SOVIET TEST FACILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000500070003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET :DINAR- CHESS -RUFF
- ;SECTION IV
SOVIET TEST FACLLITIES
1. Solid Propulsion Testing _
a. Introduction
R{TFF)
_ ~ Analysis of several Soviet test facilities has been conducted to deter-
mine the Soviet capability to provide solid propulsion units for ballistic ~tinissiles.
This study is the direct result of anaiysis of several~$oviet facilities that were
revealed through photography which provided intelligence of a concerted Soviet
e~foYt to develop large solid-propellant rocket motors. (TOP SECRET. DINAR
Propulsion Test Facilities
The Soviet facilities of primary interest to this study are located near
the cities of Krasnoyarsk, Perm, Sterlitamak, Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy and Biysk
shown in Figure 3. In addition, facilities located near Leningrad- and Sary Shagan
are discussed; also a Chinese facility that is located near Tai Yuan. Each facility,
excepting thQSe at Leningrad and Sary Shagan, contain structures that are similar.
Each is adjacent to' a chemical/munitions plant. All have what appear to be hori-
zontal static propulsion test cells. (TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF)
(I) .Krasnoyarsk - This solid propulsion static .test facility (Figure 4)
is located five NM east of the city of Krasnoyarsk. It is apparently road served
from the adjacent Krasnoyarsk Explosives Plant 5S0 Zlobino which has a probable
nitroglycerin facility. The. test facility is secured. Within the test area is a ]srge
and a small horizontal static propulsion test stand,, each complete -with apron and
blast deflectors. '(See Figure 5.) There is a revetted control bunker situated. be-
tween and to the rear of the two test cells. This area contains the typical unique
H-shaped building seen also at Biysk and Sterlitamak. In the plant area there are
.revetted buildings typical of those used for the production of nitroglycerin and un-.
usually long buildings which are typical of facilities used for nitrocellulose pro-
duction. It is important to note here that the facility suspected of nitroglycerin
production and associated with the test area is new as is the case for the Biysk
#acility. (TOP SEGRET DINAR RUFF)
~~
(2) Peerm - This solid propulsion test facility is located within the
confines of Kirov Plant- 98, Chemical and Munitions. Combine. Plant 98 is located
approximately 13 NM west of the center of Perm. The test facility is rail served,
secured and identical in part to facilities found at Biysk, Krasnoyarsk, Kamensk-
and Sterlitamak. A capability of producing several explosive bases exists within
the plant complex. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
1 59
TOP : SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF
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FACILITY
FIRST 08SERVEO
1 PERM
1963
2 STERLITAMAK .~
1963
3 KAMENSK
1963
4 81YSK
1963
5 KRASNOYARSK
1963
CROUP?1
Escludd han aNaeetk
~ownpediip and deeleeel(leellon.~
Fig. 3 Probable Solid Rocket Test Facilities
TOP SECRET RUFF
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Tor sc~11ET IIUFi
VV2003
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TOP ~ SECRET DINAR RUFF
(3) Sterlitamak - This solid propulsion test facility is located ap-
proximately T NM north of the city of Sterlitamak, adjacent to Explosives Plant 850.
V1Tithin the test area is a large H-shapedbuilding that also exists at the Biysk and
~ Krasnoyarsk facilities. As in the .case of Perm, only one static test facility exists.
(TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF) -
(4) Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy - This solid propulsion static test facility
is located djacent to the Kamensk-Shakhtinakiy Chemical Combine 101 on the south-
west side f the city of Kamenak-Shakhtinskiy. The test facility is secured. Within
the test ar a there is one teat cell which is separated from the deflector by a dis=
,tance Brea er than the other four similar sites. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
(5) Bi sk ~- This solid propulsion static test facility is located five
NM west o the city of Biysk. This facility appears to be both road and rail served
from tie B'ysk Explosives Plant and is secured by what appears to be a wall rather
than fenci g. The test area contains two horizontal test cells and a test position
tentatively identified for small artillery rockets. In addition, .this area contains
the large -shaped building also seen at Sterlit~mak and Krasnoyarsk. Photographic
coverage f the area now containing the facility typical of nitroglycerin production
revealed tin December 1960 this facility was in early stage construction. Since
then, tie robable nitroglycerin processing area has been constructed.
