STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 184
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 1, 1969
• Content Type: IS

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STUDIES
n
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 13 NO. 2 SPRING 1969
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
WENCY ARCHIVES, BLIDG.I ECRET N? 15 5 5
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Materials in the Studies are in general to be reserved to US per-
sonnel holding appropriate clearances. The existence of this journal is
to be treated as information privy to the US official community. All
copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered serially and
subject to recall.
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title
18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, oper-
ational, or historical aspect of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Editorial
Board.
The criterion for publication is whether or
not, in the opinion of the Board, the article
makes a contribution to the literature of in-
telligence.
EDITORIAL BOARD
ABBOT E. SMITH, Chairman
Additional members of the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
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CONTRIBUTIONS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may
come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon in-
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on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text
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DISTRIBUTION
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office
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For back issues and on other questions call the Office of the
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CONTENTS
CLASSIFIED ITEMS
Page
Allen Welsh Dulles ......................... Sherman Kent 1
CIA Meets the Press .................... Rush V. Greenslade 3
Soviet economic slowdown and CIA make headlines.
CONFIDENTIAL
On the Trail of Hen House and Hen Roost .. Donald C. Brown 11
Electronic detective work on the Soviet ABM system.
SECRET
The Tale of Hushai the Archite ............ C. N. Geschwind 21
The influence agent in Biblical times. SECRET
Coordination and Cooperation in Counterintelligence
Austin B. Matschulat 25
Basic principles and some challenges to CI. SECRET
A Watchman for All Seasons ............... Euan G. Davis 37
Intelligence evaluation for warning. SECRET
On Aging Leaders ..................... Dr. Jerrold M. Post 45
The impact of aging on the conduct of leadership. SECRET
Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Radars
Nicholas R. Garofalo 53
A multifarious technical collection system ready to come of
age. SECRET
Beyond Webster and All That: Dictionaries of Unconventional
Language ............................ Arthur J. Salemme 63
Insights into a need intelligence probably doesn't know it
has. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Quest for Mao Tse-tung ............ James R. Williamson 71
Photographic analysis performs another service to intelli-
gence. SECRET
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dR~/~~p
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Recruitment in Moscow .................. Donald H. Prunko
The remarkable record of a case of blackmail. SECRET
Page
87
Computers in Economic Intelligence .. Michael C. McCracken 107
Prospects for push-button manipulation of the unwieldy
intricacies of economic data. CONFIDENTIAL
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature .................... 113
UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLE
The Ciano Papers: Hose Garden .... Howard McGaw Smyth
How US intelligence acquired some remarkable documents.
SECRET MORI/HRP THIS
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THE SHERMAN KENT AWARD
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribu-
tion to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the
Studies. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles
submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if
no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional $500 is
available for secondary prizes.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles
on any subject within the range of the Studies' purview, as defined in
its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged
primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on
literary qualities. Members of the Studies editorial board and staff
are of course excluded from the competition.
Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each
volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The
editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards but re-
serves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Allen Welsh Dulles
1893-1969
There is scarcely a reader of these paragraphs who will be satisfied.
Beyond the normal desire to alter and amend will be a special. urge
to expand. Everyone will regret not finding notice of a particular
something which to him revealed the integrity and warmth, or the
wit, or the talent, or the courage, or the staying power, or the canni-
ness, or the wide diversity of interest of this remarkable man. 'There
has never been a chief who had a closer rapport with more of his
people than Allen Dulles; each of us treasures his special encounters
and favorite stories.
One thinks back to those moments of unwelcome news and the
"Great Scot!" sentence that indicated an instant awareness of its por-
tent and presaged the call to speedy action; or those other times-
moments to be dreaded-that opened with an ominous "See here."
One remembers with an inner smile his end of the unavoidably-over-
heard telephone talks, when he fell into transparent double talk,
which one could not help but translate almost as fast as he spun it
out. One can never forget the times of gaiety often hilarity, nor the
flashes of anger which usually cooled as fast as they exploded.
One thinks back to those late afternoon sessions-seven o'clock-
when our Director had already worked a twelve hour day at full
throttle. The task would be the clearing of a difficult paper on a com-
plicated substantive issue. There would be a pause as he shifted his
mind from what to do about Antarctica or a clandestine operation of
which he was self-appointed senior case officer. "Allll right," he would
say, "now let's look at your paper." Spectacles pushed up the fore-
head to the front hair, he would read, puzzle silently, reread., and
then challenge. Unsatisfied he would draft something and ask "How
about this?" And the "this" would reveal a man, thoughtful, knowl-
edgeable, and sharp at the end of a day that would have numbed
people twenty years his junior.
"What's the matter with getting exhausted," he once replied to a
lieutenant who had observed uncomplainingly that he found a certain
assigned task more onerous than all his other duties. The trouble with
this story is that Allen Dulles gave the impression of not knowing
what exhaustion was. Yet of all the men of our experience in corn-
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mand positions none more consistently courted it. How did he stay
fresh for all those years of neverending days and at the same time
he the finest hand in the demanding and nerve-wracking craft of
intelligence?
What Allen Dulles did for the people under him, he did for the
Agency as an institution. By example he suffused both with a con-
sciousness of professionalism and a reverence for it. He did more.
Ile made his Agency the most competent in the world. The amount
of attention accorded it by adversary services is the flattering ac-
knowledgment, however unpleasant, of his talents as organizer and
executive. He was the living and highly visible exemplar of the in-
spired master and the expert journeyman in his tireless efforts to
defend the faith and serve his country.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Soviet economic slowdown
and CIA make headlines.
CIA MEETS THE PRESS
Rush V. Greenslade
Long before the growth race between the US and the USSR be-
came news, a Soviet propaganda theme, and a presidential campaign
issue, CIA had organized a large-scale research effort on the econ-
omy of the USSR. This effort was started about 1950 in the Office
of Research and Reports, the predecessor of the Office of Economic
Research. The research developed in the CIA as a result of the
unavailability of reliable information from open sources. Prior to the
death of Stalin, officially released Soviet economic statistics were
fragmentary, ambiguous, and unusable for analysis or policy support.
Academic research on Soviet economic growth was under way but,
hampered by the lack of open data, it was many years from fruition.
CIA studied production in various sectors in great detail and con-
structed independent measures for agricultural production, indus-
trial production, and gross national product (GNP). The effort was
a great deal larger than private groups could undertake and it bene-
fitted by access to classified information unobtainable outside. The
results were much timelier than academic efforts even after the USSR
began releasing voluminous. statistics in 1956. Soviet aggregative sta-
tistics, even though more prompt and more numerous than before,
still suffered from biases and a non-comparability with statistics of
Western countries.
Economic intelligence research acquired new importance in the
mid-1950's when Khrushchev challenged the US to a growth race.
This peaceful competition was to take the place of the cold war
and would establish the superiority of one of the two economic sys-
tems-capitalism or socialism. During the late 1950's and early 1960's,
Khrushchev inaugurated a succession of campaigns for catching up
with US economic performance. The Soviets were "catching up
with the US" in meat and milk production, in steel production, and
in industrial production. These several campaigns were accompanied
by a barrage of statistics purporting to show progress in various fields,
faster growth on the part of USSR than the US, and a closing of the
gap between the USSR and the US.
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CONFIDENTIAL The Press
Through 1960 Soviet economic growth was impressive while that
of the US was a little sluggish. Aided by the grain production from
the "new lands," Soviet statistical performance compared favorably
with that of the US, and the achievements of Soviet science in space
made the statistics appear even more impressive and plausible. CIA
estimates showed the growth rate of Soviet GNP to be about twice
that of the US. For industrial growth the ratio was even more unfa-
vorable to the US: in 1956-1960, 81/2 percent in the USSR against
21/2 percent in the US. The most thorough and respected academic es-
timate, that of Professor Abram Bergson of Harvard, was very close
to CIA estimates for the 1950's. Bergson calculated the average
annual rate of growth of GNP from 1950 to 1958 was 6.8 percent.
CIA's estimate was 6.5 percent.
Soviet Slowdown in the 1960's
By the end of 1962 the rapid growth of the USSR relative to that
of the US was widely known. CIA estimates had been publicized by
the Director of Central Intelligence (Allen W. Dulles) in open
testimony before the joint Economic Committee of Congress in No-
vember 1959. This testimony was reported in the press and was
printed in its entirety in a Congressional document. Mr. Dulles made
another public speech in December 1959 before the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers repeating the same message. This also was
widely reported in the press. However, for the following two years,
1961 and 1962, CIA estimates indicated a slowdown in growth. These
, stimates had not yet been made public. Suddenly, in August of 1963,
the Soviet government began negotiating with Canada for a massive
purchase of wheat. It soon became known that the USSR had suf-
fered a severe drought and crop failure and did not have sufficient
grain reserves to feed its population. The USSR contracted with
Canada and the US for the surprising total of 11 million tons of wheat
for delivery in 1963 and 1964 to be paid for by sales of gold.
At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence (John A.
McCone), ORR prepared an assessment of the Soviet economy. This
was incorporated into a briefing given by the DCI to President John-
son and the National Security Council in December 1963. The high-
lights of the economic portion of the briefing were:
9. Growth of Soviet GNP in 1963 would be about 1% percent.
2. Growth in 1962 had already slowed, so the average of the two years
was only 2% percent, drastically lower than the previous rates of 5 and 6
percent.
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3. Agriculture accounted for a large part of the slowdown in both 1962
and 1963 but not all of it. Industrial growth had also slowed noticeably
since 1958.
4. In trying to raise meat production, Khrushchev had prodigally used up
his surplus grain production of the preceding years, 1958-1961, and had much
smaller grain reserves than CIA had previously estimated.
5. The slowdown in industry was in large part the result of competition
of defense for scarce investment and R&D resources.
6. Gold production and stocks were significantly lower than current public
estimates.
7. The Soviet campaign to obtain long term credits from Western Europe
for the purchase of advanced Western equipment was a natural consequence
of its dwindling gold stocks.
The President was very interested in this assessment of the Soviet
economy and suggested that it be made available to the public. How
this was to be done was apparently left up to the Director.
The Press Conference
The objectives in releasing the story were fairly straightforward.
After years of hearing that the USSR was rapidly and inexorably
catching up with the US, the American public would surely be glad
to hear that this was no longer true, at least temporarily. Secondly,
the reported developments supported the US policy of discouraging
the extension of long-term credits to the USSR. Thirdly, the report
could be declassified without affecting its substance. In addition to
releasing the story, however, the Agency decided to permit reference
to itself as the source. This was uncommon but not unprecedented.
In The New York Times of 23 June 1960, page 36, an article by Harry
Schwartz had reported on some estimates prepared by CIA, for a
Congressional committee. The headline had read: "CIA Forecasts
Soviet Output Will Grow 80 percent in Next Decade." The object
of allowing attribution to the Agency in 1964 was simply to get the
story on page one, if possible, rather than on page forty-one.
In short, the Agency had a good story to tell and wanted. to be
sure it was heard.
The main points in the Director's briefing appeared on 29 Decem-
ber 1963 in an article by Charles Bartlett on an inside page in the
Washington Star. This. article featured the limited Soviet gold stock
and production, and the need for import credits. This was the first
time the CIA gold estimates had been made public. In the body of
the article the CIA was named as the source of the information in
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the article. On 5 January 1964 a similar article appeared in The New
York Herald Tribune by Tom Lambert, datelined Washington. He
attributed his information to "intelligence analysts here."
These two articles caused no particular stir. However, on 8 Janu-
ary 1964 an article by Edwin L. Dale, Jr. appeared on the front
page of The New York Times under the headline, "Sharp Slowdown
in Soviet Growth Reported by CIA." The article reported the CIA
analysis at length and also discussed CIA's responsibility for re-
search on the Soviet economy. Dale had received no special favor or
dispensation and his article said nothing essential that was not in the
previous articles. But somehow it caused a furore. Front page, The
New York Times, with attribution! The Washington press corps raised
an immediate clamor for equal briefing.
In response to this demand the Agency scheduled its first press
conference for the following day, at CIA headquarters. Twenty re-
porters attended. The conference was conducted by the Deputy Di-
rector for Intelligence, Ray Cline. A press release, entitled "Soviet
Economic Problems Multiply," was passed out. But by this time So-
viet economic problems were no longer news. The first question
asked by a reporter was, "Why? Why this public apparition, this
naked materialization of CIA?"
The DDI replied: "Well, we thought we had a good story, so ...:'
Twenty eager faces radiated frank and open disbelief.
The press conference made headlines all around the world. How-
ever, the message of Soviet economic slowdown was subordinated
to speculation about CIA's motives in seeking the publicity. The most
frequently cited motives were (1) a supposed CIA-State Depart-
ment conflict over European long-term credits for the USSR-CIA
opposing, the State Department approving; and (2) an alleged at-
tempt to rebuild CIA's public reputation after the Bay of Pigs epi-
sode. The CIA-State Department rivalry hypothesis was illustrated
by the famous Herblock cartoon in The Washington Post which
showed a black cloaked figure offering to peddle some "hot statistics"
to a foreign service officer on the steps of the State Department
building.
The Reaction
The CIA analysis and estimates met with a mixed reaction in the
US press, among the academic specialists on the Soviet economy,
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and in foreign countries. In the US many commentators accepted
the CIA position, but a substantial number reserved judgment pend-
ing further information, and a small number openly disagreed. On 9
January, the day after the first Times article by Dale, Harry Schwartz,
who was the Times' Soviet economic expert, published the results
of a telephone survey of academic experts. All five who were can-
vassed were surprised by the CIA's conclusions about rates of growth.
One said, "It is impossible." Another said, "Fantastic." On the other
hand, Professor Abram Bergson, whose own calculations of Soviet
GNP growth up to 1958 were the most widely accepted of all esti-
mates, said, "I am a little surprised but I can't rule it out." It was hard,
as Schwartz pointed out, to understand how Soviet growth could
plunge from 6 or 7 percent a year to 2% percent. The explanation
was primarily the decline in agricultural production for two succes-
sive years, a development not yet known to the academic specialists.'
The British press was generally doubtful of the accuracy of the esti-
mates of growth and of gold stocks. In particular, the London Econo-
mist thought that the proper estimate of the growth rate should be
around 5 percent instead of 2% percent. However, most British com-
mentators agreed that Soviet growth had slowed noticeably. The Brit-
ish press unanimously interpreted the CIA action as an attempt to
support the US policy of opposing the granting of long-term credits
to the USSR, something the British Board of Trade was eager to do.
The British, unlike some of the American press, knew that this was
also US administration and State Department policy and not just
CIA's policy.
Schwartz's later analysis of the American reaction is interesting. The following
quote is from his book, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin, Lippincott, 1965.
pp. 33-34.
"The depth of this concern [with the rapid Soviet growth relative to that
of the US] became strikingly clear in early 1964. The CIA-from which
Mr. Dulles had retired-made public its calculations for 1962 and 1963,
which showed that Soviet economic growth had slowed down dramatically,
to less than 2.5 percent annually. It added that the gap separating American
and Soviet production levels was once again widening so that Moscow's
prospects for victory in the economic competition during the foreseeable future
had dimmed substantially. A naive observer might have thought that a wave
of joy would have swept the United States at this good news. The :reality
was the reverse, however, and numerous American voices were quickly
raised to criticize the CIA and its new estimates. Having finally been con-
vinced that there was such a thing as a Soviet economic threat, many Ameri-
cans seemed reluctant to believe that even temporarily Moscow had received
a setback and Washington was doing comparatively well."
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e ress
The. CIA press release took the Russians very much by surprise,
appearing as it did even before the official Soviet announcement on
the economic results for 1963. When these appeared later in Janu-
ary, the usual percentage increase in national income was absent.
All that was given was a figure of 5 percent growth in gross social
product. Gross social product is a heavily double-counted statistic
summing the outputs of all sectors of the economy without netting
out the intermediate sales from one producing sector to another.
In several letters to US newspapers, Soviet writers denounced CIA
on a variety of grounds but could find no answer to the 21/a percent
GNP growth rate except to cite the announced 5 percent growth in
gross social product. When the statistical handbook, Narodnoye Kho-
ziaistvo, SSSR v godu 1963, was finally released in early 1965-sev-
eral months late-it showed the growth of national income (Soviet
definition) to be 31/2 percent for 1963, and a 4.2 percent average
for the two years, 1962 and 1963, compared to an average of 7% per-
cent for 1959-1961. National income (Soviet definition) excludes most
services, which grow slowly, and hence systematically increases faster
than national income or product by Western definition. In the light of
that bias the Soviet announcement came closer to supporting the CIA
estimates than the Soviet economists' (or the London Economist's)
estimate of 5 percent.
The reaction of Eastern European countries was the most interest-
ing of all. As reported in a New York Herald Tribune dispatch of
10 February 1964, satellite officials accepted the CIA estimates and
were using them to oppose Soviet policies, such as economic integra-
tion through CEMA, and to support their own hopes for increased
policy independence.
In Canuary and February 1964, the Director and his deputy for in-
telligence visited the major capitals of Western Europe, briefing the
NATO governments on the Soviet economic and military positions.
A representative of ORR accompanied them to brief economic special-
ists in the governments on the methodology and data underlying the
economic estimates. All except the British Board of Trade were
persuaded that the CIA estimates were generally valid.
The validity of CIA's analysis became generally acknowledged in
the US press after the official Soviet report on economic performance
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The Press CONFIDENTIAL
in the first half of 1964. Harry Schwartz of The New York Times, a
former skeptic, wrote a Times story in July 1964 with the following
headlines: "Soviet Economy Seen Stumbling-Growth in Industrial
Output During First Half of 1964 Falls Short of Hopes-Bright Spots
are Few."
The US academic community was brought around by the appear-
ance of carefully explained calculations of Soviet GNP by Dr. Stanley
Cohn, of Research Analysis Corporation. Although his estimated
growth rates were not identical with those of CIA, they were reason-
ably close, and his methods and procedures were essentially the same
as the Agency's. Cohn's analyses appeared in successive volumes of
studies on the Soviet economy published by the joint Economic Com-
mittee. The latest revision of Cohn's estimates shows 4.5 percent
growth in 1962 and 2.7 percent in 1963 for an average of 3.6 percent.
The CIA gold estimate, which rested on highly classified data, was
accepted and published by the US Bureau of Mines in 1964. In due
time it was also accepted by the joint Intelligence Board in London
and by the banking community in London.
An Endorsement from Siberia
The most unexpected support for CIA's economic estimates came
from a prominent young Soviet economist, Dr. Abel Gezevish Agan-
begyan, who is the head of the Laboratory of Economic-Mathemati-
cal Methods in Novosibirsk, and a corresponding member of the So-
viet Academy of Sciences. He was one of a large number of econ-
omists who were urging radical economic reform on the Soviet leader-
ship prior to 1965. In December 1964, he delivered a private lecture
in Moscow, reportedly to the Central Committee, and again in June
1965 to the staff of a publishing house in Moscow. Notes taken by
someone present at the latter lecture leaked to the press in England
and Italy, and also were acquired by the American Embassy in Mos-
cow. These notes may not be accurate in every particular, but their
general authenticity has been substantiated.
Aganbegyan, according to the notes, vigorously criticized the op-
eration and management of the Soviet economy. In addition, he criti-
cized the statistics produced by the Central Statistical Administration
and objected to the policy of secrecy regarding economic informa-
tion. He alleged that Soviet economists are often forced to rely on
American sources. He cited the report by the American CIA on the
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CONFIDENTIAL The Press
decline in Soviet economic growth. This report, he said, was accu-
rate and the Central Statistical Agency had been unable to refute it.
The notes were disavowed by the Soviet press and by Aganbegyan.
However, he is not the only Soviet economist to have expressed grave
doubts of the State's economic statistics, either privately or in print.
Epilogue
CIA's first press conference was also its last. The Director was
earnestly advised to get CIA out of the news and keep it out.
Two years later, in October 1965, after the poor Russian harvest
of 1965, the CIA again prepared a press release on Soviet growth,
repeating estimates for preceding years and estimating growth of
GNP in 1965 at 3 percent. This time the State Department issued
the release. It was described as "prepared by the Department of
State in consultation with other interested agencies." The report of
this release did not make the front page of The New York Times.
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No Foreign Dissem
Electronic detective work
on the Soviet ABM system.
ON THE TRAIL OF HEN HOUSE AND HEN ROOST
Donald C. Brown
The last successful U-2 mission over Soviet territory in April 1960
obtained photographs of a very large research and development cen-
ter at Sary Shagan, on the shores of Lake Balkhash.1 It had been sus-
pected for some time that research on antiballistic missiles (ABM)
was conducted at Sary Shagan, but few who saw those first reconnais-
sance photos were prepared for the huge size of the program evi-
denced by dozens of separate facilities spread over an area approx-
imately the size of the state of New Jersey.
Two of the more arresting objects observed in the 1960 photo-
graphs were large radars which came to have the intelligence nick-
names of Hen House and Hen Roost. Both of these radars were lo-
cated on the western shore of Lake Balkhash, and they looked out
over the rest of the Sary Shagan complex toward Kapustin Yar, the
launching point for ballistic missiles which served as targets for what-
ever ABM tests the Soviets were conducting.
Both the Hen House and Hen Roost were fixed installations of
staggering size. The Hen House antenna building was more than 900
feet long-three times the length of a football field-and nearly 50
feet high. The Hen Roost had two antennas, each over 500 feet
long, separated by over half a mile. The southernmost of the two
Hen Roost antennas was very low to the ground-only 15 feet high-
but the northern antenna rose 65 feet high.
The fixed nature of the antennas for the Hen House and Hen
Roost meant that the direction of their beams of radar energy could
not be steered or altered by simply moving the antennas. It was ob-
vious that these radars, if they were not to be confined to looking in
a single fixed direction, would have to employ some means of elec-
The last U-2 reconnaissance mission in that program was that of Francis Gary
Powers, who was brought down over Sverdlovsk in May 1960.
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tronic rather than mechanical beam steering. Electronically steered
antennas were just being developed in the US at that time, and the
presence of two apparently operational radars of this type at the
Soviet ABM center whetted the appetite of the intelligence commu-
nity to know more about the Hen House and Hen Roost.
During the next two and a half years, little information became
available beyond that obtained from the 1960 photography, but both
radars continued to be subjects of considerable speculation. Those
early estimates are best passed over here, mostly because they were
wrong, however much they illustrate the severe limitations of analysis
based on only one source of information. What was needed for the
beginning of a useful analysis of either radar was knowledge of its
signal.
The first break in the Hen House-Hen Roost story came in late
1962. The Soviets had resumed atmospheric testing of nuclear weap-
ons, and some of their tests involved missile-borne weapons which
were detonated as they approached the ABM test center. Besides
the directly destructive effects of a nuclear burst, it releases enormous
amounts of energy which can cause radical changes in the radio trans-
mission properties of the surrounding atmosphere. Radar waves, which
ordinarily would be propagated in essentially straight paths into
space, can be reflected or beift to different directions in the highly
ionized region created by a nuclear burst. On 28 October 1962 one
of the ABM-related nuclear tests near Sary Shagan created propaga-
tion disturbances which caused many otherwise undetectable signals
to be reflected to US ELINT stations in the Middle East. Thirteen
new signals were recorded and many of these were thought to have
originated at Sary Shagan.
The signal which excited the most immediate interest was one
designated BUEB (its designation has varied with the years, and
currently is B357Z). BUEB had a very low pulsing rate of about 100
pulses per second, which suggested that it was intended to operate
against targets at ranges greater than 800 miles. Since even the high-
est flying aircraft are well below the horizon when they are between
300 and 400 miles from a radar, BUEB became an instant candidate
for the signal of an ABM radar. Ballistic missiles, because they rise
several hundred miles above the earth, can be visible at several times
the normal range for aircraft and most other objects. In addition,
missiles approach their intended target so rapidly that it is desirable
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to detect them at as great a range as possible. BUEB used very long
pulses which could provide the energy necessary for such long range
detection.
Most interesting of all, however, was the observation that each
pulse of this signal was transmitted at a different frequency. More-
over, as the frequency changed, the direction of the transmissions
also appeared to change. This effect-beam steering by changes in
transmitted frequency-is one type of electronic steering, exactly
what was expected from the Hen House or Hen Roost. BUEB was
therefore a prime candidate as the signal from one-but only one-of
them.
For the next couple of years a very strange argument, important
for the answer sought, but rather pointless for the chances of finding
it, developed within the community over which radar, Hen House
or Hen Roost, was the source of the BUEB signal. By early 1964, a
group of radio scientists from the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL),
under the leadership of Jim Trexler, had succeeded in detecting
BUEB transmissions after they were reflected from the moon.' These
moon-bounce intercepts confirmed that the signal was indeed from a
frequency-steered radar and provided considerable detail on. signal
characteristics. They even determined that the source of the signal
was at Sary Shagan, which had been only an informed assumption in
the analysis of the 1962 intercepts, but there was still not enough in-
formation to say which radar was the source. So the battle raged on.
Despite the lack of firm evidence one way or the other, strong ad-
vocates for each radar nevertheless emerged. Emotional, numerologi-
cal, and prescient arguments filled the evidential void. Since the ra-
dars were only three miles apart, were presumed to operate in much
the same way for, the same basic purpose, and were pointed in much
the same direction, identifying the origin of BUEB was not an easy
task.
Nor was the question merely an academic one. By 1964 reports
had been received that Hen House radars were being operationally
deployed at several locations in the Soviet Union. There was no cor-
responding evidence of Hen Roost deployment. If BUEB came from
the Hen House, there was an opportunity, rare in the ABM busi-
ness, of having an intelligence lead well before a system was com-
' See "Moon Bounce Elint," Studies XI 2, p. 59.
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SECRET Soviet ABM Radars
pletely deployed. On the other hand, if the signal was from Hen Roost,
then we were in trouble, because in that case we would not have the
slightest idea how Hen House worked.
The resolution to that controversy came in early 1965 when an ex-
ternal contractor, ESL, Inc., working with some carefully documented
measurements made by Jim Trexler's moon-bounce intercept pro-
gram, proved with mathematical rigor that BUEB came from Hen
House. After a decent interval for the Hen Roost aficionados to re-
cover, this answer was generally accepted, and Hen Roost began to
slip into obscurity. The conclusion at the time was that the two radars
had been in direct competition for the same job, that Hen House
had won the competition, and that we were unlikely to see any more
of Hen Roost. This conclusion was bolstered by the fact that Hen
House was being deployed, and by a television film made in 1965 by
the Soviets to celebrate their military might twenty years after the
defeat of Nazi Germany, which featured some close-up shots of the
northern antenna of the Hen Roost. Since the Soviets seldom tip their
hand on advanced military technology, this revelation of structural
details of the Hen Roost was taken as strong evidence that they, too,
had given up on that radar.
During the same era that the Hen House-Hen Roost competition
was being waged in the intelligence offices of the US, and presumably
also on the sands of Sary Shagan, another significant radar develop-
ment was taking place in the Moscow area. In 1964, a very large
A-frame structure began rising above the trees near Naro Fominsk,
35 miles southwest of Moscow. This structure, nicknamed the Dog
House, had all the earmarks of yet another electronically steered
ABM radar. The two flat faces supported by the A-frame were es-
sentially square and over 350 feet on a side. One face, pointed prac-
tically down the middle of the US ICBM threat corridor to Moscow,
provided convincing evidence of an ABM function. The ABM util-
ity of the opposite face, which points southeast toward the Indian
Ocean, is somewhat obscure, but interest in Dog House among ABM
analysts was-and remains-high.
By late 1967 the northwest face of the Dog House A-frame was
completed, and in the summer of 1968 those stalwarts of Hen House
signal collection, the NRL group, succeeded once again in pulling in
a new signal by lunar reflections. The signal was quickly identified
as being a transmission from the Dog House, but it was a most
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peculiar signal indeed. Like Hen House, Dog House changes its
transmitted frequency to effect beam steering. Quite unlike Hen
House or any other large Soviet radar ever observed, however, Dog
House uses a signal which is continuously on (continuous wave sig-
nal, or cw), and is not transmitted in short pulses. The Dog :House
signal is constantly changing frequency and beam pointing direction,
so it is perfectly feasible for the radar to make simultaneous range
and angle measurements without the ambiguities usually associated
with cw signals. Nevertheless, most radar analysts were rather taken,
aback at the bizarre appearance of the Dog House signal when it was
first identified.
Subsequent reports have revealed that there is more to the Dog
House system than the A-frame. More than a mile to the southwest of
the A-frame are additional long, low structures which are probably the
actual transmitting antennas. The A-frame antenna is now believed to
be for receiving only. Such a two-antenna system makes a cw signal
more explicable. Conventional pulsed radars require only one anten-
na, which is used alternately for both transmitting and receiving.
After a pulse is transmitted, the antenna is switched to the radar
receiver for the detection of target echoes, then switched back to
the transmitter during the brief time required to transmit the next
pulse. Such a sharing of functions cannot be achieved with a cw
radar like Dog House. Since the transmitter is operating all of the
time, a separate antenna must be provided for the receiver. There
are additional problems with cw operation, among them a require-
ment to prevent transmitted energy from masking very weak target
echoes in the receiver. One way to achieve this isolation of trans-
mitter from receiver is to, provide a large physical separation between
the two antennas. For the Dog House, they are more than a mile
apart.
One puzzling aspect of the Dog House had been the lack of an
identified prototype. Because of the vast physical size of the radar
and its obviously great cost, it was reasonable for the first full-scale
version of the Dog House to be placed where it would have some
operational use. The Soviets, however, are great prototype builders
and thorough testers of new equipment (the research and develop-
ment Hen House is still in operation, nearly nine years after it was
first spotted) and they probably would not use all of the unconven-
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SECRET Soviet ABM Radars
tional technology evident in the Dog House without some sort of de-
velopmental testing outside the laboratory.
After the initial shock of the Dog House signal had worn off, it
occurred to some of us that a necessary feature of that radar's op-
eration-the use of two separated antennas-had also been a promi-
nent feature of our old friend, Hen Roost. Hen Roost did not have
even a passing physical resemblance to Dog House, but it did have
two antennas. While there are sometimes reasons to use separate
transmitting and receiving antennas with a pulse radar, there must
have been some compelling reason for the 3,800-foot separation of the
Hen Roost antennas. Could it, too, have been a cw radar? Was Hen
Roost in fact a testbed for the signal later used by Dog House?
There was some evidence that the Hen Roost had been dismantled
by the Soviets after it was displayed in the 1965 TV film. If the re-
ports of its demise were true, no more signals could be expected
from Hen Roost, but those signals intercepted after the October 1962
nuclear test were still lying around on magnetic recording tape. It
was possible that the Hen Roost signal had been there all the time
and had been ignored because we were looking for a pulsed, rather
than a cw radar.
Some hope that a Hen Roost signal existed and that it could be
identified was generated by the following train of logic:
a) The Hen Roost should have been operating at the time of the nuclear
tests. If the tests had anything at all to do with ABM developments,
then all Sarv Shagan ABM radars should have been on.
b) From considerations of Hen Roost antenna size and the beamwidth which
would probably be required for it to do an ABM job, the radar should
have operated at a radio frequency somewhere near 200 MHz.
c) The Hen House signal, at a radio frequency similar to that estimated for
Hen Roost, was intercepted; therefore, whatever propagation anomalies
permitted detection of the Hen House signal should also have per-
mitted interception of the Hen Roost signal.
d) Then, if we were both logical and lucky, the problem would be reduced
to identifying which signal, of those recorded, come from the Hen
Roost.
e) The Hen Roost signal should look like the Dog House signal.
The search soon narrowed to only one of the 1962 signals. In the
records, and as reported in earlier analyses, this signal had the ap-
pearance of one from a very poor radar or perhaps some data trans-
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mission system. The signal appeared as a train of ragged pulses whose
width and repetition rate varied considerably throughout the in-
tercept. The average pulsing rate was 12.5 pulses/second, too :low for
all but the most arcane of ABM applications. For this reason and be-
cause of its seeming instability, the signal had been dismissed in
1962 as an unlikely candidate for a Hen Roost transmission. Upon
re-examination, however, another train of very narrow pulses, which
had been overlooked during the 1962 analysis, was found intermixed
with the broad pulses. When the repetition rate of this additional
pulse train was determined to be a very stable 12.5 pulses/second,
a powerful clue to the true identity of this long-lost signal was avail-
able.
Armed with hindsight, we can explain all of the observed signal
characteristics in terms of a frequency-sweeping cw signal of the Dog
House type. A signal which sweeps over a broad range of frequencies,
even though it is transmitted continuously, will be detected by a
narrow-band receiver as merely a pulse of energy. Consider the
analogy of rapidly tuning your home radio. Many stations transmit-
ting at different frequencies are on the air simultaneously. As the
tuning dial is spun, the receiver will pass each station rapidly, and
the listener will hear a series of brief bursts of sound. If this con-
ceptual model is inverted and it is imagined that the radio dial is
left at a single setting but the stations are constantly changing fre-
quency, then a rough feel can be gained for the misleading appear-
ance of a frequency-sweeping ew signal through a normal ELINT re-
ceiver.
The other features of the 1962 signal can also be explained by a
ew signal model. As shown in Figure 1, the instability of the main
pulse train could be caused by changes of receiver tuning. The short
pulses could be caused by a much more rapid frequency slide of the
signal as it returned from its highest value to begin a new sweeping
cycle; the comparative stability of the short pulse train would result
from the rapidity of the "flyback" and the consequent insensitivity
of pulse timing to receiver tuning. Additionally, the width of the
apparent pulse emerging from the receiver would be a function of
signal strength, since receiver bandwidths are not sharp on-or-off
functions, but instead fall off gradually on either side of the center
frequency.
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All of these features of the hypothetical signal model were thor-
oughly checked against the observed characteristics of the signal. In
all respects they matched. As the receiver was tuned, the positions
of the broad pulses changed; with the receiver tuning steady, the
interval between pulses was constant. The short and long pulses dis-
appeared together when the receiver was tuned away from the sig-
nal band of frequencies. In addition, the width and amplitude of the
broad pulses changed with frequency, providing evidence that the
transmitted beam was changing position with changing frequency.
All in all, the match to a Dog House-like signal was uncanny.
An uncanny match is not proof positive, however. The best that
can be said is that the 1962 signal probably came from the Hen
Roost, but it is doubtful that we will ever know for sure. The case
for the relationship can be summarized as follows:
a) The signal was intercepted due to anomalous propagation conditions after
a nuclear burst. It appeared shortly after the burst and had not been
seen before, nor has it been seen since.
b) It probably came from Sary Shagan because of its coincidence in time
with ABM tests and its appearance at the same time as the Hen House
signal.
c) It is a frequency-swept cw signal. Hen Roost was the only Sary Shagan
radar at that time suitable for transmitting such a signal.
In comparison with some of the rather far-out present-day estimates
on Soviet ABM developments, this is a pretty strong case.
It now appears, therefore, that those two large radars we first saw
in 1960 were not really competitors at all, but were instead develop-
mental models for two entirely different radars: the Hen House,
which followed a fairly direct path to become an ABM early warn-
ing and space tracking radar, and the Hen Roost, which, from the
intelligence point of view, meandered a bit but eventually grew into
the Dog House ABM radar at Moscow.
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No Foreign Dissem
The influence agent
in Biblical times.
THE TALE OF HUSHAI THE ARCHITE
C. N. Geschwind
Since the publication of the Studies article, "Wanted: An Inte-
grated Counterintelligence" in the summer of 1963, there has been
an increase of community interest and concern about that most dan-
gerous and least publicized of all agents, the "agent of influence." 1
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to review the story of the first
influence agent operation on record. This operation was set up by
King David and is recounted in II Samuel, 15-18. This account is a
good deal more circumstantial and detailed than the frequently cited
cases of Rahab the Safe House Keeper (Joshua 2: 1), and Delilah
the Penetration Agent (Judges 16: 5). Futhermore, besides its his-
torical and human interest, this operation reminds us of the efficacy
of simplicity, audacity, speed, and the exploitation of human frailties
in this kind of enterprise. Here is what happened, when King David
played for time to counter his son Absalom's surprise attack.
David's handsome and popular son, Absalom, having waited many
years in vain for his father to go the way of all kings, formed a
conspiracy to kill him and usurp the throne. King David soon be-
came aware that Absalom had assembled a large revolutionary force
from among the men of Israel, and that the King's best privy coun-
sellor, Ahithophel the Gilonite, had defected to Absalom. Upon hear-
ing of this counsellor's defection, King David prayed that the "counsel
of Ahithophel might be turned to foolishness" but he also gathered
his loyal generals and bureaucrats and fled. Absalom thereupon oc-
cupied the royal palace.
Mounting the Operation
When David stopped to pray in the course of his flight, Hushai
the Archite, an aged counsellor, came to him with his coat rent and
earth upon his head, professing grief and loyalty which the King
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SECRET Hushai
evidently knew to be sincere. King David said to Hushai, "If thou re-
turn to the city and say unto Absalom, `I will be thy servant, oh King,
as I have been thy father's servant hitherto'. . . . then mayest thou
for me defeat the counsel of Ahithophel ... and what thing soever
thou shalt hear out of the Palace, thou shalt tell it to Zadok and
Abiathar the priests, who have with them their two sons, and by
them ye shall send unto me everything that ye can hear."
Capturing the Dupe
When Hushai the Archite had made his way to the palace, he ap-
proached Absalom, who knew him well, and said, "God save the
Kingl"
Absalom asked, "Is this thy kindness to thy friend, David. Why
wentest thou not with thy friend?"
Hushai replied, "Nay, but whom the Lord and this people and all
the men of Israel choose, his will I be and with him will I abide ...
as I have served in thy father's presence, so will I be in thy pres-
ence." And so Hushai the Archite was accepted as a defector and re-
established as a counsellor.
The Influence Operation
At the council of war which Absalom called, Ahithophel advised
Absalom as follows: "Let me now choose out twelve thousand men,
and I will arise and pursue after David this night and will come
upon him while he is weary and weakhanded and will make him
afraid. All the people that are with him shall flee, and I will smite
the king only. I will bring back all the people unto thee." This pro-
posal reportedly pleased Absalom and all the elders well, but they
must have had some doubts and second thoughts as to where the
glory would land, for Absalom said: "Call now Hushai the Archite
also, and let us hear likewise what he saith."
Hushai lost no time in exploiting the distrust, jealousy, fear, and
guilt complexes inherent in the situation, saying: "Thou knowest thy
father and his men, that they be mighty men and they be chafed in
their minds, as a bear robbed of her whelps in the field: and thy
father is a man of war and will not lodge with the people. Behold,
he is hid now in some pit or in some other place and it will come to
pass when some of (our men) be overthrown at the first that who-
soever heareth it will say, `There is slaughter among the people that
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Hushai SIECRET
follow Absalom!' And even he that is valiant shall utterly melt, for all
Israel knoweth that thy father is a mighty man. Therefore I counsel
that all Israel be generally gathered unto thee from Dan even to
Beersheba as the sand is by the sea for multitude and that thou go
to battle in thine own person. So shall we come upon him in some
place . . . as the dew falleth on the ground and of him and. of all
the men that are with him there shall not be left so much as one.
Moreover, if he be gotten into a city, then shall all Israel. bring
ropes to that city and we will draw it into the river until there be
not one small stone found there."
Now, Absalom and "all the men of Israel" thought this advice was
better than the advice of Ahithophel, no doubt in part because it
gave everybody a piece of the action, and when Ahithophel saw that
his counsel was rejected, he went home, "put his household in order
and hanged himself" rather than get into a stenching contest with a
skunk. While this demonstrated Ahithophel's foresight, it also put
Hushai the Archite fully in the driver's seat. A little effective counter-
intelligence work on Ahithophel's part might have yielded bigger
dividends.
The Espionage Action
Like Alger Hiss millennia later, Hushai the Archite was not con-
tent to stick to the relatively safe business of influence operations,
but had also to dabble in espionage. Hushai immediately cabled on
Zadok and Abiathar the priests and told them: "Thus and thus did
Ahithophel counsel Absalom and the elders of Israel, and thus and
thus I have counselled. Now therefore send quickly and tell David
not to lodge in the wilderness but speedily pass over (the Jordan)."
The sons of these priests, the couriers Jonathan and Ahimaaz, were
staying under cover outside the royal city, and received this mes-
sage via "a wench," not otherwise identified. An informer observed
this contact and reported it to Absalom, who sent out an investi-
gative force. The couriers were aware of the leak and sought help
from a village woman who hid them in a well. When the investigators
queried the woman she said, "They went that-away," or words to
that effect, and the search went astray. The couriers then hastened
to King David, who promptly crossed the Jordan and mobilized a
desperate army.
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SECRET Hushai
The Pay-off
f
Eventually Absalom brought a large, but inexperienced force into
battle against the tightly organized forces of the King in terrain in
which the King's professionals had every advantage, producing
twenty thousand corpses: "The wood devoured more people that day
than the sword ...." Among the casualties in the woods was Absalom
himself, who appears to have been something of a beatnik, for he
had long golden tresses of which he was very proud, and by which
he got caught in a tree. There General Joab found and killed him,
ending the insurrection. Since Hushai's accomplices subsequently
prospered, it is reasonable to assume that he also retained an hon-
ored place in the restored administration and ultimately retired with
a large pension. General Joab, however, did not fare so well, for
King David bore him a lethal grudge for killing Prince Absalom.
Perhaps the King saw his renegade counsellor Ahithophel as the real
villain in the piece.
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No Foreign Dissem
Basic principles and some
new challenges to CI.
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
It is axiomatic that the structure and functions of a counterintel-
ligence service, or of the counterintelligence part of an intelligence
service, are determined by the activities of its chief adversaries more
than by any other single factor.' Any realistic discussion of US coun-
terintelligence thus must begin with the two Soviet services, the KGB
and the GRU, respectively, the state security service and the mili-
tary security service.
