STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 18 No. 1, Spring 1974]

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25X1 Approved For Red 4~1~1' ~1~~1\ ~1 C VOL. 18 NO. 1 SPRING 1974 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ;ARCHIVAL RECORS 25X1. PLEASE RETURN TO AGENCY ARCHIVES, BLDG. Approved Fob 3194A000400d''~~010-b4 $ $ Approved For Release ~ SECURITY PRECAUTIONS Materials in the Studies are in general to be reserved to US per- sonnel holding appropriate clearances. The existence of this journal is to be treated as information privy to the US official community. All copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered serially and subject to recall. 25X1 25X1 All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of tFie authors. They do not necessarily represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other component of the intelligence community. Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A0~0400010010-0 Approved For Rel STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE EDITORIAL POLICY Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, operational, or historical aspect o f intelligence. The final responsibility for accepting or refecting an article rests with the Editorial Board. The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion o f the Board, the article makes a contribution to the literature o f intelligence. Additional members of the Board are drawn from other GIA components. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP7~BT03194A000400010010-0 Approved For Release 2d (;ontributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 2E49, Hq. ~ and need not be coordinated or sub- mitted through channels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced. the original on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified through Secret. Periodic supplements, separately distributed, can accommodate articles of higher classifications. For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office dissemina- tion center or the responsible Central Reference Service des For back issues and on other questions, call the Office of the Editor. THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AND SHERMAN KENT AWARDS An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the Studies. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional $500 is ,available for other prizes. Lxcept as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of the Studies' purview, as defined in its masthead, will he considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive origi- nality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies editorial board and staff are of course excluded from the competition. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision. 25X1 25X1 25X1.. 25X1 Approved For Release 2085/02/17:CIA-RDP78T03194A0~0400010010-0 25X1 gpproved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010010-0 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010010-0 Approved For (Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T0~194A000400010010-0 CONTENTS Page The Case of Major X ...................................... Hans Moses 1 From the double agent's viewpoint. (SECRET No FOREIGN DISSEIvi ) Masterman Revisited ............................... A. V, Knobelspiesse 25 Another look at double agent deception. (SECRET ) Vietnam in Retrospect ................................ Ellsworth Bunker 41 An address at CIA by Ambassador Bunker. (CONFIDENTIAL ) CHURCHWAY, SNOOPY, MAD, et al ................................ 49 Morris V. Baxter Jr., and Curtiss L. Olson The computers close in. (SECRET ) Intelligence in Recent Public Literature ................................ 61 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T031 ~4A000400010010-0 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A0004(~~~'~~10-0 No Foreign , Dissem From the double agent's viewpoint: THE CASE OF MAJOR X "Now it can be told: the biggest spy story since the Alger Hiss (tease. It concerns the Russian spies who were ...TRAPPED AT THE WASHINGTON MONUMENT." That is how Jack Anderson and Fred Blumenthal, then known as the principal associates of the late Drew Pearson, captioned a feature story published in Parade Magazine on 6 January 1957. Theirs was probably the most interesting of the various stories on the same topic that had begun to appear in the press some three years earlier. In January 1953, two American residents of Vienna, Austria, Kurt Ponger and Otto Verber, had been arrested on espionage charges, and Yuriy Novikov, a Soviet diplomat accredited to Washington and linked to therm in the indictment, had been declared persona non grata. Six months after their arrest, Ponger and Verber had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced to jail. Thus there had been no need for a trial, and most of the events leading to the legal climax were never disclosed. Anderson and Blumenthal had set out to provide part of the missing back- ground, and, perhaps, to dispel some of the mystery. For introductory purposes, their account is worth summarizing here. They related how Ponger, once an inmate of Nazi