(TOP SEC ET DINAR RUFF) -
(6) Leningrad -This facility is located approximately 1Z NM northeast
of Leningr d. It is heavily secured and both road and rail served. Within the area
are revett d buildings and widely separated buildings which could accommodate all
of the pha es of manufacturing of motors. This facility differs from the other five
Soviet faci 'ties in~that there are no apparent nitroglycerin processing facilities.
While there are apparently two horizontal static test cells at this facility, there is
,in additio a larger test facility located approximately 10 NM northeast of this area.
Within thi test area are five bunkered positions that appear to contain test posi-
tions. (T P SECRET DINAR RUFF)
The Leningrad facilities have been discussed here primarily for
reporting ompleteness. These do not appear to be associated in layout or function
with the o er five Soviet facilities discussed previously. (TOP SECRET DINAR
-RUFF)
to the pro action of solid propellants and their eventual incorporation in a .rocket
motor. A present, .identification of the possible type of propellant employed, i. e. ,
systems. Within this complex, the layout of certain areas, their building configu-
rations, b Bring, and associated structures strongly suggest facilities devoted
~_ (7) Sary Shagan -Analyses of the Sary Shagan test complex (Figure 5)
indicate t this facility is designed for the development of antiballistic missile
'double ba a or composite, .is unresolved but the latter is more suggestive.
(TOP SEC ET DINAR RUFF) .
63
.TOP SECRET~DINAR RUFF
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FAMIGIING A1FA
L
~~ ~'
AS921
GR0UP?1
Eriel~ ko~ AwfaMk
MrFF~rdIFy wed dalasNkrlon.
d~
SECRET?NO FOREIGN DISSEM
;,, . yuE
Fig. 5 Suspect Solid Propellant F~icilities at Sary Shagan
i~a
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TOP SECRET DINAR -CHESS RUFF
(8) Ta+ i~Yua~ - This Communist Chinese facility ie located just north
of Tsi Yuan and was previousl targeted as "Tai Yuan Explosives and Ammunition
pant. " Photography fro~Mission 113, dated June 1962 revealed the ex-
istence. of two new structures at the plant's test range, having the appearance of
horizontal static propulsion teat stands. Because of the quality' of photography
and the solid propulsion implication, a detailed analysis was made. (SECRET-
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
- ~ The plant area of this facility is complex and houses many func-
ti ns. Of significance, however; was the facility typical of European type nitio-
gl~cerin processing with its system of bunkered buildings and cross-walks. Of
added significance was the fact that Soviet participation in this venture became
evident when photography of the five Soviet facilities became- available.
(TOP SECRET DINAR -CHESS RUFF)
Many of the Tai Yuan buildings in the plant area are similar to
those in the five USSR facilities. Analysis of this facility was then broadened to
determine this facility's function. (TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF)
The probable nitroglycerin area was evaluated in an attempt to
determine process flow and output capability. The long buildings were assessed to
.produce nitrocellulose. These two products are then blended to produce the typi-
Cal double base propellant typical of that known to be used in the Soviet Guideline
missile. Scaling of the test facility indicates that motors of up to 290, 000 pounds
thrust can~be tested at the large test range. Additionally, it was noted that
_~
sc_ awing-_similar to a blast mark existe_ d. This was scaled and resulted in a thrust
level comparable to that of Guideline. Thus, this facility may produce the boosters
for a Chinese version of the Soviet IGuideline. (SE.CRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM) ,
- 'Irhe capacit of this facility can-be determined.. However, ~it
would have little or no value ecause the nitroglycerin produced here may also be
used for many other applications. Were this plant assumed to use Biazzi nitrators,
then it would produce about. one ton of nitroglycerin. per hour. There are three
such nitrators located here; owever, one is probably a standby. Assuming 40
percent nitroglycerin in doub a base propellant; the monthly capacity with-no line
loss would be approximately , ?50-tons and production about 2, 500 tons. The
booster for the Soviet Guideline requires about 500 pounds of nitroglycerin. Thus
nitroglycerin production would be adequate for about 10, 000 boosters per month,
