ASSESSMENT OF NEW HEN HOUSE FACILITIES IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000400130024-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: August 28, 1964
• Content Type: IR

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Approved For Release 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000400130024-1
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Scientific
Intelligence
Report
No. pages 12
Copy No. ` of 130
Assessment of New HEN HOUSE Facilities
in the USSR
Declass Review by NIMA/DOD
OSI-SR
28 August 1964
Office of Scientific Intelligence
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000400130024-1
Approved For Release 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000400130024-1
 Scientific Intelligence Report
ASSESSMENT OF NEW HEN HOUSE
FACILITIES IN THE USSR
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Scientific Intelligence
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 ASSESSMENT OF NEW HEN HOUSE
FACILITIES IN THE USSR
To make a preliminary determination of the purposes of the HEN
HOUSE facilities presently being constructed at Sary Shagan Site 13,
Angarsk,and Olenegorsk.
1. Sixteen new HEN HOUSE antennas are under co%struction in the
USSR; two at Olenegorsk, eight at Angarsk, and six-at Sary Shagan.
These facilities could be completed by the end of 1965 or early 1966.
0
2. The Olenegorsk facility is probably apart of a ballistic missile
early warning facility and could also be used as part of a satellite
tracking net. If a ballistic missile early warning net is contemplated
by the USSR, several additional installations will be required on the
northern periphery.
3. The Sary Shagan and Angarsk facilities are probably for satel-
lite tracking and may comprise the total satellite tracking net. How-
ever, the Olenegorsk facility could supplement the other two facili-
ties in a satellite tracking role, and/or additional facilities could be
built elsewhere.
4. The new installations at Angarsk and Sary Shagan, when com-
pleted, will represent a capability considerably in excess of that re-
quired merely to detect the passage of U.S. space vehicles. The USSR
already has a capability to track its own satellites, utilizing trans-
missions from them, with greater accuracy than would be provided
by the new system. These factors, when coupled with the 'estimated
technical characteristics of the new system, suggest that the Soviets
are proceeding with the construction of an anti-satellite system.
Present evidence, however, does not permit a firm, judgment
regarding Soviet intent to employ such a system, and it should be
pointed out that a nuclear warhead would probably be required on the
interceptor missile.
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 5. No anti-satellite launch facilities have been identified to date,
but interceptor missiles could be launched from one of the
test ranges or from an operational ballistic missile site with little
or no advance indication.
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The HEN HOUSE and HEN ROOST radars at Sary Shagan were first
photographed
Satellite
photography subsequent to 0 indicated the initiation of con-
struction of sixteen additional HEN HOUSE-type radar installations
at three locations in the USSR. To date, none of these installations
has been completed. Search is continuing to ascertain df additional
HEN HOUSEs are being constructed at other locations.
The original HEN HOUSE radar at Sary Shagan is housed in a very
large structure nearly 900 feet long and more than 60 feet high. (See
Figures 1 and 2.) The antenna's face is oriented on 0 degrees,
toward the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Rangehead. The antenna's
aperture is more than 800 feet long, 50 feet high, and is inclined at
an angle of 25 degrees from the vertical. At one end of the antenna
building, there is a large 450 by 60 foot building which probably con-
tains the high-powered transmitters and control equipment. On the
basis of this configuration, HEN HOUSE is believed to be a high-
power, comparatively low frequency radar which scans electron-
ically. The new installations under construction resemble the origi-
nal HEN HOUSE except that they are being built in pairs with two
900-foot antenna buildings, one on each side of the probable trans-
mitter building.
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DEPLOYMENT
The deployment of the 17 HEN HOUSE radars is shown in Figure
3. There are eight pairs of HEN HOUSE radars under construction,
plus the original single HEN HOUSE at Sary Shagan. We believe that
 both antennas in a pair of HEN HOUSEs look in the same direction
rather than in reciprocal directions. This is based on site geometry
and the undesirability of having high-powered radars transmit to-
ward other facilities in close proximity to them. With each of two
pairs covering the same general azimuth, it will be possible to ob-
tain increased elevation coverage, and thereby reducing the over-
head "dead zone."
The deployment of the HEN HOUSE installations falls into two
families, with one group (three pairs at Sary Shagan and four pairs
at Angarsk) looking generally east-west and the other, a single pair
at Olenegorsk, looking north. (See Figure 4.)
ANTI-ICBM CAPABILITY
The canted pair of antennas at Olenegorsk which looks northwest
toward the U.S. probably will provide an early warning capability and
good trajectory prediction for most of the missiles fired toward
Moscow from the U.S.; Polaris missiles launched within its arc of
coverage could also be tracked, but with less warning time and prob-
ably with reduced prediction accuracy depending upon the trajectory
utilized. In order to provide early warning of U.S.-launched ICBM's
for other than the general Moscow area, several additional instal-
lations would be required on the northern periphery.