The scale of the effort that has been made and continues to be
made by Soviet intelligence is difficult to exaggerate. Some 21,173 So-
viet nationals reside in the 77 non-Communist countries of the world,
of whom 5,943 are officials. At least 60 percent of these, or 3,560, are
in fact intelligence personnel. Moreover, the Soviet services work very
closely with the 19 intelligence services of the seven Communist gov-
ernments of Eastern Europe. During the 1950's the Soviets domi-
nated these services through a system of senior advisors whose word
was law. Although this control has been somewhat relaxed during
the 60's, close coordination continues. The testimony of defector Major
Laslo Szabo before the Armed Services committee of the House of
Representatives in March, 1966, amply bore this out. Szabo served
in the AVH, the Hungarian foreign intelligence service, for 20 years
before he defected. (He is now 43 years old.) He was given a full
year of training by the Soviets in Moscow, starting in September,
1957. He testified that the AVH printed and distributed forgeries de-
faming the US, at Soviet direction. One instance was the dissemination
of a forgery of Newsweek magazine in late 1963, principally in Asia
and Africa. He said that another AVH officer, Bela Lapusnyik, who
defected in Austria in 1962, was murdered by poison in a Viennese
jail on AVH orders carried out by the Czechoslovak foreign intelli-
gence service. His testimony shows the unified nature of the clandes-
1 See A. C. Wasemiller's "The Anatomy of Counterintelligence" in Studies
XII 4, p. 9 if.
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SECRET Counterintelligence
tine Communist attack and illustrates the fact that it is still directed
centrally from Moscow. It also helps to explain why the attack at
the subterranean level is not affected by what is happening at the
diplomatic or open level. The attack does not slow down, for example,
because of thaws in diplomatic relations between the US and the
USSR.
Our defenses against this attack are of two types, passive and ac-
tive. These two kinds of defense are commonly called security and
counterespionage, and they constitute the twin halves of counter-
intelligence. All US departments and agencies with intelligence func-
tions are responsible for their own security abroad.2 Within CIA, re-
sponsibility for security is divided in two different ways. Basically,
CIA and all other agencies are trying to defend three things: its per-
sonnel, its installations, and its operations. The first two, security of
personnel and security of installations, are in the Agency the respon-
sibility of the Office of Security. Responsibility for the third element,
the security of operations, is in turn divided between the operating
divisions, which have a line function, and the counterintelligence
staff, which has the staff responsibility. This kind of division clearly re-
quires close coordination, and this in fact occurs on a daily basis.
US practices in physical security abroad are not uniform but are
also not widely divergent. Our safes are much alike. So are our guard
systems, floodlights, pass control systems, and the rest. The same is
true for security of US installations, where one of the chief dangers
is hostile audio penetration. In this area uniform measures of defense
are ensured through the work of the Audio Countermeasures Com-
mittee of the US Intelligence Board.
One significant difference in personnel security measures is inher-
ent in the basic nature and functions of the military as contrasted
with CIA. A military officer typically serves a tour of duty in the
intelligence specialty and then moves on. Intelligence is only one of
the many functions of the armed forces, which need well-rounded
officers. CIA personnel, in contrast, usually spend their entire pro-
fessional lives in the same business. The result is a steady growth in
sophistication, including counterintelligence sophistication, and the
added advantage of a far smaller turnover rate in personnel. It also
means that Agency people with access to classified information usu-
The Soviets have adopted the opposite system: the civilian service, the KGB,
is responsible for the security of the GRU.
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ally have a functional need for it. They are themselves a part of
the process of getting and reporting that information.
The point is, however, that even though the security of each ele-
ment overseas is its own responsibility, the hard fact is that US in-
telligence security is essentially indivisible. The exchange of intel-
ligence within the US community is vast and growing. The future
will see an even greater exchange, chiefly as the result of the adop-
tion of automatic data processing systems and community projects
like COINS, designed to let us query each other directly by ma-
chines. The possibility has therefore increased, and will continue to
increase, that successful operations by the opposition could obtain in-
formation originated by any element, if not all elements of the in-
telligence community.
The security of our foreign operations is also indivisible, and is
also a community responsibility. It differs from other kinds of secu-
rity work in that it does not employ set defenses, although it also
must be based on basic CI principles. The security aspects of each
operation must be hand-tailored, and no operations should be planned,
let alone launched, without security being a primary consideration
from the beginning. Counterintelligence specialists are not firemen,
to be called in only after disaster has struck. They must be brought
into the picture from the outset and remain throughout the life of
any operation, if that operation is to be secure. Through their knowl-
edge of the adversary services and their CI expertise, they are par-
ticularly adept at foreseeing complications.
The interdependence of the US counterintelligence community
is also manifest in our relationships with liaison services. We cannot
cut off these relationships because of concern about security, but
experience has certainly shown that we must calculate the risks in-
volved as realistically as possible in the knowledge that the US is
now Soviet target number one. Between 1917 and the mid-30's the
Soviets focussed their attention chiefly on France, in large part be-
cause of the presence of the large white Russian colony in and
around Paris. They were eminently successful, a fact from which we
continue to suffer today.3 From the mid-30's to World War II the
Soviets' emphasis shifted to England. Again they scored notable suc-
cesses. Consider, for example, the case of George Blake.
'See the novel Topaz by Leon Uris (reviewed in Studies XII 1, p. 88).
SECRET 27
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George Blake, born George Behar, was tried at the Old Bailey in
London on 3 May 1961. He was found guilty of offenses chargeable
under the Official Secrets Act that is, of spying for the Soviets-
and was sentenced to 42 years of imprisonment. He was born in 1922
in Holland of a Dutch mother and an Egyptian Jewish father who
had become a British subject. Blake served in the Dutch under-
ground and became involved in the ill-fated British operation code-
named North Pole. In July 1942 he left Holland, on British orders,
and travelled through Brussels and Paris to unoccupied France and
across the mountains to Spain. He was taken by ship from Gibraltar
to England. After nine months in the Royal Naval Volunteer Re-
serve he was assigned in July 1944 to MI-6, the British Secret In-
telligence Service. He served in The Hague, London, and Hamburg,
went to Cambridge for a Russian language course, took some tech-
nical and tradecraft training, and was posted to Seoul, South Korea,
in November 1948 as the first British intelligence representative there.
His official or cover position was that of vice-consul. In July 1950 he
and his colleagues were taken prisoner by the North Koreans and
were held until April 1953.
Blake later insisted that he became converted to Communism dur-
ing this period. This is doubtful. Rebecca West, in her brilliant book
The Meaning of Treason, speculates that he may have become a Com-
munist agent during his service in the Dutch underground. In any
event, the damage he inflicted was enormous.
According to his story, he decided in October 1951 to offer his
services to Soviet intelligence. He wrote a letter which was handed
by the North Korean intelligence service to the ubiquitous Soviet
apparatus. He suggested that all British prisoners be interviewed,
to protect him against suspicion. This was done, and from October
1951 to January 1952 he was able to meet securely with a Soviet
case officer. This part of Blake's story, incidentally, was confirmed
by the Polish Deputy Minister of the Interior and chief of the secret
police, Col. Alster, a Jew, who defected to the West after learning
in late 1960 that the Soviets were planning secret anti-Semitic meas-
ures. Among the Soviet spies Alster identified was George Blake.
Between April 1953, the date of his release from imprisonment,
and April 1961, when he was arrested, Blake served the British and
Soviet intelligence services in London, Berlin, and Lebanon. Accord-
ing to US calculation he furnished the Soviets with 4,720 pages of
28 SECRET
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documentary material during those eight years. As a result Soviet
intelligence scored some smashing successes. A highly placed pene-
tration agent, a Russian, was identified by Blake and then killed by
the Soviets after being identified by Blake. General Robert Bialek,
the Inspector General of the People's Police in East Germany, de-
fected to the West at the time of the June 1953 uprising. His apart-
ment in West Berlin was only a block from Blake's. In February
1956, acting on information from Blake, the East Germans under
Soviet control kidnapped General Bialek and brought him back to
East Germany. He died in a Soviet prison.
Blake attended joint meetings at which CIA legal-travel operations
into the USSR were disclosed. He also attended meetings concerned
with audio operations against the Poles in Berlin and against a Yugo-
slav military mission there. He was present at joint planning ses-
sions concerning the activity of the anti-Soviet Russian emigre or-
ganization known as NTS. Four NTS leaders, who had previously
entered and left the USSR, were caught on their next trip as a result
of Blake's information, and were never heard from again.
Blake served only five years and four months of his 42-year sen-
tence. On 23 October 1966 he escaped from Wormwood Scrubs
Prison. The facts of the escape demonstrated beyond doubt that it
was engineered by the Soviets. The buoying effect upon the morale
of Soviet spies everywhere can be easily imagined.
Counterespionage
The other side of the CI coin-counterespionage-has one pur-
pose which transcends all others in importance: penetration. The
emphasis which the KGB places on penetration is evident in the cases
already discussed from the defensive, or security viewpoint. The best
security system in the world cannot provide an adequate defense
against it because the technique involves people. The only way to
be sure that an enemy has been contained is to know his plans in
advance and in detail. Moreover, only a high-level penetration of
the opposition can tell you whether your own service is penetrated.
A high-level defector can also do this, but the adversary knows that
he defected and within limits can take remedial action. Conducting
CE without the aid of penetrations is like fighting in the dark. Con-
ducting CE with penetrations can be like shooting fish in a barrel.
The famous case of Col. Oleg Penkovskiy is an instructive example.
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Penkovskiy was born in 1919 of aristocratic Caucasian parent-
age. His father, an officer in the White Army, disappeared in the
post-revolutionary fighting in 1919. The son joined the Soviet Army
in 1937 and was commissioned in 1939. During World War II he
became a regimental artillery commander. In 1945 he married the
daughter of Lt. Gen. Gapanovich. From 1945 to 1948 he studied at
the Frunze Academy and from 1949 to 1953 at the Military Dip-
lomatic Academy. He was then posted to the GRU. In January 1955
he arrived in Turkey as the assistant military attache and as acting
head of the GRU residency there. He quarreled with a superior,
Major General Rubenko, and was sent home in November 1956. He
was embittered by the quarrel and its outcome. He began to think
about getting in touch with the Americans. During 1958-1959 he was
given technical instruction in missiles, and he began to accumulate
information against the day when he could deliver it to the West.
Having no safe means of hiding the copies that he had made of key
documents, he carried them around for two years sewn into his cloth-
ing. In 1960, as a member of a scientific-technical committee, Pen-
kovskiy had legitimate reasons for meeting foreigners, among whom
was an Englishman, Greville Wynne, who delivered certain mate-
rials provided by Penkovskiy to the British Embassy in Moscow.
Wynne also delivered a letter from Penkovskiy to American authorities.
In April 1961 Penkovskiy was a member of a scientific-technical dele-
gation visiting in the West. Intelligence contacts were made. How-
ever Penkovskiy's three applications for visas for further travel to
the West, all made in April-July 1962, were refused by the KGB.
He was last seen at liberty on 6 September 1962.
The Penkovskiy case illustrates the great value of penetrations.
There can never be enough of them. It illustrates the need for ef-
fective and secure liaison relationships. And it illustrates the neces-
sity for coordination in all counterespionage activities. In the US in-
telligence community, the responsibility for the management of
counterespionage is lodged with CIA. Specifically, the responsibility
of being the community's coordinator for espionage and counteres-
pionage is assigned to CIA by National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No. 5.
Such was not always the case. In the late 50's, when the basic
principles of NSCID 5 were hammered out, a good deal of parochial-
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ism had to be overcome. During the drafting process, certain pro-
posals were made which would have had the effect of destroying
centralization and returning the US intelligence community to the
competitive and fractionalized conditions of the past. General Trus-
cott, then the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, read these
proposals and said: "Knowing General Eisenhower as I do, I should
not wish to be the person who would bring these recommendations
to him."
In these later days, however, there is general realization that the
Soviet services and their extensions in the Communist countries of
Eastern Europe are a highly integrated system, and that we cannot
cope effectively with a coordinated attack if we ourselves are unco-
ordinated. The security problem we can handle in a decentralized
fashion because security rules are pretty much the same for all. But
counterespionage must be centralized. As we have noted, the
heart of counterespionage is the penetration operation-and we could
not possibly achieve reliable penetrations on a fragmented or de-
partmental basis.
The same is true of the other principal kinds of CE operations.
To be effective, all require a central command post. In addition to
the penetration, this is true of all efforts to induce defection. And
it is true with respect to the deception operation.
This type of CE operation is based upon an established channel
of communication with the enemy, and the purpose is to insert into
this channel misleading information which will cause the enemy to
take action which is contrary to his own interests. The need for cen-
tralized direction is clear. It is not possible to mislead the opposi-
tion by a series of uncoordinated bright ideas. It can only be done
according to a central plan.
The need for central coordination is just as great in the employ-
ment of the double agent. He is a center of controversy today in in-
telligence circles because such operations are hungry consumers of
time and manpower. From beginning to end, a DA operation must
be most carefully planned, executed, and above all, reported. The
amount of detail and administrative backstopping seems unbearable
at times in such matters. But since penetrations are always in short
supply, and defectors can tell less and less of what we need to know
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as time goes on, because of their cut-off dates, double agents will
continue to be part of the scene.4
Audio surveillance, another important CE tactic, also must be
centrally coordinated. It is a form of physical surveillance, which
means sustained drudgery. It may many times depend for success
on effective liaison relationships. Although Americans are technically
gifted, no amount of such expertise will suffice if the operation is
badly managed.
In the past three years the Soviets have been publishing more
and more about their own intelligence exploits and key personalities.
This also underlines the need for centralized effort on our part. All
of this material is being examined and when it concerns intelligence
matters, it is being translated into machine language and stored on
tape. By now a substantial percentage of the counterintelligence held
in machine language by CIA was derived from overt materials.
Ever since World War II the Soviets have devoted more and more
time and energy to a third kind of subterranean attack in addition
to espionage and counterespionage. This involves propaganda and
disinformation, including forgeries, designed to convince people all
over the world that Soviet accusations against the US, its military
forces, and its investigative services, are true. This kind of operation
is called covert, rather than clandestine, because of a basic distinc-
tion. A clandestine operation, if properly conducted, remains totally
concealed. The authorities in the target area never know that any-
thing happened. A covert operation, on the contrary, must have a
product, such as a radio newscast, a newspaper article, a forged docu-
ment or some other tangible. For this reason the service carrying
out a covert operation knows from the start that it cannot keep the
activity itself a secret; it aims instead for plausible denial. The object
'It is important to be clear about this matter of defectors. What a pre-World
War II defector has to say is still important. We shall not win this war against
Soviet intelligence without true depths of expertise. When a Soviet defects, when
he walks into an American embassy, the worst thing that can happen to him is
a confrontation with incompetence. Strong-arm methods will not work with him.
It's no good grilling him, or making him the objective of a squeeze session. Soviet
intelligence officers are told over and over that if they come over to the American
side, they will be ignored as individuals, and squeezed like lemons. What the
defector most needs is the attentions of someone who knows his world.
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is to be able to say, "We didn't do it-someone else did." The fact
that a product is surfaced gives the CI man something to work on.
He has one end of the trail of evidence in his hand. What he wants
to do, of course, is follow it all the way back to the source. In other
words, counterintelligence work carried out against covert activity
uses the same methods as does CI waged against espionage and
counterespionage. What we need to do is to spot the Soviet hand
behind the visible product.
We therefore study, for instance, the African, West German, or
American writer whose work consistently echoes the main Commu-
nist lines. Such themes have become familiar: the US government
is fascistic; in America all minorities, including the poor, are ruth-
lessly oppressed; American foreign policy is bankrupt, a mere dis-
play of brute force; CIA and the FBI are Gestapo-like organs; CIA,
in particular, has usurped the function of the State Department and
is secretly making policy; America is dominated by commercial in-
terests-Wall Street, the United Fruit Company, the big oil com-
panies; the American negro can win equal rights only through vio-
lence; and there are plenty of others. When we see these themes
played and replayed-often appearing first in a supposedly non-
Communist publication, then picked up and replayed by Tass and
Radio Moscow, then repeated in Africa-we seek to learn all we
can about the original author and the magazine or paper in which
the piece first appeared. However far to the left the tone of such an
article may be, the question is whether it is legitimate, in the sense
of being an indigenous attack. If so, we can do no more than grin
and bear it. Intelligence services can't be cry-babies, and they can't
get into a public arena and slug it out with attackers who, no mat-
ter how hostile, misled, or mendacious, are nevertheless expressing
their convictions in their own terms.
But the picture is very different if the supposedly non-Communist
writer is in reality a Soviet agent, receiving the standard Soviet: pack-
age of material from which to work, holding secret meetings with a
Soviet case officer or a go-between, and accepting Soviet money.
This sort of thing is as deadly as spying.
In sum, the US needs to pay more attention to counterintelligence
operations against Soviet covert action. We need to identify the
agents, double some of them, place surveillance on them and their
case officers, and finally mount operations to recruit Soviet CA spe-
cialists.
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The Team Approach-Vietnam
Just as the Soviet disinformation campaign underlines the need for
centralized effort, the Vietnam problem has placed a premium on
coordinated effort. When hostile clandestine pressure grows strong,
the US counterintelligence community shows a correspondingly
greater capacity for working together. This has happened with re-
spect to Vietnam. The first and gravest CI problem there, which per-
sists, is that there are simply not enough specialists engaged in full-
time counterintelligence work. The need for tactical military intelli-
gence has been so great that our CI potential has been largely drained
off to meet the need for more order-of-battle and POW information,
more analysis of captured enemy documentation, and the like. The
CI teams of both the Army and the Marine Corps spend most of
their time collecting tactical military intelligence. Compared to
these activities, the OSI detachments and the detachments of the
relatively new Naval Investigative Service are much less burdened
with positive requirements, but these are primarily security, not
counterespionage, units.
The second grave problem is to determine the extent to which the
North Vietnamese have succeeded in penetrating the government
and the intelligence services of the South. The Republic of Vietnam
has an extensive CI network. It consists of the Central Intelligence
Organization, the Military Security Service, and the Vietnamese Na-
tional Police. But they too are constantly diverted from long-range
projects by the pressing need for tactical collections. The security
program in the South simply does not work because the government
has expressed and implemented its willingness to accept as citizens of
South Vietnam all Viet Cong who profess to have had a change of
heart.
The first step toward coordinated action that had to be taken was
to identify the enemy. As long as we persisted in using "Viet Cong"
as an omnibus term for everything Communist, we were unable to
understand events. In February 1967 CIA called together the ele-
ments of the CI community and outlined the problems as it saw
them. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the
Naval Intelligence Command, the Air Force's OSI, and the CI ele-
ment of the G-2, Marine Corps. Task forces were created. CIA pro-
vided space and equipment, as well as personnel, and furnished the
researchers the counterintelligence collected up to that time.
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Before February 1967 the US had only some scattered and
largely unverified pieces of information about the military intelli-
gence structure of the North Vietnamese and about the Central Re-
search Directorate of the North Vietnamese Ministry of National De-
fense. What was known of the intelligence structure did not match
the typical Communist pattern, and strength estimates were obviously
far too low, when judged against the wide range of North Vietnamese
intelligence activity. The first research targets to be selected. were
the Security Sections, called the An Ninh, of the Communist Party
of North Vietnam, which are physically situated in South Vietnam.
These security sections are built around cadres of intelligence per-
sonnel trained by the North Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security
and infiltrated south. The Ministry of Public Security, like the rest
of the government in the north does not recognize the government in
the south and considers South Vietnam as its own territory, tem-
porarily and illegally occupied in part by the American gangsters.
Hence the An Ninh elements are regarded by their Headquarters as
security forces. The Ministry receives a constant flow of information
from these security sections and issues a steady stream of orders to
them. The sections also contain South Vietnamese Viet Cong person-
nel who have been recruited and trained in South Vietnam. Our
present An Ninh strength estimate is approximately 20,000.
Because of the view held by the North Vietnamese, these forces
carry out not only espionage and CI functions but also public safety
and security functions, judicial, police, and even penal functions. At
district and higher levels, they also have an "Armed Security Unit"
of the Security Section. It. is the assigned mission of this unit to
seek out, harass, and if possible destroy the intelligence and security
organizations and personnel of the opposition-chiefly the Americans.
Other elements of North Vietnamese intelligence and Cl are now
under study; and it is expected that additional papers, designed
primarily for use in the field, will be forthcoming on such subjects
as technical intelligence, and the Central Research Directorate. In
June 1968, CIA published "The DRVN Strategic Intelligence Service:
Cuc Nghien Cuu." Computer programs are now being used to cope
with the increasing flow of CI.
In short, the team approach is paying off. Cooperation is excel-
lent, and the results are proving useful to all.
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It is no accident that our research into the An Ninh, its functions
and structure, has revealed close parallels to the KGB. In Vietnam,
too, the Soviet advisory system is at work. The only effective answer
to the centralized clandestine war which Moscow wages relentlessly
against us is the internal cohesiveness and cooperation of the US
counterintelligence community.
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No Foreign Dissem
Intelligence evaluation
for warning.
A WATCHMAN FOR ALL SEASONS
To begin with, the knowledge which strategic intelligence must pro-
duce deserves a more forbidding adjective than `useful.' You should call
it the knowledge vital for national survival and as such it takes on
somberness and stature.
Sherman Kent in Strategic Intelligence
Allen W. Dulles in The Craft of Intelligence" comments: "The
cloud in the sky may be no bigger than a man's hand, but it may
portend the storm; and it is the duty of intelligence to sound an
alarm before a situation reaches crisis proportions."
No intelligence officer is apt to dispute Mr. Dulles' nutshell pres-
entation of problem number one. There are, however, differences
in the kinds of interest individual analysts may take in the cloud,
depending on their fields of specialization-tactical analysis, current
intelligence, strategic warning, and so on through a long list.
There is a degree of overlap among the three fields named both
because boundaries are nebulous and because the individual analyst
is often expected to don more than one hat. Tactical warning might
be described as that which can be obtained by such sensors as the
DEW line radars indicating that an attack had actually been initi-
ated. The best-publicized tactical warning in US history occurred in
April 1775 when the intelligence apparatus of the patriots sent Paul
Revere galloping across the Middlesex countryside.
Strategic warning has been defined to be that which the intelli-
gence community might provide prior to an actual attack, and hope-
fully while preparations for the attack are still in progress. This is
the uneasy realm of the warning, or indications analyst. In the na-
ture of the case, therefore, the warning analyst deals in extreme situa-
tions. The hypotheses he tests against the evidence tend to stress the
outside possibilities. He is interested in what might be. The problem
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of warning essentially involves the steady contemplation, and some-
times the courageous advocacy of ominous cases. In the trade, these
are known as "worst case" situations.
Some other distinctions can be made. Current intelligence seeks to
discern the enemy's actual intentions in the short run. The interests
of current intelligence are world-wide while those of warning intel-
ligence-as defined in the intelligence community-are rather lim-
ited geographically. The latter is engrossed in "indications of prepara-
tions for offensive military action in the immediate future against
the United States, its overseas forces or its allies." This is the pri-
mary mission of the Watch Committee, the Washington focal point
under USIB of strategic intelligence. It has historically been largely
limited to the USSR, Communist China, and their allies. In the last
decade the Watch Committee has followed developments from time
to time in a number of diverse areas peripheral to the Communist
blocs such as Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, the Sino-Indian bor-
der, Korea, Cuba and the Middle East. The rationale for following
these developments has been that a potential for Communist ex-
ploitation existed in the situation which might develop into a threat
to the US or its allies.
Indications, or warning intelligence thus may be said to be dis-
tinguished from other forms of current intelligence in that its primary
interest in enemy behavior is in terms of its threat potential. While
indications intelligence is usually co-located with current intelligence,
is always dependent on the same information, and is frequently de-
pendent on the current intelligence analyst himself, it does neverthe-
less view matters from a different perspective. The warning analyst
takes incoming scraps, matches them in his mind against an indi-
cator list, and frequently refers back to small nuggets that have long
since lost their current intelligence value. The warning analyst may
find threat overtones in a pattern of events which might otherwise
he considered innocuous if viewed piecemeal.
This is not to suggest that there is some peculiar mystique about
the indications process. The indications analyst is, in the writer's
view, a current intelligence analyst under instruction to review the
same intelligence as others, but, as we have said, from a different
perspective. The indications analyst looks at the information for
any strategic threat, perhaps only potential, to the US, its forces
abroad, or its allies. Other current intelligence analysts are also ex-
pected, as one of their duties, to think in terms of indications, but
it is the warning analyst's sole obligation to do so.
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A hypothetical situation might-.in oversimplified terms-illustrate
the differing viewpoints. Let us assume that in the 1970s the leader-
ship of Great Frusina (GF)-a mythical nation invented by Sherman
Kent-chooses to levy demands in most threatening form on the
neighboring small country of Outer Riding (OR) to stop the alleged
gross discrimination against OR's Frusinian minority. OR has a de-
fense pact with the US.
Current intelligence evaluation of the situation will proceed along
several lines. Thus, the political analyst sees the threat as part of the
Frusinian leadership's effort to distract and obtain support from dis-
satisfied groups. The political analyst will question the degrees of
support to be expected from allies of the two countries. The eco-
nomic analyst calculates the length of time it will take for GF to gird
its logistic loins for intervention. The military analyst follows closely
the number of GF units involved in exercises near OR's border.
The indications analyst, however, might ask himself whether GF
was just possibly using the threat of intervention to disquise efforts
at a surprise attack on the US. How many of its submarines are op-
erating out of their normal area? What is the state of GF's heavy
bombers? Are there any unusual steps being taken in the civil de-
fense field, such as art treasures being crated and moved out of town
in case of a retaliatory attack, keeping in mind that OR has no heavy
bombers or missiles that could reach the Great Frusinian capital city?
Hypothetically and ideally the warning analyst should be able to
rack up all his indicators, both positive and negative, and produce a
rough assessment as to how ready GF may be to launch an attack.
In reality, reading the warning tea leaves is not all that clear or
easy. Except in the unlikely event of our having direct access to
policy-making circles in Moscow or Peking, and guaranteed chan-
nels of prompt communications, the available intelligence may pro-
vide no signals, some signals, or ambiguous signals. Should the Krem-
lin decide on a pre-emptive attack on the US limited to missiles, the
preparations would be minimal and indicators might be virtually non-
existent. The other extreme would be a full-scale mobilization of the
enemy's conventional forces to be utilized in conjunction with his
missiles. In the latter case there may very well be sufficient indi-
cators available to give warning that the enemy had developed his
capabilities to the point where he could launch an attack at almost
any time should he elect to do so.
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In developing the tools of his trade, the warning analyst has sought
to create yardsticks for measuring norms of behavior. Thus, when
only a single gauge begins to register abnormally, there may be no
particularly serious threat developing. As an increasing number of
abnormalities begin to show up simultaneously, however, the warning
analyst inches closer to the edge of his chair and seeks to determine
the intent behind the enemy action.
The total picture presented by developing enemy action is rarely
defined in sharp colors. It tends to be less than clear-cut, in part
because of the constantly changing base lines which make last year's
abnormalities this year's norms. By way of example, the Soviets' sur-
face Mediterranean Squadron is now always present in the backyard
of the 6th Fleet, and the Squadron's size has gradually expanded.
There was no surface Mediterranean Squadron consistently on station
the year-round prior to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Soviet heavy
bombers get "out-of-area" and touch off radar reactions in Iceland
and the North American east coast periodically, both in numbers and
at distances that would have been rated as "abnormal" several years
ago, but tend to be considered more or less normal, if not completely
friendly at present.
There is a strong tendency in the ranks of professional bureau-
crats to safeguard one's nether parts. For the warning analyst,
however, continually to utter only shrill cries of "Wolfl" would ob-
viously be no service to the policy-maker. For this reason the warning
analyst, keeping in mind the possibility of the worst possible situa-
tion, must make a strenuous effort to give a realistic judgment on
the significance of any collection of abnormalities. And since the
enemy's activity may have been initiated for any one of a variety of
reasons, he obviously must try to come up with the best possible
assessment of enemy motivation. The enemy may he creating abnor-
malities as he prepares for a pre-emptive attack on the US or one
of its allies; or he may be attempting to defend against a fancied
attack from the US, or he may be staging a magnificent bluff in sup-
port of a major political move; or as in the recent past he may be
planning-right next door to NATO-to force one of his satellites
back on to the straight and narrow path that leads to Socialist per-
fection, Moscow style.
It can be hazardous to measure present and future situations
against past lessons. Nevertheless, past experience does suggest a
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number of observations that should help shape the warping analyst's
general background and judgment.
Two Major Don'ts
Don't expect the enemy to apply the same logic to his estimates of
the situation in question as the US analyst would. To wit, in the sum-
mer of 1968, there was a strongly-argued line current around the in-
telligence community that the Soviets probably would not invade
Czechoslovakia since they would surely be deterred by the oppro-
brium with which the world would judge such an action.
Don't be a victim of the Easy or Logical Explanation Syndrome. It
is frequently tempting to accept such an explanation even if it may
not be the correct one. Thus, during the Korean War there was
considerable warning that the Chinese might intervene in the con-
flict, but there was also a tendency to downgrade the seriousness of
the Chinese threat. Instead it was interpreted as a diplomatic ploy
designed to restrain the US and its allies by means short of direct
military involvement.
Remember that US intelligence has been trapped before by mis-
judging the intended target(s) which an enemy is preparing to at-
tack. Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the warning signals
received by US intelligence were analyzed, in part at least, as point-
ing to a Japanese campaign against Southeast Asia, which turned out
to be only a part of the whole truth.
Remember that repeated warnings can dull the reactions and
wariness of both the policy-maker and the intelligence analyst. Warn-
ings on North Korean intentions and capabilities were given repeated-
ly during the year prior to June 1950. How was one to distinguish
the North Korean Army activities north of the DMZ in June 1950
as preparation for a jump-off when similar past activities prior to
that time had proven invariably to be preparations for maneuvers?
Remember that history does not necessarily repeat itself. An ex-
cellent example of this was the Dutch hope prior to World War II
that they would again be allowed to remain neutral as they were in
World War I. The hope apparently grew into expectation. Thus, re-
peated warnings from a German military source located in the horse's
mouth, including notices of postponements and changes in schedule,
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served largely as an irritant and caused disbelief in The Hague. Fol-
lowing receipt of the final warning, the deputy chief of Dutch intel-
ligence is reported to have sought reassurance about German inten-
tions by phoning the German military attache. In the latter's absence,
his "charming wife" is reported to have given the Dutch bureaucrat
the assurance he craved. The Dutch official thereupon went home,
only a few hours before German ground forces rumbled over the
Dutch frontier.
The Two Important Questions
Do the enemy's actions signify an effort at deception and is he
deliberately, or perhaps unintentionally, creating a mix of signals that
point in virtually opposite directions? The missile crisis in Cuba is a
well-remembered example of deception. Another possible example is
the Hungarian revolution in 1956 when, in the face of the rapid
and large build-up of Soviet troops, Soviet officials in Hungary ap-
pear to have carried out a charade by fulfilling an agreement to with-
draw Soviet forces from Budapest and apparently indicating agree-
ment to discuss withdrawal from Hungary.
Does everyone have the warning? History records that some nine
hours after the opening of the attack on Pearl Harbor, US planes
were caught wing-tip to wing-tip at Clark Field in the Philippines.
The points cited are not an all-inclusive presentation of essential
background for a warning analyst, but they are typical of points he
might ideally check off in reaching a judgment. The points admit-
tedly also overlap to a degree and have been placed under arbi-
trary designators.
In conclusion, the warning analyst's analysis should tend to sound
more ominous than that of the current intelligence analyst. By defini-
tion, as the advocate of the worst possible situation, the indications
analyst is expected to espouse that attitude in considering each new
set of circumstances.
Given the state of modern Soviet weaponry, it is theoretically pos-
sible for the USSR to launch a bolt-from-the-blue without a single in-
dication warning that the appropriate Kremlin finger is poised over
the ICBM button. If the Soviet preparation, however, called for con-
siderably more activity and of longer duration involving such diverse
fields as political warnings, extraordinary civil defense measures,
unusual Long Range Air Force deployments and/or an unusually
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large number of submarines out-of-area, the chances of sounding a
tocsin would be considerably improved.
Several weeks prior to the 20 August 1968 Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia, the warning machinery expressed the belief that the
Soviets were militarily prepared to intervene if the Kremlin consid-
ered it necessary. If the reader will accept this warning as a satis-
factory example of what might be expected from strategic intelli-
gence, then the number of hours devoted to the indications type of
sentry duty represent a reasonably inexpensive US insurance policy-
possibly straight life.
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No Foreign IDissem
The impact of aging on the
conduct of leadership
ON AGING LEADERS
Jerrold M. Post, M.D.
"The old gray mare she ain't what she used to be,"-American Folk Song
"Wisdom is with the aged and understanding in length of days."-job
12:12
"And so, from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe, And then, from hour to
hour, we rot and rot, And thereby hangs a tale."-Shakespeare
"If a family has in its midst an old person it possesses a jewel."-Chinese
Proverb
There is now a sizable group of world leaders seventy years old
or more whose decisions and policies are significant to US interests.
To name but a few: Ho Chi Minh is 77; Mao Tse-tung, 75; Chou
En-lai, 70; Chiang Kai-shek, 82; Charles de Gaulle, 78; Francisco
Franco, 76; Haile Selassie, 76; Josip Tito, 76; and Walter Ulbricht, 75.
This paper will discuss some of the ways the conduct of leader-
ship may be affected by the aging process. Aging is a continuous
process which begins with conception; hardening of the arteries was
recently found in a fetus. This paper does not seek to make qualita-
tive distinctions between the young and the old, but rather to dis-
cuss directional changes which accompany the aging process and
have inherent predictive value. Particularly emphasized will be the
tendency for longstanding attitudes to become intensified and for
personality traits to become exaggerated.
One should not assume because a man has reached his seventies
that he has suffered a significant decline in his intellectual or crea-
tive powers. The vintage Bordeaux wine only achieves the full
measure of its greatness after slowly maturing over many years. One
contemporary example of a leader who performed extremely effec-
tively and, at times, brilliantly during his eighth and ninth decades
is Konrad Adenauer, who died at the age of 91, having retired only
a few years earlier. In the world of arts and letters, we need only
think of Sophocles, who was 89 when he wrote Oedipus at Colonnus,
Goethe, who wrote Faust at the age of 80, and Michelangelo, who
completed the Pieta at age 84 and served as architect to St. Peter's
until his death at age 89.
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But even the finest wine, if kept too long, can turn sour, and some
of these leaders are definitely showing signs of aging. Franco and
Chiang Kai-shek are two examples. Recent reports from Spain indi-
cate Franco is having increasing difficulties. His mental powers are
said to have deteriorated considerably; he is not as alert as formerly
and has difficulties concentrating and making decisions. Although
alert for the most part, Chiang Kai-shek has had physical symptoms
which suggest that his brain is receiving insufficient nourishment,
that there has been a decrease in blood flow to the brain.
As the examples illustrate, one really cannot make wide-ranging
generalizations about the capacities of aging individuals; there is a
great difference between an "old gray mare" and "a jewel." How-
ever, just as there are characteristic features of the normal psychology
of adolescents (undoubtedly a significant contribution to dissenting
youth), so too there are some features characteristic of the normal
psychology of aging individuals. Furthermore, as cerebral arterio-
sclerosis (hardening of the arteries of the brain) begins to take its
inexorable toll, a well-recognized, but often initially subtle pattern
develops, which progressively interferes with the intellectual facul-
ties. Of particular importance for estimative intelligence are the
ways in which problem-solving abilities, reactions to stress, attitudes,
and judgment are affected.
Normal Psychology of the Aging Period
The cultural context has an important bearing on the ways in
which an individual reacts to increasing age. In cultures with strong
family ties, where religious values stress tranquility and wisdom,
the aged individual may he revered as a prophet and given a place
of honor. In many Western cultures, a premium is placed on youth,
ambition, strength, and daring. In such cultures, old age can be par-
ticularly threatening.
Old age can produce a freedom, for as the older person becomes
progressively slowed down and has difficulties keeping up with the
pace of life, he is also less dominated by his drives. The diminish-
ment of perceptual processes, particularly as eyesight and hearing
begin to fail, is often accompanied by withdrawal. There is an in-
creasing tendency to be self-contained, to be less emotionally in-
volved with others, to be less accessible to outside influence.
Although perceptual processes and reaction time slow down, there
is no lessening of discrimination and the capacity for strategic or-
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Aging Leaders SECRET
ganization may exceed that of the younger individual. Whatever
knowledge and experience the aging individual has gained is re-
tained for an indeterminant time, as is his approach to problem-
solving. Moreover, he is able to rely upon his accumulated experi-
ence and wisdom without the distraction of conflicting personal
relationships and disturbing outside signals. Recognizing this, mod-
ern society has developed the roles of counsellor and senior states-
man.
For many, the idea of losing their occupational status may be very
threatening, particularly when the career has been an extremely re-
warding one. This often leads to a sense of nostalgia, a tendency to
see the present in terms of the past, to look to the past both for solu-
tions and reassurance. The threat of loss of position and the increas-
ing awareness of failing physical powers may lead some to react
against being passive by becoming hyperindependent and preoc-
cupied with demonstrating power and strength.
Time is of the essence. The same ambitions, wishes, feelings, yearn-
ings, and desires which motivated the aging individual when younger
are present in his old age. It has been remarked that "old wishes
never die; they don't even fade away." Although it is rare for an
aged individual to think of himself as old, with a growing awareness
of the ebbing of time, he often experiences an increasing urgency
to make his mark. He may ask, "What have I accomplished? How
much time do I have left?" It is this urgency which gives the exag-
gerated quality to the long-standing personality patterns so that
pre-existing attitudes appear to be intensified. It has been suggested,
for example, that the recent upsurge in provocative activity by North
Korea may be related to Kim Il-sung's sensitivity to his increasing
years, for although he is only 56, it is believed in Korea that a man's
life work must be accomplished by age 62. Charles de Gaulle is an-
other aging leader in command of his faculties who seems to be dem-
onstrating an increasing need to have his importance recognized, if
necessary, by standing out and showing that he is a force to be reck-
oned with in order to gain this recognition.
Charles de Gaulle
"As a man grows older, he becomes more like himself."-Anonymous
De Gaulle's inflammatory exhortations of the summer of 1967. for
a free Quebec were considered by his opponents to be "the aberra-
tion of a deluded old man, living in the past." The cry of "]iberte,
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egalite', senilitel" echoed widely. One editorial diagnosed de Gaulle
as suffering from "a morbid enlargement of the ego."
Although a member of de Gaulle's circle noted he was showing
his mental age from time to time, Ambassador Bohlen was impressed
that he was "in very good form," and other American observers have
found him to be extremely alert with no evidence of intellectual
decline.
The question, "Is de Gaulle senile?" is too bald, too black and
white. De Gaulle is almost seventy-nine and has progressively de-
teriorating eyesight. In 1964, after putting it off for several years,
he submitted to prostate surgery. More recently, there have been
scattered reports of fainting spells. The variation in reports is consist-
ent with the fluctuation in condition often found in older individuals.
On the basis of our review of the available data, we would agree
with the observers who have noted that for a man of his age, de
Gaulle is in good form. To draw the inference from this, however,
that the aging process has no influence on his attitudes and be-
havior, would be in error. What can we expect from de Gaulle in
his declining years? How will he react to political pressure? What
that le grand Charles was, if anything, grander than ever. And that
is exactly the point.
Observers of the French scene believe there is a rationale and
continuity in de Gaulle's attitudes and behavior over the past forty
to fifty years with which the Quebec episode was entirely consistent,
although some analysts have felt it was rather more extreme than
usual. When he went on successfully to confront the rioting students
at the barricades and defend the franc from attack, it was observed
that le grand Charles was, if anything, grander than ever. And that
is exactly the point.
We believe that with increasing age, the attitudes which have
characterized de Gaulle throughout his political career are becoming
even more sharply delineated. He is, in effect, becoming a carica-
ture of himself. Although many defensible rationales for de Gaulle's
actions in Canada have been offered, it may be that a younger de
Gaulle would not have been so provocative. An exaggeration of
his long-standing attitudes, perhaps in combination with an early
flagging of judgment, may have colored his behavior.
The attitudes of de Gaulle which are particularly likely to be-
come exaggerated with increasing age are those related to his own
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Aging Leaders SECRET
sense of power. If through his actions he can make himself feel pow-
erful and France seem important, this is sufficient justification. His
own viewpoint will become even more dominant so that he will be-
come less and less accessible to the counsel of his advisors. To rely
on others and need the approval of others has always been regarded
by de Gaulle as weak, but he increasingly seems to gain gratifica-
tion from not submitting smoothly to the wishes of others and to
grow stronger in the face of disapproval, as if it were a spur and
not a deterrent. Even more so than in the past, if de Gaulle cannot
feel that he has total mastery, it would not be surprising to see him
totally retreat into the exile of private life. Particularly when he is
made especially aware of his diminished stature, either as a world
leader or in a more personal sense, when he is made forcibly aware
of his failing power as a physically healthy and mentally alert man,
we can expect, at those times, the most exaggerated action in an attempt
to reaffirm his mastery as a man. The weaker he feels physically, and
the more secondary France seems politically, the grander his moves
can be expected to be. To rephrase an old adage, "the harder he falls,
the bigger he will be."
Psychological Manifestations of Hardening of the Arteries
There is no correlation between age and cerebral arteriosclerosis
(hardening of the arteries of the brain). As we have earlier noted,
many men in their seventies and eighties function at a very high
level with little or no impairment of their creative and intellectual
capacities. Conversely, younger men may show significant interfer-
ence with their functioning, particularly when other medical condi-
tions exist which may accelerate arteriosclerosis. Gamal Abdel Nas-
ser, 51, Chiang Ching-kuo, 57, and Francois Duvalier, 61, all of whom
suffer from diabetes, may be much older arterially than their chrono-
logical ages. Once the march of symptomatic cerebral arteriosclerosis
has begun, a pattern of functional disturbance usually follows which
can reliably be expected to become more severe.
1. Afflicted individuals demonstrate a progressive impairment in their capacity
to think abstractly. Thinking becomes more concrete, rigid, and inflexible
with a tendency to see things in black and white terms.