which of course is lan extremely high number of boosters.. (SECRET -NO FOREIGN
DSEM)
c. Propellant Iden `fication , -
Soviet handbooks discussing 'missiles that have used solid propellants
have provided knowledge of. the use of double base propellants in motors of the un-
guided FROG artillery rocke~s and the booster of the Guideline. Five of Soviet
~' solid motor manuf2-cturing ax~d static testfacilities contain an area typical of that
for nitroglycerin processing, identified?b}. the system of revetted buildings and
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF
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TOP S-EGRET DINAR RUFF
system of cross-walks.. Facilities such as these can be modified to some other
propellant system.' However, at both Krasnoyarsk and Biysk the probable nitro-
glycerin areas are new. Were some other propellant system being used in the
motors being made here, other signatures would likely be evident. (TOP SECRET
DINAR RUFF) ,
Soviet open literature reveals interest in the use~of both the double
base and composite propellants. Since. double-base propellants are still a
part of the Soviet effort, it is reasoned here that the motors currently being devel-
oped use the double base propellant system. It can, however, be postulated that if
the Soviets were to encounter serious setbacks in the application of double base sys-
tems- to urge motors they would, with additional effort, be able to change propellant
' formulations. {TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
d. Initiation of Facility Construction
The five Soviet solid propellant motor manufacturing and static test
facilities located near Perm, Sterlitamak, Kamensk, Biysk and Krasnoyarsk were
first observed in mid-1963 through the recognition of a separately secured static
test area. Since their discovery,. it has been possible from: previous coverage to
determine roughly when construction was initiated. The Krasnoyarsk facility was
s-tamed in 1960 and completed in 1961.. -The other facilities were probably started
in 196-1 and completed in 1963. Because of the similarity in plan -layout, all appear
to be under the control of a single agency such as the State Chemistry Planning
Committee Nr. 3 as noted in the liquid propellant program. (TOP. SECRET DINAR
RUFF)
e. Analysis of Thrust Capabilities
Because all-five of the facilities are similar the analysis of one .may
~.:abe 'regarded as representative of all. For purposes. of orientation and demonstra-
tion of analysis technique, the Krasnoyarsk facility shown earlier was chosen.
Figure 5 is a line drawing of the test area showing the blast deflectors and the
H-shaped building which represented the principal identifier. Here is seen the
large and small horizontal static test stand with their aprons and deflectors.
Thrust capability of the facilities is based on the.distance from the end of -the test
position to the face of the deflector and is shown in Figure 7: After determining
the critical distance of each of the seven test positions, the method chosen to
determine the thrust rating of the stand was applied. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
Thrust determination was based on general gas dynamic principles
whereby the exhaust plume of a rocket motor has been well defined. This process
of analysis is referred to as the- "Exhaust Stagnation Pressure' method. ~It is ,
recognized that the length of an exhaust plume of a rocket motor is primarily de-
pendent on thrust. Within the.glume there is a wide range of gas velocities,
66
TOP SECRET~DINAR RUFF
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TOP SECRET RUFF
DEFLECTOR
AV 206 ___. ^. ? ~ ~~` TOP SECRET RUFF
~wrnt~l~ d d~ele~~ifkrion.
Fig. 6 Krasnoyarsk Static Test Stands
67
TOP SECRET RUFF
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GROUP?1. ,
Ealudod hom ouon~~o
down/~d1e1 ~ d~eleulfkalion.
TOP SECRET RUFF
Fig. ? Krasnoyarsk Test Structure
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TOP SECRET ~ DINAR RUFF
pressures and.temperaturee. Atypical stagnation pressure-temperature map for.
a sea level thrust of 1, 500, 000 pounds is shown in Figure 8. (TOP SECRET
DINAR RUFF) - ?
It has been well established by test stand and structural principles
? that the ideal point for a blast deflector is just beyond the last point where the
exha=ust plume remains supersonic. Many organizations in the United States who
have studied this technology have established the 30 psis isobar as the critical
stagnation pressure or that point where the exhaust velocity is down to Mach 1.
