VOLGOGRAD SAM COMPLEX C21-5 DEPLOYED AAA/SAM FACILITIES USSR OCTOBER 1968

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T04563A000100010053-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: October 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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ti m er n rpretation Report
NATIONAL
PHOTOGRAPHIC
INTERPRETATION
CENTER
YOLGOGRAD SAM COMPLEX C21.5
DEPLOYED AAA/SAM FACILITIES
USSR
OCTOBER 1968
Declassification by FA,DoD
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COPY NO.1.02
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Volgograd SAM Complex C21-5
SAC. USATC 200, Sheet 0235-21HL, 4th ed, Mar 64, Scale 1:200,000 (SECRET)
ABSTRACT
Volgograd SAM Complex C21-5 is one of the eight complexes which together form the
southern barrier of SA-5 defenses of the USSR. This complex consists of a launch area
containing three launch sites, a tracking/ guidance facility, missile-handling and support
facilities, and an air warning radar facility. Although it was the eighteenth of the SA-5
complexes for which construction was initiated, the Volgograd complex was unique in
configuration and design when first observed. Its distinguishing features included the
heavily revetted launch positions and the subsurface electronic equipment shelters. Sub-
sequently, these features have been incorporated into a significant number of other SA-5
complexes. In addition, this is the first complex at which a low-level acquisition radar,
Squat Eye, has been identified. This radar in combination with an unidentified height
finder also present probably gives the air warning radar facility the capability of pro-
viding the necessary target data to cope with low-level penetration attempts.
Although the SA-5 missile has not yet been observed here, an operational capability
for the complex may be expected within the next 6 to 12 months.
INTRODUCTION
Volgograd SAM Complex C21-5 I is at 48-21-40N 044-17-32E, approxi-25X1
mately 22.5 nautical miles (nm) south-southwest of Volgograd, USSR. The complex is at
an elevation of approximately 350 feet above mean sea level and is oriented on an
azimuth of 150 degrees. The direction of fire is, therefore, to the southeast in the gen-
eral direction of Iran and Turkey and away from the city of Volgograd. This is the sec-
ond SA-5 complex deployed in the Caspian-Black Sea Area and the eighteenth complex
for which construction was started. The Volgograd SA-5 complex is now one of the
eight forming the southern barrier of SA-5 defenses of the USSR (Figure 1).
BASIC DESCRIPTION
Volgograd SAM Complex C21-5 was first observed in and was unique in de-25X1
sign and configuration among the 18 SA-5 complexes under construction at that time.
The complex is distinguished by its heavily revetted launch positions and subsurface
electronic equipment shelters. Subsequently, similar revetments have been. observed at
at least seven other complexes and, in varying form, electronic equipment shelters have
been observed throughout the system. In addition, association of a low-level acquisition
radar, Squat Eye, with the SA-5 system was first established at this complex.
The basic components of the complex are consistent with other SA-5 complexes and
include three launch sites, a tracking/ guidance facility, a missile-handling facility, a sup-
port facility, and an air warning radar facility. The operational components, launch sites
and radar facilities, are in a more advanced stage of construction than the support and
missile-handling facilities. The SA-5 missile has not yet been observed at this complex;
however, an operational capability for the complex may be expected within the next 6 to
12 months.
Table 1 presents a chronology of the complex development denoting the date signifi-
cant occurrences were first observed, and the measurements provided in this report are
accurate, unless otherwise noted, within plus or minus 5 feet or 2 percent, whichever is
greater.
NOTE: This is published as an Interim Basic Report in response to a COMIREX-approved requirement
and with concurrence of DIAAP-9.
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FIGURE 1. LOCATION OF VOLGOGRAD SAM COMPLEX C21-5.
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Launch Area
The launch area contains three launch sites designated A, B, and C, each consisting of
six revetted launch positions and a site control center (Figure 2). Construction of Site A
(Figure 3) has progressed more rapidly than that of either Site B or Site C. Launchers
are emplaced at the six positions of Site A and a missile-ready shelter appears to be ex-
ternally complete at position A6. Placement of missile dolly tracks has been completed
at only this position. Launchers are also emplaced at four positions of Site B and are
adjacent to the launch point at the other two positions. Six launchers are in the revetted
area of position C3. Two missile dollies are observed in the revetted area of both posi-
tions A4 and A5. Each of the site control centers consists of a subsurface electronic
equipment shelter with three van compartments. 1/ All launch positions are connected by
cables to their respective control centers and the control centers appear to be connected
by cables to each other. A cable also extends from each control center to the engage-
ment radar position associated with that site. These cables converge at a point north-
west of the launch area and then extend as a single line to the control center of the
tracking/ guidance facility. From here, the cables radiate to the engagement radar posi-
tions. An additional cable extends from the control center of Site C toward the tracking/
guidance facility. A tower or mast north of Site A is possibly associated with commu-
nications.
