TYURATAM MISSILE TEST RANGE LAUNCH FACILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000200390120-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 120
• Publication Date: September 30, 1963
• Content Type: IR

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Provisional Scientific Intelligence Report
TYURATAM MISSILE TEST RANGE
LAUNCH FACILITIES
The data and conclusions of this finished
intelligence report are provisional and do not
necessarily reflect the final position of the
Office of Scientific Intelligence. Neverthe-
less, the material is beinig published at this
time for use by the Intelligence Community
until a firm estimate can be established.
OSI-PR/SC/63-3
30 September 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
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PREFACE
One of the primary inputs to assessment of Soviet ICBM research
and development has been the data derived from the construction and
continuing development of the Tyuratam Missile Test.Center. This re-
port updates intelligence on launch facility construction at Tyuratam
and is based primarily on good quality photographic coverage during
the spring and summer of 1963. This report correlates a detailed anal-
ysis of research and development facilities at Tyuratam with data on
both Soviet and U.S. deployed missile sites in order to improve contri-
butions to the continuing assessment of Soviet ICBM development.
Two representatives of the Space Technology Laboratories, Pro-
ject0 contributed to the technical analysis in this report, and
the CIA detachment at NPIC provided assistance in the photographic
analysis as well as providing the necessary graphic preparation and re-
production services. The cutoff date for data used in this analysis is
17 July 1963.
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PREFACE . .. . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PROBLEM ..................................... 1
CONCLUSIONS .................................. 1
SUMMARY ..................................... 2
DISCUSSION ................................... 4
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
Launch Complex A ............................
Launch Complex
Launch Complex
Launch Complex
Launch Complex
Launch Complex
Launch Complex
Launch Complex
B ............................
C ............................
............................
. . . . . . . .? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
............................
............................
...... ......................
FIGURES
1. Drawing Tyuratam Missile Test Range, October 1962
and June 1963 .. . .. . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . 5
2. Chart Tyuratam Missile Test Range Construction
Schedule . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 6
3. Photo Complex A, April 1963 . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 7
4. Drawing Complex A . .. ... . . . .. .. .. . . ... . .. . . 8
5. Drawing Complex B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Photo Complex C, April 1963 . . . . . .. . . . . .. ... 9
7. Drawing Complex C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Photo New Type SS-7 Operational Soft Site . . . . . . . . 11
9. Drawing Launch Site D-1, April 1963 . .. . . . . . . .. . . 12
10. Drawing Launch Site D-2, April 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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11. Chart Construction Schedule for SS-7 Hard Sites .... 13
12. Drawing SS-7 Hard Site in Mid-Stage of Construction .. 14
13. Drawing SS-7 Hard Site Completed . .. .. .......... 14
14. Photo SS-7 Hard Site Late Stage of Construction,
Olovyannaya A, July 1963 . . ... . . . . 16
15. Drawing Development Sequence of Launch Complex E . 19
16. Photo Launch Complex E, April 1963 . .... ..... . 20
17. Drawing Complex E .... ........ .... .... .. ... 21
18. Photo SS-8 Soft Deployment Site . . .. ... .. . . .. .. . 23
19. Drawing Comparison of SS-8 Operational Soft Site and
E-3 .............. 23
20. Photos Plesetsk D and E . . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . .. 25
21. Photo Tyumen A and C ... . ... ...... .. .. .... 26
22. Chart Construction Schedule, Complex E and SS-8
Operational Soft Sites . .. .... .. .. .. .. . 27
23. Drawing
& Photo Launch Complex F .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. .. 28
24. Drawing Omsk Area A, June 1963, Possible SS-8
& Photo Operational Hard Site ................. 30
25. Photo Complex G . .. .. .. . . ... . .. ... .. ... .. 31
26. Drawing Launch Complex G, October 1962 . .. .. .. . . . 32
27. Drawing Launch Complex G, June 1963 .. .. . . . . .. .. 33
28. Drawing Comparison of G-1/G-2 Area and G-3/G-4 Area 34
29. Drawing Complex H ......................... 36
30. Drawing Typical Configurations of ICBM Launch Sites 39
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To assess the significance
Missile Test Center.
s
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1. The continuing high rate of construction
at the Tyuratam Missile Test Center indicates
that the Soviets not only plan to continue active
use of all the present facilities, but are develop-
ing new facilities for the testing of new missile
systems.
2. The probable guidance facility asso-
ciated with the SS-6 has been identified both at
Launch Complexes A and B and at the SS-6 op-
erational deployment sites at Plesetsk.
3. The construction of two new large build-
ings at Launch Complex B suggests that addition-
al activity, possibly the testing of a new space
booster and/or space vehicle, is planned for this
facility.
4. Launch Complex C is being modified to
permit field testing and training with the latest
SS-7 operational soft site. configuration.
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5. Launch Complex D consists of two
hardened launch sites, D-1 and D-2, each com-
prised of three silo-type launch facilities. All
three silos are believed to be for missile
launching.
6. Excellent photographic coverage of
Launch Complex E during the spring of 1963
shows three launch sites, E-1, E-2, and E-3.
Launch site E-3 is the prototype of the launch
sites associated with the SS-8 operational soft
complexes. Similar. electronic facilities that
are possibly guidance associated are located at
Complexes A and E and at the SS-8 operational
soft sites.
7. SS-8 operational soft sites at Gladkaya
are being modified to, or replaced by, the SS-7
soft site configuration. The SS-8 soft sites at
Plesetsk D and E appear to be complete or very
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near completion. The SS-8 soft sites at Tyumen
A and C appear to be still under construction. It
is not yet possible to determine the extent of
activity at the SS-8 sites at Tyumen B or at
Kozelsk.
8. Launch Complex F appears to be in the
late stages of construction and to consist of
three silos spaced approximately 180 feet from
center to center. All three silos are believed
to be for missile launching. Operational hard
site construction at Omsk and Kozelsk appears
to differ from the SS-7 hard sites and probably
represents the deployment version of the Com-
plex F configuration.