2. Responses to stimuli become less flexible and more stereotyped; it becomes
difficult to change a mental set so that afflicted individuals are seen
as becoming more "stubborn."
3. There is a general decline in intellectual capacities. Concentration and
memory, particularly recent memory, are usually especially affected.
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4. There is an associated impairment of judgment. Impulses which had
earlier been checked by the restraint of judgment may now be more
easily expressed. Thus, an individual may behave more aggressively or
he more easily provoked.
5. Emotional reactions in general become less well controlled; afflicted in-
dividuals are irritable, easily provoked to anger, tears, or euphoria, and
are more sensitive to slight. Depressive reactions are common.
6. Earlier personality traits tend to flower. As with the normal aging indi-
vidual, the basic personality and life style remain intact. But even more
than in the older individual without organic problems, long-standing
attitudes and drives are expressed in an exaggerated way. The charac-
teristically distrustful person may become frankly paranoid. Josef Stalin
is a case in point.
7. Afflicted individuals have both good days and bad days. The course of
cerebral arteriosclerosis is often characterized by wide fluctuations, but
is invariably downhill. Thus, a reliable report of apparently excellent
health should not lead the analyst to discount other reports of failing
health, as has sometimes been the case with Mao Tse-tung.
Mao Tse-tung
"Though he has watched a decent age pass by, A man will sometimes
still desire the world."
Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonnus
Millions of Red Chinese today give daily praise to the thoughts of
Mao Tse-tung. As best as we are able to tell, the thoughts of Mao
are probably rather confused. There can be little doubt that Mao is
suffering from significant symptomatic cerebral arteriosclerosis. Re-
ports continue to depict a deterioration in his health. Some of the
apparent discrepancies in Mao's behavior and appearance have con-
fused many observers and led some to discount the reports of ill
health. We believe in the main that the fluctuations in his behavior
and appearance are related to the varying course of the arterioscle-
rotic process.
The impaired use of his left side and several appearances without
speaking suggest organic brain damage. Paralysis or weakness and
difficulty in finding words and in speaking are frequent residual
symptoms of "stroke," a frequent complication of hardening of the
arteries of the brain. It has been reported that Mao was told by
his physician that he has "brain anemia." His waxen facial expres-
sion and robot-like manner of moving give added weight to the im-
pression that he is suffering from a cerebral deterioration.
It was possible in 1966 to indicate some of the ways Mao's think-
ing and behavior would be increasingly affected by these difficulties.
We suggested that Mao would probably become more and more
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We suggested that Mao would probably become more and more
rigid and inflexible with a tendency to see things in black and white;
that once he had set a plan in motion, it would be difficult for him
to stop it despite compelling evidence and advice; that his judgment
and decisionmaking faculties would become progressively impaired.
We suggested that distrust, suspiciousness, and emotional lability
would mount so that a friend one moment could be seen as an enemy
the next, and he would be less and less accessible to outside influence.
We observed that individuals damaged by arteriosclerosis are often
unaware of their incapacities, so that Mao might attempt to main-
tain control beyond the time when appropriate to yield the reins;
but that to the extent he was aware of his failing powers, vanity
and pride would become magnified so that he would be more sensi-
tive to loss of face and would feel an increased urgency to accom-
plish his mission and demonstrate that it was he that brought Com-
munism to its full flowering.
The Cultural Revolution represents a complex crisis in the con-
temporary history of Communist China. Powerful social and political
groups are in conflict, fighting for their very existence. Although it
would be foolish to ascribe such a complicated social crisis to one
man's intellectual deterioration, as the foregoing estimate suggests,
it may be that an important contribution to the chaos of the Cul-
tural Revolution is the internal diameter of the arteries in the brain
of Mao Tse-tung.
Conclusion
We have attempted to delineate some of the effects of aging on
the intellect and personality. We have suggested that understanding
these changes may help in evaluating and predicting the political
behavior and decisionmaking of some world leaders. To illustrate
these points, two world leaders from opposite sides of the globe have
been discussed: Charles de Gaulle,* as an example of normal reac-
tions to old age; and Mao Tse-tung, as an example of changes as-
sociated with hardening of the arteries.
Of particular importance to intelligence estimation is the interac-
tion of exaggerated pro-existing attitudes with decrease in judgment.
More than political factors should be considered in trying to fathom
the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung and Charles de Gaulle, for the relent-
less onslaught of age is probably playing a significant role.
* Editor's Note. This edition of Studies was in an advanced stage of production
when de Gaulle resigned in April, 1969.
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No Foreign Dissem
A multifarious technical collection
system ready to come of age.
PRESENT AND FUTURE
CAPABILITIES OF OTH RADARS
Nicholas R. Garofalo
The unique significance of over-the-horizon (OTH) radar systems
is that they can provide information on hostile missile and aircraft
activity, and support other intelligence gathering systems, at ranges
up to 5,000 kilometers. By using the ionosphere as a reflector for
radio energy, these radars are not limited by the line-of-sight restric-
tions on conventional ground-based radars. The ionosphere performs
as a reflector when the radar operates in the high frequency (HF)
region, nominally 3 to 40 MHz. By means of this technique, intelli-
gence can be gathered by a ground-based radar placed in a friendly
country adjacent to the target area. The OTH system can, to a
limited extent, alleviate the need to deploy costly and sometimes op-
erationallysensitive line-of-sight platforms, such as aircraft or satel-
lites. The purpose of this paper is to outline the history and results
of the community's efforts in this area to date, and to offer a fore-
cast of the future capabilities of this variety of collector.
Development Philosophy
With the Office of Naval Research, the CIA shared in the use of
a domestically situated OTH radar facility called CHAPEL BELL.
This has been especially helpful for equipment checkout and experi-
mentation. The CIA program also has benefitted from the extensive
basic research sponsored by other agencies at this facility conducted
by a single commercial contractor. From the outset, the CIA's method
in deploying OTH installations has been to continue research and
development in the field, for reasons of economy as well as ex-
pediency. Indeed, fiscal circumstances did not allow development
of a test prototype prior to deployment.
This procedure has worked, and CIA-sponsored systems have
been and remain in the vanguard of sophistication for operationally
deployed OTH systems. Not the least of the merits of the overseas
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deployment philosophy is that the installations it has produced
have yielded valid data. In addition, this kind of approach has pro-
vided valuable information to others in the defense community plan-
ning deployment of similar systems in the future.
History of CIA Systems
The first OTH radar system deployed overseas was called EARTH-
LING (formerly CHAPLAIN). Plans for this installation started dur-
ing the embryonic stages of OTII technology in 1958. The radar be-
gan operation in I uin March 1961. Compared to
later systems EARTHLING was crude indeed, but continuous ex-
periment with it spawned invention and made possible new and
viable systems.
EARTHLING was what is called a monostatic-pulse radar which
operated over a frequency range of 6-26 MHz and had peak power
of 200 kilowatts. From the outset it was evident that it had to be
able to compensate for variabilities of the ionosphere. The system
was therefore designed to be tuned instantaneously to any frequency
in the above-mentioned band. This so-called frequency diversity mode
of operation is still a feature of CHECKROTE, our present system.
At any given period of time, the frequency moves about in such a
manner that only two or three coherent pulses are transmitted at a
specific frequency in a selected optimum 3 MHz band. The coherent
pulses are required for a moving target indicator, which discriminates
moving targets from fixed ground clutter. There are numerous ad-
vantages to this "frequency diversity" format, perhaps the most im-
portant being that it causes minimal interference with other HF
uses. On this score, indeed, there have been no serious complaints
from the international community in more than eight years of over-
seas operation.'
EARTHLING was designed primarily to detect ICBM or earth
satellite vehicle launches from the Tyuratam missile complex. The
engines of such missiles continue to burn until they reach an altitude
well above 100 kilometers, thereby creating an enhanced radar cross
section which can be 3 to 5 times larger than the actual radar cross
section of the body of the missile. This effect is caused by excess
'It is interesting that I picked up the
CHECKROTE signal and correctly diagnose its purpose and the probable
location of the transmitter.
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electrons generated by the ionization process of the missile exhaust.
These electrons remain unattached because of the rarified atmos-
phere at these high altitudes. IRBMs, MRBMs and ABMs 2 usually
burn out below 100 kilometers and such enhancements are not fre-
quent in firings of such missiles. Radar sensitivity requirements for
detection of such firings are therefore much more stringent than for
the larger vehicles.
Research and development to improve EARTHLING's perform-
ance continued into 1964. In June of that year it was felt that the
system had reached operational readiness for employment against
the enhanced missile targets mentioned above. To September 1965,
EARTHLING detected 65 missiles launched from Tyuratam. This
was 82 percent of the total number known to have been launched when
EARTHLING was on the air. There also were a few detec-
tions not reported by any other source. These could have been aborts
which line-of-sight collection systems could not have picked up. 'There
is also the possibility that certain of these detections could have
been false alarms.
In September 1965, closed the EARTH-
LING installation, an action precipitated largely by the political un-
certainty resulting from
After negotiating with or over a year to little avail,
CIA decided to remove the equipment in November 1966.
In May 1965 work began to install an OTH radar system called
CHECKROTE in the western Pacific off the China coast for the
purpose of monitoring missile launch activity from the Shuang-Cheng-
Tsu missile complex (SCTMC). The program met an ambitious
schedule and CHECKROTE was on the air by 1 August 1966. This
system is the most sophisticated OTH radar presently developed or
operationally deployed within the intelligence community.
2 There is a possibility that ABM types such as high-performance SPRINTs
will create an enhanced radar cross section. The reason is that such missiles travel
at much higher velocities at lower altitudes than conventional missiles, and also
high g maneuvers usually occur during these flights. Interest has been generated
in this hypothesis because of suspect SPRINT detections made by the Naval
Research Laboratory's MADRE radar. This matter is presently under investigation
within the community.
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It was suspected that the Chinese were at the time testing med-
ium or possibly intermediate range missiles at this complex, and it
was therefore necessary to design the radar to detect the missile
skin, rather than the enhanced image. This meant that the radar had
to be at least three times more sensitive than EARTHLING. The
CHECKROTE format was patterned after that of EARTHLING,
but improved performance was obtained by increasing the peak power
and the antenna gain. In addition, the system processing gain was
increased through the use of a technique known as pulse compres-
sion. This latter modification also improved range resolution (20
times better than EARTHLING) vital to the acquisition of missile
trajectory information. Also included in CHECKROTE was an auto-
matic azimuth monopulse mode which has the capability of provid-
ing refined target azimuth data; however, this feature has not yet
functioned effectively. The difficulty is that presently the missile sig-
nature signal-to-noise ratio is not sufficient for such an automated op-
eration. It is hoped that the present equipment modifications will al-
leviate this problem.
The first missile detection from the SCTMC was made on 5 De-
cember 1966. Through September 1968 there have been 38 suspect
missile detections reported by CHECKROTE, 3 in 1966, 29 in 1967,
and 6 in 1968. There is a justifiable tendency within the intelligence
community to demand firm collateral substantiation of events ob-
served by OTH early in the development phase. Unfortunately, no
such collateral information presently exists with respect to China,
which in turn ironically emphasizes the importance of CHECKROTE.
The procedure at present is to analyze any doubtful signatures with
care to make certain they are consistent with the characteristics of
the missiles expected from the SCTMC complex and with the ex-
pected radar performance. We can therefore be reasonably confident
that the great majority of the signatures collected were bona fide
detections. Obviously, in the absence of collateral information and
because of the present limited statistical base, accurate determina-
tion of the rate of false alarm or misses is impossible. It is hoped
that improvement in the performance of CHECKROTE will in time
improve the situation and allay doubt. As a matter of fact a major
modification is presently in progress to improve the target-discerning
capabilities of CHECKROTE. More refined signature data should
become available after these improvements are completed in the
spring of 1969.
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Major Problem Areas
The difficulties of predicting the performance of OTH radar sys-
tems can be attributed mainly to ionospheric vagaries and to back-
ground noise. Past and present systems have continued to be plagued
by uncertainties introduced by these conditions. Proponents of OTH
therefore usually have felt constrained to offer rather modest or quali-
fied judgments about the results to be expected from any new sys-
tems. Not surprisingly, this often engenders scepticism, which is en-
hanced when the realization dawns that the interpretation of mis-
sile signatures on OTH records is a matter of considerable difficulty.
In fact, candor compels confession that analyzing these records is
more an art than a science. The trick is to distinguish the valid signs
from ground clutter, noise, and normal ionospheric perturbation ef-
fects. Moreover, these problems are much more acute in systems like
CHECKROTE, which detects the actual missile or aircraft skin, than
in systems detecting enhanced ICBM targets.
Two techniques are presently being used in the effort to resolve
these problems. First, CHECKROTE is being used in such a way
that the optimum frequency for illuminating the target area can be
definitively determined consistent with the actual ionospheric refrac-
tion conditions at the mid-point. By using this technique, known as
oblique sounding, unpredictable conditions at the mid-point can be
determined at any given moment, thereby permitting the equip-
ment to be adjusted to minimize ionospheric attenuation losses. This
technique is successful because CHECKROTE's range resolution is
so precise that ground features, such as mountain ranges and cities,
are identifiable and thereby act as passive beacons. Since the dis-
tances to these features are known, the height of the ionosphere can
be determined with some accuracy. This information is essential for
the analysis of signature data to calculate missile trajectories.
Concerning the external noise problem, it has been theoretically
and experimentally demonstrated that by using a technique known
as sub-band filtering, HF interference may be reduced. Here, the
receiver IF bandwidth is divided into numerous smaller bands by
using contiguous filters, which operate in such a way that an inter-
fering signal will contribute to the overall noise in only a minor
fashion. The degree to which this is effective depends on the number
of filters used. Without filtering in the receiver, it could be captured
SECRET 57
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SECRET OTH Radars
and desensitized by an incoming signal, rendering it useless for tar-
get detection. This filtering technique has been successfully employed
in CHECKROTE.
Two of the most difficult problems confronting the OTH radar de-
signer-noise and ionospheric effects-can thus be ameliorated by
using the foregoing or similar techniques. It therefore follows that
reasonably accurate predictions about performance can be made. In
time, these techniques may result in reasonably high quality data
from OTH systems and thus increased confidence within the com-
munity for their use in fulfilling intelligence needs.
Other OTH Systems
Another variety of OTH radar is the so-called MADRE, developed
by the Naval Research Laboratory at the Chesapeake Bay Annex in
Maryland. This system can make precision doppler 3 measurements
as well as those of range and azimuth. This capability is essential
to monitor multiple targets, such as aircraft. The AN/FPS-95 or
SENTINEL FAN presently under development by the Air Force is
patterned after MADRE. It is scheduled to be installed
I uin about mid-1970, and will cost approximately $50
million. The purpose of this installation will be to skin-detect mis-
siles from the northern operational missile complex of the USSR and
to provide information on movements of Soviet aircraft. This project
has drawn heavily upon the experience gained in the development
of CHECKROTE.
(of
the bi-static CW type) targeted against missile activity at the Tyura-
tam and Kapustin Yar missile test complexes in the Soviet Union.
This radar provides doppler and duration-of-flight data, but not range
data. It has the advantage of simplicity, but its inability to provide
refined range data forecloses its use to obtain the oblique sounder
information so important for continuous reliable operation. The re-
sults obtained with =to date have shown this deficiency.
Particularly during the summer months the probability that it will
detect missiles is diminished appreciably because of irregularities in
the ionosphere.
'In this type of radar the doppler shift in frequency caused by a moving target
is measured accurately. This aids in distinguishing fixed from moving targets,
together with isolating specific objects in a multi-target environment.
25X1
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Also 0 modified a ui pment called
has been recently installed at installation to monitor
ABM activity at Sary Shagan in the USSR. As yet, no results have
been received, and reliable coverage of this prime target may be
difficult because it is so far away from the receivers. This could re-
sult in inefficient propagation a good percentage of the time, but
there is little doubt that under favorable conditions this system should
be able to detect ABMs at Sary Shagan.
The Air Force 440 L program and that of the Army Security
Agency are examples of so-called scatter systems. The difference be-
tween the two is that the former system controls the transmitters
used to illuminate the Soviet missile complexes of interest, while
the latter system uses available inimical transmitters which fortui-
tously illuminate the areas of interest. In the case of 440 L, transmitter
complexes in the nd two in lare in con-
tinuous operation using a programmed frequency ormat in an at-
tempt to set up sufficient radio paths across the USSR to monitor
Soviet operational missile complexes. Five receiver sites in Western
Europe, from re used to record the missile de-
tection information. The primary mission of this system is to provide
early warning of multiple launches against the United States. It has
demonstrated the capability to detect the ionospheric perturbation-
type signatures associated with ICBM missiles. There is a degree of
controversy within the community as regards the false alarm, or miss
rate capability of this system. In any case, it has little or no capabil-
ity for detecting missile skins because of the extremely long ranges
at which it must operate.
With regard to using signals from non-cooperative transmitters, i.e.,
Soviet or Chinese, such a system theoretically could skin-detect a
missile if these effectively illuminated the target from line-of-sight,
and if the frequency of the transmitter were such that minimal
ionospheric path losses were encountered back to the receiver site.
The effectiveness of such a system for a particular intelligence or
early warning mission, when considering the probability of missile
detection under various diurnal and seasonal conditions, is a subject
of great complexity and will not be discussed here. For present pur-
poses, it is sufficient to note that under certain conditions skin-de-
tection of missiles could be accomplished by such means.
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25X1
25X1
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Other Applications
Up to now, the primary applications considered for OTH radar
systems have been adversary missile monitoring, trajectory determi-
nation, and, to a lesser extent, aircraft monitoring and tracking. Ad-
ditional uses for such systems are under active investigation, includ-
ing nuclear detection and diagnostics, command and data retrieval
functions for stay-behind devices,4 and navigational monitoring and
updating for hostile border penetration vehicles. With regard to nuclear
detection, OTH can supplement the other elaborate technical collection
techniques already deployed. Both the EARTHLING and
CHECKROTE systems have demonstrated that they can provide
data collateral or complimentary to that obtained by these other sys-
tems, especially if the nuclear event occurred at a high altitude and
was of a yield in excess of 100 KT. Such collateral data gathered by
EARTHLING has been useful in the analysis of past Soviet nuclear
tests.
Programs were initiated in the other two areas mentioned above
in 1963. These efforts were started by developing equipment which
could respond to the unique frequency diversity format used in
CIA's OTH radars. The system is thus relatively secure. Experi-
ments have also been made to apply it to tracking cooperative air-
craft, and during the WANDERING BOY program in 1964, an air-
craft with the appropriate equipment aboard was successfully tracked
from San Francisco to Hawaii from the ONR site at Muirkirk, Mary-
land. It is now possible to use OTH systems to perform such func-
tions when stay-behind data rate requirements are modest, such as
1,000 bits/second, and studies are in progress to improve upon this.
Even if the data requirements of a particular application are too
high for reliable HF propagation, OTH systems can still perform
important command functions required for the efficient operation
of remote systems. The CHECKROTE system has already been used
in this capacity for China mainland operations, and there will be
more such applications. Development in this general area is pointed
toward specific operational requirements. The problems are the clas-
sic ones of making the equipment reliable and secure as well as
extremely small.
` Such devices are usually implanted in a hostile country close to targets of
opportunity. There they gather intelligence unattended, store the data, and
transmit it upon command.
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OTH Radars SECRET
Planned Systems and Capabilities
A recent study has shown that it would be reasonably simple to
modify CHECKROTE for aircraft tracking and monitoring. A pulse-
doppler radar format would be required for such a mission, that is,
one different from that for missile detection. The study in question
suggested modifications to CHECKROTE to give it a capability
for covering both a missile and an aircraft mission simultaneously.
The Air Force is presently contemplating installing a separate OTH
system in the Far East similar to the modified CHECKRCTE to
monitor enemy aircraft activity in the Cambodia, North Vietnam, and
Laos areas. Deployment of a modified CHECKROTE system in the
Middle East is also planned to gather intelligence on ABM and
SAM activity from Sary Shagan.
Future Considerations
Recent advances in technology and overseas operational accom-
plishments have ensured that OTH radar systems will have an im-
portant future role in a variety of intelligence applications. Such sys-
tems also promise to be valuable in other areas, including early warn-
ing of hostile missiles and aircraft, and peacetime monitoring of com-
mercial aircraft. In the nature of the technique, certain limitations
still persist, but technical advances now in sight will give the req-
uisite degree of reliability. What is required now are initiative and
imagination in exploiting the available technology. OTH radar sys-
tems are finally coming of age.
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Insights into a need intelligence
probably doesn't know it has.
BEYOND WEBSTER AND ALL THAT:
DICTIONARIES OF UNCONVENTIONAL LANGUAGE
Arthur J. Salemme
Every professional linguist, regardless of the language in which he
specializes, has repeatedly had to answer the question, "Why do
you have to have another dictionary? You got three already!" Each
time the question is asked, the linguist can only groan and explain
once more that yes, he does have three dictionaries, but they were
all published before World War II. One, in fact, was compiled by a
linguistically unsophisticated missionary in 1862. But this new dic-
tionary has the foreign equivalents of such terms as "radar," "anti-
missile missile," and "nuclear warhead." Wouldn't it be nice to know
them? Unfortunately, that argument does not always satisfy the non-
linguist, who probably is simply trying to economize by eliminat-
ing boondoggles and fripperies. At one point he might even inter-
rupt the explanation to say, "But you've been an expert in that lan-
guage for years-you're supposed to know all the words in it."
Well, to put this on a purely personal basis, I've been speaking
English all my life and I must admit that I still don't know all the
English words that exist. I still have to use an English dictionary
from time to time! Vast technical areas that I am completely igno-
rant of have their own well-established terminology and are develop-
ing new words right and left. These technical and specialized terms
often are unrecorded in everyday dictionaries. A general dictionary
like Webster's could not be expected to include all of them even if
new supplements to the dictionary could be printed every month.
And Webster's is having a hard enough time keeping up with the
changes in the nontechnical vocabulary (e.g., "irregardless" now
means "regardless," "imply" now means "infer"). Therefore, people
working in many fields of activity need specialized dictionaries and
glossaries. That is why in any language there are specialized dic-
tionaries used in-you name it-the plastics industry, the semicon-
ductors industry, aerospace research, bookkeeping, beekeeping, and
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so on and on. Will the nonlinguist concede that there may be, in one
or more of those fields, one or two words that he does not immediately
know the meaning of? If so, will he then concede that there might
be a practical value attached to having those specialized dictionaries
printed in the first place?
If this much be conceded, why not also have a dictionary of un-
conventional language? That is, a dictionary of the very sorts of things
that your English teacher used to rap your knuckles for ("Marvin!
`ain't' isn't in the dictionary!") or your mother used to wash your
mouth out for ("Never mind what it means!-just don't say it any-
more, and I don't care if kids do say it!"). Isn't the collecting and
printing of non-standard expressions a legitimate field of linguistic
research? Isn't Eric Partridge, the author of the Dictionary of Slang
and Unconventional English and many other works in the area of
unconventional speech, a serious lexicographer, even though some of
his listed entries end up having four letters each?
Yes-forgive me answering my own question-such dictionaries
do have a practical value. They can, of course, help the casual reader
in interpreting graffiti and certain types of literature (how, for ex-
ample, can a person reading early Mailer be helped by the Webster
definition of the verb "fug" as "to loll indoors in a stuffy atmosphere"?).
But, more importantly, they can also be of use to anyone who-for-
give my indelicacy-is listening in on anyone else's private conversa-
tions for whatever reason. Take the law-enforcement officer employing
legal means to collect information about an illegal activity. How
about an undercover narcotics-squad agent working on a case? 1
Wouldn't it be a good idea for them to know the meanings of all
the words they hear, even if some of them are indelicate. Wouldn't
it be better for the undercover agent to memorize all the entries in
a "List of Words Used by L. A. Hippies" than to blow his cover by
saying, "Hey, man, I don't dig that word you keep using!"
And how about a "usually reliable" source who reports that a highly-
placed military or governmental figure in country-whatever might
be on the point of defecting? Wouldn't it be good for him to know
'The word "case" in this context is used in the meaning "the matters of fact
or condition involved in a suit," as in the newspaper item, "Police discovered a
case of whisky under the railroad culvert last night. No marks of identification
were found, but in the meantime the entire detective force is working on the case."
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exactly what is compelling that person to consider defecting? Of
course the defector will eventually write in his autobiography that
he "could no longer live in a society where the personal rights of the
individual are trampled under a system of totalitarian, etc., etc." But
you and I know, and the source knows, that the would-be defector
is probably in some kind of serious personal trouble. But exactly
what kind? Since the defector is a foreigner, ask the linguist. Whether
he says, "I translated all the words I can find in the available dic-
tionaries, and the blanks represent words I've never seen or heard
in my life," or whether he says, "I left blanks for the words I can
find in a bootleg copy of a Nasty-Words Dictionary, but I didn't
want the typist to see them," there is little value attached to explana-
tions such as the following: "He ... his ... with a .... The two of
them ... a while and then he ... his ... She giggled a bit and then
all of a sudden, she yelled, `You ... I I'm going to tell my husbandl' " 2
Wouldn't it be desirable for the contact man to have all the facts at
his disposal so as to make the proper recommendations to his supe-
riors about how to handle the ... ?
Well, even if we get a few nonlinguists to admit that there are
practical needs for such dictionaries of unconventional speech, that
doesn't mean that the linguists can now run out to Brentano's and
order one in every language. Who says there's a Dirty Greek Dic-
tionary anyway? Even if there is one, it would probably contain only
those words that one particular dirty Greek in 1943 thought should
be included. One man's idea of obscenity is not another man's, and
one nationality's is not another nationality's.3 That explains the sins of
omission and commission in the few dictionaries of obscenities that
'As I invented this snatch of conversation, I thought that I was putting the
dashes in at random, but then I suppose that Rorschach kept insisting that his
inkspots were random too.
'To this day, Germans keep saying that the officers on the German High Com-
mand were completely baffled by General McAuliffe's terse and presumably con-
temptuous message at Bastogne, "Nuts!" A lot of Americans were baffled too.
"Nuts!" is the sort of thing that a male hairdresser might say when he can't get
a spit curl to curl just so, but a general telling the Krauts to flub themselves?
The mystery was eventually cleared up when it was learned that, somewhere in
transmission to the Germans and to the American frontline reporters, the general's
original five-letter expletive had been changed to a four-letter expletive. The
linguistic tour-de-force of putting in a four-letter word to clean up a statement
was somewhat marred by the fact that, while the two words are synonymous in
one sense, they are not completely interchangeable as expletives.
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are available. In the field of Dirty Russian Studies, for example, there
are only two publications generally referred to (and you'd be sur-
prised to hear how often they are referred to for operational rea-
sons). One publication, the typescript "Dictionary of Slang, Obscen-
ities and Colloquial Phrases," is incredible in what it includes. In ad-
dition to the obvious obscenities, it contains words that can be found
in any Russian-English dictionary, such as "plaksa" (crybaby) and
"skryaga" (miser). Apparently the Russian compiler simply listed all
the words he could think of that would get him a fist in the mouth.
The American-born author of the other Russian-to-English obscene
dictionary was more selective: his thin but definitive work contains
words and expressions which often cannot be found in any other
printed source.
The fact remains that there are few dictionaries of unconventional
speech in any language you can think of, and the ones that do exist
are often incomplete or just plain too old. Even Partridge, for all his
work in English, cannot keep up with the times. He is of little use,
for example, to the person looking for hidden meanings in the "Have
Some Tea with Goldie O'Keefe" skits on the Smothers Brothers pro-
gram. It took many years for the Key to Finnegan's Wake to appear.
How soon can we expect the Key to the Smothers Brothers? What
entries will it contain besides the obvious ones like, "Tea: see pat";
"Pot: see marijuana; "Gold: high-grade marijuana"; "O'Keefe, Keefe:
see keef (also kef, kief, khyf)." Whenever that key does appear, it
will probably be mostly obsolete anyway.
But disregarding those expendable words that are designed to
mean something to a particular "in-group" and mean something else
(or, presumably, nothing) to everyone else, there are certain un-
conventional words which, in any language, have a long and mostly
unrecorded history. Some of these (are they now respectable?) words
in English are in Webster's Third Edition. Unfortunately, the defini-
tions are not always complete. As for what is often called "the word"
or "this particular four-letter word," it ain't there a-tall(' But usually
'When reviewers asked the publishers why specifically that word is absent,
while others are present in the Third Edition, the publishers replied that it did
not seem sensible to risk an investment of several million dollars on a single
word. That's right, it doesn't.
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that fact does not give rise to ambiguity about its spelling or its
meaning.5
The situation that applies to English also applies to foreign lan-
guages-slang comes and goes, new technical words are created, old
words change their meanings, and the new dictionaries try to keep
up with the changes. But at the same time there is always an un-
recorded, surprisingly stable, list of words that few respectable dic-
tionaries, and certainly no textbooks for foreigners, even want to in-
clude. How, then, does the American-born linguist ever learn them?
Well, one way that a foreigner can learn them is to watch a native
carefully. When he sniggers, try to find out why. That's how the
Duke and Duchess of Windsor, on a honeymoon tour of France, are
supposed to have learned that the innocent letters CUL on their
British license plate were being misinterpreted by the French citi-
zenrys
If only the linguist had dictionaries with all the words in his own
language, plus all the words in the foreign language in which he spe-
cializes! Words used in all fields of social and technical endeavor,
words at all levels of usage, words with all types of shibboleths!
Translation would be extremely easy then, and there would be no
'Ambiguity is, of course, not precluded. One coworker of mine, for example
(unmarried, mid-thirties), remarked a while back, "I've seen that word around
a lot since I was a little girl, but I didn't know what it meant until last year."
The next day, hand-lettered signs began to be posted mysteriously, asking,
"Who told?"
'Another coworker of mine, while attending the University of California at
Berkeley many years ago, worked on a language-department project to produce
completely meaningless literal trigraphs for California license plates. After all
three-letter English words-everyday, obscene, and potentially obscene or other-
wise improper-were eliminated, the project participants had to eliminate any
other combinations that turned out to be nasty words in foreign languages. Some-
one in the Bureau of Motor Vehicles was probably aware of the embarrassment
created toward the end of World War II when someone pointed out that the
name of the agency responsible for administering occupied Italy-AMGOT,
for Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory-sounded funny when
read as two Turkish nouns. At any rate, with the large number of languages
spoken in the world, it was not long before the 26'=17,576 possibilities were
reduced to a pitifully small number. And still, years after the project was over,
fellow participants in the project kept turning up improper combinations that
had nevertheless slipped through.
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linguistic ambiguity in translation, because the linguist would never
have to guess at the meaning of any word.
The translator of Russian, at least, has at his disposal one publica-
tion in which unconventional Russian words and expressions are trans-
lated completely unambiguously into English. That publication, the
latter of the two previously mentioned Russian-English dictionaries of
unconventional language, is Lawrence M. Carpenter's Dictionary of
Russian Taboo Words and Expressions.' The history of that publication
must be typical of the difficulties involved in publishing such linguis-
tic aids. Perhaps Mr. Carpenter will someday chronicle that history
himself, starting with the initial unqualified disapproval of his disserta-
tion topic and ending with the ultimate publication of his opus in a
complete edition of five copies. In the meantime, the reader will
have to imagine the series of administrative crises that had to be
resolved before Mr. Carpenter could state his elegantly simple
"Purpose":
"The aim of this dictionary is to give the American linguist who en-
counters unfamiliar Russian obscenities a working aid where he can find
out about the Russian birds and bees without the usual ordeal of furtive
glances and snickering mumbles or the all-too-frequent preliminary game
of "What do you want to know that for? Cultured Russians don't talk
that way." Anyone who has ever gone up to a sweet old Russian lady and
innocently asked her the meaning of 'pizda' will immediately welcome this
dictionary. No further attempt will be made to justify the need of a
Russian-English dictionary of fairly common and long-standing words
that are not listed in any readily available dictionaries."
One of the five copies of the dissertation and one copy of the Rus-
sian-English "Dictionary of Slang, Obscenities and Colloquial
Phrases" is, fortunately, available for my use whenever a need arises
during the translation of colloquial Russian text. Unfortunately, six
years after the publication of Mr. Carpenter's dissertation, the world
still does not seem ready for a wider dissemination of his major con-
tribution to Russian linguistics. Witness my reluctance to cite, in this
brief survey, any of his masterful translations of classic Russian ex-
pressions or even to translate the one Russian noun in the excerpt
above. Its equivalent is a Webster's Third Edition. Why, then, can't
I simply type the four-letter word here and now? Probably for the
same reason that Mr. Carpenter himself gave the basic definition of
'Dissertation, "U.S. Army Institute of Advanced Russian Studies," Foreign Area
Special Training Program (Russian), 1 March 1963, [iv] +20 pp.
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the Russian noun not in one four-letter English word with a long
and distinguished history 8 but in three words derived from Latin. So
long as he and I feel uncomfortable about using that English word in
certain situations, and native speakers of foreign languages feel as
uncomfortable about certain words in their own language, there will
be gaps in the dictionaries available to the professional linguist. It is
the dedicated linguist who attempts to fill those gaps and the brave
linguist who keeps the few available aids so produced right there on
the top of his desk, alongside of such other specialized dictionaries
as his Russian-English Dictionary of Cybernetics and Computer Tech-
nology.
e See, for example, the famous English-lesson scene in Shakespeare's Henry V.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 69
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No Foreign Dissem
Photographic analysis performs
another service to intelligence
THE QUEST FOR MAO TSE-TUNG
James R. Williamson
From time to time the need arises to verify that some head of
state, important educator, scientist, or other important personage ac-
tually is the identity he is alleged to be. This paper describes one of
the more exact and relatively new methods by which such verifica-
tion can be provided.' The point is, of course, that in certain circum-
stances the impersonation of such an individual by a double or "look-
alike" could deliberately be arranged to mislead or confuse the out-
side world, or otherwise be used as a deceptive maneuver in inter-
national politics.
Such a possibility arose some years ago with respect to none other
than Chairman Mao. Mao had not been physically observed for some
months in 1965, and there were reports-none confirmed-that he
was in ill health. The question of Mao's health, and correspondingly
his role in the scheme of things in China continued to arouse interest
and concern until July, 1966, when news of the Chairman's famous
swim in the Yangtze burst upon the world. The specific task involved
the evaluation of still photographs and movie films depicting Mao,
and the invention of photogrammetric 2 means to determine whether
or not the individual in the photography was in fact Chairman Mao
Tse-tung in all cases.
A method of identifying persons through ear measurements was
used in this endeavor. This method, also used by police authorities in
criminal investigations and by hospitals for infant identification, has
proven nearly as reliable as identification through fingerprints. A
leading authority on the subject, A. V. lannarelli, states that "despite
'The requirement in the instance in question was levied by the Office of Medical
Services upon the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).
'The science or art of obtaining reliable measurements by means of photographs.
SECRET 71
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SECRET Identification
cellular evolution the pattern form of the ear is as lasting, immutable,
and individual as fingerprints ... this pattern form, as in friction
ridges, develops months before birth and remains constant through-
out life until decomposition at death " 3 Also, as the body changes
after birth "the ear must grow in proportion, governed by the limita-
tions set by nature ... The rule might be: the ear grows rapidly dur-
ing infancy and adolescence, tapers during young adulthood, and ac-
celerates during advancing age." Therefore, "the predominant cause
for the growth in the length of the ear can be attributed to the sag-
ging lobe ... Since it does not affect the over-all anthropometric 4
measurement of the ear proper, the growing lobe cannot affect the
practicality of this system based on the anthropometric measurement
of the ear."
The basic procedure is simple and straightforward, and the validity
of the method has been substantiated through many years of study.
A 35mm camera is used to photograph the subject's ear, and a print
is made with a special set of guidelines overlayed on the photograph.
Measurements of the ear are made along the guidelines and recorded.
These measurements are compared with those taken from other pho-
tographs. If the values are the same for all the photographs com-
pared, then all the photographs are of the same individual. The time
span between photographs does not make any difference within the
limitations set by nature.
The procedure as described by Iannarelli is considered "clinical"
when the photographs are taken under controlled conditions. That
is, the subject is posed, specified cameras and film are used, cameras
are properly aligned with respect to the ear, and complete photo-
graphic data is recorded. The photography presented for the Mao
study was "non-clinical," in that it showed the subject in motion,
cameras of various types and unknown manufacture had been used,
photographic data was completely lacking, and photography many
generations removed from the original film was all that could be pro-
vided for study. In order to compensate for the "non-clinical" pho-
tography, NPIC devised a procedure which adapts the "clinical"
procedure to the "non-clinical" photography. This adaptation proved
to be sound.
Alfred Victor Iannarelli, System of Ear Identification, Police Series, The
Foundation Press, Inc., 1964.
'A term from physical anthropology having to do with measurements of the
human body to determine differences in races, individuals, etc.
72
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enf~ ication
The photography provided was inspected and the best prints and
negatives depicting Mao over several years were selected for meas-
urement. This selection also took into account the "look angle" 5 from
which the photography was taken, and the ability of the film to pro-
duce acceptable, or relatively unblurred images at high magnification.
The initial inspection to determine whether the "look angle" was
acceptable was visual. Later, after the measurements were recorded,
a ratio of two of the ear measurements was calculated to determine
the amount of variation in "look angle" that could be tolerated with-
out introducing radical changes in the measurements due to obliq-
uity 6 or angle of change. The chronological order of selection enabled
the analyst to check for elongation of the ear, and to take this into
account in the final analysis.
The adapted or "non-clinical" procedure requires extensive photo-
graphic laboratory work before a negative can be made into an ear
photograph for measurement. In many instances the frame must be
enlarged through several steps in order to obtain a usable negative.
The size or scale of the ear images at final printing is very important
because all must be at the same scale. Otherwise, the measurements
will obviously be meaningless due to variations in scale between
images.
A special easel and several guideline templates are used in making
the ear photographs for measurement. The templates are placed on
the easel, and by using the negative image the analyst can make the
proper alignment and control the scale of the ear images for printing
the photographs. Superimposed on the final ear photograph is a set
of guidelines that are used in measuring. The entire procedure is
dependent upon the most accurate use of the special easel and its
associated equipment.
Validating the "Non-Clinical" Procedure
In order to derive a basis for comparison and to determine what
amount of deviation in comparative measurements should be con-
"The angle between a line from the camera to the plane of the profile of an
individual being photographed. A "look angle" of 90? would be a profile photo-
graph, while a forward "look angle" of 80? would move the camera forward from
the profile position without moving the individual's position.
"Angle change between the subject's profile plane and the plane of the exposed
film introduced by deviation of the taking camera from the plane perpendicular
to both the profile plane and the film plane.
SECRET 73
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SECRET Identification
sidered significant, the adapted procedure was tested in what might
be called a semi-clinical fashion. That is, ear photographs were taken
at different angles and from various distances, using a hand-held
camera, and pertinent technical information was recorded.
Two groups of people were photographed at different times, and
some of the test subjects were included in both groups. No record
was kept of the identity of the owners of the ears in the Group A
photography but the photographs of Group B were identified by the
initials of the individuals photographed. Also, the measurements on
the Group A photographs were not taken until measurements were
taken from the Group B photography, in order to reduce the pos-
sibility that the analyst might remember which ear in Group A be-
longed to which individual.
The ear photographs having been taken, the laboratory work now
began. The final ear measurements depend upon the alignment and
scale of each photograph. As indicated, alignment and scale are de-
termined in the photo-lab through the use of a template on the easel.
Drawn on the template are two sets of lines, an oblique line and a
scale line. These lines enable the analyst to ensure that the alignment
of all the photographs to be analyzed and compared is the same,
and that all of the photographs are on the same scale. The oblique
line is placed across two points on the ear: the overlap of the Helix
rim over the upper Concha area, and the outer most point of the
Tragus. (See Figure 1) Once the oblique line has been placed cor-
rectly, the image is adjusted to make the scale line fit just inside the
Concha area, as in Figure 1. As noted above, a set of guidelines for
measurement was superimposed on the final prints. The guidelines
are on a glass plate which was placed over the photographic paper
when the final adjustment had been made and the ear print was
ready to be made.
After the photo-lab work was completed, the classification and
mensuration could begin. The "primary classification" of the test sub-
jects was limited to Caucasian and Asian males. A chart of the primary
classifications is shown in Figure 2.
7 An initial classification using the identification of sex over race, i.e., '/A would
be a male Asian, 7?/e would be a male Caucasian.
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Identification SECRET
Figure 1. Placement of oblique line and positioning of scale line in the ear.
The mensuration is divided into two classifications, the first in-
volving 12 individual measurements, and the second, six, as shown in
Figure 3. The analysis and identification of the ear photography is
based on these classifications.
Shown in Figure 4 are the Group A and B measurements. In
Group A the individual ear photography has been identified by a test
The primary classifications are listed as sex over race. There are eight categories
to this classification. The use of this primary classification reduces the chance of
duplication almost by half, and in the filing system separates the males and females
for each race.
Male _ M
Male
M
Male
M
Male M
Caucasian C
Negro
_
- N
_
Asian A
Indian I
Female _ F
Female
_ F
Female
F
Female
F
Caucasian - C
Negro
- N
_
Asian - A
_
Irian - I
Figure 2. The primary classification of ear photography.
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SECRET Identification
Figure 3a. The 12 First Classification Measurements.
\\2
Figure 3b. The 6 Second Classification Measurements.
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Identification SECRET
number, while in Group B the individual ear photography has been
identified by the initials of the individual photographed. To stimulate
the "non-clinical" photography received for the Mao study the test
subjects were photographed from three different positions. One pho-
tograph was taken from slightly in front of the subject, one from
slightly in back of the subject and the third photograph was taken
from full profile.
In Figure 4 the September photography is that of Group A and
the October photography that of Group B. Comparison of the tabula-
tions of test 6 in Group A and C.C. in Group B showed very close
correspondence. In Group B, the measurements marked C.C.1 were
of the full profile photograph and the next two sets of measurements
were the photographs taken from slightly different angles. The three
C.C. tests show that even if the viewing angle is not quite the same,
the analytical results can be accurate.
