STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 12 No. 3, Summer 1968]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 114
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1968
• Content Type: IS

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STUDIES
~?
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 12 NO. 3 SUMMER 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
A~tCHNAL 2tECORT3
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGF1~oCf~did~le~b8 05/02/17 :CIA-R
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They- do not necessarily represent the ofFcial
mews of the Central Intelligence Agenry or any other
component of the intelligence community.
'This material contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title
18, USC, Sects. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
to an unauthorized person ie prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENI~E
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, oper-
ational, or historical aspect o f intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Editorial
Board.
The criterion for publication is whether or
not, in the opinion o f the Board, the article
makes a contribution to the literature o f ire
telligenee.
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
EDITORIAL BOARD
ABBOT E. SMITH, Chairman
DONALD F. CIIAMBERLAIN LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
E. DREXEL GODF'REY, iR. WILLIAM N, MORELL
JOHN H. RICHARDSON
Additional members o f the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
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CONTRIBUTIONS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the etditors may
come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon in-
vitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted
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and need not be coordinated or submitted through chan-
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DISTRIBUTION
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office
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SECURITY PRECAUTIONS
Materials in the Studies are in general to be reserved to U.S. per-
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All copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered serially
and subject to recall.
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"Foretesting" ABM Systems: Some Hazards .... Sayre Stevens,
Best stick to narrowing tlae range o f the possible. SECRE'T'
Page
1
Estimates and Influence ..................... Shexman Kent: 11
Credibility the overriding aim. CONFIDENTIAL
Reentxy Vehicle Analysis ................ Jerold H. Klaimon. 23
Slim clues to the characteristics o f Soviet ICBM warheads,
SECRET
In Search of Migratory Isotopes ............... Ned C. Horel. 35
An appeal to biota in the hunt for Chinese nuclear plants,
SECRET
Alexander Rado ............................ Louis Thomas, 41
A Soviet wartime spy still collecting intelligence. SECRET
Communication to the Editors ............................. 63
Historian's query about psychological testing. SECRET
Paris Okhrana; Final Phase ............ Rita T. Kronenbitter 65
The Tsar's countersubversion field agency from 1909 to
I9I7. CONFIDENTIAL
With Vandenberg as DCI: Part I .......... Arthur B. Darling; 79
Funds and some functions centralized in CIG. CON-
FIDENTIAL
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature. OFFICIAL USE
Cryptology .......................................... 99
Miscellaneous ........................................ 106
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SECRET
an annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribu-
' Ana to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the
t-t=;dies. The prize may be divided if the two or more be:>t articles
c+,cnitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if
::~~ article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.
1?xcept as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles
an any subject within the range of the Studies' purview, as defined in
its masthead, will be considered for the award. They will lie judged
pritnariiy on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on
literary qualities. Members of the Studies editorial board and staff
are of course excluded from the competition.
Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each
volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The
editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but re-
sen~es to itself exclusive competence in the decision.
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No Foreign~Dissem
Technical intelligence must be content
with delimiting the possibilities off or-
eign weapon development.
"FORETESTING" ABM SYSTEMS: SOME >EiAZA:RDS
Sayre Stevens
I am moved to respond with what I hope is a "reasoned" rejoinder
to Mr. Tauss' piece in your Winter issue describing his work in pos-
tulating aSoviet ABM system.' What he had done, essentially, was:
to devise a hypothetical antimissile system for exoatmosph~eric in-
tercept that would be consistent with the appearance of the Hen
House radar at Sary Shagan and the VHF signals that had been
associated with it; to have this system tested mathematically to
show that its performance would be adequate; to assume There-
fore that the Soviets were actually in an advanced stage of de-
veloping such a weapon system, though they might not "construct
it to operate in quite this manner"; and to urge that U.S. counter-
measures in general be initiated on the basis of such early hypothe-
sizing and without community coordination.
In order that my response be constructive and fair, I find it
necessary to provide a brief look at my conception of how the
game of technical intelligence analysis ought to be played when
its objective is the definition of advanced foreign weapon systems.
This will lay bare my peculiar biases.
When reading in alumni magazines about the exalted accomplish-
ments of my fraternity brothers, I am tempted to use the defensive
ploy of envisioning myself as today's version of Sherlock lE-Iolmes'
brother, Mycroft. Lacking both energy and ambition. but having the
tidiest brain with the greatest capacity for storing facts of any man
living, Mycroft Holmes became the most indispensable man in Eng-
land, apoint of omniscience dealing out true answers concerning
all government problems. He thus represents what an intelligence
analyst could wish to be: wise beyond compare, a storehouse of vital
information nowhere else available,. and able to pluck out from it any
truth upon demand.
MORI/HRP
from pg.
01-09
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however appealing such a role may be to contemplate, it will of
course simply not wash. There are several reasons. One is that the
real business of technical intelligence analysis as it relates to advanced
weapon systems cannot be that of dealing out true ansv~~ers on the
basis of an omniscience gained through years of experience. This is
an important point to make because Mr. Tauss tended i:a attribute
value to the work he described on the basis of its having provided
an in some degree true answer. This attitude is embarra~~sing to the
technical analyst: however moot other aspects of the ~irticle may
lie, there can be little contention about the fact that its definition
of the ABM system in question was wrong. One of thE~ objectives
of this essay is to show that this awesome considerati~~n actually
need not be disabling at all.
