a few that each could represent. We have been treating the kit as a police device, but its application in intelligence is obvious. One might almost say, in fact, that virtually every technique used in intelligence is 34 SECRET SECRET 35 Approved For Release-20 es into the meticulous of those who examine ' papers for forgery or CREDENTIALS-BONA FIDE OR FALSE? David V. Brigane The use of false documents, traditional in espionage, has re- Approved For 2005103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 sponded like all else in the profession to the modern trend of expansion, organization, and technological advance. As intelligence activities have multiplied, the demand for docu- ments has grown, and increasing effort has gone into their procurement and manufacture. On the defensive side, the de- tection of false documents has undergone a parallel growth in importance. Those not familiar with false documentation would be amazed to see the elaborate techniques that go into the making of a high-grade reproduction and startled by the per- fection of the results achieved. German World War U re- productions of British pound notes were so accurate that a Swiss bank, asked by German agents to check them as pos- sible forgeries, had no reservations about declaring them au- thentic. The bank had not been remiss: it had made a care- ful examination and cabled London to verify the serial num- bers and dates. After an extended period of use it was no physical flaw but merely the unavoidable duplication of exist- ing serial numbers that ultimately gave them away. More recently a Western security service accepted a reproduction of its country's passport as genuine even after the question of forgery was raised. But false documentation is an uneven business. Require- ments on it are unpredictable, its raw materials often un- :'available, and the time interval between demand and delivery can be appallingly short. The perfection of high-grade re- 'productions is no less astonishing than the crudity of make- shifts sometimes used even by the intelligence services of ma- world powers. Documents prepared by the German secret services during World War II have been described as being in Approved For Re;re05103115:CIA-RDP78T03194A00 AGES 37-49 SECRET Credentials Credentials Approved For Releas 05103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 many instances "beneath contempt", and "veritable death war- rants to their unhappy holders." 1 Japanese documentation specialists, examining German reproductions of the Russian basic identity document, noted that the multi-colored cloth cover was too the printing ink too glossy, noticeably ground tint made by the. Zammel printing press brighter than it should be, and the place-of-issue indicator identical in all copies. Soviet Agent Documentation of The Russians themselves have not been above using some the crudest devices known to the forger's trade. In reproduc- ing rubber stamps for the German military travel permit, they economized by making a separate stamp for the center emblem and combining it with various reproductions of the outer portion, which showed the place of issue. The composite cachets, of course, did not reflect the individual variations characteristic of the originals, did not have the emblem in proper alignment with its encircling legend, and even showed al- inking differences from the separate imp r .ode But the though the Soviet services have thus improvised pressure of operational needs, especially in wartime, gambling that their makeshifts will escape close scrutiny, they are nevertheless journeymen at the documentation trade, having long since passed their apprenticeship. The Soviet emphasis on clandestine and deep-cover activi- ties has historically made documentation of its agents a mat- ter of prime importance. As Don Levine's new book recalls,2 a false Canadian passport was successful in establishing an identity for Trotsky's killer, even though the NKVD has mis- spelled the name as "Jacson." Richard Sorge used forged passports to conceal his travel to Moscow, and his radio op- erator, Max Klausen, traveled on three passports, Italian, Ca- nadian, and German.3 Documents were a major concern to Alexander Foote and other members of his net. Rudolf Abel used an altered American passport for entry into the United States and two birth certificates to create different identities 1 Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies, p. 102. 'The Mind of an Assassin, reviewed in this issue. ' See Willoughby's The Shanghai Conspiracy (New York: 1952). r_ i, .,after his arrival; his assistant, Hayhanen, built an elaborate 'identity structure on an original American birth certificate 'apparently confiscated from a U.S. citizen who had emigrated Estonia 4 Khokhlov,5 false identties a But Wifl documents ents were relied on documents to support of critical importance in these famous cases which now hap- pen to be in the public eye, imagine the documentation re- quirements created by the countless throng of subordinate agents and couriers, the proletariat of Communist espionage hierarchies. To meet this continual demand, the Communists have al- ways devoted a major effort to document collection and forgery. Even in the early thirties they operated a documentation unit in Moscow, one in Berlin, and a third in the United States.6 Of these three the German Pass-Apparat was the most elaborate, with six workshops and agencies all over Europe. In Germany alone there were agents for document collection in each of 24 districts. Their sources were varied. Communist sympathizers sometimes offered their own per- sonal documents. A cleaning woman at Berlin police head- quarters stole blank passports for the Party from time to time. Two engravers at the Stempel-Kaiser plant provided duplicates of rubber stamps manufactured for the German government. Two Saarland police officers formed a partner- ship in passports, one supplying the blanks, the other the stamps. Once during these years a Communist raid on a Czech police office yielded 1500 Czech passports as a by- product, but the richest document hauls in the thirties came from the International Brigade in Spain. Later, during World War II, Max Habijanic, a Swiss police officer in Basel, was a reliable source of backstopped Swiss passports. Currently the Soviet intelligence services use documents of their own Bloc extensively to authenticate defector and refugee cover. They also maintain a systematic watch within the Bloc for foreign identity documents held by returned emigres. 'See W. W. Rocafort, "Colonel Abel's Assistant," Studies, III 4, p. 1. 'See his book, in the Name of Conscience, to be reviewed in the spring issue of the Studies. 'David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage, p. 92. Approved Elease 20f ORM : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 SECRET Credentials Credentials Approved For Releas 005103/15: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 As a corollary to these Communist activities, Western in- telligence services have given increasing attention to the coun- terintelligence aspects of documentation. Techniques of docu- ment analysis developed in scientific criminology have been combined with world-wide intelligence resources to serve the investigative needs of intelligence organizations. Docu- ment analysis has been found increasingly effective as an aid in the investigation and detection of enemy agents, in the surveillance and control of one's own agents and verification of their intelligence reports, in the screening of refugees and defectors, and in developing biographic information and es- tablishing the bona fides of individuals of intelligence interest. Enemy Agents Among the odds and ends of intelligence debris deposited during World War II by the tide of battle in Burma was a Japanese document bearing the title "CERTIFICATE OF RE- LIABILITY." It contained a detailed description of the bearer, followed by this text: "Please extend every assistance to Mr. Aung since he is employed by us as a spy." Although a spy's normal documentation does not resemble the forth- right Mr. Aung's in advertising his profession, it often holds hidden evidence against him. Document analysis can play a key role in uncovering enemy operations. The nature of this role can be illustrated in the case his- tory of a Soviet escapee, whose documents and statement, in accordance with standard practice, were subjected to analysis and evaluation. During examination of the documents for format, an abnormally small spacing between the abbrevia- tion "No." and the serial number of his basic identity docu- ment, the pasport, attracted attention. No pasport from the same place of issue being available for comparison, an analysis of the imprint was undertaken. It was determined that the serial number had been added after the document was printed and bound, contrary to all normal procedures for manufactur- ing the pasport. Then the signatures came under suspicion, two signatures by each of two officials, because both pairs showed undue similarity. Subjected to handwriting analysis, all four proved to be traced forgeries. Now the pasport was checked against the escapee's military reserve document, and an irregularity in the photographs be- 7came apparent. Normally the photos in the two documents ould have been taken on different occasions and would show ` w different poses, clothing, and lighting. It does sometimes hap- pen that prints for both documents are made from the same negative, but then the print used in the pasport is differenti- ated by a white corner. In this case it was found that the photo in the military reserve document had been copied from that in the pasport but enlarged and cropped to eliminate the white corner. Such rephotographing from another docu- ment, generally inconsistent with legitimate issuance, may be necessary when a forged document should show the person at an earlier age or when because of time, distance, or security considerations the subject is not available to the forger for photographing in person. In addition to these evidences of forgery, discrepancies were found between the information given in the documents and biographic data supplied by the escapee himself. In the use made of these discoveries this case was a typical one. While the results of document analysis did not prove conclusively that the man was a Soviet agent, they showed that his docu- ments had not been issued legitimately, disproved his general story, and opened up specific lines of interrogation and in- vestigation. As a tool in the investigation of enemy agents, document analysis can be used to great advantage not only in mak- ing an initial detection but in the handling of known agents, inducing them to talk and confirming or refuting their state- ments. The material evidence from documents has a strong psychological impact in corroborating or disproving an agent's story, and can be effective in destroying his self-confidence and eliciting confession. Agent Control and Other Applications Document analysis is not reserved for enemy agents; it can be equally valuable in determining the reliability of one's own agents and in assessing their reports and missions. A Far Eastern case will serve as illustration, one wherein an agent's report and the authenticity of a Chinese Communist docu- ment on which it was based were tested by analysis. ApprovedSF&R?lease 2( 1815 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 41 ApW,9& 1 Fpr Rele, Qj15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SECRET As evidence of mission accomplished, the agent had also pre- sented, along with the questioned document, the forged travel permit supplied him for use in the target area, now bearing a Chinese Communist cachet stamped on, by his account, at a checkpoint in the area itself. There were no known authentic exemplars with which to compare either the questioned docu- ment or this precise checkpoint cachet, but the cachet was compared with others from the same general area. It ap- peared to follow the normal pattern; several of the examples on hand were similar in format. One of them, however, was especially similar, to the point of suspiciously close likeness. Photographic comparison proved that both cachets had been stamped with the same instrument, and the place names sep- arately imprinted. Legitimate use of the same stamp in two different localities was out of the question. Fraudulent use of an authentic stamp in Chinese Communist hands was also out; this agent had no such capability. The answer was obvious: both cachets were forgeries. Since the exemplar cachet had been obtained from another agent travel permit, all papers connected with the mission this one had been used for came under scrutiny. Among them was a document, allegedly procured in another target area, which bore a small cachet of receipt in a Chinese Communist office. Here again economy of effort betrayed the forger's hand. This cachet proved to be identical with a re- ceipt cachet on the questioned document in the current case, although the receiving offices could not have been the same. It was clear that neither of the reported missions had been carried out and that the documents allegedly acquired in the target areas were fabrications. In a similar but simpler case, an agent presented a letter which bore a postal cancellation as proof that he had been in a certain city. This time, however, many authentic ex- amples of postal cancellations from the city in question were available for comparison. Examination of the lettering, dat- ing, inks, and indicators conclusively proved that the cancel- lation was a forgery. Document analysis is useful in many other kinds of personal investigation-for establishing the bona fides of refugees, for surveying the activities of target personalities, for clearing prospective recruits, etc. Sometimes it is not a question of establishing authenticity, but only of developing informational ontent. An itinerary analysis from a passport, for example , provides detailed information on a person's movements which may not be procurable from any other source. Culling in- formation of this type might appear to be a simple matter of reading the record, not involving analysis; yet it requires 'thorough familiarity with travel regulations and the custom- ary passport entries to get the maximum amount of in- formation. In one recent case where little proved biographic information was available on a person, his detailed record dat- ing back to 1931 was built up through documents. Spotting Forgeries False documents are brought to attention through observa- tion of some defect in them, through improper use, or through suspicion about the situation or activities of the bearer. Analysis can come only after the initial spotting, and rela- tively poor documentation can frequently escape detection if used in an ordinary way under circumstances which do not attract attention. Anyone who has experienced the harried formalities of an international port of entry must be aware that a passport flaw could well be passed. For where the vast majority of the documents are genuine and the circumstances of use normal, only an obvious flaw will give the document away. The obviousness of a flaw, however, is relative to the acuity of the checker. The human mind and senses make astonish- ingly fine distinctions, often unconsciously, in dealing with familiar things. And the results of analysis can be used to increase the checker's sensitivity and so play a part in the initial spotting. Checklists of irregularities indicative of forgery have long been a counterintelligence tool. During World War II Soviet intelligence prepared a list of indicators for reproductions made by the German Abwehr. One of the salient signs was the use of rustproof staples in the Abwehr reproduction of the Ukrainian basic identity document, a gleaming evidence of forgery. More recently such checklists have been useful in screening Hungarian refugees. In another part of the world, analysis of South Korean documents reproduced for SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SECRET Credentials $ Credentials Approved For ReleaW~a05/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 North Korean agents has revealed characteristic flaws and even made it possible to differentiate among those forged by different North Korean intelligence units. patterns in the Aside from characteristic individual flaws, p documentation of enemy agents can be detected by analysis and set up as spotting devices to be used in screening large groups of people. Some underlying pattern is likely to reflect the basic constants in operational needs and aims and the limitations of human imagination and material resources for support of operations. For one thing, there is a tendency to simplify false documents, since greater variety and complexity mean greater chance of error in detail. The resultant simpli- fication may lead to the establishment of more specific de- tectable patterns. Take for example the question of showing a military career. A fictitious military background is complex and would require elaborate training to maintain under in- terrogation. The simpler solution of giving no military back- numerous ground has been noted in the documentation therefore Soviet agents. Lack of military background may be one element of pattern. The effort to conceal information of value to the opposi- tion may account for other elements of pattern. When the Communists use defector or refugee cover, the agents' docu- ments themselves are of considerable value to Western in- telligence. The Communists, operating under the assumption that these Bloc documents will be exploited by Western intel- ligence services, have introduced slight defects in them, pre- sumably in the hope that these will be reproduced in docu- ments for Western intelligence operations and thus serve to identify Western agents. One of these defects is the separate imprinting of the pas- port serial number noted in the case of the Soviet "escapee" we examined earlier. Other deception devices have been an added letter, asterisk, or period, differences in printing impres- sion, fabricated registration and deregistration cachets, and an additional dry seal not used in legitimate documents. One Communist service has shown a pattern of suppressing seri- alization information by not recording the number of a previ- ous document as "basis for issuance." But the Communist services risk being trapped in their own ? 'dialectic. This technique has been noted and turned anti- thetically to counterintelligence profit by the West: inten- tional'irregularities are carefully watched for and when found incriminate the document holder. And their detection is fa- cilitated by their tendency to follow a general pattern. J; If,.on the other hand, the Communists use the documenta- tion of a neutral or enemy country, the limitations on their resources for such documents may set a noticeable pattern. After the Communist raid on the Czech police office back in the thirties, the windfall of Czech passports was used freely until French police became aware of the pattern of Czech pass- port holders unacquainted with their native language. For all these potential aids to document checkers, it must be admitted that the counterintelligence function of provid- ing them data for the identification of forgeries has in gen- eral not been well developed. This is evidenced by the fact that the average official whose duties include checking per- sonal documents is surprisingly uninformed even about the characteristic features of domestic documentation. The sys- tematic Japanese do go so far as to provide police with pocket- sized booklets listing the blocks of numbers assigned to prov- indes for Japanese Alien Registration Certificates and describ- ing some elementary characteristics of forgeries; but these rudimentary aids did not prevent the Tokyo Metropolitan Po- lice from being taken in by a Tokyo-issued Alien Registration Certificate carried by a self-acknowledged North Korean agent. Only the agent's insistence that he brought the document from Korea led the police to request an analysis by Printing Bureau experts, which proved the document a forgery. Another Far Eastern country, less methodical, is also per- haps more typical in its lack of attention to the counterin- telligence aspects of documentation. It gives its police of- ficers little or no assistance in detecting forgeries of the basic identity document of its capital city, although an excellent device is at hand. Genuine documents in use in the city have come from thirty or more different printing plates made up from, time to time when additional stocks have been needed and the old plates were no longer available. No attempt ap- pears to have been made to turn this diversity to benefit by Approv Release6EQQ 03115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 C#*0WWtl For Rele @ fl) iJ33115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SECRET SECRET is- maintaining accurate records of the districts and dattes of is- sue of the different printings. At the same time, undergone have reproductions of the document ~ by the security forces, and only the most elementary rY expected, has piaved a documentation, as might therefore be expvery minor role in the spotting of infiltra- against Communist tion the long-continued struggle infiltrators. tion and subversion, this counterintelligence function de- serves much greater attention. Analytic Procedures Analysis of documents is essentially item with an authentic ex- But it is not simply comparing ing an examples of ample in order to detect discrepancies. Take two a -given signature: they will not be identical lsis unless one of both have been forged. So the process f double comparison. First the two signatures are compared and points of similarity and difference noted. Then these dif- ards of ac ferences are compared at least mentally with stand t has es ceptable variation we i? t X atiioonto g large numbers of tablished through p principles based handwriting specimens and through study of on similar experience by others. The most laborious part of the job, the establishment of norms, has therefore been ac- e two mould not havesbeee tuestabli hedvwithout large And norms c numbers of handwriting specimens available. Essentially the same process is applied in all stages of. docu- ment. analysis, and invariably one of the greatest difficulties volume of material extensive enough to de- is to build up a judgment are needed on all the termine norms. Standards of j agin and innumerable details relating to format, alterations, g5 ondi- applicability and use of the document under varying tions. One of the first things normal one, as determined from eon ginals, photosmeat's, format is the covering issuance and use, and informa- s of many types. All characteristics of the docu- Lion report rinting, dry seals, cachets, serial meat must be considered-p dt g style of entries, termi- ments must be subjected also to technical analysis, a special- ized field requiring separate treatment.' Interestingly enough, format analysis can be applied very successfully to Soviet agent documents issued by the Russians themselves. It is sometimes assumed that when an intelli- gence service requires the documents of its own country for its operations, it will make use of the genuine article, docu- mentation invulnerable to counterintelligence analysis. This is by no means true. Even if an agent document is issued by the normal issuing office, it will frequently show peculiarities arising from the operational needs of the case. Most notably there is the problem of the date of issue: the agent cannot be equipped with birth certificate, school diploma, military regis- tration document, occupational papers, and basic identity document all issued with a current date. But the blank docu- ments appropriate to the required date may long since have been replaced by new forms, and the normal issuing official, not being a documentation specialist, will probably back-date the document as required without departing from current is- suance procedures. The resultant discrepancies can be re- vealed by format analysis. A Seaman's Passport carried several years ago by a Commu- nist agent is a case in point. The document itself was genuine, duly issued by the appropriate Harbor Master, but it had been back-dated one year to meet operational requirements. Its serial number therefore corresponded to those of issuances a year later than the date shown, in other words to the actual rather than ostensible date of issue. It also bore a cachet which did not come into use until several months after its Purported date and omitted the fingerprint which had been included up to and for approximately eight months after that date. In addition, the document lacked the two dry seals normally placed over the photo. The logical explanation of this irregu- larity appears to be that it was received from the Harbor Mas' ter's office with serial number, issuance cachets, and signa- tures, but otherwise blank. The seal could not have'been in- cluded with the issuance cachets since it had to be stamped 'See Wilson K. Harrison's Suspect Documents-Their Scientific EX_ 2. numbers,. signatures and han amination, reviewed in Studies, III etc. Some of these ele- nology, photos, inks, paper, binding, Approved For Release q` /0,3115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SEC ET R SECRET Credentials f44For Release'-2005103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 on-the still absent photo. For reasons of security or con- com- venience, the intelligence office did not see fit to auhave thority. pleted document stamped later by the issuing '.'t'hese various flaws in format could be detected because the availability of document intelligence reports and a l- number of photocopied Seaman's Passports from which norms could be established. These made it possible to determine the approximate dates on which the new cachet was trod odu sed and the use of fingerprints discontinued, and through rial number sequence shown in the photocopies to pinpoint the exact date on which the questioned document was actually issued. . In addition to flaws in format, the Seaman's Passport con- tained certain biographic inconsistencies. It recorded a change of position from radio operator to apprentice, a retro- gression violating the normal occupational pattern; and it indicated that the seaman had made no voyage for a full year after the document was issued. An even more damaging rfact turned up in the photocopies of Seaman's~~Iotsentlh with the bearer had held a second such different mission. the questioned document, apparently and distinguishing fur- tive difficulty of establishing norms however7 by human un- of- predictability, violations of them is compounded, the best established of- predictability, which can easily ficial procedures. Irregularities do not per se prdove fraud e. A document held by a Hungarian refugee is a g aroused immediate suspicion b ed o e the photo did not cor respond in the dry seal impressed respond to the number in the cachet of the issuing This irregularity, however, was the legitimate result of an unusual chain of events. Involved ma bicycle ac ciiden tiin Budapest, the bearer had had to present document for police check. The Budapest police she adrobs ved that the dry seal was missing-something never noticed-and checked with the issuing office in another town. When the authenticity of the document was confirmed, the woman was allowed as a matter of convenience to have the dry seal entered in Budapest, where she was then staying, although the Budapest office with dthe number in not correspond, as in principle it the issuance cachet. In another refugee case, analysis disclosed entries in civilian documents inconsistent with the refugee's reported military record. Further interrogation of the subject satisfactorily explained these inconsistencies, drawing his exasperated com- ment that if there had been anything wrong with his docu- ments, he wouldn't have presented them. This comment of a sensible man caught in the toils of a suspicious bureaucracy seems logical, but its logic is not shared by those who have something to conceal. The risk of having no proof seems greater to them than the risk of defective proof. They are generally not aware of the amount of information their docu- ments will yield, and are prone to suppose that officials un- familiar with them will fail to detect flaws. One such hopeful deceiver was a Hungarian refugee whose documents were used to check his political background, es- pecially with regard to whether he had served in the State Security Authority, the AVH. The man denied that he had, maintaining that he had been employed in the civil police only; but his documents told a different story. His Military Re- serve Document recorded his police service in the space pro- vided for military experience, and only service in the AVH, not in the civil police, is counted as military service. Further- more, the Military Reserve Document was not issued until the termination of his police service, which therefore must have been considered the equivalent of military duty. This is one of the many cases in which documents that are themselves genuine serve on analysis to betray the bearer's falsifications. Document analysis is a valuable tool in counterintelligence, but it is one tool only, to be used in combination with other investigative techniques. And since documents do not exist in a vacuum, intelligence data on many apparently unrelated subjects may enter into document evaluation. On one occa- sion, Navy reports on coastal Chinese weather corroborated the travel route shown on a Chinese Communist document, confirming other evidence of its authenticity. Furthermore, the dependence for analytic effectiveness on intelligence re- sources, document information and exemplars requiring con- stant collection effort, make this activity an integral part of intelligence processes, one that cannot be carried on in isola- tion from the whole. Approved For Release 288M/15: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A priori considerations preju- dicing successful interrogation by `trance induction suggest a possible variant technique. HYPNOSIS IN INTERROGATION Edward F. Deshere The control over a person's behavior ostensibly achieved in hypnosis obviously nominates it for use in the difficult proc- ess of interrogation. It is therefore surprising that nobody, as the induction of "Mesmeric trance" has moved from halls of magic into clinics and laboratories, seems to have used it in this way. A search of the professional literature shows at least that no one has chosen to discuss such a use in print, and a fairly extensive inquiry among hypnosis experts from a variety of countries has not turned up anyone who admits to familiarity with applications of the process to interrogation. There is therefore no experimental evidence that can be cited, but it should be possible to reach tentative conclusions about its effectiveness in this field on the basis of theoretical con- siderations. The Nature of Hypnosis Experimental analysis has gradually given us a better un- derstanding of hypnosis since the days of Mesmer 6 and his fol- lowers, who held that it results from the flow of a force called animal magnetism from hypnotist to subject. Nevertheless, although no present-day investigator shares the lingering lay Opinion that hypnosis is in some way an overpowering of a Weak mind by a superior intellect, there are still many di- vergent theories propounded to account for the accumulating Clinical observations. Some of these have significantly dif- ferent implications with respect to the susceptibility of a hypnotized person to purposeful influence. The view that hypnosis is a state of artifically induced sleep bas been widely held since Braid 7 invented the term in mid- th-century. Currently Pavlov 20 takes a similar posi- UOn in maintaining that cortical inhibition, sleep, and hyp- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 51 Approved F "se 2005103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A0g 0Rf/#MP1RAGES 51-64 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY HypnosisApproved Y esiease 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 subject is motivated a priori to cooperate with the hypnotist, usually to obtain relief from suffering, to contribute to a sci- entific study, or (as in a stage performance) to become a center of attraction. Almost all information currently avail- able about hypnosis has been derived from such situations, . to - and this fact must to situations idifferenttfromtthese.p ply the data essentially identical. This view is now held thro5 p nosis are - out those parts of the world where Pavlovian theory eri- cepted as creed, but to the American investigator tBassxp for mental evidence against it appears overwhelming efiex, which - kneecaWells 29 example, has shown that he Patellar W disappears in sleep, is not diminished hypnosis- and hanom can others have demonstrated that all hypnotic p p a pan be elicited in a state bearing no r lhat sleep-like as- formance which suggests the hypothesis hypnosis are not intrinsic to the hypnotic state but 90 pects of to result from the hypnotist's suggestion that his subject sleep. Barker and Burgwin 2 have shown that the electroen- cephalographic changes characteristic Of sleep do not Occur The hypnosis except when true sleep 18 hypnotically induced. The findings of two Russian papers which dispute Sion, affirming that the EEG rhythm characteristic of hyp- p, have not nosis resembles that of drowsiness and ight. been verified by replicating their exp to The concepts of suggestion and suggestibility as applied hypnosis, introduced been developed and refined in modern nosis osis investigators, , have 1o concluded that hypnosis times. In a major monograph Hull a state of heightened suggestibility and has the is primarily it becomes increasingly easy state that for a subjeect ct too enter habit of hypnosis after he has once for done it. subj Welch,26 in an ingenious application of the condition- done ing theory, pointed out that trance induction begins with sug- p gestions which are almost certain to take effect and does to more difficult ones. While the concept of suggestion normal provide a bridge between tthe he hoftt e gyps tic proc g state, it does not explain peculiarity ess or the causes of the state trance- which might be called Several more recent approaches, osis, hold that achievement of motivational theories of hypn , to enter such a state- trance is related to the cshunblcec~ts desire the motivational Experimentalists and view-including the present writer, whose conclusions onli he subject of this paper are undoubtedly colored by it- that it accounts best for the major portion of the clinical data. Trance is commonly induced in situations where the Hypnosis of Interrogees The question of the utility of hypnosis in the interrogation in- of persons unwilling to divulge the information sought volves three issues: First, can hypnosis be induced under con- compelled can be so ditions of interrogation? If so, can the information be to reveal information? And finally, if obtained, to o induce or without induce e trance either again b the subject's a his being aware of it. The. Subject Unaware. Hypnosis has reportedly been ef- fected without the subject's awareness in three eonsitua- tions-in sleep, in patients undergoing p Ydubjtat tion, and spontaneously in persons observing another being hypnotized. The older'literature is replete with references to somnam- bulistic hypnosis induced by giving suggestions to sleeping subjects in a low but insistent voice. No case records are cited to support these statements, however; and they appear, many others in hypnosis literature, to have been carried over from one textbook to another without critical evaluation. In a recent study Theodore X. Barber 1 found considerable similar- ity between subjects' compliance with suggestions given dur- ing sleep and their reactions to ordinary hypnotic techniques. Since Barber had asked them for permission to enter their rooms at night and talk to them in their sleep, however, it is reasonable to assume that most if not all of them perceived that trance induction was his purpose. They cannot therefore be regarded as truly naive sleeping subjects. Casual experi- mentation by the present writer has failed to demonstrate the feasibility of hypnotizing naive sleepers. The sample con- sisted of only four subjects, three of whom awakened to ask belligerently what was going on. The fourth just continued to sleep. 