The C.B. test in Group B provides an example of what an error
in laboratory procedure will do to the measurements. Test 11, from
Group A, and C.B. were found to be of the same ear, but on closer
examination so was Test 12 of Group A. The correlation in the
values resulted from a difference in the scale on which these pho-
tographs were made. In making the ear photograph for Test 12, the
correct procedure was not rigidly adhered to and the result was
measurements that could not possibly agree with measurements from
another photograph of the same ear. It must be emphasized that the
photographs to be analysed must depict the ear images all at the
same scale.
Inherent in the procedure is a check for human error in visual
identification, as was proven when the test photography was being
analyzed. The test marked J.C.P. in Group B had been marked in-
correctly. In comparing measurements, the prints in Group A the
values of J.C.P. were found to be the same as. Test 11. That was
manifestly impossible, because Test 11 was of C.B. Upon comparing
test J.C.P. to test C.B., however, it was found that test J.C.P. had
been incorrectly identified and was really a C.B. ear photograph.
These results were most encouraging. In the original clinical study
almost any variation in the comparisons of first classification measure-
ments was cause to doubt that the individuals in question were iden-
tical. Any change in the second classification measurements was sig-
nificant enough to state definitely that the individuals were not the
77
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SECRET Identification
I D : Identification Number of ear photo
VAR : View Angle Ratio
P Primary Classification
UD a Undated Photography
CLASSIFICATIONS
I D
R
P
first
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
second
1 2 3 4 5 6
GROUP A
6
-5
M,
1
1
1
1
4
3
2
3
3
2
3
6
11
6
3
3
56
8
10
.7
M,
3
2
2
2
5
9
7
5
3
23
3
12
2
.3
M
2
2
2
4
6
4
2
1
4
2 3
3
9
7
.5
M
1
2
1
1
4
6
2
5
3
2
3
10
5
5
M
1 1
1
1
1
4
3
2
3
3
3
3
6
12
.4
M
2
2
2
2
5
5
2
2
3
2
3
8
1 1
.5
M ~
3
2
2
2
6
7
3
3
3
3
3
11
GROUP B
C1
.5
MA
1
1
1
1
4
3
2
3
3
2
23
6
11
6
3
34
5
8
C
.45
MA
1
1
1
1
45
3
2
3
3
2
2
6
11
6
3
4
6
8
C
5
M A
1
2
1
1
4
3
2
2 3
3
2
2
6
1.1
6
3
3
5
7
JCP
C B
.43
.43
MC
M
2
2
2
1 2
1 2
2
2
2
7
7
7
7
3
3
3
4
3
3
2
2
23
2
11
I1
Figure 4. Listing of measurements and data from the September and
October 1968 photography.
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Ydenti,cation SECRET
same. From this test it was determined that the first classification
measurements (one through twelve) would have to differ by one
unit or more for two or three measurements to cause doubt. The sec-
ond classification measurements (one through six) would have to
differ by one unit or more for one or two measurements to invalidate
a comparison and indicate that two individuals were involved.
In all cases due consideration was given to the quality of the en-
larged photograph, because "non-clinical" photography would very
likely give poor resolutions at high magnification. Indeed, the deg-
radation of the enlarged photographs in some instances in the test
study was so severe as to render the photographs unusable.
The adapted procedure thus proved to be tolerant of deficiencies
in print quality, as well as accurate. This was especially true in the
comparison of photography not taken at the same view angle. A ra-
tio of two of the values from the first classification measurements was
computed and used as an indicator that comparable photographs had
been taken from approximately the same angle. This enabled the
analyst to group photographs of the same "look angle," and therefore
enhanced the accuracy of the comparison of measurements. The re-
sults showed that the correlation between ear photograph measure-
ments of the same individual is very marked and that any scale
changes 9 show up as a radical variation in the tabulated measure-
ments. Normally, if the identification is positive, this scale change
can be corrected for by multiplying all changed values by a con-
stant, so that the corrected measurements may be used in the data
tabulation. This can also be done when the identification is not sure,
but this does not give positive proof that the ear images are identical,
and the corrected data thus may not be included in the data
tabulation.
Results of the Adapted Procedure
In the Mao study, the adapted procedure had to be applied to
photography of highly uneven quality. As indicated, some of it
dated back many years. It included several examples selected from
each of certain years. The collection of this data is shown in Figure 5.
'The breaking up of the emulsion into its component parts causing the photo-
graph to be blurred.
Occurs when the final ear photographs for comparison are not made to the
same scale.
SEC FT
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I D : Identification Number of ear photo
VAR: View Angle Ratio N :Measurements not
P Primary Classification possible
UD : Undated Photography OA:Overal,I Average
CLASSI FICAT IONS
ID
A
P first second
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6
AVERAGE VALUES FROM THE SEPARATE YEARS
58
.5
M A
2
3
2
2
4
5
2
1
3
1
3
5
415
8
6
3
3
8
60
.5
M A
2
3
2
2
4
4
2
0
3
1
2
4
14
8
5
3
3
8
62
.5
M A
__
_
2
-
3
2
2
4
4
2
.8
3
1
3
5
14
8
6
3
3
8
63
.4
M A
2
3
2
2
4
4
2
1
3
1
3
S
15
8
5
3
4
8
6 4
5
M
2
3
2
2
4
4
2
1
3
1
3
5
15
8
6
3
3
8
.
A
5
66
.6
MA
2
3
2
2
4
4 5
2 3
1
3
1 2
3
4 5
15
1 8
6
;t
3
8
D
_
6
M
2
3
2
2
4
4 5
2
1
3
1
3
5
15
8
6
3 4
3
8
OA
5
M A
2
3
2
2
4
4 5
2
1
3
1
3
5
15
8
6
3
3
8
MEASUREMENTS FROM THE 16M.M. MOVIE FILM
FILM NUMBER W6306
W-1
1.3
M A
2
1
1
1
3
5 6
3
N
4
2
3
7
1 3
7
5
3
5
9
W-3
5
M
2
3
2
2
4
4
2
6
3
2
3
5
16
8
6
3
3
8
A
W-4
8
M A
2
3
2
2
4
4 5
3
1
3
1
3
4
15
7
6
3
3
8
-8
8
M A
2
3
2
2
4
4
3
1
3
2
3
5
14
7
6
4
3
7
Ave
8
M A
2
3
2
2
4
4 5
3
1
3
2
3
5
1 5
7
6
3
3
8
FILM NUMBER Y6028
Y-4
1.0
M A
2
2
2
2
3
4
3
N
2
N
N
11
7
5
3
5
5
Y-7
5
M A
2
3
2
2
4
4
2
N
4
N
N
1 5
8
6
3
5
9
y_7
5
M A
2
4
3
2 3
4
4
2
N
4
N
N
1 6
8
7
4
6
10
Y-8
.5
M A
2
3
2
2
4
4
2
N
3
N
N
14
8
5 6
4
5
8
-9
.3
M A
2
3
2
2
3
3
1
N
3
N
N
12
6
4
2 3
4
7
ve
5
M A
2
3-
2
2
3 4
4
2
N
3 4
N
N
1 5
7 8
5 6
3 4
5
7 8
Figure 5. Statistical data used in determining the left ear measurements of
Mao Tse-tung.
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The photography covering the years 1958 to 1966 was in the form
of enlarged photographs, and therefore required re-photographing in
order to obtain negatives with which to work. An analysis of the
mensuration by year, and of how individual examples of photography
compared in any specific year, is given in the appendix.
The measurements derived from the photographs for each year
were averaged, and the resultant is to be considered representative
for each year. Note that there are no differences in the first five meas-
urements (see Figure 5) among the seven averages. In the sixth
measurement only one of the seven averages differs by a whole unit,
and three averages by approximately one-half of a unit. Only one
value in measurements seven, eight, ten, eleven and twelve differs
among the seven averages. The correlation between the averages
over the years is so strong that their average value can be accepted
as the left ear measurements for Mao Tse-tung.
Two 16mm films were given to NPIC with the understanding
that the Office of Medical Services felt that the individual represent-
ing Mao Tse-tung in one of the films was a possible double. The
apparent physical abilities of the individual in question were not
compatible with the intelligence community's assessment of Mao's
physical condition. The films are identified according to their respec-
tive file numbers, W6306 and Y6028 (Figure 5). Ten frames were
selected from each reel of film, but due to very poor imagery at the
high magnification required, only four frames on each film were us-
able.
The reel of film numbered W6306 provided frames numbered 1,
3, 4 and 8. A break-down on these frames is given in the appendix.
Analysis of the four W6306 frames depicting Mao yielded average
measurements differing in two places from the first classification
measurements of the 1958-66 photography and at one place in the
second classification. Analysis of the data suggested the possible con-
clusion that the four photographs did not all depict the same in-
dividual. Since the enlargements from 16mm film were of the order
of 120 diameters, however, the fact is that the selection of measuring
points was very difficult and was almost certainly in error. Making yet
another photograph would not necessarily have helped because of the
poor quality of the negative being used.
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The reel of film numbered Y6028 provided frames number 4, 7-A,
7-B, 8, and 9. A break-down on these frames is in Appendix 1-C.
It should be emphasized again that when working with small neg-
ative material, such as the 16mm movie frames in the Mao study,
the enlargement of the ear image to the scale required for compara-
tive measurement inescapably means serious degradation of the reso-
lution of the film. Obviously, therefore, no single frame can yield
conclusive evidence, and the average values of several frames must
be used.
The measured values for the photography from the two movie
reels ~(W6306 and Y6028) were independently averaged and a com-
parison was made between the two reels. There were no differences
in the first four measurements of the first classification, and less than
a half a unit in the fifth measurement. The seventh measurement
differed by a whole unit as did the twelfth measurement. The ninth
measurement also differed by a half a unit. There were three measure-
ments for reel Y6028 that could not be taken because of the de-
ficient quality of the film enlargement. Only the fifth measurement
in the second classification for the movie data departs from the norm
to a significant degree.
On the whole, therefore, the correlation of the two sets of aver-
ages derived from the movies was very close, and was sufficiently
marked to support the judgment that the same individual was de-
picted in both movie reels.
Comparison of the values derived from the 1958-66 picture of
Mao with the analysis of the two movie reels also yielded close cor-
relation. The following criteria were applied to determine whether
observed differences were sufficient to support suspicion that the
measurements were of images of different individuals. In the first
classification three measurements had to differ by one unit or more.
In the second classification, two or more measurements had to differ
by one unit or more.
As shown in Figure 5, only two measurements in the first classifi-
cation and one in the second classification differed from the aver-
age for reel W6306. The average measurements of reel Y6028 showed
only one difference in the first and second classifications. Therefore,
the analysis of all photographs and frames considered in the Mao
study yielded a strong correlation in their respective measurements.
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The results of the test study and the Mao analysis indicated that
positive identification of persons through ear measurements is a. prac-
tical and accurate method. The procedure has some inherent restric-
tions with respect to the quality of photography that may be used.
The photographic laboratory work must be precise. Once the ear
photograph has been made, however, the analyst need only to make
his measurements, record the data, and make the comparisons. The
criteria by which significant differences between ear photographs are
determined must take into account the quality of the photography
being used.
In the study of Mao Tse-tung, some apparent anomalies emerged
in the early stages of the analysis that were resolved in the final evalu-
ation, having to do with look angles and resolution. The final analy-
sis showed that there was nothing significant enough to cast suspicion
or doubt on any particular set of measurements.
In conclusion, the method of identification described in this article
can be commended as a useful tool for the intelligence community.
Thirty-five photographs and frames were used in the study and the
data produced proved conclusively that all measurements were of
the same individual, Mao Tse-tung. A file of measurements has been
established and through the use of this file additional photography
can easily be checked.
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A. Break-down of mensuration by year.
1958. Three photographs from this year were measured (one neg-
ative was used to make two ear photographs) and the correlation of
these photographs is very strong. There were no marked differences
in the important first eight measurements of the first classification.
The differences in the remaining first classification measurements
were not enough to be considered doubtful and were attributed to
film quality and the view angle. Photograph 17-A might be viewed
as having a significant difference, but since 17-B was produced from
the same negative it was adjudged highly unlikely.
1960 and 1962. Since there was only one photograph from each
of these two years, data derived from them was entered into the
tabulation as it is. Under the criteria stated for the testing there was
no reason to doubt the identity of the subject in these photographs.
1963. In this group of three photographs dating from 1963, num-
ber V seemed to present enough differences to arouse some doubt,
but upon examination the prints were found to be of bad quality.
The selection of some points by the analyst was in error. This in-
stance shows the need to use several photographs for comparison in
a non-clinical study.
1964. There are five photographs for this year, all of which
correlate very closely. There was no doubt that all five photographs
are of the same individual.
1966. Five of the six photographs for this year showed a very
close correlation. The sixth photograph did not seem to be any dif-
ferent from the others, and the quality of the photography was ade-
quate. Either it depicted a different individual, or some error in pro-
cedure had been made, resulting in a scale change. The latter was
discovered to have been the case.
Undated Photography. These six photographs could have been
taken at any time from 1954 until late 1966. Here, two photographs
("W-1" and #13) seemed to have enough differences from the rest
to cause doubt, but the second classification analysis ruled this out.
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B. Break-down of mensuration on the 16mm movie film numbered
W6306.
W-Frame #1. Many values differed from the averages established
for Mao, but the photography was very bad, almost beyond use. A
total of eight measurements differed in the first classification and five
in the second classification. Due to the degradation of the enlarge-
ment, this data had to be discounted as any sort of conclusive proof
that the frame represented some individual other than Mao.
W-Frame #3. The frame provided excellent results when com-
pared to the average values derived from analysis of the 1958-66 pic-
tures. Only one value differed significantly in each of the first and
second classifications.
W-Frame #4. Another frame that provided close correlations
when compared to the average. Only two differences showed up in
the first classification and one in the second.
W-Frame #8. There was no reason for doubt in the first classi-
fication, but the second classification had four values that differed.
Although this enlargement was poor in quality the procedure seems
to have been slightly in error, thus causing a shift of the guideline
origin.
C. Break-down of mensuration on the 16mm movie film numbered
Y6028.
Y-Frame #4. A total of five measurements differed from the
average values in the first classification and five measurements in the
second classification. Again, this was attributed to very poor quality
reproduction in the enlargement.
Y-Frame #7A. Very close correlation with the average values.
Only one measurement differed in the first classification and two in
the second.
Y-Frame #7-B. Procedural error was the cause for the discrepan-
cies here. Four measurements differed in the first classification and
five in the second.
Y-Frame #8. Another close correlation in the first classification
when only one measurement differs, but four measurements differed
in the second.
Y-Frame #9. Here three measurements disagreed in the first
classification, and all measurements disagreed in the second. This is
a case of very poor quality enlargement.
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SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
The remarkable record
of a case of blackmail.
RECRUITMENT IN MOSCOW
Donald H. Prunko
This is the true story of the recruitment by the Soviet Committee
for State Security, the KGB, of a secretary assigned to a Western
embassy in Moscow.' The foreign diplomatic colony is fertile ground
for such activity, but this particular case is unusually interesting be-
cause it shows the KGB at its most proficient, and at its maladroit
worst. The timeworn techniques of compromise and blackmail were
in the beginning employed with uncommon subtlety and sophistica-
tion. When the secretary was reassigned to another country, how-
ever, the follow-up was so ham-handed, and so lacking in understand-
ing of how to manipulate her foibles and weaknesses, that she was
prompted to report to her own security authorities. We have a re-
markably detailed account of the Soviet handling of this case over a
period of several years, because the secretary's indiscretions were
not limited to her affair with a Russian lay religious leader and her
cooperation with the KGB, She also kept a date book in which she
noted all her appointments with her Soviet friends.
The victim in this episode, Birgitta Lundberg, was born into a
poor family in Ostersund, Sweden. Her parents had minimal educa-
tion and little interest in the world outside the family and neighbor-
hood. Upon completion of her education and training as a secretary,
Brigitta found employment with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. She served in several foreign posts and by the time of her ap-
pointment to the embassy in Moscow in May 1961, had acquired
fluency in German, French, English, and Russian, an interest in art
and culture, and a predilection for a rather luxurious style of living.
In Moscow, Birgitta settled into an apartment building largely oc-
cupied by members of the foreign diplomatic colony and high-rank-
ing Soviet dignitaries. She lived alone and employed a part-time maid,
True names, dates, and some nationalities have been altered.
SECRET
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who also worked at the Swedish Embassy, where Birgitta was a gen-
eral secretary in the political section. On occasion, Birgitta also
worked for the ambassador and the principal political officer.
Not long after her arrival, Birgitta made a bus trip from Moscow
to Leningrad in the company of an attache of the Swedish Embassy
who was on a military intelligence mission. When her companion dis-
covered that they were under surveillance in Leningrad, they re-
turned to Moscow without incident. Birgitta had gone along to pro-
vide cover for the other employee. She also went twice to a local
bookshop which specialized in military publications and purchased
several books for the colleague whom she accompanied on the Lenin-
grad trip. It was probably her involvement with the Swedish mili-
tary intelligence officer and the purchases she made on his behalf
that brought her to the attention of the KGB.
In July, 1961, Birgitta was visited by a Swedish friend, a Miss
Forsberg, who was in transit from Hong Kong to Sweden. While
they were waiting at a bus stop during a sightseeing trip of Moscow,
a Soviet officer waiting at the same stop introduced himself, in Eng-
lish, and after a brief conversation invited them to his apartment,
saying that he would like to become better acquainted, and that he
wanted to show them that personal freedom was not suppressed in
the Soviet Union. They accepted this invitation, and the officer, whose
name was Sokolov, hailed a taxi. After they alighted from the taxi
and were walking to the apartment, someone suddenly took a flash
photo of Birgitta and her friend. Sokolov said it was probably the
work of hooligans and asked them not to be alarmed. He lived in a
well-furnished apartment with his wife, mother, and child. They all
spent a few hours discussing Russian history and culture, and listen-
ing to the Voice of America and other Western broadcasts. Sokolov
asked no questions concerning Birgitta's work, and he invited her
and Miss Forsberg to visit him again on 21 July, which they did.
On 30 August Sokolov phoned Birgitta at the embassy and asked
her to go out with him, either for lunch or to the theater, but the
connection was bad and they were cut off before establishing where
or when they were to meet. She made no effort to contact Sokolov.
Birgitta last saw Sokolov at a theater in Moscow about a year later
in the company of the woman she had met at his apartment. They
had a friendly chat and Sokolov invited her to visit him, but no date
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Recruitment KK
was set. This was the last time she saw Sokolov. Birgetta knew no
more about Sokolov other than that he was an officer, apparently a
gentleman, and spoke excellent English.
During her first year in Moscow, Birgitta met a Professor Engman
of Stockholm who was interested in the Russian Orthodox Church
and its art, especially icons. Engman was an enthusiastic Russophile
and had contacts with Patriarch Alexei and other church luminar-
ies. Through him Birgitta met many church officials and personalities,
and she helped him distribute various religious pamphlets and books
which were probably printed in Western Europe by emigre circles.
The material was strictly religious in content and not anti-Commu-
nist. Birgitta also received letters from Engman which she delivered
to various Soviet friends of his. The letters, books, and pamphlets she
distributed for Engman were usually kept in her apartment and thus
were accessible to her maid.
On 2 March 1962 Professor Engman introduced Birgitta to one
Oleg Sergeyevich Belov at the Hotel Ukraine, and they all went on
a tour of Moscow churches. Oleg told her he was an official in the
office of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. She also met
Oleg in the company of Engman on 8 and 15 March.
On 11 April Birgitta met Oleg alone for the first time. She went
to his office and gave him a small package she had received from
Engman, and he made a date with her for the following evening at
her apartment. Thus began her romance with Oleg, and during the
period from April 1962 until August 1964 she had 100 meetings with
him, either at her apartment or in restaurants and cafes. To cover
her meetings with Oleg, which were illegal since members of the
embassy staff were forbidden to have social contacts with Soviet citi-
zens, Birgitta always told her ambassador that she was delivering
materials for Professor Engman. The ambassador finally forbade her
to have further contact with Oleg or Orthodox priests. Birgitta's re-
action was to stop reporting such contacts to the ambassador.
Oleg told Birgitta that he was married to a woman with an educa-
tion and an intellect inferior to his and that he had nothing in com-
mon with his wife. He lamented his unhappy marriage and apparent-
ly found an easy and welcome refuge with Birgitta. Oleg was about
35 years old. He said that he had attended a seminary for four years,
was one of six children, and that his father was an engineer who
had died when Oleg was very young. Oleg said that he intended to
SECRET
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write a book on the Orthodox Church in China, and that he would
like to become a priest when he was 50 years old. Birgitta did not
know where Oleg lived, but said he sometimes slept at his office.
Oleg spoke some English and always appeared to have plenty of
money and lived well. He said he received a bonus of 300 rubles a
month from the Patriarch because he worked so hard. He claimed
to be known as anti-Communist and pro-West. Birgitta sometimes
purchased western clothes for him from her colleagues at the em-
bassy, and gave him an occasional bottle of liquor, but never money.
On 17 January 1964, almost two years after their first meeting,
Oleg took Birgitta by taxi to a woods where there was a lovely small
church. He told the cab driver to wait, and they walked to the church,
which unfortunately was closed, so they took a stroll through the
woods instead. They walked about for nearly two hours. Upon their
return they found the taxi surrounded by soldiers. An army major
approached them and announced that they were under arrest for
trespassing on a military reservation. (There is in fact a large reser-
voir in the vicinity.) The major interrogated them on the spot, took
their names, places of employment and so forth, and announced that
he would send reports of the incident to the Patriarch's office and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that the Swedish Embassy would be
contacted on the case. Oleg became terribly upset, lamenting that
his life would be ruined. Birgitta was concerned because her con-
tacts with Oleg had been against the ambassador's orders. She felt
more sorry for Oleg, however, and held herself responsible for the
incident. In the taxi on the- way home, Oleg suggested they go to
the house of a friend of his who might be able to help them. The
friend, Ivan Basilyevich, had a private apartment which he shared
with his mother. He was employed as an economist. Oleg and Birgitta
told Ivan the story of what had happened in the woods, and on the
basis of his friendship with Oleg, Ivan said he would try to help
them, that he had a friend who was with the KGB. He then phoned
this friend, Andre Popov, explained the case, and Andre was heard
to say over the telephone, "If these people are your friends, if they
are 100 per cent faithful, then I will help." Ivan assured him they
were his friends and were trustworthy.
In about 30 minutes Andre arrived. He appeared to be about
45 years old, corpulent, almost six feet tall, with dark hair, small
teeth with silver dental work, a generally unpleasant, ugly face. He
indicated that he spoke only Russian.
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Andre asked Birgitta and Oleg to repeat the entire story of their
arrest, and when they finished, he promised he would help them as
much as he could because they were friends of Ivan's. Andre asked
Birgitta what she did at the Swedish Embassy and followed this up
by asking her to write out the facts of the incident in her own hand-
writing in Russian. Birgitta continued to plead with Andre to help
them because she did not want Oleg to get into trouble. Andre told
them they were not to discuss the incident with anyone, that if they
did he would be unable to help them. They promised this in writ-
ing. In their presence, Andre telephoned the arresting officer's su-
perior, an unidentified general, and asked that he take no action on
the reports and send them to Andre's office. Andre again stressed
that the affair was a very serious one because the area where Bir-
gitta and Oleg had trespassed contained a large reservoir. They
could easily have poisoned the water.
While Birgitta was writing her account of the incident, Andre! asked
her also to include her impressions of the Soviet Union and its people.
Ivan advised her to say that she approved of everything she saw in
Russia. This she refused to do because she didn't like the political
system, although she did like the people and the country. The report
contained only her favorable impressions. When Birgitta had finished,
they had vodka and snacks to celebrate the "settling" of the inci-
dent. Before they left Ivan's apartment, Andre told Brigitta and
Oleg to meet him the following evening in Ivan's apartment when
he would let them know if he had been able to stop an investigation.
The next evening Oleg and Birgitta took a taxi to Ivan's apart-
ment. Andre was already there when they arrived. He produced
the report submitted by the major and told them to read it and check
to see that it was accurate. They both agreed that the report was
correct and Birgitta asked Andre to tear it up. He said that he
couldn't do that, but that he would keep it in a safe place in case
anyone ever asked for additional details. Perhaps he would be able
to destroy it later. Andre asked Birgitta to sign a paper to the effect
that she would not discuss the case with anyone.
Barely one week after his "arrest," Oleg travelled to the United
States as a member of the Grand Patriarch Alexei's delegation. He
explained to Birgitta that he had been unexpectedly selected to ac-
company the delegation since two other men originally scheduled to
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go had been hurt in an automobile accident, and that he had not orig-
inally been chosen because he was known to be pro-West and anti-
Communist.
Near the end of April Andre phoned Birgitta at her apartment at
lunch time and asked her to join him at a restaurant for lunch the
next day. She agreed. There had been no contact between them for
about three and a half months, since the last meeting in Ivan's apart-
ment, and Birgitta had not expected to see Andre again.
The next day Birgitta went by taxi to the restaurant where Andre
awaited her. They were served lunch in a private room, and it was
apparent from the deference shown to them that Andre was a priv-
ileged patron. During lunch he talked pleasantly about many things,
without mentioning Birgitta's work. When they had finished lunch,
he gave her a brief newspaper article in English and asked her to
translate it into Russian. Birgitta said it was difficult for her to do
without a dictionary, but that she would attempt it. The article con-
cerned book printing. When she finished, Andre remarked that she
had done a good job, although she was unable to determine from
his comments whether he could read or speak English. Andre said he
would like to meet her again, but that restaurant meetings were
difficult because he was well known to many higher ranking em-
ployees of various diplomatic installations in Moscow. He asked her
if she would meet him elsewhere and she agreed. Andre told her he
would phone her at a later date, would send a cab for her, and then
instructed her not to discuss her meetings with him with anyone,
not even Oleg. Birgitta agreed to keep their meetings secret.
About a week later Andre phoned, again at lunch time, and made
arrangements for dinner the following evening. He told Birgitta he
would send a cab which would pick her up around the comer from
her apartment at seven in the evening and gave her the number of
the taxi. He told her the cab driver would deliver her to the meeting
place and that she would not have to pay the fare. After this phone
call Birgitta began to think that the entire affair was rather strange,
but decided to go along with the plan because she had given her
word that she would meet Andre. Her affair with Oleg was not af-
fected by the meetings with Andre, nor did Andre appear to have
any interest in a more personal relationship with her.
Birgitta was picked up at the designated time and place by a
new, very clean cab. The driver opened the door from within and
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drove her around Moscow for at least 45 minutes and then stopped
suddenly in front of a large apartment complex with a center court-
yard. Birgitta has no idea of the taxi's route, but remembers passing
the Ukraina Hotel and the Sokol Metro Station.
Andre was waiting for her at the entrance to the courtyard. Bir-
gitta told him she was frightened as a result of being driven aim-
lessly around the city, but Andre told her not to be alarmed, since
he was her protector and safeguard. She then said that she would
not go with him unless he told her where they were going for dinner.
Andre again said he was too well known to be seen in public with
her, and that it was in her best interests to go to private places.
He was therefore taking her to dinner at the apartment of an uncle
who was away on holiday at his country dacha. Andre said he al-
ways looked after the apartment when his uncle was absent. Birgitta
accepted this story and went with him across the coutryard to a
ground floor apartment. The apartment was well-furnished and in
one of the rooms a sumptuous dinner had been readied. Birgitta
wanted to know if anyone else was in the apartment and Andre
suggested she make a search and see for herself, which she did, find-
ing no one. They consumed much vodka and had a delicious meal.
Birgitta is unable to remember much of what was discussed, but she
was impressed with Andre's good manners. She thinks they talked
about the theater and art, and says that Andre did not ask questions
concerning her work.
After dinner Andre served coffee and brandy. He then asked Bir-
gitta if she would do a favor for him and translate something from
English to Swedish. She did not want to do it, but agreed after Andre
said, "I helped you. Why don't you do me one small favor?" Although
Birgitta was vaguely aware that this was probably the beginning of
a change in her relationship with Andre, she protested no further.
The article concerned economic relations between West Germany
and Indonesia and she remembers that it was not a newspaper article.
During the evening Andre stressed that his only aim was to help
Birgitta and Oleg out of their difficulties, but that occasionally he
would ask small favors of her. Birgitta in turn told him that the only
reason she was maintaining contact with him was to prevent Oleg
from getting into any further difficulties. She thus played directly into
Andre's hands. The dinner party lasted two and a half hours and
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the cab took her home. At the end Andre again warned her not to
discuss their meetings with Oleg.
Five days later, on May 12, Andre phoned Birgitta at her apart-
inent during lunch and made arrangements for dinner that evening.
She was picked up by cab at seven o'clock at the usual corner, and
again a long, devious route was followed to the same apartment com-
plex. As before, a feast had been prepared before her arrival in
Andre's "uncle's" apartment, and during dinner the conversation
again revolved around art and culture. During dinner Birgitta gave
Andre a letter she had written in Russian in which she explained
that she was an employee of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
that she had taken a secrecy oath, and that it was forbidden for em-
ployees of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have uncon-
trolled social contact with Russians because the people in Western
countries believed that the Soviet Union was a hostile country. An-
dre read the letter through and put it in his pocket. He then said
that the Soviet Union was friendly towards Western countries, and
pointed out the benefits of living in the USSR. He asked Birgitta
about her family, her relatives, her personal life and about her finan-
cial status. She answered all his questions freely and truthfully. Andre
said that what she did at the Swedish Embassy was of no interest
to him. The meeting lasted until 11:30 p.m. and Birgitta was taken
home by cab.
On May 20, 1964, Birgitta and a Swedish colleague at the embassy,
a Miss Larsson and her mother, went by train to Leningrad on a
three-day Intourist excursion. When Birgitta told Oleg of her plans
he said that he too would be in Leningrad on May 21. As Birgitta
was to be staying at the Hotel Astoria, they made plans to meet in
the lobby there at five o'clock on that date.
When Birgitta and the Larssons arrived in Leningrad via the night
train from Moscow, they found that the Astoria was fully booked
and that they were to be billeted at the Hotel Yeuropeyskaya. Al-
though Birgitta waited for Oleg at the Astoria at five o'clock he did
not appear. However, he phoned her at seven saying he had traced
her whereabouts by inquiring at the Astoria. He also had a room in
the Yeuropeyskaya on the same floor at the end of the corridor. That
evening and the following day Oleg accompanied Birgitta and the
Larssons on sightseeing trips about Leningrad.
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On May 23 Oleg told Birgitta that he had to fly back to Moscow
that evening and invited her to his room to say goodbye at four p.m.
They had wine and cheese. Suddenly Oleg said, "Let me make love
to you." Birgitta objected, saying that she was afraid of hidden cam-
eras and concealed microphones. To reassure her, Oleg suggested that
they search the room. This they did, but found nothing. They drew
the curtains, but not the drapes, locked the door and remained to-
gether for about two hours. Oleg left for the airport soon thereafter,
and Birgitta and the Larssons returned to Moscow that evening by
train.
A week and a half later, Andre phoned Birgitta at her apartment
and invited her to dine. The evening followed the now familiar rou-
tine of the rambling taxi ride, and an elaborate meal with vodka
followed by coffee and brandy. Andre began to question Birgitta
about her work at the embassy and about the other Swedish em-
ployees there. Birgitta is unable to recall what she told Andre be-
cause she had had so much to drink. She does remember that he
asked if other women at the embassy had Russian boyfriends and
that she replied affirmatively. Andre then began asking more spe-
cific questions about Birgitta's work, about her ambassador's report-
ing, and whether he sent secret reports to Sweden on his discussions
with his West German, American and British counterparts. Birgitta
became angry at this line of questioning and refused to answer. Andre
arose and left her alone for about 15 minutes. When he returned
he told her she should consider his questions in light of the help
he had given her and Oleg, that it was assistance between friends,
but that he would never ask her such questions again. He cautioned
her again not to discuss any of this with Oleg and gave her his private
phone number, but did not permit her to write it down. As she was
leaving, Andre gave her a silver vase. Birgitta at first refused to ac-
cept it but he insisted, saying that she had given him so much of
her time. He also gave her a sealed envelope and told her to open
it when she arrived at her apartment. When Birgitta arrived home
she opened the envelope and found 200 Swedish krone. She kept
this money.
A week later, on 10 June 1964, Oleg phoned Birgitta at home at
lunch time. He sounded extremely nervous and said he had to see
her because something terrible had happened. They met on a street
corner after work that evening because Oleg said he could not go to
her apartment. He said that that morning he had been picked up
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on the street by three men who pushed him into a car and took him
to an Office of the Ministry of Interior and interrogated him for
three hours about his trip to Leningrad. He was shown a photograph
of himself and Birgitta walking on a street in Leningrad but his in-
terrogators told him they had much more information regarding his
Leningrad trip, including compromising films. He wailed that he
would probably lose his job and appeared to be completely distraught.
According to Oleg, his friend Ivan, who had interceded before, was
ill in a hospital about 200 kilometers away. Since Birgitta had prom-
ised Andre not to reveal his private phone number she suggested to
Oleg that they call Ivan's mother to see if she knew how they could
get in touch with Andre. This Oleg did and about 10 p.m. reached
Andre who told them to meet him at a nearby restaurant. Oleg re-
peated to Andre the tale of his encounter with the three unknown
men and of his interrogation. Andre asked Oleg to describe the of-
fice he had been in, and then said that the situation was very bad,
because the office described handled all the sensitive cases and that
it would be difficult to stop the investigation. He promised to do his
best, telling Birgitta, not Oleg, to phone him the next day at his office.
When Birgitta phoned Andre he said that he had all the files and
would meet her the next day, June 12, at 7 p.m. at the apartment
where they regularly met.
Accordingly Birgitta was picked up on June 12 by cab and taken
to the uncle's apartment, where Andre awaited her. The usual dinner
had been prepared. During coffee and brandy, Andre brought out
some files which he showed to her and said they concerned not only
Oleg but her too. He also handed her a sealed package of film and
told her she could open it, that he was not interested, but he ad-
vised her to look at about one meter of the film. She looked at the
strip of film and saw that it depicted everything that had occurred
in Oleg's hotel room in Leningrad. According to Birgitta, the films
were of excellent quality. After scanning the films, she admitted
everything that had happened. Andre then handed her another small
package and told her to open it. Wrapped inside were transcripts of
all her phone conversations with Oleg in Leningrad and also a reel
of tape. Andre told her the tape was a sound recording of everything
that occurred in the hotel room. Birgitta did not wish to hear it.
Andre then asked her what she thought of the "entire ugly affair"
and she agreed that it was a terrible mess, especially for Oleg, who
was married. Andre countered that it was also very bad for her, but
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that she of course could always leave Russia and start life anew,
whereas Oleg could not get away. Birgitta pleaded with Andre and
promised that she would do anything she could for him if he would
help Oleg. Andre thought this over a long time and finally said that
he would try. He told her all the files, films and tape would be trans-
ferred to his safe on condition that she write in her own handwriting
the following letter in Russian.
"Dear Mr. Andre ... .
I thank you for all the help you have given me and I promise you
that I will not divulge our contacts to anyone, neither the Ambassador,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Swedish intelligence service, and
that I will help you in the future in your work."
Birgitta signed this note in her true name.
After this, Andre was very friendly and assured Birgitta that he
would help her. She returned to her apartment about 11 o'clock
by cab.
The next day Birgitta phoned Oleg and invited him to her apart-
ment that evening, to tell him what had happened and what was
in the files Andre had shown her. Oleg appeared to be completely
flabbergasted. He got very drunk, but said nothing.
Several days later, as a result of the strain of her involvement
with Oleg and Andre, Birgitta went to see an embassy doctor who
advised her to go on leave. She spent three weeks at a health resort
about 200 kilometers from Moscow. A few days after returning from
the health resort, Birgitta flew to Sweden for a short holiday with
her family and friends.
She returned to Moscow on July 28 and met Oleg for lunch on
the 29th. She mentioned that she had discussed their relationship
with some of her friends in Sweden. Oleg was obviously disturbed
by this information and said that he wanted to talk about it in greater
detail in the evening.
When Oleg arrived at her apartment, he said he had phoned Andre
and told him about Birgitta's conversations with her friends in
Sweden and that Andre was furious and said he never wanted to see
her again. However, Oleg was able to persuade him to meet Bir-
gitta just one more time and he had agreed to come to a dinner
arranged by Oleg that evening at the Hotel Praga. Birgitta also agreed
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to attend but told Oleg that she would do the talking, that he was
to keep silent.
When they met Andre appeared to be angry with Birgitta. She
explained that she had discussed Oleg with an old girl friend and
her husband who were sympathetic regarding her difficulties and
merely advised her to be careful. Andre then asked the identity of
her Swedish girl friend and husband and wanted to know if they
were members of the Swedish intelligence service. He was assured
they were not. Andre then wondered aloud if Birgitta might go to her
ambassador with the entire story. She replied that she was brave,
but not that brave and promised that if she ever intended to do such
a thing she would tell Andre at least three days ahead. By this time
Andre probably believed with some justification that he could talk
her out of anything, provided he had sufficient warning.
In response to a question from Andre, Birgitta said that it was
possible that she would soon be transferred to another post because
she had been in Moscow quite a long time, but that she had no idea
where she would he sent. When she said she would like to remain in
Moscow, Andre promised that if she gave him the name of her
replacement he would see that she would not be issued a visa. Bir-
gitta brushed this aside as improper. They parted in a friendly man-
ner and in the presence of Oleg, Andre made a date with Birgitta
for August 5 at the Sovietskaya Hotel.
When Birgitta arrived at the hotel Andre was awaiting her in a
VIP suite which consisted of several elaborately furnished rooms.
There was a cold buffet. Andre repeated the points covered in his
previous talk, emphasizing that Birgitta was to notify him, in ad-
vance, of any intention to talk to her ambassador. He questioned her
again on the kinds of reports the ambassador wrote and asked her
if she had any contacts with the Swedish intelligence service. She re-
plied that she knew no one in that organization. Andre told her that
if she needed financial assistance he would help her. She declined
his offer. She did say that Oleg was now afraid to come to her apart-
ment because someone might see him and report his visit and asked
Andre if he could help. He told her that he would arrange with the
concierge for Oleg's freedom of entry and exit to her apartment. Bir-
gitta then asked him if her apartment was bugged and her phone
tapped, and he assured her he would have everything checked. He
asked her if the Swedish Embassy had its own technical sweepers and
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she replied she didn't know, but that she was certain that some of
the embassy offices and residences had been examined. Andre again
asked her if two of the other embassy secretaries, whom he named,
had Russian boyfriends, to which she answered affirmatively. He did
not ask for the names of the boyfriends, but warned her not to dis-
cuss their relationship with the other women.
On August 11 Birgitta phoned Andre as arranged at the last meet-
ing and made an appointment to meet him at the Sovietskaya Hotel
the next evening. In the embassy mail the next day there was a
letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notifying her that she
would be leaving Moscow on 18 August. Andre asked how the letter
had arrived and she said by diplomatic courier. He asked her if she
had mentioned her impending departure to anyone and she said only
to the other secretary in her immediate office. He then wanted to
know if she had spoken with anyone from the security section of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when she was home. She replied that
she had had' the normal security interview in which she was asked
if she had any contacts with Soviet citizens, to which she had an-
swered negatively. Andre asked for an outline, including personality
assessments, of the employees in the security section. Birgitta told
him she didn't know anyone employed there. He asked for the name
of the person who had interviewed her and was told it was a Miss
Ekberg. Andre asked no further questions about this section because
Birgitta told him all the people were listed overtly in the ministry
personnel roster. He then returned to the subject of the ambassador's
reports and pressed her to furnish him with copies. She put him off
by promising to bring them to him next meeting. Andre told her the
reports were not really secret and that he usually received copies
of all such correspondence. However, if she could give him copies,
it would save much time since the normal channel required three
weeks, and they were further held up because of translation prob-
lems. At the end of their chat Andre gave Birgitta an expensive icon
as a present. When she pointed out that it was forbidden to take
icons out of Russia, he replied that he would arrange everything
for her.
Birgitta met Andre the day before she left at the Sovietskaya Hotel
for coffee and cognac. Andre was very anxious to know if word had
gotten out concerning their relationship and if this had anything to
do with Birgitta's sudden recall. She assured him that it was routine
and that if there were a problem the ambassador would not be giving
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a dinner in her honor. This appeared to reassure him. Andre told her
that he had no future need of her assistance, but that if he ever
did need her help he would contact her by sending a colleague in
his name. He said he was sorry to see her leave because she loved
the Russian people and country so much. He asked if she intended
to remain in contact with Oleg and upon hearing that she would
write to him, gave her an address in Moscow to use, to insure that
Oleg would receive her letters.
Andre instructed her to write to Oleg in German, and to sign
her letters, "Elsa." He said he would pick up the letters, translate
them into Russian and deliver them to Oleg and would do the same
with Oleg's letters to her. Andre again assured her of financial assist-
ance if she should need it and promised her transportation and ex-
pense-free trips to the Soviet Union. When Birgitta asked if she would
he able to see Oleg again, Andre promised he would send him to
some western country, such as Switzerland, for a three week holiday
whenever she wished it. They parted as great friends and Andre told
her he would contact her if he ever needed her help.
Later that evening, Birgitta and Oleg visited Ivan and his mother
to say goodbye. Ivan gave her a book as a present. Then Birgitta and
Oleg had dinner and Oleg presented her with a beautiful icon, al-
legedly from the Patriarch's museum. Oleg told her he would not
come to the airport to see her off because he was too upset about her
departure. Birgitta departed Moscow by air for Sweden on August
18, 1964.
Between 18 August and 30 September 1964, Birgitta was on leave
in Sweden. She sent Oleg several post cards to his office address
and signed her name as "Juliana Michelovna." It is not clear why
she did not use the address Andre gave her. Probably she was under
the impression that by not doing so, she could ensure the privacy of
her letters to Oleg.