jails, had fled in 1939 to America, where two years later he met two fellow refugees, Otto Verber and his attractive sister Vera. In World War II, both men had enlisted in the U.S. Army, where Verber rose to the rank of Second Lieutenant and Ponger to Staff Sergeant. Both had maneuvered them- selves into Army intelligence assignments, and later wangled jobs as interpreters at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, where they made contact with a professional spy. In 1948, Ponger married Vera Verber, who had meanwhile worked for a red spy ring in England. Ponger opened a press agency in Vienna, and Verber helped by carrying the photographer's bag. In 1949, as Parade put it, Verber made one mistake: he solicited information from a U.S. Air Force officer- "Major X"-who happened to be acounter-intelligence officer. The major's superiors instructed him to play along. This, the authors noted, was a delicate assignment; both spies had been trained by our own Army intelligence; both had served as interrogators at the war crimes trials; both had started by learning to parry questions in concentration camps. But "Major X" turned out to be their match. Ponger and Verber, masterminded by the scheming Vera, were duped into thinking he was an easy mark, and paid him in old untraceable $20 bills for carefully phonied "secret" defense documents. "Major X," meanwhile, watching the spy ring over a period of four years, discovered that Ponger and Verber were only links in a spy network that reached all the way across the Atlantic into the Soviet Embassy in the United States. He thereupon doctored some seemingly vital documents which Verber and Ponger found so MORI/HRP from pg. 01-24 SEC~~broved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010b10-0 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010010-0 SECRET Double Agent exciting that they arranged for "Major X" to carry them personally to their contact in Washington. `Chun, on a balmy April evening in 1951,* "Major X" passed his doctored data at the Washington Monument to a mysterious Russian who turned out to be a Soviet diplomat. The scene might have been staged in Hollywood, the authors abserved; but the only cameras aimed at the meeting were operated by FBI agents hidden in the vicinity. Surveillance continued for two more years. Finally, when counter-intelligence had learned enough about the spy ring, they arrested Verber and Ponger and sent the Soviet diplomat packing. 1 1.7ad a far more than ordinary interest in the Anderson-Blumenthal version of the events for, unbeknownst to the authors, I was the man they had dubbed "Major X." Thus I venture to call my own reminiscences of the operation "The Case of Major X," even though I do have a name, and I have never been a major. Like Ponger and Verber, I had left Europe in the late 1930s, and during and after World War II served in the infantry and in U.S. Army intelligence. In 1949, when the story began, I was a civilian employee of an air intelligence unit of the U.S. Army, not an Air Force officer. ':Che Parade story needs correction and elaboration in many other respects, if we are to view the case as intelligence officers rather than as magazine readers. Firstly, it was not a matter of one man's exploits against the Soviet spy system; it was a story of teamwork on one side against teamwork on the other. Secondly, it was not a sequence of romantic adventures. Even though it had its share of excitement for the participants, it was mainly a grim and tedious operation, with more than a fair share of disappointment and frustration, which brought me as close to a breakdown as I would ever want to come. Thirdly, it was not a story of superior planning crowned by success; it was rather a tale of trial and error, with only partial successes. hinally, it was not an operation run under perfect conditions, thoroughly supported by all security organs, to the undimmed benefit of the nation's security interests; it was a matter of give and take, of risk and compromise, and, I think, of well-suited as well as misapplied security considerations. 'this raises a number of questions, among them the following: 1. Were American personnel, including myself, properly prepared for the method of approach used by Soviet agents? 2. Was the U.S. Government sufficiently well equipped and organized l~or this type of operation? 3. How, if at all, could we have gained more than we did? 'Chose and related matters have long been debated by participants in the "Major X" case, and by others who have studied and analyzed it. It has been and continues to be a useful debate. My contribution to it can be made most informatively, I believe, in the form of an abbreviated chronological review. *Parade evidently overlooked the fact that this date would not have allowed the afore- mentioned "four years" of observation. Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100~~~ET Doutil~r~ivenfFor Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A0004(~iECl~ET10-0 9 My account of these experiences is being offered here in print for the first time. Although I have provided some comments, it is my hope that the story for the most part will speak for itself. Background Of the two individuals mentioned, I came to know Verber much better, but I actually metPonger first. In November 1946, when I was aboard ship headed for Europe, Ponger was one of my co-passengers. Like myself, he had been hired as a civilian government employee. I heard from others aboard the shhip that he had a distinguished combat record with the Office of Strategic Services. Only once did I have any occasion to talk to him alone. At that time, he askc;d me if I intended ever to return to the United States. When I expressed my surprise at such a question, he informed me that he himself would never go back. What little he owed to the United States, he said, he had paid back a hundred times. The only ties he had anywhere bound him to Austria, where his family had once owned property which he would try to recover. This was the last talk I had with Ponger for a number of years. Should it have given me a clue as to his real state of mind? Perhaps it should have. The fact remains that it did not. It appeared to indicate no more than an odd sort of attitude. I saw both Ponger and Verber in 1947, when I was assigned to the war crimes trials in Nuremberg where both of them worked as interrogators. Here I had no private contact with either of them, and the only observation I made was that Verber wrote good concise interrogation reports, whereas Ponger produced practically none at all. It is indeed possible, as Parade says, that they made contact with a professional spy there. If so, the fact is that no one seemed to know, or take notice. My first more personal contact with Verber was made some time in 1948 in Vienna, where I had taken a civilian job with an air intelligence unit of the U.S. Army. Verber, originally a Viennese, had arrived in his old home town as a student under the G.I. Bill and, I heard, also intended to go into t:he news business with Ponger, his brother-in-law. Verber occupied a house in the American sector in Vienna; Ponger lived in the Soviet sector. In the months that followed, Ponger kept very much in the background. Verber I met at first casually. After I invited him, equally casually, to look me up same time, I was surprised when late in 1948 he paid me an unscheduled visit at the office, getting past the Austrian receptionist's desk by introducing himself as an old friend of mine. I found him extremely curious about two escaped Soviet flyers who had landed in Austria. Inasmuch as the story had just been published in the Austrian press, however, his curiosity seemed explainable. There followed a period of social contact with Verber and his wife. Nothing remarkable seemed to happen during those days. The Verbers did their level best to teach us how to play bridge, but never quite succeeded. It may be signifi- cant that he maintained this kind of contact for several months without asking for information. SE~I~roved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100310-0 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010010-0 SECRET Double Agent First Phase: The Approach IIe made a different approach, however, in June 1949, when my family and I had returned to Austria from home leave. We were sitting in Verber's garden in the beautiful Viennese sunshine, sipping cool drinks and thinking everything was all right in the world, when Verber asked to talk to me privately. Broaching the subject of anti-Semitism in general, he charged that the U.S. Government was actually engaged in furthering anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi pur- poses. As examples, he mentioned former Nazi technicians and scientists, who normally would have been considered war criminals, and who now were being sent under secret contracts to the United States. Informants of American intel- ligence agencies in many cases were also former Nazis, he said. I could help the cause of anti-Nazism if I could give him the names of such people as they might become available to me in the course of my duties. When I asked him how someone like myself could separate Nazis from non-Nazis, he told me I could Ieave that to him; as long as I gave him the names, he could find the criminals. When I wanted to know what he proposed to do about them once he knew their names, Verber said he could get the Israeli government to launch official protests. He had the necessary contacts, lZe said. I would like to point out here how carefully Verber adjusted his approach to what he thought were my points of vulnerability. He did not try to persuade me to work for the Soviet Union or for Communism; that evidently would not have worked. Instead, he tried to take advantage of the fact that I was a Jew, an anti-Hitlerite, and a former employee of the war crimes trials. In effect, by implying that if there was any government involved it was Israel, he was using the classic recruitment tactic of the "false flag approach." T.aunching the Operation t1s it happened, his judgment was not very sound. I left him with the impression that I was going to think about his proposition, and I did think about it. In fact, on the very next working day, I invited my entire office staff to