Placing--the deflector any closer than the 30 psis isobar places it in an area too
destructive for conventional .construction materials because of supersonic shock
waves, overpressure and high temperature.? The deflector -can be located farther
away, say-at the 25 psis isobar; however, if the purpose of the deflector is to con-
- selrve space then it is not ideally located. Since_ the deflectors are located at
several different distances from the test cells, it ~is assumed that they were placed
by design rather than happenstance. Therefore, it was assumed that the deflectors
- were placed such that the 30 psis isobar of the motor being tested would be pro-
- duced on the front face of the deflector. Several pressure maps such as the one
j shown here have been constz-~icted for various thrust levels. Using `these maps an
empirical relationship between the critical distances and sea level thrust was de-
veloped for the 30 psis isobar and the 1000oF isotherm. The results of this anal-
ysis are presented in Figure 9. Using this correlation, the measured distance
from the test cell to the deflector was the basis for determining directly the max-
imum sea level thrust limitations ~of the seven test cells. The distance hetween
the static test cell and the deflectors- is shown in Figure 10. .These dimensions
' then have been correlated to thrust level which is also shown. `- (TOP SECRET
DINAR RUFF)
Implied Applications
The thrust class of about 400, 000 pounds associated with four of the
seven -test stands exceeds the requirem nts of unguided solid artillery rockets
(under. 100, 000 pounds) or the boosters ~or surface-to-air missiles (about 60, 000
pounds for Guideline to about 260, 000 pounds for GRIFFON). Additionally, the -
four larger stands are in a later time phasing than is proper for the above appli-
cations. -Therefore, it can be reasonably concluded that the -four larger stands
are part of a Soviet solid propulsion missile program that could lead ~to an ICBM
capability. The three smaller test stands have a thrust class between 80, 000
pounds and 200, 000 pounds, and they could be tied in with upper stage static motor
testing of a possible future solid ICBM. While this ~ove .call thrust determination
analysis has been predicated on the discrete use of gas dynamic maps reduced Ito
- - -~-~- -
with similar maps whose pressures and temperatures are presented in increments
of pressure and temperature better suited to computer techniques quite indepen-
dently obtained thrust levels comparable to those listed herein. (TOP SECRET
DINAR RUFF)
. 69
TOP ~ SECRET ? DINAR RUFF
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RADIAL JET SPREADIIyG,FT
100
50
990
50
100
OROUP,7
Dewnpdd e1 12 reer Itienele~
!M eefwee/ieeily Ieel.uHle1.
Fig. 8 Sample Pressure-Temperature Map
I ~ ~ ~ i
STAGNATION TEMPERA 1URE1 ,F.
i i I l
~ 2000 looo
3000 ~~
RAMP DESIGN POINT
100
.~^^.-~
100 200 300 400 500 600, 700 800 900 1000?
AXIAL DISTANCE FROM NOZZLE EXIT,FT
N
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1000 ^
100
10
DISTANCE-FT
V64.1268
GROUP?~
~pwn~r~d'~1 12 ~ I~N.~rdts
tM aufowrkdl~ 1aIN~N1~.
10 100 1000 10,000
THRUSt-1000 LBS SECRET
Fig. 9 Thrust Determinations from Facility Dimensions
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C
11
DISTANCE
DATE OF ~
DATE OF
FROM
SEA LEVEL
FACILITY
START
FINISH
TEST SAY TO
THRUST
~~ DEFLECTOR
X103 L~)
KRASNOYARSK
`
A ~ LA R G E)
MaR. 1961-
SEP. 1962
310
400
~ ~SM.AII)
.JAN. 1960
JUN. 1961.
110
~ 80
E R M
1961
1962 - 1963
335
450
STERLITAMAK
1961
1962 - 1.963
200
200
~IYSK
A ~ L A R G E)
D1EC~. 1961
JUN. 1963
340
450
SMALL)
DEC. 1961
JUN 1963
150
125
K A M E N S K
DEC. 1961 ~
JUN. 1963
350
475
AVERAGE TIME OF FACILITY CONSTRUCTION: 1%2 YEARS
GROUP?1
Eselud~d hom oNOwalle
downondino vnd d~el~ssllkallon.