5j0314fi :6 RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 53 Appr ved For l a 200 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 52 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approvt`Por release It is frequently possible for a therapist to perform hypnosis with the patient unaware. Advising the patient to relax, sug- gesting that he would be more comfortable with his eyes closed, and so on, the practitioner may induce a deep le term m trance in a relatively brief time without ever using hypnosis. Even though the subject has not explicitly sented to be hypnotized, however, his relationship to the hyp- notist, here a man of reputation and prestige, is one of trust and confidence, of justifiably anticipated help. Observers of hypnotic demonstrations may papents has re- ported enter trance. One of my own psychotherapy that she went into a trance while watching me demon- strate hypnotic phenomena on television. This spontaneous hypnosis occurred despite the fact that the patient was in the company of friends and it was therefore a source of embar- rassment to her. But here again we are dealing with a sub- ject in sympathy with the purposes of the hypnotist and one who feels himself to be in a safe situation. It has been noted clinically that persons with negative attitudes about hypnosis are not susceptible to spontaneous trance. conducted by The Subject Antagonistic. Ins experiments subjects making an effort Wells,29 Brenman, and Watkins, to resist trance induction were unable to fight it off. Space does not permit a full review of these experiments here, but in all three the subject had had previous trance experiences with the hypnotist, which, we may assume, initiated a positive relationship between subject and hypnotist. The subject was instructed to resist hypnosis, but in the context of partici- pating in an experiment to test this issue. It seems possible that his response was one of compliance with a supposed im- plicit desire on the part of the experimenter that he collabo- rate in demonstrating that trance can be induced in the face of resistance. The demand characteristics of the situa- tion-those influencing the subject to partake of the experi- menter's purposes--may have been such that his prescribed attitude of overt resistance was unable to prevail over the more fundamental attitude of cooperation in an experiment to show that trance can be brought on against a subject's will. Orne IS has shown that the demand characteristics of an experimental situation may greatly influence a subject's hyp- Hypnosis FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It is clear that at some level any cooperative tic behavior v . a subject wishes an experiment to "work out," wishes to help he exp - aura.,. , - pose of the experiment or the bias of the experimenter, he is disposed toward producing behavior which will confirm the ex- tide in a hyp- ticularl i y s par This perimenter's hypothesis. notic relationship. We are led to the conclusion that the many apparent cases of hypnosis without the subject's awareness or consent all seem to have depended upon a positive relationship between subject and hypnotist. The most favorable situation is one in .which the subject expects to derive benefit from his associa- tion with the hypnotist and trusts in the hypnotist and his ability to help. This would not be the situation in an interro- gation wherein the hypnotist is seeking to extract informa- tion which the subject wants to withhold. The possibility of using hypnosis would therefore seem to depend on success in the slow process of nurturing a positive relationship with the interrogee or in perpetrating some kind of trickery. Obedience in Trance Assuming that an interrogator has circumvented these problems and hypnotized a subject who wants to withhold in- formation, to what extent might the subject retain control of his secrets even in deep trance? This is an area where wide disagreements prevail among authorities and where ex- perimental evidence is highly contradictory. Young,30 for ex- ample, reports that subjects resist specific hypnotic sugges- tions if they have decided in advance to do so, while Wells 2S re- ports that none of his subjects were able to resist a prear- ranged unacceptable command or indeed any other. Most work on this problem has focused on the more specific ;,question of whether a person can be induced under hypnosis _110 commit some antisocial or self-destructive act. Supporting ?'the negative view is the classic experiment by Janet," who 'asked a deeply hypnotized female to commit several murders ;'before a distinguished group of judges and magistrates, stab- bing some victims with rubber daggers and poisoning others ;With sugar tablets. She did all this without hesitation. As the company dispersed, however, she was left in the charge of some young assistants, who took a notion to end the experi- 5 FCI&AiDBSBTONt94A000100040001-0 Approved FQr pose 200 FOR O IcIAL USE `T FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ments on a lighter note. When they old her that she was now alone and would undress she promptly awak. murders were play-acted, the W0111 d the been reseal; and the subject 'had no difficulty iff. Wells 29 on the other hand, caused a subject to commit the past-hypnotic theft of a dollar of his actiofrom the n and denied vehement y The subject was unaware argues that other fail- that he had stolen the money. Wells the possibility of do- ing to compel such acts do not disprove ing it, whereas even one success emons~ce that t itbehavior can be done. Schneck and Watkins, also, cite by hypnosis. can be i me ordinarily constituting a cr Schneck 22 inadvertently caused a soldier t t desert notis action. order to carry out a suggestion for posYp Watkins 24 induced a soldier to strike a superior officer by sug- gesting that the officer was a Japanese soldier, and he ob- tained from a hypnotized WAC some information classified "secret" which she had previously told him she would not re- there veal. convincing) Although these demonstrations appear are deficiencies in their experimental conditions. Since both Schneck and Watkins were Army officers, the offenses com- mitted could not possibly result in any serious damage. At t have been aware of this. This some level, the subjects mus same reasoning applies in experiments requiring a subject to hurl acid at a research assistant or pick up a poisonous snake: the participants are protected by invisible glass, a harmless and so forth. The snake is substituted for the poisonous one, situations are clearly experimental and the hypnotist who re- reputable self-destructive behavior is known to quests the homicidal or the subject as a From real life there are a fair number of cases Gcases on record dating before 1900, particularly among the peoples, claiming hypnotically induced criminal behavior, uate sci mostly sex offenses. dat hard was trelativhese of the entifically at this late ; that charged hyp- hyp- subject, rather than the offender himself, notic influence. Within recent is esaid to have played aorole Release 2005103115: CIA-RDP78TO31 4,AQQ1 O90~a' 1Y rVK UAL 'Hypnosis 14 and Reiter 21 These three cases have a common ele- er M , ay ment: in each a dissatisfied person found gratification through It notist h i yp . ng the individual who later became his seduc will be sufficient to examine one of them. the case reported by Kroener a young and sensitive un- I n married male schoolteacher came under the hypnotic influ- ence of a neighbor. Beginning with neighborly hospitality, the neighbor built up the relationship to the point where he was ive to h g er able by hypnotic suggestion to get the schoolteac t of his t es or lend him small sums of money and goods. As a power he then implanted the post-hypnotic suggestion that the schoolteacher would shoot himself in the left hand. The schoolteacher actually did shoot himself in the left elbow, sub- l 1~* jectively perceiving the event as an accident. Finally the hyp- notist caused his victim to confess to crimes that he himself had committed. Throughout the entire affair, lasting five years, the schoolteacher had no recollection of the hypnotic sessions. He was convicted on the basis of his post-hypnotic confession, but through a chance remark began to suspect the nature of his relationship with his neighbor. After many appeals, he was recommended for examination to Kroener, who eventually uncovered the true course of events by re- hypnotizing him and causing him to remember the hypnotic experiences with his neighbor. to . the vinterrogator~ hoping to extract secrets by hypnosis. When the relationship between two individuals is marked by "intense feelings and a strong tendency in one to comply with it is in fact the other b , y 'Whatever requests are made of him ,hardly necessary to invoke hypnosis to explain the resultant behavior. In the interrogation setting this emotional relation- i t t o ex s . aTup of subject to hypnotist is not likely Accuracy and Veracity however, that an interrogee has been hypnotized Supposing , end" induced to divulge information: how correct is this in- ormation likely to be? Accuracy in Recall. A great deal has been written, espe- lp in the press, about the perfect memory and unfailing ac- se 20051 11p5:tlA RDPy 8T03194A0001 00 0001-0 have mented cases in which hypnosis y 6o~ed For, in criminal behavior have been reported b .~.~ nrnr-AI I1SF f1NLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY nyth frequently been made about their ability to read according that has happened to them even while infants, is a to some even prior to birth 12 Hypnotic age-regression Lanis fro uently used for this purpose. The subject is meal en - to, the age of six. begins to act, talk, and "taken back a " to, say, ' ear-old. He hal- to some extent think in the manner of a six-year-old- details about lucinates the appropriate environment and g' people sitting next to him in school, his teacher's name, the color of the walls, and so on. His actions are exceedingly con- tht an actual vincing, and it has frequenly been d assumed ed gic age compo- regression in many psych gi nents to the suggested year takes place. There is little evidence for the genuineness of hypnotic age- regression, even though there have be31 end bard that per, - mostly based on single cases. Young ro riate to the per- mostly formance on intelligence tests was not app P e? Unhypnotized control subjects were more su ci- hypnosis in simulating essful than subjects under deep a study of rwife S, demonstrated age. Using the Rorschach test and ts ated hypnotic age-regression in ten subj non-regressive that while some regressive changes appeared, resent, and changes toward regression elements were also p ect. The drawings to subj showed no consistency from s ix-year-olds, being characterized did not resemble the work of5histicated oversimplification." by Karen Machover as p e of six by one subject were s actually done at the age Drawings there was not even a superficial the available for comp often gave with great conviction resemblance. Subjects one they had had at a later age? name of the wrong teacher, Y d Stephenson,23 and McCranie, Crasilneck, Studies by True an and Teter 15 failed to find in electroencephalograms taken dur- ing hypnotic age-regression any change in the direction of a childhood EEG. Similarly they report no increased heart rate, as characteristic of infants, or other changes in electro- cardiograph tracings. Hypnotic y qty. Considerably less data is available on the veracity of information furnished in trance. I have been able to find in the professional literature only one deals with prevarication under, hyp- author-Beigel a ' 5 w ho l communication that people persona nosis. He writes in a person F pp FOR OF ICIAL USE q6I a hypnosis FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY may lie, refuse to answer, or wake up when asked direct ques- tions on sensitive matters. Our own clinical work has amply bjects are capable of lying pnotized su convinced us that hy When they have reason to do so. 12__ w+ninor1 from an sible that ore pos It is theref osis would be either deliberate prevarica- gee by by n interrotion or an unintentional confusion of fantasy and reality. ation so obtained would thus f any inform The correctness o h. have to be established by independent criteria. l prophylactic Hypnosis ai, 4 estions have been made by Estabrooks 9 for what Three sugg might be called defensive uses of hypnosis. He proposed that nosis-nroof on capture h e yp d to r - 1L. m1911L Lit; use y the enemy, to induce in them amnesia for sensitive ma- .b terial in the event of capture, or to help them resist stress, i ca ti - . n p particularly pJaln, As we have seen, there is little or no evidence that trance ainst a person's wishes. Proofing personnel d ag can be induce against hypnosis attempts which they could successfully re- sist without this conditioning would seem a practice of doubt- ful utility. The hypnosis undertaken in order to suggest that they resist trance induction upon capture might in fact pos- sibly precondition them to susceptibility. It might be better simply to warn them of the techniques of trance induction t i . inform them that they can prevent and on capture u i p a l- Providing by hypnotic suggestion for amnes an intriguing idea, but here again we encounter technical problems. It is well ]Flown bnai, vile -- - Fence of hypnotic suggestion is directly related to the con- b'.. suggestions such has; blanket amnesia have unpredictable effects even on very st that good subjects. Moreover,. even if it would work to sugge umber l i , n a 'a soldier remember only his name, rank, and ser there is the serious question whether this might deprive him tivit0 It would arti- V_. .... _ ca p i g - W1V1niCH1V11 Pu- w ---- - p induce a state of severe psychopathology, which if aall y tive to his situation in some respects might be extremely la p bing in others. The impoverishment of his knowledge k i distur er y end his, loss of ego-control would give his interrogator a v 1@FF&*k18 M4A000100040001-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Hypnosis Approved For Releao effective means of controlling him, possibly leading to a quasi- therapeutic relationship in which the captive would turn to the interrogator for "treatment" to relieve his distress. This method has other serious drawbacks: cooperation aaction mong such as attempts to escape or scheme for p prisoners to obstruct interrogation, would be severely handi- capped. It could be far safer to rely on the soldier's own ego- control to decide what information ought not to be re vealed to an enemy than to make this decision for him in ad- vance by hypnotic means. individuals not to feel stress, particularly pain, Conditioning ? would seem to hold promise of protecting a have demon- strated to interrogation. Laboratory experiments strated that although subjects under hypnotic analgesia con- tinue to respond physiologically much as they do in the It appear- ing state, they do not report experiencing pain. that effect situations the anxiety comp anxiety t od has its best in probably pain. particular in- stances, a procedure might be undertaken in pr Only stances, but probably is not feasible as general practice. a relatively small number of individuals will enter a suffi- ciently deep somnambulistic state to produce profound anal- gesia. Furthermore, though major surgery has been per- formed under hypnosis proper, I am unaware that major surgi- cal procedure has ever been undertaken during po yp this In some individuals, I am sure, s esia l g ically induced ana . would be possible, but clinicians working with hypnosis gen- erally believe that the hypnotic state itself is more effective than post-hypnotic inductions. of suggestion should the If this should be tried, what type subject be given? The post-hypnotic suppression of all pain might be dangerous to the individual, since pain serves as a physiological warning signal; and it is doubtful that such a blanket suggestion would be effective anyway. It would be better to focus the suggestion on inability to feel pain at the hands of captors. Even this suggestion, however, would rap- idly break down if the captured subject felt any pain at all, as is likely in all but a very few instances. The soldier who had been taught to rely on hypnosis as an analgesic and 60 FOR OFFiCply%f06ft&a Hypnosis rvR vrg ,.. t. found it ineffective in certain situations might be considerably in the first i ce worse off than if he had not trusted this dev e. pseudo-Hypnosis as Interrogation Aid People do undergo physical and mental suffering to with- hold information from an interrogator. Without attempting Ito discuss the psychodynamics of capture and interroga- tion--which obviously will vary widely from captive to.cap- of their th e core tive-we would hazard the suggestion that at r iiresistance is the sense of extreme guilt which would be ac- '_. _t,oatPrl by collaboration with the enemy while-still in contro ull se of se f ~, ?---__, g n this ~`of one's faculties. The alleviation o might be extremely useful to the interrogator. Both the 'fore , hypnotic and the hypnoidal states induced by certain drugs are popularly viewed as ones in which a person is no longer master of his fate. This fact suggests the possibility that the hypnotic situation, rather than hypnosis itself, could be used to relieve a person of any sense of guilt for his behavior, giv- ing him the notion that he is helpless to prevent his manipula- tion by the interrogator. A captive's anxiety could be heightened, for example, by rumors that the interrogator possesses semi-magical tech- f;?.niques of extracting information. A group of collaborating jcaptives could verify that interrogees lose all control over their -actions, and so on. After such preliminary condition- ing, a "trance" could be induced with drugs in a setting de- i scn'bed by Orne 19 as the "magic room," where a number of F devices would be used to convince the subject that he is re- ponding to suggestions. For instance, a concealed diathermy machine could warm up his hand just as he receives the sug- gestion that his hand is growing warmer. Or it, might be to him that when he wakes up a cigarette will taste Uter, it having been arranged that any cigarettes available bn would indeed have a slight but noticeably bitter taste. ith ingenuity a large variety of suggestions can be made to true by means unknown to the subject. Occasionally manipulations would probably elicit some form of trance Imenon, but the crucial thing would be the situation, not incidental hypnotic state. The individual could le- 94A0001 00040001-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AppV4998s or Rel risibility for divulging information, gtjmafely renounce responsibility much as if he had done it in delirium* however, would The correctness of information tonobt i ed from hypnosis be no surer than that of inform a=-o Further, the interrogator would have to act in his itself. e h he were confident that relationship with the captive as he could detect falsehoods with it was all correct, el, t would increase the sub- certainty. Any doubt he betrayed 's 'feeling of control and so decrease the effectiveness 1ect ation, the hypnotic situation. Cr Ct formation ordinarily de- of his success in deriving once the prisoner loses his feel pends, would be denied him. behavior, he also is relieved of re- ing of responsibility for his beh he al information. onsibility for giving accurate and pertinent sp ainst this hypnotic situation, as An effective defense against by raising the level of against hypnosis, could be provide be exposed to it. Even one sophistication of those who might, of possible devices to trick them or two lectures warning them notossi could show them that believing themselves hyp t their will and cannot be nt o i gains yl of be hypno~ed a ll".la people cane nosis to tell the truth or to follow compelled even under hY to their beliefs. y contrar ll y ns rea suggestio Findings l In summary, it appears extremely doubtfbue that possible to hyP- be induced in resistant subjects. It may person without his being aware of it, but this would notize a notist and subject require a positive relationship between ation setting. Disre- not likely to be found in this d ubtful that proscribed be- garding these difficulties, havior can be induced against the subject's wishes, though we must admit that crucial eopee evidencesalso indicates that have not yet been perform ac info curate information obtained during hypnosis need not bsu rate in fact contain untruths, despite hypnotic and may the contrary- Hypnosis as a prophylaxis against interrogation, whether ca tors, to condition against stress information, would revent hypnosis by P e to p and pain, or to create amnesia fo emechan ism with the sen- artificial repressive n as an functio Approved For Release 20051QFFIEI.JLRSPdW~'94AO00100040001-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY )5103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 of diminishing the captive's mastery of the disadvantage rather than hyp- bigi ituation i , c s hypnot a{ipn. Finally, the re effective instrument in be amo is'`itself, seems likely to BIBLIOGRAPHY Barber, T. X. Hypnosis as perceptual-cognitive restructuring: IU? + ~,?nnosic. J. Psychol.,1957, 44, 299- t ? S. Brain wave patterns accompanying 2; Barker, W., and Burgwlri, ,. f lness daring hypnosis. Psychosom. u Med., 1948, 10, 317-326. sleep- 'Bass, J. Differentiation of hypnotic trance from normal M. ,A QQ9_so4 hol - Xxper. rayc ., _ hypnosis. '.4. Beigel, H. C. Prevarication under J. clip. exp. Hypnosis, 5. Beigel, H. C. The prooiem ui y~~~~? _-_-_ _ 1953,15, 332-337. Living il , y and Fam r5 Marriage ,,6. Boring, E. G. A history of experimental psychology. 950 I nc., ` Appleton-Century-Crofts, 7. Braid, J. Neurohypnology. London: George Redway, 1899. 8. Brennan, M. Experiments in. the hypnotic production of anti- Psychiatry, 1942, 5, 49-61. ior h av social and self-injurious be . 9. Estabrooks, G. H. Hypnotism. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1943. New York: Appleton-Cen- 10. Hull, C. Hypnosis and suggestibility- tury-Crofts, 1933. historical and clinical study. 11. Janet, P. Psychological healing, a London: George Allen & Unwin, 1925. 12. Kline, M. V. A scientific report on "the search for Bridey Murphy." New York: Julian Press, 1956. Cohen. Wiltshire, 13. Broener, J. Hypnotism and crime. Trans. J. Hollywood, 1957. Munchen: J. F. Lehman, &14. Mayer, L. Das verbrechen in hypnose. 1937. 15. McCranie, E. J., Crasilneck, H. B., and Teter, H. R. The EEG In hypnotic age regression. Psychiat. uae .1119555, 29, 85 8. sleep. bain In i 16: Nevsky, M. P. Bloelectrical activity Neuropatologia: psikhiatriia,1954, 54, 2642. age regression: an ex- perimental Orne, M. T. The mechanisms of perimental study. J. abnorm. soc. ch 1951, 46d213s 25. J. 18. Orne, M. T. The nature of hypnosis: abnorm. soc. Psychol.,1959, 58, 277-299. 19. Orne, M. T. Hypnotically induced hallucinations. A. A. A. S. sym- posium on hallucinations, December, 1958, in press. 20. Pavlov, I. P. The identity of inhibition with sleep and hypnosis. aria anQ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Hypnosis Approved For Release 2 21. Reiter, P. J. Antisocial or criminal acts and hypnosis: a case study. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1958. J. New 22. Schneck, J. M. A military offense induced by hypnosis. ment. Dis.,1947,106,186-189. 23. True, R. M., and Stephenson, C. W. Controlled experiments corre- lating electroencephalogram, pulse, and plantar reflexes with hypnotic age regression and induced emotional states. Person- ality, 1951,1,252-263. 24. Watkins, J. G. Antisocial compulsions induced under hypnotic trance. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,1947, 42, 256-259. 25. Watkins, J. G. A case of hypnotic trance induced in a resistant subject in spite of active opposition. Brit. J. Med. Hypnotism, 1941,2,26-31. 26. Welch, L. A behavioristic explanation of the mechanism of sug- gestion and hypnosis. J. abnorm. soc. P 1947, 42, 35t9 o 4. 27. Wells, W. R. Experiments in "waking hypnosis" purposes. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1923, 18, 239-404. 28. Wells, W. R. Ability to resist artificially induced dissociation. J. abnorm. Psychol.,1940, 35, 261-272. hypnotic production of crime. 29. Wells, W. R. Experiments in the hJ. Psychol.,1941,11, 63-102. 30. Young, P. C. Is rapport an essential characteristic of hypnosis? J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1927, 22, 130-139. 31. Young, P. C. Hypnotic regression-fact or artifact? J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.,1940, 35, 273-278. L~UNHUENTIAL4 F p i%V`~oV eleasLe 2005/03/15 : CIARDL 78T03194A 00100040001-0 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 ~iPr rand book reviews on the, following pages are un- authors of articles are identified in the taoie or unwunw editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA. Historical Intelli= Lter , current public literature for in- ce Collection, in scanning M a ; ed ; book reviews for this issue of the Studies. Most oteworthy. in this respect are tine iuuuwu~g. I e' Intelligence in World War II .. Lyman Kirkpatrick eAmerican Revolution ............ Walter Pforzheimer bm's?. The Secret World ............... by Levine- and Wolfe on Trotsky..... . card's Les Dessous de i'Espionnage....... 'sBe Not Fearful...;. ........:.... Approve i e,2005/ 15 : CIA-RDP78T A000100040001-0 Approved F ;103/15 : CI8ELR7 Appro ed For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Approved For Release 3115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 -DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER MORI/HRP PAGES 69-7 FROM THE CIA CORNERSTONE CEREMONIES America's fundamental aspiration is the preservation of peace. To this end we seek to develop policies and arrange- In war nothing is more important to a commander than is a proud one. u.Because I deeply believe these things, I deem it a great and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you are a part. No task could be more important. Upon the quality of your work depends in large measure the success of our effort to further the nation's position in the international scene. By its very nature the work of this agency demands of its members the highest order of dedication, ability, trustworthi- ness and sel ftessness-to say nothing of the finest type of courage, whenever needed. Success cannot be advertised; failure cannot be explained. In the work of intelligence, he- roes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism-their reward can be little except the conviction that they are per- forming a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. I assure you this is indeed true. The reputation of your organization for quality and excel- lennce, under the leadership of your Director, Mr. Allen Dulles, 'hey deal with conditions, resources, requirements and atti- tudes prevailing in the world. They are essential to the de- velopment of policy to further our long term national security ,In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature. of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. "'the facts concerning the strength, dispositions and intention privilege to participate in this ceremony of corner-stone lay- ',,#Z9 for the national headquarters of the Central Intelligence $gency. On this spot will rise a beautiful and useful structure. Jf(Lyit long endure, to serve the cause of peace. Approved For fReI a 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 The laying of this cornerstone marks an important stage in the growth of the Central Intelligence Agency. We will soon have a home of our own, in these inspiring surroundings high above the Potomac. The Agency was established 12 years ago by the same Act of Congress which created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. Thus the Central Intelligence Agency was recognized as one of the important elements in our national security structure. World War II and its aftermath and the international com- munist threat had already brought home to us that our vital interests were at stake in places as distant as Korea and Laos, in Africa and the Islands of the Pacific, as well as in this Hemisphere and in Europe. Since then, our country's ever expanding responsibilities have increased the need for better information from the four corners of the earth and for sound analysis of that informa- tion. The law creating the Agency was voted by a Congress in which there was a Republican majority. It was sponsored and signed by a Democratic President. For the past crucial years it has had the unfailing support of a Republican President and a Democratic Congress. Facts have no politics. Our charter, in the carefully drafted provisions of the Na- tional Security Act, has undergone no change. It provides that, under the direction of the President and of the National Security Council, the Agency shall correlate and evaluate in- telligence relating to the national security, and perform such additional services of common concern in this field as the Na- tional Security Council may direct. Wisely this legislation provides that we should have no do- mestic internal security functions. Yet the scope of the juris- diction granted is ample. Our work is broad and comprehen- sive enough to enlist the interest and to inspire the devotion of those who choose, and are chosen, to enter upon it. Laws can create agencies of government; they cannot make them function. Only the high purpose and dedication of all serving them can weld them into effective instruments for our national security. Approved F In this work of intelligence we must not forget that human beings are largely the creatures of their beliefs As individual . s we tend instinctively, and sometimes wistfully, to become at- tached to causes, to theories, to solutions. If they be sound and enduring, based on the deep moral strivings of man and the highest conception of our national interests, let us cling to them. But in the field of our rela- tions with our fellowmen abroad let us assure oursel , ves, through accurate intelligence, that our attachments to poli- cies are soundly based. It is the particular duty of this Agency to help perform this function in a world where change is the rule rather than the exception. This task must be carried out fearlessly, with- out warping to meet our prejudices or our predilections or even the tenets of existing policy. As we build a new edifice in which to house, to concentrate and coordinate our work, we must rededicate ourselves to this high purpose. The guiding motto to be inscribed on the face of this build- ing will be the words taken from the Gospel according to St. John: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." The President of the United States has graciously consented to lay the cornerstone. -ALLEN W. DtrLLEs The editors particularly invite readers to offer suitable manuscripts based on their own work or experiences. These need not be ambitious pieces, but may for example simply describe some not well known methodology, suggest or tell of procedural innova- tions, discuss successes or frustrations in getting efficient working relationships along some production line, show the complexity of an administrative process peculiar to intelligence, or supply some bit of intelli- gence history that should be recorded. The views of intelligence officers about the problems they live with are likely to be more useful than the constructions of those who theorize about them. Approved For Manifest characteristics of cli- :max in scientific research which may betray areas of future breakthrough. THE SYMPTOMS OF SCIENTIFIC BREAKTHROUGH Scientific intelligence has the responsibility for guarding this country from scientific or technological surprise and to , that end tries within practical limits to maintain constant 'surveillance over all foreign research and development. The evaluation of what is actually being done or published in a scientific field is certainly the best basis for detecting the imminence of a breakthrough there. But it is clearly impos- sible to keep all the many facets of modern scientific research under constant surveillance, and intelligence analysts must in practice confine their work to the major fields of obvious importance. A significant advance in some obscure field of basic science may thus go unrecognized until its application brings it to the forefront of world attention. There may be a way, however, to mount a less exhaustive watch which would have some chance of uncovering research of potential breakthrough caliber even in obscure fields. If we can identify a group of common factors-general attributes of the research, of the scientists involved, of the environ- ment-which characteristically tend to be associated with sci- entific breakthrough, we could set these up as tentative criteria for areas in which breakthrough ma be im di y pen ng. Research seeking to identify such common factors was done at Teachers College, Columbia University, in 1957-58 by six Ph.D. candidates in the physical and natural sciences. This article summarizes the results of their study.' sMethodolvgy The researchers selected for stud t y cer ain breakthroughs In four fields-biology, medicine, chemistry, and phys- 'Entitled A Study of Patterns Which Have Characterized Certain Major Scientific Breakthroughs of the Twentieth Century, by Lau- rence J. Grassman, o.S.B., Eugene V. Petrik, John H. Rosengren, Mrs. Esther B. Sparberg, Herbert H. Stewart, and the author. 