help me think. At least one of them had the idea that Verber might, con- sciously or unconsciously, be working for the Soviet Union. Accordingly, we checked his file at the counter-subversive section that same morning. There was, we found, no information on him, but quite a bit on his brother-in-law Ponger. There was enough reason far me to make a written report of the incident. I did this with mixed feelings, and requested that I be allowed to Stay away from Verber in the future. [:f my request had been granted, there would be no story to tell. But after stn interval of a few days, I was asked through the local CIC office to stay in touch with Verber, and report on possible subversive activities. I agreed to cio what I could, especially since such an investigation seemed to have its intriguing possibilities. I then made my next appontment with Verber. [At this point, the 1949 Cold War atmosphere in Vienna is portrayed l,y a senior CIA operating officer who at the time was the senior U.S. ci- vilian air intelligence officer in Vienna, and the author's direct superior.] App,~oved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100~~ET DoublepAoe~d For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194AOOO~L~10-0 9 The visitor to contemporary Vienna will see little tangible retard beyond the Soviet Memorial in Schw~arzenberg Platt o f the city's mast recent military occupation:, nor sense anything o f the atmosphere o f sometimes lethal clandestine combat o f the first few years f o~llowing the end of military hostilities in 1945. Viewers of "The Third Man" may dismiss mention of the hazards of the "Soviet Era" of Vienna as fanciful melodramatics. But the Soviet troops, moving freely through- out the city, and in control of Europe from the Enns River far to the west, all the way to Siberia, were an inescapable reality to the Viennese. During this 1949s period in Vienna, people simply disappeared-a high police official, for example, or a government economics expert, on:e o f the few who eventually returned after years in Soviet prisons. In those years Soviet intelligence even succeeded in recruiting two American military policemen to abduct a Western agent (although this mystery was unsolved when the case o f "Major X" began.--all that was known was that another Austrian has disappeared totally, without trace). "Siberia" could he a present reality in the Vienna o f 1949. Or murder. Irving Ross, for instance, who was found brutally battered to death with. the jack handle o f his car, late at night, in the Soviet sector of Vienna on l November 1948. And there wwere to be others. In such an atmosphere, the risks which might be invodued in embarking upon a double agent operation against Soviet intelligence were clear to all concerned, most especially to the central figure, "Major X:' I count it my good fortune to have been one of those in the author's office staff . I recall the discussion vividly still, and remember distinctly my immediate visceral feeling that Verber~s pitch had the ring of authenticity. Here was no amateur proposal, but a real attempt, by what I (and all others privy to the case) assumed from the' outset u~as Soviet intelligence, to recruit a member o f the American intelligence staf f in Vienna. We had long realized, from Soviet defectors and from informa- tion gleaned through Army counter-intelligence informants, that the Soviets were actively seeking to penetrate the U.S. Headquarters in Vienna. Moreover, we were forced privately to concede the possibility that the Soviets had already managed to recruit operatives within our ranks. The wartime assignments o f Lt. Verber to Army intelligence and Sgt. Ponger to OSS rcere in themselves examples. The decision to undertake the case took into account from the outset the consider- ation that the Soviets might possess a formidable cross-check capability. Prospects for a successful double agent play were poor for other reasons, too. "Major X" was a member of the air intelligence staff, and therefore separated physically from the main Army intelligence compo- nents, G-2 and CIC, which were located in other buildings at some distance from the air staff. That air staff, however, as was well knor~rc in G-2 and CIC, was de facto a section o f G-2, responsible for evalu- ating specialized air intelligence information and serving requirements SECroved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010~10-0 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010010-0 SECRET Double Agent in its particular area upon all Army field collection units in Austria. That air intelligence sta f f comprised only four persons in 1949, when the case began. We thus faced the dilemma of persuading the Soviets, via Verber, that "Major X" had only limited access to intelligence in- formation, all the while knowing that many members of G-2 knew or would assume that this was not in fact sa. Nor was ozzr problem made any easier by the presence in Austria o f literally scores o f former civilian employees o f the Nuremberg war r_rimes trials staff . Hired by G-2 in Austria as interrogators o f the Austrian prisoners o f war returning from the USSR