9. Construction at Launch Complex G con-
tinues. The original launch area will probably
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contain two launch sites approximately 900 feet
apart. In addition, a second similar probable
launch area with two launch sites is under con-
struction about 2 miles east of the original launch
area. Two L-shaped facilities, possibly inter=
ferometers, have been located behind the original
Complex G launch area. Ccmpletion of this Com-
plex is not expected before mid 1964.
10. Complex H is located between Com-
plexes C and D and probably represents a new
ICBM launch area. An L-shaped electronic
facility with legs approximately 1,200 feet long
is associated with the Complex. Completion of
Complex H is not expected prior to the first half
of 1964.
No significant additions have been made in
the Launch Complex A area since October 1962.
This Complex has been associated with the SS-6
and SS-8 ICBM's and Soviet space launchings.
However, it has been possible to distinguish SS-6
guidance systems in use at launch pad A-1 and
at Launch Complex B on 1963 photography. It
has also been determined that the rail line which
runs into the A-2 pad area probably abuts the
west side of the launch pad.
Significant additions at Launch Complex B
(also associated with the SS-6 and possibly
Soviet space systems) consist of two large build-
ings, one a rail pass-through building and the
,J other, at present, a road-served building. When
corn ted, the latter will be the third largest
building"in the Tyuratam rangehead area.
At Launch Complex C (a soft launch facility
for the SS-7), two canted buildings of the kind
noted at the new-type SS-7 operational soft sites
have appeared adjacent to the C-2 site.
Launch Complex D (a-hardened launch facili-
ty for the SS-7) consists of two silo launch sites,
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designated D-1 and D-2, each containing three
silos separated approximately 180 feet (center-
to-center) along a straight line. All three silos
at each site probably can launch missiles, al-
though this cannot be determined conclusively.
The left silo as Been from the control bunker has
always been indistinct or nonexistent on photog-
raphy of all such sites during the early and mid-
stages of construction. This suggests that it is
started later than the other two and possibly
serves a different function. On the other hand,
all three silos appear to be identical during the
terminal construction phases and at completion,
therefore it is believed that they probably are all
missile launch silos. Construction of site D-1
was probably completed around October 1962
after about 22 months of work. The excavation
at D-2, about 4,100 feet east of D-1, has not
been backfilled as yet, but completion of this
site is expected by the end of 1963.
Launch Complex E (a soft launch facility for
the SS-8) contains three launch areas, two of
which (E-1 and E-2), are flat pads about 150
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feet square located 800 feet from the probable configuration for the SS-8. It contains three
missile-ready buildings and surrounded by three silos in a linear pattern, with center-to-center
above-ground structures located close tothe pad. separation distances of 180 feet. In this respect,
The third area (E-3) is a flat 150-foot-square it is similar to the launch sites at Complex D.
pad with buried adjacent structures. The However, it appears dissimilar to these sites in
similarity between E-3 and the launchers at the several other ways, including the modes of con-
SS-8 operational soft sites indicates this to be struction, the positioning of the control bunker,
the probable operational, prototype. Other and the appearance of the individual silos. Little
similarities--such as road patterns, separation usable photography is available for this type of
distances, and the existence of both triad and site, and it is not possible to determine con-
1,200-foot interferometers- -also indicate that clusively if all silos are launch silos, although
Complex E is related to the SS-8 operational this is believed to be probable.
soft sites, although in some respects, the
arrangement of the research and development The extremely limited data base also pre-
facility is reversed from the deployed sites. cludes making a definitive estimate of average
The exact purposes of the triad interferometer construction phasing for the launch site at
and the 1,200-foot one are not evident at this Complex F, but construction has been under-
time, although both have possible guidance ap- way for about 22 months and appears to
plication. Construction scheduling analysis be nearing completion. Only two other possibly
suggests that the triad may represent the initial similar sites have been identified (at Omsk
guidance concept and the longer base-line system and Kozelsk), and their photographic coverage
a secondary or backup concept. In both cases, is also inadequate for determining construction
the system orientation is such as to place one time.
leg of the interferometer in the field of fire. Launch Complex G is the largest test com-
Siting requirements apparently specify that the plex in the Tyuratam rangehead area. It now
loading axis be situated 45 degrees from the consists of one launch area containing probably
center of the launch azimuth sector. two launch sites, a second area which will also
Analysis of FLIM FLAM has indicated that probably contain two launch sites, and a single
the SS-8 missile was initially tested from Com- large support areas. Construction is still under-
plex A. However, in June 1962 an SS-8 firing was way in all three area. An electronic facility,
conducted, or at least controlled, from Complex consisting of two possible L-shaped interfer-
E. Similarities of the guidance installations and ometers, has been located behind the launch area
the launchers at Complex E and at A-2 support Complex G will probably not be completed before
the probability of SS-8 firings from both Com- the middle of 1964. Due to its overall size, it
plexes. would appear to be intended for the next genera-
Launch Complex F, located about 7 miles tion space system, which in an ICBM role could
northwest of Complex E, is a hardened launch be used to deliver a 100-megaton weapon. How-
site under construction. Based on the location of ever, the probable pad spacing' (900 feet), the
Complex F and the association of nearby Complex bunkered aspects of all structures in the launch
E with soft SS-8 operational sites, it is postu- area, the number of probable launch points, and
lated that Complex F represents the hardened the revetted area being constructed west of the
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main area also suggest the possible use of this
Complex as a test facility for a solid propellant
ICBM.
Complex H, located between Complexes C
and D, is in an early stage of construction. The
direction in which the construction extends and
the proximity of a new partially completed
guidance/missile-tracking electronic facility
suggest that Complex H will be an ICBM launch
facility when completed. Its location between
Complexes C and D and its proximity tothe SS-7
support area suggest that it may be fora radio-
guided version of the SS-7 system. Construction
work is too preliminary to permit an estimate
of the completion date, but completion would ap-
pear to be possible no earlier than the first half
of 1964.