099 p 73 005103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A00010004MORIIHRP PAGES 73-85 The Symptoms Of Scientific Bre Ap r p oghd Fort R ics-which came to fruition during the twentieth century and have had a marked effect upon western culture. From lists of major scientific discoveries, some assembled from reference works and some submitted by members of a panel of 15 ex- pert consultants, they made their final selection with an eye both to the apparent importance of.the discoveries and to the availability of detailed information on them. The four break- throughs selected were the following: relativity and the quantum theory; atomic energy; chemotherapy; and plant 1 i auxins.. tical ad- theor ~ The first of these comprised three majorn The l~VJ a..u ~~~~ and general theories or reiatiivny in The others were all characterized by successful experimenta- tion. The atomic energy breakthrough was viewed as the re- sult of the concentrated experimental work done by some 30 scientists between 1939, when Hahn and Strassman identified barium among the products of neutron-bombarded uranium, A - and 1942, when Enrico Fermi and others working under thur Compton constructed the first chain-reacting pile. Chemotherapy began with Ehrlich's discovery of salvarsan in 1910, and 14 scientists figure prominently in its development up through Waksman's production of streptomycin in 1944. The discovery of the first plant auxin-growth hormone-was the work of one young botanist, Frits Went, in 1926. Alto- gether, 50 contributions by 47 different scientists can be dis- tinguished in these four breakthroughs. The case histories of these contributions were reconstructed by studying the scientific papers reporting them, by examin- ing published accounts, at first or second hand, of the cir- cumstances surrounding them, by assembling biographical and autobiographical material, and in some cases by corre- sponding with the responsible scientists or their associates. A description of the approach, techniques, and equipment used in:. the course of a breakthrough development was supple- mented by analyzing the scientific climate at the time, the stream of scientific ideas which converged at the breakthrough point, the public environment outside the scientific world, the nature and vigor of support for the scientist in.. his re- search; and the personal characteristics and circumstances Approved For 74 The Symptoms Of Scientific Breakthrough e 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 of the scientist. The fifty cases were then compared and their common features identified and assembled into a pattern which might have predictive value for use in intelligence..., The results, not startling to anyone well acquainted with scientific activity, do constitute a methodical confirmation and logical presentation of the characteristics of scientific ad- vance, which may serve to dispel some popular misapprehen- sions about scientists and their work. Since the case histories were all taken from the Western world, some of their features will not be applicable to other societies, notably the Soviet. But refinement in dry-run and live application, with adjust- ments where necessary to Communist conditions, might make them a first step toward a predictive methodology. They.can be grouped for summary in categories-the general: state: of affairs in science, the state of the particular scientific,art, the sociological environment, the attributes of the scientist, and the immediate circumstances of the breakthrough. The State of Scientific Affairs The contributions to breakthrough were not made in isola- tion from other progress, past and contemporary, in re- lated-sometimes not obviously related-fields. The quantum and relativity theories of the first two decades of this 'cen- tury, with their widespread effects in all scientific fields, were in particular one of the preconditions for the nuclear physics breakthrough. Planck and Einstein, in turn, traced their own ideas which flowered in these theories back through many.sci= entists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to their foundation on Newtonian mechanics and optics. Fleming owed his penicillin and Waksman his streptomycin to Ehrlich, Koch, Pasteur, and ultimately Galen. Went found his auxin with the help of Darwin, Loeb, Fitting, and others. The in- terrelations among sciences and the cumulative nature of sci- entific advance thus illustrated create one necessary condi- tion for breakthrough-the free communication of scientific information. Secrecy failed to retard the military applica- tion of atomic energy only because the basic discoveries had already been made in open collaboration by scientists of many nations-New facts turned up by a scientist in one. corner of the world' were subjected to scrutiny. and verification :in an- ..._ _,...1-._...- _- ---- Approved For R other, led to new questions asked of the universe in a third, and stimulated new answers in a fourth. A related circumstance notable particularly in the many contributions to the achievement of nuclear energy release and to the development of chemotherapy was the part played by a corps of inconspicuous. scientists and technicians con- scientiously gathering and patiently checking data in a series of unspectacular advances toward the goal. The scientists who became famous all acknowledged their indebtedness to the many who toiled in obscurity to make possible the eventual giant stride. Another condition favoring break- through, therefore, especially in experimental fields, is the presence of a great army of scientific workers doing lesser jobs. We shall discuss later the attributes of the breakthrough scientist, but one of them seems universal and important enough to include as a third element in the general state of scientific activity: the scientists studied were clearly all men driven strongly toward some goal, usually characterized by the urge to reduce complexity to a unitary understanding of the environment. The third general condition favoring break- through is then the presence of inspired men devoting their lives to a compelling scientific purpose. The State of the Art The breakthroughs were all made when the stage, so to speak, was set for them, and in fact it is something of a truism to say that a necessary condition for breakthrough is that the state of the art be such as to provide some important un- answered questions and a theoretical foundation, mathe- matical tools, equipment, and techniques to answer them. Viewed thus, the breakthroughs seem but the next logical step in a series of lesser advances-the relativity theory, in answer to Michelson-Morley's fruitless attempt to detect an ether drag on light, going one step beyond Lorenz and Poin- care, whose steps in turn led back to Maxwell and Faraday, the fathers of field theory; the nuclear breakthrough reached in logical progression from the first exploration of the new worlds of radioactivity and the cathode ray tube, backed by the quantum theory and Einstein's mass-energy equation; the antibiotics developed by systematic experimentation; the auxins found by application of newly developed techniques to The Symptoms Of Scientific Breakthrough 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 the old problem of phototropism, once teleological explana- tions no longer satisfied the scientist. This logical quality in scientific advance has led some schools of thought to say that a ready state of the art is not only a necessary but a sufficient condition for breakthrough, that an advance is inevitable when the time is ripe for it; and these people quote Einstein to the effect that the special theory of relativity would have been born about the time it was even if he himself had not. Einstein, however, thought that the same statement would not be true about the 1915 general theory of relativity; and the study of these selected cases does not support the logical inevitability hypothesis. It would have been more logical to arrive at the quantum theory through an extension of Helmholtz' work than through Planck's thermodynamics. The mathematical tools which converted the special to the general theory of relativity had been there, unused, before. The potential of penicillin lay unrecognized for a dozen years. There is no logical reason why the plant auxin could not have been isolated by Loeb or Fitting, ten or twenty years before Went found it. The state of the art made the breakthroughs possible and likely, but did not bring them about. The Sociological Environment !Scientific activity thrives or sickens according to the kind of society in which it lives, and a generally thriving science is of course a condition favoring breakthrough. The influence of society is felt in science through education, facility of com- munication, financial support, and moral support or stimulus. These factors are examined with reference to the cases under study and, more broadly, to their influence on twentieth-cen- tury science as a whole. Education. The nineteenth-century extension of education to the middle classes, broadening the personnel base of scien- tific activity, is reflected in the fact that almost all the 47 sci- entists here studied came from the middle classes. The con- tinued democratization which has now opened the universities 'to all classes must be counted a principal factor in the geo- metric progression of scientific advance in this century. Communication. Easy communication among scientists we established above as a condition favoring breakthrough. The mptoms Of Scientific Breakthrough The symptoms ut Jcientitic Breakthrough The S y Approved For Rele4 5I03115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 proliferation of media for scientific communication in today's society provides for this intercourse as never before. On the other hand, national antagonisms and especially wars tend to bind it with requirements for secrecy. Support. The universities furnished not only the person- nel base but also the facilities and financial support in most of the cases studied, as in scientific activity generally during this period. The funds came in large measure from govern- ment, but the use of academic institutions as disbursing agents left them free from specific controls. The current trend toward industry-supported research was illustrated in some measure in dye and drug firm help toward the development of chemotherapeutic agents. Support from industry here, like the support from government in the nuclear break- through, was predicated on the development of applications rather than aimed at basic research. An adequate level of support for basic research appears to be independent of gen- eral prosperity or depression; the poverty of the thirties seems not to have retarded the mounting flood of scientific discov- eries. Perhaps the surplus of resources available to science in prosperity tends to be squandered in hectic technological development. Moral Stimulus. Basic science appears indifferent also to popular acclaim or disapproval. Whether idolized as the hero of technocracy in the twenties, hooted down as the creator of depression in the thirties, or tolerated as an impractical wizard in the forties, the scientist stuck to his laboratory, stimulated by his own goals. An obstacle in public doubt and suspicion was noted only in the early history of the work on chemotherapy. The stimulus of national aims is generally not strongly felt by the notoriously unnationalistic scientist, but great causes may spur him on: the refugee scientists who contributed to the nuclear breakthrough were moved not only by their scientific purposes but by bitterness toward Naziism and apprehension of a German breakthrough in atomic energy. That social needs may provide a stimulus was evident in the development of chemotherapy and in the work on plant growth substances. And finally the great stimulator of so- ciety, war, galvanizes science too, mostly toward technological applications but with repercussions on basic research, as seen jJWthe course of nuclear energy development. The cold war, th. its less urgent demand for immediate applications, is bet- than hot war in this respect as in others. summary, we can say that sociological conditions favor- ffig breakthrough include the following: universal education; hence of political inhibitions on scientific intercourse; ade- quate funds administered by an agency, such as the universi- ties, interested in knowledge for its own sake; compelling so- of international competition without a division of knowledge into national compartments. Attributes of the Scientists The 47 scientists studied included three women, two in medi- cine and one in atomic energy. Eighteen were born before equal probability that the family was in moderate to com- fortable financial circumstances or better. The chances may beashf hasAt 1t1, tth o 1900, the other 29 between 1900 and 1920. They were of many nationalities. Statistical studies of available data on them yield the following results. Family Background. The chances are at least 2 to 1 and probably as high as 4 to 1 that at least one of the break- through scientist's parents was well educated. There is an g a e scientist was reared in a religious against his being an only child. The boys born to the sci- either the youngest or the oldest of the children but 18 to 1 ffi,entists' parents outnumber the girls 3 to 2. The chances are for was their own interest. In choosing their fields of re- rte me from their teachers, the greatest single motivating fac- Although many received encouragement in the choice of this vocation from their family, friends, relatives, associates, and scientific hobbies and showed exceptional ability in childhood. became interested in science early in life. Many engaged in - ~r Choice of Vocation. The great majority of the scientists profession. perhaps 4 to 1 in favor of its having others engaged in some rather high. against the family's having another scientist, but ;search, their own recognition of the need for development of some field, the presentation of an opportunity, and the guid- Approved For Relea 2005103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 79 fI The Symptoms Of Scientific Breakthrough Approved F ance of teachers seem to have been factors of equal impor- tance. Education. No significant pattern was found at the ele- mentary school level, but the chances are 3 to 1 that the scientist's undergraduate school was a large one, the same that it was state-supported, and 2.5 to 1 that it was both. More than half of them left their undergraduate school to enter a large graduate institution. All 47 attended some grad- uate institution; the chances are 9 to 1 that it was a large one, better than 3 to 1 that it was state-supported, and al- most 2 to 1 that it was both. Most of them had a Ph.D. or the equivalent at the time of their major contribution. A few were actively engaged in their doctorate research. At least half had continued their research studies past the doc- tor's degree. Private Life. The scientists' marital status conformed to the normal pattern for the population. Their economic sta- tus followed the normal pattern for college graduates: most of them were at least moderately well off. No significant pat- tern was found either in their religious or in their political affiliations. Most of them were reported to be in good health. Some were active in athletic sports. Age at Time of Contribution. This study confirmed other evidence 2 that advances are made with the greatest frequency by scientists between 30 and 39 years old. There is a sharp decline from these to the next most prolific age group, 20 to 29 years old, which is then followed closely by those 40 to 49 years old. Eighty-six percent of the contributions were made before the scientists reached their fiftieth birthday. Professional Standing at Time of Contribution. The data from these 50 cases yield a zero probability that a major sci- entific advance should be made by anyone except a scientist actively engaged in research. The probability is also almost nil that a major advance should have been made by a scien- tist whose talent was not recognized at least by his immedi- ate colleagues or the person directing the research. The prob- ability is extremely high that the scientist who made a major 2Se e Harvey Christian Lehman, Age of Achievement (published for the American Philosophical Society by the Princeton University Press, 1953). ease 2 6 ? 91 kNOTA Md 6*100040001-0 Ir, discovery had already published the results of previous re- search. The chances are better than 2 to 1 that he was in fact an acknowledged authority in his field. The large ma- jority of the breakthroughs were made while the scientists were engaged in their regular research in their usual places of employment. Almost all of them were connected with aca- demic institutions; only about 10 percent were connected in any way with industrial organizations, and only 2 percent were working solely in industry. Composite Type. The study thus gives a composite portrait of the typical breakthrough scientist as a person who early in life became interested in science and in adolescence had a scientific hobby. He came from an educated, middle-income family, where he led a normal childhood life, probably getting more than average encouragement in his choice of science as a career. He attended the usual elementary and secondary schools but showed a decided preference for the larger gradu- ate institutions, and more than likely he continued his studies after receiving the doctorate. He became a professor or fel- low actively engaged in research at an academic institution. He published a number of scientific articles, and by the time he made his major discovery he was well known, although still probably only about 35 years old. He was fortunate in hav- ing chosen a field ripe for major advances, and fortunate also in his choice of associates. He seems to have led a normal and reasonably happy life, having the intellectual rewards of achievement in his chosen field and not much worry over Circumstances of the Breakthrough In an effort to arrive at a corresponding picture of the typical breakthrough situation, the data from the 50 con- tributions were analyzed and tabulated under two heads: at, nature and origin of the contribution, whether theo- etical or experimental, whether arising out of diffused ad- ance along a broad front or from a concentrated push on a arrow front, whether lying in the scientist's own field or not. econd, organization and support of the research work, Nether done by an individual, working alone or with assist- :ts, or a team, by whom paid for, whether hindered by lack funds, whether controlled by the sponsor, whether helped The Symptoms Of Scientific Bor R or hindered by location, space, or equipment, and whether helped or opposed by other scientists. Nature and Origin. Six of the contributions were classi- fied as pure theory, and the remainder divided about equally between pure experiment and experiment plus theory. The pure theories advanced science along a broad front, most of the others on a narrow front. One, the penicillin spore on Fleming's bacterial culture, could be classified as an accident under propitious scientific circumstances. All the other ex- periments which led to contributions were planned, many of them to clarify the unexpected result of a previous experi- ment. None of the contributions lay outside the scientist's major field of interest or a closely related one. Organization and Support. Team projects outranked of in- dividual research, with or without assistants, by a ratio 0 to 1. About 76 percent of the scientists got all or part of their financial support from academic institutions and private foundations. About 14 percent got some government funds, but only about 2 percent were entirely supported by the gov- ernment. Industry helped finance about 8 percent, but en- tirely supported only about 2 percent. Probably fewer than 10 percent of the scientists had what might be called gen- erous budgets, but about 80 percent were receiving adequate financial support. Another 8 to 10 percent produced their contributions under very meager financial circumstances. Little or no control was exercised over the funds made avail- able. Physical conditions for the research were in general ade- quate. The favorable location of many of the laboratories may have been an important factor. New techniques were a factor in 50 percent of the contributions, new materials in 16 percent, and new or improved equipment, in conjunction with new techniques or materials, in 10 percent. About 85 percent of the scientists, all those on whom this informa- tion could be obtained, had the benefit of some kind of en- couragement from other scientists. About 15 percent, before World War I, were hindered by some form of professional op- position. Scientific discoveries of the rank under discussion are never ignored by other scientists. 6810 ' 't.?ftA-WD?79qt#9 1 fA 'f0 40001-0 "atterns for Prediction In assembling these common elements into patterns which telligence might use as criteria for indicating the break- hrough potential of any particular piece of current research, e should recognize that no one can predict a specific break- through in the sense of anticipating its essential features. uch a predictor would create the breakthrough itself. We only hope to define the conditions that make some kind of breakthrough likely in a given area, much as hurricane pre- diction, although it cannot foresee a particular hurricane arising at a precise point in space and time, can at least set a twenty-four hour watch on any area where certain defined 'conditions have been found. When the patterns which have been associated with past scientific breakthroughs are found to characterize any field of current scientific research, that area should bear watching. General State of Science. As we have seen, a major ad- vance, irrespective of field, is most likely to be made when there is free and untrammeled interchange of the accumu- lated knowledge of all the sciences, and when the leaders of science, each dedicated to his particular goals, are supported by a large corps of ordinary scientific workers and technicians. The State of the Art. If the experimental research in some field appears to have reached a plateau whereon old data are being refined and more precise measurements made but no new evidence generated which cannot be explained satisfac- torily by current theories, where the tools of the trade are being fully used and are giving satisfactory results, and where the scientists believe they know all the answers or at least what to do to get the answers, no major advance is likely to be in the offing. But when scientists in a field are developing Patterns and cannot be explained satisfactorily by present theories, and realize that they are dealing with new evidence , not "experimental error," then the science will begin to ad- 'ance to the extent that techniques, instruments, and the materials required become available (sometimes from the de- Vveloping state of another science), and a major advance is el tht y ase nex logical step in a series of lesser advances. Characteristics of Current Research. No major advance will made in an area of science where little or no basic re- The Symptoms Of Scientific Bre,Rppro?vd For search is being done, and there is bound to be some. correla- tion between likelihood of breakthrough and quantity of cur- rent research. Intelligence analysts can get some idea of the amount of research being conducted in a given field by merely counting the number of scientific papers produced. The fear that many research papers may be unpublished seems not to be well founded: the results of basic research seem always to get published in some journal or other, since military se- crecy, beginning to operate only after the breakthrough is al- most accomplished, cannot even then dam all the flow. And peripheral areas not readily recognized as pertinent often hold the key to breakthrough. Sheer quantity, of course, is no assurance of impending breakthrough. The features common to the advances we have studied show that research most conducive to scientific break- through will be conducted by a group of scientists working as a team in their major field of competency, with capable technical support, to advance scientific knowledge along a nar- row front. It will have adequate financial support free from control, and moral support from other scientists. It is likely to consist of experiments designed to clarify the unexpected result of previous experiments, and to feature the use of new techniques, new materials, improved equipment, or all three. The Scientists. The most common and outstanding char- acteristic of breakthrough scientists, we have seen, is youth combined with experience in the field in question. The scientist 30 to 39 years old will have had 10 to 20 years of research experience. The one who makes a great discovery, most common at this age, will almost invariably have worked in it for some years during and after his study for the doc- torate. He will have published articles concerning his past or present research. He is likely to be attached to an academic institution or non-profit foundation, a recognized authority in,his specialty. He almost invariably has attended large, well-known academic institutions, at least for his doctorate work. As breakthrough scientists have not appeared suddenly from total obscurity, so they have not come, either, from the lower economic strata of society nor been freaks or even infant prodigies. They have come from homes of moderate ;2005103f15 :CIA RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 to comfortable financial circumstances, with one or perhaps both parents well educated. They grew up without peculiari- ties except an early interest in science. They lead the normal 'family lives of well educated, upper-middle-class society. society is in sympathy with scientists and their effort and does not create artificial restraints or barriers to their inter- ~communication or try to make them the mere providers of comforts. The favorable economic situation is one in which adequate funds can be made available for basic research- necessarily times of greatest prosperity, which may be too busy developing previous discoveries to feel the need for further basic work. Politically also, the need for basic re- `"-search must be recognized, whatever the circumstances 'that bring it to attention. Some nations foster scientific re- ',search in time of war (the United States) and some do not (Nazi Germany). Some governments favor research in time of depression and forget about it in time of prosperity. One country (the USSR) incorporates it into its national phi- losophy, and another (the United States) fosters it to keep ahead of the other. Finally, scientific advance is most likely when education is widespread and scientific education broad, not a mere training of technicians for the development of applications. Approved For R Check-List of Criteria The five most critical of the conditions described above might be listed in abbreviated form as a kind of prospector's ,wand to be tested by intelligence analysts for its value in locating a subsurface breakthrough in any current field: 1. New experimental evidence that cannot be satisfactorily explained by present theories is being discovered at a rapid rate. 2. New techniques, new materials, and new or improved equipment are being brought to bear on an old problem. 3; A group of scientists is assembled to make concentrated ?.! attack on the problem. A4. This group is composed of relatively young men well qualified in this specific field. The group has adequate technical and financial support and professional encouragement. .nit of the Department of ommerce now serves the scien- fic public with an intelligence rc~mmunity product. PUBLICIZING SOVIET SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH after Sputnik I jarred the nation on 4 October tl Sh y or 1957, people began looking for someone to blame; they rapidly settled upon the Government and charged it with a total tall th e neglect of Soviet scientific information, spreading tale that Soviet scientific periodicals were gathering dust If the nation's on the shelves of the Library of Congress. E,. _-_ _ r-_.i4. f ^TTornTn PYlt. f th e o that was the wrong charge, as previous articles in the Studies con- ti ons, have shown.' Some half million pages of transla fi c densations, and abstracts from Bloc-mostly Soviet--scienti literature had been issued by the intelligence community since the beginning of 1949. t The Government's fault, if there was one, with respect to this literature, aside from its general disposition to encourage public disrespect for propagandistic Soviet emanations, was the, lack of vigorous measures to acquaint the U.S. scientific telligence community, however, for all that its responsibilities elfish reasons begun efforts to repair this omission even be- ore the epochal earth satellite was launched. In 1958, thanks utnik's lubrication of Congressional purse strings, these efforts reached full fruition. ntelligence Doffs the Veil The history of the community's treatment of information om Soviet scientific literature is one of progressive relaxa- ion of restrictions, ending almost in an active peddling to the te i t R c es r nblic. Up through 1949 this material was stamped ..eva ge La. a -5--Y -> nail, "The Exploitation of Russian Scientific Literature for Intelli- }:gene Purposes," 1 13, p. 45. 