(C) CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY LOGISTICS AND CAPABILITIES TAB A- CAPABILITIES ON THE SINO-INDIAN/NEPALESE FRONTIER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000400210031-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: November 4, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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ToppsECRETelease 2003/12n9 ? cIA-Pnthalaus.119A000100210031 4
SAO/PC 465/2-1-64
PANELED NOV 4 1964 /z/96
,DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Special Activity Office?
Reference Facility
Rm 1D918, Pentagon ?
(C) CH1NE,SE COMMUNIST -
MILITARY LOGISTICS AND CAPABILITIES
TAB _A- CAPABILITIES ON THE SINO-INDIAN/NEPALESE FRONTIER
DIA, JCS reviews completed
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,
CHICOM MILITARY LOGISTICS
AND CAPABILITIES
TAB "A"
SOUTHWEST THEATER
S I NO - INDIAN - NE .PALESE FRONTIER
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'Statement of .the Problem
? TAB A -
P78T05439A000400210031-4
II . Summary of Study and Conclusions
Facts Bearing on the Problem A, 4
IV Assumptions A-5
Capability to Supply Tibet ,from Railheads in China A-6
V
VI Supply Support from Tibet of CCA Attack on India and
Nepal A-_11
VIII Capability of the Chinese to Attack India and Nepal
Over the Himalayas; Location and Timing of Attacks
IX Interdiction Targets
X Intelligence Cups
GAZETTEER - List of place names and locations*
Appendix A Interdiction Targets List
Appendix B Average Tonnages Delivered by MSRrs
Appendix C Terrain and Climate Limitations to Logistic
and Air Operations on the Sino-Indian
Nepalese Frontiers
A-20
A-33
A-37
A-39
AA-1
AA-3
AA-4
t Appendix p Estimated Daily Supply Requirements for
? "Unit in Tibet.and S. W. .China AA-13
Appendix E Twelve Month Stockpile Capabilities at MSR-
Terminus Depots at "Maxirrium" and_TrProbable"
Scales of Attack AA-14
Appendix F
Estimated Net Seasonal Capacities of Supply
Routes from NiLSR Terminus Depots to Frontier
Crossing Points
AA-15
Appendix G Estimated Net Seasonal Capacities of Attack
Routes South of the Sino-Indian/Nepal Frontiers AA-17
ANNEXES - Data used as a basis to calculations:
Annex IA
Annex. IB
Annex IC
Annex ID
Annex 11A
Annex 11B
Personnel and Material, Infantry Division (Standard). CCA
Personnel and Materiel, Infantry DivisiOn (Light), -CCA
Personnel and Materiel, Infantry Regiment (Standard and
-Light), CCA
Personnel and Equipment, BD/MIS Division: PLA
Average- Daily Resupply Requirements for Selected CCA Units
Daily Ammunition Requirements of Selected CCA Units
:Gazetteer in this study is a draft which will be replaced by a vex-i cod
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I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
To determine the maximum forte which the Chinese Communists can
logistically support in a sustained attack on India through the Himalayas
and the most favorable areas and timing for such. an attack.
II: SUMMARY OF STUDY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. Ground, Capabilitie s
Assuming a one-year stockpiling program prior to the attack .
and no interdiction Qf supply lines, the Chinese Communists could deploy
and support for one or two months a maximum of nine Infantry divisions
arc 1 t-sy,
le: :;eparate regiments, totalling about 153, 000 men, for attacks
/
against India and Nepal. The best weather for a probable main attack in
.the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) area exists in October and November.
Limited objectives would likely be attained, but the logistic-support require-
.
merits on supply routes supporting a main attack through NEFA are assessed
ip7tr's--.soun lo sustain operations at this maximum level to the initial
objectives. (Section VIII and Appendix C).
b. We expect Chinese attacks would be directed to those border areas
?
claimed by Communist China, rather than in areas not in dispute, such as
-
the Churnbi Valley, where prepared Indian defenses-also exist. Further,'
we believe it unlikely that China would attack India and Nepal simultaneously.
We therefor'believe that a more realistic assessment of the force the Chinese
could employ and sustain to their initial objectives would be three light in1antry4
divisions and fifteen separate reniments;! tioi:oThaig approximately 72, 000 men,
on the whole Sino-InCian frontier. The main attacks would probably be
towards the .Gauhati/Tezpur area of Assam through the NEFA and in Ladakh
towards Leh, with only a diversionary move in the ChUmhi Valley. Further
ac_IN:rances v.-o r c_ e additional improvements of the routes, through the
Himalayas. (Section VIII).