New construction has appeared between
Complexes A and B and between Complexes E
and A, but the construction is not far enaugh
advanced to permit assessment of purpose. The
location, orientation, and spacing of these new
areas, however, suggest that they will be addi-
tional launch complexes. New construction has
also been observed west of Complex G. The
purpose of this construction as well as its rela-
tion, if any, to Complex. G cannot be determined
at present.
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An improved, and in some cases, a revised,
understanding of the ICBM launch facilities as-
sociated with the Tyuratam Missile Test Range
(T rMTR) has resulted from excellent quality
photography that was obtained during the spring
and summer of 1963. This coverage also clearly
indicates that the construction of new facilities
at Tyuratam is continuing at a very rapid pace.
Figure 1 presents a layout of the facilities at
Tyuratam and contrasts the appearance of the
rangehead in October 1962 to that in June 1963,
only nine months later. Figure 2 presents the
rangehead construction schedule as derived from
sequential photographic coverage.
Excellent photographic coverage of the
Tyuratam rangehead area in April and June 1963
revealed no significant changes in the A-1 launch
pad area (figure 3). However, the high quality
of the photography permitted the guidance facility
for the SS-6 system to be observed clearly, both
at launch pad A-1 and at Launch Complex B. This
guidance facility has been apparent on Launch
Complex A photography since late 1959. It con-
sists primarily of three buildings and an oval-
shaped antenna pad. One of the buildings is large
(1$O by 60 feet) and the other two are smaller
(70 by 50 and 85 by 50 feet). The radar antenna
pad, located about 350 feet from the large build-
ing, has three objects on it which measure about
objects located about 2,630 feet northwest of the
large building are believed to be a bore sighting
device and a theodolite. A4Tignment of the various
parts of the guidance system indicates that the
facility at Launch Complex A was installed with
equal emphasis on its use for firing both to the
United States and to Kamchatka. Appearance of
the new guidance system at about the same time
as the appearance of the SS-6 light re-entry
vehicle and use of the same guidance system at
the four SS-6 operational sites at Plesetskindi-
cate that the system is associated with the oper-
ational version of the SS-6. The guidance facili-
ties at Complex B and at the SS-6 launch com-
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CONSTRUCTION HOUSING AND ADMINISTRATION AREA
c.: 15' .=370'
Surfaced toad
Graded road or trail
Fence
FIGURE 1. TYURATAM MISSILE TEST RANGE, OCTOBER 1962 AND JUNE 1963.
COMPLEX G I
UNDER CONSTRUCTION COMPLEX F
plexes at Plesetsk are oriented along the firing
sector to U.S. targets.
No significant changes are apparent in the
launch pad A-2 area within the last year. How-
ever, April 1963 photography was of sufficient
quality to determine that the railroad probably
extends to and abuts the west side of the launch
pad (see figures 3 and 4). This suggests that
missiles may be delivered to launch pad A-2 by
rail as well as by road. Discussion of the guid-
ance facilities associated with launch pad A-2 is
included under Launch Complex E.
The guidance system at Complex B is
similar to that associated with launch pad A-1.
While some variation occurs in the spacing of the
various parts of the system, the main difference
between the two is in the orientation of the radar
antenna pad. Comparison of the radar-antenna-
pad orientation with that of A-1 and of the SS-6
operational sites at Plesetsk suggest that the
Complex B facility was installed with operational
firings to the United States as a primary con-
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91
COMPLEX A
LAUNCH PAD A 1
LAUNCH PAD A 2
COMPLEX B
LAUNCH PAD
COMPLEX C
LAUNCH PAD C1/ C2
LAUNCH PAD C3
COMPLEX D
LAUNCH SITE D 1
LAUNCH SITE D 2
COMPLEX E
LAUNCH PAD El: E2
LAUNCH PAD E3
COMPLEX G
LAUNCH AREA G1/G2
LAUNCH AREA G3,G4
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ESTIMATED RANGEHEAD CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE
NEW CONSTRUCTION
BETWEEN COMPLEXES A & B
BETWEEN COMPLEXES A & E
-COMPLETE/ESTIMATED COMPLETE
A NOT PRESENT
? FIRST OBSERVED MISSION
? NOT COVERED/CLOUD COVERED
sideration and firings to Kamchatka and the
Pacific as a secondary consideration.
Notable recent changes at Launch Complex
B are the construction of another rail-drive-in
building (235 by 70 feet) and a large building
(370 by 135 feet) which is at present only road
served (see figure 5). Construction of the rail-
drive-in building at the terminus of the wishbone
configuration began in the summer of 1962. It
was completed between April and June of 1963.
The large road-served building is being con-
structed along the northeast fence line. This
construction began between November 1962 and
April 1963. When completed, this installation
will be the third largest building in the rangehead
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area, the two largest being at Complex A and
Complex G. Construction of these new buildings
indicates that Complex B definitely has not been
abandoned as a launch site, but rather that some
increased or new activity is intended for this
facility. This new activity could be associated
with a new space booster, new space vehicle,
new upper stages for the old SS-6, or a combina-
tion thereof.
April 1963 photography (figures 6 and 7)
shows that two canted buildings have been added
on the east side of launch site C-2. Similar
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canted structures have also appeared at the new-
type SS-7 operational soft sites at Kostroma G,
Perm D and E, Tekova D, Yurya I and J,
Drovyannaya C and D,.and Verkhnyaya Salda H
and I (figure 8). The purpose of these structures
is not clear, but they could possibly represent
relocated missile servicing facilities in en-
vironmental shelters close to the launch point.
This modification of Complex C indicates a
Soviet intent to test and possibly train with
facilities similar to the latest operational con-
figuration.
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Railroad
Road
EXCAVATIONS
FIGURE 4. COMPLEX A, TYURATAM MISSILE TEST RANGE.