Fig: 10 Thrust Levels at Specific Soviet Test Stands.
TOP SECRET RUFF
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n
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TOP ~ SECRET ~ DINAR. .RUFF
Solid Propulsion Development Program
To relate these facilities to, a specific motor development program,
a sample development schedule has been established- as shown in Figure 11. Pho-
tographic intelligence of the Krasnoyarsk facility has established the construction
time period and reveals the availability of the static stands for testing. This dates
the achievement of,certain mileposts in the basic technologies. Based on the in-
formation on the manufacturing and ~atatic test facilities from 1960 to 1963, it is
believed that propellant energy improvement to the double base plateau (200 seconds
of the basis of 1000 psi to sea level pressure) with the use of additives should have
started in about. 1957.. It is probable that in early 1958 the Soviets committed
themselves to a serious solid propulsion program. Motor designs would then have
been chosen by. 1959 to provide facility construction details such as process flow,
motor sizes, facility equipment and the initiation of motor parts design that could
be developed elsewhere. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
Assuming that the program went as planned, static testing of the small
motors should have occurred in late 1961: Testing of the large motors could then
have started in late 1`962. Development testing would then continue until the design
was proven. By mid-1964 motors could be available for flight testing. Static
motor testing has just recently been detected at the test stand of the Kamensk
facility. Additionally, it appears that testing of a motor has just recently been
? ~ accomplished at the remote heavily bunkered area adjacent to the test facility at
Perm. This testing which has occurred approximately one year after the facil-
ities were apparently complete indicates that motor development is behind schedule
' as indicated by the Novikov reporting or that additional time was required to com-
plete other portions of the facility germane to the motor development. (TOP
SECRET DINAR RUFF)
Photographic evidence confirms all of the earlier studies that have
been conducted which indicated the existence of a Soviet solid propulsion program.
Based oa the timing of facility construction the timing of the propulsion program
cant be reasonably well defined. Analysis of the static test facilities has revealed
the thrust class of the motors under consideration. .However; the actual design
and performance of the solid propulsion subsystem is also required in order to
determine effectiveness in a missile. The two most important motor parameters
that must be determined in order to define a propulsion s}iatem are specific im-
pulse and propellant weight fraction. Specific impulse is a measure of propellant
energy. Weight fraction is the ratio of propellant weight in the motor to the over-
all motor weight. (TOP SECRET DINAR 1ZUFF) -
From the nature of these terms it can be readily- realized that precise
knowledge of actual performance is not known, nor is it readily available. These ...
parameters will, however,. become better defined when telemetry'. from flight
vehicles is obtained and analyzed. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
?3
TOP- SECRET ~ DINAR RUFF
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BASIC
AND DESIGN
(TECHNOLOGIES
FACILITY
DEVELOPMENT
-~ NEST AREA-
O RELATED
'~ SUPPORT
~~ AREAS
rn
~1 STATIC TEST
~ ~ CAPABILITY
rn
ICBM
f LIGHT. TEST
CAPABILITY
GROUP?1
Exeludd kan aRowrfie
1ewn~~lliq ~ d.el~~~Nka-lon.
1355 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64, 65~ 66
TOP SECRET RUFF
Fig. 11 Sample Solid Missile Development Program-Krasnoyarsk
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MO OR DESIGN CHOSEN
* ,~
D CISIO TO
DEVELOP MOTOR
~ ~ t SMALL
LARGE
COMPLETE COMPLEITE
ISMALL LARGE
0
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TOP SECRET"DINAR RUFF
h. ICBM Implications
Based on these studies these parameters have been correlated with
time and shown in Figure 12; in order to assess a Soviet ICBM capability. The
specific impulse curve shows that in 1957 propellant performance was very low.