05/03115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 87 MORI/HRP PAGES 87-9 Publicizing Soviet Scientific Research Approved For when it was pure dead-pan translation, Secret when it was tailored to meet intelligence requirements. It was not just from force of habit that such stamps were applied: the So- viet security laws of 1948 throttled the flow of Soviet scien- tific periodicals to the United States until it reached an all- time low of B9 titles in the winter of 1949-1950, fewer than forty of them of intelligence value, while a full hundred un- classified Soviet periodicals were unobtainable outside the USSR. In 1950, however, this trickle began the steady increase which has brought it to its present flood tide, and the in- telligence community now recognized the periodical litera- ture as its major and indeed only encyclopedic source of in- formation on Soviet scientific organization, activities, and per- sonnel. The need for classification faded with the softening of Soviet security practices, and it began to be more and more de- sirable for community purposes to issue this information in unclassified reports. The reasons an unrestricted availabil- ity is desirable lie in the difficulties of scientific intelligence production: the range of subjects that must be covered is all out of proportion to the number of scientific hands available in the community. A tremendous number of pin-point specialists in numerous divergent disciplines are required to evaluate the foreign data. Scientific intelligence, in fact, seems to be best served when all U.S. scientists are well informed about re- search conducted abroad, notably in the USSR, in parallel with their own specializations. The reports were therefore declassified in 1950, and in 1953 came the first diffident move to make them publicly available: they were anonymously deposited in the Library of Congress, the Department of Agriculture Library, the Crerar Library in Chicago, and some others. This was a step in the right direction, but the producers of scientific intelligence, whether in Air Force, Army, Navy, AEC or CIA, still had difficulty getting the translated data to all the many scientists and con- tractors assisting them. Two or three years later the Na- tional Science Foundation, acting for the U.S. scientific com- munity, began to help: in 'cooperation with several learned institutions it sponsored translations. to be sold by subscrip- tion at a modest fee. The National Institutes of Health began a parallel program for medical translations, and together the Approved For P 0i z3 Soviet Scientific Research 2a00 0315 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 r , wo now offer more than 50 Soviet scientific periodicals trans- fated from cover to cover. The intelligence .community ad= ised and assisted in setting up both these programs. r I.n the sear ch -for a more comprehensive solution a meeting of the, various processors and users of Soviet scientific data kwasheld under National Science Foundation auspices on 3 October 1957, one day before Sputnik I. The Department of me. -technical information to the public but had no appropriar tion.. tor. handle the massive quantities of Soviet scientific lit- erature, was invited to send a representative. It was unan- imously agreed at this meeting that the intelligence commu- nity should make the material available, unclassified, to Com- merce's Office of Technical Services, and that the Department should request from the Congress the funds to publish and disseminate it. In due course, with help from the Sputnik, OTS got the money, and since 1958 U.S. scientists have at a nominal cost had access through this channel to large volumes of data translated from Bloc sources. The OTS intake, in its second year now, is a huge and growing one. The intelligence community's product has grown seven-fold from its low in 1948 to nearly 150,000 pages ofabstracts and translations in 1959. To this flow contribute eight principal intelligence components-Air Force's Air In- formation Division in the Library of Congress and its Air Tech- nical Intelligence Center, Army's ACSI, Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps, and Ordnance Corps, the Atomic Energy Com- mission, and CIA's Foreign Documents Division. Yet an- other 50,000 pages are supplied from outside the community by the translation programs of the NSF, the NIH, the Joint Publications Research Service, the Consultant's Bureau, Per- gamon Press, and others. For controlling and researching this total of some 200,000 pages of translated Bloc studies arriving annually, OTS sells a - semi-monthly listing of "Technical Translations" done in and out of government and the semi-monthly "Scientific In- formation Report" produced by CIA, which presents the high- lights of research published in nearly a thousand Sino-Soviet Bloc periodicals. Complete tables of contents of Bloc periodicals C. Publicizing Soviet ScientiAPllWeetkffor are contained in the "Monthly Index of Russian Accessions" and "Monthly Index of East European Accessions" available at the Library of Congress and in the "Current List of Medi- cal Literature," at the National Library of Medicine. Finally, CIA still produces the venerable "Consolidated Translation Survey," now in its eleventh year. Not generally available to the public, to be sure, it is nevertheless unclassified and may be sent to individual scientists when government needs are thereby served. The intelligence community, which has neither the func- tion nor the funds to publish reports for the general public, has thus in its own interest done the next best thing- helped arrange and supported appropriations for others to disseminate the information, making available all its unclassi- fied production on a regular basis for public use. 4. historical object-lesson on the consequences of letting ill- considered intelligence assump- tions determine a course of PORTUGUESE TIMOR: AN ESTIMATIVE FAILURE reparation of U.S. intelligence estimates has become The p an organized and methodical process. In response to a change re th a mo in the international situation or in accordance wi or less regular schedule, an estimate is laid on by the USIB. Terms of reference are circulated to members of the intelli- gence community, agency contributions are made, and a com- posite draft is produced by an estimates staff. After considera- tion and revision by representatives of the agencies, a final draft is presented to the USIB for concurrence in the National Intelligence Estimate of a given situation, provided to guide American military and political policy. Under special condi- tions this process is shortened, but not essentially changed. IA similar process goes on in the governments of a number of 'Western countries, and we can probably assume that equivalent iet Part S th S y o ov joint intelligence exercises are undertaken by e and Government. This unhurried and systematic mobilization of available in- telligence resources to bear on a given problem is a relatively be gun recent phenomenon, one which can be said to have during World War II. Before that time intelligence estimat- ing in most countries was a pretty haphazard affair. Strategic intelligence as a function distinct from policy-making was usually regarded as superfluous to the extent that it was re- in ld War II W t , or o garded at all. Accordingly, until well in telligence estimates appear to have played only a very modest role in the making of political and military decisions. ~$. Of the many examples that could probably be drawn from trou di s sas the earlier years of World War II to show the consequences that followed from operational plans based on i g- inadequate intelligence consideration, one of the most po n of Portu- ti o nant, it seems to me, was the Dutch-led occupa - - guese Timor, the isolated overseas territory of neutral Far 05/03/154: CIA-RDP78T03194A 18A?A Va93ES 91-96 91 :;k ... ..... wc% gal. This rather sparsely inhabited eastern half of Timor, the easternmost large island in the Lesser Sundas,, lies ahnot 2,000 miles southeast of Singapore but only about 500 miles from the north coast of Australia. Its proximity to Australia gave the otherwise remote and unimportant territory a dis- proportionate strategic value which, in the fall of 1941 and early, 1942, brought it. an unwelcome, prominence not, known . before, or since The "Estimate" The nature and extent of Japanese interest in Portuguese Timor in 1941 are not fully known. At that time, however, Japanese interest in the East Indies was primarily attracted to Sumatra, Borneo, and Java, where major sources of strategic raw-materials were to be found; and the fact that Japanese operational plans in Southeast Asia prepared in 1941 did not originally envisage, a landing in Australia removed what would have been the principal attraction.for them in the Portuguese territory. Dutch archives for this period are ? not open to the public, and we are therefore thrown back on official histories to shed some light on this recondite corner of the history of o the War II strategic planning. A- Dutch official history period, Nedertands-Indic Contra Japan,' states that Japanese interest in an air service with Portuguese Timor aroused great concern among the Allies. Timor, indeed, formed a very important link in the defense chain which linked Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and Australia. A Japanese air base in Timor could form a -very- dangerous starting point for further actions against Dutch and Australian territory. The Dutch history goes- oni to note that-Dili, the capital of Porte ese Timor, "which lent itself so well to the establish- ifent of a base for amphibious-uircraf-t; was on1y7weakly held by the Portuguese, iargely--vvith`nativetToops " The Portuguese "garrison," in fact, consisted of a company of indigenous latoon of "Frontier Police" appar- st'outs=cazres ana platoon- the Dutch tern- alon t g ies assiged to imnu anon to du entryl border. . , .._ Historical Scion Geteiai Staff of the Royal Netherlands Army' ~J(Bandung,195d). Vo1,II, pp. 230-232; PortugueseJimor The Dutcb1iistory continues: These troops were not in. a secure enough Jppanese attacker The with their own small strength nme to was thereby faced with a. difficult Netherlands Indies Governor anese ocI" _ 3- the decision: On n o hand he otherg hand occupation of #hiS h e l m T tern of Portuguese ession against the territory of a friendly territory by us s meant. aggr tically with certainty; that Tac power. Since it could be be foreseen p t Of' Japan-would-not hesitate to aim at Timor-Dili as the Poinplace with port, it. was decided in November, 1941, to occupy Dutch and Australian troops and thereafter to offer the Porte.- geese Government protection for that territory. This November decision was apparently contingent upon all fi c. ,actual outbreak of war in the Paci lear whether any a The Dutch history does not make c detailed intelligence estimate was formulated on this p Given the relatively primitive development of intelligence es- urea timating at the time, it seems unlikely Fa d withe an question considered at any great le g Japanese assault in great force on the. Netherlands Indies- the failure of I which seemed virtually inevitable oe low i g n t e Dutch a the hutch-Japanese trade talks in , ould opt simultaneously to have assumed that the Japan-se. en to them and attack for all the strategic alternatives p across the board, from Sumatra to Tenor.. of -4 aan and 1941 ade d r Yet in the economic a-n r 7 t emphasizing the Japanese had shown ^little i interest plieso of the raw ma d terials produced in Sumatra, Borneo, ~ Portuguese Timor by the t i tt n of Japanese interes se history hardly constitute convincing evidence o Nor do other available sources o ry. tent to occupy the territ anese economic inter- Ja di p ng provide such evidence in recor l Portuguese source, Timor Partu- - officia ests there. Asemi n s,R states that Japanese firms began to invest capital on- 934 and that in 1938 a Japanese Portuguese Timor in 1 sulate was opened in Dili. There is no indication that these commercial. Por l y Japanese interests were more than pure roducer of modest consequence i s a p tuguese Timor was and 'By Capt. Helo Felgas, Agencia Geral do Ultramar (Lisbon, 1956) pp. 287-288. of high-quality Arabica coffee. After the opening of the Japa- nese Consulate in Dili an Australian Consulate was also es- tablished there. Even the efforts made by the Japanese to obtain landing rights in Dili need not have been considered particularly omi- nous, for an air route from Japan to Australia via the Palaus and Portuguese Timor is fairly direct, avoiding the long detour to the west through Hong Kong, Singapore, and Batavia. Moreover, an airline operating from Japan to Australia via Singapore and Batavia would have faced heavy from the British-owned Imperial Airways, particularly on the Singapore-Australia segment. The Dutch estimate of Japanese intentions towards Portuguese Timor, therefore, appears have been both hurried and poorly done. The extent of Aus- tralian participation in this estimate and the consequent de- cision to occupy the neutral territory is not known, but Aus- tralian agreement to the action must have been obtained. The Action If the estimate was poorly done, the operational response was even worse. After the outbreak of hostilities to occupy em- ber 8, the Royal Netherlands Indies Army prepared Portuguese Timor. The action was carried out on December 17 by a combined force of about 600 Dutch-led Indonesian troops and some 300 Australians. The combined force was equipped with four 75-millimeter field guns, six sections of machine gunners and three squads of light mortars, in addi- tion to the usual small arms with which infantry companies were then equipped. The force had no tanks, no anti-tank guns, no provision for air or sea support. This action was undertaken at a time when the forces avail- able for the defense of the far mere important islands of Java, Sumatra, and Borneo were already much too slender to op- pose the avalanche of Japanese troops pouring into Southeast Asia. The size and weight of the forces already poised to attack the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies were reasonably well known to the Dutch and the other Allied countries, and against this background the absurdity of the unsupported and ill-equipped 1,000-man expedition to occupy Portuguese Timor stands out clearly. '~Nl ~'ro@fA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 ? The Portuguese response to the Dutch-Australian invasion was non-violent, but the Portuguese Prime Minister, Dr. Sala- zar, immediately protested to the British government. He ap- parently sought British assurances that the Allied invasion `African troops to be dispatched from Lourenco Marques in Mozambique to reinforce the Timor garrison. 'he Aftermath Whatever the arrangements between the Portuguese and the Allied nations, the presence of an Allied force in Portu- guese Timor inevitably drew the attentions of the Japanese. As their invasion forces moved deep into the Netherlands In- lies in late 1941 and early 1942, they undertook preparations or the assault on Timor. On February 20, 1942, simultane- usly with a landing near Kupang, capital of Dutch Timor, 'apanese troops of the 228th Infantry Regiment, supported by ance. The Dutch troops withdrew towards Dutch Timor, here they were eventually forced to surrender, and the Aus- tralians retreated to the center of the island. From there they carried out guerrilla operations throughout 1942, but in 'ebruary 1943, after suffering heavy casualties, they were withdrawn to Australia by submarine. From a faulty intelligence estimate to an ill-considered op- erational plan, the Allied occupation of Portuguese Timor pre- sents a sorry spectacle. Much the worst of it is the fact that ,this performance probably brought on the Japanese invasion f the territory. It cannot be said with certainty that the apanese would otherwise not have taken action, but it should noted that they respected the neutrality of another Por- guese territory in the Far East, Macau, which remained holly in Portuguese hands throughout the war. Although British consul was resident in that territory during the 'ar years, no Allied troops were ever stationed there. Given Fts relatively few attractions, it seems reasonably plausible that the Japanese would have left Portuguese Timor alone so, if the Allied nations had not been the first to occupy it. For the balance of the war a fairly large Japanese occupa- on force remained in Portuguese Timor. This force, in turn, resented an attractive target to Allied bombers, based less 05103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 i than 500 miles away in Darwin-Australia: Dili was virtually flattened by Allied bombardments. Late in 1942 the Governor of. the. territory, Sr. Manuel Ferreira de Carvalho, ordered Por- tuguese citizens (as distinguished from the indigenous "pro- tected persons") in Timor to concentrate in an area west of Dili, on the north coast. There, he felt, he could provide them some measure of defense against the depredations of the oc- cupation force and the indigenous bandit gangs encouraged by the Japanese. While this move gave them some protec- tion, their supplies of food, medicine, and clothing steadily dwindled in quantity and quality throughout the rest-of the war, and eventually 50 of them, out of a total of some 300 in the territory, died. Several thousand indigenous inhabitants died, from causes directly or indirectly connected with the Japanese occupation. Although the certificates of death issued for these people (if, indeed, any certificates were made) may have given ma- laria, beri-beri, or complications of dysentery as the imme- diate cause of death, the real cause they might have cited was "Bad intelligence estimate." INTELLIGENCE,. IN- RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II THE LONGEST DAY. By Cornelius Ryan. (New York: Si- mon and Schuster. 1959. Pp. 350. $3.95.) D Day. By David Howarth. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1959. Pp. 251. $4.95.) INVASION: 1944. By John Froyn Turner. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1959. Pp. 248. $3.95.) The fifteenth anniversary of the greatest triphibious as- sault in history was marked by the publication of these three books devoted exclusively to the events of that sixth day of June, 1944. By far the best written, most concerned with in- t to- ll y pu telligence aspects of the action, and most skillfu gether is Ryan's The Longest Day. Like Howarth, Ryan bases his story largely on the personal accounts of participants, but by concentrating on fewer individuals and developing some new material he has produced a better narrative. The Longest Day tells how the senior German commanders were scheduled, ironically, to attend a Kreigsspiel at Rennes on 6 June to war-game the theoretical invasion of Normandy. OBBC to notify the French underground that the invasion had begun-how Admiral Canaris had learned of the code phrases .. . . -`-I ---- L...... T4 Col. Hellmuth Meyer, intelligence officer of the German Fif- Iteefith Army, picked them up when broadcast, and how the ifteenth Army was thus put on the alert while the Seventh Army, which held Normandy, was not. It shows how, after n its evaluation, some believing it a feint to draw the defend- s away from the Pas de Calais, the real objective of the main Ts away M Howarth's D Day describes in greater detail the individual battles fought at the sites of air drops and on the beaches, ' s book. Al- supplying fewer personal anecdotes than Ryan MORIIHRP PAGES 97-98 05103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 97 though Howarth pays less attention to intelligence, he gives several pages to a description of British beach reconnaissance: in the preceding months men had been secretly landed on some 30 French beaches to determine the precise characteristics of the landing areas. Turner's Invasion: 1944, "The First Full Story of D-Day in Normandy," is much more detailed than the other two, but far less interesting. Turner concentrates on logistic aspects of the operation, devotes the first half of his book to planning and preparations, and has little to say about intelligence. BATTLE: The Story of the Bulge. By John Toland. (New York: Random House. 1959. Pp. 400. $5.00.) This is a superbly organized and excitingly written book about the battle in the Ardennes, from 15 December 1944 to 23 January 1945, in which three German armies smashed through a lightly held Corps sector of the United States First Army and were ultimately thrown back by the First and Third U.S. Armies plus a British Corps. Mr. Toland indicates that he travelled a hundred thousand miles and talked to more than a thousand participants in order to write this hour-by- hour account of the engagement. He has done a magnificent job in making a cohesive picture of the multitude of clashes (between units ranging in size from patrols to armored divi- sions) that collectively were the Battle of the Bulge-a strug- gle in which there was seldom a defined front and where knowl- edge of the enemy's location was certain only upon contact with him. The author gives short shrift to the controversial question of whether the initial success of the Germans in the Ardennes was the result of a major breakdown in the Allied intelligence effort. At the beginning of his story he notes that on the night of 15 December "no Allied commander seriously feared a major German attack." A woman who came through the lines of the 28th Division did report having seen a mass of German tanks behind the Siegfried Line, and she was sent to Corps and then to Army to tell her story. Col. Dickson at First Army predicted there would be an all-out German of- fensive, and in the Ardennes; but his associates said he was a notorious pessimist, and overworked. The 12th U.S. Army 13fgl% 0! Ik fkt5I.T8T03194A000100040001-0 p said attrition was sapping the German strength. Mont- gomery was of the opinion that the Germans "cannot stage ;Germans were all but finished. After describing the 38-day battle that caused 75,000 cas- es, Mr. Toland concludes: Much has been written of the failure of American G-2 officers to foresee the battle. The rather primitive, naive American intel- ligence system, based largely on procedures used by the Pinkertons in the Civil War, was not at fault; the sophisticated British system was just as blind. The blame should not even fall on Hodges, Bradley and Eisenhower, nor on the architects of strategy, Roose- velt and Churchill. The entire Allied world must share the blame. On the night of December 15, 1944, it breathed the air of com- placency, optimism and self delusion. Although Mr. Toland's graphic description of one of the decisive battles of movement in modern warfare is fascinat- ing reading, particularly for those who fought in the Bulge, the estimative failure and a presentation of some wchallen - g ing situations for the combat intelligence officer. `EE CLOCK WITH FOUR HANDS. By James Leasor. (New York: Reynal & Company. 1959. Pp. 314. $5.00.) Pub- lished in England under the title, "War At The Top." With some interpolations by Mr. Leasor, this book is in ef- fect the diary of Sir Leslie Hollis, who was in an exceptionall y advantageous position to observe the making of high British "' cy before and during World War II: as one of the secre- 6,000 meetings of that body. Unfortunately, the book does ^ ot live up to the potential of that experience, either in depth using but all highly opinionated, tied together by the ..a -r,_._, - - - Quld be expected of it than appears here, or if he still had r to publish his own memoirs. There are, however, some interesting tidbits here for the !rofessional intelligence officer, telling for example how the ?rit ish Government in the thirties refused to listen to intel- 005103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A00010004M1iRIHRP PAGES 99-100 ligence reports on the growing strength of Germany, and how its surprise at the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor equaled that in the United States. British intelligence correctly pre- dicted the German attack on Greece. On. the other hand, it so exaggerated. German industrial production (which actually was less than British) that it seriously inhibited the planning for ,the second front. A useful chapter devoted to topographical intelligence, and the organization of the Inter-Service Topographic Department describes the way it had to scrounge for information. There was scarcely enough to brief the R.A.F. for a raid on the Dort- mund-Ems Canal. When the army had to be evacuated from Dunkirk so little data was available about the beaches that travel agencies were asked for brochures, and then destroyers were sent for an on-the-spot look. The BBC broadcast an appeal for photographs taken by tourists, expecting to get eight or ten thousand, and were inundated by nine million. "Know Thine Enemy." By Captain J. V. Heimark. (U.S. Na- val Institute Proceedings, Vol. 85, No. 8, August 1959. Pp. 65-71.) Shows how good intelligence-primarily reconnaissance- on the part of the U.S. forces at Midway and ignorance of the enemy's whereabouts at Pearl Harbor, in the Coral Sea, and in the Philippine Sea had a decisive influence on the outcome of these naval actions. MORI/HRP PAGE 100 100 COATS, TRAITORS AND HEROES. By John.Bakeless. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. 1959. Pp. 406. $6.50.) In the past twenty years, since the publication of Morton ennypacker's General Washington's Spies on Long Island and in New York' and Carl Van Doren's Secret History of the American Revolution,2 more and more facts and documents concerning British and American intelligence in the Ameri- can Revolution have come to light. Colonel Bakeless' mis- leadingly titled book is the first attempt to synthesize this new material with the old in a comprehensive intelligence his- tory of the Revolutionary War. The generally conceded fact that American intelligence on a large and organized scale dates only from World War II should not be allowed to obscure the wealth of espionage ac- tivity which the Revolution developed from casual and amateur- ish beginnings until it reached a point of considerable sophisti- cation, with backed-up cover, secret writing, couriers, cut- outs, double agents, and deception operations. It is evident that George Washington himself was a masterful intelligence officer. He gave close personal attention both to the opera- tional- details of espionage and to the reports of his agents, whom. he sometimes called "my intelligencers.7. He had a preference for spies "who live with the other side; whose local circumstances, without subjecting them: to suspicions, .give ;hem an opportunity of making observations"; he noted that t was "necessary to be circumspect with double spies." Washington had competent intelligence staff officers, but le himself planned many operations and made his own evalu- ation of the product. Colonel Elias Boudinot. recalls bow, after reporting some newly arrived intelligence, he repeated his own interpretation of it three times to the apparently ;uncomprehending General Washington, who then gave it a diametrically opposite evaluation.. When the General proved 'Brooklyn: Long Island Historical Society, 1939. 2 Garden City: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1941. 2005103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040WPJIHRP PAGES 101-108 I it Recent Books: Amer' ,d&V BP R to have been correct, "I then said," wrote Colonel Boudinot in admiration, "that I never would again set up my judgment a i t h " ga ns is . Washington initiated many intelligence deception opera- tions, planting false strength figures and other information which he often compiled himself, advising his agents what could be safely passed along. The hero of the cherry tree legend could tell some whoppers. He made a practice of plant- ing the same false story in several widely separated places, thus providing the enemy with "independent confirmations." One such plant was so successful that when a British intelli- gence officer laid the facts before General Howe, the British commander treated him "with contempt & Severity" for such bad reporting. General Washington's view of intelligence as a matter to be kept "as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success de- pends in most Enterprises of the Kind . . ." is illustrated in the realistic American use of cover. Agents sent into the Brit- ish lines as Tories and deserters were officially listed as such, rewards were sometimes offered for their capture alive, and their families often suffered public opprobrium. In 1781, after five years of being hoodwinked, the British ordered no further protection for deserters; but then it was too late. Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes attempts with indifferent success to tell its history chronologically, beginning in the fall of 1774 with Paul Revere and his friends in the Boston area, "the first American intelligence net," real amateurs. A little later, the Americans in Georgia are shown perpetrating a deception: they intercepted a letter from the Royal Gov- ernor there to the British commanders in Boston and substi- tuted forged documents of contrary purport before sending it on. At Lexington and Concord, American intelligence was not bad; the British was probably better. And even the French introduced a couple of agents into the Boston area to see how the American cause was progressing. By 1776, when the American Army had suffered many re- verses, intelligence was improving; and an espionage-deception operation now brought a victory. John Honeyman, sent by 102 Approved Fo 2AMIXWkfi r , Tg 1,000I000a000I-o ashington into Trenton as a butcher and horse trader-3 dar- gly brought back critical intelligence on the defenses of enton. Then, "escaping" from Washington's headquarters , le returned to Trenton and assured the Hessians that no ac- tion was to be expected from the Americans. It was with intelligence preparation that Washington crossed the Del- a ware on Christmas night to the victory at Trenton. 11, General Washington's most important intelligence net was probably that of the "Culpers" in British-occupied New York Townsend (Culper, Jr.) sent reports by courier (usuall Aus- y tin Roe) to Samuel Woodhull (Culper Sr.) on Long Island , . There they were transferred to Caleb Brewster whose whale , boats took them across Long Island Sound to Fairfield Con- ,necticut, to one of Washington's finest intelligence offic r e s , Major Benjamin Tallmadge, a Yale classmate and friend of Nathan Hale. These reports, Colonel Bakeless indicates were handled als , o by Alexander Hamilton, on Washington's staff. The book gives nothing further on Hamilton's intelligence activities, the .extent of which has yet to be revealed. They may in fact have been negligible; but some historians say he served as an intelligence staff officer, and this reviewer has seen one docu- ment which reports the dispatching of spies, "Agreeable to well-kept secret for a century and a half, until Pennypacker established it. Culper, Jr. continued to mas uerad i N , q e n ew ;York as a Tory merchant until the war's end Th e British . knew that intelligence was leaking from New York that many , of the reports were written in secret ink and that C l b a e , Brewster's whale boats ferried them across the Sound but , were unable to catch Brewster or discover the sources. Colonel Bakeless adds comparatively little to what Penny- ?acker wrote about the Culper net and he contrib t , u es noth - g material to the history of Hercules Mulligan,4 the Arnold- In meffi t aar, orhe case of Nathan Hale. But he does help * See "A Spy for Washington," in American Heritage, Vol. VIII, No. 5, August 1957, pp. 58-64. O'Brien, Hercules Mulligan: Confidential Correspondent of General Washington. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1937. ' unravel: the threads of, another American intelligence net, that established from. New Jersey by Joshua Mersereau to operate behind the lines in Staten Island, showing among other things that there was a third Mersereau in addition to. the two previously known. Joshua Mearser fob is cited in re- General Washington's account books as paid wards of himself & others (whom he was obliged to employ) to open & carry on a Correspondence with persons within the Enemy Lines by the way of. Staten Island." But money was sometimes short and agents complained. One wrote to Mersereau from Staten island: as soon as you fulfil that Request of mine, a regular Corre- spondence shall take place & unless you indulge me in that, I could not resume my Pen on a Subject of this Nature with any degree of s Propriety; for give me Leave to remark that aitho my Brea t thro bs with the purest & most fervent Love to my country, to Noble actions, & banishes from my Soul every lucrative Pas loon; ro- Yet a laudable Country; e'er I enter on So dange ous ant Undertaking tion of my my C Country; . Before I bid you farewel, I must beg it as a particulor favour that you will be careful of my Letters, as you value the Safety of your Friend ... Colonel Bakeless also relates in detail for the first time the role of an intelligence agent at the Battle of Saratoga. It will be recalled that the first battle for Saratoga was fought with inconclusive results in mid-September 1777. Then on October 7 the British attacked at Bemis Heights, were re- pulsed, and withdrew to the plain at Saratoga, where they surrendered ten days later. There has now come to light an affidavit made in 1852 by one Daniel Bryan, recounting the role played by his father, Alexander, in the battle of Saratoga. Alexander Bryan is said to have been asked by the American commander, General Gates,. to go into General Burgoyne's lines and get information "as to the heft of the artillery" and the strength and contemplated movements of the enemy. In- side the British lines, he "purchased a piece of cloth for a trowsers when he went stumbling about to find a tailor and that thus he soon learned thestrength 1 as the. plan. to take the. number of the Army Bemis Heights the next day With this. intelligence, General Gates was able to fortify himself on Bemis Heights and then _,-r-..4 4 - Rritish e-50 pi 5a" -- b YO9794A000100040001-0 There seems little reason to doubt this story, and if it is easonably correct Bryan's venture was a one-shot espionage job which may have changed the course of history. Saratoga is generally considered one of the decisive battles in world ory: had the British won, the colonies would have been F' split in two at the Hudson River, and the American victory was an important factor in the French decision to enter the war. It is nevertheless difficult to go along with Colonel Bakeless' nomination of Bryan as "the most successful spy in history" "and "the man who really won the American Revolution." The author, in this reviewer's opinion, also errs in dating Bryan's first in nclus th tle ? w . e espionage in September before Saratoga. The internal evidence seems to place it before the second battle, fought on October 7. And Benson J. Lossing, in his Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution,, describes how a sergeant arrived at the headquarters of the American com- mander, General Gates, just before the British attack of Octo- ber 7, "with intelligence of the movement of the British army." This sergeant may have been Alexander Bryan. Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes also treats the activities of British intelligence in America during the Revolution. There were many (including Benjamin Franklin's son William, Royal Governor of New Jersey) whose loyalty to the British Crown was not shaken by rebel activities, and many loyalists were fruitful sources of intelligence. Even before the Revolution broke out, the British had established a high-level penetration of patriot activities in Boston. Their agent was Dr. Benjamin Church, Jr., a member of the Massachusetts Provincial Con- rgress, privy to the patriots' innermost councils, and ultimately ,General Washington's Director General of Hospitals, whose .Ong successful operations show up the early lack of American counterintelligence. But finally an indiscreet ciphered letter from him fell into patriotic hands; his courier-mistress, "an -Washington himself and forced to reveal her principal's ' s specialists. name; and the cipher was broken by Washington Historians of the period have noted before that Dr. Church ust have begun to feel shaky, for he had found out that an erican spy deep in Cabinet levels in London, whose name ' New York: Harper Brothers, 1851. Vol. I, p. 60. Approved For Recent Books: American Revolution has never come to light, was learning the identities of British agents in America. In November 1774, Paul Revere had been advised that there was a leak somewhere high in the patriot group. Still suspicion was not fixed on Church, even when it was observed in 1775 that he was spending beyond his ap- parent means and keeping a mistress. he showed Re- vere his blood-stained stocking day after the 't Lexington, Revere was fully convinced of his loyalty; hours did didn't stop to think that the Doctor had had twenty-four to clean stockings. American security had not come of age, and the full extent of Church's treason was not known until General Gage's papers became available in the Clements Library at the University of Michigan in 1930. Much of Colo- nel Bakeless' account had already been told in Allen French's General Gage's Informers.6 of Boston, General Gage had numerous agents working out ton, and his intelligence for Lexington and Concord was g "There is one evil that I dread," wrote General Washington of the British, "and that is, their spies." And again of the Brit- ish commander in New York: "General Howe has every Species of Intelligence he can wish for ...) One oofHagents New was James Moody, who doubled as a guerrilla Jersey and published a book about himself of eTe ah ddsr 7side in Women were not overlooked as agents by the Revolution. One of the must successful was n Bates, who worked for the British under peddler cover. (This ch spy Enoch also the cover occasionally used by the American s p Crosby," the prototype of James Fenimore Cooper's Harvey Birch in The Spy). Colonel Bakeless' superlatives for Ann- "the most successful female spy in history"-are attributable to the fact that she remained anonymous until his own re- searches identified her as "tie Woman" in British General Sir Henry Clinton's intelligence files. ' Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1932. Lieut. James Moody's Narrative of his Exertions and Sufferings in the Cause of GovernmSince ent, orhMemoirs 7of Enoch Crosby, alias a Barnum, The Spy S1nJ Harvey Birch.... New York: J. & J. Harper, 1828. Recent Books: American Revolution f the intelligence work for General Clinton was di- Much o whose ability in this field seems r John Andre M , ajo reeted by have been high until he took to the road himself and ies were quite effective, but 's s t p on hanged for his pains. Clin the American Army, i n two of them turned out to be captains d ' Even at errs. s or working for the British on Washington e h er ? this late dat ,'wrote to a friend who had seen an early draft of his book: I have had to do a great deal of re-writing since I saw you Part, of it because one of Sir Henry Clinton's prize agents turned out ththe rank ink of Sir o Henry's. to have been working for all thew e. If my face is red ando it with is well qualified in the subject of his book. Colonel Bake,--o He had military experience in both World Wars, much of it ent s h t p e er; in intelligence work; he is a good scholar and wri four years of intensive research on this work, and his exami- n fairly exhaus- b ee nation of primary sources appears to have ve access to the exten- t h a :tive. it is too bad that he did no van had D ono sive files which the late General William J. amassed in the hope of writing on intelligence in the American Revolution. Yet the most evident weaknesses of Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes stem not from scarcity of sources but from the wealth rise of insufficiently integrated material. ,it was . . . a surp to find," Colonel Bakeless writes in his preface, "how ,.