Z. Air Capabilities
The Chinese are hampered by having only three airfields close to the
ci locations.
See Gazetteer, Page A39, and Map 2 for place names
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frontier which can a.ccorrirnocate jet aif
craft, and one of these (NagclahL.
Dzong) is temporarily unserviceable. The Chinese could deploy a maximum
of 175 tactical aircraft to forward airfields in the Tibetan area, although
tactical aircraft have not been detected to .date in this area. This fce
could consist of 90 jet fighters, 25 jet light bombers, and 60 propeller
_light bombers. operating beyond the range of fighter cover, the Chinese
could employ their 15 TU-4 bombers against Calcutta, New Delhi, and
possibly Bombay. Considering their limited facilities, and in order to
avoid retaliatory attacks, the Chicoms might elect to limit their use of
aircraft in such an operation to that of air defense. In such event, only
fighter aircraft would be deployed. (Section VII).
3. Military Situation (Jan 1964)
a. Ground Order of Battle
The Chinese Communist Army forces now in the Sino-India
border area consist of five divisions, eleven seParate combat regiments,
? -
a'separa.te artillery regiment, six border defense regiments, and adrninis-
.
trative and support troops, totalling about 114, 000 men. A maximum
offensive would require the redeployment of additional divisions from
?
elsewhere in China, which the Chinese 'Communist Army could accomplish
without jeopardizing its overall military posture.
(Section VI).
b. ,Logistic Situation
(1) The remoteness of Tibet makes logistic support difficult.
?
From rail transhipment points at Ch'eng-tu, Hsi-ning, La.n-chou, Hung-
.
liu-yuan, and Urumchi-Turfan, supplies, must be trucked more than a
thousand miles over difficult rytairt uppl =tit:es (MSRs) to depots and units
on the Sino-Indian and Sino-Nepalese frontiers. This creates asevere
demand on vehicles, fuel, and the supply organization.
(2) Used to capacity, the four MSRs could deliver a maximum
of 1:840 short tons per day, requiring some 12, 900 trucks. Available
evidence indicates that -the People's Liberation Army las from 3, 000 to
4, 004 trucks in Tibet supplying the four MSRs and delivering between 700
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and 800 short tons per day for a garrison requiring approximately 570
short tons per day. Any excess tonnage capacities above garrison
requirements is probably being allocated to the expansion of facilities
in the 'Tibet area rather than stockpiling. Considerable improvement
of lines of 'communication, barracks and stOrage areas, and vehicle
workshops has been noted since 1960.
(3) We have found no indications that the Chinese are having
undue difficulties ivrith the logistic.support of this area. The facilities
identified, though not elaborate, are assessed aS adequate for the 114, 000
troops we estimate now in the area. The proximity of four petroleum
refining and stora*e areas close to the railheads supplying the .MSRs
assures adequate POL, supplies.
4.. Vulnerability to interdiction
a. Transportation
Chinese transportation ties with Tibet are very vulnerable
to long long range interdiction. The simultaneous destruction of key rail
,and road bridges and rail classification yards would cut supply to Tibet
for not less than a month. The destruction of facilities at selected rail-
.-
to-Opad transhipment points would furthe'r handicap the supply effort.
b. Logistic base
Because of the almost total dependence of units in the Tibet
area on supply by road, serious damage tiE; the oil refineri-es at Lan-chou,
Yu-men, Leng-hii, and Tu-shan-tzu would very severely affect any
military operation launched by China through the Himalayas. Further,
such damage would result in serious and long-term disOrganization of the
country's industrial base. Close to the Sino-Indian frontier, the only I
critac.alhort-range logistical support installation so far identified is the
Central Transportation Headquarters and vehicle workshops in Lhasa.
(Section IX).
5. Intelligence gaps
The reliability of the intelligence used in this sturiv VA ries from OCCI
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RDP78T05439A000400210031-4
TAB A
Road, railroad, and airfield intelligence is considered good.