~- This point is representative of unmodified double base propellants as identified
through Soviet handbooks. Shown then is the improvement in performance that
_- is both necessary and readily obtainable by first generally improving the double _
base energy by formulation changes, then by the use of additives. These changes
are required to support high thrust, long duration motor development. Without
this achievement the Soviets could not provide an effective large solid-propellant
motor. Propellant weight fraction which is really a term that denotes metal parts
efficiency must also be improved. The Guideline surface-to-air missile booster"
is known to have a.propellant weight fraction of approximately 0. 58. This means
that the metal parts of the motor weigh almost as much as the propellant. This
- represents dead weight that must be carried. This motor has a volumetric ef-
ficiency of about 55 percent because the individual extruded grains are held in
place in the straight portion of the case. If this propellant cast in the motor case
were approximately 15 percent, more propellant could be loaded in the same case
and the propellant weight fraction would then be approximately 0. 63. Additionally,
were the propellant cast in the motor case, the case steel thickness using the same
steel could be reduced which would provide an additiorLal improvement. Changing
the steel to ~ higher strength type would effect another improvement. (TOP SECRET
DINAR RUFF)
This type of improvement is not too critical to a booster such as the
Guideline; however, for large motors of the ICBM class these gains must be made.
_ The Soviets in 1959 developed a new high strength steel for application to solid-
propellant motors. .The Soviets have been assessed to have the capability to cast
double base propellants. These factors then provide the improvement shown by
this weight fraction curve to about 1965 where it is expected to level out at'about
0.85. No further improvement is visualized-because the Soviets have a tendency
to overdesign their motors, the propellant they have apparently chosen is a hot
burning propellant which will require heavy nozzles and there has been no firm
indication of a Soviet program to develop fiberglass pressure shells for solid pro-
pulsion application. For comparison, propellant weight fractions achieved by the
U. S. for upper stage motors exceeded 0.85 only when fiberglass pressure shells
were introduced. (TOP SECRET. DINAR RUFF)
These considerations form the bases for application of solid propellants
to the Soviet ICBM capability. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
75
TO.P~ SECRET ~ DINAR RUFF
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SPECIFIC IMPULSE
260.
GROUP?3
Downord~d ~ 12 -~ IRwrdy
Nei wleswlcelly d~elauMbd.
~ ~
0.6
I ~
PROPELLANT DENSITY-100#/FT'
0.5
PROPELLANt LOADING-8~-88%
1960 1965
FLIGHT TEST CAPABILITY.
Fig. 12 Soviet Solid Propulsion Parameters
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TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF
2. Solid Propellant Missile Testing
a. Introduction
Subsequent to the 'completion of satisfactory teats at propulsion de-
velopment facilities, motors developed at these facilities will be transferred to .
missile test facilities for stage mating, checkout and flight testing. Upon satis-
factory completion of the flight testing, the motors developed or serially produced
at these facilities will be transferred to operational sites for stage mating. Check-
out and storage in the ready condition. The Soviet facilities which would be used
for the field testing of solid missiles would be either those at Kapustin Yar or
Tyura Tam. These were studied to determi}ie possible indications of the Soviet
solid-propellant program. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
- b. Kapustin Yar Missile Testing Facilities
A study of the Kapustin .Yar test facilities eliminates from considera-
tion all areas except the C area. The A and B areas are primarily associated with
Soviet naval cruise and ballistic missile systems; the D area is associated with
long range cruise systems; and the G area is associated with the shorter range
systems _such as the SS-1 and SS-2. The key factors on the C area are summarized
in Figure 13. The only area that could be compatible with the possible Soviet solid
propulsion missile program of 1963-1964 is the C-5A area, which is probably pri-
marily a trainin; area for soft SS-4 deployment. However, it was under construc-
tion up to the end of 1963, while the C-5B probable training area for soft SS-5
deployment apparently was abandoned in 1962. There is nothing in the C-SA area
that can be uniquely associated with a solid .propulsion missile; however, this is
the only area at KYMTR which is in time compatibility with the possible solid
propulsion missile program of 1963- 1964. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
c. Tyura Tam Missile Testing Facilities
.The Tyura Tam missile. test center is the Soviet ?research and develop-
ment facility for ICBM weapon and space systems. It is shown in schematic form
3n Figure 14. The SS-6 missile and space program was flight tested from Area A
prior to 1961. After I9~1 the SS-6 operational missile ?flight'test program moved
to Area B but the space flights using the SS-6 booster continued to use. the A area.