- ,--, a....,,,.,onte raally the - - , , - embarrassingly auw-.,--- were ... it became necessary to reduce the scope of the work inated the story of li m Ave times." The author sensibly e in l ume British and American espionage overseas, another vo f Benjamin itself. (The British intelligence penetration o ? __ .. .w? 9 and no one Am satisfactorily done the story, for example, of James Aitken ainte _ ---- sabotage in Great Britain during the Revolution, who was fire to naval stores and tried and hanged in 1777 for setting See Bemis, "British Secret Service and the French-American Alli- April No 3 XXIx l v . , , . o ance," In The American Historical Review, 1924, pp. 474-495. the Rope House in Portsmouth Navy Yard)1O He also has limited his coverage of well-known figures like Nathan Hale and of the Andre-Arnold affair, on which a good book already exists. 11 Even so, the book is often choppy and uneven; at times it becomes almost a mere catalog, as the author crams in names and incidents in indigestible profusion. It wavers uncertainly between the chronology of the War and the sequence of action in different espionage operations; perhaps it might have been more easily organized around General Washington's headquar- ters, as a focal point from which most of the remaining ma- terial would drop into place. Nevertheless it is an important book, the first to deal comprehensively with the material now available on its subject; and future treatments of this ma- terial should be the better for it. 1? [AITKEN]. The Trial (At Large) of James Hill.... London: G. Kearsley and Martha Gurney, [1777]. Flexner, The Traitor and the Spy. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953. 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES THE SECRET WORLD. By Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 1959. Pp. 334. $4.50.) Here is another book about Soviet intelligence, about the men who make it tick, and about those who-for one reason or another-get tired of the ticking and defect to the West. Its world is really not so secret any more, thanks to books like this which publicize its objectives and techniques, remind- ing any readers who need it that the KGB is still very much with us, whatever we may think of Mr. K's real intentions. Lay readers having no special knowledge of Soviet opera- tions, if they have not been habitual devotees of cloak-and- 'dagger stories, may derive a good bit of new information from this book. Certainly they will be impressed, even if they real- ize that no intelligence service falls in the Sunday school cate- gory, with the repulsiveness of the Soviet system of internal intelligence; and the achievement of this effect was appar- ently the main aim of the authors. The book describes Deriabin's early life in the Altai region of southwest Siberia, traces his teen-age career in various So- et youth oganizations, crowned by appointment to a politi- cal post with the Army, shows him in action in the Battle of Stalingrad and, after the war, working for State Security in Siberia. In a chapter entitled "The Shape of Terror" there ~r . factual material which the professional reader will recog- as authentic on the internal structure of the KGB and e scope of its activities. Deriabin's transfer to Moscow occasions some good passages ascribing life in the Soviet capital from the vantage point a security officer. A list of numerous security installations Moscow is also conveniently supplied, and something is told ut Soviet interrogation techniques. Soviet foreign intelli- ce is portrayed as the "cleanest" part of the security or- ation, being staffed by "some of the most intelligent, hnically accomplished and sophisticated members of Soviet X2005/03/15: CIA-RDP78TO3194A00010004D00111~RP PAGES 109-112 A chapter on the "Hidden War in Germany" tells of the Linse kidnapping and the Otto John case, and one entitled "Cold Storage Agents and Satellites" devotes quite a bit of space to Allen Dulles. Deriabin is said to have noted, in a pamphlet on American intelligence he edited, that "in 1944, Dulles already foresaw the breakdown of the anti-Hitler coali- tion and . . . began to make plans for intelligence activity against the Soviet State." Another old Soviet pamphlet is said to treat the CIA, the CIC, Naval and Air Force Intelligence, and even the FBI as components of a single organization. There are a number of chapters on the misdeeds of the So- viet upper crust-"Moscow Executive Suite," "The New Class," "Soviet Immorality," and the struggle of the Stalin succes- sion. Khrushchev is pictured as no great improvement over Stalin, it being suggested that Malenkov might have made a more reliable co-existence partner. A chapter on "Vienna" has much authentic quadripartite flavor, and one entitled "Agents and Escape" tells about Austrian operations involving emigres and would-be returnees. Deriabin himself escaped in 1954. The book has four appendices, one illustrating the develop- ment of a Soviet surveillance case, one on provocation tech- niques, one a lengthy and tedious discussion of "some pitfalls of Socialist `legality,"' and a fourth giving the organizational diagrams of the several elements of the State Security or- ganization. For the professional reader the shortcomings of The Secret World are obvious-the sensationalism of its "terrifying re- port," its deceptive cloak of authorship, its exaggerations and misstatements of fact. It isn't a book by Deriabin and Gibney or even one by Deriabin "as told to" Gibney. For all Mr. Gib- ney's protestations to the contrary, it is a book by Frank Gibney about Deriabin and several other things, including what Mr. Gibney thinks of the Soviet Union-which evidently isn't much. Here are some examples of his purposeful extravagances. On Soviet morality: [On] the high level of the "New Class" Soviet society ... debauch- ery is organized and beyond criticism.... A clinical study of Soviet social life might easily dwarf The Lost Weekend and make the Kinsey Report look like a Parents Magazine anthology. Mt, o9ldfAS0, 71lr(Y4A000100040001-0 escribing Stalin's exits from the Kremlin: The only warning ... would be the amber lights blinking ... and the sudden screaming cavalcade with Colonel Kirilin of the Guard shrieking obscenities and frequently spitting in the faces of passers-by. On the right of the Soviet voter to cross out names of candi- dates he doesn't like: Compared to the Soviet voter, even a Negro voter in Mississippi could be said to enjoy a thoroughly democratic franchise. ... this huge and sensitive Russian subsidiary. On housewifely Mrs. K.: It is doubtful if Mrs. Khrushchev has seen the working end of a kitchen for a good many years. The author's sense of mission also leads him into oversimpli- fications and some substantial errors in fact: At the beginning of the Revolution and for some years thereafter . the reins of leadership were held by intellectuals of bourgeois or even noble background, like Lenin and Trotsky. Trotsky a Russian nobleman! Admiral Canaris' Abwehr ... was strongly anti-Hitler until it was absorbed by the Gestapo after Canaris' arrest and execution. One of [Deriabin's] teachers . . . had managed to keep a large library from the old days.... So it was that The Last of the Mohicans, Tom Sawyer, and Huckleberry Finn became a part of one young Russian's education, although he scarcely included them on his Komsomol reading lists. The exceptional Russian student would be the one not acquainted with these books. The decision to "de-sanctify" Stalin was probably taken late in 1955 by Khrushchev, who was aware of the void left by the great dictator. Just as people in the early Stalin period had grumbled that "things wouldn't be like this if Lenin were alive," a tendency had grown to look wistfully back to the Stalin era whenever the regime showed shortcomings. nostalgic concept, the good old days of Stalin. Recent Books: So)lAotfmor Mr. Gibney's views on foreign policy and estimate of the Soviet Union can be illustrated by two final quotations from his work: [During] the Time of Troubles, from 1953 to 1956 ... had the USSR been faced with an aggressive American diplomatic policy on the international scene, the Party leaders might have been in real trouble. American tourists can come back from Moscow with stories of a society straining at its old controls. Cultural exchanges can multi- ply. The Soviet people can inch a few more steps forward toward a better and freer life. But in the last analysis, all efforts to pro- duce a real thaw in the USSR will fail as long as State Security maintains its position as the ultimate executive arm of the regime. History will have to tell us whether even Soviet-style intelli- gence can so decisively govern a nation's course. THE MIND OF AN ASSASSIN (The Man Who Killed Trotsky). By Isaac Don Levine. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy. 1959. Pp. 232. $4.50.) THE GREAT PRINCE DIED. By Bernard Wolfe. (New York: Scribner. 1959. Pp. 398. $4.50.) Whether assassination is the same thing as murder de- pends, as the saying goes, on where you are sitting and what cards you hold. For those who hold Communist Party cards, the assassinations which have been carried out all over the civilized world by the "organs of State Security" have merely executed the sentences of competent judicial organs without benefit of the legal nicety of extradition. But even the Com- munist who sees them in this light must admit that there have been some spectacular remote-controlled executions in the history of Soviet jurisprudence. The execution of the death sentence passed by the Soviet organs on Ignace Reiss, the Soviet senior spy in Western Eu- rope who broke in revulsion over the Moscow show trials of the late thirties, brought an exaggerated bit of Chicago to a quiet Swiss country road. Reiss' body was literally cut to pieces by heavy machine-gun fire. The case of General Walter Krivitsky, Soviet espionage boss in Western Europe who fled to safety in the United States after breaking at about the same time as Reiss, is a classic illustration of the homely proverb MORI/HRP PAGES 112-116 Approved For Rel cent Books: Soviet Services 21005103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 of the State Security apparatchiks that anyone can commit id i e. c a murder, but it takes a real artist to arrange a good su cide note by his side, shortly after he had told a friend never ever kill himself. Lev Davidovich Trotskiy is probably the only man in history to die by ice axe in execution of a death kentence passed by a court. The tradition of this form of retribution against traitors to the movement is so strong that the widow of Richard Krebs Jan Valtin) told a friend in 1958 that she was not Night, as at all certain Krebs had died the natural death officially pro- nounced by Maryland doctors at New Year's 1951. Clara Krebs was born and raised on the Eastern Shore and never had anything to do with Communism, but almost lost her the J ex-Communists and some professional anti-Communists, spent looking for clues and speculating about an assassination in his case. Those who would like to believe that assassinations of this sort belong to the age of Stalinism should note that the de- nunciation of Stalin crimes (or "errors") has been confined to those committed against good comrades, not against trai- tors. And they might usefully contemplate the mysterious death of Stefan Bandera, the legendary anti-Soviet Ukrainian )artisan leader. Bandera was poisoned in Munich, Germany, in October 1959, in this age of peaceful coexistence. The murder of Lev Davidovich Trotskiy, popularly known as Leon Trotsky, was not a case of "whodunit," but of "whobeit." ['he mystery was not who committed the murder, but who the murderer really is. The best published study of the Trot- l S a- a sky assassination has been that by Leandro A. Sanchez zar, the Mexican police official who conducted the investiga- On.1 Latterly the impending release of the killer, whose venty-year sentence will have been served on 20 August 1960, apparently at least partly responsible for the appearance of ese recent books by Isaac Don Levine and Bernard Wolfe. 'Murder in Mexico (London: Seeker and Warburg. 1950). Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Recent Books: Soviet Services Don Levine is a vigorous anti-Communist and a man who b producing and ghosting books that will sell makes his living by ob1jective and metic- racterized by h a vain to well, not necessarily ones c ulous scholarship. Richard Krebs, after trying sell Out of the Night to a number of publishers e the r it d States, finally gave the manuscript and all ed of a num to Levine fora pittance. Later Krebs complain- from act which ly before s Krebs' stemmed death ber of inaccuracies andQt errors short Levine, and it was that a personal reconciliation of the two m n for effected. Pub- on the other hand, Levine has been responsible memoires by Com lication of a number of highly interesting ,s In ytCom- munist defectors (among them Walter Krivitsky ce 2 and for bringing some of these defectors together r fui } ral together for the intellectual and o~ h e husl~asm of a changing ideas. Krebs has spoken night he spent at Levine's home talking without e ufascinating through the night and into the morning let-up t Krivitsky after Levine had helped them overcome their mutual mistrust. The mind of an Assassin does not live up to wha atever ood story, givings one may have about the a to dr. The is factual errors well researched and interesting y (insistence, for example, that Vittorio Vidali's real n amg as Carlos Contreras) are neither so frequent nor so glaring to disturb the knowledgeable reader greatly. Levine makes too much at this late date of the mystery of the killer's iden- tity, which has not really been a mystery for the past five years or so, but he does perform a useful job in pulling to- gether some of the scattered material on the subject which interestin has appeared over the years, and he makes a her Speaks g new contribution in the final chapter, This last chapter is a communication which Levine says he received unsolicited from Enrique Castro Delgado after the manuscript for the book had gone to the printer. Castro was lived in Moscow a hero of the Spanish Communist movement, after the Spanish Civil War, broke with Communism in 1944, and after a number of very precarious months managed escape from the USSR. While in Moscow, Castro heard from s New York: Harpers. 1939. the lips of the assassin's mother, an old-time Spanish Commu- e says in his letter to Levine that he had never told it to anyone before. more nt m -- It is evide - - assassin than with Trotsky. Two of the chapters, th t e h i w P ainst Psychologist" and "Portrait of an Assassin," r a i g sone r deal with the years-long analysis of the murderer by Mexican ted to borrow a m t i p e s rdoetors and psychologists. Here one played Freud, Freud lost. These chapters are boring and ap- the g hed (e t f f . ., c e ar- pear to a non-professional somewhat as able to kill h er, w killer idolized his mother, hated his fat f Trotsky as a father-symbol). Not so, however, the story o s othe n d + y ma the murderer, the role played by his mother an - h as Lou=.. --- -- (sUc masterminding of the execution by Soviet General Leonid Eitingon, and related stories like that of the death of Trotsky's S i + enetration agents -1 the ov e p nd a in the Trotsky movement, Jack Soble and Mark Gborovsxy. From former close associates of Trotsky we know that dur- ing the whole period of his exile in Turkey, France, Norway, and Mexico the father of the Red Army was a hunted man. 1938 r b F , y rua e ter his son died mysteriously in Paris in seemed to wait more resignedly for his own end. His otsk y idow Natalia is quoted by Levine as having written, "Both latonic s not t p wa knew that the verdict of the Moscow cour d that it would be carried out in one way or another." The h ' s book, althoug y it was carried out is well told in Levine e titular mind of the assassin has eluded him. .Bernard Wolfe, for reasons best known to himself, has osen to tell parts of the story of Trotsky's Mexican exile in ctional form. permits him, it is true, to deviate from _ . ly doesn't) or when the truth is neither stranger than f Ction nor as interesting. Because its hero Victor Rostov fa ,So thinly disguised Trotsky, The Great Prince Died is both Ltalizing and frustrating for a reader familiar with the story the Mexican exile. 103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Wolfe, who as a young man did spend some time at Trot- sky's exile headquarters in Mexico, has developed the hypoth- esis that Trotsky's later years were plagued by a gnawing sense of guilt regarding his role in suppressing the Kronstadt uprising. Wolfe suggests that Trotsky was struggling with an increasingly strong awareness of his own betrayal of a revo- lution. It is interesting as a hypothesis, but others who were closer to Trotsky in this period have seen no traces of this struggle of conscience. If The Great Prince Died could be read as straight fiction, it would not be a bad book. The story is well told, the writing tight and professional. There is plenty of suspense to hold the reader's attention. For this reviewer, however, it has not been possible to achieve the necessary detachment from his knowledge of true events to read it as straight fiction, and such a conflict within the reader spoils the whole book. The only part which could be read under these circumstances with- out any trace of annoyance is the section entitled "Author's Notes," pp. 383-398. This is not enough to compensate for the frustrations of the rest of the work. ESPIONAGE AND PARAMILITARY TALES DESSOUS DE L'ESPIONNAGE: 1939-1959. By Robert Boucard. (Paris: Editions Descamps. 1958. Pp. 249. 750 frs.) M. Boucard, who has published several books on intelligence subjects and services, dedicates this one to the memory of Rene Dubois, formerly Attorney General of Switzerland, who took his own life in 1957 after the clandestine contacts of high Swiss officials with an attache in the French Embassy were publicly exposed. The promise in its title of the inside story of espionage for the past twenty years, however, is poorly to indifferently fulfilled. Although it presents vi- gnettes from many interesting cases, both details and material 'substantiating its purported revelations are sadly lacking. In summarizing the story of the famous German agent Cicero, for example, the author says that the Turkish secret service arranged his employment by the British Embassy in Ankara and helped him in his project with the ambassador's 01 secret papers. It would be good to know whether there is rome evidence other than presumptive indications in his op- rations that Cicero worked for the Turkish service. Else- here, as when he offers "the truth about the Gleiwitz affair," wherein the Nazis had prisoners in Polish uniforms attack a German transmitting station to give pretext for the invasion V Poland, Boucard's exposes are sometimes quite old hat. One of the most tantalizing stories in Les Dessous is that of `Japanese general, military attache in Ankara, Sofia, Madrid, d Stockholm, whom Boucard calls Yamato Ominata. The erican authorities, it is said, discovered in the idlemst archives a message, No. 39,)B-,M from Stockholm to rlin, in which Ominata, under the cryptonym "Eierkopf," posed to "Senior" (Himmler's nom de guerre) the sale of an, Portuguese, Turkish, Vatican, and Yugoslav codes 28,000 Swedish crowns or 20,000 U.S. dollars. Boucard says t Ominata was also in contact with Admiral Canaris, the tish service, and OSS. These bits of information strongly 005103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001i01ORI/HRP PAGES 117-1 Recent Books: ftl For suggest that Yamato Ominata is none other than Major Gen- eral Makoto Onodera, Japanese military attache in Stockholm with responsibility for espionage in the Scandinavian coun- tries from February 1941 to the end of the war. A Swedish newspaper article which appeared on 11 January 1953 when Onodera was on a business trip to Sweden mentioned that he had been known to the Germans as "Eierkopf" and had made a large amount of money selling foreign codes to the Germans. A PERSON FROM ENGLAND (and Other Travellers to Turke- stan). By Fitzroy MacLean. (New York: Harper. 1959. Pp. 314. $5.00.) Bokhara, Samarkand, Khiva and Merv are here brought back in a series of true episodes which make good bed-time reading for romantics, lay historians, and connoisseurs of bold and curious men. A rabbi's son who astounded the Emir of Bokhara by arriving from England to demand single-handed the release of two of his countrymen, a gifted Hungarian linguist disguised as a dervish from Turkey, a New York re- porter who caught up with the Russian forces in time to enter Khiva with General Kauffmann, and a British correspondent elected Khan of Merv as human symbol of the British Crown to stay the Russians-these were four who lived to describe their adventures in forbidden territory during the Great Game be- tween England and Russia in Central Asia. The story of the fifth, a British colonel for whom Bolshevist Tashkent became too dangerous in the fall of 1918, is of par- ticular interest to collectors of intelligence tales. After wear- ing thin an astonishing variety of disguises he enrolled as an Albanian lepidopterist in the Bolshevik intelligence service and was sent to spy on briefly independent Bokhara, where fifteen previous agents had vanished without a trace. He managed to obtain asylum there until he could escape with other refugees in a hazardous desert trek to the Persian border, where the Bolsheviks claimed to have killed him in a skirmish at the river crossing. He reported to the British command at Meshed in January 1920. Approved For @MS/Bab1fs:: E3 idd9ff8T03194A000100040001-0 CAME IN THE NIGHT. By Brede Kiefos. (Greenlawn, New York: Harian Publications. 1959. Pp. 207. $3.75.) This is the personal account of a young Norwegian cadet's bntribution to his country's liberation from the Nazis. It eludes what he could observe in Norway of the growth of esistance from spontaneous impudences to an organized and curity-minded movement, his confession to a naive venture military espionage in Stockholm, and details on his com- ando training in Scotland. Intelligence officers may find ese items useful; more likely they will want to use them as an excuse to read an honest and unglamorized story of exalted uman enterprise in the service of a cause, followed by inevi- table disillusionment when the cause is won. h, , Approved For Rel EVASIONS AND ESCAPES BE NOT FEARFUL. By John Furman. (London: Anthony Blond, Ltd. 1959. Pp. 224. 18/-.) This account of a British army officer's escapes and pro- longed evasion in Italy during World War II, in some respects a story much the same as many previously published, is unique in its pertinence to organizational aspects of large-scale eva- sion activities and for the light it throws on wartime intrigues in and around the Vatican. Mr. Furman was one of the many Allied prisoners of war who escaped from camps in Italy during the brief period of confusion in 1943 between the Italian surrender and the con- solidation of German authority in northern Italy. Aided by sympathetic Italians, thousands of these men remained at large behind German lines, moving southward in the hope of reaching Allied-controlled territory. Opportunities for cross- ing the front were limited, however, and caution, inertia, and official directives encouraged the escapees to remain where they were until the front overran them: "It will only be a matter of days or at most a few weeks," they said. But as the weeks rolled into months and food became scarce, evaders found it increasingly difficult to keep alive and in hiding. To meet the exigencies of this situation, a Roman Catholic priest, Mgr. O'Flaherty, organized from the Vatican a supply and billeting service in which the Italian-speaking Furman became a key Rome coordinator. At the peak of its activity this group provided aid to some 3,000 evading ex-POW's within a forty-mile radius of Rome, among other things dispensing subsistence money at a rate that reached some 4,000 tire per man per month. The records of the organization remained within the safety of the Vatican along with its director, an arrangement that raised and still raises some thorny ques- .ions of law, ethics, and policy. Eventually captured by the Gestapo, Furman escaped from a train conveying him to Ger- many and made his way back to Rome, where he resumed work for the O'Flaherty organization. He continued with this op- eration until Allied forces entered the city. MORI/HRP PAGES 120-121 Approved For Rel A%0ke1,&78T03194A000100040001-0 Successful clandestine activities require luck; and Furman d his cohorts had a full, almost too full, share. Neverthe- ss the author's two breaks from POW captivity, both of em conceived, planned, and carried to completion in a mat- r of hours, are classics of quick thinking and good timing. d it was not a matter of luck that he achieved fluency in Et< iian in a relatively short time by taking advantage of his idence in Italian households. Be Not Fearful fills gaps in the open-source history of eva- on during World War II. Its not having been published until fifteen or sixteen years after the events it describes is probably due in part to the delicacy of its revelations about the war- PIMPERNEL IN PRAGUE. By Donald Campbell-Shaw. (Lon- don: Odhams Press. 1959. Pp. 192. 18/-.) H Leisurely account, generous with relevant and irrelevant 'detail, of how the author arranged privately for the 1950 es- 'cape of his wife's relatives from Czechoslovakia, hoodwinking not only the Communists but also a number of would-be help- ers, including officers of the American CIC. Of mild interest m illustrating the border-crossing activity of that time. Some of its solemn dissertations on peripheral matters-the evolution and functions of the several Soviet and U.S. intelli- gence services, for example-are amusing in their ingenuous- Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 MISCELLANY B Charles W. Thayer. (New York: Harper and DIPLOMAT y Brothers. 1959. Pp. 229. $4.50.) This casual compendium on the workings of diplomacy in- . eludes a quick look at intelligence as certain others see it. elements of Chapters XII, XIV, and XV combine taken from tory of intelligence-the Black Chamber, OSS, CIA, sources-with The anecdotes or has reservations sab u dip- standard n- lomat extraordinary. of socio-anthropologists, with their new teiligence in the hands scientific methods. He sees the research ands a ~ iengaged in their isolated tower in State high-level speeches and re- analyzing gathering materials for hig - public analyzing foreign newspapers long since scrutinized in foreign our embassy staffs." He asks how the new "scien- capitals by tific" expert can "take into ric he erationhe naer felt to on t he smile he never Saw or a new concept of national estimates he quotes Churchill's on-that " any attem tempt of "collective e wisdom" of " severallrrimds must end by re- fleeting to the synthesize the products product of none. But he concedes that specialists in intelligence are useful support of the Diplomat, the only true intelligence officer. in the Diplomat has As the general practitioner in~gtheence, mass of information a requirement for specialists to bring numbers for men under encyclopaedic control by substituting in intelligence to tal capacity. Above all, he needs specialists safeguard his communications. MORI/HRP PAGE 122 122 Approved 005/03/15': CI I T03194A0 OFFICE OF TRAINING Approved Fo 03115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SPRING 1960 AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SECRET authors. They do not necessarily represen#,the fRcia views of the Central Intelligence AnryeCeof Training, or any other organaational component of the intelligence community WARNING`S This material contains ;information affecting the National Defense of the United States; within' the meaning of the Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- espionage laws, Title 18 USC, person mission or revelatioA of, which to an unauthorized is prohibited by law. SECRET EDITORIAL POLICY TUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE EDITORIAL BOARD SHERMAN KENT, Chairman Additional members of the Board represent other CIA components. 5/03/15 : CIA-RDPg T 94A000100 40001-0 Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doc- trinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence. The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Edito- rial Board. The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the litera- ture of intelligence. 25X1 SECREI1 Approved For CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION Contributions to the Studies or communications to the edi- tors may come from any member of the intelligence commu- nity or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelli- 5X$ence, Room 2013 R & S Building and need not be coordinated or submitted through c e . They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond pa- per. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text fol- lowing the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified through Secret. For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk, 5XMI For back issues and on other questions call the SECREII Approved For S8EU3d94AOOO1OD 2005103115 :CIA-RDP7P78T CONTENTS CLASSIFIED ARTICLES Page he Intelligence Literature Award . . . . . . . . . faces 1 nrecognized Potential in the Military Attaches Lyman B. Kirkpatrick 1 Personal recommendations for enhancing the value of an intelligence asset. CONFIDENTIAL sign for Jet-Age Reporting . . . . . William Earling 7 New look in speed and guidance for routine informa- tion reports from overseas. SECRET tes on the CRITIC System . . . . William A. Tidwell 19 informal progress report on the procedure for urgent intelligence flashes. SECRET ti-Soviet Operations of Kwantung Army Intelligence, 1931-39 . . . . . . . . . . . Richard G. Brown 25 Critique of Japanese methods and results in Man- churia. OFFICIAL USE ONLY Le U.S. Hunt for Axis Agent Radios George E. Sterling 35 Story of the FCC's Radio Intelligence Division dur- ing World War II. OFFICIAL USE ONLY )05/03/15: CIA-RDPggff 40001-0 UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES Page Operation Portrex . . . . . . . . . Edwin L. Sibert Al Intelligence and unconventional warfare in a combat exercise. The Last Days of Ernst Kaltenbrunner Robert E. Matteson All Capture and trial of the chief of the Nazi RSHA. The Lohmann Affair . . . . . . ... James H. Belote A31 Clandestine German operations in the twenties. A39 Communication to the Editors . . . . . . . . . . intelligence in Recent Public Literature Espionage and Counterespionage .... . . . . Resistance Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services . . . . . . . Psychological Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25X1 SECREJ e 2005103115: CIA43194A00010004 001-0 CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE yman B. Kirkpatrick is Inspector General of the Central In- telligence Agency. 111iam Earling is a member of a CIA group established to explore new systems for linking the overseas collector of information with his consumer in Washington. illiam A. Tidwell is Chairman of the USIB's Critical Commu- nications Committee. rge E. Sterling, who had played a part in the beginnings of Signal Corps radio intelligence with the AEF in the first world war, organized and directed FCC's Radio In- telligence Division during World War II. He retired after serving from 1948 to 1954 as a Federal Communica- s; jor General Edwin L. Sibert, after seven years of G-2 work culminating in duty as a CIA assistant director, in 1949 and 1950 commanded the U.S. Army Forces Antilles. ~bert E. Matteson is a member of the Board of National Esti- mates. es H. Belote is a CIA current intelligence analyst and a student of modern European history. 25X1 SECRET THE INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE AWARD An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the Studies. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of the Studies' pur- view, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the award. They will be judged primarily on substantive original- ity and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Mem- ders of the Studies editorial board and staff are of course ex- eluded from the competition. Awards will normally be announced in the first issue (Win- ter) of each volume for articles submitted during the preced- welcome ing calendar year. The but editorial nominations for awards, petence in the decision. 