On 30 September 1964, Birgitta arrived in Algiers and took up her
duties as secretary to the ambassador. She moved into a small apart-
ment in the Swedish compound and bought a Citroen. Through
another Swedish Embassy secretary, whose mother was Russian,
Birgitta met a Russian emigre family, the Vinogradovs, who lived near-
by. Birgitta enjoyed visiting this family, with whom she spoke Rus-
sian and talked about Russian art and culture. She sent Oleg several
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letters through the Swedish diplomatic pouch, in care of a girl friend
at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow who delivered the letters to Oleg
at his office. In Algiers, Birgitta became friendly with another Swede
who was married. However, it was a platonic relationship, apparently
because he wished it to be so. Birgitta received no mail from Oleg.
On 30 November 1965, more than a year after her arrival in Al-
giers, Birgitta went to visit the Vinogradov family. As she was park-
ing her car another automobile with two men in it pulled up im-
mediately behind her. One of them got out and came over to her
car, opened the door and got in. It was Andre. Birgitta was very sur-
prised to see him and asked how he had found her. He said, "I saw
you driving by and I never forget people I like." They made a date
for dinner on 4 December.
Andre picked Birgitta up at a prearranged place near her apart-
ment in a taxi and they went to a restaurant. He gave her some pres-
ents from Oleg, a letter from Oleg, three photographs of Oleg and an
antique wine carafe. Andre was concerned about whether Birgitta
knew anyone in the restaurant and was relieved when she said she
didn't. After they had dined, Andre asked her the names of the per-
sonnel at the Swedish Embassy in Algeria and about their former
posts. She gave him as much information as she could remember,
later explaining that none of this information was secret. During this
part of the conversation Andre took notes. This was the first time
he had ever done so.
On 8 December Andre phoned Birgitta at her apartment and asked
her to have dinner with him again. In the restaurant he gave her a
present, an egg-shaped cut stone allegedly from the Ural Mountains
possessing some religious significance. He also gave her an expen-
sive jewel box. Andre said he was unable to eat much because he
was suffering from a stomach ailment, so the meeting was very short.
No business was discussed during the meeting and Andre said he
would phone later.
On 11 December Andre again took Birgitta to dinner. This time
he arrived in a grey Simca driven by a stranger whom he intro-
duced as, "My good friend, Vladilen." Andre said that in the future
Birgitta would maintain contact with Vladilen because he had to
leave Algiers in a few days. Birgitta was agreeable to this arrange-
ment. During dinner Andre gave her a bottle of vodka and two cans
of caviar. In turn she gave him a bottle of Martel cognac, following
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a pattern she had established while in Moscow. After they finished
dinner, Andre said, "I haven't had time to buy you an appropriate
gift, so please give me your handbag." He placed an envelope in the
bag and returned it to her. Andre said that he would be leaving Al-
giers soon and assured Birgitta that Vladilen was an interesting man,
an engineer by training. Andre stressed that he had to go to Tunisia
and asked Birgitta to give Vladilen her phone number, which she
did. Vladilen appeared to be reluctant to take it, or at least gave
the impression that he didn't know what he was supposed to do with
it. Birgitta did not believe that be was a member of the KGB be-
cause he did not press her for information, and did not appear to
know anything of her background. In any event, they had nothing
in common to discuss.
Vladilen phoned Birgitta at her apartment on 15 December and
made arrangements to pick her up for dinner that evening at the
place where Andre had met her. Vladilen seemed to have difficulty
adjusting to Birgitta and near the end of the meal he
suddenly blurted, "Give me a list of all the Swedish people in Al-
giers." Birgitta answered that she didn't know many people but he
persisted and said for her to bring the list to their next meeting. When
Birgitta asked why such a list was needed, Vladilen answered that it
was for her own security, that he wanted to check the names to see
if any Swedish intelligence people were on it. Birgitta told him he
could get such a list by writing to the Swedish Embassy and asking
for it. He became confused and said that he couldn't do that. Ap-
parently disturbed at the way the meeting was going, Vladilen de-
cided to take Birgitta home. He dropped her off about 11 p.m. in
the neighborhood of her apartment and told her he would phone her
again.
On 19 December Birgitta received a phone call from Andre who
said he was back from Tunisia and would like to see her. She said
she was busy and asked him to call the next day. When Andre phoned
again on 20 December Birgitta again said that she was too busy
to see him, that she would like to but unfortunately she had too much
to do at the embassy. This was the last time she spoke with Andre.
She never saw or heard from him again.
On 27 December Vladilen phoned Birgitta and she agreed to meet
him at the usual place. By this time she had made up her mind to
break off the contact. She wrote a note in Russian in which she said
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she did not enjoy Vladilen's small dinner parties nor the indiscreet
questions which followed and that she did not want to see him
again. Vladilen read the letter and seemed to be both impressed and
embarrassed and said, "Help me please, and go to a restaurant with
me." When she refused he demanded that she give him a list of
the members of the Swedish colony in Algeria. She refused to discuss
it and told Vladilen that he had read her letter and should under-
stand that she did not want to see him again. She left him standing
on the street. The meeting had lasted ten minutes.
About three weeks later Vladilen phoned Birgitta at her apart-
ment and said that he would like to see her about the letter she
had given him at their last meeting. Birgitta agreed to meet him,
mainly because she wanted to see if any mention of Oleg would be
made at this time. Vladilen invited her to dinner in a restaurant but
she refused to go. She had the impression that he was afraid and
didn't know what to do next. He told her he had sent the note she
had given him to Andre and that Andre had been very surprised.
Vladilen then asked her in Andre's name to give him a list of her
close Swedish friends so that he could check it for persons dangerous
to her security. She again refused and told him to ask the embassy.
He then asked if she would give him a report about Swedish tech-
nological and economic assistance to Africa which she also refused to
do. He asked for copies of correspondence which she had access to
and was again refused. Every refusal by Birgitta brought a warning
from Vladilen that he would inform Andre. Before they parted, Vladi-
len pleaded for her help and cooperation, and when she continued
to. refuse he told her goodby on the street.
By this time Birgitta had informed her platonic Swedish friend of
her troubles with the Soviets. He told her not to worry, that they
would eventually drop the case. There is reason to believe that Bir-
gitta had transferred some of her affection from Oleg to her new
male friend, but apparently he did not wish to enter into a liaison
with her.
Birgitta met Vladilen again on 18 February 1966 only because he
told her he had a letter from Andre. While they were dining Vladilen
handed her the following letter which was written in English.
Dear Juliana,
I am very surprised and disappointed with what Vladilen has written
concerning your behavior. I don't understand your attitude in view of
your excellent help in the past, especially in translating articles concerning
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Indonesia, the information about the Swedish Embassy personnel in
Moscow, the excellent information concerning the Intelligence Section
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the information concerning Swedish
Embassy employees in Algeria. Your information was of great help to
me in my work, and I expect you to answer all of Vladilen's questions.
If you are unwilling to cooperate, I will then send all the material I
have regarding you to Vladilen. You understand quite well what Vladilen
will do with this, and that as a result you will be in a very awkward
situation.
The letter did not mention Oleg. After reading it, Birgitta asked
Vladilen. if she could keep it but he said no and told her to give it
back to him. She said she would have to have time to think over
what to do and explained that at the moment she was upset be-
cause her mother in Sweden was ill, which was true, and that she
might have to go home. She asked Vladilen not to press her for an
answer but to phone her around the end of February. If she was not
at home it meant that she was in Sweden and he should call her
later. She promised not to discuss her situation with anyone.
Following this meeting with Vladilen, Birgitta could no longer stand
the strain of her mother's illness in addition to her own problems with
Vladilen and Andre, and phoned one of her colleagues in the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden to ask for help. The ministry
turned the case over to the Swedish security service.
Birgitta was recalled to Sweden for an interview with the service
on 27 February 1966 and remained there until 29 February. Ar-
rangements were made for her to return to Algeria to close her apart-
ment and return home permanently.
On 9 March 1966 Vladilen phoned Birgitta at her apartment at
7:15 a.m. in Algiers and asked to see her, saying he had phoned a
hundred times before. She told him she would be unablo to see him
before 20 March because of the pressure of her work, knowing that
she would leave Algiers on 19 March. However, she had prepared
a letter for Andre which she had planned to give to Vladilen but the
Swedish service forbade her to do so. In the letter she had written
that she still considered Andre her friend.
Birgitta returned to Sweden 19 March 1966, and was assigned,
pending further investigation, to a non-sensitive position in the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs.
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ecru- men
Epilogue
The Swedish security service described Birgitta as a 52 year old
woman who looks about 60 years old, but who believes she has the
charm and beauty of a young girl. She told one of the representatives
of the service that she was like a young woman of 25, and she be-
lieves it. She is easily attracted to men and falls in love with anyone
who flatters her or gives her attention. She told one interviewer that
she was still in love with Oleg and refused to believe he was an
agent of the KGB. She asked that this be proved to her, and said
that she would leave for Switzerland on a moment's notice to meet
him if she knew he was there. The fact that Oleg is 16 years her
junior does not appear to her to be unreasonable or cause for concern.
In the opinion of the Swedish service, Birgitta gave them a self-
serving account of her relationship with the KGB and of the informa-
tion she passed to them. Certainly any reckoning of the time, money,
and personnel invested in her by the Soviets indicates that they must
have received information of far greater value than she has indi-
cated.
Altogether she had about 100 meetings with Oleg in Moscow,
about 16 meetings with Andre in KGB safehouses in Moscow, and
five meetings with Vladilen in Algiers. To date, no attempt has been
made by the Soviets to recontact her since her return to Sweden.
Birgitta's handling by Andre reflected a shrewd knowledge of her
character. He catered to her love for fine things, presented her with
gifts of "new icons" described to her as antiques, exploited her fond-
ness for gourmet meals, resplendent furnishings and good manners.
In contrast, Vladilen's lack of assurance and poor manners repelled
her and had much to do with her decision to end the affair. This case
illustrates KGB technique at its best and worst. It also exemplifies a
very sophisticated maneuver in which blackmail was applied in a
backhanded way, deliberately causing the culprit to feel a moral ob-
ligation to "protect" the person who was actually primarily responsible
for her troubles.2
' For an account of another fairly recent episode illustrative of KGB tech-
niques, see Cdr. Arthur Courtney's Sailor in a Russian Frame, London ( Johnson )
1968, reviewed in Studies XIII 1, p. 87 if.
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CONFIDENTIAL
No Foreign Dissem
Prospects for push-button ma-
nipulation of the unwieldy in-
tricacies of economic data.
COMPUTERS IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
Michael C. McCracken
It is Monday, 21 May 1973, another day in the life of Jim Bond, ana-
lyst of the Soviet economy. While drinking his morning coffee he looks
through his "mail," the contents of his in-box. This he does by his re-
mote console, identifying himself to the central computer, and asking for
mail. On the cathode-ray tube (CRT) screen appears a listing of
descriptive titles with other identifying information and data on the
length and priority of each item. Jim selects one-an administrative
announcement-scans it, indicates how to dispose of it, and sees the
list reappear without it.
Next he selects an article translated from a Soviet journal, and as he
reads it from the CRT screen he considers under what descriptors it
should be made retrievable for future reference. Some descriptors have
already been attached to the article by a computer program and by
other analysts; he adds others from the viewpoint of his specialty. This
system assures a thorough cross-indexing and future availability to
analysts of all descriptions.
He goes through all his mail this way, dumping some articles, re-
serving others for later reading, and adding some, with appropriate
descriptors, to the permanent files. Next year he expects to be able to
read articles in Russian from his CRT; the programers have yet to
complete the required Cyrillic alphabet display routines and link in a
dictionary routine to aid the imperfect Russian reader with automatic
definitions on demand.
The phone rings: an urgent inquiry from the Congressional liaison
office as to the amount of tin exported by the USSR to Ruritania during
the past four years. Jim turns to his console and interrogates the file
of Soviet foreign trade data, which has the amounts of tin exported to
Ruritania in 1970 and 1971. From another file he gets a forecast of the
data not yet published for 1972. Then he interrogates the file of ship
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CONFIDENTIAL Economic ADP
and cargo movements and is given all tin shipments to Ruritania from
the USSR in the period from January to date in 1973. In a simple pro-
graming language he instructs the computer to sum up this cargo data
in a figure for the first part of 1973. Finally he enters all this informa-
tion and his comments on it onto the console in a message routed to
the caller. A bell will ring at the latter's console as the message is en-
tered into his mail.
Later that morning he participates with other analysts in an evalu-
ation of the latest economic data released by the Soviets. One of the
first items is the production of cotton cloth. The new Soviet data indi-
cate a 7 percent increase in output but the previous forecast was only
3 percent. Each analyst examines this divergence from his own view-
point. Jim Bond retrieves the data for production of cotton, exports
and imports of cotton, and inventories of cotton. He concludes that
there is sufficient cotton available to support a 7 percent increase
without reducing inventories substantially. Meanwhile, other analysts
are retrieving information on textile plant capacity, consumption of
cotton cloth by the civilian and military sectors, and other data related
to cotton cloth production. A senior analyst at a CRT display reads
the comments of each contributing analyst and prepares a summary
at the console that is then displayed at each analyst's console for con-
currence or comment. A similar procedure is followed for the rest of
the data. Those items agreeing closely with forecasts (most of them)
require little additional analysis. However, each major divergence is
examined. Subsequently, the OER forecasting group will examine
their "misses" and, if possible, adjust their econometric models.
After lunch we find Jim Bond quietly reading a book about the Soviet
economy. A bell rings at his console indicating an incoming message.
He logs into the system and receives the message that his intelligence
memorandum prepared yesterday has been approved by the division
chief except for minor revisions required. A list of the desired changes
is displayed. Jim then retrieves the draft from the computer files and
begins entering the required revisions. He only enters desired changes-
the old draft is updated and line justification and pagination changed
by the computer program. Upon completion from the console he will
file memorandum in the division chief's "mail," but not ring the
bell!
Jim locks his console and prepares to end a typical working day for
an economic intelligence analyst.
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Economic ADP CONFIDENTIAL
The story may read like science fiction but everything in it is "state
of the art" in economics and computer science. The computer hard-
ware exists (remote consoles, peripheral storage, large central proc-
essors) ; the computer software is emerging (on-line, time-sharing
monitors, file management programs, and interactive programing lan-
guages); and the tools of econometrics, programing, and systems de-
sign can be mastered. All that remains is to combine these elements-
a task which can be accomplished during the next five years.
Two preconditions for the adoption of these techniques are, first,
demonstration of the potential gains and, second, the education of
analysts in the use of computers and quantitative methods. Programs
are under way to fulfill these preconditions.
Currently the applications of computer techniques to economic in-
telligence are few in number. Personnel familiar with economic prob-
lems and computer systems design are still scarce. But the potential
applications abound. To obtain a better idea of how computers are
currently used in this field and how they might be used in the future,
let us distinguish the several functions an economic intelligence analyst
performs and examine the current and potential applications of com-
puters under each of these functions. There are three primary func-
tions-file management, analysis, and the communication of intelli-
gence. Computers can aid analysts in all of these by increasing accuracy,
saving time, and reducing costs.
File Management
This term covers the process of scanning documents for relevance,
extracting data, filing the extracted information according to some
system, and retrieving information from the files in response to ques-
tions-the things we saw Jim Bond doing during his day. CIA has
several operational projects using computer techniques to manage
economic files.' These files, periodically updated and validated, pro-
vide the data base of reports both for the use of CIA analysts and for
dissemination to the community at large. The advantages of having
them automated are speed and consistency in the retrieval of informa-
tion. Furthermore, they can frequently be maintained by intelligence
assistants, and the analysts freed for other tasks that are less routine.
1 Notably concerning Chinese nutrition, Communist economic assistance, and
Soviet foreign trade.
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CONFIDENTIAL Economic ADP
In the future the scope of computer-aided file management will
be greatly expanded. It is now technically feasible to have a central
data bank containing information on the international trade, income,
population, military establishments, economic organizations, prices,
and other economic variables of most countries of the world. Such a
central store would greatly enhance the ability of research components
to rely on strict quantitative methods in their estimates and would en-
sure that the same data are used by all.
As the CIA central reference files become more completely auto-
mated,2 the economic analysts should be able to make retrospective
searches of intelligence documents on a variety of topics, thereby
reducing their need to maintain their own files for all anticipated
problems. Work is also under way in R&D components on automatic
systems for scanning text and extracting desired information from it.
At present the updating of ADP files is periodic, by batches, and
printouts are also provided periodically. Many estimating activities,
however, require continuously current data. Time-sharing systems
(under which the computer can serve a number of customers at remote
locations simultaneously) can provide, at relatively low cost, the re-
quired currency. Therefore, it is planned to put the files of interna-
tional ship and cargo movements to critical areas, for example, into a
system in which data can be entered and retrieved at consoles in the
analysts' offices.
All these developments point to a time in the not too distant future
when each analyst, or at least each branch, will have a remote console
which will provide immediate access to a wide variety of files of docu-
rnents and data, and enable the analyst to retrieve and manipulate
quantities of information quickly, cheaply, and accurately.
Analysis
The analysis function encompasses the use of judgment, the per-
formance of calculations, the application of economic theory, and
mathematical modeling. Computers are now used to calculate the
Soviet national income and product accounts and compare them with
the US accounts, to calculate the indexes (percentages of increase from
a given base) of Soviet industrial production, and to calculate foreign
aid requirements and repayments under various hypothetical situ-
'See Paul A. Borel's "Automation for Information Control" in Studies XI 1,
p. 25 ff.
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Economic ADP CONFIDIENTIAL
ations. The use of the computer on these projects has eliminated a
substantial number of hours of desk calculator work. Analysts also
can test the effect of various assumptions on the results of the calcu-
lations (e.g., the sensitivity of the distribution of GNP by sector to
changes in the input-output table or turnover tax component of final
demand), an exercise not always feasible before because of the amount
of calculation required.
Work has begun on the construction of an econometric model (ac-
tually several models) of the Soviet economy based on the 1.959 in-
put-output table published in the USSR in 1961. The model is a set
of equations describing the interdependence of various components
of the economy (e.g., prices, income, output of industry and of agri-
culture, capital stock, employment, and consumption). When the model
is complete, projections of these components under alternative assump-
tions about increases in military output, the size of labor force, the
amount of capital investment, and trends in productive efficiency can
be obtained with the aid of a computer program.
The potential in this area is likewise enormous. Eventually we
should have models of most foreign economies, of international trade,
and of other processes important to economic intelligence. The key to
success in this area is to involve the analysts in designing the models
and interacting with their application. This requires educating the
analysts in the use of quantitative tools and providing them with ade-
quate computer programs, and assistance in the application of these
tools.
Communication
The communication function, whether exercised in a telephone
call or a formal report or briefing, requires mutual understanding,
which computers can improve substantially. When both data bases
and analytical techniques have been standardized for all analysts by
the use of computers, it will be easier to understand what steps an
analyst has taken to reach a given conclusion, and other analysts will
be able to reproduce these steps and validate the conclusion. The
direct communication of inquiries to a data base will also eliminate
the need to bother an analyst with simple questions of fact.
Computers can be employed to advantage in the graphic plotting
of data and in the preparation of textual reports. Various organiza-
tions have systems under which a secretary can place an analyst's
rough draft and any subsequent revisions into computer storage from
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a remote console. The latest version can be printed automatically
at any stage. In the brief period that such systems have been in use
they have demonstrated that substantial savings in time and costs
can be expected from them.
Preparatory Tasks
Computers will play an ever-increasing role in economic intel-
ligence. The analyst will work in an environment of well-organized
Piles, substantial aids to calculation, and other routine-eliminating
tools enabling him to apply his mind directly to intelligence prob-
lems. The manager will find it easier to transfer responsibilities from
one analyst to another because files and the techniques for exploiting
them will be standardized. What needs to be done at present to pro-
mote this environment of the future?
One major requirement has already been mentioned-a vigorous
program to educate economic analysts and management in the use
of computers. Certain key personnel will need intensive instruc-
tion in programing, quantitative methods, and systems design. A
workshop was conducted during the spring and summer of 1968 for
ten analysts in these areas. A similar activity is planned for early 1969.
A gradual increase in the number and sophistication of operational
applications for computer systems in projects involving file manage-
ment, analysis, and communication will lead to better working knowl-
edge of the use of computers on the part of analysts as well as to
the development of machine-readable data collections.
Much of the expertise and design of future computer systems, par-
ticularly remote-console, time-sharing systems, will come from R&D
and computer service units. It is desirable that economic intelligence
officers keep aware of developments in this direction and at the same
time encourage the computer experts to examine economic applica-
tions.
Active participation in any community projects for building up
data collections, putting documents into machine-readable form,
standardizing classification systems, and similar activities 3 will of
course be of direct benefit.
If these preliminary tasks are not neglected, the economic intelligence
analyst will live a very different official life in 1973 than he has in 1968.
Such as that described in Zane Thornton's "Community Progress in Information
Handling," Studies XI 1, p. 13 if.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
STA JE CIA? (WHAT IS CIA?) By Milovoje J. Levkov. (Belgrade;
Sedma Sila. Dokumenti Dana"snjice, Issue No. 178. 1987. 78 pp.
2 n. din).
The author of this pamphlet received his law degree from the Uni-
versity of Belgrade in 1956 and his doctorate in 1965, choosing as
his thesis topic international law as it pertains to espionage, with
special attention to the espionage practices of various countries fol-
lowing World War II. The publishers mention that Mr. Levkov
has previously contributed several articles to the same journal on
espionage and international law.
The present article contains no startling revelations about CIA.
The author's sources are basically overt, ranging from Allen Dulles'
"The Craft of Intelligence," (the dust jacket of which the author or
publisher has reproduced on the cover of this book) to numerous quo-
tations from "The Invisible Government." The author also refers to
other foreign authors such as Soviet Brigadier General V. A. Viktorov,
who wrote "Espionage Under the Mask of Tourism" in 1963; G. Zhu-
kov's "Plan of Cosmic Espionage and International Law" in 1960, and
F. N. Chistyakov's "The Secret Front War" in 1965, to name but a
few. Levkov claims that some of his information comes from "other
sources" not further identified.
What Levkov writes is in fact much less interesting than the ques-
tion of why he (or we should say the Yugoslav government) wanted
to publish at all, unless mainly for internal consumption in connection
with the revelations made at the time concerning the plans and ac-
tivities of Alexander Rankovich. The author's major object, it ap-
pears, is to attempt to prove that espionage is contrary to all forms
of international law. The reader is supposed to infer from his slanted
statements that only CIA is engaged in international espionage.
Levkov delves into the history of CIA and mentions its early
beginnings, including the role of the OSS, which he says was en-
gaged in a variety of special intelligence missions and supported
underground anti-Nazi groups deep in occupied territory. In. addi-
tion, the author comments on the role of OSS in the invasions of
Normandy and North Africa. For reasons best known to himself, the
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author chose to ignore the fact that OSS was in the mountains of
Yugoslavia helping Marshal Tito in his struggle against the Axis
powers.
Levkov refers to most of the other US intelligence agencies, all of
which we are to understand are under the control of CIA. He be-
lieves that CIA has some 20,000 staff employees and approximately
200,000 agents throughout the world. As far as he is concerned, the
US government cannot do anything in the realm of global strategy
and politics without the approval of CIA. He pictures CIA as an or-
ganization beyond any real control. He apparently wishes to amuse
his readers by giving a literal translation of the Watchdog Committee,
i.e., that they are "dog watchers," implying that CIA is an organiza-
tion of dogs that must be watched carefully. He attempts to explain
the role. of the National Security Agency (CIA-controlled) mostly
from excerpts of the 1960 press conference given in Moscow by de-
fectors Martin and Mitchell. In presenting the readers with an idea
of how CIA operates (against international law), he makes references
to the Berlin tunnel of 1956, CIA's activities in Iran (1952), Guate-
mala (1954), Indonesia (1958), Cambodia (1966), Laos, Vietnam,
the U-2 affair, the use of Samos and Midas as spy satellites, the Bay
of Pigs episode, British Guiana (1963), the National Students Associa-
tion, penetration of Western European labor unions, purchases of
news media, political assassinations, psychological warfare in Viet-
nam, Camelot, Svetlana Alliluyeva, and Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy.
Despite the western literature presumably available in Yugoslavia,
the author chooses to side with the Soviets in the Penkovskiy case.
He makes no reference to Penkovskiy's having been a GRU officer
and points out that Penkovskiy was a mere reserve officer in the Red
Army. He debunks the information given by Penkovskiy and implies
that he became an agent for money and no other reason. It is interest-
ing to note that the author, who, we have been told, is an expert
at international law, defends the right of the Soviets to arrest Greville
Wynne in Budapest "due to a legal agreement between the USSR
and Hungary." Then we learn that Wynne was "traded for Gordon
Lonsdale (alias Konon Molody), a Soviet citizen arrested in Great
Britain for espionage.
Levkov depicts the defection of Stalin's daughter as a CIA opera-
tion timed to embarrass the USSR during the celebration of the 50th
anniversary of the Revolution. According to Levkov, Svetlana Al-
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liluyeva is "two million dollars richer thanks to the actions of CIA."
Levkov claims that CIA prepared her book of 80,000 words from
CIA archives in Frankfurt. Levkov refuses to believe that she wrote
her book three years prior to her defection, apparently because he
does not believe her story that she found little difficulty getting her
manuscript out of the Soviet Union.
Levkov seeks to leave the reader with the impression that the US
government revolves around the CIA. He presents a chart showing
all US intelligence agencies (CIA, NSA, FBI, and the Department of
State's INR) as being under the control of CIA. When the author
comments on psychological warfare, the reader is to understand that
the numerous organizations overseas he refers to are really CIA or-
ganizations, including the Voice of America.
The author appears to be very frustrated because international law
does not seem to be able to cope or curtail espionage, i.e., CIA ac-
tivities. In his final paragraph he warns nations to look after their
individual security and to defend themselves from the "dangerous
acts of CIA." In order to strengthen his point, the publishers have a
cartoon (drawn by D. Savich but of the type usually found in Soviet
periodicals) on the back cover showing a man with CIA written on
his chest and sitting on the globe so that he can cover the entire
world. In addition to the usual capitalistic cigar in his mouth, the
CIA operator has six hands. They hold a telephone, microphone,
hand grenade, pistol, and dollar bills.
Unfortunately, Mr. Levkov does not give us any references to his
doctoral work in which he allegedly wrote about more than one
country. In this article he appears to accept the fact that no country
has admitted to being engaged in international espionage and he,
therefore, comes to the conclusion that the US is the only country
involved because CIA admitted to such activity in 1960 during the
U-2 affair.
Frank W. Talpalar
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CONFIDENTIAL Miscellaneous
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: PROBLEMS OF
SECRECY IN A DEMOCRACY. Edited by Young Hum Kim.
(Lexington: D.C. Heath & Co. 1968.113 pp. $2.00.)
This collection of articles is one of a series of volumes entitled
"Problems in Political Science" published under the editorial direc-
tion of Neal Riemer, of the University of Wisconsin. Kim's introduc-
tion states that the purpose of this "reader" is to provide students of
politics with carefully selected texts concerning the problem of se-
crecy in a democracy.
Kim's approach to his task, however, seems closer to that of moral
philosophy than to political science. In his introduction, he pronounces
as follows:
"Any governmental organization in a democracy which operates in secrecy,
such as the CIA (although its activities are primarily directed toward
foreign powers), tend to resort to totalitarian means to achieve its ends.
As a result, such an agency, particularly but not exclusively in its over-
seas operations, invariably violates the ethics of a democratic and constitu-
tional society and may ignore that due process of law which has safe-
guarded fundamental democratic rights and liberties."
Since the foregoing is evidently Kim's settled view, one wonders
why he has gone to the trouble of compiling his "reader." If, that is,
the consequences of any secret government organization are indeed
"invariably" malign, then there is no mystery about the matter, nor
any "problems of secrecy in a democracy," save that of extirpating
secrecy. But elsewhere Kim finds it possible to conceive of circum-
stances under which "the creation of an instrument of government
such as the CIA ... may be justified."
The (presumably youthful) readership which this volume may
reach will not find much guidance in the selections themselves to
get them out of the methodological thicket into which the editor
has led them. Most of the authors are well-known as critics of CIA
from one point of view or another, and none are disposed to address
themselves to the much more difficult problem of how, in fact, legiti-
mate secrets can he kept in a democracy.
There is a need for a good and useful reader on this subject. Other
selections are available that could give concerned readers a balanced
and genuinely dispassionate picture of the CIA, while noting valid
criticisms. The Central Intelligence Agency is not that volume.
Walter Pforzheimer
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BELLE BOYD IN CAMP AND PRISON. By Belle Boyd. Edited
with Introduction and notes by Curtis Carroll Davis. (New York:
Thomas Yoseloff. 1968. 448 pp. $9.50.)
This is the book to end all books about Belle Boyd; it will of course
do nothing of the kind. It establishes her as the author of that al-
most unheard-of-article, an authentic Civil War spy memoir, and as
a greatly overrated spy, in which latter respect it amplifies an opinion
previously announced to the readers of this journal.'
The history of the case is this: Belle, seventeen and living in the
Shenandoah Valley, gained notoriety in 1861 by killing a Federal in-
vader in her home. This was a bad start for a would-be spy. While
the locality was in Northern hands at several periods in 1862-63,
Belle associated amiably with Federal officers. They reciprocated her
attentions and kept a decently close watch on her. She was also well
covered by the newspapers, which made her a celebrity. She served
two short sentences in Washington prisons, the first in 1862 after
the famous caper in which she fled Front Royal afoot in broad day-
light to deliver information to Jackson as he arrived by surprise before
the town. The second, in the post-Gettysburg period, was for causes
less evident.
Repatriated to Richmond a second time, she was made a bearer of
dispatches to Europe and was arrested at sea, but so charmed her
captor that he took a hand in her release, resigned his naval com-
mission and followed her to London, where they were married..
There, her book was published in 1865, ghosted by a prominent
local hack. In 35 years of postwar life she tried to capitalize on her
wartime celebrity by taking to the stage, first as actress, then as reader
of dramatic accounts of her espionage. Although she was thus be-
fore the American public off and on for four decades, her fame
dimmed until legend eventually confused her with the gunwoman
Belle Starr.
As to her book. First, it is surpassingly dull. Second, it follows the
pattern of Civil War espionage memoirs by concerning itself with the
spy's comings and goings and tribulations, thoroughly disappointing
the reader who hopes to find out what information the spy delivered.
Third, it differs from most of its genre in that its claims about infor-
1 Edwin C. Fishcl, "Military Intelligence 1861-63," Studies X 3, p. 81 if.
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CONFIDENTIAL Miscellaneous
mation delivered are modest indeed. Fourth, as a piece of writing it
belongs in the class known as Overblown Victorian, as far from an
American girl's natural style as the ghost, George A. Sala, could make
it. We forgive-aye, we endorse-Dr. Davis' adjective: "G.A.S.-eous."
In an 80-page introduction Dr. Davis gives the background of this
unremarkable document, unearths and dispels enough myths that
grew around Belle Boyd to surprise the most hardened historian,
and develops Belle's postwar activities with the comprehensiveness
of a one-man FBI. In 42 pages of notes he gives many corroborations
of her account from other sources. But to this reviewer the most sig-
nificant result of his work is the contemporary reports he found of
Belle's appearances on the lecture platform. These reports do not
seem to have elaborated on the limited story she was willing to tell
in 1865. This may be taken as an indication that there was not much
of a story after all.
Now for the first time we have one of the two dozen American
Civil War spy memoirs subjected to exhaustive and skillful detective
work. That is a help to future scholarship, and one admires the dedi-
cation of Dr. Davis as well as the publisher's, but wonders if the
publishing world could sustain a second experiment of this kind.
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No Foreign Dissem
How US intelligence obtained
some remarkable documents.
THE CIANO PAPERS: ROSE GARDEN
Howard McGaw Smyth
Galeazzo Ciano, dei conti di Cortellazzo, was born on 18 March
1903 at Leghorn, the son of Admiral Costanzo Ciano, an Italian hero
of World War I and an early supporter of Mussolini. After gaining
his degree young Ciano dabbled for a time in journalism and, then
in 1925 entered the Italian diplomatic service. He served briefly at
Rio de Janeiro, Peking, and the Holy See. On 24 April 1930 he married
Edda, the daughter of Mussolini. Thereafter his promotions were very
rapid indeed. After a brief period serving as Consul General at Shang-
hai, Ciano was named Minister to China, and in 1932 served as presid-
ing officer of the League of Nations' Commission of Inquiry on the
Sino-Japanese conflict. In August 1933, Mussolini named his son-in-law
chief of his press office, which in September of the next year was up-
graded and renamed the Office of Press and Propaganda with Ciano
as its undersecretary. In June of 1935 the Office was transformed into
a full-fledged ministry with Ciano at its head.
Ciano volunteered for the Ethiopian War and served in command
of a bomber squadron. He was decorated by Marshal Badog]iio for
military valor in that war. Then on 9 June 1936, at the age of 33, he
was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, an office which he filled
until February 1943. Young Ciano was even accorded, retroactively
it would seem, that great Fascist honor of having taken part in the
"March on Rome" in 1922.1
Countess Edda Ciano liked to speak of herself as half-Russian,
ascribing her moodiness and weak lungs to her Russian blood. Mus-
solini's wife dismissed such talk as mere gossip: Edda was born to
1 At least it is so stated in the Enciclopedia Italiana, appendix I, p. 41.2. See,
however: Duilio Susmel, Vita sbagliata di Galeazzo Ciano (Milan: Aldo Palazzi,
1962) p. 56.
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e
us on September 1, 1910, she writes, but Benito and she were
not yet regularly married; hence, the stupid insinuation that Angelica
Balabanoff was the mother of Edda.2
The Cianos had three children: the older son, baptized Fabrizio
Benito Costanzo, born 1 October 1931; the daughter, Raimonda, born
21 December 1933; and Marzio, the younger son, born 18 December
1937. But the marriage was not a happy one: it was common knowl-
edge that each spouse had numerous affairs. Edda was headstrong
and violent in her feelings, something which seemed to endear her
to her father.3
Ciano was Minister of Foreign Affairs during the period of the
British acceptance of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, of the Italian
intervention in the Spanish Civil War, of Italy's rapprochement and
subsequent alliance with Nazi Germany, and of World War II until
February 1943. It was in the course of the Italian intervention in the
Spanish Civil War that Ciano instigated the murder of the Rosselli
brothers, Carlo and Nello, founders of the movement Giustizia e
Liberta.4 He met and spoke with practically all of the important Euro-
pean leaders of the time, and kept a diary or diaries during all or most
of the period of his ministry. The larger portion of these diaries was
first published in English translation in the American edition of
January 1946.5 An earlier portion of the diaries was first published in
' Rachele Mussolini, La mia vita con Benito (Milan: Arnaldo Mondadori, 1948)
p. 31.
'Roman Dombrowski, Mussolini: Twilight and Fall (New York: Roy Publishers,
1956) p. 114.
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 58, relates that when Edda returned from her trip
to Germany in 1937, where she had been shown great attention by Hitler and
the Nazi bigwigs, Galeazzo asked her directly if she had ever betrayed him. She
answered No, and Susmel assures us that this was the truth.
The statements to the contrary are too numerous to be listed.
'Charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) pp. 159-160;
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 74-75.
Cf. Massimo Salvadori, The Labour and the Wounds, A Personal Chronicle of
One Man's Fight for Freedom (London: Pall Mall Press, 1958) pp. 118-119.
'The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943: The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count
Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943, Edited by Hugh
Gibson, Introduction by Summer Welles (Garden City, New York: Doubleday &
Co. Inc., 1946).
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e
Italian in 1948. The English translation followed in 1953.? These diaries
are unquestionably, incomparably, the most interesting and important
Italian memoir material regarding World War 11.7
Closely associated with Ciano's private and often highly subjective
notations in the booklets of his diary were the supporting papers.
In the American edition of the diaries one encounters such interpola-
tions as these:
12 January 1939 (p. 10) : "I shall let Mackensen read yesterday's
record."
19 July 1939 (p. 110) : "I have set down my impressions of Spain
in a notebook."
1 October 1939 (p. 154) : "As usual I have summarized in a mem-
orandum in my conference book the official account of my contacts
with Hitler and other high officials of the Reich." 8
In the diaries for 1937-1938 (English edition), one finds such
references as these:
5 November 1937: "An extremely interesting conversation. I have
summarized it in a minute." (p. 29)
3 January 1938: "Conversation with Perth, of which I have made
a minute:" (p. 58)
5 January 1938: "The first [conversation of the Duce] of which I have
made a minute, was with Count Bethlen." (p. 60)
These supporting papers by Count Ciano, in the form which they
had acquired when they reached Washington, came to be known as
"The Ciano Papers: Rose Garden." Our primary aim in this essay is
to narrate how they got here. But this story cannot be told by itself.
To make it intelligible we must at the same time unravel the story
of the diaries themselves. But even before the diary and supporting
papers begin their movements from Rome, a few things should be
noted.
' Galeazzo Ciano, 1937-1938 diario (Bologna: Cappelli, 1948); Ciano's Hidden
Diary 1937-1938. Translation and notes by Andreas Mayor, With an introduction
by Malcolm Muggeridge (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1953).
'Mario Toscano, The History of Treaties and International Politics, Vol. I
An Introduction to the History of Treaties and International Politics: The Docu-
mentary and Memoir Sources (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966)
pp. 454-455.
Cf. Lewis Bernstein Namier, Diplomatic Prelude 1938-1939 (London: Mac-
millan, 1948) p. 494.
8 Other such references are to be found on pp. 175, 212, 219, 223, 255, 274,
277, 293, 305, 306, 419, 436, 470, 477, 552, 556.
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The diary was not very secret. Parts of it had been shown or read
to Dino Alfieri, Ambassador to Germany; to Filippo Anfuso, Ciano's
secretary and later Ambassador to Hungary; and to Zenone Benini,
a life-long friend of Ciano's, Undersecretary in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 1939, and Minister of Public Works in Mussolini's last
cabinet before the overthrow of July 1943. Benini later told the
Americans about the diary. It was known also to Felice Guarneri,
Undersecretary in the Ministry for Currency and Foreign Exchange,
to Giorgio Nelson Page, and to Orio Vergagni, also friends of many
years." Sumner Welles recorded: "He showed it [the diary] to me and
read me excerpts from it in my first conversation with him." 10
Mussolini was thoroughly aware that his son-in-law was keeping a
diary; he knew of Ciano's dislike and suspicion of the Germans, and
that the diary and selection of supporting papers reflected this attitude.
In the entry for 6 July 1941, Ciano noted Mussolini's irritation over
German activity in the Alto Adige, or the South Tyrol, as the Austrians
call it. "Note it down in your diary," Mussolini said, "that I foresee
an unavoidable conflict arising between Italy and Germany." For 6
November 1942, it is recorded: "Mussolini asked me if I was keep-
ing my diary up to date. When I answered affirmatively, he said
that it will serve to prove how the Germans, both in military and
political fields, have always acted without his knowledge." On 8
February 1943, three days after Mussolini had told Ciano that he
was being transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
embassy at the Vatican, the Duce "asked me if I had all my docu-
ments in order." Ciano assured him that they were in order, and that
he could document all the treacheries perpetrated against Italy by
the Germans."
The diary entries were recorded by Ciano in calendar note books
issued by the Italian Red Cross, page by page, usually one page for
one day. These sheets were about 8 inches by 10 inches. The notations
were in longhand in ink. Now and then, when much was recorded
for a given day, extra sheets had been pasted in. At other places
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 76-77.
10 The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943, p. xxvii. Cf. p. 212, entry 26 February 1940.
tl Op. cit, pp. 374, 539, and 580.
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the handwriting was extremely cramped in order to compress one
day's material on one sheet. One booklet was used for each year.
The booklets were kept in the little safe in Ciano's office.12
The published volume for 1937-1938 at the second entry, that for
23 August 1937, reads: "From today I mean to resume a regular diary.13
This implies or strongly suggests that there were other, antecedent
diary notations. This notation, however, should be read in conjunction
with the entry for 22 August: "My writer's vanity makes me beg that,
if one day publicity is given to these notes, it will be remembered
that they were thrown on to the paper by me, in bits and pieces,
between an interview and a telephone call....." 14 The wording may
mean that there was at some time some sort of systematic set of
notations by Ciano for 1936, a notebook which did not survive the
vicissitudes we are about to relate. Susmel insists that the Ciano diaries
originally consisted of eight notebooks, one for each of the years 1936
to 1943.15
The author has found positive evidence of only seven booklets
in the various movements of the diaries from 1943 onward. The nota-
tion for 22 August 1937 may merely indicate that Ciano experimented
from time to time with diary notations prior to that date, but kept
a systematic record only thereafter.
In 1944, when American intelligence officers first picked up the
trail of the diaries and papers, Zenone Benini, who seems not to have
drawn a clear distinction between the diaries and the papers, men-
tioned additional people to whom the diaries were known: ]Blasco
Lanza d'Ajeta, Duke Marcello del Drago, and the writer Curzio
Malaparte. Benini felt sure that the German Embassy knew of the
diaries. According to Benini, Curzio Malaparte stated that as early
"Interview with Mr. Allen Dulles, 17 January 1966; Telegram, Bern to Wash-
ington (Dulles to O.S.S.) 11 January 1945, Item 58 L, File "Edda Ciano Diaries,"
Personal Files of Allen Dulles; Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 76.
The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, pp. 1, 189, 329, 429, 563 reproduce the covers
of the Red Cross notebooks used by Ciano. The 1937-1938 diario, between p. xvii
and p. 1, provides a facsimile of the entry for 22 August 1937.
1' Ciano's Hidden Diary 1937-1938, p. 3.
141937-1938 diario, p. 5; but placed separate in the English edition (op. cit.,
p. vi) and labeled "Ciano's Foreword."
16 Vita sbagliata, pp. 57, 336, 370.
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as May 1942, Ciano had been advised by a friend to resign and seek
refuge in some foreign country but had replied: "'The publication
of my Diary will be sufficient not only to protect me from all political
vengeance and persecution, but will rehabilitate me even in the eyes
of my adversaries.' Ciano stated on several occasions to his friends
that he intended to publish this document abroad, perhaps in America
or in England." 16
"Escape" to Germany
Count Ciano, whom Mussolini had relieved of his position as. Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs on 5 February 1943, was one of the ring
leaders of the revolt against the Duce in the Grand Council of Fascism.