The SS-7 program has employed the C and D-1 areas at Tyura Tam, and these
facilities have served as operationally configured prototype launch areas for soft
and hard deployment, respectively. The SS-8 program has employed the E and F
areas at Tyura Tam, and these facilities have served as operationally configured
prototype launch areas for soft and hard. deployment, respectively. The SS-9
program probably will employ the H area for a soft launch environment and the
D-2 area for a hard launch environment. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
"77
TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF
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. ,TOP SEC,ET CHESS RUFF
Fig. , 13
KYM TR AREAS
u -tip ,
r ~~
`'~ w,
y ~ ~~:
i ~~!
~~
TC~P SECRET CHESS RUFF
V ~ 15 4 8'"
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C-1 MODIFIED IN 1962...KY COSMOS
C-Z 1960...SS-S i N0~ CHANGE;
C-3 SS-3 AND SS-4 SOFT SITES
C-4 OPERATIONAL PROTOTYPE
SILO SITES FOR SS-4 AND SS-S
C-SA TRAINING SITE FOR SOFT SS-4
~- DEPLOYMEN_T. CONSTRUCTION
COMPLETED IN 1963; TIME
COMPA TABLE WITH NEW. MRBM
PROGRAM
C-St TRAINING SITE FOR SOFT SS-S
DEPLOYMENT ABANDONED IN 1962
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-U/1
SITE 'G' 5a;6
SITE 'G' 1Q~2
SI'~E '~G' .38,4
SIDE 'K'
SITE 'F'
SITE '8'
SITE 'E' SITE 'O'
SITE '~' ITE
SITE 'A' SITE 'I'
1~2
AR A 'X' ~,
TYURA TAM
rn
n
MAIN SUPPORT
GROUP?1
E~elu~~d kom wlaw~lic
~wn~rdln~ ~n1 dici~s~Nkeflen.
NM
15
Fig. 14 Tyura Tam MTR Areas
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TOP SECRET DINAR.RUfF
Of the newer facilities. some can be shown to be for larger systems
and therefore would probably be tied in with liquid .propulsion systems. Areas
G-1 and G-2 can be positively associated with the new Soviet ICBM program which
began in April 1964. Areas G-3 and G-4 and J are facilities that will probably
support future large liquid propulsion systems. (TOP SECRET. DINAR RUFF)
The smaller new facilities are suspect for a possible Soviet solid pro-
pulsion ICBM program. Area _I is shown in the lower half of Figure 15. It consists
at present of a single rectangular excavation for a probable silo launch site. There
is road service into the area. Area K is shown on the upper part of Figure 15. It
consists at present of two smaller rectangular excavations for probable silo launch
sites. There is road service into the area. .The K area also will use an L-shaped
interferometer ?similar to the type used in the H area and D-2 area SS-9 facilities.
Both the I and K areas could be for future solid propulsion ICBM programs, but no
unique characteristics can be identified.. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
A--more probable solid propulsion ICBM facility at Tyura Tam is the
area west of area G. It is shown in Figure 16. The left facility above the road had
been initiall evaluated by FTD as a possible soft launch area, but later coverage
The center area below the r.oa is -very semi r o a so id-prope nt
motor storage area. The right facility above the road has just been recently iden-
tified on later coverage and the two launch points have been designated G-5 and
G-6. However, it is not believed to be a part of the main G complex since the
rail service for the main G complex is not intended for this new area, and since
the pair of launch points form a smaller site .than either G- 1 and G-2 _or G-3 and
G-4. It is believed that G-5 and G-6 will be aroad-served soft launch site. The
two launch points are- relatively close together, about 800 feet apart.
(TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
The association of the center facility below the road shown in
Figure 16 with solid-propellant motor storage is based on a comparison of the
revetted buildings in the area with the Polaris solid motor storage revetted
buildings at Cape Kennedy. In Figure 17 the Soviet facility in the area west of
the G area is compared with the Polaris facility using a common scale factor.