No longer in this business can one make a bold enlighi:ened grasp
for the precise and only answer. In the analysis of foreign weapon
systems, protected by all the mechanisms of security the modern
state can erect, the problem has become one of cautiously (and above
all, elegantly) defining the bounds of what is technically possible.
By seizing on every bit of usable information made available, by
utilizing techniques of systems analysis, Mycroft's replacement must
with vigor and credibility bound. an ever-narrowing range of possible
capabilities for the weapon system under scrutiny.
In many regards this procedure is unsatisfactory; it is detested
icy some, scorned by others, and really understood by very few.
I personally am excited by its challenge and feel that it is an
absolutely necessary approach in coping with modern intelligence
problems. Its objectives and accomplishments have limits, however,
which it is critically important that we recognize and understand.
A number of factors have made it necessary to resort to this
bounds-defining type of analysis. Principal among these causes is the
extremely conservative policy-in the sense of "covering all bets"-
followed in our own military planning. This planning--as to our
targets of attack, projected forces, deployment of ne~,v weapons
systems, and development of even more advanced one:>-must, of
course, be responsive to the enemy threat; and one of the purposes of
intelligence is to define that threat. But in order to provide every
assurance for the national security, it is natural to insulate the
military planning decisions against errors in the definition of the
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9
threat. Protection is sought by giving credence, for planning purposes,
to the maximum possible offensive or defensive capability a foreign
weapon system could have. This cautious policy effectively dimin-
ishes the contribution to planning made by intelligence on foreign
weapon systems. It has also led to some of the greatest imlbroglios
imaginable when two sets of enterprising system designers undertake
to conjure up the maximum threat from a state of ignorance about
what is actually happening.
A second operative factor is, indeed, this lack of information about
advanced weapons being developed or newly deployed in those areas
of greatest concern to us. No direct access to the real ansvvers we
seek exists. Most of the reliable information available is either
technical in nature or significant only in terms of technical analysis.
The simplest and most critical answers-e.g., what specific targets
a foreign weapon system is designed against, in what circumstances
it will be used, what its measured effectiveness is-are consequently
far removed from the information immediately available a.nd can
be reached only at the end of a long deductive chain whiich will
almost certainly lack several links of significance for the answer.
Most importantly, even if one has managed to finger the truth,
there is no good way to know for sure that one has done sa. And the
truth has no unique value unless it is recognized as such by those who
must act on it.
Thee piecemeal analytical trench-warfare we must substitui:e for a
lightning thrust at such answers is also generated by the very nature
of the information available: intercepted radar signals, snatches of
telemetry, uncertain photography, or perhaps a representative electron
tube acquired for analysis. Several fine articles have been published
in the Studies on the ingenious uses of these types of information.
I can rather imagine, however, that people engaged in more direct
efforts to get answers to the central questions might be scornful of
such scratching around on the edges. From this point of view it is
a miserable way to do the job-expensive, slow, esoteric, and an-
alytically hazardous; it is, however, the only approach that appears to
be passible in the absence of direct access to needed information.
In some cases the answers provided by technical analysis are, in
fact, precisely the ones sought. Such a situation arises when the
questions are asked on behalf of the development of countermeasures
aimed at degrading the performance of an enemy system by ~,vorking
on its very detailed technological susceptibilities. Countermeasures
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SECRET "F~retesfing"
development constitutes a unique type of problem, however, and is
not really a part of what is being discussed here. It has had an impact
on the full range of technical intelligence analysis, sharpening both
collection and analvtical techniques and giving an inherent value
to derived technological facts they might not otherwise have; but
it must come somewhat later in the game than the initial grappling
with the characteristics of a new enemy system, since it presupposes an
understanding of the operational concepts the system embodies and a
knowledge of all the elements it embraces.
Side Effects
The use of technical intelligence analysis to set limits rather than
give precise answers has had some important effects which should
he noted:
As pointed out above, the demand for early description of a
rcr~wly developed weapon system has been replaced by a willing-
rce~ss to accept and use a methodical, credible delimitation of
the possible capabilities of the system.
Judgments as to the intended use of the system are. apt to be
,Wade on the basis of these capabilities so delimited. When
the range of possible capabilities extends over several missions,
there is sure to be hell to pay: different people are more
concerned about (and consequently will want to emphasize )
different threats.
Credibility is vital. This is particularly true when the results
.zrc contentious, as they generally seem to be. In order to
delimit meaningfully the capabilities of a system, it is necessary
virtually to prove by the laws of physics (or other appropriate
discipline) that something must be or cannot be the case.
1t is an unfortunate fact that some of these laws, particularly
those relating to weapon effects, are themselves ~~ontentious.
An>clytical elegance and rigor are the natural response to the
complexities of the problem and the need for a demonstrable
cx~nsonance with respectable science and technology. Technical
r?ompetence must be continually demonstrated; any slip will
r