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Railroad
Road
Fence
r
^
^
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S
ASSEMBLY
AND
001 X 95,
'W ISH BON E'~--"'
ADMINISTRATION
AND
HOUSING SECTION
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FIGURE 6. COMPLEX C, TYURATAM MISSILE TEST RANGE, APRIL 1963.
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ROAD
ORIGINAL LIMITS
ADDED SINCE
RAILROAD
N
--.r- FENCE
CANTED BLOGS
BLDG
90' X 30
U/I OBJECT
BURIED tho'x 45'
STRUCTURE
125 U,C
500 0 500 1000
C'
CZ
0":' C3
FEET (APPRO X)
75'
?
90?X
90'
ERECTOR.'LAUNCHER
BORROW
PITS
BURIED
TANKS
VEHICLE/EQUIPMENT
110'
t1o'
PREPARED PARKING
1
,1
95*X 35'
X
AREA
40,
I
65
1
6 O'X45'
COMPLEX H-
?
MOUNDS
COMPLEX 0 SUPPORT AREA-
BYPASS ROAD TO COMPLEX O-.
611
Launch Complex D at Tyuratam is located
at the eastern extremity of the rangehead area
about 14 nautical miles from Complex C. It
consists of two similar, separate hardened
launch sites, D-1 and D-2, each containing three
silos. Site D-1 was first detected while in the
initial stages of construction in December 1960
and was completed in the fall of 1962 (see figure
9). Launch site D-2 is located approximately
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4,100 feet east of D-1. Construction began
sometime in October or November 1961, and as
of July 1963, it is in the mid or late stages of
construction (see figure 10). The entire Com-
plex is road served, and since no significant
support base is yet apparent within the immediate
vicinity, such services are believed to be located
in the enlarged support area just south of Com-
plex C, about 14 nautical miles to the west.
Site D-1, as it appeared on April 1963
photography, represents a typical "signature" of
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BUNKER
FIGURE 9. LAUNCH SITE D-1, TYURATAM MISSILE TEST
RANGE, APRIL 1963.
the basically completed hardened-mode launch
site for the SS-7 ICBM. As of July 1963, 19
such sites have been detected in various stages
of construction at 11 ICBM deployment com-
plexes scattered across the Soviet Union.* The
most significant features of the site are the three
silos, each capped by large covers approximately
40 by 80 feet which are canted at 45 degrees to
the long axis of the site, a large underground
bunker (about 180 by 110 feet) located on the
uprange side of the silos, and a loop toad sur-
rounding the bunker and silos.
In April 1963, the excavation at Site D-2 had
not yet been back-filled. Two of the silos ap-
peared to be identical but the third (left silo as
seen from the control bunker) appeared less
distinct. The two terminal bunkers between the
silos in the large excavation and the control bun-
*Three sites each at Yurya and Shadrinsk; two each at
Verkhnvaya Salda, Novosibirsk, Yedrovo and Olovyannaya;
and one each at Kostroma, Plesetsk, Perm, Drovvanaya,
and Gladkaya.
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TANKS
-
PROBABLE SPRAY
POND UNDER
CONSTRUCTION
EXCAVATION
U N DER
CONSTRUCTION
POSSIBLE
WATERLINE
BLACKTOP
ROAD
(oo o 200 400
FEET (APPROXIMATE)
NPIC N-4646 (9/66)
FIGURE 10. LAUNCH SITE D-2, TYURATAM MISSILE TEST
RANGE, APRIL 1963.
ker in the characteristic "notch" excavation were
clearly defined. The good quality photographic
coverage of D-2 in April 1963 and of Olovyannaya
A in July 1963 permitted the best measurement
obtainable to date for the actual silo hole at an
SS-7 hard site. The hole appears to be approxi-
mately 30 feet in diameter. Although the internal
hole is circular, the external shape of these
silos is square and canted at 45 degrees with
respect to the long axis of the excavation. This
orientation is retained in the alignment of the
silo covers upon completion of the site such as
is the case of D-1.
Frequent KEYHOLE coverage ofComplexD
and all similar deployment sites during con-
struction have permitted development of a com-
posite construction sequence and an average
schedule for completion of the constrution of a
typical SS-7 hard launch site (see figure 11).
The site is first identified by a rectangular
excavation with a notch along one of the long
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EXCAVATION
CONTROL BUNKER
SILOS
EQUIPMENT BUNKER
BACKFILLING
CLOSURES AND
FINAL SIGNATURE
ESTIMATED AVERAGE CONSTRUCTION TIME FOR SS-7 HARD SITES
PROBABLE
CONSTRU C T60N PHASE
sides (uprange side). Subsequently, three silos
and two terminal bunkers and a probable inter-
connecting tunnel appear in the excavation, and
a large bunker (probably the, control bunker) ap-
pears in the notch (figure 12). (The third silo,
when it can be detected during the mid-stage of
construction, initially presents a different ap-
pearance from the other two silos; this difference
will be discussed later in this report.) Finally,
the excavation is backfilled to cover the bunkers,
the large control bunker is earth mounded over,
and the three silos are capped with large (40 by
80 feet) covers canted at 45 degrees to the long
axis of the site (figure 13). A service road loops
around the control bunker and the three silos.
The final configurations of D- 1 at Tyuratam and
the completed SS-7 hardened deployment sites
appear almost identical.
The average construction time for an SS-7
hard launch site is about 21 months (+I month).
This estimate is based on a rather intensive
analysis of construction progress at the various
FIGURE 11. CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE FOR SS-7 HARD SITES.
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MONTHS
101 11 1 121131 14
PH
11
hard sites. Although no single site was covered
regularly by good quality photography, an aggre -
gate total of nearly 100 coverages provided a
good sample rate. The 21-month construction
period compares favorably to the 22-month
period required for construction of the Titan II
missile launch sites and a 24-month period re-
quired for the Titan I missile launch sites in the
United States.