In his new position as Ambassador to the Holy See, Ciano worked
assiduously for Italy's withdrawal from the war, with Mussolini if
possible, without him and even against him if necessary. He cooper-
ated closely with Bottai and Grandi in preparing for the meeting
of the Grand Council on 24-25 July and in lining up a majority of
the Councilors to vote for Grandi's resolution. Throughout Ciano's
speech, Mussolini glowered at him in contempt and indignation.
The revolt within the Grand Council gave the King the opportunity
to dismiss Mussolini and to appoint Marshal Badoglio as his suc-
cessor.17
Headquarters Peninsular Base Section, Memorandum (by Lt. Col. Henry H.
Cumming) for A.C. of S., G-2, A.F.H.Q. 16 August 1944, Subject: Count Ciano's
Diary, Enclosure 2, Despatch No. 703, Robert D. Murphy to the Secretary of
State, 25 August 1944, Item 63 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries," Personal Files of
Allen Dulles.
"There were no stenographic minutes of this last meeting of the Grand Council
but some of the participants made their own records: Benito Mussolini, Il tempo
del bastone e della carota: Storia di un anno (ottobre 1942-settembre 1943)
Supplemento del "Corriere della Sera" No. 190 del 9-8-1944 XXII, pp. 16-18;
Dino Grandi, "Count Dino Grandi Explains." Life (February 26, 1945) pp. 21 ff.;
Giuseppe Bottai, Vent' anni e un giorno (Milan: Garzanti, 1949) pp. 295-318;
Dino Alfieri, Due dittatori di fronte (Milan: Rizzoli, 1948) pp. 320-ff.
The fullest secondary account in English is that by Frederick W. Deakin,
The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism (New
York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1962) pp. 438-456. See also Ivone Kirkpatrick,
Mussolini: A Study in Power (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1964) pp. 545-
567. There are very full accounts in the Italian works, Giorgio Pini and Duilio
Susmel, Mussolini, l'uomo e l'opera 4 vols., Vol. IV, Dall' impero alla repubblica,
1938-1945 (Florence: La Fenice, 1955) pp. 244-255; Ruggero Zangrandi, 1943:
25 Luglio-8 settembre (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1984) pp. 108-142.
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Prior to the meeting of the Grand Council, Ciano seems to have
had high hopes that he would play a leading part in the new govern-
ment, that he and Grandi would steer the Italian ship of state into
the harbor of a separate peace with the Western powers. The King's
ideas were utterly different. It was the government headed by Badoglio
assisted by a cabinet of technicians which took over after Mussolini,
a regime which was launched with the slogan that "the war contin-
ues." Ciano then reverted to the idea of a withdrawal into private
life. He decided to resign as Ambassador to the Vatican, and through
Ambrosio whom he had supported as successor to Cavallero as chief
of the Comando Supremo, Ciano asked for passports so that he and
his family might seek exile in Spain."' But the days turned into weeks
and the passports were not forthcoming. Not only that, but the Badog-
lio government created a commission to investigate the matter of
illicit personal gains by members of the Fascist hierarchy. A press
campaign was launched against Ciano charging him with financial
corruption. He was placed under house arrest and he began to fear
for his personal safety if he remained in Italy.19
In these circumstances Edda Ciano got in touch with :Eugen
Dollman, and through him arrangements were made for the German
Sicherheitsdienst to transport Galeazzo, Edda, and the three children
to Germany. The escape, as Count Ciano and the Countess regarded
their departure, went off according to plan on 27 August. Edda and
the children in one car eluded the Italian police; Ciano took a differ-
ent car and a different route. They were each picked up later by a
German military truck and taken to Ciampino airfield. There they
were put aboard a Dunker 52 plane which flew them to Munich, and
from there they went by auto to Oberallmannshausen. The man
who made these arrangements was Wilhelm Hoettl.20
1e It is said that Ciano and Serrano Suner had a pact of mutual assistance that
each would help the other in case of need for refuge outside his own country.
Ermanno Amicucci, 1600 giorni di Mussolini (Rome: Editrice "Faro," 1948) p. 19.
1B Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 289-293.
40 Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 292-293. Later in the year Ciano told his friend
Benini that the Germans tricked him and broke a promise to let him get out to
Spain. Zenone Benini, Vigilia a Verona (Milan: Garzanti, 1949) pp. 44-45. Hoettl
denies any such promise at this time. Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 293.
The pilot of the plane was Captain Erich Priebke, whom Peter Tompkins later
met in Rome in rather unusual circumstances. Peter Tompkins, A Spy in Rome
(New York; Published by arrangement with Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1962)
p. 171.
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A word may be in order here about the organization and the
persons involved in the German security service, the Sicherheitsdienst,
or SD, in Germany and in Italy in 1943. The head of all the Nazi
police forces was Heinrich Himmler. Back in 1929 when the National
Socialists were merely a party contending for leadership in the Ger-
lnan state, Himmler was simply the head of Hitler's private body
guard, the Schutzsta ff el, or SS, which at that time numbered pos-
sibly 300 men. By 1933, this elite corps of the Nazi Party had grown
to 52,000.
Within the SS, a security service had been organized as early as
1931. In the summer of 1934, the SD under Reinhard Heydrich,
Himmler's chief lieutenant, was recognized as the sole intelligence
and counterintelligence agency of the Nazi Party. Himmler also man-
aged to take control of the Prussian police away from Goering in
1934. Himmler's lieutenant, Reinhard Heydrich, brought all the police
forces together under one central office, the Main Security Office,
or Reichssicherheitshauptamt, which was generally known by its ini-
tials, the RSHA. After Heydrich's assassination he was succeeded by
Ernst Kaltenbrunner who bore the title of Obergruppenfiihrer, a
rank in the SS equivalent to lieutenant general in the regular army.
As head of the Main Security Office, Kaltenbrunner was second
only to Himmler in the control of the police, in the operation of
that principal instrument of terror of the Nazi regime. These were the
men who organized the wholesale slaughter of the Jews of Europe.
After Germany's defeat and the dawn of the day of reckoning, Himm-
ler committed suicide on 23 May 1945. Kaltenbrunner was tried
before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, was sen-
tenced to death on 1 October and hanged on 17 October 1946.21
The Main Security Office was divided into seven subordinate offices
(Amter), such as Amt III, which dealt with intelligence work in
Germany and the occupied countries; and Amt IV, the old Secret
State Police (Geheime Staats Polizei, or Gestapo), whose task was
to ferret out opposition to the State. Amt VI dealt with foreign in-
telligence. In June 1941 Schellenberg took over Amt VI and reorgan-
ized the foreign intelligence service 22
"History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission Development of the
Laws of War (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1948) pp. 520-521.
"See the introduction by Alan Bullock to The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter
Schellenberg (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956) pp. ix-xiii; or Hildegard v.
Kotze, "Hitlers Sicherheitsdienst im Ausland," Die politische Meinung (August
1963) pp. 75-80.
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Until the end of 1942, there had been no German secret service
in Italy because Hitler had forbidden it, out of deference to Mus-
solini. The foundations of a very modest service were laid in the early
part of 1943, apparently without Hitler's direct knowledge. In Febru-
ary Wilhelm Hoettl was made head of the section of Amt VI which
dealt with Italy. In April the security service submitted a report
which delineated the growing opposition to Mussolini within Fascist
Italy, the physical and psychic decline of the Duce, and something
of the moves by Ciano, Grandi, and Bottai. Hitler merely acknowledged
the report, and Schellenberg thereupon determined to organize a
thorough service in Italy. In a sense it was too late. The Grand
Council meeting of 25 July and the King's dismissal and arrest of
Mussolini took Hitler quite by surprise.23
The German search for Mussolini in the summer of 1943, the en-
ticement of Ciano into Germany, and, as we shall see, the search
for Ciano's diaries and papers were the work of the SI) and
particularly of Hoettl as Referent for Italy in Amt VI of the ]RSHA.
To anticipate the story somewhat, there is one more character
whom we should introduce in the SD in Italy: Gruppen fuhrer (Gen-
eral) Wilhelm Harster. From 1940 to 1943 Harster had served in
the SD in the Netherlands where he was instrumental in rounding
up the Dutch Jews and sending them on for others to exterminate.
On 9 September 1943 Harster set up his headquarters in Verona.
He headed the whole of the SD in Italy, ranking just below Kal-
tenbrunner.24
Throughout the summer of 1943 Hitler had spurred the Sicher-
heitsdienst to the greatest efforts to locate Mussolini. On 12 September,
Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret Front: The Story of Nazi Political Espionage
With an introduction by Ian Colvin; Translated by R. H. Stevens (2nd ed.,
London: Weidenfelt & Nicolson, 1954) pp. 221-223. This English edition is much
superior to Hoettl's first account which was published under the pseudonym of
Walter Hagen, Die geheime Front: Organisation, Personen and Aktionen des
deutschen Geheimdienst (2nd ed., Lienz and Vienna: Nibelungen Verlag, 1950).
"See Allen Dulles, The Secret Surrender (New York, Evanston and London:
Harper & Row, 1966) pp. 58-59. Harster in 1949 was sentenced by the government
of the Netherlands to a term of 12 years for his part in the deportation of some
80,000 Dutch Jews. In January 1967 he was again tried in Munich, and on
24 February was sentenced to imprisonment for complicity in the murder of
those Jews whose deportation be had arranged. (Washington Post, 25 February
1967.)
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four days after the Allied attack at Salerno and the simultaneous
announcement of Italy's surrender to the Allies, Hitler was successful.
Otto Skorzeny had learned that Mussolini was held in the ski lodge on
the Gran Sasso, highest peak in the Apennines. He and a small group
of paratroopers made a daring drop on the mountaintop, seized
Mussolini, flew him to Rome and then north to Munich. On the next
day Edda Ciano met her father. She vigorously defended her hus-
band's actions in the Grand Council meeting. The next day, 14
September, Mussolini was flown to Hitler's headquarters in East
Prussia.
Ever since learning of the Grand Council meeting, Hitler had
had the plan of restoring Mussolini, and of reconstituting the Fascist
regime. In his eyes the Grand Councilors who had voted against
Mussolini were guilty of treason and he felt it essential that a revived
Fascist government punish such traitors with death. But at the
meeting with Hitler, Mussolini appears to have defended Ciano's
conduct. On 19 September the ex-Duce returned to Bavaria and
spoke with his son-in-law. He assured him on this occasion that he
had told the Fiihrer "that he would guarantee with his own head
the correctness of the attitude of Count Ciano."26
Mussolini's attitude toward Ciano, and his lack of desire for ven-
geance, left the Germans quite puzzled. They began to write Mus-
solini off, even though they were determined to re-install him as chief of
the government of Italy. They thought that Edda's hold on her father
was the knowledge that Mussolini himself had had the idea of desert-
ing Germany.26
When Ciano realized that he would not be permitted simply to
fly out to Madrid, he approached Hoettl with a proposition. In ex-
change for facilitating his transfer to Spain with Edda and the chil-
dren, he offered his diaries. Hoettl soon became convinced that these
materials were of great political and historical value. He convinced
Kaltenbrunner that Ciano's diaries and supporting papers could be
used to discredit Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, a man
whom Himmler and Kaltenbrunner loathed. It appears that arrange-
ments were practically completed for the Ciano family to fly to Spain.
Guiseppe Silvestri, Albergo agli Scalzi (Milan: Garzanti, 1946) p. 77.
" The Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943, Edited and translated by Louis P. Lochner
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1948) pp. 468-69, 471, 480-481.
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Hoettl had even prepared false passports to take the family to South
America. But against Hoettl's advice, Edda insisted on asking the
Fiihrer's permission. Hitler would have none of it, and the plan fell
through.27
Ciano remained in German custody. The diaries and supporting
papers remained where Ciano had secreted them in Italy.
We may note in passing that this notion of using Ciano's diaries
to discredit the German Foreign Minister was by no means fantastic.
Some of the notations by Ciano were used in 1946 to confound and
confute Ribbentrop, but not in the fashion and circumstances which
Himmler and Kaltenbrunner would in 1943 have imagined, for ex-
tracts from the diary were produced in evidence at the Nuremberg
trials in refuting Ribbentrop's testimony,28 the same tribunal which
condemned Kaltenbrunner to hanging.
On 27 September Edda Ciano returned to Italy alone on a. slow
military train. She had come to appreciate, somewhat earlier than
did her husband, the extreme dangers which threatened him. First
she went to Ponte a Moriano where she met her mother-in-law,
Carolina Ciano, who turned over to her the notebooks containing
the diaries of Galeazzo. The widow of the Admiral Costanzo Ciano
is said to have remarked on this occasion that these documents
were worth the life of her son 29
It is said that Edda then went to Rocca delle Caminate, Mussolini's
one-time summer residence, and now the temporary capital of the
neo-Fascist puppet state, the Italian Social Republic, as it came
to be called, in which Mussolini was being reinstated in power by
n Hoettl, Secret Front, pp. 274-275; The Goebbels Diaries, pp. 479-481.
Cf. Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 296-297.
" Extracts from the diary were submitted in evidence as Document 2987-PS
(Exhibit U.S.A.-166), Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International
Military Tribunal-Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, English
edition, Vol. XXXI, pp. 434-438; comment by Sir David Maxwell-Fyffe, 8 January
1946, Vol. IV, pp. 567-568.
Cf. the Introduction to the French edition by S. Stelling-Michaud, Comte
Galeazzo Ciano, Journal politique 1939-1943 2 vols (Neuchatel and Paris, 1948)
Vol. I, p. vi; and Eugene Davidson, The Trial of the Germans (New York:
Macmillan, 1966) pp. 153-154. (The citations here in footnotes 9 and 10 should
be to The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943.)
" Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 302. Susmel asserts that there were eight booklets
of the diary which were transferred, and which constituted the whole. I have
not found confirmation of this number. There seem to have been only seven.
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Hitler. Whatever function it performed for the Italians, it spared
the Germans the burden of having to administer the four-fifths of
the Italian peninsula they occupied by means of military government.
Here Edda came to realize how much her husband was hated by
her countrymen who were loyal to her father. She persisted in de-
fending her husband's actions and integrity. She told Mussolini that
Galeazzo wished to return to Italy. He seems to have been persuaded,
for a time at least, that he might have a position in the neo-Fascist
government.
Edda had been under great strain, and this was apparent to her
father who suggested to her that she go to a clinic for rest. This she
did, entering the clinic operated by the Melocchi brothers at Ramiola
near Parma. Beforehand she made a trip to Rome where she gathered
up her wardrobe. It is said that on this occasion she also carefully
hid the diary in a secure place there. It was 10 October when she
entered the clinic.30
The author of the diaries, Count Ciano, remained at Oberallmanns-
hausen as a "guest" of the German Government. Although the first
attempt to barter his diaries for his freedom had failed when Hitler
refused permission for the Cianos to fly to Spain, Ciano recurred to
this scheme. He. knew that within the seemingly monolithic structure
of the Nazi dictatorship there was an incessant struggle for power
among the chieftains surrounding the Fiihrer. He too had an intense
dislike for von Ribbentrop, and he knew that this antipathy-perhaps
even hatred is not too strong a word-was shared by Himmler and
Kaltenbrunner, who as we have remarked, were particularly anxious
to get hold of Ciano's diaries and supporting papers in order to use
them to discredit von Ribbentrop and bring about his replacement.
Ribbentrop, on the other hand, was equally determined to see that
Ciano was eliminated for his "treason" to the Axis and that his diaries
and papers were suppressed.
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 302-303, whose account here is apparently based
on "Il carnet d'oro della duchessa di sermoneta" which appeared in 10 installments
in L'Europeo, 26 June-28 September 1949.
Ciano's diary, that is the seven or eight booklets, may have been hidden at
this time, but not in Rome. But the supporting papers, that is the records of Ciano's
conversations, were concealed in Rome along with some other materials. These
were retrieved on 4 January 1944. See below, p. 20.
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Whether Ciano would be able to trade his diaries for his freedom
remained to be seen, but of the German interest in the diaries there
can be no doubt. Himmler and Kaltenbrunner would have been quite
happy to get the diaries without any bargain, if only they could find
them. Doubtless at the urging of his superiors, Hoettl now provided
Ciano with an interpreter, whose real task was to find out the lo-
cation of the diaries and supporting papers. This was the pretty, ]highly
intelligent, sensitive, and sweet-natured woman known as "La Burk-
hardt," or Frau Beetz, or "Felicitas" Beetz, the wife of an officer in
the Luftwaffe.31 Ciano recognized her for what she was, someone
set to spy on him, but nevertheless he found her very attractive,
simpatica. She was. not a professional spy; this was her first assign-
ment as an agent; and she found herself strongly attracted to Count
Ciano. Frau Beetz was destined to play an extraordinary role in the
final chapter of the Ciano's life and in the rescue of his diary and
supporting papers for posterity.32
On 17 October Hoettl appeared at Oberallmannshausen and in-
formed Ciano that he was to be returned to Italy. Ciano had mean-
while had an operation on his ear and on returning to the castle learned
that his children had been brought to their grandmother, Rachele
Mussolini. The children for the time being remained north of the
Alps. Ciano was flown back to Italy on 19 October along with Frau
Beetz and some SS men. When the plane landed at Verona be was
promptly arrested by both German and Italian police.33
31 Frau Beetz, born Hildegard Burkhardt, at Obernissa near Weimar in 1919;
finished secondary school in 1938; then attended a private interpreters' school
in Leipzig. In 1939 she entered the Sicherheitsdienst, served in Weimar until
March 1940 when she was transferred to Amt VI of the RSHA and worked as
an interpreter and translator of Italian in the Rome and Berlin offices. In Rome
during the spring of 1943 she met Hoettl who at the time was Referent for Italy
and Hungary. She returned to Germany, then was back in Rome in Jul), in the
staff of the German Embassy. In August she was evacuated to the Reich along
with the other female employees of the Embassy and thus was at hand when
Hoettl decided to employ her as an agent. Her husband, Captain (later Major)
Gerhardt Beetz, was an acquaintance of the Cianos.
"Benini, Vigilia a Verona p. 29 records that when he first met her in the
Scalzi prison, he wondered if she really were German, for her Italian was almost
perfect.
He records further that when he spoke to her shortly before Christmas, she
said there was no hope for Ciano; he would be shot. She wept when she said
it, and Benini knew that this could not have been pretense (op. cit., p. 93).
"Rachele Mussolini, Vita con Benito pp. 222-223; Susmel, Vita shagliata,
pp. 303-304.
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Meanwhile, Mussolini had established himself in the Villa Feltri-
nelli at Cargnano on the shore of Lake Garda. Donna Rachele re-
joined him there and the three Ciano children were brought back
to Italy by their uncle, Vittoria Mussolini. Edda Ciano demanded
the return of her children to her own custody and in this demand
she was successful. She now began to see the full extent of her
husband's plight and how difficult it might be to save him. As Dom-
browski has phrased it: "It was a public secret in Italy that the
Ciano couple was not a good match and that their married life was
unhappy. They each went their own way, and nobody thought she
had any depth of feeling for him. Yet in the face of this threat she
determined to make every effort to save him." 34 Edda Ciano's extraor-
dinary effort to save her husband, and when that failed, to revenge
him and to vindicate his memory, are crucial parts of the story of
his diaries and supporting papers. Apparently it was through Frau
Beetz that Edda Ciano learned that her husband had been arrested.35
In late October of 1943 the Council of Ministers of the Italian
Social Republic set up a court to investigate and try those who had
scuttled the Fascist ship by voting against Mussolini in the Grand
Council on 25 July. Ciano and those of the other disloyal Grand
Councilors who had been caught were transferred to the Verona
prison in early November. Frau Beetz had meanwhile presented
herself to General Harster, and he had granted her free rein. She
had free access to Ciano's cell, but Edda was forbidden to see her
husband. Frau Beetz came to serve as intermediary between
the two.
Edda had begun to fear that even her children, Mussolini's grand-
children, were not safe under the puppet neo-Fascist regime. Her
friends had been legion before 25 July; now she found almost none.
" Dombrowski, Mussolini: Twilight and Fall, p. 114.
' See p. 2 of the report of Pucci to Allen Dulles, 24 May 1945, Item 18 R,
File, "Edda Ciano Diaries," Personal Files of Allen Dulles. This item, 17 double-
spaced, typewritten folio pages, is cited hereafter simply as Pucci Report.
A considerable portion of this report is quoted in the article by Andrea Nicco-
letti, "The Decline and Fall of Edda Ciano," Colliers, 20 April and 27 April 1964.
"Fraulein Ilse" is substituted in this printing for the name of Fran Beetz. The
article is based on the documents assembled by Mr. Dulles in the file "Edda
Ciano Diaries." Further citations to the article will read: Niccoletti, Colliers, date
and page.
Cf. Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 305.
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But there was one friend of former days of the Cianos whose
loyalties were undiminished, Lieutenant Pucci of the Italian Air
Force.38 With Pucci's help, Edda Ciano managed to get her children
across the border into neutral Switzerland, out of reach of Nazi or
Fascist vengeance.37
About the middle of December the, preliminary judicial investiga-
tion of the treason trials of Verona began with Ciano himself as the
first defendant. Edda now appealed to her father on behalf of her
husband. There were strong words and hot tears from each, but
Mussolini would not relent. He had a document, he said, that was
proof of Ciano's betrayal and he thought that Edda herself would
some day appreciate this.38
Operation Conte
On the night before Christmas Eve-Thursday-Ciano came to
realize that he would be found guilty and executed. In his cell he
wrote out three documents: a preface for his diaries, a letter to King
Victor Emmanuel III, and a letter to Prime Minister Churchill. Frau
Beetz again served as messenger and delivered these three items to
Edda. Each contained Ciano's denial of guilt and a bitter accusation
against his father-in-law. The first became the final entry of the
'Emilio Pucci di Barsento was born in Naples on 20 November 1914, scion
of an ancient Florentine family, but with some blending of foreign blood, for
his paternal great-grandmother was a niece of Catherine II of Russia. A part
of Pucci's education occurred in the United States. He studied agriculture at the
University of Georgia, and then political science at Reed College under Professor
G. Bernard Noble, receiving an M.A. degree in 1937. At Reed he was very popular
with students and faculty alike, despite his vigorous defense of the Fascist regime.
A man of strong loyalties to his country, to his college, to his friends, Pucci was
endowed with superb physical coordination and was an extraordinarily graceful
dancer and a natural sportsman. At Reed, Pucci served for a time as a ski instructor
and apparently during this period he began designing ski costumes, exhibiting the
talent that later won him world acclaim.
Pucci returned to Italy in 1937 and received his doctorate (laurea) at Florence,
but his hopes of entering the Italian diplomatic service were frustrated by Italy's
entrance into World War II. He joined the Royal Italian Air Force in 1938,
served for more than a decade and was decorated for valor. Since the war Pucci
has become one of the world's leading fashion designers. In August 1963 he
became a deputy in the Italian Parliament, taking his seat with the Liberal group.
' Pucci Report, 24 May 1945, p. 2. Niccoletti, Colliers, 20 April 1946, p. 12.
' The encounter took place on 18 December. Rachele Mussolini, Vita con Benito,
p. 233.
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diaries as printed in America. It contains not one word acknowledg-
ing responsibility for his own iniquities and blames the Germans
only, and particularly Ribbentrop, for the war. Damning Mussolini
for the death awaiting him, he wrote:
"Within a few days a sham tribunal will make public a sentence which
has already been decided by Mussolini under the influence of that circle of
prostitutes and white slavers which for some years have plagued Italian
political life and brought our country to the brink of the abyss. I accept
calmly what is to be my infamous destiny."
Countess Edda apparently, sent the letters for the King and for
Churchill to her husband's brother-in-law, Massimo Magistrati, Italian
Minister in Bern .40 Victor Emmanuel III received the letter addressed
to him and had it authenticated by a notary, believing it would help
the cause of the House of Savoy. Ciano mentioned in that letter:
"I have arranged that as soon as possible after my death my diary and
some documents will be published which will shed much true light on many
facts hitherto unknown." "
On Christmas Day 1943 Lieutenant Pucci drove Edda Ciano to
Verona, but she was not allowed to see her husband upon orders of
Mussolini himself. Through Frau Beetz, Edda and Pucci learned
that the trial was now set for 28 December and that the outcome
was a foregone conclusion: Ciano would be executed. Edda was
terribly distressed on hearing that her father insisted on the execu-
tion. Pucci now urged Edda that she escape into Switzerland. During
the next day or so Pucci made preparations to get the Countess over
the border with the diary in her possession in order to be able to
snake good Ciano's threats. The booklets containing the diary were
carefully hidden in Milan the day after Christmas. Lieutenant Pucci
then accompanied Edda back to Ramiola, and made arrangements
so that she would be able to make contact with certain people
in Como and from there cross the border into Switzerland on 27
"The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, pp. 583-584.
" Emilio Settimelli, Edda contro Benito: Indagine sulla personalitit del Duce
attraverso un memoriale autografo di Edda Ciano Mussolini, qui riprodotto (Rome:
Corso, 1952) pp. 26, 53.
" The letter to the king is published in Attilio Tamaro Due anni di storia, 1943-
1945 (Rome: Tosi, 1948-1950) No. 41, pp. 363-364.
Cf. Pini and Susmel, Mussolini, Vol. IV, pp. 379-381.
Edda later told Pucci in Switzerland that Churchill made no acknowledgment
of the letter addressed to him. (Pucci Report, p. 15.)
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December, the day before the scheduled opening of the trial. The
plan at this stage was that once safe in Switzerland, Edda would
threaten vengeance by publishing her husband's diary if her father
would not relent. Pucci would himself come back with the letter
threatening revenge against Mussolini. The arrangements were al-
most finished, and on the morning of 27 December Pucci and Edda
drove off from Ramiola, heading for Como by way of Verona where
they had arranged to meet Frau Beetz.
The three met at midday. La Burkhardt, this German interpreter,
agent, and go-between, now came forward with the scheme that
came to be known as "Operation Conte." She told Edda to return
to Ramiola, and there she would receive a proposal from the Ger-
man authorities that Count Ciano would be freed despite the wishes
of the neo-Fascist government if Ciano's documents were turned
over to the Germans. The proposal by Frau Beetz was confirmed
by a letter from Count Ciano himself.42
The next day, 28 December, Frau Beetz came to General Harster
in his office, greatly disturbed. She explained that it was Ciano's fate
to be condemned and shot, but in that case his diary and other
documents would be published in America and England. Only if his
life were traded for these materials, she indicated, could such pub-
lication be prevented. General Harster immediately got in touch
with his superior, Kaltenbrunner, who agreed to such an exchange.
Kaltenbruunner in turn obtained the consent of Himmler, the leading
contender for power in the group immediately surrounding; Hitler.
These two, as we have noted, were extremely anxious to get hold
of Ciano's papers, believing that they would provide the means for
42 Pucci Report, pp. 3-4.
Cf. Dombrowski, Twilight and Fall, p. 118. Dombrowski's whole account at
this point, his chapter 6, "To Save One Life," pp. 114-125, is largely based on
articles which were written by Pucci for Italian newspapers after the war's end.
The Marchese Pucci at this time did not know the fate of Fran Beetz and chival-
rously avoided any mention of her name or even precise identification, for she
was referred to only as "Mr. X." "When Edda Ciano returned to Italy she was
repeatedly asked to reveal the true name of 'Mr. X: She always replied that
as Pucci had kept it secret there must be good reason for it, and she felt bound
to follow his example." But Edda did know that the Allies knew the correct
name. (Dombrowski, op. cit., p. 125). Pucci's report, which was both closer to
the event and not intended for publication, is much the better source than his
newspaper accounts. See also Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 323-325, and Niccoletti,
Colliers, 20 April 1946, p. 53.
17
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discrediting von Ribbentrop. They planned to act without informing
Hitler in advance, to. confront him with an accomplished fact. The
scheme was to employ a couple of SS men disguised as Fascists, who
would abduct Ciano from his cell and speed him on his way with
Edda through Switzerland to Hungary. When she received con-
firmation of Ciano's release she would be expected to turn over the
diaries and the supporting papers.43
Kaltenbrunner approved the plan, but wanted a written agreement
with Count Ciano regarding the surrender of the diaries and papers,
and he summoned General Harster for a discussion at Innsbruck.
On 2 January 1944, in a conference Kaltenbrunner met with
Harster, Hoettl and Frau Beetz. The proposed scheme concerning
Ciano was now written out in detail in four steps.
Step 1. Ciano was to reveal the hiding place of his Foreign Office records
in Rome so that the SD could take them over.
Step 2: Ciano was to be sprung from his cell, and quickly taken to Switzer-
land with Edda, the children, and Frau Beets."
Step 3. Ciano, safe in Switzerland, was to turn his diaries over to Frau Beetz.
Step 4. She in turn would return to Italy to deliver them to General Harster.
Apparently some stipulation was also made to give Ciano some funds so
that he could live in Switzerland."
The "springing" of Count Ciano was set for 7 January. His trial
was now scheduled for 8 January.
Lieutenant Pucci, who had heard nothing from "La Burkhardt"
since 27 December, had meanwhile gone to Florence to be with his
family for the New Year holiday. Late in the afternoon of 3 January
he returned to Ramiola. Frau Beetz had come there that same day,
a few hours before him, with the complete details of "Operation
Conte." These were embodied in oral instructions and in two letters
which Ciano gave to Frau Beetz for delivery to his wife.
"Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 328-330. Susmel's account here is based on testi-
mony given him after the war by Harster.
" Frau Beets at this time was aware that the children were already in Switzer-
land, but made no mention of it.
" See Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 330, who bases his account at this point on
post-war statements made to him by General Harster.
Note that the documents (or supporting papers) were to be turned over in
advance. The diaries were to be surrendered only after Ciano was free on Swiss
soil.
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Edda was to drive to Rome in a car which was to be provided
by the Gestapo. There she was to pick up two groups of documents
which were to be used as part payment for Galeazzo's. life. The two
letters elaborated the oral instructions. In the first, which Ciano
wrote with the knowledge that it would be read by the Germans,
it was explained that Ciano was to be freed if the documents were
turned over to German agents. The first group of documents, which
have been hitherto referred to as the supporting papers, were the
"colloqui," that is the records of conversations to which one finds
reference from time to time in the diary. These documents were to
be turned over directly to the Germans.
The second group of documents was in a parcel labeled "Ger-
mania." In the second letter, intended for Edda's eyes only, Galeazzo
directed that the parcel be retrieved in Rome, and taken north. But
Edda was to keep it in her possession so that in case the Germans
reneged on their promise to release him, she might deliver the parcel
to the Allies.46
When Frau Beetz explained the plan to Edda, the Countess did
not like it. She did not trust the Germans; she thought it all a dirty
business. Lieutenant Pucci argued with her into the early morning
hours of the next day, 4 January. He finally convinced her that it
offered the only chance to save her husband from Nazi-Fascist venge-
ance at Verona.
But Edda by this time was quite worn out and in no condition to
undertake a hurried trip to Rome by automobile. Lieutenant Pucci
now volunteered to go in her stead, to retrieve Count Ciano's sup-
porting papers, and to deliver them over to the Germans in fulfill-
ment of the first step of the agreement for "Operation Conte."
At 0330, 4 January, Lieutenant Pucci left Ramiola and at 0400, a
few miles out of Parma, he met the car with the Gestapo agents.
'e Pucci's Report, p. 4.
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 330. At this point of his narrative Susmel draws on
post-war statements by Harster who incorrectly stated that the diaries as well
as the other papers were in Rome. Pucci's knowledge was first hand; "Flarster's
was not. The earlier collaborative work by Susmel is more accurate on this point.
Pini and Susmel, Mussolini, Vol. IV, p. 382 where the reference is to Silvestri,
Albergo agli Scalzi pp. 147-149 and to the Italian translation of Walter Hagen's
German monograph.
Cf. Niccoletti, Colliers, April 20, 1946, p. 53.
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They were an odd bunch. There were two Gestapo agents, Pucci
records, Frau Beetz, and he himself in place of Edda. One of the
Gestapo types was an officer brought from Holland especially for the
operation. He had the knack of killing a man with one blow in the
face before the victim could utter a sound, and his role would be
to deal with the Fascist guards. He was a Dutchman named Johans-
sen, Harster recalled, and the other was SS Lieutenant Johan Thito,
a confidential agent of Harster's. The party drove on to Rome for 10
hours without stopping.
In Rome, following directions, Lieutenant Pucci quickly found the
five volumes of the conversations, the package marked "Germania,"
and a third item, the political will of Count Ciano. These had all
been carefully concealed in a wall over a doorway. Pucci took the
first two items, but left Ciano's political will.47
It was some time after midnight (4-5 January) that the foursome
started its return trip north. Pucci had the volumes of the conver-
sations in plain view, but he managed to keep the package marked
"Germania" concealed under his air force overcoat. Not far from
Rome the car got stuck in the snow and the engine conked out com-
pletely. Pucci remembered and recorded that he spent the next 18
hours walking knee-deep in snow, trying to get another car for the
return trip; that by 5 January they managed to get the car started
again, and only on the evening of 6 January did they reach Verona.48
But it was probably on the evening of 5 January that they reached
Verona, and there certain of the materials which had been recovered
at Rome were turned over by Frau Beetz to General Harster. These
" Pucci Report, pp. 4-5, refers to five volumes of the "colloqui" which he was
to pick up.
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 331-332, states that Marchese Pucci in Rome re-
trieved all of the Ciano materials: the diary in 8 volumes; the records of con-
versations in 16 volumes; the package labeled "Germania"; and the papers re-
garding Ciano's last mission as Foreign Minister. The primary evidence for Sus-
mel's account here is not clear. In any case the diary was not at Rome. Susmel's
various references to the number of volumes constituting the colloqui are not
consistent.
Cf. Dombrowski, Twilight and Fall, pp. 117-119; Niccoletti, Colliers, 20 April
1946, p. 53.
18 Pucci Report, p. 5; Niccoletti, Colliers, 20 April 1946. p. 53.
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were apparently the conversations ("coiloqui") or a good part of
them.49 Pucci now returned to Ramiola. The first step in Operation
Conte had been completed. Edda Ciano had arranged for the de-
livery of Count Ciano's papers, or at least a good part of them, to
the Germans. And it was Frau Beetz who had brought General
Harster into possession of these coveted papers. At this point the
story of the diaries diverges from the story of the supporting
papers.
On receiving the five or six volumes of records of conversation,
General Harster consigned them to a young SS Lieutenant, 'Walter
Segna, a South Tyrolese attached to SD Headquarters in Verona.
Segna. after the war told Susmel that he remembered these volumes
as rather large, each bound in green leather. He remembered also
that what he saw related to the whole period, 1938-1943. Some of
the documents were typewritten, some were stenciled. At the order
of General Harster all the volumes of the conversations were photo-
graphed by Segna, assisted by a. Lieutenant Fritz von Aufschneiter
of Bolzano. The pair also translated a few selected documents into
German and prepared a general summary. They worked against
time, right through the night, and then returned all the material
to General Harster.so
Harster locked the photographic copies of the, documents and the
general summary in his safe. He ordered Lieutenant Segna to take
the original papers, that is the five or six volumes of the records of
conversations, by air directly to Berlin and to deliver them person-
ally to Kaltenbrunner. On receiving this portion of the Ciano ma-
terials, Kaltenbrunner telegraphed Harster to, go ahead with "Opera-
tion Conte." 81 Harster in turn notified La Burkhardt who was able
9e At this point the evidence is not clear or consistent. Pucci (Report, p. 5)
does not mention delivery of the volumes of the "colloqui," but states merely
that he later went on to Ramiola, and still had the parcel of documents with him,
i.e. the package marked "Germania."
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 332, states that six volumes of the conversations were
turned over by Frau Beetz to General Harster, and that the remainder were
taken to Edda at Ramiola. (If 16 were recovered at Rome, then the remainder
should be 10, but Susmel is not consistent with his numbers.)
F0 Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 332. This would have to be the night of 5-6 Jan-
uary (Wednesday to Thursday).
b' Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 332. (The account here reverts to Harster's post-war
testimony as its source.)
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to let Edda Ciano know of the next step: She was to be on the road
from Verona to Brescia at a point 10 kilometers from Verona at 2100
on 7 January. Edda was asked to bring plenty of money with her,
apparently for living expenses once they made their way through
Switzerland into Hungary. The expectation was that at the appointed
rendezvous Edda would meet her husband, and once over the
border she would deliver the diaries, and possibly the remainder
of the papers and other materials, as the balance of the payment
due for Galeazzo's life.52
Everything was going according to plan and everything was set
for carrying out Operation Conte. The SS agents, the husky Dutch-
man Johanssen and his teammate, were on hand. They were pre-
pared to disguise themselves as Fascists, to overpower the guards
and liberate Count Ciano. Guards at key points in the prison, whose
names were Krutsch and Guck, had been instructed to aid the SS
men, but to feign resistence and act as if they had been overcome.
Frau Beetz had carried out her assignment beautifully. She had
achieved the delivery of Ciano's papers and had arranged that
Harster, Kaltenbrunner, and Himmler would get the Count's diaries.
At the same time she was aiding Edda to save Galeazzo's life.
At this point the whole plan collapsed. Kaltenbrunner and Himmler
had so far kept the plan secret, even from Hitler. Possibly they had
hoped to confront him with an accomplished fact, and had reckoned
on gaining his approval when they would submit the Ciano docu-
ments and diaries to him. Or it may have been that at the last moment
they had misgivings and asked for the Fiihrer's approval. In any
case Hitler learned of the plan and immediately forbade its execu-
tion. General Harster recalled after the war that on the afternoon
of 6 January he received a telephone call from Hitler himself who
stated peremptorily that Harster would forfeit his own head if Ciano
were enabled to save his. Harster immediately countermanded the
whole operation. Frau Beetz was bitterly indignant at the role which
she had been induced to play, but there was no other course open
89 Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 332-333, whose narrative at this point is again
based on Harster's post-war account.
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to her but to inform Ciano and then Edda and Lieutenant Pucci
that her superiors had quashed the operation.53
Edda Escapes
It was late in the night of 6 January as Lieutenant Pucci recalled
(more probably 5 January) that he made his way back from Verona
to Countess Edda at Ramiola. She was much upset by Pucci's delay
which she at first attributed to some new German trick. About noon
of 7 January the two started off for the rendezvous with Galeazzo.
They made a first stop in Milan where they picked up the seven
booklets of the diaries which they had hidden the day after Christmas.
They put these seven booklets into one suitcase, packed the large
parcel "Germania" in a second suitcase, and placed some letters
and other papers of Edda in a third. They did not get off for Verona
until about six o'clock in the evening.
An hour or so later they were on the Milan-Brescia highway. About
half way toward Brescia the two rear tires went flat. They decided
that Pucci would stay with the car, and that Edda would. go on
89 Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 333, whose quoted paragraph is taken directly from
Harster's post-war account. It is Harster who gives the date of 6 January for
Hitler's veto. If this is correct, then there is an error of one day in Pucci's report
of 24 May 1945, and the foursome got back from Rome to Verona on the evening
of 5 January rather than on the 6th. Cf. p. 20 and footnote 48.
Harster (Susmel, loc. cit.) was, of course, in Verona at the time, and did not
witness what happened in Berlin. He records that he heard later the version
which circulated among the German high military: that Ribbentrop was tipped
off by someone, and immediately appealed to Hitler who all along had opposed
any compromise with Ciano. Hitler promptly summoned Himmler and Kalten-
brunner and gave them a tongue lashing. -
Hoettl, Secret Front, pp. 276-277, gives a somewhat different version. He states
that Himmler and Kaltenbrunner got cold feet at the last moment, and asked
Hitler's permission for the operation which was refused. He confirms that Hitler
threatened to punish anyone who aided Ciano, but he does not mention a phone
call, gives no precise date, and suggests that Hitler rather believed that Mussolini
would not permit the father of his own grandchildren to be put to death.
Deakin, Brutal Friendship, p. 637, footnote f, states that Rudolf Rahn, the
German Ambassador to the Republic of Salo, told him after the war that at
this time, just before Ciano's execution, he flew to Hitler's headquarters and
urged that Ciano be allowed to escape into Switzerland. Hitler refused, it is
recorded, and reiterated that the Germans must regard the Verona trials as
exclusively the affair of Mussolini.
Giovanni Dolfin's diary, entry for 7 January, confirms that Rahn was at Berlin
at this time. Con Mussolini nella tragedia: Diario del Capo della Segreteria Parti-
colare del Duce 1943-1944 (Milan: Garzanti, 1949) p. 188.
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alone as best she could, taking the diaries with her. Edda managed to
thumb a ride as far as Brescia, and from there she walked and ran,
and even rode a stretch with a man on a bicycle, straining every
nerve to reach the rendezvous point by 2100. She arrived an hour
late. She waited and waited in the bitter cold night. But her husband
did not appear.
At about 0500 the next morning, 8 January, Edda hailed a ride
in a truck and made it into Verona, dragging the suitcase containing
the diaries. She sought out Beetz and together they went to General
Harster, who merely remarked that the Germans had changed their
minds. Frau Beetz apparently recognized what was in the suitcase
but said not a word, and Harster did not have Edda searched. Frau
Beetz managed to snatch an opportunity to urge Edda to flee to
Switzerland, and to explain that General Harster had been made
personally responsible for Count Ciano. She also managed to slip
secretly into Edda's hands a letter in which Galeazzo recorded his
last wishes.54
Ciano's trial began on the same day, 8 January. The night before
(7-8 January) there had been a rather strange intervention on the
part of the Germans. Ambassador Rahn had gone to Berlin. He tele-
phoned from there to Charge d'Affaires Von Reichert urging that
Ciano's trial be postponed for a few days. Von Reichert in turn got
in touch with Pavolini, Secretary of the Fascist Party, who brought
the proposal to Mussolini. The Duce declared bluntly: "That the
Republican Government, given the publicity already made regarding
the matter, could not consider it opportune to postpone the opening
of the trial by even one day." But this curious intervention of the
Germans at the last moment left Mussolini rather perplexed. He felt
certain, however, that the German action did not come from Hitler.