25X1 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL se 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 A former G-2 officer gives some ersonal views on how to mul- tply the value of a military in- Uigence asset. COGNIZED POTENTIAL IN THE MILITARY ATTACHES Lyman B. Kirkpatrick The system of U.S. military attaches, a worldwide liaison service which today is accredited to 75 countries, including five a.. of the Government's intelligence arms. Probably because of is lack of understanding its great potentialities remain rela- vely untapped. The military attaches have produced and are producing - arge amounts of intelligence information, and certain at -2che reports have been of significant strategic value. The Army attache in Tel Aviv correctly interpreted the Israeli d i ne mobilization of October 1956 as a war measure and determ vo- a key item in the intelligence which enabled the Watch it 2 X, Committee to alert the President to the impending Suez War, e uid be counted by itself a sufficient justification for the at- om behind the Iron Curtain has also been of incalculable alue, and that from many, other areas has provided informa- on of importance. As the attache systems become recurrently the target of economy drives in the Department of Defense, however, the roduce for the intelligence community grows apparent. At- he reports are not often singled out for distribution to gh departmental policy levels. Most of them are incon- sieuous elements of the routine reporting which keeps each ilitary service up to date on the corresponding services of ante'' of the encyclopaedic National Intelligence Surveys; but Ocers at the policy level are unlikely ever to look at an NIS F, r.VVJ1 VJI IJ . VIM-RUr I U I VJ IJ4MVVV IVVV4VVV 1-V 'ONFIDENTIAL MORIIIIRP PAGES 1 CONFIDENTIAL The MilifaryA @d For until, when a crisis hits, they have an immediate need for data on the Lebanese army or the Indonesian navy, and even then they do not necessarily remain conscious of the fact that it was the attaches who supplied these data. Nor is it always obvious at the policy level that there is a significant from the military attache system in nearly every Na- tional Intelligence Estimate. It seems clear that the social rather than intelligence as- pect of the military attaches' work is weighed too heavily at certain levels in the Pentagon. Hence the attaches are criti- cized as "cookie-pushers" assigned to duty on the cocktail cir- cuit. It is true that the nature of the job in many capitals requires considerable social activity. In Washington itself, the papers abound with accounts of parties for or attended by the service attaches of the various foreign embassies. It may also be true that the attache staffs occasionally include some too socially conscious or ambitious officers who devote themselves too assiduously to the kind of intelligence collec- tion that is done over a glass. But that sort of thing can happen in any organization; it is something that can be reme- died quite quickly and easily by command action. It is important that a new dignity be given to the attache system and a deserved respect accorded it. It is important that the still untapped reservoirs of information needed by the Government which are available to military attaches be recognized and exploited. There are new areas that need to be covered, and old ones that should be covered better. There are new horizons of opportunity, and new approaches can be used to obtain intelligence of utmost value. Coverage and Cross Accreditation Today there are 761 U.S. staff personnel serving in the at- tache systems of the Army, Navy, and Air Force overseas, The Army has 429 (143 officers, 212 enlisted men, and 74 civilians), the Navy 161 (157 officers), the Air Force 171 (145 officers, 22 enlisted men, and 4 civilians). There are army at- taches accredited to 73 countries, air attaches to 69, and naval attaches to 58. Army attaches are actually stationed in 69 countries, air attaches in 53, and naval attaches in 45, Approved For R CONFIDENTIAL Obgf A5 f& kDP78T03194A0001000400U'I=OFIDENTIAL It has been the policy to accredit one attache to more than ne country in order to economize in manpower, because the Gtivities of some countries in some military fields are limited. or example, there are army attaches in Costa Rica, El Sal- dor, Honduras and Nicaragua; but Air Force interests in ese four countries are handled by the air attache in Guate- ala, and naval matters in all five republics plus British Hon- liras are the responsibility of the naval attache in Mexico City. There are other variations in service practices around the Caribbean. A naval attache is stationed in the Dominican w? Republic, but the air attache accredited to Ciudad Trujillo is tationed in Venezuela, and the army attache comes over from tba. Haiti, on the other hand, has an army attache in Port u Prince but is covered by the air attache from Caracas and e naval attache from Havana. While there is certainly not enough work under present auditions in many, of these places to keep separate attaches illy occupied, the system of cross accreditation does create me peculiarities. Thus in Havana, where the Air Force rep- `sentative covers only Cuba, the Navy's covers Haiti in ad- toii Rbli Oilitr in, and the Army's the Domncanepuc.ur may ise on the Dominican Republic is partitioned among udad Trujillio, Havana, and Caracas; a regional conference Auld have to be called to get the consensus of our on-the- t representatives about the over-all strength of the Trujillo e. Sometimes the changing currents of international relations sate some curious situations in this representation from tside, and changes have to be made in accreditation. At one Mt the United States had no service attaches in the Sudan, representatives of all three services in Egypt being ac- ted also to Khartoum. With the Sudanese more than a e suspicious of Nasr's designs on their struggling young tion, this doubling raised obvious problems. Today there p army attache in Khartoum-a most important, assign- ent with a military junta running the Sudan-and air affairs op, e are covered by the air attache in Ethiopia. actory in certain instances. But we should be aware in this era of rising nationalism the armed services of 5103/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194AO00100040001-0 FIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL not accorded resident attaches may consider those countries and coopera- themselves slighted and so feel more kindly- resi- tive-toward the major powers that do keep attaches in deuce. It would be wasteful, to be sure, to assign naval at- taches to the Sudan or Switzerland, but the most powerful aff and influential nation on earth should be able co ry?T that least one appropriate service attac own every aunt will a has a military force, however embryonic. more than enough to keep such officersactive demonstrate. will employed I hope the following paragraphs New Horizons of countries where the One need only look at the number Position, military are today in full control, hold a dominant P? or at least exercise considerable political influence, in order to see the ascending potential of the role of the service the mhre Taking the world region by region and noting only important examples of this situation, we find in Europe Gen- eral de Gaulle master of France, General Franco running and Marshal Tito ruling Yugoslavia, all of them de- Spain, support from the army; pendent in one degree or another on in the Middle East Egypt's Nasr and Iraq's Kasem, army of- ower by military coups; in Africa Haile Se ficers brought top on the loyalty of his imperial body lassie of Ethiopia relying a military junta; in Asia the guard and the Sudan run by and Burma subject to the will governments of Laos. Paean' pivoting on the key position of of the military and Indonesia not the dominant fac- the army; in Latin America theermi n from the rule. for in domestic politics only by P military may In such countries, and in count i i al force, ethe officers of es where in future emerge as a powerful p Olit he military services become a prime intelligence source and target. The U.S. service attache has as his first obligation, of course, the development of contact with officers on the d chief-of-staff level of the service to Cthe need But the circumstances of the coup in Iraq Point up of- for getting to know also the ambitious and rising achieve p omr ficers who through ability or good fortune may nence at some future time. The of all future could by this mean insure, not an advance warning there would be fewer surprises. eTT60Md&Pf :' 9kS P78T03194A00010004000'f2NFIDENTIAL It is acknowledged that in many countries a too obvious or aggressive cultivating of friendships with military personnel by U.S. attaches would be viewed with disfavor-and prob- ably recognized for the surreptitious probing that it was. Some ingenuity and long-range planning would be required here. Initially the attache might be able only to spot up- coming young officers who should be approached later, per- haps by others, particularly since in many countries those that carry a political thrust are kept in provincial garrisons away from the capital. Sometimes the embassy, using the country-team system, could have people outside the attache's immediate office make the initial contact, develop the neces- sary rapport, or maintain a relationship which had been es- tablished. But a main avenue of long-term approach to future wielders of power starts in the United States. Every year hundreds of foreign military officers attend U.S. service schools. Per- haps not all of these will reach chief-of-staff level, but the expectation that they will achieve senior rank is implicit in their selection for the expensive visit to the United States. Consider, for example, that Admiral Larrazabal, who headed the junta that governed Venezuela between the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez regime and the election of Betancourt, had attended the U.S. Naval War College at Newport. We have thus an ideal opportunity to establish personal relationships that could in the future keep us informed on ;affairs of critical intelligence interest. I am not talking about ruitment of these officers as agents; it is a matter of de- eloping the conviction in a foreign officer that his, your, his entry's, and the United States' interests are all identical, 'o,'r;; so very close that it would be to his country's advantage, or; at least not to its detriment, for him to confide in you. First, there should be a thorough, methodical system at -e school for developing biographical data on each individual 7ficer--not just the usual personal history statement or bio- phial sketch, but knowledge of the likes and dislikes of man and what makes him tick. Did his father fight with Rhalifa against Kitchener at Omdurman? Does he drink oily, have occasional sprees or amatory adventures? Is he d he can't afford a better home, feel he can't enter- /03/15:ALA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 FIDENT CONFIDENTIAL The MilitaryAVpmdaeed Fo taro Americans? What are his cultural inter c, Goethe, chess? Has he been discriminated against because his race? Where does he want to end his career-as chief of staff? as constitutionally elected president? as dictator') ear as a professional officer who has served his country And how does he see the future development of his own coun- try? Which great powers does he think can best help it? faculty Much of this information can be assembledbyn the a man's of the school in question. But intimate insight that character, and especially the establishment of a rapport would yield continuing intelligence dividends, would require that as often as feasible and practical the U.S. officer destined to be assigned to a country become a classmate of its poten- tially influential studenisasat~a~ creates a strong bond iden- tity of interest among If a foreign officer attends a U.S. school it can be assumed that his English is passable. But this should not lead to any relaxing of the attache's effort to acquire fluency in the an- guage of the country to which he is assigned. The psycho- logical advantage of knowing the language is tremendous. An intelligence officer's objectives are much easier to reach if his foreign contact senses in him not a superficial, self-seeking interest but a true and deep understanding based upon knowl- edge of the country's language, history, and customs and an im- appreciation of its people. Such specialization, it is question. plies a relatively long assignment at the post in The full implications of this long-range approach for the personal career of a military attache may appear rather for- t midable in terms of present-day concepts. A year or two spent learning language, area, and customs, a year service school to cultivate the friendship of a foreign officer, and at least a double tour of duty in one country-these may add up to a third or a half of the U.S. officer's entire active military career. But if we are serious about our intelligence effort, this is a way to give new significance and worth to the attache system, and the long-term benefits should certainly be high. Approved For CONFIDENTIAL radical proposal for control- g the substance of routine in- ormation reports from over- 4e ds and getting them promptly consumers. DESIGN FOR JET-AGE REPORTING William Earling 'ransmitting information from its variegated and far-flung :collectors to users in the complex intelligence community is ecessarily a tremendously complicated business. In our pres- ent situation the natural complexity is compounded by our having been content to handle nonpriority materials by means evolved with little change from communication systems of the archaic past in separate departments and agencies. 1900 the few copies of dispatches from abroad required in 'ashington could be supplied by carbon copies typed in an em- assy and forwarded by ship pouch. The only improvements we have introduced for routine reports since then are to use ,ts or stencils instead of carbon paper and to forward them air instead of by sea. Given the vastly increased volume of reporting, this speed-up ;means of transportation has not been able to prevent a et slow-down in the flow of information. Dispatches are directed back to parent departments in Washington ugh many separate channels. There are departmental ews, revisions, retypings, reproduction. man rooms and retariats distribute them to other interested departments d agencies, which in turn route them by messenger to sub- nate components. At every stage they queue up in front logs and registers. The average transmission time for tine reports has come to. be measured in months, and some 'documents take more than a year to make their way Pugh the maze. is true that the community is not suffering critically delay in receipt of priority information transmitted by and cable. Although much of our rapid communica- system is also archaic, radical improvements have been MORI/HRP PAGES 7-17 03115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 7 SECRET made in some segments. Others are needed and possible, but this article will limit its concern to routine dispatches and information reports. For them we need a new, much faster system, though not necessarily so fast or so expensive as for cables. The model intelligence reporting system would connect all components of the community through one integrated com- munications network. This network would have the capac ity to move all intelligence from reporter to consumer within, auto say, 24 hours. It would have standard, at bstream eneds of the matic procedures for handling information Personal procrastination, or line, with no room for backlogs, p processing delay. This model is something we can aim at, but we must begin at some modest and practical beginning. Let us then examine the design of a not too expensive system to speed the sluggish flow of information reports from overseas perhaps not fifty- fold but ten. Most analysts would find it not bad to be sure of getting all routine information, down to the lowest priority, within a week of its dispatch. Triplicate Problem The time required for the many processing steps that inter- vene between reporter and consumer, a time exponentially increased with volume as each report e but it is not the problem, processing station, is central to our whole problem. If we concentrate on the mechanics getting possible withou pieces of paper from point to point as fast as p one out considering their substantive purport we are ignoring of the coin. That the current volume of reporting is outgrow- ing our ability to handle and use it effectively is manifest not only in unacceptable delays but in consumer complaints that they receive too many reports they do not need while failing to receive information they do need. Collecting components retort that consumers fail to let them know through standard evaluation procedures which of their reports are useless anto keep them informed through the standard placing of re- quirements precisely what is needed. A lack of communica- tion between the two elements is evident. 03A5Re8?A!AP78T03194A000100040001-0 Lt is clear that better guidance would improve the quality d reduce the volume of reporting; and this smaller volume ;better material could in turn be handled more speedily. ormal collection requirements alone cannot do the job: the angry analyst writes his requirements loosely in order to sure of getting everything that bears on his subject, and e avid reporter in the field will find some bearing on some uirement in almost everything. Nor is the present ton- er evaluation procedure sufficient to the purpose: in all of 1958 CIA, for example, received only 25 spontaneous eval- tions of its CS reports, and of those rendered on particu- `request most were too slow coming-from an average six oaths up to almost two years in instances-to be useful as basis for corrective action. What is needed is some new sys- edm for rapid and frequent user criticism of individual reports order to point up good material and weed out at the source my information below the level of significance for the intelli- ence community.' A third facet of our problem, bearing both on the delay of 'ormation and on the analyst's dissatisfaction with what es show up in his in-box, is the practice of successive dis- ation through organizational channels, through office tral mechanized dissemination direct to individuals would tomatic system 2 indicate that a great deal of excess paper ;pumped into the mill by a straight-faced, undiscriminating e presented with imprecisely defined user require- ts. If we can find some way to pinpoint in machine lan- e exactly what each individual analyst requires, we can him more nearly what he wants and give it to him faster. f'a'ding of Intelligence Collection," Studies III 1, p. 37, and Lowell Dunleigh, "Spy at Your Service, Sir," Studies 11 12, p. 81. cribed by Paul A. Borel, "On Processing Intelligence Informa- 1," Studies III 1, p. 32. For other aspects of mechanized Air In- gence information handling see two articles in the series on velopments in Air Targeting," Outten J. Clinard's "Data Han- g Techniques," Studies III 2, p. 95, 'and Kenneth T. Johnson's gress and Future Prospects," Studies 111 3, p. 53. 3115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SECRET The problem is then a three-fold one-to speed transmission and processing of reports, to improve by guidance the quality of reporting, and to make dissemination faster and more re- sponsive to precise individual wants- These needs are inter- related in something of a vicious circle: delayed and indis- criminate distribution of reports to users breeds delay in get- ting evaluations of them back to the originators; user disin- terest in outdated information extends to disinterest in com- - menting on it; lack of evaluative comment means m4oe~e discriminate reporting and disseminate Weri greater ignifioantle of reports produces still more ~time and better tailor cut the transmission and processing our dissemination, users will better recognize thoe the n in- terest in feeding back substantive app clm tor; and the collector will be enabled bonprompt user marginal and to stop wasting his precious manpower submarginal operations and spurred to concentrate it on pro- ductive enterprises. Design for Speed cope with The design here exhibited of a new sytem on the this triple problem was developed for experimentation CS reports of CIA. One of its central features is a roll of per- forated paper tape. In its most familiar form it is the tape produced by the perforator unit of a standard M-19 teletype machine, with its rows of up to five holes in different p~c ed combinations, each representing a letter or function punch fed o pethis rforation is produces on the keyboard of edistrib for each When the M-19 transmitter -distributor tion, and these an electrical impulse in a channel corresponding to its p impulses are used to key a page printer, or if desired produce an identical tape, at the other end of a tele- phone line or radio circuit. A postwar development, the fiexowriter, has adapted the tape communicator principle to the electric increase typewriter Wthe sef in the its richer keyboard and smaller print. number of impulse channels and corresponding p positions on the tape permits enough additional combinations to carry both capital and lower-case letters and some char- acters and functions, such as semicolons and tabulation, that the teletype machine cannot perform. Experimentally We Approved FQr eI 10335 PA 78T03194A000100040001-0 can use either the M-19 or a modified flexowriter in our design, ut the M-19 is a bit crude for finished reports and the ad- antages of the fiexowriter are largely vitiated by our need : to' stick to five channels in order to keep the tape compatible ~: . th other communications equipment. Both machines are too noisy. New tape-producing typewriters are being devel- oped which will suit us better than either of these. It is not that we are proposing electric transmission of all routine information reports, not yet at any rate. But we are borrowing many features, from cable procedure, and our stem will if necessary be immediately convertible, in whole 'or in part, to one using electric means. The prepared tape can be automatically scrambled into a quite meaningless pattern of perforations. Thus encrypted, it is secure for radio transmission or, in our design, for air- ailing by whatever means is fastest. In practice, this means will probably be the unaccompanied State Department pouch without waiting for other material to accumulate: the State uch cannot be bumped by the air lines and is not held up In customs. The tape should take sometimes as little as one day to reach its consignee, rarely more than three. In the experimental procedure, then, a routine CS report typed in the field, beginning with its operational cover sheet, on a tape-producing typewriter. The report will be in the 'orm, a compromise between cable and dispatch format, in 'hich the analyst will in a few days, we hope, find it on his desk; the first manual typing will be the only one in all but Pceptional instances. Form headings and other repetitive aerial need not be so typed even here: a standard tape Tying them can simply be run through. Carbons or a t in the printer will take care of local dissemination and ord copies. Encrypted and pouched, the tape bypasses in effect all gistries in the field and in Washington-a carbon by the ual accompanied pouch will satisfy their needs-and is de- 'ered with only a pause for automatic decryption to the CIA able Secretariat. The Secretariat operates day and night th its own courier service and whatever staff is necessary RET to get cables to their users within an hour or two of receipt. It has developed exceedingly effective procedures, and this bit of borrowing on our part from cable usage will be impor- tant both materially and psychologically. In the Secretariat the unscrambled tape is run through a printer, typing original and carbons of the operational cover sheet, mat and carbons of the report. Responsibility for releasing the report, however, still rests with the controlling area desk, and that for indicating its dis- semination belongs jointly to the desk and to CIA Central Reference. A Central Reference expert will be on duty in the Secretariat, and as soon as the mat is typed he will read it against user requirements and note on its face the proper recipients, as far as possible individual analysts. In the mean- time carbons of the report, along with the original and carbons of its cover sheet, have gone to the area desk. If it can be released without further ado, it goes back immediately, as- signed a number and showing the addressees prescribed by the desk, to be added to Central Reference's designations. If it requires consultation, comment, or correction, it is held up, possibly a day or so, for these. There will be check-up and inquiry about overdue releases. Back in the Secretariat, the report number, dissemination instructions, desk comments, and minor corrections can easily be added either on the mat or to the tape, and the tape can either type a new mat or be fed by teletype to the consumer. At some future date the whole community may be sufficiently linked in a secure teletype network that most of the distribution can be accomplished by feeding the cor- rected tape into it. Considering the usual need for a courier at the receiving end of the teletype line, however, courier service from the Secretariat direct to individuals like that in present use for cables might be at least as fast for many ad- dressees. When there are a large number of recipients at one location, as at the Pentagon, the tape and teletype might be used to print a mat at a central cable center there, say the Army Staff Communications Office, which could then make distribution to Army, ASA, Air Force, Joint Chiefs, and Secre- tary of Defense offices. iEh'i11 pG)ltty DP78T03194A000100040001-0 SECRET Field preparation of the tape may have taken a day, trans- ~rttation as much as three, Secretariat processing possibly blother, desk release and distribution perhaps a couple more. en the user analyst gets his information it will probably no more than a week old. He could get it faster only with large-scale and costly introduction of new radio and cable ireuits with advanced terminal equipment. Field offices and sporting but also their considerably greater volume of opera- onal correspondence all moving at this speed. _Design for Guidance and Coordination This speed alone will help feed back to the source an opinion ,-, on the usefulness of his information, but as we have shown, new medium is needed for communication from user analysts !procedure, centered on a form bearing a deadline for return. 4.1........,1?0+ f the v~h,P -- - . ' ------`--, o by credibility, and adequacy of each report in meeting his require- ments, with ideas on how it could have been made more useful. We should like eventually also to get here the analyst's com- ti me ments on its subject-coding, information which should in build up to yield greater precision in stating requirements, g dissemination, and retrieving documents from stor- e. Comments on subject-coding would not be possible under resent procedures: information reports as now disseminated ye not yet been coded. But in our system the Central derence expert on duty in the Cable Secretariat who reads report to determine its proper recipients could also assign ISC and area codes. If the interposition of this step before urination seems an added complication when we are try- gto get a report to its users as fast as possible, it would not y take extra time, and the pay-off in getting analysts to ik in terms of the codes and in making Central Reference re of analysts' criteria for coding should be enormous. e evaluation form will accompany reports sent to those ysts whose feedback is worth exploiting, the specialists corned with the subject matter reported, those responsible ms~ writing collection requirements on it, those whose work 5103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SECRET will, suffer if information is not adequately retrievable because of imprecise coding. It stands to reason that their coopera- tion will be quickly rewarded by receipt of fewer reports which are of no interest to them, by retrieval of filed mate- rials they need in research, and by the more direct and effec- tive contact with collectors made possible lebw1 their responses. The form will be designed for simple multiple- checks both for the convenience of the analyst and than facilitate later processing. In past half of the elaborate old evaluation forms are returned with For check marks only, no subst~ hi~ o~ p~~ Processing of the new the most part, therefore, p forms will eliminate carbon or reproduced copies and obviate manual sortings and distribution. One operator can punch All derived six to eight hundred forms onto cards a day. comment. products, except those including analyst will be tailor-made machine tabulations. Feedback for Coders Every theoretical discussion of retrieval problems brings out the inevitable human limitations in the coding process .3 Central Reference document analysts are not omnis icuuni- versal geniuses; in assigning the apparently pertinent they are bound to overlook or not to be aware of angles under which retrieval might in the future become necessary. This is the primary criticism leveled at the present lib arryde ystem espe- by personnel using it. The Intelligence Subject cially with the refinement of its current revision, will be a which splendid instrument, useful exactly tood r which to which coders properly foresee the headings ln material may need to be recovered, but no further. The better and more widely known the ISC, the more it is directly used and contributed to by experts better the retrieval system. If when its revision its fields, , complete we could provide a space on the evaluation form for analysts to suggest coding in other categories than those as- signed by Central Reference, analysts would become more fa- ' S roes ff example George W. Wright, "Toward a Federal Intelligence Memory," Studies 11 3, p. 7, and Paul A. Borel, "On Processing Intel- 25 . ligence Information," Studies III 1, p. Design For Reporting e 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 and any analyst who received ith the coding systems , ar w nuu a report could take care of his own interests by thus nomi- nating the appropriate codes. 1^ Central Reference coders in weekly tabulations. These could ach f , or e show report numbers, the additional codes proposed could be Th ey and the names of the contributing analysts. order t ever arranged by document or ISC number or in wha stem the s i t y o n wwould be most conducive to integrating them roponents. ith the p after any necessary discussion w this feedback process had been under way for some O nce time and analysts had become used to it, it is hoped they - uld develop sc-- ---- wo ;particularly as wmechanization provides increasingly reliable eed that they would th ey n and rapid service-to retrieve what _ ._ _r ai,...:,. ......, hnlrlinAC of -- o b .....p .. I Wuuaas e indexed documents. Without participation in the coding d ! . process we believe this confidence could not be establishe Feedback for Disseminators re to achieve the speed and efficiency of mechanical If we a dissemination from a central point direct to individual analysts, their individual requirements, as we have noted, will have to be stated with precision and kept up to date by a feedback system suitable for mechanization. Under such a des t , co system, dissemination can take place by ISC subjec ort would automatically __ ., e r p des to of ll iAdicate its dissemination. But coded requirements as we as coded reports are a prerequisite for such a mechanized process. st will - he l r -i - - y aaaa II can ever be fully stated in machine language, and certainly 94 - __,._ -gin i...,.... t in hsmaiprl nit- o side any mechanical system. But most requirements can be reat routine bulk of f th e g sufficiently- codified to take care o st's require- anal f y an d statement o dissemination. A codifie tabulating his b y rents may be derived in the first instance uestions on k t ey q o response over a period of some months d along with i ` ve e fll the reports he rece evaluation formor a, sts could trans- nal t y a Documen sir assigned subject codes. 115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 15 late this tabulation into a tentative Statement of Require- ments, to be refined in discussion with the analyst concerned. The resultant agreed Statement of Requirements would be used as the basis for current dissemination to him, and his could be kept up to date by the continuing feedback of evaluations. tend to give the This feedback system, properly used, will analyst and his supervisor direct control over the volume of information delivered to his in-basket. The supervisor is an interested party because of his responsibility for an equitable distribution of workload to his subordinat~e~ pra ice a mast difficult task. Most supervisors carry and do not inspect their subordinates' in-baskets at regular d intervals. Tabulations of the evaluation convenient int melcould provide them every week or at any a list of the reports their subordinates ook in and their aid re- actions to them. This tool might be a considerable proper workload distribution. Feedback for Collectors Most of the questions on the form will be designed to guide the collector. Headquarters can use the answers, incorpo- rated into punched card systems covering operational data, sources, project numbers, and lists of requirements, to fur- nish. the field, in tabulations bbystation aloi bof their ase and source cryptonym, the evaluations placed matched up against requirements levied on the station. Head- quarters desks and staffs will be able, in their planning and control functions, to use not only these but other tabulations, for example listings by project and source of reports and their evaluations, lists by requirement numbers of evaluated reports responsive to requirements, and a variety of statisti- cal compilations. If evaluations run consistently high on a low-cost source; there will be little question about the renewal of his operation. Adverse reactions will provide an indication to the desk and staff that a situation be drowned in the stato be looked ck of paper sur faced User rejections will not faced once a year in the project renewal process, but will lead to an examination of all pertinent facts and the prompt clos- ing of marginal operations. Desk and staff personnel will be ApproveeEfRel Design For Reporting eed from the routine bookkeeping chores now required to ,pep track of field reporting. From Prototype to Production Model This design for speed and guidance has undergone limited tests on the reporting of a major field station, and it has been ound to produce at least the short-term benefits antic- Ipated. It is still in the prototype stage, however, subject to modification in more extensive testing planned as equip- ment becomes available. It may be that new technological developments, for example photographic or magnetic tape en- processes now being investigated, will make major changes desirable. In any case it will require adaptation to varying local needs in the field before it can be generally ap- lied to the reporting of even this Agency. There will be many obstacles to the integration of the re- porting of the whole community in a single system. They will have to be tackled slowly, and piecemeal. The easiest be- ginning will probably be on the receiving end, with the ex- tension of rapid dissemination and the application of some better evaluation system in those agencies, notably Air In- telligence, that employ the Intelligence Subject Code. Ef- forts are now under way to standardize the format of all com- unity reporting. For all its tentative and limited nature, our design does provide a basic concept and may embody some specific features that can lead to an ultimate integrated re- rting system. 