The lack of satisfactory continuity of good
quality coverage for any individual site leaves
the evidence available to date somewhat incon-
clusive with respect to whether only two or all.
three silos are launch silos. Previous estimates
of the SS-7 hard launch site configuration were
POSSIBLE
CONSTRUCTION PHASE
the data from KEYHOLE missions
October 1962). At that time, the
launch site was thought to be comprised of three
primary structures--a control bunker and two
silos. Subsequent good to excellent quality
photography has permitted the positive identifi-
cation of additional structures which include a
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z = -= "i~0y
.~' C
_ - SO\
~12
1 t.
180'
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third silo, two terminal bunkers, and an inter-
connecting tunnel. The third silo (which is in the
same relative position in every case) consis-
tently appears somewhat later in the construction
cycle than the other two. Although it appears
to differ from the other two during the early and
mid-stages of construction, it appears identical
during the final stages. After site completion,
all silo covers also appear identical. The ob-
servations during the early and mid-stage of con-
struction suggest that the left silo (third silo)
may serve a purpose other than launch. In
addition, the presence of two instead of three
terminal bunkers suggests a pair of launchers
and an auxiliary silo. Also supporting the above
conclusion is the fact that at all of the SS-7 hard
launch sites the control bunker appears to be
centered on the terminal bunkers and the right
pair of silos, or in other words, not centered on
the complex of the five structures. (The technical
reasons for such an alignment in either case are
not obvious.) Finally the generic relationship of
the SS-5 and SS-7 together with the configuration
of the MRBM/IRBM silo launch sites (which
exhibits an asymmetrical third silo that tenta-
tively has been identified as a portal silo) sug-
gests that the left silo at the SS-7 hard launch
sites may serve a similar function.
Alternatively, the postulation of a structural
pattern of three launch, silos in the case of the
MRBM/IRBM silo sites and three launch silos in
the case of the SS-7 hard sites is supported by
the fact that the closures appear quite similar
on completion of construction at both sites. All
three are identical in size (40 by 80 feet) at the
SS-7 sites and very close to the same size at
the MRBM/IRBM sites (45 by 45 feet at two of the
silos and 40 by 50 feet at the third). This pro-
position is strongly supported by the fact that in
CHESS RUFF
July 1963 coverage of Olovyannaya A in the
late mid-stage of construction shows-three silos
that appear identical prior to the completion of
backfilling and the installation of the covers
(figure 14). Another possible indicator that all
three silos are similar is the appearance during
the late mid-stage of construction of three ob-
jects, approximately 30 by 100 feet, one in the
vicinity of each silo. These objects seem to
disappear one by one as construction progresses
and are not apparent upon site completion.
Ground scarring which would indicate the burying
of these objects has not been observed. These
objects appear to be the correct size and dis-
appear at the proper time to be sleeves or liners
for the silos. If they are, they would indicate
that all three silos are of the same depth and
probably identical.
Some of the arguments relating to the third
silo question at the SS-7 hard sites raise techni-
cal implications. The suggestion that the third,
left-hand silo does not appear as early or as
clearly as the center and the right-hand silos is
explainable in either of two ways. The first is
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that the left-hand silo is started third in the
construction sequence and consequently takes on
a definable shape only in the latter part of the
construction cycle after the right and center
have already been stripped of forms and are,
therefore, more easily identified on good quality
photography. The second explanation is that the
left-hand silo is started at the same time or
later than the other two but is somehow con-
figured differently internally and hence requires
a different construction technique. However, for
reasons of construction standardization the ex-
ternal appearance in its upper portion is identical
to the center and right silos.
It is not possible at this time to determine
whether either of these explanations is correct.
A sequence of construction and related external
appearances similar to those noted in the first
argument has been observed at Titan I opera-
tional sites. Furthermore, the second explana-
tion requires that a rational premise be made
regarding the third silo's purpose. For this
discussion, the functions of a power house and
alternatively a propellant terminal are assumed;
other assumptions are no doubt possible. Based
on a wall thickness of
silos), it is believed that the internal dimensions
of the structure are probably no greater than 40
by 40 feet in plan and might contain as many as
three work levels if the structure does not extend
below the bottom of the main excavation. Such a
structural configuration is far from ideal for a
power house installation with equipment stacked
in levels. This is especially true from the
standpoint of access foi major equipment re-
moval as well as from the standpoint of weapons
effect ground shock isolation provisions. The
structural geometry might be suitable for a pro-
pellant terminal, but its asymmetric location
with respect to the center and right silos is
extremely unfavorable because of the excessive
pipe runs. Although it is probably possible to
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package a portion or all of the site utilities
systems into the left-hand silo, it does not appear
efficient or desirable. After reviewing all of
the available photographic coverage of the SS-7
hard launch sites as well as the possible uses
that might be considered for the third silo, it
appears, although not conclusively so, that the
third silo is probably also a missile-launching
silo.
In reviewing the photographic coverage of
Complex D at Tyuratam and selected similar de-
ployed sites, consideration was given to deter-
mining the basic launching technique. A pre-
vious report, based on the then available silo
dimensions (75 feet in diameter), noted that the
SS-7 silo launchers could be either the silo-
lift or flyout type. The most recent dimensions
based on good to excellent quality KEYHOLE
photography are 55 feet square with a circular
opening approximately 30 feet in diameter which
is visible during the mid-stages of construction.
If the SS-7 silos are assumed to have walls as
for the upper 30 feet of the silo), then 15 to 20
feet must be deducted from the 55-foot square
to obtain the interior dimensions below the silo
mouth. On this 'basis the SS-7 silos have a
are not inconsistent with the 30-foot diameter
opening observed in the silo during the final
stages of construction and with the 40-foot
closure width. If these estimates (30-foot
minimum and 40-foot maximum silo inside di-
ameter) are correct, then it is improbable that
a flyout launcher of the Titan II type could be
incorporated with the SS-7 silos. For com-
parison purposes, the inside diameter of the
Titan II flyout silo is 55 feet while the Titan I
elevator silo is 40 feet. Also, prior to the
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selection of the Titan II silo diameter, a number
of detailed studies were carried out by the Titan
associate contractors to determine the feasi-
bility of designing a Titan II flyout launcher
which could be fitted into the 40-foot-diameter
Titan I silos. The results of these studies indi-
cated that such an approach was not feasible. It
would appear, therefore, based on silodiameter
alone and assuming that the 30- to 40-foot
inside diameter is correct, that the SS-7 silo
launchers are possibly limited to the elevator
type. However, before a definitive answer is ob-
tained, other factors such as power requirements
for the elevator drive, the silo depth, and the
closure configuration, as well as other launch
techniques (for example, that used with the
Minuteman) which are beyond the scope of this
report, must be considered.