Tracking/Guidance Facility
The tracking/ guidance facility consists of three radar positions and a control center
(Figure 2). Engagement radars occupy each of the mounded radar positions. Surrounding
each of the radars is a circular foundation in diameter. At the most northwest- 25X1
ern position which is associated with Site B, the circular foundation has been covered,
thus leaving exposed only the upper portion of the engagement radar including the re-
flectors and feed. These foundations, rising 10 feet in height, probably serve to dissipate
wind pressure otherwise exerted against the surface area of the radar's lower compon-
ents. Other protective functions are obviously indicated. Electronic equipment shelters at
the radar positions include two van compartments.. At the control center, the shelter con-
tains six van compartments. The cable from the air warning radar facilit terminates at
this electronic equipment shelter. A probable communications mastigh and two 25X1
associated vans are northwest of the control center. u
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Missile-Handling and Support Facilities
Construction of the missile-handling and support facilities is somewhat less ad-
vanced than that of the operational components of the complex (Figure 2). A propellant
loading facility is under construction at the missile-handling facility. Two revetted pads,
J for the placement of fuel tanks are presently under con-
struction. Five horizontal tanks, each 30 by 5 feet, are adjacent to one pad and three
horizontal tanks, each are adjacent to the other. Between the two pads is a
buried to in diameter.
Three mad or uildings, 25 1
and the possible foundation for a thermal plant are noted at the support facility. Two of
these buildings are externally complete and numerous other buildings/ structures in-
cluding a security building are also present. Two buried tanks, each ~n diamet5X1
and similar to that previously mentioned at the missile-handling facility, are within the
vicinity of these buildings. Twelve radar transporter vans are parked southeast of the
support facility. These vans were probably used as transporters of the engagement radars.
A soccer field is between this facility and the launch area.
Air Warning Radar Facility
The air warning radar facility is approximately 4 nm north-northeast of the launch
complex (Figure 4). Present at the facility is the normal complement of two Back Net
and two Side Net radars. These radars are mounted on elevated positions and are con-
nected by cables to an equipment shelter with 11 van compartments.
An additional equipment shelter of similar design is 660 feet east of the four radars
described above. Adjacent to this shelter is a mast-mounted Squat Eye radar. This is the
first known association of a low-level acquisition radar with an SA-5 complex. A second
mast, probably to be used in a communications role, is also adjacent to the equipment
shelter. Both masts are 100 feet in height. Immediately north of the equipment shelter is
an unoccupied radar mound. Northeast of the shelter and connected to it by cable is an
unidentified height finder radar mounted on a van. This may be the radar that will
eventually occupy the mound mentioned above. The combination of the Squat Eye and
the height finder radars probably gives the facility the capability of providing necessary
target data for coping with low-level penetration attempts. Although no SA-3 site has
been observed in this area, the future identification of such a site in the vicinity of this
complex is highly probable.
Two unidentified associated areas are northeast of the air warning radar facility.
Three rectangular excavations are present at one of the areas while six similar excava-
tions are at the second. Association of these areas with the complex is based primarily
on their location and the date on which their construction was first observed. No sig-
nificant activity has been observed at these areas during the past 12 months. Their func-
tion has not yet been identified.
Table 1. Chronology of Complex Development
Activity
No construction activity
Initial construction
Construction of site control centers
Construction of tracking/guidance facility
Construction of launch positions
Air warning radar facility identified
Unidentified associated areas identified
Support facility construction
Construction of missile-handling facility
First launch positions occupied by launchers
Tracking/guidance facility, occupied
Air warning radar facility occupied
Squat Eye radar identified
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SAC. ?USATC 200, Sheet 0235-21HL, 4th cd., Mar 64, Scale 1:200,000 (SECRET)
25X1 1. NPIC. Electronic Equipment t Shelters at Deployed SA-5 Complexes, USSR, Jun 68(TOP
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