and Yugoslavia, many of these interrogators knew Verber, Ponger, and/or "Major X," rend we lzad no idea what the Soviets might be able to construe from even elicited remarks made innocently by former colleagues about "Major X" and his activities. O f course, not all these hazards were clearly perceived at the outset, but they quickly became evident. Yet the decision to engage in the double agent gambit, despite all, was not unsound viewed in th.e perspective of the times. A vague awareness that American intelligence in. Austria ivas a Soviet target was transformed, that April day in 1949, into a highly personal, direct, and tangible reality. One of ours had been approached by the Soviets, and was ready to use the opportunity to f r~,estrate and negate the Soviet effort. Throughout the overseas phase, those o f us engaged in the case were constantly cognizant of the psychological stress imposed upon "Major X." The difficulties we experienced in obtaining cleara~e far build-up material moved some o f the of fieers with responsibility far the case to a pessimistic estimate o f its viability. Some even. reached the flat conclusion that the Soviets had perceived the double play and u;ere laying a trap. (One o f the lessons I derived from this case was provided after his arrest by Verber, who stated he never had been suspieiaus of "Major X." What a help it was to us, at times, to haws Verber actively looking far plausible excuses to~ explain his agent's failure to produce!) In this atmosphere o f uncertainty about the real state o f the case, we countered what we regarded as a threat by a f airly sudden transfer to Salzburg, fended of f with what we hoped were plausible arguments t{ze importunings to meet "the General" in the Soviet Zone, and finally felt compelled to adopt the precipitous transfer device once again, rend sent our man back to the United States in early January 1951 to avoid the physical risk to him 2vhich we felt was real. All of this, o f course, was mast clearly evident to "Major X" him self . Still vivid in my memory is a telephone call i got from his wife on New Year's Day, 1951, asking me to meet her. "Major X" was even then, as our surveillance had confirmed, meeting with Ponger. She handed me the gun we had provided him, and explained that he had told her, in essence, that he was not afraid to meet Verber or Ponger, but was afraid to carry the gun, lest one of them somelww notice it and draw the proper inference. App~ved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100'~QRET Dou~~rcdgentFor Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A0004(~'~.10-0 Ta me, thus, the point is clear. This was a successful counter- espionage case, which achieved the goals o f exposing its Soviet intel- ligence backing and neutralizing th.e Soviet agents directly involved. There were many, many people involved in the support and', at times, non-support of the operation, but its success was the work of one man: "Mapor X:' Early Stages After having gotten my apparent agreement to work with him, Verber expressed great interest in having a "fundamental talk" with me, which would show him what kind of information I could get, and would enable him to ask me "more intelligent" questions. When the first meeting in my house was in prospect, I decided, rather than to depend on my own eyes and ears alone, to ask for the installation of listening devices. My quarters were not exactly designed for that sort of thing; we lived on the top floor of asix-family house, and had only Austrian neighbors, among them. a very curious housekeeper. The maid happened to be on vacation, however, and her room could be used. In it we locked a CIC agent, a secretary, and an enlisted man who ran a huge tape recorder. I maneuvered Verber onto a sofa with a microphone taped behind it, and he talked quite freely about what he wanted me to do. His requirements this time included one for names of employees of American intel- ligence agencies. The meeting lasted for several hours. Verber was so absorbed that he did not notice the noise when the microphone fell to the floor, and he paid no attention to my badly disguised attempts to enunciate my words care- fully. That effort was to no avail, anyhow, because the recorder failed to operate. After that, Verber. and I had frequent meetings, most of them. with a social flavor. We usually just separated from our wives, and conducted our business in a "private" room in one of our houses. At my home, listening devices were used regularly. On some occasions a photographer was placed on the back porch, where he could take pictures of Verber and myself. There was even a proposal to install atwo-way mirror in the wall-something to which I objected as I did not know how I could explain the hole in the wall to outsiders..As time went on, my wife became quite unhappy at the interference with her privacy, and the need to keep the children and the maid out of the way at specified times. Finally, when we were asked to transform. our maid's room. into a per- manently equipped observation post, she put her foot down, and government affairs had to move outside. Security During the first