Intelligence derived from collateral and communications intelligence
sources in this area is generally poor. Continued exploitation and
analysis of the latest photography, which was not completed in time for
this study, will improve the reliability .and scope of inte?ligence on logistic
facilities used in the preparation of this paper.
?
III. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. There are limited access routes into India and Nepal. Therefore
attacks in the following area-s are considered:
??
a. Western Area
(1) Ladakh
(2) Through the passes south of Ladakh and northwest of Nepal
b. Central Area
Through the five 'principal passes into Nepal
Eastern Area
,(1) Through- the Chumbi Valley towards Siliguri
(2) Through western Bhutan to Paro Dzong
Through eastern Bhutan to Lhuntsi Dzong
Through western North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) to Tezpur
Through central and eastern NEFA to the Brahmapt:tra Valley
2. The capability described in this study is based on the ability of the
Chinese Communists to Iogistical4yLw,tplacrrt:2attacks,:throcaugh:the Iithaa.L4y_as iitc
India and the border states.
3. "Optimum" and_"minimum" road capacities adjusted-for climatic
conditions as well as all available intelligence on the availability of supplies
?
and transportation have been used to determine logistic capability.
4. Tonnages are expressed in short tons. 25X1 C
"Optimum" road capacities are those calculated from the agreed u road
methodology for normal usage in fair weather over a long period.
"Minimum" road capacities are calculat,_-_-6 :ram the methodology using
figures for wet base and sub-bas-e.
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IV.As6leTioNs
?
Although not necessarily 'launched simultaneously, major attacks
.on India and Neoa continue concurrently in all areas of possible attack.
?
The supply
trement for- such areas will therefore be simultaneous once
all attacks ha, e, begun
'The Chinese Communist Army (CCA) can train, equip and acclimatize
sufficieptlfores to provide the maximum number of troops that could be
logisticall4 supplied in all areas of attack.
In order to meet maximum troop, requirements for attack, aagmentation
of CCA forces no'- % in Tibet willl take place so that reinforcements have at
least one month to a-_:cimatize to Tibetan altitudes before being committed'
to the attack
During The period of reinforcement normal-supply t0 Tibet will be
interrupted and troops in the region will be supplied from stockpiles.
Without disrupting essential civilian air schedules, the Chinese
will-use ta-:tica: air-supply and airborne forces
The Chinese wirl] beg'in a stockpiling program one year before under-
taking a major attack on-India and the border states.
The amount of supply required for formations and units-engaged in
attacks-on India will be based on "light combat rates * except for forces
operating, t,hrouah the Chumbd Valley5 ithich.will be at "average combat rates".."
Reserve forces in the forward staying areas will total in number about
a (fttarterof those engaged in combat
The Chinese Communists are prepared to violate the neutrality of-
Sikkim and. Bhutan
lc, ? The .light infantry-division and the independent infantry regiment
will loe the standard units to be employed.. Organizations and tonnagrequire'--
ments are gi,:en at Annexes
T and II.
"Light Combat rates" Based upon average ammunition expenditure over a
. period of one year in a combat zone. (See Annex-TM) .
"Average Combat rates" ? p- sed upon ammunition consumption for minor
skirmishes between small units over a period of one year.- (See Annex, IIB)
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CAPABILITY TO SUPPLY TIBgT FROM RAILHEADS IN CHINA
Railroads
?
There areno railroads in the Tibet area
Railheads
?
The main railheads for the supply of forces? in Tibet are Lan-chou
Hsi-fling (Th'engtu Hung-liu-yuan and Urumchi/Turfan 'From those points,
? suppies must be mo,:?ed by truck over great distances; for example Lan-chou
L'Ilmchi and Ch'engtu are about CC, 900, and airkine miles respectively
TAB "A"
.
"rem Lhasa,
Lan-hoJ-UrUMchi
Both Lan-hound Urumchi'are on the standard-gauge Lung-hal line ,which extends to
?
the east a-:ross mainland China.
from the north a brai7h line from which also joins the Urumchi line at
- ,
This line JS jointe'd at Lanchou by a standard-gauge line
Ian choli-Hsi-ning Line
-
The short standard-gauge line extending from Lan-chouwest to Hai-yen .
generally .follows the Huang Shill River valley. Ihe present terminals on the
line are:Ho-K'onan and Hsi-ning.