1115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 Approved For Release 15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 agniflcant advance and recal- rc' rant bugs in the procedure or urgent intelligence flashes. NOTES ON THE CRITIC SYSTEM William A. Tidwell "A true critick ought to ... communicate to the world h things as are worth their observation." Joseph Addison's job description in 1712 could also be the Otto for a special CRITIC set up by the intelligence com- unity in mid-1958, the reporting system responsive to a di- yective that critical intelligence be communicated from the eld to the "highest authorities" in "speeds approaching ten utes." CRITIC does communicate rapidly to this high ecutive world things that are worthy of their urgent at- tion, specifically indications of international crisis or im- ding military hostilities. If, in its present state of develop- eut and with the communications hardware now in use, ere are relatively few occasions on which a CRITIC message y moves from reporter to intelligence user in ten min- ' time, the establishment of the system has nevertheless e radical changes in the flow of critical intelligence to Washington, and messages handled under it take only a frac- of the average time required for similar messages before ;inauguration. blishment and Performance e intelligence community has always been concerned the rapid reporting of urgent items, but a systematic unity-wide assault on the problem did not get under until the autumn of 1957. At that time a study of the 'sting related to the Turkish-Syrian crisis and certain ted indicators of Soviet military activity demonstrated t'many critically important items were being handled in utine manner and that they frequently required more 24 hours to reach the White House. In terms of aver- a message containing information such as is now han- in the CRITIC system would take nine hours and a half Approved For Release 2E'IA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 SECRET The CRITIC System Approved For to move from the field reporter to the intelligence user in Washington. The results of this study were given to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which, with the concurrence of the IAC, recommended to the President that the problem be attacked with the utmost vigor by the intelligence community. This recommendation was approved by the President, and the community initiated ac- tion on two fronts, that of facilities and that of procedures. The first resulted in the promulgation of NSCID No. 7, desig- nating the Department of Defense as executive agent for creating and managing a world-wide communications system for the transmission of critical intelligence. The second led to the establishment of the CRITIC system of procedures for rapid reporting over this world-wide communications net. From the beginning it was obvious that the initial decision as to whether an item of information is of critical nature would have to be made by the field reporters. At the same time it was clear that field reporting personnel, not always apprised of all the related information available in Washe ng might err in their judgments. It was necessary, fore, while giving as much guidance as possible to the field, to reserve to intelligence headquarters in Washington opportunity for final evaluation of CRITIC items before pass- ing them to the White House. Critical intelligence was therefore defined as "information indicating a situation or pertaining to a situation which af- fects the security or interests of the United States to such an extent that it may require the immediate attention of the President," and in DCID No. 1/8 specific categories of infor- mation considered to fall under this definition were listed. Field reporting personnel of all intelligence agencies were di- rected to prefix the indicator CRITIC to all messages con- taining information under these headings and to forward them under high precedence by the most rapid communica- tions means available. It was arranged that in Washington messages carrying this indicator would receive simultaneous electrical dissemination Tactical Air Commands. sys em the Strategic and the was put into effect on 21 July 1958. Approa 1o The CRITIC System 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Like most new undertakings, the CRITIC system operated with a certain amount of creaking and groaning during the Est few months, but its effect on the speed of reporting immediately apparent. CRITIC messages already moved m field reporters to intelligence users in Washington in an average of about an hour and a half, as against the 91/2-hour a erage during the Turkish-Syrian crisis. The Critical Com- iunications Committee, monitoring the system on behalf of the USIB, spent a great deal of time refining the interpreta- on of various categories in the CRITIC list and unsnarling rocedural problems as they were identified. By the end of Pe first year of operations the average transmission times h ad dropped to an hour or less, an accomplishment made Inj. possible by improvements in the hardware and operating pro- cedures of the supporting communications services along with better handling of the traffic in the intelligence agencies. ersistent Problems The progress achieved by the CRITIC system has thus been excellent, but a number of problems remain to be overcome before it can reach full efficiency. For one thing, it can func- ion perfectly only if the messages are kept short, but field eporting personnel have not all learned yet to be as concise .s possible. It is still not unusual for a message to contain hundreds of groups, and one even reached the 3,000 mark. It obvious that these messages cannot be put through in ten- 4 m inute service by present communications equipment, operat- vi~ g at 60 or 100 words per minute. Long messages to de- ibe a complex situation could often be obviated by a series short messages sent as the situation develops. Some headquarters personnel have been misled by the defi- tion of critical intelligence as matter for "the immediate at- tion of the President" into thinking that each CRITIC ~e should in itself be something of an earth-shaker. t there are a number of categories of CRITIC items, indi- tors of Soviet hostile intent, which become critical only as eY form a critical pattern. The pattern, however, can be erred only in Washington, by the combination of its sev- elements; and field reporters without access to the rest the pattern must therefore give CRITIC handling to in- 103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 21 SECRET The CRITIC System Approved For dividual elements, items which may prove in Washington to be isolated events of relatively little significance. Some reporting personnel have not understood that the handling of CRITIC messages in Washington is organized on a community-wide basis, that the CRITIC designator is less a communications precedence indicator than an addressee group which automatically ensures immediate distribution by electrical means to all appropriate addressees in the Wash- ington area. Their consequent designation of multiple ad- dressees has increased handling and processing time and de- layed delivery to intended recipients. One reporter even ad- dressed a CRITIC message to the Chairman of the awakened Joint Chiefs of Staff, causing General Twining to be middle of the night and blocking delivery of the message to its proper recipients until he could authorize its release. Such shortcomings as these, however, are probably inevi- table when a large number of widely dispersed people are called upon to learn a new system of operation; experience and fur- ther training of both intelligence and communications per- sonnel should greatly improve performance in these respects. More recalcitrant is a problem arising from a communica- tions fact of life: in a number of highly important countries of the world, including those behind the Iron Curtain, the U.S. Government cannot maintain its own communications facilities and is dependent upon commercial facilities or the monopolies of the governments concerned, which of course do not recognize the comparative precedence assigned a mes- sage within the U.S. Government systems. Some of these governments might be willing on a reciprocal basis to grant us the right to operate our own communications, but the granting of such rights in the United States is contrary to U.S. policy. Communications from these forbidden areas are generally the responsibility of CIA and the Department of State. Both organizations are hard at work on the problem, and there is some hope that improvements can be effected. In the communications systems operated by the U.S. Gov- ernment, considerable additional improvements are planned or under way. We have good reason to believe that CRITIC messages handled by these facilities can achieve average 22 ApprWe_WPO The CRITIC System ____ SECRET reds of 10 minutes or less within the very near future. Nu- erous test messages transmitted in substantially less than kif, minutes prove that the goal of "speeds approaching ten utes" is attainable under the right conditions. The ?CRITIC system will become a "true critick," however, only by e of alert and efficient support from a great number of telligence and communications personnel in many agen- es of the Government. Great strides have been made, but Approved Fc se 2005103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A0CQf6kW4600F0 ONLY critical review of prewar Jap- e military intelligence op- ations in Manchuria. I-SOVIET OPERATIONS OF KWANTUNG ARMY INTELLIGENCE, 1931-391 Richard G. Brown Japanese military intelligence operations against the Soviet uon in the Far East became of prime importance after an took over Manchuria in 1932. Before that she had no s t need for intelligence on the Soviet forces in the Far p ary; with the U.S.S.R. on the continent, the Chinese being in [fit. _ -- , ?L LL .. L;w... nF +ti,n TI~,]Y,_ of of c44hurian incident the Japanese nevertheless had potentially N~~F? strong operational intelligence assets in numerous inhabit- into Soviet territory with relative ease so long as So- security remained generally lax. In addition, there were umerous anti-Communist White Russians in northern Man- e, h'uria willing and able to engage in intelligence activities 1a, sabotage, counterintelligence, and what was to be- cy in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, included propa- the Japanese. e intelligence operations of the principal Japanese aphy of the area. The means it employed included the me a major collection effort on the Soviet army and the atch of secret agents into Soviet territory, the intercep- s and defectors, and the establishment of border ob- rp of radio communications, the interrogation of Soviet de- article is based on historical data compiled, with the assistance tpersonnel of the Japanese Kwantung Army, by the Military His- the Office of Military History, Department of the Army. The Approved For 005103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Manchuria, issued in June 1955 under the title "Japanese Intel- Bence Planning Against the USSR." MORI/HRP PAGES 25-34 CIAL USE ONLY 25 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwantung Army Intelligence Approved F From the first the Kwantung Army and the Army General Staff in Tokyo were alert for indications of Soviet reaction to the Manchurian incident, and after Kwantung Army ele- ments moved into the Soviet sphere of influence the surveil- lance of Soviet actions in the Far East, particularly any mili- tary movements, was intensified. Yet Japanese military headquarters felt that the Soviet Union had no intention of intervening in the situation, and so devoted its attention not to immediate countermeasures but to consolidating the Japa- nese position in Manchuria and developing an extensive in- telligence network as Kwantung Army units advanced toward the Soviet border. This intelligence effort was intensified as Soviet border defenses improved: aerial photography during the summer of 1933 revealed extensive fortifications designed to check Japanese military operations against Soviet terri- tory. Agent Infiltration The principal field intelligence units under the Intelligence Section of the Kwantung Army staff were eight Army Special Services Agencies. Of these it was the unit in Harbin which played the major role in the Manchurian operations. The Harbin ASSA used White Russians for espionage missions, and these were the best of the agents available. The border area ASSA's occasionally used White Russians, but relied mainly on local Chinese and Koreans. These agents were in- filtrated into Soviet territory to carry out espionage. Occa- sional deserters from the Soviet army were also exploited for information. The Soviets commenced to bolster border security during 1935. They increased the number of border garrison units, ordered the evacuation of border area inhabitants, and insti- tuted constant patrolling. A Soviet counterespionage network in Manchurian territory, especially in the border area, regu- larly observed and reported on the movements of Japanese agents. The White Russians, while more reliable and compe- tent than other agents, being most of them ardent anti-Com- munists, were more easily detected. Many were shot in at- tempting to cross the border, and the majority did not re- turn, thanks to effective Soviet security. A deadlock in trans- border operations resulted. OFFICIAL USPWe Kwantung Army Intelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY se 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 The standstill in intelligence operations was quite embar- rassing to the Kwantung Army's headquarters Intelligence Section, which therefore came increasingly to take over the t1icularly of the ASSA units. Efforts were made to improve techniques of agent infiltration, to take more pains in forging credentials, to pay more attention to dress, baggage, and lan- guage, to give better training for missions and reporting At . tention was also given to other means of intelligence collec- tion-communications, publications, and telescopic observa- Communications Intercepts Soviet communications in the Far East relied mainly on wireless; the wire network had failed to keep pace with the mushrooming military and industrial expansion. A very con- siderable number of Soviet message circuits were thus vul- erable to interception. In order to learn the techniques for breaking codes, the General Staff in Tokyo had sent several technical officers to Poland in 1933 and 1934: the Polish Army anese to be among the best in the world. When the first con- 'tingent of these officers returned from Poland in 1935, a small unit for studies on radio interception and the breaking of So- Eventually this unit was expanded and became known as the Communication Intelligence Group, operating directly under the supervision of the Kwantung Army intelligence service. The interception and analysis of Soviet plain-text messages was not undertaken until 1936, when the Soviet Union began ent o sup l ,u vats --o-'----- p Trans-Siberian Railroad. The BAM line was a matter of grave concern to the Japanese General Staff, but the Kwantung Intlli Sti h egenceeconad no means of observing the prog- 's8; Of construction on it. The Operations Section th ere - ore took the initiative and asked the Japanese-controlled Its Communications Research Department in Harbin. This ch was charged with intercepting plain-text wireless mes- es concerning construction on the BAM line and with LcL10SJ88113NII31A-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 Kwantung ArmyAllg g@@cFor R ;, [iQ9 54re Afi 4%TW194A00010006"0bQL 0 0 USE ONLY V 3 Y F O y _ a H a =a s 0 ~~ ~ of o s I . k y< 1 r 0 d d x } E ma z G~ Y ~- U a a s ` m o X -E Y i. 0 /Y N I V N, aZ ~~~ , ~ 1, r" I Y t a 0 o x Z_ "- 1, It f - _ o 104 \ I o ? ~ ? ~Y 0 !\~ t ~ ` 0 iq , kr n ysis of the intercepted data with respect to selected sub- bets. Although this installation supplied data to the intel- gence network through the very active Harbin ASSA the act that it was conceived and supervised by the Operations Section became an irritant in this Section's relations with the telligence Section. The success of the Railway Company's ceptions with clear text intercepts, which were thereafter o rwarded on ticker tape to the Harbin ASSA for analysis by is:Document Intelligence Division. ocument Analysis The importance of available Soviet publications, primarily ewspapers published in the Far East, had somewhat belatedly analysts originally assigned to the Harbin ASSA had been aug- is staff included a large number of White R i i t uss an n ellec foals, as well as Japanese competent to interpret and anal ze y Soviet documents, publications and messages. Periodicals, id even personal notebooks collected by the various intelli ter, when it became difficult to obtain documents greater grear , 1Portance was attached to Soviet radio broadcasts l , a ong th the intercepted clear-text wireless messages But th . ere ere still documents obtained by agents, papers carried by e o ccasional defectors from Soviet territory, and in one plane which made a forced landing in Manchuria in 1938. `der Observation I n- the early thirties the military units of the Kwantung Z T7 each front-line unit had a few lookout posts equipped lt u ies 111 'gene collection became acute in 1934, the intelligence -- ----- .,j.,.,H... - .... lligence activity. The observation posts were organized Soviet side of the border under surveillance day and night, OFFICIAL USE ONLY ICIAL USE ONLY Approved Fo ~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwantung Army IAjf#i9vwd For recording in detail the movement of even a single soldier, horse, or vehicle. The posts were each manned by approxi- mately one squad. They used telescopes of various types, ranging up to one of 150 power obtained from the Navy for night use. The front-line Army commands were ordered to make use of any suitable points in their respective sectors for this purpose, and to train and supervise the personnel to make the observations. Nevertheless, up until 1938 these teams were often composed of inferior personnel and occa- sionally even lacked telescopes.. Some of their more impor- tant reports were on the arrival and departure of ships in Vladivostok harbor, as observed from posts at Wangchaoshan and Tumentzu, and on the arrival and departure of aircraft at Voroshilov, as seen by posts at Suifenho and Tungning. Achievements and Failures By mid-1939 the Kwantung Army's intelligence agencies had scored considerable progress in improving their operations. In 1935 the communications intelligence Research Unit had succeeded in breaking the simple codes used by the Soviet border forces, and constant study brought later successes against Soviet army codes of three and four letters. Although these codes were not commonly used for important messages, the Research Unit was nevertheless able to learn the organi- zation and disposition of some border garrisons and the loca- tion and movements of some air units. It also did traffic analysis, compiling statistics on the origin and volume of So- viet radio messages. The interception and study of plain-text messages by the South Manchurian Railway's Communications Research De- partment yielded considerable information about the progress of construction on the BAM line. The Kwantung Army's Re- search Unit was also able to obtain from plain-text intercepts some valuable indications about particular military situations in Asiatic Russia. Analyzing this data, the Document Intel- ligence Branch of Kwantung Army intelligence was able to reach conclusions about the disposition of units, changes in units, their commanders, their numerical designations, the arrival of new personnel, and their places of origin, as indi- cated by messages of safe arrival sent home. Messages in the 30 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved antung Army Intelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY ear also supplied many fragmentary details about industrial dl economic conditions in Asiatic Russia, and these often r t ibuted to important findings. 91 r hewn,..e piecemeal data compiled by the Harbin Document In- .. T_.. elons in making estimates of the enemy's + 000 Soviet officers in the Far East, for example, contributed cantly to ascertaining the order of battle for Soviet y forces in eastern Asia. An unusual o erati n - p on u der en, by the Division was the examination of postal matt r e the Soviet mail plane which made a forced landing in Man- tula in 1938. The mail had to be secretly opened, sorted, plom f ---_?? negotiations o the turn of the airplane and its crew were being carried on, ' e analysis of the material was completed within a month. The observation teams engaged in telescopic surveillance of e not notably successful. They provided details on S i t ov e unification improvements in parts of the border zone and ho e b hi C u s e nd the ortifications, and they compiled statistical data on vehicle ... tl(1Tta ennrnr+;nn. +L.,, e_..c,,,_ , _ A's to penetrate Soviet territory with spies were nearly ,failures, but their interrogation of fugitives from Soviet __-- Ak~~'~r,rtest of the Kwantung Army's intelligence services was which began in may as a series of clashes between Soviet and Manchuria. By June it had become a major engage. divisional magnitude and in August a failure for the ese. This operation disclosed several serious defects of iite -'g --.y intelligence, of its significant improvement since 1931 I . n gen fit: showed itself still not sufficiently modernized and sys= tied to be effective. It also showed marked differences g em and procedure among its several components. ,CIAL USE ONLY 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwantung ArmAilpw6gor Deficiencies at Nomonhan The chief defects of the Kwantung Army's headquarters Intelligence Section arose from its having assumed over a period of years complete control of all the ASSA's. Its own functioning had consequently become extremely complex and its real aims were often lost from sight. Properly a policy planning staff, the Section had been transformed into an op- erating agency, and the detail arising from its domination of the ASSA's constantly obstructed it. As the discharge of its normal responsibilities became careless under these stresses, the headquarters Operations Section lost confidence in it and tended to make its own estimates, arbitrary and independent, drawn from scanty information and often from untested sources. The Intelligence Section was unable to halt this trend, and it became more pronounced with the passage of time. This headquarters involvement with the ASSA's was aggra- vated by an organizational weakness in the coordination of these units which prevented them from being utilized sys- tematically. The ASSA's had failed to systematize liaison and cooperation among themselves. The Harbin ASSA, which had the greatest experience and capacity in Soviet intelligence and a staff more comprehensive and diversified than any of the others, was kept on an equal footing with the other seven, so that the benefit of its knowledge and expert guidance was not imparted to them. With all eight operating independ- ently under the direct control of the Intelligence Section, the administrative burden became too great during the Nomon- han incident. A serious procedural defect in the handling of information was illustrated by an incident which produced a minor crisis in relations between the Intelligence and Operations Sec- tions. The Harbin ASSA had obtained through a contact in the office of the Soviet consul general there a file purporting to be extracts from message traffic between Moscow and Khabarovsk. Initially this correspondence seemed authen- tic and important, but developments after the outbreak of the Nomonhan incident convinced the Intelligence Section that it was false and deceptive. The Operations Section, how" ever, which had obtained a copy of it from the Harbin ASSA, OFFICIALpUSE ONfr wantuna Armv Intelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY !ssumed that it had been acquired by interception and deci- herment, and. reproduced it under highest security classifica- ature of this correspondence to the Operations Section, 'hick therefore tended to be misled by it in some phases of e Nomonhan operations. It was not until the last stages of this engagement, as the Kwantung Army was concentrating its strength for an attack, that the communications intelligence Research Unit achieved some moderate success in learning the disposition Soviet and Mongolian troops in the Far East; and even limited accomplishment was made from the vantage point Changchun-almost 500 miles from the scene of battle. e Kwantung Army's inadequacies in the communications _ telligence field were strikingly apparent in its failure to f battlefield information transmitted by wireless in either ode or plain text, for the Soviet army often transmitted in clear text in situations demanding speed, and the increase in number of coded communications for combat purposes uld have facilitated the solution of the Soviet code. Com- unications facilities in the vastness of Outer Mongolia, the rocale of this conflict, were so patently poor that a significant ~_aa n++t,o ntbreak of hostilities. Japanese interception equipment was nately trained to tap this source of intelligence. Another usive use of the intelligence services; the secret missions t did get into Soviet territory were often therefore aced. 9! committee of officers from Kwantung Army headquar- g Army's performance during the Nomonhan incident fact that the operations staff officer had insufficient con- ce in the estimates of the enemy situation made by the Bence staff officer, and as result was inclined to form own estimates on an inadequate intelligence foundation, times even basing his decisions exclusively on the peace- 1 31Rt CJDP78T03194A000100040001-0 33 f time situation. Another was the preoccupation of intelligence officers with peacetime intelligence problems to such an ex- tent that they failed to develop a war mobilization plan and thus were unable to exploit enemy activity during the No- monhan hostilities. A third was the fact that improvements in techniques were insufficiently taken advantage of, and that there was a great need for systematizing operations and pro- cedures. The committee recommended that major improve- ments be made in. the peacetime operation of the intelligence services and in preparing. them for wartime activity, so that intelligence estimates, as well as other intelligence products, would enjoy the full confidence of operations officers and be accorded full weight. OFFICIAL USE ONLY 005103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 ov FCC's routine policing of ether became in World War u multi-purpose defense serv- `and a far-flung counter- ge operation. THE U.S. HUNT FOR AXIS AGENT RADIOS George E. Sterling I hope that this country, particularly its intelligence agen- es, has become better organized to handle a national emer- 'ency than it was in 1941. When the war, after slowly creep- uddenl h y ores, s for two years from Europe toward U.S. s s had to be undertaken in desperate haste and with thin g t times disorderly improvisation. Many agencies were giver. sing equipment approximating what was needed for the war- rdi- t rao e work. That they by and large discharged these ex vely toward the gradual readjustment of temporarily as- rtici- gned functions, is something in which all those who pa ated can take pride. The Federal Communications Commission, because it had olice the domestic airwaves, was given its full share of ties not called for in its job description. It ran a rescue k. t r hors weather. blac ou o ting them by their radio signals and furnishing them their _ e -L:-L -....,,7.7 n+U,ar_ have been really lost, were given FCC emergency fixes Air Force personnel were trained, with our help, ore Arm y take over the job. It monitored enemy commercial radio ith .nits and furnished the Board of Economic Warfare w dreds of leads useful in the preclusive buying program. meet requirements of the Eastern, Gulf, and Western de- e commands, the Commission's legal responsibility for ap- ending unlicensed radio stations was extended to sur- e of the coast by radio patrols for signs of surrepti- e 15j UOWP78TO3194A000100040001-0 35 MORIIHRP PAGES 35-5 tious communication with enemy submarines. The network intercepted foreign weather traffic for our air forces. It mon- itored foreign radio broadcasts, setting up the organization which now has become the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and published texts and analyses of broadcast news and propaganda for a variety of government consumers. It trained OSS personnel in radio methods and procedures and built equipment for their use. For a year and a quarter the FCC's Radio Intelligence Division, as the monitoring network was known, carried the full load of military radio intelligence in Alaska, where the Army was not able to station a radio intelligence company until late in 1942 and got a monitoring station in operation only in the spring of 1943. It radio-patrolled the Alaskan coast by sea. It also participated at Army request in military in- telligence elsewhere, most notably in Hawaii and on the west coast. In San Francisco it set up an Intelligence Center where officers of the military services were on duty around the clock. It identified and tracked the radio-equipped bal- loons which the Japanese launched against our west coast. It discovered and established the location of a Nazi weather station on Greenland, which the Coast Guard was then able to destroy. It trained the military personnel who eventually took over most of these duties, prepared instructional book- lets and monitoring aids for them, and supervised their work until they became competent enough to operate without help. The RID even participated from afar in the guerrilla move- ments in the Philippines. This activity began when one of our monitors picked up a signal using the call, PK1JC, of an amateur in the Dutch East Indies, where no amateurs could operate. We fixed its origin in northern Luzon. PK1JC sent a message coded, we determined, with a prewar Signal Corps cipher disk, giving the name and serial number of an unsur- rendered American soldier trying to establish contact with MacArthur's headquarters. He requested acknowledgement by a signal from General Electric's powerful KGEI transmit- ter near San Francisco. The Signal Corps arranged for this acknowledgement and asked us to continue copying all his messages. Later, when the landing of transmitters by sub- marine created quite heavy traffic from the Philippine guer- 6~f5 Ralf%aRDP78T03194A0001001 J I40 USE ONLY villas, a primary monitoring station at San Leandro, Cali- fornia, was exclusively devoted, at Signal Corps request, to copying it and expediting it by private teletype circuit to Washington. Policing the Domestic Ether Although these spirited improvisations requested and sup- ported by the military services lay far outside the Commis- 'sion's proper charter, the Communications Act of 1934, they were undertaken eagerly when required and relinquished later gracefully but with reluctance by our radio men and women anxious to contribute to the war effort in any way they could. Our people had enough of their own proper work to do, for after Pearl Harbor the regular job of the Radio Intelligence Division took on a new and grimmer aspect. It was now not just a question of tracking down maladjusted transmitters, unshielded diathermy apparatus, or even the illegal communi- cations of pranksters, smugglers, and racetrack tipsters, but of sealing the country's leaky ether against loss of war secrets over the radio circuits of enemy agents. Hitherto, with commercial communications to foreign countries free of surveillance, spies in this country had had no need to risk secret transmitters; now these commercial facilities were 'closed or censored and the whole spectrum had to be patrolled or furtive whisperings in Morse cipher. The RID was under challenge to live up to its initials. The Division's equipment, personnel, and physical deploy- ment were adequate to the task. During the state of national emergency that preceded Pearl Harbor the FCC had been au- orized to begin an expansion of its radio detection faciu- ti s; which were ultimately stabilized in twelve primary moni- ring stations, about sixty subordinate monitoring posts, and nt ninety mobile units distributed through the United tes, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska. The fixed stations d many of the mobile units were linked by instantaneous (ommunications. They were organized into three major net- erks based on radio intelligence centers respectively in sshington, near San Francisco, and in Honolulu; but in fix- the location of a source of radio signals the three net- Mks were fused into one and directed from Washington. 05103115: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 ICIAL USE ONLY 37 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis ,AppiiogediSnr Re Each primary station, in addition to its complex of rhombic and other antennae and its receiving and recording equip- ment, had at least one Adcock direction finder, a large rotat- ing antenna sensitive to the direction of shortwave signals bounced off the ionosphere; this device had been invented in England, but was refined and improved by RID engineers. At short range, say within a few miles, a simple loop antenna can pick up the ground-wave component of a signal and deter- mine its direction; our disguised mobile units included these in their equipment. And finally, for locating transmitters at really close quarters, we developed what we called a "snifter," a signal-strength meter that a man could carry in the palm of his hand while inspecting a building to determine which room a signal came from. In the routine day-and-night operation of a monitoring sta- tion, the patrolman of the ether would cruise his beat, passing up and down the frequencies of the usable radio spectrum, noting the landmarks of the regular fixed transmissions, recognizing the peculiar modulation of a known transmitter or the characteristic fist of a familiar operator, observing an irregularity in operating procedure and pausing long enough to verify the call letters, or finding a strange signal and re- cording the traffic for close examination, and then sometimes alerting the nation-wide net to obtain a fix on the location of its source. More than 800 such fixes would be made in an average month, requiring the taking of some 6,000 individual bearings. For although mathematically the intersection of two bearings provides a fix, the 1% error that must in prac- tice be allowed in the angle of a bearing, even when it is cor- rected for variations in propagation and site conditions, be- comes considerable at distances that may run to thousands of miles; and at least four bearings are needed for a reason- ably reliable long-range fix. Radio Spies in the United States With respect to Axis agents in the United States and its territories this close vigilance was almost purely prophylactic, and effective in its prophylaxis: out of respect for it enemy agents, as far as we ourselves were able to discover, made only two attempts during the entire war to establish radio communications across our ethereal frontiers, and in both cases Approved For OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1,69M# : I'1 DP78T03194A0001000 fAL USE ONLY 'ailed to get a single message through. The stories of these ,two, although they have been told from other viewpoints else- Ohere,2 are worth summarizing here. The first took place in the spring of 1940, long before Pearl Harbor had roused us to hunt for radio spies here in earnest . Our routine monitoring turned up an unidentified transmit- s- ter carrying on coded traffic with a distant station which used the call AOR. We asked the Army and the Navy if it might - LL----_ r... _ one of hd a ought it might be a St. John, New Brunswick station But , . Our direction finders showed it to be on Long Island, and its correspondent AOR near Hamburg, Germany We re orted . p to the FBI. The Bureau told us in confidence that it was indeed a Ger- man agent radio, but under their control. A German-Ameri- can, William Sebold, had revealed that he was recruited b y the Nazis and instructed to set it up. The FBI built and now Were manning the station for him feeding Hambur fals , g e or nnocuous information and identifying its agent sources. The deception continued for more than a year under our joint a +. geuw whom the traffic had furnished leads were arrested. At ei til th rraat fall, when the defense tried to maintain that OR was not a German station but an FBI entrapment device the United States, RID engineer Albert McIntosh produced shi th fi owngex on Hamburg. His public testimony ust have been one factor in the German decision not to risk nt transmitters in the United States. They did try it once more, though, right after Pearl Har- r, apparently on local initiative, impromptu In the ene l . g ra srt which followed that shocking Sunday morning we had gton streets. These were equipped not only with loop di- finders btith di u w aevce we called the watch-dog, an i~Pilhehn Hoettl, one of the German foreign intelligence area chiefs, ,firmed during his interrogation b 3rd A i y rmy n June 1945 that th e Sicherheitsdienst had not been able to establish a single wireless 06ao1y in Don Whitehead's The FBI Story. 