In the analysis of the two SS-7 hard launch
sites at Complex D, the problem of determining
hardness level was also studied. Such factors as
dimensions of the hard launch site structures,
their-separation distances, and the configuration
and dimensions of the silo closures were ana-
detailed discussion, see appendix B to this re-
port). However, no definite conclusions re-
garding the hardness level of these sites can be
reached on the basis of available information.
Certain factors suggest that the SS-7 hard sites
could be designed for hardnesses of 100 to 300
psi, whereas others tend to indicate its hardness
would be 100 psi or less. Solution of this prob-
lem may be feasible, however, with more study
of available material and if future photographic
coverage of a SS-7 hard site could be acquired
that would reveal the mode of operation for the
silo closures.
Finally, there is the question of why two
such similar or identical launch sites as D-1
and D-2 are required at a research and develop-
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ment missile rangehead. Superficially, such an
arrangement appears to be redundant and costly.
Perhaps the second site supports the operational
training program and/or serves as a back-up
facility in the event of a catastrophic accident
that would disable one of the launch facilities. It
is also possible that, although the two launch sites
at present appear to be similar, they may vary
considerably in their internal characteristics. A
solution to this question obviously cannot be de-
rived solely from the analysis of available
photographic data.
Although reloading the operational silos for
a refire capability would probably take many
hours, nothing was observed about the facilities
that would preclude such an operation; and the
support facilities associated with the complexes
were certainly adequate for storing extra mis-
siles.
Launch Complex E at Tyuratam, covered
fairly consistently by KEYHOLE photography
since September 1961 25X1
described in detail based on
photography The improved
quality of the photography obtained during April
19631 __1 and June 1963
= has permitted more detailed analysis of
the rangehead facilities and a resulting reap-
praisal of some of the characteristics of this
Launch Complex.
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h C
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unc
omplex E was first observed on []
although data
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h
d
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revealed construction underway on
the main road leading northwest from the original
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Tyur
atam rangehead complex. When first ob-
served, ground clearing and construction of
several buildings were underway. Complex E
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SV RFACED ROAD
~ - FENCE SCAR
~"BU IL DIN GS
UNDER
CONS TRUCTIONII
CONSTRUCTION
TRAILS
;x
NEWLY SCARRED AREAS
~I f UNIDENTIFIED
TRACK
NPIC N-4033 (9!03,
FIGURE 15. DEVELOPMENT SEQUENCE OF LAUNCH COM-
PLEX E, TYURATAM MISSILE TEST RANGE.
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and considerable construction activity was noted
although the poor quality of the photography. pre-
cluded qualitative readout. Heavy scarring was
noted in the west end of the area now occupied by
the 1200-foot interferometer. By June 1962
the Complex appeared as a se-
cured irregularly shaped area measuring 4,500
by 2,900 feet and containing 14 buildings. New
construction was noted on the north side of the
complex adjacent to the security fence. October
1962 photography revealed that
although construction was continuing, it could
probably have supported missile launchings dur-
ing the summer (as was indicated by FLIM FLAM
data SS-8 launch). The ex-
cellent quality of the coverage obtained is April
1963 and June 19631
revealed additional details. Development of the
Complex is shown in the series of line drawings
presented in figure 15.
Launch Complex E in its present form con-
sists primarily of three probable launch pads, a
possible guidance facility, 15 major buildings,
and an interferometer (see figures 16 and 17).
The Complex is apparently an autonomous facil-
ity with no separate support area associated with
it. At the extreme eastern end of this Complex
are two buildings measuring approximately 140
by 70 feet and separated from each other by a
distance of 800 feet. North of each building and
connected to it by a possible pipe or cable con-
duit is a small unidentified object.
Approximately 800 feet west (up range) of
these buildings are two clusters of three build-
ings, each surrounding a probable launch pad.
Due to the proximity of the buildings, the exact
shape of this encircled pad is not discernible.
However, the spacings of these buildings sug-
gest that the overall measurements could be of
the order of 150 by 150 feet. In the center.of
each of these pads is an irregular dark area
about 65 feet across. Two poles, possibly for
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FIGURE 16. LAUNCH COMPLEX E, TYURATAM MISSILE TEST RANGE, APRIL 1963.
illumination, are located on each side of each.
pad. These areas have been designated launch
pads E-1 and E-2 as indicated in figure 17. The
buildings surrounding these pads measure 185 by
55 feet, 95 by 40 feet, and 100 by 35 feet with the
two larger buildings abutting the pad itself and
thus possibly located as close as 75 feet to any
missile being fired from these pads.
A third launch position, designated E-3, is
located 1,000 feet northwest of E-2 adjacent to the
security fence in the area marked by heavy
ground scarring and construction activity in
June 1962 This launcher, con-
nected to the other areas by a paved, curved
road, consists of an almost circular road sur-
rounding a mounded structure which now oc-
cupies the area of an excavation seen in June
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1962 On the north side of the
circle road is a square pad approximately 150
feet across with a heavily revetted or mounded
structure on the north side and a mounded
smaller structure on the south side. The mound-
ing obscures the exact measurements of these
structures, although in relative size, shape, and
position, these are similar to the buildings meas-
uring 50 by 50 and 25 by 50 feet observed at pad
A-2. Two poles are positioned on opposite sides
of the pads on the same manner as at E-1 and
E-2. A trace is observed connecting to the north
150- by 70-foot building.