phase of the case, security precautions were somewhat problematic. As I noted earlier, a fairly large number of people, including my entire office staff, knew of the beginning of the operation. With a great deal of enthusiasm and, for my part, all the blessings and afflictions of inexperience, we made arrangements and decisions. A special problem was created for me by the people who knew both Verber and myself, as I had to ask myself in every case whether or not they could be trusted, whether they were in a position to know anything that would give me away, and to what extent I should treat each of them as a friend or a potential enemy. I sometimes compromised by SEC~pproved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010a10-0 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010010-0 SECRET Double Agent warning people to be careful with Verber and Ponger, without telling them about the operation. Fortunately, not too many people knew both sides well enough to cause real difficulty. Objectives and Methods As for the objectives in the case, they were largely self-conceived in the early stages. I determined my approach to Verber before each meeting, and displayed the attitude which I thought would be best suited to gain his confi- dence and at the same time attain results. We wanted to prove, first, that Verber actually was a foreign agent, find out which country he was working for, and discover the contacts he had and the operating methods he used. In order to break his story of Israeli connections, I pretended to be just as dissatisfied with the state of the world as he was, but indicated that Israel, to me, just was not the right solution. I thus displayed an ideological vacuum which I asked Verber to help me fill. In general, when he offered opinions or made requests, I tried to appear receptive but not too bright, and usually willing but not always able. Above all, I did my best to display a consistent attitude and have an expla- nation for everything I did, just in case it was observed. information to be passed to Verber was cleared for me through the CIC. As weeks turned into months, Verber wanted to know more and more. I had to help myself by pretending to get information from outside the office where I could not follow it up, and by describing my activities in the office as very limited, which made it impossible for me to observe. too much. One of the subjects of his inquisitiveness was the Central Intelligence Agency. He tried to find out who was representing it in Vienna, and what it did. I am afraid that I was not of much help to him there. t;onsidering how little guidance we had during this first phase, our efforts seemed to have splendid results. Verber appeared to believe that he was leading me on, and came somewhat closer to admitting his Soviet sympathies. I even induced him to admit, to the benefit of a secret tape recording, that in case of a war he would prefer to fight for the Soviet Union. Second Phase: Commitment Our own plans now became somewhat more ambitious. I was asked through intelligence channels whether I would consent to become along-range double agent, or whether-in' view of the danger to my family and myself-I wished to be excused. If I would go along, I was told, this would mean that the operation would become the foremost thing in my life, and that in effect I would have to eat, drink, and sleep with it. In return for this service, I was informed, I could virtually set my own conditions. What followed was very simple: I accepted, and made no conditions whatsoever. The working set-up now became more systematic, and security restrictions were tightened considerably. I could no longer discuss the progress of the case with just anyone in my office which, at times, was a bit uncomfortable. I also received more direct guidance on what I was supposed to accomplish, and how this was supposed to be done. The operation ~>as divided into prospective phases: I was sugposed to establish myself progressively more firmly in a spy Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010019E~RET Doub~~~~er~td For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000~~1~~010-0 system. which by now we all assumed to be Soviet; eventually, the operation was supposed to be transferred to Washington; and in the hoped-for final stage, was to be used to feed the Soviets false information. Initiatives and Problems One of the first requests I had to make under the new program was this: I had to ask Verber for money-a $5,000 bank account. When Verber declined, the request was changed to one for a monthly salary of $50. After some apparent hesitation, Verber seemed happy to comply. Altogether I collected about $300 from him in Vienna. He now needed a code name for me for use on his vouchers, so he called me, of all things, "Lindbergh,"-probably because I had once reported to him having met Charles Lindbergh at an air base in Bavaria. Verber con- tinually admonished me not to take the money too lightly, because it not only was a token of appreciation, but also represented the earnings of working I>eople. (For the time being, however, he still refused to tell me who his actual