Ile then turned to his personal secretary, Dolfin, and declared:
"No intervention now can halt the course of events! For me, Ciano is already
dead. He will not be able now to maneuver around in Italy, to let himself
be seen, to have a name. Whoever voted for Grandi's order of the day
will be condemned for it."'
Pucci Report, pp. 5-6; Cf. Dombrowski, Twilight and Fall, pp. 120-121;
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 334-335.
Dolfin, Con Mussolini nella tragedia, pp. 188-189. Cf. footnote 53.
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e iano apers
Lieutenant Pucci, who had stayed with the car while Edda went
on, hoping to meet her husband, managed to get the tires repaired
and reached Verona about noon. When he got to Edda. she looked so
distressed and worn out that he scarcely recognized her. They were
not able to say very much for they were under constant surveillance
by Gestapo agents. They started back for Ramiola, escorted this
time by 14 German police in three automobiles. When they got to
the clinic the place was under guard both by the Germans and by
neo-Fascist police.
Not till she got to her own room did Edda read the letter from
her husband which Pucci recalled ran something as follows:
"Darling, -meanwhile you are still living in the wonderful illusion that
in a few hours we are going to be together again and free; for me agony has
already started. . . . bless the children and bring them up to respect and
worship what is right and honorable in life. . . .
Edda now broke down in utter helplessness and frustration, knowing
that her husband soon would be shot. The doctors worked over her
for some time and after midnight she managed to pull herself together
sufficiently to think about her next step. At Pucci's urging she decided
to escape into Switzerland with Pucci's help, taking the diaries with
her, and threaten its publication if Count Ciano were not released.
There were the problems of carrying the documents, of eluding the
guards, of getting across the Swiss frontier.
It was quite out of the question for Edda to carry all the diaries
and the remaining documents as well. Pucci selected the five book-
lets of the diaries which covered the war years, wrapped them in a
cloth which Edda then wound round her middle as a belt. Pucci
had a flair with women's costumesl The first two booklets of the diary,
the parcel of documents on "Germania," some personal papers of
Edda, and some of her jewels were carefully wrapped up and the
package was sealed with wax. Lieutenant Pucci then turned the
package over to Dr. Melocchi, one of the two brothers directing the
clinic, who assured Pucci that he would hide it where no one could
find it, near the electric plant where there was danger of electrocution.
The doctor was already initiated in the matter, and furthermore, had
connections with the partisans. Dr. Melocchi swore that if Edda
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 25
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and Pucci should be caught and executed, he would turn the docu-
ments over to the Allies when they reached Ramiola.56
Pucci, in his air force uniform, approached the guards and showed
them an appointment which he had at the air force medical institute
in Ferrara where he was due for a physical examination following
his illness. He was granted permission by the German police to go.
At about noon, when there were fewer guards about the clinic than
at other times, Edda went out through the basement and across the
fields. It is said that she had pinned a "Do not disturb" card to the
door of her room. Pucci and Edda made a clean get-away; they fol-
lowed the back roads and made for Como where they stopped
with friends.57
Late in the night of 8 January Pucci and Edda Ciano reached
Viggiu (or Cantello-Ligurno) on the frontier of Switzerland. They
stayed overnight at the Hotel Madonnina and there Pucci helped her
to write out three letters.
'"This is Pucci's own first hand account, Report, pp. 7-8. Cf. Dombrowski, Twi-
light and Fall, pp. 121-122,
On May 16-17, 1945 Allen Dulles visited the clinic at Ramiola and re-
corded: "At the time of her flight on or about 5 January 1944 (Dr. Elvezio
Melocchi thought it was Friday or Saturday) Edda Ciano entrusted to Dr. Elvezio
Melocchi her husband's diary for 1937-1938, one package containing a file which
bore the mention in Italian `Ministry of Foreign Affairs-German-Italian rela-
tions'; two packages of phonograph records of Bruno Mussolini's voice; one case
of jewels and many personal belongings including a quantity of furs. Edda took
with her several other of her husband's diaries, concealing them on her own
person, which made her look very bulky and gave rise to the rumors in Switzer-
land that she was to have a child. The documents and the diary left in Dr.
Elvezio Melocchi's care represented the surplus which she was unable to carry
with her." Memorandum for Files, 18 May 1945, "Ciano Diaries for 1937 and
1.938, as well as other important documents left by his wife in Italy at the time of
her flight to Switzerland in 1944," Item 12 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries," Per-
sonal Files of Allen Dulles.
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 335-336, mentions the sealed package given to
Dr. Melocchi with the volume on "Germania," and Edda's personal papers and
jewels. He states further that the package contained 12 volumes of the conversa-
tions. If 16 volumes of the conversations were recovered at Rome (op. cit. p. 331),
and if 6 were delivered to Harster (op. cit. p. 332) the remainder should have
been 10, not 12.
Susmel also states that Edda took with her 8 booklets of the diaries.
Pucci Report, p. 8; Dombrowski, Twilight and Fall, pp. 122-123. According
to Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 336, three booklets of the diaries, those for the years
1936, 1937, and 1938 were left at Como in the house of the Pessina family.
26
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To General Harster she wrote: "[January 10, 1944]
General: For the second time I have entrusted myself to the word of the
Germans with the outcome which you know. Now it is enough. If that is
not done which was promised me I shall release against the Axis the most
fearful campaign and thereby I shall make use of all the materials which I
have and of all that I know. My conditions are: that within three days
from the moment at which these letters will be transferred to Frau B[eetz]
my husband must be at the Bern railway station, accompanied only by Frau
B. between 10:00 and 15:00 hours. If this should be carried out in a com-
pletely loyal way, we will retire into private life and let nothing more be
heard from us. The diaries will he turned over to Frau B. by my husband
on that same day. I enclose two letters on this same subject, the one to the
Fiihrer, the other to the Duce. Turn these over immediately together with
a copy of this letter itself. (signed) Edda Ciano."
To Hitler she dictated: "January 10, 1944.
Fiihrer: For the second time I believed your word and for the second time
I have been betrayed. It is only the fact of the soldiers who fell together on
the battlefields that restrains me from going over to the foe. In case my
husband is not freed in accordance with conditions which I have specified
to your general no considerations will restrain me any longer. For some time
the documents have been in the hands of persons who are authorized to use
them in case anything should happen to my husband, to my children, or to my
family. If, however, as I hope and believe, my conditions are accepted and
we are left in peace now and in the future, one will hear nothing from us.
I am distressed to be forced to act in this fashion, but you will understand.
(signed) Edda."
To her father Edda wrote: "January 10, 1944
Duce: I have waited until today for you to show me the slightest feel-
ings of humanity and justice. Now it is enough. If Galeazzo is not in Switzer-
land within three days in accordance with the conditions which I have made
known to the Germans, then everything which I have at hand in the way of
proofs will be used without pity. If, on the other hand, we are left in peace
and security against everything from pulmonary consumption to auto-accident,
then you will hear nothing further from us. (signed) Edda Ciano."
Deakin, Brutal Friendship, pp. 642-643, gives the texts of these ]letters in
English translation in his summary of Kaltenbrunner's telegraphic report of 12
January 1944. I have translated the letter to Harster from the German of Kalten-
brunner's report, the original of which is in the file, Handakten Brobrick, in the
Politische Archiv of the Auswartiges Amt at Bonn. The microfilm is in the collec-
tion, Microcopy T-120, Serial 738, frames 267681-686, in the National Archives.
In a written report of 13 January 1944 addressed to Ribbentrop, Kaltenbrunner
forwarded photostats of the original letters in Italian which were sent to Hitler
and to Mussolini (738/267674-680). These originals each bore the date, 10
January 1944. The facsimile of Edda's letter to Mussolini, and the typed text
were first published by the Milanese edition of L'ifnitd, 23 June 1945, p. 1.
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The next day, Sunday, 9 January, Pucci took Edda up to the frontier.
They stopped a few hundred yards from the line. He gave her a
revolver to use-on either German or Italian guards if necessary, or
on herself if they caught her. Pucci waited for an hour or so to make
sure that she was across the frontier and then turned back.59
Pucci records that he got back to Verona at about 0100. This must
have been the night of 9-10 January. After some difficulty he was let
into the hotel where the German agents lived, and he found Frau
Beetz. The hotel is identified as the "Gabbia d'Oro" by Susmel. He
assured her that Countess Ciano had reached Switzerland with the
diaries. He added that she could let Ciano know of this, and he gave
her the letters, urging her to hand them over as quickly as possible.
Frau Beetz mentioned that the trial had not yet finished; and said
she would wait until 0800 or so to turn over the letters. This delay
would give Lieutenant Pucci a head start in getting into Switzerland
himself.80
LB Pucci's own account, Report, p. 8, indicates that they left Ramiola on 9 January,
that they stayed overnight 9-10 January in the Hotel Madonnina, and that on the
next day, 10 January he took Edda to the frontier at 1700. He then turned back
and reached Verona about 0100 which would be on 11 January. Here again
Pucci's chronology is off by one day. It does not leave sufficient time for his
subsequent actions and the developments at Verona.
The German police report of the frontier crossing, which was made a short
time after the event, states: "On Saturday, 8 January 1944 at 2230 hours there
arrived at the Hotel Madonnina in Cantello-Ligurno (the proprietor Rustini),
3 or 4 kilometers eastwards of Varese, a woman with two men. The woman was
recognized from a snap shot without a doubt as Frau R. The three stayed there
overnight. On Sunday, January 9, 1944 at about 1:30 one of the men and the
woman went toward the border. At about 1730 hours the man returned alone. A
short time later both men drove away. The woman gave her name as Emilie
Santos of Rome." Kaltenhrunner to Ribbentrop; 13 January 1944, German For-
eign Office Archives, Inland II geheim: "Geheime Reichssachen" 1944, Vol. XV.
(box 3). I have used the film, Microcopy T-120, National Archives, Serial 712/
262452-453.
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 336 correctly dates the frontier crossing as the evening
of 9 January.
Pucci Report, pp. 8-9. The trial lasted for three days, 8, 9, and 10 January.
The remark by Frau Beetz that the trial was not yet finished could not have
been made during the early hours of 11 January. Pucci must have reached Verona
on the night of 9-10 January, rather than one night later as he records.
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The letters which Edda Ciano wrote, and deliberately misdated,
were delivered before Ciano's execution, which occurred at about
0900 on Tuesday, 11 January. According to Susmel, Frau Beetz on
the evening of 10 January, before making her usual visit to the Scalzi
prison to see Ciano, went first to General Harster's office and delivered
the envelope with the three letters, stating that they had been brought
to her at the Hotel "Gabbia d'Oro" by Lieutenant Pucci. She added
that she had also learned from Pucci that Ciano's wife had fled into
Switzerland. General Harster forwarded the letter addressed to Mus-
solini by a special courier. He transmitted the text of the letter to
Hitler by a telephone call to the Main Security Office in Berlin, and
from there the text is said to have been retransmitted by telephone
to Hitler's headquarters.8'
Over at Gargnano, Mussolini had been following the course of the
trial and the actions of the accused with great interest. At about 0100
on 11 January he telephoned to his personal secretary, Dolfin, who did
not at first recognize his voice. Mussolini asked if Dolfin had had any
news of Edda. He had had none, he said, and he had no particular
news from Verona.
Mussolini summoned Dolfin the next morning at 0800, a good half
hour earlier than usual. The Duce was very upset and extremely tired.
"Last night," he said, "a letter was delivered to me from Edda, who
has. fled. In case Ciano is not set free within three days, she threatens
to publish a complete documentary account of our relations with the
Germans. I had known for some time that Ciano kept a diary on the
events of these last few years, and a dossier which documented it,
point for point. Ciano was clearly anti-German. His personal relations
with Ribbentrop were never good, and toward the end they hated
each other. The publication of this diary which aims to show the
continuous German treachery toward us, even during the period of
full alliance, could at this time provoke irreparable consequencesl"
With great bitterness Mussolini went on: "It is peculiarly my destiny
to be betrayed by everyone, even by my own daughter. She has
probably escaped into Switzerland.ez
"Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 346. The account here is apparently based on
Harster's post-war testimony to Susmel.
62 Dolfin, Con Mussolini nella tragedia, pp. 200-201.
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Back in Verona within the walls of the Scalzi prison, at the close
of Monday, 10 January, the news soon spread that all of the Grand
Councilors were condemned to death except Cianetti who was sen-
tenced to 30 years imprisonment. Zenone Benini, Ciano's lifetime
friend, was able to have a few words with him during the early part
of that long night.83 The Germans had at first refused even to permit
him to take communion and to confess. The brunette lady, as Benini
called Fran Beetz, was trying to get such permission. The permission
was later granted and Don Chiot, the prison chaplain, was able to offer
Count Ciano the last comforts of his faith. 64
About midnight the Chief of the Province appeared to make an
inspection. He said that since the beginning of the trial he had had
to report continuously to Mussolini. Ciano, Benini records, was now
free for a time from his German guardian angel, and the two friends
walked the corridor of the prison, arm in arm. Ciano told Benini:
"'Forget about the plea for mercy: Let us speak of serious things.
When you return among men, and this cursed war will have finished
(and it will finish soon) do not abandon my children and my wife:
they are the only things that I still have. Edda has conducted herself
admirably toward me.'-Then he was silent; he wiped a tear with
the back of his hand; murmured some words which I was unable to
understand. Then he resumed. `Now she is in flight and is trying to
reach Switzerland, where the children have preceded her. She has
with her my diary and other important documents, some of which I
have written here. The transfer of these papers, the preparation and
execution of all of this is mainly due to that noble creature whom
the Germans set to spy on me. To her I have entrusted my political
testament and other correspondence of great importance. I have also
written to my friends letters of no political import, and she has left
these with the Director so that they would be delivered through the
appropriate authorities and that thus there would be no suspicion of
of a clandestine correspondence.
" Benini was not a member of the Grand Council of Fascism, but in the period
before 25 July, while Minister of Public Works, he was active in the movement
to oust Mussolini. After the formation of the Republic of Salo, Benini gave him-
self up to avoid reprisals against his family, and he was promptly thrown into
the Scalzi prison where he had the opportunity to talk to Ciano. He was released
on 29 January 1944. Vigilia a Verona, pp. xlvii, 82, 168-169.
Benini, Vigilia a Verona, pp. 115-125.
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"'Now if Edda succeeds in crossing the frontier with all the docu-
mentary material which she has, she will be in position at the ap-
propriate moment to demonstrate to the world how things really were,
and to reveal the principal secrets and the behind-the-scenes moves
which led to the alliance with Germany and to the war. It will be
something of the greatest interest."' 85
Some time later during that long night, the prison director, Dr. Olas,
passed on to Benini the latest news from the Prefecture. The Countess,
it appeared, had eluded both the Italian and the German police, who
had been searching for her for days. The last word of her was that
she was at the Swiss frontier. Toward dawn Benini went back to
Ciano's cell. The German lady again was there. Ciano's face radiated
satisfaction when he got that news.66
Although Countess Edda had got over the border and into Switzer-
land, her troubles were by no means over. On 15 January she was
able to reach her children and tell them the horrible truth: papa had
been shot because grandpa insisted on it. Mussolini himself was
embittered by his daughter's attitude and thoroughly alarmed. by her
threat to publish the diaries. Both he and the Nazi leaders during the
year 1944 tried by one means or another to learn of Edda's where-
abouts, to make contact with her, and to gain possession of the diaries.
On 11 January Vittorio Mussolini, at his father's instigation, tried
to follow his sister's trail in order to get the diaries, or at least to
try to persuade her not to have them published. He got to Como and
there at the house of the Pessinas learned that Edda had crossed
into Switzerland.67 He could follow the trail no further.
Later that same month Mussolini arranged to have Don. Giusto
Pancino visit him at Gargnano. This priest had been a childhood friend
of Edda's; later he had been a chaplain in Albania when Edda served
there as a Red Cross nurse. Don Giusto had not seen Mussolini since
March of 1942 and he was shocked when he was ushered into the
private study of the Duce on 27 January.
Benini, Vigilia a Verona, pp. 128-129.
Benini, Vigilia a Verona, pp. 137-140.
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 359.
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Mussolini appeared emaciated, dispirited, worn out. Their interview
lasted for more than half an hour. Mussolini explained how Edda had
been pursued by the SS which was intent on getting possession of
the diaries at any cost. Mussolini tended somewhat to play down the
importance of the diaries in speaking to the priest. He mentioned that
he himself had from time to time advised Ciano to record the events
of the day. The main thing, he suggested, was to prevent the Germans
from getting them. He urged the priest to go to the Vatican for help
in getting into Switzerland to find Edda Ciano.
Don Pancino reached Rome on 2 February, spoke to Monsignor
Tardini, Deputy Cardinal Secretary of State, and received from him
a letter of introduction to Monsignor Bernardini, Apostolic Nuncio
in Bern. On 5 February Don Pancino again met with the Duce who
directed him to say to Edda that her father's house would be open to
her if she wished to return to it. After a second trip to Rome to secure
a Swiss visa, Don Pancino was able to reach Bern on 4 March.68
According to Don Pancino's testimony at the trial of Graziani, the
Germans in Italy got wind of the discussions with Mussolini and of
the intended mission into Switzerland in search of the diaries. Mus-
solini, the priest stated, was at the time nothing more than a prisoner
of the Germans who completely dominated the situation and knew
his every move. Rahn and Wolff took pains to assure Don Pancino
that this was the situation. When he got into Switzerland, German
agents approached him with the offer of 100 million lire if he would
deliver the diaries to them.68a
Edda Ciano was now practically a prisoner of the Swiss government
which maintained a most careful watch over her. Only with difficulty
was Monsignor Bernardini able to learn of her whereabouts from Pillet
Golaz, head of the Political Department in Bern. When Don Pancino
arrived at Ingenbohl, Edda was astonished to see him; she wondered
how he had been able to find her. But she refused to hear anything
from her father. She told the priest that Mussolini would be redeemed
'Don Giusto Pancino, "Tentai di riconciliare Edda Ciano e Mussolini," Oggi,
22 September 1954.
Cf. Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 365-366.
" Testimony of Don Pancino at the session of January 21, 1949, Rodolfo
Graziani, Processo, 3 vols. 1948-1950, vol. III (Rome: Ruffolo editore, 1950),
p. 1106.
Cf. Deakin, Brutal Friendship, p. 777, note c.
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in her eyes only if he fled or if he killed himself. On returning to Italy,
Don Pancino first sought the advice of Cardinal Schuster before re-
porting such negative results to Mussolini.
It was not easy for Don Pancino to tell Mussolini, on 29 March
what Edda had said. During the course of the discussion Mussolini
learned that Hitler had a copy of his own diary of the summer of
1943, which contained comments anything but flattering to Hitler.69
This only increased Mussolini's concern lest the Germans gain pos-
session of Ciano's diaries as well.
In April Mussolini for the second time summoned Don Giusto and
persuaded him to go to Switzerland again to see Edda. This time the
priest carried a letter from father to daughter. He had some success,
and was able to make new arrangements for the manuscript of the
Ciano diaries. Edda had but little money because most of Ciano's
wealth had been confiscated by the Badoglio regime. She was in
miserable health. She feared for the fate of her three children in case
of her death. The booklets of the diaries were now delivered over to
Don Pancino who placed them in a strong box at the Credit Suisse
bank of Bern under his name and that of Emilia Conte Marehi, a
pseudonym chosen by Edda. In case of Edda's death, Don Pancino
agreed to arrange for publication of the diaries with the proceeds
to go to support of the children.70
In March 1945 Don Pancino undertook a final mission to Switzerland
at the behest of Mussolini who now was hoping to make some contact
with the Allies. The priest again saw Edda, quite secretly, for the
Swiss authorities had refused him permission to visit her. She had left
Ingenbohl and now was living in a clinic near Montreux.71
?? Don Giusto Pancino, op. cit.
Cf. Hoettl, The Secret Front, pp. 232-233.
' Don Giusto Pancino, op. cit.
Cf. Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 370.
n Don Giusto Pancino, op. cit.
Edda later mentioned something of this visit to Allen Dulles whose file has
this undated notation:
"Justo Pancino-old friend of Musso-brought letters from Musso to Edda &
Nuncio-Told Edda that Himmler wished Nuncio to advise Vatican that Germans
wished peace & would let Am. & B's in; didn't want Russians-
"Told Musso re Himmler's plan & said the fools-should have done this 2 yrs
ago -" 1Item 23R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
01
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The next month came the triumph of the Allied armies in Italy,
the rising of the partisans in the North, and the end of the Republic
of Salo. Edda had just turned her radio to the wave-length of the
Milan station on 28 April when she heard the announcement that a
great crowd had gathered at the Piazza Loreto to see her father's
corpse.72
The Germans Pursue
The Countess Ciano and the Marchese Pucci had neatly given the
German guards the slip when they left Ramiola for the Swiss border
on 8 January. But when the guards discovered the empty room behind
the "Do Not Disturb" sign, there was a quick call for reinforcements.
The SD arrived in force and interrogated the Melocchi brothers. But
they learned very little and they did not, at this time, carefully search
the clinic. The diaries for 1937-1938, the portion of the supporting
documents, and the other possessions of Edda Ciano which had been
entrusted to Dr. Melocchi, remained safe.73
Meanwhile, other German agents had picked up Pucci. After deliver-
ing Edda's letters to Frau Beetz by whom they were passed on to
General Harster, Lieutenant Pucci had hoped to make his own escape
to Switzerland over the route through Sondrio. But he was ill to
begin with, had over-taxed himself, and had had very little sleep
for several nights running. He pulled off by the side of the road and
slept for several hours. When he tried to move on, the starter of his
car failed to operate, and he went to a peasant's house for help. On
his return, another car drew up on the road, full of Germans. They
asked for his papers, and on learning his identity shouted with gleeful
rage. Their first question was, "Where is the Countess?" 74
Pucci was first taken back to Verona for interrogation, and then
on to Ramiola where there was further questioning in the presence
42 Il Giornale del Mattino (Rome) 21 September 1945, Jader Jacobelli, "Sono
stato a Lipari e ho parlato con Edda."
Cf. Anita Pensotti, "Edda Ciano parla per la prima volta," Oggi, 25 September
1959.
'? "Memorandum for Files. Subject: Ciano Diaries for 1937 and 1938, as well
as other important Documents left by his wife in Italy, at the time of her flight
to Switzerland in 1944," 18 May 1945, Item 12R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries,"
Personal Files of Allen W. Dulles.
' Pucci Report, p. 9.
Cf. Niccoletti, Colliers, 27 April 1946, p. 24.
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of Dr. Melocchi. The doctor, it appeared, had told the Germans that
Pucci was violently anti-Fascist and anti-German, but he explained
to Pucci that he had said this to make the Germans believe he was on
their side, After a few hours a German officer ordered Pucci to change
from his uniform into civilian clothes, and to be taken to Gestapo
headquarters in the Hotel Regina. Here the Germans produced the
hotel keeper of Viggiu who identified Pucci as the man who had helped
Edda Ciano over the frontier. The Germans questioned Pucci from
all angles regarding Edda, the diaries, the documents, and the children,
and beat him unmercifully when he refused to talk.
After some hours of torture, Pucci was thrown into a cell in San
Vittore prison with another prisoner who appears to have been an
agent provocateur. Next day Pucci was brought back to the torture
chamber and beaten so severely that his skull was fractured in. several
places. Fearing that he might betray his trust Pucci tried to commit
suicide with a razor blade which he had managed to conceal on his
person at Ramiola. But he was handcuffed; the attempt failed; and
the net result was that he was further weakened by loss of blood.76
The next day the beatings and questionings began again, but sud-
denly ceased. The Germans moved Pucci back to his cell, and treated
him with decency. Frau Beetz appeared. What had happened? It
seems that on 14 January Hoettl arrived back in Italy with a new
mission for "La Burkhardt" She was to go to Switzerland, make con-
tact with Countess Edda, and learn from her the hiding place of the
remaining diaries and papers. She herself made the suggestion that the
SD also make use of the services of Pucci, who, because of his rela-
tionship with Countess Edda, might be able to persuade her not to
use the diaries against the Germans. La Burkhardt burst into tears at
the sight of Pucci covered with blood after his torturing. Furthermore,
her conscience bothered her. She felt that her own haste in turning
over Edda's letters to General Harster had been responsible for Pucci's
quick capture. By her tears and pleadings Pucci was persuaded to
agree to tell Edda that both she and the children would be killed
if she did anything against the Germans.76
The SD had little difficulty in getting Frau Beetz into Switzerland.
Her cover was that of temporary replacement for a clerical secretary
' Pucci Report, pp. 9-11.
Cf. Andrea Niccoletti, Colliers, 27 April 1946, p. 24.
'? Pucci Report, p. 12; Cf. Niccoletti, Colliers, 27 April 1946, p. 74.
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in the German Consulate in Lugano, and as such she was promptly
issued a Swiss visa. With Pucci it was different. He had no proper
papers. The SD smuggled him across the border by boat during the
night, and once across he met Frau Beetz at a prearranged rendezvous.
As soon as he was in Switzerland, Lieutenant Pucci made very
strenuous efforts to interest the British authorities, through the Vice
Consul in Lugano, Mr. Lancelot de Garston, in the Ciano documents.
Perhaps he also asked about the possibility of asylum for Edda and
her children in England. The British attitude was completely negative.
The one thing that Pucci accomplished here was to give Mr. de
('>arston a note which he hoped would be delivered to Edda Ciano.
All this time Pucci had been simply going on his nerves. Now he
suddenly collapsed. He got to a doctor who felt sure that his skull
had been fractured, and thus it was that Lieutenant Pucci felt obliged
to report to the Swiss police. He then entered a hospital in Bellinzona
under the care of a Dr. Bettellini. Not until the end of March was the
Italian Air Force Lieutenant released from the hospital and sent to
Estavayer-le-Lac. For the rest of his stay in Switzerland he was under
close supervision by the Swiss police.77
Pucci under internment was of no use to Frau Beetz and the Ger-
mans in their efforts to reach Countess Edda and to head off any
attempt at publication of the diaries. Frau Beetz then tried unsuccess-
fully to raise the bail money required by the Swiss authorities in such
cases as Pucci's. Possibly Pucci was able to learn Edda's address, and
to write to her, urging her not to undertake any action against the
Germans.
Frau Beetz also learned where Edda was staying, and made a trip
to Ingenbohl, but without being able to see the Countess. About this
time she got some alarming news from her superiors. It appeared that
a priest named Pancino had been able to visit Edda in her internment
at Ingenbohl, and Frau Beetz suspected that Father Pancino was
working for the Germans as well as for Mussolini. It should be
remembered that it was through Frau Beetz that General Harster
and the SD had got hold of Ciano's supporting papers which had been
sent to Berlin in January. She had been a most useful and skillful
97 Pucei Report, pp. 12-14.
Cf. Niccoletti, Colliers. 27 April 1946, p. 74.
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agent. Now Frau Beetz was greatly afraid that Edda would tell the
priest of the part which she had played in helping Edda to escape
and to get the diaries into Switzerland. If her masters were to learn
of her true role, she feared they would arrest her and torture her.
She resolved to cover her tracks by taking the initiative for the recovery
of the remaining Ciano materials which she knew were at Ramiola.
After her second Swiss visa expired, Frau Beetz returned to Italy.
There she enjoyed a couple of weeks vacation with her husband,
whose military leave had been arranged by Kaltenbrunner. She was
now directed to make contact with Father Pancino and with his aid
to reach Edda and urge her to keep quiet. This second mission into
Switzerland did not materialize because the Swiss Government refused
to issue a new visa.
In the summer of 1944, either through the direct participation of
Frau Beetz, or at her instigation, the Sicherheitsdienst was able to get
its hands on all of the materials which Edda and Lieutenant Pucci
had left at Ramiola in January. There are two or three different
versions of this episode varying in credibility and differing as to the
precise time and who took part. But there is agreement that it oc-
curred during the summer of 1944 and that a fabricated letter played
a big role.
The most convincing version comes from the Melocchi brothers.
At war's end, as we will note, Allen Dulles hastened over the border
of Switzerland into Italy, equipped with precise directions for getting
to Ramiola, and with a genuine letter addressed to Dr. Walter 1V.lelocchi
by Edda Ciano, asking that he turn over to the American her husband's
diaries, certain other documents, and the case of her jewels. Here are
the exact words of Allen Dulles' report:
"1. On May 16th and 17th I called on the brothers Elvezio and Walter
Melocchi, doctors of medicine, who have a sanitarium ("casa di cure-
Ramiola") at Ramiola, Prov. of Parma. Countess Edda gave me a letter
addressed to Dr. Walter Melocchi in which she requested him to turn over
to me certain documents, parts of her husband's diary and a case of her
jewels which she left with him for safekeeping at the time of her flight to
Switzerland in January 1944.
"2. The doctors stated that all the documents and the box with Edda
Ciano's jewels were taken away by the Germans after Edda's departure.
Dr. Walter Melocchi, to whom Edda's letter which I brought was addressed,
answered this letter in writing."
[Here follows an account of the searches in January 1944.1
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"7. During this first interrogation, no questions were asked about any
documents and the brothers did not volunteer any information about them.
As a side remark Dr. Elvezio Melocchi mentioned that he had concealed
the two diaries behind the books on the shelves of his office. The interroga-
tion by the Germans took place in that room and they looked over some of
the hooks without discovering the diaries. The remaining documents, phono-
graph records and the jewel case, Dr. Elvezio kept in his own room. None
of these were taken away by the Germans at that time.
"S. Shortly afterwards the Italian police appeared at the Sanitarium,
wanted to arrest the two brothers and to close the establishment because
of its being connected with the Countess's escape. The brothers were con-
vinced that there was an Italian spy among the establishment's personnel,
who was reporting to the Italian police, often exaggerating the happenings
in order to give himself more importance.
"9. It was not until some time in August that the next development took
place. At that time there came to the Sanitarium a man who claimed to be
a nephew of Professor Fossati, a well-known gynecologist from Milan. This
man stated that he came from Switzerland as emissary for Edda Ciano to
obtain the documents left behind by her. Elvezio Melocchi was caught off
his guard and asked for the written instructions from the Countess, as it
had been arranged between her and the doctors that the things left behind
would only be delivered upon written orders from her. The man left but re-
turned two days later bringing a letter purported to have come from the Count-
ess. It was an obvious falsification and the doctors decided not to hand over the
think=s, pretending that they were no longer at Ramiola, which was not a
safe place for them, but that they had been taken away and hidden some-
where in Florence. The pseudo-messenger left again. Dr. Walter Melocchi
noticed that the car in which he had come had a German license identified
as coming from Trieste.
"10. A few days later two agents of the SD from Parma appeared at the
Sanitarium accompanied by an SS officer whom they recognized as one of
those who conducted the original interrogation in January. Elvezio and
Walter Melocchi were both taken to Parma, to via Carlo Alberto XIII
(Stradonc). A number of the German military were lined up on their enter-
ing the building and generally a show of importance was put on, pre-
sumably to intimidate the brothers. By that time both of them were quite
nervous and unwilling to take any chances on behalf of the Countess.
Therefore when they were told that they would be taken to Florence to
produce the documents left behind by Edda, they admitted without further
difficulties that there was no point of going there as the documents were
kept in the Sanitarium at Ramiola. They were taken back and turned over
to the German SD officials everything they had for the Countess, including
a handbag mentioned by them now, for the first time during this narrative.
Elvezio Melocchi stated that the Countess had shown him the contents of
this handbag which contained a number of letters from Mussolini to her.
The Countess qualified these letters as being `Important for future develop-
ments.' When asked whether they had read those letters after Edda's de-
parture the brothers answered in the negative, saying that they never were
interested in politics. I then asked them whether they had read the con-
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tents of the Italian Foreign Office dossier left with them. Elvezio Melocchi
said that they had not, inasmuch as, to avoid any complications, he wrapped
and sealed with his own seal, those documents, in the presence of Edda.
They admitted, however, having read some parts of the diary which dealt
with the Spanish war events. One of the brothers said that they found the
reading nauseating and after a few pages did not read any more. I then
remarked that the diary concerning the Munich events was in these volumes,
to which one of the brothers promptly reacted by saying that the relative
sheets, perhaps 10 or 15 in number were cut out. The brothers then
admitted that they had looked for that particular topic as one they thought
would be interestingl! Both brothers stated that they made no copies of
anything at all nor did they make any photostats, .. .?' 48
48 "Memorandum for Files, Subject: Ciano Diaries for 1937 and 1938, as well
as other important Documents left by his wife in Italy, at the time of her flight
to Switzerland in 1944, 18 May 1945, Item 12R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
A letter of Walter Melocchi to Countess Edda Ciano, dated 16 May 1945,
related substantially the same facts regarding the two booklets of the diary and
other materials and it repeats the statement of the arrest of the brothers by the
SD in October of 1944, Walter for five days and Elvezio for 53. Item 20R, File
"Edda Ciano Diaries."
Cf. Niccoletti, Colliers, 27 April 1946, p. 76.
Frau Beetz, at the end of the war in Europe and after she fell into Allied hands,
seems to have explained that she twice visited Ramiola in June 1944 and then with
the aid of Dr. Segna regained all of the materials. She herself then took the docu-
ments to Zossen where she prepared a summary of them for Hoettl, Chief of Amt
VI B. It is not excluded that Dr. Segna is the same person as was described by Dr.
Melocchi to Allen Dulles.
Susmel, Vita sbagliata, pp. 369-370, gives an account which is apparently based
on post-war testimony to him by Harster, as follows. Segna remained convinced,
despite the failure to discover anything in January, that Edda Ciano must have
left important materials at Ramiola. He therefore fabricated a letter purporting to
be from Countess Ciano in Switzerland to Dr. Melocchi asking that the materials be
turned over for delivery to her. Thereupon Dr. Melocchi surrendered: the 12 vol-
umes of the "colloqui"; the file "Germania"; the documents regarding Ciano's
last mission to Hitler's headquarters in December 1942; Edda's diary as a Red
Cross nurse; and her correspondence with her father. The Ciano materials were
sent on to Berlin; the others were held at Verona. Susmel's account is not so
credible as that of the Melocchis. What Harster learned was second hand,
not what he himself saw or did.
Susmel makes no mention in this connection (pp. 369-370) of the diaries before
1939. He states, however, that after the recovery of the materials at Ramiola,
Frau Beetz and Segna went on to Como and there picked up the three booklets
of the diary, that is for 1936, 1937, and 1938.
I find no mention anywhere in Edda Ciano's correspondence with Allen Dulles
of a diary for 1936. Edda Ciano in that correspondence frequently referred to the
two notebooks for 1937 and 1938 respectively, and stated consistently that she
had left them at Ramiola.
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The Sicherheitsdienst, chiefly through the operations of Frau Beetz,
now had the five or six volumes of records of conversations which
General Harster had received in January 1944 and had sent on to
Berlin; the two diary volumes for the years 1937 and 1938, and the
hound volume labeled `Germania' which had been taken from Ramiola
in August. The two volumes of the diaries were quite like the other
five calendar notebooks.79 The volumes of the 'celloqui' or memo-
randa of conversation must have been the copies which Ciano per-
sonally made or set aside while other official copies went into the
Archivio di Gabinetto and have survived in microfilm form.79a The
volume, `Germania' must have been a kind of personal copy retained
by Ciano.
Frau Beetz made a summary of the new materials seized at Ramiola
in the summer of 1944, and then was directed to return to her home
in Weimar to make a full translation of the whole collection. This
work was done under careful security precautions. Each night after
the day's work the original documents were placed in the safe of the
Gestapo in Weimar. In the last month of the Nazi regime, that is in
April 1945, Hitler ordered these Italian documents and the trans-
lations to be destroyed. Without the knowledge of her superiors, how-
ever, Frau Beetz had made an extra carbon copy of her translations.
It has been suggested that she thought of using these in a book in
case Countess Ciano would grant permission. Just before the end
came, she buried these copies of her translations in her garden, which
some said was a rose garden.
Enter US Intelligence
On 4 June 1944 the Allied armies entered Rome. In the next month
l'Unita, organ of the Communist Party in Italy, published a little note
which was immediately echoed in the New York Times of the follow-
ing day, 30 July 1944:
"Interested parties are deliberately holding back the pub-
lication of the late Count Ciano's diary, the Communist news-
paper Unita, charged today.
See above, p. 4-5.
'?` In the microfihn collection at the National Archives called the Lisbon Papers,
Microcopy T-816.
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"The diary, which Ciano kept from the beginning of the
war until his arrest last summer, is said to be one of the most
important historic documents of the Second World War. It
was believed that his wife had taken the only copy with her
when she fled to Switzerland, pursued by the orders from her
father, Benito Mussolini, to get her, dead or alive. However,
Units said that the diary was in Italy and had been hidden
or suppressed by some who feared its revelations."
This note in l'Unita. was apparently the first real alert American intelli-
gence agencies received about the Ciano diaries.80
A bit later, that is about mid-August of 1944, American counter-
intelligence agents picked up Zenone Benini. Ciano had poured out
his heart to Benini on that last long night before his execution, and
almost his last words were of his hope that his widow would be able
to publish his diaries and notes and thus vindicate his memory.81
Benini was able to give considerable information about the diaries,
information which was embodied in a 15-page memorandum by Lt.
Col. Henry H. Cumming, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Peninsular
Base Section and dated 16 August.82
Benini mentioned that the diaries were known to quite a number
of people, and that Ciano on several occasions had mentioned his
intention to have these documents published abroad, perhaps in Eng-
land or America. Benini also stated that the diaries included:
"a. Records of personal conversations between Hitler and Mussolini;
b. Terms of the so-called Pact of Steel;
c. Accounts of the Munich Conference;
'Interview with Mr. Allen W. Dulles, 7 January 1966. Mr. Dulles had learned
of Edda Ciano's arrival in Switzerland in the winter of 1943-44, he had made in-
quiries with Magistrati, Italian Minister in Bern and who had married Ciano's
deceased sister, but had got no clue that she had the diaries with her (Message
Dulles to OSS, Washington, 19 January 1945 [paragraph 5], Item 44, File "Edda
Ciano Diaries").
Sumner Welles knew of the existence of the diaries, but he did not publicly
mention this fact until he wrote the introduction for the American edition of the
diaries which was issued in January 1946.
German intelligence agents, as noted, had been on the trail of the diaries for
some time. It is not excluded that there was a Communist penetration of the
SD which enabled l'Unitd to publish its note.
"See above, pp. 30-31.
82 Enclosure No. 2, Despatch 703, Robert D. Murphy, United States Political
Adviser, AFHQ, Top Secret, File "Edda Ciano Diaries," Item 65R.
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1. Copies of all personal secret documents of Mussolini concerning the
most important problems of foreign policy, particularly those bearing on Italo-
German relations. (Ciano is understood to have copied these documents per-
sonally, in long-hand, trusting no one.)" '
Benini declared categorically that Ciano had told him: "They
(The Germans and Republican Fascists) have stripped me of my
possessions. I am poor now. But there is one treasure they have not
taken which is of more value to me than all the rest: my Diary, now
in the hands of my wife."
"Benini is convinced that, as life-long friend of Ciano and as finan-
cial manager of both Galeazzo and Edda, he can persuade the latter
to make the document available to Allied authorities. He is equally
convinced that Edda Ciano, now reported in Switzerland, has not
turned the Diary over to the Germans, since she regards it as an
instrument of eventual security for herself and children after the col-
lapse of Germany and the Italian Republican Fascist government."
To assist the American authorities (and incidentally thereby to
help his own cause as a former Fascist) and at the same time to fulfill
the promise to Galeazzo, Benini on 15 August addressed a letter to
Edda, entrusting its delivery to the Americans.
"I was in the Verona prison," Benini wrote, "from the 30th of
November to the 30th of January and I was able to get in touch with
Galeazzo in spite of the strict guard kept. I spent the last tragic
night of January second [sic] with him, and I am burning with the
desire to bring you his last wishes, his last words, and his advices."
Somewhat cryptically Benini mentioned that "He praised all that you
had done for him, upon you he placed the certainty that some day
he will be truly understood as to his thoughts and actions in Italy
and abroad. He has counted on you so that the world might have an
irrefutable revelation of so many capital truths." 84
Ambassador Kirk was consulted and suggested that the matter of
securing the diary was of sufficient importance to warrant its being
taken up through the War Department with a view to possible diplo-
matic action in Switzerland.
" Note that Benini, in speaking to Colonel Cumming, drew no distinction be-
tween the diary and the supporting papers.
" The letter in English is enclosure No. 1 in Despatch No. 703, 25 August 1944.
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Between the arrival in Washington of Mr. Murphy's despatch No.
703 to the State Department, the arrival of whatever messages regard-
ing Ciano's diary went to the War Department through its channels,
and the next step, there was quite a lapse of time. But on 22 October
the US Minister in Bern 85 received an instruction stating that the
Department of State had reliable information that Count Ciano's
diaries were in the possession of his widow in Switzerland. The Min-
ister was directed to try to get the diaries or a microfilm copy, and it
was suggested that he might wish to make use of OSS help.86
The head of the Office of Strategic Services network in Switzer-
land was Allen W. Dulles. He operated in direct contact with the
Legation and was able to use its communications facilities for report-
ing to home base in Washington. He had managed to get into the
bastion of neutral Switzerland just as the portcullis was being lowered
following the Allied landings in North Africa and the German over-
running of unoccupied (Vichy) France .87
After discussing the problem with Minister Harrison, Mr. Dulles
began, or rather renewed his search for Edda Ciano and the diaries.
Bellia, the Italian Consul in Lausanne,"" had served in Ciano's personal
office; he knew Edda well; and from him Dulles gained the impres-
sion that Edda probably had the diaries with her. Mr. Dulles enlisted
the services of a few people, a team, so to speak, in the quest for
Edda and the diary. These were Cordelia Dodson, Mme. Louis de
Chollet, an American woman married to a Swiss, and Paul Ghali,
correspondent of the Chicago Daily News.89
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Pucci, who had been released from the
hospital at the end of March with the fractures of his skull healed,
had been sent to Estavayer-le-Lac, and then to Fribourg. There he
met Mme. de Chollet in the early autumn. Pucci abruptly turned down
Leland Harrison (1883-1951); Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotenti-
ary to Switzerland since July 13, 1937.