Immediately to the west of pad E-1 and south
of E-3 are four square-appearing objects that
form a triangle (see figure 17). The sides of the
triangle measure about 230 feet. The legs are
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140' x 100'
OVERALL
BUILDING SIZES
FEET (APPROX)
1
165 x 55 (2)
2
95 x 40 (2)
3
100 x 35 (2)
4
140 x 70-(21
5
120 x 25
6
160 X 55
7
110 x 45
8
115 x 40
POSSIBLE
TANKS
125/305-degree orientations. The orientation of
the entire complex that is, of all major struc-
tures and of the general road pattern, is along
At the extreme western end of the fenced
area is a cruciform interferometer with base-
lines of approximately 1,200 feet. Objects are
noted at the extremities of the cruciform ground
scars and additional objects are present closer
to the center station which could be additional
receivers for ambiguity resolution. The legs
of the interferometer are on 35/215-degree and
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------ Road (blacktop)
Road (concrete)
----- Trail
* Fence
---- Probable fence alignment
Ground scar
-------------- Possible ground scar
CCDI Unidentified structure
or object
Mounded structure
Pole
Outside the security fence near the access
road are two possible tanks and two structures.
The functions of this portion of the facility as
well as of a T-shaped structure in the southeast
corner of the secured area are unknown..
The excellent quality of the data obtained in
April 1963 has permitted analysis
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which indicates that reassessment of the function
of some of the elements at Complex E is in order.
It was noted from this mission that the A-2 launch
pad at Tyuratam was not octagonal as previously
assumed but square, measuring 150 feet on a side
and flanked by two structures, one measuring
50 by 50 feet and the other 25 by 50 feet, with
the separation distance between being approxi-
mately 165 feet. A dark spot is observed in the
center of the pad (see figure 4). Returning to
Complex E, it is observed that the buildings at
E-1 and E-2 are separated by 165 feet; and while
the exact dimensions of the pads between the
buildings is obscured, they appear to be square,
obviously fit within 165-foot distances, and each
has a dark spot in the center. At E-3, there is
a square area 150 feet on a side and flanked by
two buried structures. While exact measure-
ments are not available due to mounding, it is
clear that the structure on the south side is
larger than that on the north side and the separa-
tion distance is 165 feet--again the same ar-
rangement and separation distance that exists
at pad A-2.
Based on these similarities of pad size,
shape, darkened areas, the separation distances,
and the fact that FLIM FLAM has indicated SS-8
firings from Complex E, it is concluded that
three separate launch facilities are present in
Complex E. The anomaly of the two buildings
abutting the pads at both E-1 and E-2 might pos-
sibly be explained by the use of these areas pri-
marily for prelaunch operational checkout train-
ing--such as missile handling, erection, check-
out, and perhaps fueling--in which case the pre-
launch support equipment has been located above
ground for convenience. Although the nature of
the construction of the buildings at E-1 and E-2
is not apparent from photography, they evidently
must be of a type that will withstand the induced
environment from an ICBM launch 75 to 80 feet
away from a flat pad. Since FLIM FLAM data
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indicate an SS-8 firing from Complex E as early
the firing must have occurred
from either E-1 or E-2. There was no evidence
of construction activity in the
quality, indicates that E-3 could not have been
ready in 2 weeks to support a firing
Comparison of the E-3 area with deployed
SS-8 soft sites gives the first concrete evidence
of a relationship between the two. On the basis
of similarities derived, it is concluded that the
E-3 area is the prototype of these deployed sites.
Looking at E-3 in figure 16, it can be seen that
if the square pad and the two opposing buried
structures had been seen in the early stages of
construction, when only the foundations for the
structures were evident, the area including pad
and structures would have had a "winged" ap-
pearance. This is a characteristic of the ob-
served ICBM launch sites seen at Tyumen,
Gladkaya*, Kozelsk, and Plesetsk D and E. Also,
the later coverage of these deployed sites has
revealed the development of a circular roadpat-
tern as shown in figure 18. Further similarities
between E-3 and an SS-8 soft site are shown in
figure 19. Note especially the "plus sign" ground
scar patterns at the rear of each complex.
The SS-8 soft sites were first discovered at
Tyumen (April 1962). First
activity in this area, in retrospect, was seen on
(December 1961). Similar com-
(June 1962), at Kozelsk on
Unfortunately, photography has
never been of sufficient quality to show the fine
details at any SS-8 soft site. However, in gen-
eral, the launch complexes are comprised of two
ready buildings (approximately 130 by 115 feet)
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 launch areas. The separation distance between
pads is also 800 feet. One distinguishing feature
is a "winged" appearance of the construction in
the area of the suspect launcher. A second
characteristic is a "plus sign" ground scar pat-
tern to the rear of each complex. The "plus
sign" ground scars appear to be arranged to form
a triangle with the long side coinciding with the
loading axis of the complex and with one leg
oriented within the operational launch sector.
Orientation of the main complex appears to be
selected at 45 degrees from the center of the op-
erational launch sector.
see figure 4), at Complex E (April
1963, see figure 17), and behind
the SS-8 soft operational sites could be a radio
guidance system consisting of at least one con-
trol building and a probable L-shaped interfero-
meter with a 250- to 300-foot baseline. Pre-
ferred direction of fire would then appear to be
along one leg of the interferometer and 45 de-
grees from the loading axis of the launch pad.
It might be noted that this direction of fire is
supported by the modification of the Gladkaya A
and B SS-8 soft launch sites in ?avor of SS-7 soft
sites that are on an azimuth oriented 45 degrees
from the original SS-8 installations. This is con-
sistent since, in most cases, SS-7 soft sites are
oriented approximately along the center of the
operational launch sector.
Cruiciform interferometers with a 1,200-
FIGURE 79. COMPARISON OF SS-8 OPERATIONAL SOFT SITE AND E-3, TYURATAM MISSILE TEST RANGE.