sponsors were. ) While Verber's pressure for information was still remarkably light after the first payment, it soon grew much more intense. We often did our talking in one of our cars, and I quite often carried listening devices in the car or on my person. My meetings sometimes led me into the Soviet sector, and once or twice to Ponger's home. In order to realize how uncomfortable that w,, were willing to drop some of their earlier reservations. My description of the new contact-about 30 years old, weighing about 200 pounds, with dark hair, round face, horn-rimmed glasses, and speaking with a guttural accent-seemed to fit someone they knew, although they could not be sure. At the FBI Field Office, I examined picture after picture. Finally I pointed to one showing a man walking in front of a building. This time there was no doubt. The man with whom Ponger had placed me in contact was Yuriy V. Novikov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. The FBI agent ixi charge of the case took me home after midnight. Tlie case had indeed begun, he said; the Bureau valued my services and was willing to pay for them. I declined. Although the FBI would undoubtedly not have seen it in the same light, it still would have given me the feeling that my services were for sale. The information I obtained as the by-product of a penetration attempt directed against the enemies of the United States was not a commercial item, to be paid for upon delivery. Job Problem If my contact with a Soviet official in Washington was, as it seemed to me, a tremendous thing, I failed to feel its effect in my relationship with the Air SECT'proved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001~b10-0 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000'~901~-0 SECRET I7ou a gent '~~"orce. As agreed, I started to work on about 20 April, although I was not scheduled to go on the payroll until 1 May. Just prior to 1 May, moreover, I eeceived word that I had not been properly processed, had not been cleared, and ~:ould not be allowed to work in the designated office until my papers had properly gone through channels. This was supposed to take a maximum of three >veeks-and it took exactly that. In the meantime, my available cash had dwindled to almost nothing, and all my earthly possessions were tied up in what I had a:ome to regard as the "Washington venture." At that time, I entertained serious +loubts that the Air Force would honor its commitment to employ me, or that I liad enough time to wait for the decision. I attempted and failed to find suitable ~;hort-term employment outside the government, and wondered how I would have explained an outside job to my Soviet contact without making him lose i~.terest in me. i?or the second and third weeks of May, fortunately, my anticipated Air Force salary was paid by the FBI. On 20 May, the Air Force finally opened its doors. 1 still had not been cleared, and my rating had been cut yet another notch, but it was a starting point. :V ext zYl ee~tings ~Yly next meetings with my Soviet contact were quite different from anything t had experienced overseas. He seemed to be interested mainly in avoiding possible surveillance. He never talked to me at the location where we met, and refused to talk in the car. Usually he drove me around for as long as an hour, going through a park, crossing main streets, suddenly stopping and reversing himself, and all the time watching for other vehicles. When he seemed to be r;atisried that no one had followed him, he parked in a spot quite distant from r~ur meeting place, and we both got out of the car and discussed our business while walking or standing out in the open. Afterward, he sometimes drove me to the vicinity of my own car, but more often told me to take a cab. He always ?;ave me the time and location of the next meeting before we started on the return trip, and also made careful arrangements for alternative meetings if we should happen to miss each other. I usually wrote the details down, but could never induce him to give me a sample of his handwriting. Subject of Meetings Novikov was as systematic in his approach toward my exploitation as he :vas in his anti-surveillance precautions. Right at the beginning, he informed me that he wanted to proceed "scientifically." First, he questioned me on my personal history and background, then on my associates in the office, and finally on my capability to provide information. t)ne of the first things I got cleared for him was my job description, which ~.tated, truthfully, that I was working on general interrogation requirements as swell as specific requirements on installations in the Soviet Union. Novikov im- ~nediately pounced on the latter and asked for as many details as possible. 