005103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 ICIAL USE ONLY Axis AgeAp g?d For ?x2g0~aenltl a I1-RDP78T03194A0001000~ 0001' 0llcr! ^~v Approved F e 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 aperiodic receiver we had developed which would sound an alarm when it received a strong signal on any of a wide range o f frequencies. (It was patented by two RID engineers and O i later used by OSS and the Navy.) In the wee hours of Tues- day, December 9, one of these watch-dogs was triggered b y signals on a transatlantic frequency. At the same moment three thousand miles away our monitors in Portland Oregon , , heard them too-station UA briefly and vainly calling a dis- ant control center. Five other direction-finding stations were t to watch the frequency; and when a few hours later UA tried it again, they reported the bearings projected on the chart in Figure 1. This fix confirmed the uncertain supposi- tion of the watch-dog that the transmitter was in Wash- ington. Now three mobile units were given the scent, and they juickly narrowed down the location to the German Embassy , as shown in Figure 2. It was a problem to pin-point the transmitter without entering the Embassy because the an- ~ enna was stretched between two buildings, with equal signal trength at each end and apparently lead-in wires to both uildings. This problem was solved in a pre-dawn conference pith the FBI, who arranged, in cooperation with the Potomac lectric Power Co., that we could go down into a manhole in he street and cut the power to each building separately in urn when UA began to call. In the end, however, because he State Department was afraid for our own diplomatic mis- on still in Germany, we did not seize UA but simply set up vo jammers to drown him out if he should try once more. :e never did. This beginning was the end for Axis radio agents within zr borders; any German agents picked up by the FBI there- `ter were found to have been using secret ink or some other !mmunications than radio to get information out of the try. And we learned that some Japanese agents who re- tested their headquarters' permission to set up a transmitter re were turned down on the grounds that the FCC would tb them as soon as they got on the air. Outside our own ates and territories it was a different story, one in which so the RID became intimately concerned. OFFICIAL USE ONLY DFFICIAL USE ONLY F OFFICIAL USE ONLY AxiAplHeSRe le The Portuguese Net One day in September 1941, monitors at the secondary RID post in Miami heard a station using irregular procedures and signing the call UU2, one not in conformity with those used on commercial and other authorized circuits. it was there- fore made a case for investigation. Bearings fixed its loca- tion near Lisbon, Portugal; and as it continued to call almost nightly without receiving a reply, RID units were instructed to be on the lookout for the answering station. After more than a month monitors at the secondary posts in Pittsburg and Albuquerque simultaneously picked up the answer from a station signing CNA; bearings were taken which located this transmitter in South Africa. A few days later another station using the UU2 procedure was intercepted, this time with the call BX7. It was also in Lisbon, and the characteristics of its signal showed that with- out question BX7 was the same station which had previously signed UU2, apparently the control station of a network. After a week an answer with the call letters NPD was picked up by our Rhode Island monitoring post. This station proved to be in Portuguese West Africa. The messages exchanged between the Lisbon control UU2' BX7 and the two out-stations in Africa were of course en- ciphered. RID did not maintain a cryptanalysis laboratory, decipherment being the responsibility of the FBI, of the Army's Signal Intelligence Service, and, on behalf of the Navy, of the Coast Guard; but in order to facilitate the identifica- tion of intercepted traffic we had interested a couple of our staff in cryptanalytic work. These men attained a consider- able skill and in some cases were able to furnish leads for the FBI decipherment. The Lisbon cipher was one of these cases. It was an up-and-down transposition whose key length varied from day to day. The texts of the messages showed this network to be one channel by which German agents in the neutral countries and colonies of Africa reported on the movements of ships, troops, and materiel and on political events. On March 26, 1942, for example, the South Africa station reported ship sail- 42 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Re jjOX/J& 9hJcP78T03194A00010004 1 AL USE ONLY, gs and the concentration of Allied troops which later took agascar. As translated from the Portuguese: TWENTYSIXTH. AMERICANS "NISHNAHA" AND "SOLONTU- SHAW" SAILED WITH ORE FOR NEW ORLEANS, ALSO ENGLISH "CITY OF N. CASTLE"; "ANGOLA" AND ENGLISH "ISIPIEGO" FROM DURBAN ARRIVED WITH PASSENGERS. TROOPS STILL CONCENTRATED; TRYING TO LEARN DETAILS. From Portuguese West Africa an agent with the code-name do sent similar information intermingled freely with iperational reports. On December 4, 1941: ARMANDO REPORTS ENGLISH CONSUL RECEIVED LONG EN- CIPHERED TELEGRAM RELATIVE ENFORCING STRICT VIGI- LANCE AGAINST ESPIONAGE. OFFICIALS CLAIMED ENGLISH STILL COMMAND CAPE VERDE SUBMARINE CABLE. MANY MEN GO TO FREETOWN OWING APPROACH TEN CONVOY SHIPS, LARGE TROOPS, AMMUNITION AND TANKS. HOW- EVER INFORMER DOES NOT KNOW IF THEY REMAIN LAGOS On January 7, 1942: WEST INDIA ARRIVED BATHURST FOURTEEN WITH PILOTS AIRCRAFT MECHANICS DISASSEMBLED TANKS ANTIAIRCRAFT MACHINE GUNS MUNITIONS LARGE QUANTITY GASOLINE CAMPAIGN TENTS. NEXT MONTH WE WILL HAVE REGULAR CONNECTION DAKAR THROUGH INTELLIGENT NATIVE GOLD- SMITH AUTHORIZED TO ENTER COLONIAL SERVICE UNDER GOVERNOR TO HELP MY WORK. ARMANDO On February 5: CHIEF OF POLICE LIEUTENANT UNDERCOVER IMPRUDENTLY WORKS FOR ENGLISH. CONVENIENT TO OBTAIN HIS RE- TURN LISBON. BE CAN DAMAGE US. ARMANDO But the Germans were growing dissatisfied with Armando's ork. The Lisbon station radioed him on February 11: SAID THERE IS TO BE DISEMBARKMENT ENGLISH AMERICAN TROOPS DAKAR NEXT FIFTEEN DAYS. WHY NO REPORTS MOST URGENT. On February 12: DISEMBARKATION TROOPS FREETOWN NOT DAKAR. I OR- DER YOU INVESTIGATE. NOT SATISFIED REPORTS WHICH I CALL FOR. HAVE RECEIVED BETTER REPORTS FROM OTHER PERSONS. OFFICIAL USE ONLY E ONLY Axis Agent Radios OFFICIAL US Approved For R And most indiscreetly,. on 27 March: SECURE EXPEDITIOUSLY RECENT REPORTS DAKAR FREE- TOWN RELIEVE CAROLINA OF. HIS DU TM. PERSONALLY NEW POR- TER BEARER SHOULD DELIVER LETTERS HOTEL DUAS HACOES VICTORIA STREET FOR. MR. OR- GANIZATION TWO MORE MONTHS. USE YOUR BEST REPORTS FOR MY VINDICATION. The organization did not in fact last much longer than two more months, but it was not the Germans who termi- nated it. Revelations like this one enabled Allied intelligence officers to clean out the Portuguese group in the summer of 1942. Nazi Agent Training and Procedures Having thus demonstrated its capability in the European theater, the RID was approached early in 1942 by its British counterpart, the Radio Security Service, with a request for the establishment of regular liaison and exchange of informa- tion. From then on to the end of the war we maintained a most harmonious and fruitful relationship which served to build up a pretty complete picture of the German diplomatic and espionage networks and their activities. The characteris- 1 rators were e d ua ap tics of individual transmitters and mdivi recorded and catalogued so that they could be recognized when they were used on a different circuit. Nearly all the codes and ciphers were broken, and the great bulk of the clan- destine traffic could be promptly read. During the most criti- cal period of the war in Europe the RID was monitoring 222 frequencies used in clandestine intra-European circuits. After the Lisbon net was closed down the Germans had five major networks, with control centers in Berlin, Hamburg, Bordeaux, Madrid, and Paris. The out-stations were located in practically every European country, in Africa and the At- lantic, and in the western hemisphere. The operators of these out-stations were in general not skilled radiomen, we learned from captured spies, but agents who had been trained in radio and codes and ciphers along with other tradecraft-for ample photography and microfilm, secret writing, explosIYes and demolition-at a school near Hamburg. Their radio OFFICIA>.p(Wt9b* R 20~05A0~3115 RCIA-sRDP78T03194A00010004001&IA USE ONLY training embraced the use of International Morse and the construction and operation of transmitters and receivers. Student operators were required to achieve the modest transmitting speed of twelve words a minute (as compared; nr example, with our Merchant Marine requirement of 20-25 ords a minute). Then they would make a five-minute sample transmission on a device which recorded graphically their ed, touch, and characteristic fist. On the basis of this ph they were assigned a permanent transmitting speed and given another week's training at this speed. Then a sec- ppnd graph was made as each operator graduated, this one to filed as a specimen signature against which his later mes- ges would be verified as genuine and not the deception of enemy counterespionage. This procedure was apparently dopted after the Germans learned that the FBI had fooled them with the Sebold station on Long Island. The agents were furnished portable transmitters and re- livers, usually of the type built into a suitcase, complete with antenna wire, tools, and all the accessories necessary for going to immediate operation. They were given precise instruc- .ons for constructing a directional antenna which would af- ord a maximum signal to their control center and amini- in to eavesdroppers. Then they were dispatched to their by neutral ship, by submarine, by parachute, or over The first sign of their safe arrival would be their call let- on the air; and this would signify their presence to us, for it is difficult to disguise an agent radio's call. At one k when the control of one of the German nets passed the Abwehr to the Gestapo, its transmitters adopted . e%, tcall letters and frequencies of commercial stations in ~ I America; but other characteristic procedures of clan- e traffic still betrayed them, and this device was later coned. ;being able to disguise their calls, the agent networks eta practice of changing call letters, usually every day, effort to spoil continuity for their pursuers. But very r,d a rota which remained nonrepetitive for a year, say, We, were able to work out in advance the call letters many espionage transmitters would be using on any AJ.I USECIA- P78TO3194A000100040001-0 ONT OFFICIAL USE ONLY AxisAp~rovecf or Rele particular future day; sometimes we even caught the out- stations making mistakes in their own system. Some worked with a list of 31 different calls which repeated itself every month. Some had two such lists, one for odd and one for even months. One system was worked out with such little forethought that a spy once had to call with the international distress signal, SOS. This was one of the systems that deter- mined call letters in connection with the cipher key for the day, a connection that sometimes led our part-time crypt- analysts into the decipherment of messages. One-group, we learned from one of its indiscreet first mes- sages sent blind, based its calls and transposition cipher on the Albatross edition of Axel Munthe's The Story of San Michele, a book excluded by copyright arrangements from the British Empire and the United States, using a different page each day. The page to be used was determined by adding to a constant number assigned each agent the number of the month and that of the day in question. The last line on this page contained the calls to be used-the first three let- ters, reversed, for the control center and t o he last three, reversed, for the out-station. An example procedure may be of interest. Shortly before midnight, eastern standard time, on March 12, 1942, one of our monitors at Laredo, Texas, copies the fol- lowing slow hand-keyed message on 11,220 kilocycles. VVVV EVI EVI EVI IWEOF WONUG IUVBJ DLVCP NABRS CARTM IELHX YEERX DEXUE VCCXP EXEEM OEUNM CMIRL XRTFO CXQYX EXISV NXMAH GRSML ZPEMS NQXXX ETNIX AAEXV UXURA FOEAB XUEUT AFXEH EHTEN NMFXA XNZOR ECSEI OAINE MRCFX SENSD PELXA HPRE We know from our analysis of previous messages that the call EVI is due to be used by an operator of the San Michele group whose assigned constant number is 56. Checking, we add the month and day-this would be March 13 by Green- wich Mean Time-and turn to page 72 of the novel. The last word on the page is "give," so EVI is right. The first word on the last line is "like"; the control center will sign KIL. The message sent in the early hours of March 13 was prob- ably enciphered on March 12, so we go back to page 71, shown here opposite, for the key. Here the first line reads, "I would is Agent Radios OFFICIAL USE ONLY x510315: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 I would have known how to master his fear, and would have been the stronger of the two as I have been in later years more than once, when I have stayed a hand clutching a revolver in fear of life. When will the anti-vivisectionists realize that when they are asking for total prohibition of experiments on living animals they are asking for what it is impossible to grant) them? Pasteur's vaccination against rabies has reduced the mortality in this terrible disease to a minimum and Behring's anti-diphtheric serum saves the lives of over a hundred thousand children every year. Are not these two facts alone sufficient to make these well-meaning lovers of animals understand that discoverers of new worlds like Pasteur, of new remedies against hitherto incurable diseases like Koch, Ehrlich and Behring must be left to pursue their researches unhampered by restrictions and undisturbed by interference from outsiders. Those to be left a free hand are besides so few that they can be counted on one's fingers. For the rest no doubt most severe restrictions should be insisted upon, perhaps even total prohibition. But I go further. One of the most weighty arguments against several of these ex- periments on living animals is that their practical value is much reduced, owing to the fundamental difference from a pathological and physiological point of view between the bodies of men and the bodies of animals. But why should these experiments be limited to the bodies of animals, why should they not be carried out on the living body of man as well? Why should not the born criminals, the chronic evil-doers, condemned to waste their remaining life in prison, useless and often dangerous to others and to them- selves, why should not these inveterate offenders against our laws be offered a reduction of their penal servitude if they were willing to submit under anesthetics to certain experi- ments on their living bodies for the benefit of mankind? If the judge, before putting on the black cap, had in his power to offer the murderer the alternative between the gallows and penal servitude for so and so many years, I have little doubt there would be no lack of candidates. Why should not Doctor Woronoff, the practical value of his invention be ye known how to master his fear" etc. We take the first e letters and number them in sequence: I W 0 U L D H A V 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 tJALC*-FL8I'T03194A000100040001-0 OFFICIAL USE ONLY AxAp,%@NPq&dfsR Substituting these figures in the first four groups, with nulls for any missing letters, we get IWEO F WONUG IUVB J DLV(:p 1 2 x 3 x 2 3 x 4 x 1 4 9 x x 6 5 9 x, or "12 March, 2304 hours, 149 letters in 659th message fol. lowing." There are actually 154 letters following, but the first group of five is simply a special indicator identifying the agent. This is as far as the RID needed to go for its own purposes before turning the message over to the FBI. But the text could be worked out from the same page of the novel. Lay out a blank message in lines of twenty letters each, keep- ing the columns straight. 149 letters in rows of 20 make nine columns of eight letters each followed by eleven columns of seven each. Write across the top the first twenty initial let- ters of the lines on page 71, skipping indented lines. Number these in alphabetical sequence, and then go down the columns in the indicated order with the encrypted text. This arrange- ment gives the clear German text: 8 4 9 14 1 2 16 10 3 S P R U C H x S E V E S T A x A N x N x M A R Y x Q U x E L F T E N x E MEZxMEZxV AM P E I R 0 x C H O E H E x R E C GEMELDET.x 17 15 19 11 5 20 6 7 12 C H S N U L L X V S T E I N x x Q U E E N x M A R Y x I N S A C H T x U O N DAMP F E R A M P E IRO x A I F E x R E C I F P t 13 18 0 N E E A M H R X C U F E X In English: TEXT SIXTY FROM VESTA TO STEIN. QUEEN MARY Rs- PORTED OFF RECIFE BY STEAMSHIP CAMPEIRO ON ELEV- ENTH AT EIGHTEEN O'CLOCK MIDDLE EUROPEAN TIME- The Latin American Infestation The Queen Mary message, from an agent in Rio de Janeiro, came at a moment of climax in RID's most active and critical theater of counterespionage operations, Latin America, There were in March of 1942 six agent transmitters in l OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For, 6AF,WAJFDP78T03194A0001000'tSPAKL USE ONLY iand three of them reported the Queen Mary's arrival eb,twelfth. The espionage messages were full of news er until after she sailed on March 20, but these were t messages most of the agents sent. By the time she ain in mid-Atlantic on a safely altered course, the Bra- authorities had arrested some 200 of the German spie& ry behind this roundup is first of all an RID story. of the Nazi effort to create an espionage base in America began to be apparent as early as the fall of On October 27 our primary station at Allegan Michi- , picked up a strange maritime signal using the unregis-. ' Ca ll BCNL Othiti .er monorng posts were alerted, and --r- Of Mexico and Caribbean Sea. The FCC's Tampa office firm called Gough Bros. and controlled by a coastal sta- 9e Command, after developing evidence that thi fl t s ee being used to refuel German submarines and pass infor- ring and was able to arrange a trap for nineteen others litlg the ringleader prominent British shi i pp ng execu - George Gough, in Belize. while in Mexico a German Spy was sending out intelli_ in private code over Cnapultepec Radio, the anslnitter used for clandestine communication with Ing the first world war .3 After Pearl Harbor, when f o code on commercial facilities was prohibited in this man, a properly registered amateur resort d t e o , 4 clandestine radio but made the mi t k f , s a e o cornrrlullf - Brst with the FBI's deception station on Long Island. man driv abli h ~o wv s radio agent nets . hemisphere however and t our s ,, ruggle against them in the spring of 1941. One of our monitors at Millis, '.USett s detected th fi ,eant signals of a station that e. circuit operating on the same frequency. It was E .,, - , out the signal sounded quite t fitof AOR, the FBI-operated Sebold transmitter's re- Q. Yardley's The American Black Chamber. .USE ONLY 15: CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 j " OFFICIAL USE ONLY spondent. Other monitoring stations, asked to help identify the suspicious and noise-shrouded signal, discovered that when REW paused to listen a station on a different frequency would start sending the can letters PYL. The two transmit- ters put on the same performance at the same hour the next day, and for several days; they were apparently trying with- out success to communicate with each other. One of our monitors became so engrossed that he wanted to go on the air and help them out. Our fixes showed that REW was in- deed in, Hamburg, and PYL in Valparaiso, Chile, an espionage station discovered before it could make contact with its base. For the present, however, there was nothing that could be done about agent radios outside U.S. jurisdiction except to listen in, and more and more of them began to appear, setting up in a half dozen of the Latin American republics. Chile and Brazil held the principal concentrations at this time. There were three main agent networks in Brazil, centered on transmitters that we designated LIR, CEL, and CIT, from the call signs they were using when first heard; the EVI of our decipherment example was LIR. Evidence of the damage they could do began to mount. The German control stations, for example, sent exhaustive lists of requirements for naval information, asked PYL in Chile if it could "place a suitable man for us among students going to the United States for air training," complimented agents as "exceptionally correct" in their reports on tech- nical details of English and American 'cruisers' equipment, and assigned agents to investigate "USA parade and air bases Colombia and Venezuela" and "air units Trinidad and Lesser Antilles and flights via those places to West Africa; airplane types, movement, dates." The agent radios sent back reports like these: 5 JULY. NINE BOEINGS FLEW WITH MIXED CREW ENGLISH AND AMERICANS. IN NEXT FEW WEEKS 20 MORE TO HE FLOWN ACROSS. DETAILS FOLLOW. 19 JULY. LM REPORTS 15 LOCHIINED HUDSONS FLEW ACROSS. ENGLISH REGISTRY AND CANADIAN-AUSTRAIdAN CREW. BOEING CLIPPER LEFT NATAL ON SEVENTH AIJEG- EDLY FOR BOLANO WITH 19 LOCKHEED MECHANICS AND 11 CREW. Axis Agent Radios USE ONLY 7 AUGUST. USA STEAMER URUGUAY ON LAST VOYAGE ' TO UNITED STATES LEFT RIO 25 JUNE. WAS CONVOYED BY BRITISH AUXILIARY CRUISER CARNARVON CASTLE TO TRIN- IDAD. TRIP TAKES 7 DAYS. CRUISER TRAVELED SOME- TIMES AHEAD SOMETIMES ASTERN OF SS URUGUAY. 8 OCTOBER. BMM REPORTS SEVERAL HUNDRED US AIR- CRAFT OF VARIOUS TYPES AND 8000 SPECIAL TROOPS AL- LEGEDLY LANDING CORPS BEING ASSEMBLED PORT OF SPAIN. In November PYL identified a network courier as "daughter Clarke, secretary in USA embassy Quito since 1 November." d ten days after Pearl Harbor an agent offered details on the torpedo safety nets with which ships were being equipped htwo or three large armed English ships ... without any sus- -/ ----- sinking, nothing in advance." The control station in Germany ' interesting." Reports on plane production also now began 1 JANUARY. CURTISS COLUMBUS FACTORY WILL BEGIN MASS PRODUCTION SERIES SB2C SINGLE SEATER STUKA FOR NAVY. ARMAMENT ONE CANNON FIVE MACHINE GUNS, MO- TOR 1700 HP WRIGHT. BUILT FOR 2000 HP WRIGHT IN EX- PERIMENTAL STAGE. PRODUCTION S03C BEGUN IN COLUM- BUS FACTORY AT BEGINNING DECEMBER. EMPLOYEES ALL CURTISS AIRCRAFT FACTORIES DECEMBER TOTAL 27000. PROPELLER PRODUCTION NOVEMBER 1042. Our Government finally took action. On January 15, 1942, e Rio conference of foreign ministers of the American re- ublics recommended immediate measures to eliminate the andestine stations. An Emergency Advisory Committee for olitical Defense was established with headquarters in Uru- y, and under its auspices we dispatched some of the best monitoring officers to the six countries where we knew ent radios to be operating (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Cuba, inique, Paraguay). They had a two-fold mission-to 1o- to the hide-outs of known agent transmitters with mobile ection-finding equipment they took along, and to help the gvernments of these countries establish monitoring net- .rks which could keep them free of radio spies in the future. 91 bSECL5 9P78T03194A000100040001-0 57 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios Approved For Relea For this second purpose we sent men also to six other coun- tries (Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay). Forty men from eighteen Latin American republics were at the same time brought here for training at our school in Laurel, Maryland. The man we sent to Brazil was Robert D. Linx. He helped lay the groundwork for that arrest of 200-odd spies after the Queen Mary left her dock in March. This roundup appar- ently cleaned out the LIR and CIT organizations, the latter led by a man named Christiansen; they were never heard again. Some members of the CEL net escaped to the in- terior, but two series of arrests after they ventured twice at intervals to reactivate their transmitter put an end to them too. By mid-year Brazil was permanently cured of its agent radio infestation. Linx stayed on to direct the establish- ment of the monitoring service, and became known as "the father of Brazilian monitoring." Although our men in Latin America worked quietly by them- selves as much as possible, the German agents were not al- ways unaware of what was going on. We heard one of them telling his control that he knew at least six Yankee direction finders were beamed on him and he was going to cool off in the woods for a while. (He cooled off in a Central American jail.) In Chile, the PYL organization took the precaution of establishing a stand-by transmitter to assure continuity of communication if one should be seized. On March 9 PYL sent a message informing Hamburg that "Pedro," whom they had employed to operate the new transmitter, would be ready to get on the air the following day. On March 10, although RID had not yet received the decrypted text of this message, our monitors picked up Pedro's test transmission with the call GES and fixed his location in Antofagasta. The arrival of our man, John de Bardeleben, in Valparaiso on March 19 was the signal for the main PYL transmitter to go mobile. De Bardeleben spent weeks tracking its chang- ing locations in the area within a ten-mile radius of Valpa- raiso. It developed that every second week, however, a trans- mission would be made from the house at Avenida Alemana 5508, Cerro Alegre. This house belonged to one Guillermo Zeller, a radio technician and licensed amateur who was often 52 OFAE 8vU6EH6*lea is Agent Radios OFFICIAL USE ONLY 103115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 een in the company of Hans Blume, manager of the Valpa- aiso branch of the German company Transradio. In April 941, shortly before PYL was first heard trying to contact , Blume had bought from the radio supply store Casa idow a complete set of transmitter parts and two Halli- r receivers. A tan was now placed on the Zeller tele- ,I ..... .r hone. ,The Chilean authorities were persuaded to raid the Zeller Buse on June 25. Their perfunctory search discovered no itter, but Zeller was indiscreet enough to telephone terwards to one of his agent colleagues and report his nar- ow escape: "Lucky they didn't search very good, especially the basement." With some trouble and delay another earth warrant was obtained, again to no avail; the officers id It bother to open a box they noticed in the basement urporting to contain a sewing machine. PYL went off the air after this, and nothing could be done until after many eeks De Bardeleben found the transmitter in its sewing-ma- e box stored in a grocery on Cerro Alegre. Finally, on October 23, most of the agents of the PYL organization were sted; but the -man who actually operated the main trans- itter and operator Pedro at Antofagasta had disappeared. Neutralist Argentina, which did not participate in the ergency Advisory Committee, posed a delicate diplomatic roblem with respect to the elimination of clandestine enemy ismitters, and one of critical importance as the clean-up Brazil and Chile made the Argentine the main base for ionage activity in this hemisphere. Not only agent radios Lut the powerful Argentine commercial transmitters were g quantities of compromising information to Italy, Ja- an, and Germany, and we could only copy their transmis- ons, hundreds of messages daily. Many of these were at eels too high for manual copy; we recorded them on tape d trained selected typists to put them into page form. A ng memorandum from the U.S. Government on January 1943, enabled us to send two men to Argentina to try to b' what we had done in Brazil and Chile, but our earlier sue- es were not repeated here. The agent operations had be- me much more sophisticated. While our men were taking rings on a signal the transmission would be cut on at )L4-031 94A000100040001-0 p OFFICIAL USE ONLY AxApfgoj*dccRelea that location and picked up by another transmitter several miles away. And the cooperation of Argentine officials under the Castillo and Ramirez-Peron regimes was less than eager. They finally became so resentful of U.S. Government pres- sures that we had to withdraw our men. One spy who escaped in Chile, however, did not get as far as Argentina. Almost a year after the incomplete catch of the PYL ring in Chile, monitors at three different RID posts heard a new station with the call PQZ, and all three were sure they recognized the fist of operator Pedro of the GES sta- tion at Antofagasta. Bearings placed the transmitter at Santiago, Chile. De Bardeleben's successor in Chile, William Fellows, was notified, and he picked up the signal the next time it came on the air. Working alone, he had to move around and take bear- ings from different locations in order to get a fix; but after two more PQZ transmissions he had the house located. To my considerable personal satisfaction the operator Pedro, a graduate of the Hamburg spy school, who had the effron- tery to use my own initials as his clandestine call, was arrested and his equipment seized. With this postlude there ended, except for the Argentine hold-out, the story of radio spies in the Americas. 54 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For 3115: CIA-RDPZP~k D100140001-0 es and book reviews on the following pages are un-' and may for convenience be detached from the clan: y of the Studies if their origin therein is protected. . ,ors of articles are identified in the table of contents itors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr . Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intern- ouection, in scanning current public literature for in- e{materials, and of the many intelligence nmcers,.,, o book reviews for this issue of the Studies. Most ` yin this respect are the following: The Panther's Feast ........... "Ir Live intelligence ............... `SHM... ther's Executive overseas ......... eapan on the Wall ..... ........: . the Hungarian AVH ............. 'Grivas and the EOKA .............. Roger G. Seely SECRETI 45: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 , roved For R ^3115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 RE d~l0ORN', .A,-p For Relea 03115: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000100040001-0 etligence, deception, and un- jiodox stay-behind opera- in a combined and cut but -war combat exercise. OPERATION PORTREX Edwin L. Sibert truth in the gibe that a war's first d to be some ere use th the weapons and techniques (includ- intelligence tec qu 'previous war. Now, however, the practice of conducting ;,, +;mP of peace, incor- Les are fought - 11-1 es} of the final engagements of the ting new developments not only in weapuffo arrr. -w~ aramilitary de- nd l p a also in intelligence, psychologica ,- - . __iii -- f the nPVt. War o 51 ith the methods of the last maneuvers t w t be fough at leas- e such war game in which i participated during mili War TT and the Korean War e an auuwv a particularly stimulating illustration of how r , l limitations on realism practica ise can be made, of some ventional of the extent to which deception and uncon rations can be worked in. Y ?c sn' t wa erasion ror rex ut all elements of the armed forces-ArmY ^ Navy, Air - - nd k ---- - par v, ., 11'larines_ oO and guerrillas. It was staged in the ts undercover agen , quarter of 1950 on the island of Vieques, atwenty-mile It e- to Rico m of land some ten miles east of Puer . ar a- a period of more than two months devoted to prep or a three-day assault action. f the exercise was the recapture of a hypo- , op"' problem o Usi ~cal major Caribbean island which the enemy had occu- ?. a nnri am- to - V.U. force .were - us assault on its southern beaches, represented by those ues, and clean out the ten-square-mile maneuver area - isl i n Ursa. .... ?..-- ___ af.U t the enemy defenders, who had available in the beach rovi- kM-y a regimental combat team reinforced by a p Operation Portrex Operation Portrex Approved For Rel 05103115 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100040001-0 `$TI - bnal armored reconnaissance unit, an engineer company, and fixed battalion of anti-aircraft artillery, with light avia- and the support of a weak fighter wing. The invading force consisted of the 3d Infantry Division reinforced by attalion of the 82nd Airborne Division and a marine Corps nnaissanee company. It had the support of a strong ttalion, adequate sea lift for the ground forces, and naval MANEUVER AREA I~tT? RED EACH FttTa Y Ylal yyr. BLUE BEACH ' PORT MOSQUITO ISABELA SEGUNDA DETAIL FROM Isla de VIEQUES PUERTO RICO 0 2 Miles commanded the land forces of the enemy defense, Puerto an regulars. In mid-December 1949 I was permitted to them to Vieques. First we had to construct a tent camp ~