? Ch'enotu
? Ch'engtu is served- by a standard-gaugeiline which branches from the
Lung-hai line at Pao-chi to the 'southeast of Lanchou:- There is no railhead
to the v.:est from Ch'ellgtu.
5 Status al.' RaitToads-
- The condition and efficiency of railways in West China-are not accurately
known,. Communist China has made significant imp_rovement during the past decade
in railroad plan/ and operation, but operations ate hampered.by:
(1)
poorly engineered roadbeds,
light or overage tack construction
_(?) low-qu;41ity initia, installation and inadequate maintenance of the
right of way
deterioration of all plant through overloading,
(5)
insufficient length and the too great distance between passing tracks,
(6) insufficient doubly-tracking and
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(7) .inadequate.motive power and rolling stock inventories.
All the effects of the foregoing shortcomings are.felt.On the lines included
in this study
Gradual elimination of these deficiencies may be expected
if the economy continues to recover.
Tonnage Capabilities
. ;
The railroads serving Lanchou- Hsi-ning. Hung-liu-yuan Ch'emgtu, and
Urumchi/Turfan can delil'er tonnages to railheads in excess Of the tonnages,
which the. SR' no Tibet can carry
? Road Transportation -
a ? There art. :c.)u- main supply routes (M5Rs) into :Tibet from China
_
roper *.11"e are ol?er 000 miles long' The MSRs originate at the rail-
heads mentioried above. From west to east the MSRs are:
the Urumchi-Kashgar-Aksai Chin road, which extends from Kashgar,
in neighboring Sinkiang. to Tashigong in western Tibet
(2) the central MSR which extends from Hsi-ning and Hung-liu-yuan to Lhasa;
the northeastern MSR, goes from Hsi-ning to Choma Wong
The eastern MSR from Ch'engtu in Szectiwan to the. area of Tibet
north of India's Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA),
b The central MSR receives 'traffic from two initial-points which
cOnve,rge at Golmo,(Ka-erh-mu) The central MSR is the best and highest-
capacity route into Tibet ? It is also the easiest to keep in operation.- The
eastern MSR has been extremely difficult to maintain because of. the cross-
compartmented nature of the terrainand the many rivers which it crosses.-
6-1 Nature and Condition o( Road -Net
a Tibet has'a rudimentary and low-capacity 'road network.- There are no
significant inland waterways in Tibet ,-The Tsangpot(Brahmaputra) River is
navigable to small Craft for short sections: but is ofmore importance as an
obstacle notih-south transportation. The Tsangpo is not navigable through
the Northeast Frontier Agency into India,
?
? b ? The basic weakness of Tibet's road network is its lack of development.
In many of the areas'. roads have been built merely by removing' rock and large
stones from the natural
.surface followed by improvement
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c Because of poorly constructed subgrades inadequate surfacing and
poar drainage facilities. roads deteriorate constantly and require continuous
repair.
A major weakness of the regiOn's road system is the absence or poor
. construction of bridges Although bridging in-the desert basins is not of
year-round importance. spring runoff or summer flash floods often makeford
sites unusable for short periods. High level cable suspension bridges which
cross the deep ravines of the Yang-tze Mekong'and Salween rivers are vulnerable
to attack ? Almost without excePtion
bridges, in Tibet are on ,lane wide with
estimated gross load capacities varying from to 12 short tops.
'9 ? Specific Routes-
The Main Supply,Routes -(MSR) are as follows:
a - Fastern MSR: Ch'engtu-Chomo Dzong'brdinarily serving eastern Tibet
b Nor heastern MSR! Chomo Dzong. also serving eastern Tibet.
Central MSR: .Lanchatt/Hsi-ning/Hung-liu-yu?an-Lhasa via Golmo, ordinarily
serving Lhasa and the central setor_
d.
Western MSR: .Urumchi/Turfan-Kashgar/Yeh-ch'eng. usually SerVing only
the western sector
10 Supply Flov.,
Northeast,-7D and Eas' 7n MSIls
From the base supply depotsai\Ch'engtu and Hsi-ning, supplies are delivered by road to
Chomo Dzong depot area serving. the Ch'engtO and Lin-chih Military Sub-.
Districts
From IChomO Dwong jupplyldepot: supplies are distributed to:
(a) The northv,est-garrison area (units employed on internal security in
the Ting-ch'ing area
-(b) Li-ma (units operating in eastern NA).