9 Jnfortunately, it was subsequently decided that I could not give him such in- i'ormation, and I had to figure out a very intricate retreat, involving a change in my job description and a rearrangement of the functions attributed to other office personnel. Apli~ved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010(~GHET Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010010-0 Dou61e Agent SECRET Otherwise I had hardly any information for him at first. The fact that I had not been cleared served as a temporary explanation, although it was some- what difficult getting through a meeting with the pretense that :I knew absolutely nothing. Novikov, however, was surprisingly patient, and even coun- seled me to be patient too. He provided me with several hundred dollars;, which, as always, I immediately turned over to the FBI, and told me to be careful, as the time element was less important than the necessity for me to gain the confidence of my associates. I thus helped myself over the dismal present by making implied promises for a more productive future. At the same time, I tried to get Novikov to give some requirements, and to reveal something about himself and his superiors; I thought it would be in character for me to be curious about those things. Novikov, however, would only tell me that I was working for the benefit of the Soviet Union, and that information of interest to the USSR was more important to him than data pertaining to satellite countries. He advised me to use my own intelligence in determining what information would be of interest to the USSR. Beyond that, he never revealed anything-not even his own identity. Clearance Procedures In the early days, my official contact regarding all phases of the operation was confined to the FBI. After I had stalled Novikov for a while, I kept asking for the backlog of information which I thought I was supposed to receive. I was told that there was some delay, and that in the meantime I should collect the information myself and hand it to the FBI agent, who would hand it to the clearing body, which would pass it back to the FBI agent, who could then return the cleared items to me. For some time, that was actually the way it worked. As I had not yet received my clearance papers, however, I did not have a chance to do much collecting. I could merely use some items which I had accidentally seen or overheard, and I hated myself for handing them in. More to the point, that type of information was neither voluminous nor significant enough to satisfy my contact, especially because a fairly high percentage usually failed to get cleared. It was, I felt, an impossible situation. At one time, I asked the FBI whether it would not be better to have me transferred to a different agency, preferably G-2, where better working arrangements might be obtained. (I actually prepared Novikov for a potential change to a "different intelligence agency," whereupon he solicitously asked if, perhaps, I meant the Central Intelligence Agency. ) Finally, after some additional pressure, the Air Force came through with my full clearance for the job, which helped the case as well as my morale. I had to continue to collect my own information, however, and have it cleared by the somewhat cumbersome procedure I outlined earlier. Usually I got my items back so shortly before I was scheduled to meet Novikov that there seemed to me to be too little time to clear up debatable points, weave the items into a fitting cover story, and make my way to the meeting place. In addition, items once cleared were occasionally withdrawn later. I was also told to volunteer nothing and to give as little as possible, but instead to get Novikov to tell me what he wanted. SECA~i~roved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001Q~10-0 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010010-0 :iECRET Double Agent My FBI contacts in those days gave me the impression that they appreciated any difficulties, but could do little about them. After all, the FBI also had to =wait for the items to be cleared. I was encouraged to do the best I could with what I had. In retrospect, I can appreciate that my view of the goals of the operation at that time may not have coincided with the concepts of those who were setting the policy. At any rate, eventually I wrote a memorandum, t~ointing out what I thought were the flaws in the working set-up, expressing any conviction that they were endangering the operation, and making several +~oncrete proposals, including one for direct contact between me and the responsible organs of the Air Force. The memorandum was directed to, and =,vidently vigorously supported by, the FBI. A short time later, I was called into a joint conference of Air Force and FBI representatives. From then on, 1 had my own Air Force case officers, two senior colonels, whose efforts in my behalf and in behalf of the operation I came to appreciate, especially when it became evident to me that they were working with very limited resources. i'olicy To me, the purpose of the operation had seemed quite clear overseas, but it was less clear in the United States. I knew, of course, that Novikov's identi- a'ication had been useful to the FBI, and that the operation could help them to +dentify some of his associates. I received no explicit guidance, however, as to the Type of information I was supposed to provide, or what I was supposed to ,accomplish with it. Later, I heard that there was a policy to keep the case going with a minimum of information. (This would be in keeping, of course, with a