Based on a simulated Minuteman trajectory from Montana, the
Olenegorsk installation should be able to acquire the ICBM 18
minutes prior to impact in the Moscow area. After eight minutes of
tracking (ten minutes prior to impact), the system could predict the
subsequent impact position of the missile to within an ellipse meas-
uring 0.4 n.m. by 1.2 n.m. The Olenegorsk system could also have
a capability to back-track the ICBM trajectory to an elliptical area
measuring approximately one by seven nautical miles and thus give
an indication of the launch complex used.
25X1 B One major problem of an ICBM detection and tracking system
operating at such low frequencies is nuclear blackout.
The Olenegorsk site would not be affected by nuclear bursts in the
target area well to its rear, but would of course remain vulnerable
to a precursor burst positioned ahead of the site, or, because of the
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lack of ABM defenses near the site, would itself be vulnerable to
nuclear attack.
A significant advantage of the low radar frequencies used is the
relatively large radar cross-section of re-entry vehicles at these
frequencies and the improved capability to discriminate against
small decoys.
We estimate that the Olenegorsk installation could be completed
in the latter half of 1965. This installation would significantly im-
prove the capabilities of any AB\I defenses for the Moscow area.
This initial analysis of the HEN HOUSE installations in an anti-
satellite role is based on simulated tracking from all three locations,
Sary Shagan, Olenegorsk, and Angarsk_ A satellite vehicle in an
orbit with 88 degrees inclination and at a constant altitude of 100
nautical miles was chosen for the analysis. Elevations of up to 52
degrees were used where twopatrs of HEN HOUSEs were available,
and elevations of up to 26 degrees were considered where only a
single pair was available. The radar capabilities discussed above
were the basis for the computations. The computations indicated that
the ? 2 degrees elevation accuracy assumption did not produce
significantly more accurate results than an accuracy of ? 20 degrees
in elevation as long as the assumption that doppler data accurate to
? 10 fps was utilized. Thus the ? 2 degrees assumption was not crit-
ical to the analysis.
The computations showed that at the end of six orbits after launch,
the system could predict the position of the satellite in the seventh
orbit with a major-axis error of less than 900 feet. If the prediction
were extended as far ahead as the sixteenth orbit, the error. with-
out further tracking, would still be less than 8,000 feet. Such pre-
diction accuracies would permit the launching of an interceptor
vehicle to a predicted point in an attempt to destroy the satellite.
However, even the 900-foot accuracy probably would require use of
a nuclear warhead on the interceptor missile.
We believe that all of the HEN HOUSE installations identified to
date at Sary Shagan and Angarsk could be completed by the end of
1965 or early 1966. We have no indication as yet as to whether ad-
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ditional installations will be constructed to extend the east-west,
Sary Shagan-Angarsk, net. We believe that this net is almost cer-
tainly for satellite detection and tracking and that the Olenegorsk
site would also support it. The Moscow "A frame" installation
might also provide data to such a system. However, considering the
orientation and location of the Sary Shagan-Angarsk HEN HOUSE
facilities, they do not appear to have any significant role in anti-
ballistic missile defense.
The information on the HEN HOUSE, radar is too limited to make
a firm estimate of the cost of an individual element or of the total
system. It is estimated that the total cost of the 16 HEN HOUSE
radars presently under construction might run from 100 to 160 mil-
lion dollars but this does not include support facilities, housing,
etc., which may prove to be a significant factor. If the HEN HOUSE
radars are more complex internally than presently estimated, this
cost could also be considerably higher.*
We feel it unlikely that the USSR would expend such resources
only for the purpose of detecting the passage of U.S. space vehicles,
or of locating "space garbage" in general. Such a n?nimum system
would cost approximately 25 million dollars. Furthermore, the USSR
already has a capability to track its own satellites, using co-
operating S-band beacons, with greater accuracy thatwouldbe pro-
vided by the new system. These factors suggest that the Soviets are
proceeding with the construction of an anti-satellite system. Cur-
rent evidence does not provide the basis for a firm conclusion as to
the Soviet intent to extend this development, or to employ it in an
anti-satellite role once it is finished. The Soviet concern over
Western reconnaissance has been continually stressed, however,
and adds weight to the possibility that the HEN HOUSE system has
an anti-satellite role.
We have not yet identified any launch facilities that would be used
in the system nor have we noted any research and development
testing indicative of a satellite intercept system. If existent ballis-
tic missiles were to be used as the interceptor vehicle, launch
facilities at the missile test ranges or at operational sites could per-
form this function. With the amount of "space garbage"now avail-
*This section on the estimated cost of the HEN HOUSE installa-
tions was provided by the Office of Research and Reports.
 Figure 1
?.
Sa", Shagan Missile Test Center: Original HEN HOUSE
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Sary Shagan Missile Test Center: Plan and Elevation Views of Original HEN HOUSE
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 HEN HOUSE Rclativc: Orientation
Figure 3
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Angbr~k
Olenegors k
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SOVIET DUAL HEN HOUSE INSTALLATIONS
 able as targets for development testing, we might or might not
identify such test firings if they occur as apparently routine
launchings of ballistic missiles from Kapustin Yar 'or Tyuratam.
Neither.. is it yet clear whe r any of the anti-missile missiles of
the ABM systems under evelopment in the USSR are capable
of utilization in an anti-satellite role.