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foot baseline are seen at Tyuratam Complex'E
and in the electronics area behind Complex A-2
and are oriented with one leg approximately
along the range line. Such an installation could
serve as the ground installation for the radio
guidance system of the SS-8 missile system, now
associated with Tyuratam launch pad A-2 and
Complex E by virture of FLIM FLAM analysis
and with the SS-8 operational soft sites by facil-
ities analysis. Identical interferometers are
under construction at Tyumen A and C at Plesetsk
D and E. While these installations were identi-
fied from the excellent quality coverage in April
and June 1963 respectively, in retrospect it is
possible to observe initial construction of the
interferometer at Plesetsk in May 1962
Orientation is apparently such as to place
one leg of the cruciform along the center of the
operational launch sector (figures 20 and 21).
The timing of construction (or appearance in
photography) of the "plus" configuration (or
triad) and the 1,200-foot baseline cruciform in-
terferometer is peculiar and so far not under-
stood. At Tyuratam A-2, the triad was evident
in December 1960 in time to support the start of
the SS-8 flight program in April 1961; the inter-
ferometer was, not evident until May 1962 0
although firm evidence of ground
February 1962
early as Septe
1962
and possibl
The
coverage prior to this time
was not of sufficient quality to permit identifi-
cation.- At the SS-8 deployed soft sites, one of
the first identifying characteristics seen was the
"plus" configuration (triad) ground scarring.
The interferometer, on the other hand, was not
observed until May 1962 at Plesetsk and April
1963 at Tyumen and has not yet been seen at some
of the remaining SS-8 soft sites. A comparison
of the construction schedules for all of these
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areas is shown in figure 22, from which it can be
seen that there is a possible consistency in the
appearance of the 1,200-foot interferometer--
some time after the first quarter of 1962. The
triad is always evident in the early stages of
construction, except for Complex E where there
is insufficient quality of coverage for readout of
this type of installation. One possible explanation
? is that the triad short baseline concept was the
original system used to start the program in
1961, and that the 1,200-foot system was estab-
lished as a backup or secondary system after
the first phase of the flight test program. Such
a change is consistent with the observed per-
formance of the SS-8 missile system, since
analysis of FLIM FLAM indicates that the ac- 25X1
curacy demonstrated to Kamchatka (3,400 nauti- 25X1
cal miles) is not particularly good and is, in
fact, not significantly better than the all inertial
system of the SS-7.
While the E-3 launch pad has been identified
as a prototype of the SS-8 operational launcher,
Complex E as a whole remains somewhat of an
anomoly. The buildings surrounding E-1 and E-2
cannot be explained and are not apparent in any
deployed site. Considering the entire launch
complex as compared to the SS-8 operational
sites, the placement of the launchers, checkout
buildings, and guidance area (both relative to
each other and to the research and development
launch sector) appears to be reversed. However,
considering the E-3 pad alone, the larger of the
two adjacent structures is on the south side, the
same side as at pad A-2. This suggests that the
missiles are loaded from the same direction at
both A-2 and E-3, thus indicating that, while
other Complex E structures are reversed, the
E-3 launcher is situated correctly for aKam-
chatka/Pacific launch. On balance, there is suf-
ficient evidence to indicate that Complex E is
associated with soft sites of the type seen at
Tyumen, Kozelsk, and Plesetsk D and E and in
CHESS RUFF
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 I
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP78T05439A000200390120-8
1
1
1
1
TOP SECRET
CHESS RUFF
TOP SECRET I I CHESS RUFF
;25X1
;25X1
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP78T05439A000200390120-8
TOP SECRET CHESS RUFF
m
TOP SECRET I I CHESS RUFF
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP78TO5439A000200390120-8
TOP SECRET CHESS RUFF
FIGURE 22. CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE, COMPLEX E AND SS-8 OPERATIONAL SOFT SITES.
TOP SECRET I I CHESS RUFF
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP78TO5439AO00200390120-8
1960
1
961
1
96
2
1963
LOCATION
TYURA TAM MISSILE TEST CENTER
COMPLEX A-LAUNCH SITE A2
NEGATED
TRIAD (PLUS)
JULY 1959 1
INTERFEROMETER
---
--
-
COMPLEX E-LAUNCH SITE E-1-E-2
---
TRIAD (PLUS)
INTERFEROMETER
- LAUNCH SITE E3
OPERATIONAL SITES
GLADKAYA- LAUNCH SITE A'
TRIAD (PLUS)
--
?-__
INTERFEROMETER
NONE
- LAUNCH SITE B"
IDENTIFIED
-
TRIAD (PLUS)
---
INTERFEROMETER
NONE
IDENTIFIED
-LAUNCH SITE C
--?
(TYPE III SITE)
KOZELSK-LAUNCH SITE A
TRIAD (PLUS)
---
INTERFEROMETER
NONE
IDENTIFIED
-LAUNCH SITE B
--
TRIAD (PLUS)
-i
-.
f
INTERFEROMETER
----
? LAUNCH SITE C
---
L
TRIAD (PLUS)
?-
---
INTERFEROMETER
NONE
IDENTIFIED
- LAUNCH SITE D
TRIAD
(PLUS)
-
}
-
I"-----
r
INTERFEROMETER
---
PLESETSK-LAUNCH SITE D
-
-
-
TRIAD (PLUS)
INTERFEROMETER
-
- LAUNCH SITE E
-
-
-
-
-
TR
P
IAD (
LUS)
INTERFEROMETER
-
-
-
TYUMEN-LAUNCH SITE A
-
-
I
TRIAD (PLUS)
F
R
T
INTER
E
OME
ER
- LAUNCH SITE B
--
~
TRIAD (PLUS)
INTERFEROMETER
NONE
IDENTIFIED
:
1
111
- LAUNCH SITE C
I
4
TRIAD (PLUS)
INTERFEROMETER
-?-
-CANNOT BE NEGATED.