88 Copy of telegram as received, item 60R, File, "Edda Ciano Diaries."
84 See Allen W. Dulles' own delightful account of his adventurous arrival in
Switzerland: The Secret Surrender (New York, Evanston, and London:: Harper
and Row, 1966) pp. 12 if.
es Franco Bellia, entered the Italian foreign service in 1933; in 1941 headed the
"Ufficio della Segreteria" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
80 Interview with Allen Dulles, January 17, 1966.
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Mme. de Chollet's suggestion that he capitalize on his friendship
with the Countess Ciano by writing some newspaper articles about
her; but he gained the clear impression that the Americans were much
interested in Ciano's widow.
At the end of October, Pucci, who had moved back to Estavayer,
managed to see Edda in Lausanne. They talked at length about the
diary and documents. Pucci asked her if he should contact the Amer-
icans and she agreed. Finally on 6 December Pucci managed to get
permission to go to Fribourg along with a school group which made
the excursion to see the procession of St. Nicholas. Although Pucci
was not able to see Mme. de Chollet, he talked to her on the phone
indicating that he wished to see her and had something of importance
to say. But he did not wish to run the risk of directly mentioning the
diary on the telephone.
A couple of days after this phone call, Mme. de Chollet arrived in
Estavayer accompanied by Paul Ghali, and the two met with Pucci.
At just about this time there had been newspaper stories of a marriage
of Countess Ciano and Marchese Pucci. Ghali wanted to know about
this. Pucci denied the rumor, but he brought up the subject of the
diaries and indicated that Edda might be willing to let them out.9?
The next step was the delivery to Edda Ciano of a copy of the
letter which Zenone Benini had entrusted to the American authorities
in Rome in August. To Mme. de Chollet, who served as messenger,
Mr. Dulles wrote on 15 December:
"I do not know whether the original letter was sent to Washington or
direetly to the Countess by other channels. If she has not already received
it, I feel sure she would desire to read it, and, of course, she may keep
this copy, if she so desires.
"From Rome I learn that Signor Benini is with the American military forces
in the neighborhood of Rome and has given these authorities all information
in his possession with regard to the importance of the Diaries, and of his
willingness, in the interest of his friend and of the cause, to do what he
can to help toward making them available, so that photographic copies
can he made under conditions that would preserve to the rightful owners
all rights of eventual publication.
"I am :sure that you will express to your friend my sincere conviction that
it is important that the material we discussed be made immediately avail-
able under safeguards which will be scrupulously observed, and which will
reserve to your friend and her children all rights of publication."
Pucci Report, pp. 14-15.
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In conclusion Mr. Dulles mentioned that he had to leave for Paris
next day, but hoped to see Mme. de Chollet on his return which
would be on December 20th.91
We can well imagine Edda Ciano's feelings from the reply to
Benini which she drafted on 16 December:
"Dear Zenone: Only today I have received a copy (in English) of the letter
you wrote me on August 15th. It is useless, and I cannot tell you all I went
through-a real hell-always with the thought that I was not able to do
(for reasons beyond my control) what Galeazzo had written me to do.
"Your letter, although late, arrives to the point. For that reason, before
arranging anything, I would like to see you as soon as possible. It is very
important. I beg you to be careful because if the Swiss (for reasons of quiet
living) or above all the Germans knew of the dirty trick I am about to pull
on them, my life (but that would not have any importance-I am so tired
of everything) and that of my children would be seriously endangered.
"But it is certain that even if I would have to die, I want first to avenge
Galeazzo and to succeed in making him known such as he was.
I will be waiting for you. I embrace you affectionately.
[signed] Edda"
After this reply by Edda, which was read and analyzed all the way
from Bern to Caserta to Rome, the initial thought of the American
intelligence authorities was to try to elicit another letter from Benini,
in which he would specifically direct Edda Ciano to the next step.
This time, however, Benini refused. Edda Ciano wanted Benini to
come to Switzerland so that she could consult him directly. But Benini
was under a blanket indictment for his Fascist activities, and the
American intelligence officers did not wish to go so far as to move
him into neutral Switzerland.93
Mr. Dulles in Switzerland had believed, after receiving the reports
from Mme. de Chollet and Paul Ghali, that the situation was now
ripe for filming the diaries. He made out a certificate that Daniel
Schachter was officially authorized "to make photographic reproduc-
91 Copy of the letter, Bern, 15 December 1944, Item 57R File "Edda Ciano
Diaries."
"The Italian holograph, marked `not sent,' is in the File "Edda Ciano Diaries"
Item 8R. A copy in English translation, item 53R; another such copy, item 44R,
Exhibit A.
"Telegram, Caserta to Bern (for Dulles) 29 December 1944, Item 61 L; Tele-
gram, Bern to Caserta (for American Political Adviser) 31 December 1944, Item
60 L; Telegram 837, Caserta to Bern (for Dulles) 11 January 1945, item 57 L,
File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
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tions of documents, records and reports desired to complete the official
documentation of United States Government Offices. Any documents
so photographed by him are for official uses only." 94 Armed with this
certificate, Schachter was sent to Countess Ciano to make photographs
of the diaries, but she refused. She stated that she was willing to go
through with the matter of making the diary available to the United
States Government, but she insisted first on talking directly with
Mr. Dulles.95
Countess Ciano got the same message to Mr. Dulles through another
channel. In a letter sent 20 December to Mme. de Chollet she
wrote . . . "when your `important friend' comes I should like to talk
with him because, though I am willing with all my heart to carry
through the deal the whole thing is too important for me (and I
am not thinking of money) to take wild chances blindfolded. . . .
Your important friend could come with his car and take me for a ride
(not in the American sense of it I mean to say)." 96
In these circumstances, and despite the risk which was involved
of a refusal by Countess Ciano to cooperate, or to spin the nego-
tiations out and exploit a connection with Mr. Dulles, he determined
to speak to her directly. He brought Magistrati into the picture at
the time, and that influence probably was helpful. Magistrati was no
longer Minister in Bern. His prominent Fascist past might require
investigation in anti-Fascist Italy. Dulles believed that Magistrati had
worked conscientiously for the Allies since the Armistice, and promised
to put in a good word for him at Rome if he would help to get the
diaries."'
Dulles Gets the Diaries
On 7 January 1945 Allen Dulles motored to Monthey, in the Valais,
accompanied by Mme. de Chollet, who had arranged for a meeting
94 Copy of the certificate, item 58 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries," Personal Files
of Allen Dulles.
"Dulles' report to OSS, Washington, Bern, 19 January 1945, item 44R, File
"Edda Ciano Diaries." (This report is of basic importance and summarizes a great
deal of Dulles' moves with respect to the diary.)
- Holograph letter, undated but with envelope post-marked Monthey, 20 XII 44,
item 7 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
' Interview with Mr. Dulles, 17 January 1966; Message of Dulles, 30 December
(944, Item 52 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
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there with Edda Ciano. It was almost a year since Countess Ciano,
with the help of Lieutenant Pucci, had been able to escape into
Switzerland with the 5 booklets of Count Ciano's diaries. This meet-
ing in Monthey was secret. The war was still going on, and Countess
Ciano was under rather close surveillance by the Swiss. The three
spent a good part of the afternoon discussing the delivery of the
diaries to the United States Government.
On the one hand Edda wished to make the diaries available in
accordance with what she now believed to have been her husband's
last wishes. On the other she hated to give up her last assets. She
wished to bargain, yet she wished at the same time to give the im-
pression of a generous act toward America. She was anxious to get
out of Switzerland and beyond the reach of the Sicherheitsdienst. She
wanted to talk directly with Benini before coming to a decision. She
needed clear assurances regarding her rights for commercial publica-
tion, and she was very anxious that her husband's political reputation
be vindicated.
Mr. Dulles was chiefly anxious to move quickly. He took the po-
sition that the diaries were losing value to the US Government every-
day; that this was Edda's last real chance to make a generous act;
that the US Government was not interested in a bargain or in. pay-
ing out money. He gave full assurances that her rights for commercial
publication would not be impaired, but he could not state when, with
the war still on, the diaries could be published. He was careful to
explain that the US Government might conceivably wish to publish
parts of the diaries if it would help in the war.
In the end Edda agreed and arrangements were made for a team
of photographers to make the reproductions. Dulles was impressed
by Edda's great resentment at her father for failing to heed her in-
tercession for Ciano's life, and by her fear and hatred of the Germans,
above all of Ribbentrop. In his report of the discussion, Dulles sug-
gested that if the US government were to publish any part of the
diary, there should be consideration of her protection. But no such
assurance was requested or given in the discussion of 17 January.98
Dulles' report to OSS, Washington, Bern, 19 January 1945 (paragraph 7),
item 44 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries";
Interview with Allen Dulles, 17 January 1966;
Cf. Niccoletti, Colliers, 27 April 1946, p. 74.
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Next day Mr. Dulles sent his team. Captain Tracy Barnes, a
trained lawyer, supervised; Schachter did the actual photographing.
These reproductions were regular photos, not microfilms. The men
worked secretly in Countess Edda's room in the sanitarium in Valais
where she was confined. They worked in great haste lest they be
discovered by the Swiss authorities. The whole job was completed
that day: some 1200 pages were photographed of the five notebooks.99
Countess Ciano was not completely satisfied with Mr. Dulles' oral
assurances, although she felt that his word as a gentleman would
be honored. Early next day (at 0500 according to her account), she
wrote to Mr. Dulles asking for certain specific guarantees:
1) A formal acknowledgement from the Government of the United States
that she donated the diaries;
2) A written engagement from the American Government that the materials
be used only for political and military purposes, secretly; and that nothing be
published without her consent;
3) For assistance in commercial publication of the diaries in the United
States as soon as the Government had gone over the material.100
At the secret meeting with Allen Dulles, Edda Ciano had men-
tioned that there were additional documentary materials of Count
Ciano which were still in Italy, the "chocolates" as she liked to call
them. She referred to these additional documents in her letter of 8
January: "Another thing, the rest. The complement of the diaries
are still in Italy-if you take me out of here, I am willing to go and
fetch them, only Pucci and I know where they are. Pucci does not
know that I know." 101
There was no problem in understanding Countess Edda's motives.
In his telegraphic report of 11 January, Dulles recorded that "Today
Hitler, Ribbentrop and her father are the chief objects of her hatred."
But the guarantees which she asked were a different matter. Dulles
stated:
"In prior conversation I never accepted such conditions but told her I would
give her personal letter of acknowledgement after diaries photographed and
'Telegram Dulles to Washington, 11 January 1945, item 58 L, File "Edda
Ciano Diaries";
Interview with Allen Dulles, 17 January 1966.
110 Letter, Edda Ciano to Allen Dulles, 8 January 1945, the holograph, item 5 R;
a typed copy, item 44 R, exhibit B, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
101 Ibid.
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that in giving us copy, such rights as she might have regarding publication
would be undisturbed. I specifically stated our Govt might wish to publish
certain extracts."
On 13 January through Mme. de Chollet, Dulles sent the acknowl-
edgement over his signature with the concluding sentence:
"This will further acknowledge that the photographic copies of the diaries
will be forwarded to Washington for the information of the government, to-
gether with a copy of the Countess Ciano's letter of January 8th, that the
material in the photographic copies will be used for official purposes only,
and that the giving of these photographic copies will not affect any rights
which Countess Ciano may have with regard to the eventual commercial
publication of the diaries." 102
Edda Ciano had not stressed financial considerations, and Count
Ciano had insisted that she not accept payment from the American
government. But in Switzerland she was living on a very limited budg-
et. The Swiss authorities saw to it that she did not get sufficient
funds to move around easily in their neutral country. Mr. Dulles
gave her an advance of 3500 Swiss francs against future possible
royalties.103
In reporting his success in gaining the Ciano diaries, Dulles ac-
knowledged that he had no independent basis of judgment of their
contents, but he felt completely sure of the authenticity of the ma-
terials. The 1,200 pages covered the period 1 January 1939 through
8 February 1943, and Edda included Galeazzo's note of 23 December
1943 from his cell in Verona. Mr. Dulles noted, however, that there
were some pages which were missing or had been cut, particularly
those between 25 January and 24 April 1941, regarding the Greek
war. 104
"Item 48 it, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
109 Telegram, Dulles to Washington, 11 January 1945, as cited.
104 At a subsequent stage the late Professor Gaetano Salvemini was able to ex-
amine the photographs of the diary, page by page. He noted that the sheet with
the entries for 27 and 28 October 1940 had been removed and substituted. Sus-
mel suggests that when Ciano was Ambassador to the Holy See, he was able to
make interpolations and mutilations in the day to day entries which he had made
earlier. (Susmel, Vita sbagliata, p. 78 and footnote 1.)
Allen Dulles rather suspected that Edda Ciano herself might have excised
certain passages which she considered might have been offensive to the Anglo-
Americans (Interview with Allen Dulles, 13 January 1966).
Toscano, The History of Treaties and International Politics, Vol. I, p. 455 sug-
gests that the French edition, published directly from the original manuscript note-
books, is the more accurate, i.e. Journal Politique, 1939-1943 (Neuchatel: La
Baconniere, 1946). See below, note 117.
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The work of photographing the diaries had been done in secrecy
and in great haste. It was feared that some of the filmed pages would
prove to be illegible, that there would be double exposures, and that
quite a few of the pages of the original notebooks would have to be
retaken. At Allied Force Headquarters, they still had Benini on the
hook. At Allen Dulles' suggestion they kept him there in case his
intervention should be considered necessary to gain Edda Ciano's con-
sent for the making of re-takes. She was extremely worried throughout
this time lest the Swiss authorities learn of her activities and expel
her as an undesirable alien, or that the Sicherheitsdienst might learn
of her disposition of the diaries, and kill her.105
On 16 January, however, Dulles was able to report that the repho-
tographing had been carried out successfully and that he had good,
clear films of all elements of Count Ciano's diaries which Edda had
admitted to having with her in Switzerland. There was now no need
for any call on the services of Benini, and Dulles arranged for a copy
of his report to be sent to Caserta, lest any complications arise from
Ciano's friend who was anxious to clear up his Fascist past.'??
On 15 January, Captain Barnes had sent his chief a full report
regarding the work of rephotographing. It listed all of the entries of
which retakes were necessary. It listed the missing dates as follows:
1939 17-18 February
1940 13-18 April
1941 26-31. January
]February-entire
March-entire
1-23 April
23-31 July
August-entire
1-21 September
1942 10-19 July
17-24 August
12-21 September
"The only explanation given for the significant omissions in 1941 was that
during the period 26 January through 23 April Ciano was a flight officer with
the Italian Air Service. The Countess stated that she knew of no reason why
-Telegram, Bern to Washington, 13 January 1945, item 56 L, File "Edda Ciano
Diaries."
" Telegram, Bern to the American Political Adviser (AMPOLAD), Caserta, 16
January 1945, item 54 L; Telegram, Bern to Washington, 16 January 1945, item
53 L, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
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the second big period was left out in 1941 nor for the shorter omissions
occurring in other years."
There was another rather puzzling matter about the original
diaries. There was a series of initials, in red pencil, and in capital
letters, at the right hand top corner of many pages. "The Countess
examined these rather carefully but said, and I believe truthfully,
that she knew no explanation for them." 107 When Allen Dulles and
his team were able to study these initials at leisure, it appeared that
they corresponded with the initials of some of Galeazzo's lady
friends, and apparently had been recorded for the appropriate
days.'?8 These markings argue rather strongly that the diary was
genuine, and that there was but little retouching of the original en-
tries by Count Ciano.
In his comprehensive report of 19 January, Allen Dulles informed
the OSS central office in Washington that the reproduction of the
diaries would be despatched the next day, hand-carried in the form
of two sets of microfilm.109 Apparently there was a reduction to micro-
film after the initial photographing sessions by Captain Tracy Barnes
and Daniel Schachter. The two aluminum containers of the sets
of film were designated respectively "A" and "B". Container "A" held
the negatives of the initial filming done on 8 January; container "B"
the negative for the subsequent refilming.110 Mr. Dulles further re-
ported that he was keeping one complete set of prints of each of the
two films and was arranging to have them translated under the edi-
torial guidance of Royall Tyler."'
These translations went forward rather rapidly with covering notes
of 19 February, 1 March, and 3 March 1945.112 The Washington cen-
tral office of OSS, in accordance with Mr. Dulles' suggestion, promptly
forwarded a print of the microfilm of the diaries to the Department of
10' Report of Captain Tracy Barnes to Mr. Dulles, 15 January 1945, Item 45 R,
File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
108 Interview with Allen Dulles, 17 January 1966.
109 Item 44 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
11? Item 44 R, Exhibit E, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
"Report of 19 January 1945, as cited.
119 Respectively items 37 R, 34 R, and 33 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
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State.113 As the translations reached Washington from Bern, OSS
promptly forwarded copies to the Department of State. The series
was completed on 12 April 1945, only a short time before the end
of the war in Europe. 114
Shortly after VE day, and as quickly as the border of Switzerland
and Italy was opened up, Mr. Dulles hastened to Ramiola, in search
of the supplementary materials of which Edda had told him. At her
request, Mr. Dulles supplied her with a film of the photographs of
the diary, and promised that she would receive film copies of whatever
additional materials he would be able to retrieve in Italy.115 When he
reached the clinic of the Melocchi brothers, he learned that the Ger-
mans had got there first. The "chocolates" had been gobbled up.116
Publication of the Diaries.
Paul Ghali, correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, had been of
real service to Allen Dulles in making contact with Edda Ciano
and in inducing her to make the diaries available to the United States
Government. Dulles felt under obligation for these services and, within
the limits permitted by his official position, he assisted Ghali in
getting first rights of publication. There were some difficulties for
Ghali in making a bid. Use of commercial cable from Switzerland in
describing the materials would promptly alert the authorities and
jeopardize the status of Countess Ciano as a political refugee. If
Ghali were to cross the border and telegraph from Paris his message
might not get through the Allied censorship. Yet if he did not act
there was the risk that Edda would become impatient and approach
some other publisher. Toward the end of January Dulles reported to
the OSS in Washington that he felt obliged to let Ghali go ahead in
11% Covering letter, Charles S. Cheston, Acting Director, OSS, to James C. Dunn,
Assistant Secretary of State, 6 February 1945, Top Secret, 103.918/2-645, Central
Files, Department of State.
The author, at this period, was serving in the Division of Southern European
Affairs, and thus learned for the first time about the diary but had but little time
to study it. The film, so far as I recall, was carefully guarded and kept in the
safe in Mr. Dunn's office.
`Under cover of hand-carried letters, 16 March, 15 April and 12 April, Secret
File, 865.01/3-1645; 865.01/4-545; and 865.01/4-1245; Central Files, Department
of State.
"Edda Ciano to Mr. Dulles, 3 May 1945, item 25 R; receipt by Edda Ciano,
9 May 1945, item 24 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
"'See above, p. 48.
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contacting his publisher. At the same time Dulles pointed out that
any aid with communications would enable the OSS to keep control
over the whole matter. Edda agreed orally to give the Chicago Daily
News preference. She asked for $25,000 for the newspaper rights and
for an additional offer for publication of the diaries in book form,
but leaving Mme. de Chollet free to negotiate for a French edition
to be published in Switzerland and France.' "7
The Chicago Daily News readily agreed to accept censorship of
such materials in the diaries as might be judged necessary by the
Department of State-since the war was still on in Europe-but with-
out seeing the material the newspaper felt able to offer only $3,500
for exclusive first publishing rights, leaving the publication in book
form to await inspection of the manuscript.'-"'
By mid-March some of the staff in Chicago had been able to read
a portion of the diary in translation. (At this time only the OSS and
State Department had the text of the whole manuscript.) After a sec-
ond trip to Paris, Ghali returned to Switzerland at the end of .March
with full authorization to offer $25,000 for the exclusive first publi-
cation rights for newspapers and periodicals throughout the world,
excepting only Switzerland and France.""o
On 7 April Edda Ciano, acting for herself and for her three chil-
dren, and Paul Ghali representing John Knight (Chicago Daily News)
signed at Monthey, Switzerland, the formal contract for publication.
The News agreed to pay $25,000 for the rights of serial publication
of the five booklets of the diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano. Edda agreed
to deliver to the firm a photocopy of the manuscript, and she formally
guaranteed its authenticity. The News further agreed to act as Edda
Ciano's representative in arranging for publication of the manuscript
in book form. She retained the right to accept, to reject, or to discuss
such offers as would ensue. Switzerland and France were excepted.
'Telegram Bern (Dulles) to Washington, 17 January 1945, item 52 L; Tele-
gram, Bern to Washington, 25 January 1945, item 42 R; undated message, by
Ghali for John Knight, item 31 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
'Telegram, OSS to Bern (via Department of State) 14 February 1945, item
36 L; copy of letter, Paul Ghali to Edda Ciano, 5 March 1945, item 28 R, File,
"Edda Ciano Diaries."
"Telegram, OSS to Bern, 20 March 1945, item 26 L; Telegram, Bern to OSS,
31 March 1945, item 23 L; File, "Edda Ciano Diaries."
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Article 3 of the contract stated:
"There are references in the manuscript to certain documents which are
not at the present time in the possession of Countess Ciano.
"if they should be retrieved, it is understood that she will send photo-
copies to the Chicago Daily News of such of those documents as clearly
have the character of supplements or appendices to the manuscript."'
After VE day Lieutenant Pucci decided to return to Italy and ap-
plied for permission of the Swiss police to travel to Bern in order to
put himself at the disposal of the Italian authorities. The Swiss police
promptly granted the request but at the same time notified him politely
but very clearly that he was expected to leave Switzerland by the end
of the month, May. On 15 May Pucci called on Ghilia, the Italian Air
Attache in Bern. Whatever may have been the chivalry of Pucci's
aid to Countess Ciano in her escaping into Switzerland, or however
admirable his courage under German torture, there was the basic
fact that he was an officer of the Italian Air Force, and he had been
absent without leave.
Pucci identified himself to Ghilia, for he had a distinguished war
record, but the Attache indicated that Pucci's actions had made him
a political figure. He suggested that Pucci write out a complete ac-
count of his actions since September 1943. Pucci did not feel free
to do this although he declared that he was willing to submit to an
investigation or judgment by the Italian authorities. The suggestion
was then brought forward that Pucci indicate that he had been aid-
ing the Allies, and that he submit his case to the Allied authorities
in Bern. Lieutenant Pucci explained the matter to Miss Dodson who
was able to assure him that some favorable solution would he found.
A few days later Pucci again spoke to the Attache who indicated
that the members of the Italian Legation were quite pessimistic re-
garding his chances of returning to Italy. Ghilia thought there were
only two possibilities: a statement by some Allied authority that Pucci
was working for them; or an Allied declaration that he was a supporter
of the Allies and that his return to Italy would be useful to them.121
"Copy of the contract (in French) item 29 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."
12" Memorandum by Pucci, undated, but written some time between 15 May
and 24 May 1945, item 16 R, File, "Edda Ciano Diaries."
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It was Allen Dulles who represented the Allied authorities as far
as Pucci was concerned and it was Cordelia Dodson who on 24 May
got from him his most interesting account regarding his help to Edda
Ciano and in preserving Galeazzo Ciano's diaries.122 Apparently the
intervention of Allen Dulles was promptly forth coming and effective.
Not long afterwards Pucci returned to Italy and he himself published
the first accounts of his key role in saving the Ciano diaries.
Edda Ciano also returned to Italy not long after Pucci. In June
there was some press agitation in Switzerland against her presence,
and her name was linked with others whose Fascist political activities
had been notorious: Alfieri, Volpi, Bastianini. But the Swiss, despite
the wars of their neighbors, have preserved a humane tradition. They
did not wish to force Edda Ciano across the border into Italy if such
action would result in her maltreatment or death. They asked if the
Americans would accept delivery and assure her safety. Some sort
of assurances seem to have been offered, and at the end of August
Countess Edda was consigned to Allied authorities by the Swiss guards
at the frontier. The Risorgimento Liherale (Rome) of 31 August told
something of her life in Switzerland, "including her alleged marriage
to an Italian diplomat named Pucci and her confinement in Swiss
sanitarium. Story concludes with report of Italian semi-official com-
munique which has announced she might return to Italy safely and
had nothing to fear from Italian or Allied authorities."123
For almost a year Edda was confined on Lipari Island, but without
serious suffering or even real hardship. It was a very different: kind
of imprisonment from that which her father had inflicted on the anti-
Fascists whom he confined on that island. On 20 and 21 September
1945 she gave some interviews to two Italian and three American
journalists. She mentioned that she was reading the "Mem oriale
Pucci" which was being published in the Giornale di Sicilia, and on
being questioned she declared that Pucci's published account was
'r` Covering memo by Cordelia Dodson to Mr. Dulles, 24 May 1945, item 15 R;
Covering letter, Pucci to Mr. Dulles, Bern, 24 May 1945, item 17 FL, File,
"Edda Ciano Diaries."
' Bern telegram No. 3203, 16 June 1945 (740.0011EW/6-1645 Top Secret);
Departmental telegram to Bern, No. 2127, 28 June 1945 (740.0011EW/6-1645
Top Secret); Caserta telegram No. 3369, 24 August 1945 (740.0011EW/'8-2445
Secret) ; Rome press telegram No. 2527, 31 August 1945 (865.00/8-3145 Plain),
Central Files, Department of State.
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completely accurate and truthful. She declined, however, to reveal the
name of "Signor X," explaining that if Pucci had not wished to
mention it, she herself would not do so.124
We can infer that Edda Ciano managed to keep some contact with
Frau Beetz. She told the newspaperman:
"Signor X is a German who is now in an Allied concentration camp and
the Allies know his name. He is perhaps the one German who is human."'
Countess Edda "reverted frequently" during her talk with the news-
papermen to the memory of her husband, and eulogized him. "We all
asked ourselves why this woman, who for so many years openly showed
an extraordinary indifference to the conjugal bonds, should now in-
stead he so bound up by his memory. Was this a true sentiment or
only pretense?" 128
On 2 July 1946 the newspapers in Rome announced that Countess
Ciano had been granted her full freedom; she was released by the
Ministry of the Interior from confinement on Lipari and freed to move
about and act on her own free will.121
During her stay on Lipari Island Countess Edda had kept up some
correspondence with Marchese Pucci, as she mentioned to the news-
papermen in September 1945.128 The rumors that she would marry
Pucci persisted into 1947.129
Franz Beetz, as we have noted earlier, had been able to regain,
directly or indirectly, the two booklets of the diaries of Count Ciano
covering the years 1937 and 1938, the booklets which in January 1944
had been left at the clinic in Ramiola. Whether Frau Beetz was able
to hold the originals, or merely to hide photostats or microfilms of
these two notebooks after the final collapse of Nazi Germany is not
clear. But the texts of Ciano's notations for 1937 and 1938 were re-
"" Jader Jacobelli, "Sono stato a Lipari e ho parlato con Edda," Il Giornale del
Mattino, Rome, 21 September 1945, news cutting enclosed in Rome Despatch
No. 2346, 25 September 1945 (865.00/9-2545) Central Files, Department of State.
" Ibid.
1. Ibid., 22 September 1945.
" New York Times, item 14, Rome, 2 July 1946, File "Lanfranchi-Mussolini IV."
'Jader Jacobelli, op. cit. (21 September 1945).
'" Newscutting, "Edda Ciano to wed friend of late husband," Paris, 11 Sep-
tember 1947, item 11, File "Lanfranchi-Mussolini IV."
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stored to Edda Ciano prior to their publication in 1948. We read in
the introduction:
"Of the seven notebooks. . . , Edda Ciano . . . was able to bring with her
only five, and precisely those of 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943, which
were edited two years ago by Rizzoli of Milan. Having learned that only
those notebooks had been taken into Switzerland, to a secure place, and
that the other two, which were of exceptional importance, had been left at
the clinic where Edda had rested, the SS were charged to find them. The
doctor of the clinic, to whom these notebooks had been entrusted, con-
signed them under threat of death, to the Reich police who demanded them.
From that time on, until a year ago, there was no word of these diaries of
the years 1937 and 1938, and it was thought that they had disappeared for
good. Instead, they were in the hands of a third party, and their fortunate
recovery permits us today to make them known to the public in their en-
tirety." 18?
The "Rose Garden" Papers in Washington
Allen Dulles' trip to Ramiola at war's end was a complete dis-
appointment as far as concerned "the chocolates." The Sicherheitsdienst
had got there first. They had picked up the diaries for 1937-1938, the
bound volume marked "Germania," and the jewels and personal be-
longings of Countess Edda. But this, was not the last round.
In May 1945 came the Wehrmacht's total defeat and unconditional
surrender. Germany as a state ceased for a time to exist. Teams of
Allied experts swarmed over the country searching for government
archives; intelligence agents ferreted out Nazi leaders and got ac-
counts of their activities which could be used in the war criminal
trials at Nuremberg; Special Counterintelligence (SCI) groups sought
out the members of the Sicherheitsdienst and of the RSHA. On 30
June Mr. Dulles received word via London that the SCI detachment
in Germany 131 had picked up Frau Beetz, who had mentioned some-
18? Ciano, 1937-38 Diario, p. xvii.
181 The SCI detachments were OSS elements. In Germany they were under
command of the then Lt. Col. Andrew H. Berding, who was immediately under
Allen Dulles. Lawrence E. de Neufville, who picked up Frau Beetz, was a
civilian in Berding's Berlin detachment.
The author interviewed Mr. Berding on 28 November 1967, but he was able
to add nothing about Frau Beetz. Ile had refrained from keeping any personal
records; he did not remember her; there was such a press of work that only with
difficulty could they keep up the day's tasks. He commented that as the flood of
reports and intelligence swept in, they hoped and imagined that some fine day
some one in Washington would carefully sort the material out. I said that I was
trying to do just that for a small fraction of the materials with which I was
familiar, but was encountering difficulties.
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thing about having Ciano's diaries for his tenure of office. The message
did not seem clear. In reply it was explained that the diaries for 1939
to 1943 had been obtained some months earlier, but that the diary
for 1937-1938 and the memoranda which Ciano prepared for Mussolini
had been seized by the SD; if Frau Beetz could give any clue regard-
ing these missing documents it would be of great interest. Four days
later, on 6 July, the report reached Allen Dulles that his detachment
in Germany had obtained from Fran. Beetz in German translation the
memoranda of Ciano as Foreign Minister. The detachment had sent
them on to the Documents Center of 12th Army Group Headquarters.132
It was almost a year later that the Department of State received
official information about Ciano's supporting papers. In May 1946
Ambassador Murphy 133 informed the Secretary of State:
"I have the honor to report the information that complete copies of
Ciano's records of conferences of Hitler, Mussolini and Ribbentrop, and all
telegraphic and letter correspondence between Hitler and Mussolini were
discovered by SCI detachment in May 1945. They were obtained from Hilde-
garde Beetz, a German SD agent assigned to Ciano while he was in jail
in Verona. The documents in question were sent to the document center,
12th Army Group and then transmitted to War Department. I understand
that in one of the file indexes is the name of Beetz.
"Further information concerning these documents can be obtained from
Lawrence E. De Neufville who originally obtained the documents from
1rau Beetz. . . :.'$`
The author first heard of this collection on 13 January 1947, being
at the time the head of the Mediterranean Section, Historical Office
of the War Department (since redesignated Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, or OCMH). At lunch on
that day Professor Raymond J. Sontag, then on leave from Berkeley
and serving as Editor-in-Chief of the Documents on German Foreign
Policy 1918-1945, mentioned that he had learned of this most interest-
'A= Telegram London to Bern, 29 June 1945, Item 7 L; Telegram to London,
2 July 1945, item 6 L; Telegram London to Bern, Item 4 L; File "Edda Ciano
Diaries."
"The various teams of experts which gathered up the German Foreign Office
archives and began their microfilming operated as members of the staff of Robert
Murphy.
" Despatch No. 3614, Berlin, 21 May 1946, 840.414/5-2146 Secret, Central
Files, Department of State.
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ing find, possibly from the report, possibly from Ambassador Murphy
directly.135
The next day I first telephoned and then sent a memorandum to
Major Seeley, War Department General Staff, describing the papers
on the basis of what I had been told by Professor Sontag, and asking
that they be transferred to the Historical Office. My memorandum
mentioned that
"Ciano also kept certain materials, reports and memoranda in addition to
the diary-materials which constitute a kind of appendix for the diary as
published. The materials were seized by the Germans during their occupation
of Rome and were translated from Italian into German by a woman em-
ployed by the German Foreign Office. While making this translation this
woman made an extra copy of the translation for herself which she buried
in a rose garden.. . :.
Major Seeley promptly sent the material but I was not able, at that
time, to learn much more about its acquisition than I had been told
by Professor Sontag.
The papers consisted of a couple of bundles of loose sheets of carbon
copies in German, without an index or table of contents. Because of
the method of their acquisition there was a presumption of authenticity
of the documents. After examining the materials the author became
convinced that they were genuine, chiefly for two reasons: many of
the accounts of conversations comprised in the collection tallied pre-
cisely with references in the published Ciano diaries to full records
kept elsewhere; and scattered among the sheets of German carbon
copies were a few stray items of Italian originals.137
'I wrote to Professor Sontag on 10 August 1964, asking if he could tell me
how he first learned of this collection. In his reply of 21 August 1964 he stated
that he could no longer remember the circumstances of his learning of these
papers. (Personal Files).
" Memorandum for Major Rudolph G. Seeley, WDGS, 14 January 1947;, copy
in Personal Files.
13' "Verbale del colloquio a Palazzo Venezia tra it Duce, von Ribbentrop e it
ministro Ciano," Roma 28 ottobre 1938-XVII, item 2, 1938, revised paging 007-010;
"Appunto, Salisburgo, 12 agosto [19391 XVII, item 11, 1939, revised paging
044-046;
"Verbale del colloquio del Duce con von Ribbentrop presenti Eccellenze Ciano,
Alfieri e Mackensen," 19 settembre 1940-XVIII, not listed as a separate item,
initial paging pp. 196-199;
"Colloquio Ribbentrop-Ciano, Sch6nhof," 4 novembre '40, not listed as a sepa-
rate item, initial paging 223-224.
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY The Ciano Papers
I arranged the papers in chronological order, and numbered the
pages with a stamping machine. I then prepared an index or table
of contents of the papers initially sent to me which comprised:
4 items for 1939 (pp. 1-31) ;
56 items for 1940 (pp. 32-254) ;
:32 items for 1941 (pp. 261-393) ;
19 items for 1942 (pp. 394-469) ;
6 items for 1943 (pp. 470-490).
In the Historical Office, War Department, we wondered what to call
this collection. I had understood from Professor Sontag that it was
dug up out of a rose garden and we dubbed it the "Ciano Papers:
Rose Garden." The name stuck. This is the designation usually used
in the citations to this material in the Historical Office, now Office of
the Chief of Military History.138
Having put the materials in shape for our use we then received
a bunch of additional sheets: some material for 1938; and a great
deal for 1939. The integration of this additional material required
a re-numbering of the pages and the preparation of a revised index
which now showed:
4 items for 1938 (pp. 1-13) ;
108 items for 1939 (pp. 14-290) ;
56 items for 1940
(pp. 297-519);
:32 items for 1941
(pp. 520-652);
19 items for 1942
(pp. 653-728);
6 items for 1943
(pp. 729-749).
The index for the revised paging lists two of the Italian original
texts as separate items. Hence the total number of documents is 223.139
Professor Sontag in the spring of 1947 arranged for the State Depart-
ment to borrow the material from the War Department and to have it
microfilmed.140
" See Albert N. Garland and Howard McCaw Smyth, Sicily and the Sur-
render of Italy (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965),
p. 34, note 21;
George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Wash-
ington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), p. 4, footnote 5.
Cf. footnote 137 above.
Assistant Secretary of State J. H. Hilldring to Howard C. Peterson, Assistant
Secretary of War, 8 April 1947, copy in files of the Historical Office, Department
of State.
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Thus the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden" was assimilated into the
collection of microfilms of the German War Documents Branch of
the Historical Office, Department of State. A copy of the microfilm
was sent to J. W. Wheeler-Bennett who at the time was British Editor-
in-Chief of the Documents on German Foreign Policy and thus a copy
of the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden" became available at the Public
Record Office.
The carbon copies of the German translations made by Frau ]Beetz
with the few, stray Italian originals were held in the Office of the
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army for 22 years. In
January 1969 they were turned over to the National Archives, which had
assumed the succession to the German Military Documents Section. 140a
These carbon sheets bear the revised page numbers 1-749. The
crossed out page numbers reflect the revision which I made when the
additional items were received at OCMH. The microfilm is held in the
National Archives, listed as Reel No. 4597 in the great series of films
made by the German War Documents Project, the series designated
Microcopy T-120. The film is complete and gives the 223 documents.
But I have no way of proving whether or not the collection comprises
all of the supporting papers which Count Ciano originally set aside
in his office in Rome.
One or two more descriptive comments. Throughout most of the
materials there is merely the notation at the end of each document:
"iibersetzt." For the last two items of the collection, items 5 and 6
for the year 1943, on pages 742 and 749 respectively, is to be found
the typewritten note "ubersetzt" followed by the signature "Beetz."
The handwritten, arabic numbers enclosed in circles are in my writ-
ing, added when I listed the documents by year. The other series
of numbers and letters, such as "7-y" (p. 007) or "7-x" (p. 004) were
on the papers when they reached OCMH and apparently were nota-
tions made by Frau Beetz. It appears that she made some retouches
on the materials on turning them over to the Americans. We find such
140' By letter of transmittal dated January 16, 1969, Col. H.A. Schmidt, Chief,
Historical Services Division, OCMH, to the Archivist of the United States. (Memo-
randum for the Record, National Archives, February 25, 1969).
GMDS was initially succeeded by the Captured Records Section of the Depart-
mental Records Branch, TACO, which in turn became the World War II Records
Division of the National Archives and later evolved into the Modem Military Rec-
ords Division, NA.
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USE The Ciano Papers
notations as the following and in English: p. 196, "This is separated
from the sheet that should go with it. Translator;" p. 223, "Italian
version;" p. 245, "List of necessary raw materials;" p. 484, "Separated
from the sheets that belong with it. Translator."
Most of the letters and memoranda of conversations which are
recorded in German translation in the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden"
appeared in the Italian original in the book, L'Europa verso la
catastro f e. This work was published in Italy in January 1948 by the
firm Arnoldo Mondadori, and was promptly translated into French and
English.140b But there was not one word in the Italian work or in the
French or English translations regarding the provenance of these
documents.
Beyond all shadow of a doubt, these Italian texts came from the
collection of documents known as the Lisbon Papers. These had been
sent out of Rome by plane by the Foreign Minister Raffaele Guariglia
and hidden in the safe of the Italian Legation in Lisbon in the summer
of 1943. In 1946 these papers were demanded by the United States
Government under terms of the Armistice. They were delivered to
Washington and microfilmed, and the originals were restored to the
Italian Government in May 1946.140c Only the Italian Government
itself would have been able to arrange this publication. These original
Italian texts confirm overwhelmingly the authenticity of the "Ciano
Papers: Rose Garden."
But the collections are not identical. There are at least a couple of
cases, however, of texts which are to be found in the "Ciano Papers:
Rose Garden" which do not appear in the Italian Cabinet Archives
or in the published version of Ciano's Diplomatic Papers. Thus we have
given the draft of the secret protocol dated Hendaye, 23 October 1940
but which clearly is Ciano's modified version which he had on 3-4
'"?" Les archives secretes du conte Ciano 1936-1942, Traduction de Maurice
Vaussard (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1948); Ciano's Diplomatic Papers. Edited by
Malcolm Muggeridge (Long Acre, London: Odhoms Press, Ltd., 1948).
""Cf. p. 73, footnote 79a.
'"t Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, vol. XI (Wash-
ington, 1960) Editors' Note pp. 466-467.
The German text was initially published by Donald S. Detwiler, Hitler, Franco
and Gibraltar: Die Frage des spanischen Eintritts in den zweiten Weltkriege
(Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1962) pp. 118-119 and is now available in
Akten zur Deutschen Auswartigen Politik 1918-1945, Serie D, Band XI, 1 (Bonn:
Gehr. Hermes, 1964) pp. 394-395.
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November 1940 at Schonhof.141 What we printed in Washington is an
English translation from an enlargement ("blow-up") of a microfilm
made from a carbon copy of a German translation of an Italian d',ocu-
ment, the original of which had disappeared. 142 We also printed
Ciano's minute of 8 December 1940 which is not found elsewhere.143
We can now summarize the relationship between the Italian cabinet
archive-the so-called "Lisbon Papers," the printed selections pub-
lished under the title L'Europa verso la catastro f e, and the "Ciano
Papers: Rose Garden." We can have no doubt of the authenticity of
the Lisbon Papers because of our precise knowledge of their origin,
travels, filming and restitution. They are in fact the Cabinet archives,
and are by far the largest of these collections. The printed book pre-
sents only a portion of the Lisbon Papers, and in a few cases the
complete texts have not been reproduced. The duplication of many
of the same documents in the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden" only
clinches the argument for their authenticity. They survive in transla-
tion only. The original Italian copies were destroyed in Germany.
Probably the collection is not complete. They are, however, the
genuine "Ciano's Diplomatic Papers." They are what he himself set
aside to accompany his diaries.
"'But surely this is as close to the vanished original as is the reconstructed
text, for example, of the "Defensor Pacis" to that missing original manuscript,
as edited by Richard Scholz, Marsilius von Padua De f ensor Pacis (Hanover:
Hansche Buchhandlung, 1932-33). See particularly the Introduction, pp. v-lxx.
1.. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D., vol. XI, docu-
ments No. 477, footnote 7, p. 823. (German text, op. cit., Band XI. 2, 686)..
See also Series D, Vol. XII No. 17, footnote 7 (p. 30).
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