The use of revetted buildings is common for safety and environmental handling
of solid-propellant motors. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
? The facility at Tyura Tam west of area G. is therefore probably as-
sociated with a solid propulsion ICBM program, and~vill probably include a .
' nuclear storage aiea, a solid-propellant motor .storage area., and two soft launch
pads. It could be completed in early 1965. (TOP SECRET DINAR RUFF)
82
TOP. SECRET ~ DINAR RUFF
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TOP SECRET RUFF
TYURA TAM
~'
TOP SECRET RUFF
vv2oo~
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TOP SECRET RUFF :,
TYU RA TAM
MISSION 1006-1
. JUNE 1964
TOP SECRET RUFF
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~i
TOP SECRET RUFF
SCALE IN FEET
V V 1945
GROUP-1 i
E:cludod f~em oulow+elle
de~rnyrodinp and deelesslficeeton.
Fig. ?17 Tyura Tam MTR. Area G and Polaris Storage Area
H7
TOP SECRET- RUFF
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SECRET-
. SECTION V
APPLICATIONS OF SOVIET SOLID PROPELLANTS
1. Introduction
An early application of solid propellantB by the Soviet Union was in
the early 1430'x. Using" a concept patented by Alfred Nobel in 1888, the gelatinza-
tion of nitrocellulose by the explosive plasticizer nitroglycerin, the Soviets were
able to refine the jelling process enough to develop adouble-base solid propellant
suitable for use in their ''Katyuska" artillery barrage. rocket. This rocket used a
double-base propellant which contained 56.5 percent nitrocellulose, 28.0 percent
nitroglycerin, 11.0 percent dinitrotoluene'~~another explosive less sensitive than
o nitroglycerin) and 4.5 percent ethyl centra].ite, a combustion stabilizer. (SECRET)
Since World War II, the Soviets have given primary attention to the
development of liquid fueled missiles; derivations from German technology acquired
after World War II. The Soviet achievements with liquid fueled engines are widely
known. (SECRET)
Because of this success and concentration on liquid fueled engines,
Soviet use of solid propellants has been confined to aircraft takeoff boosters, short
range air-to-air missiles, tactical missiles, and to first stage boost for surface-
to-air and an antiballistic missile system.' The -majority of these solid propellants
are believed to be double-base formulations. These propellants are referred to
generically by the Soviets as "gunpowder." Known formulations of Soviet solid pro-
pellants were given in Table III. In two instances, the AA-4 and AA-5, the use of
composite solid propellants is suspected because of the time of weapons systems
development. ~ (SECRET)
pressure relationship. (SECRET)
Similarities to the basic compositions were noted with refinements
such as dibutylphthalate and nitrodiglycol as plasticizers, vaseline as an extrusion
aid, magnesium oxide and chalk as burning rate modifiers, and the lead oxide as an
approach to "plateau" catalyst to decrease the sensitivity of the burning rate-
The Soviets are granted the capability to adapt ,this formulation to all
of their known present-day, solid-propellant missile systems, within conceptions
of using single or multiple extruded grains. (SECRE.T) -
The Soviets are assessed to be using solid propellants in all five of
their air-to-air .missiles. They are not believed to be using solid propellants in
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SECRET
any of their-four air-to-surface missiles, although one of the air-to-air missiles,
the AA-1, is granted a limited air-to-surface capability and one of the liquid-fueled
air-to-surface missiles, the AS-4, might use ashort-duration RATO unit. The
major use of solid propellants by the Soviets ie in their surface-to-air missiles as
boosters burning for 4 to 5 seconds. Thrust of these boosters is from about 24, 000
to 260, 000 pounds. For application to surface-to-surface rockets, the Soviets are
assessed to use solid propellants on six of their eight free-flight tactical artillery
rockets (all of less than 30 NM range), .for their two antitank wire-guided missiles,
and for an ejection device for -the SARK, an underwater submarine-launched liquid-
fueled mi'seile. Zn addition to these rocket. and missile applications, the Soviets
have baoet-assist systems such as small RATO units and larger -zero-length launch
units .? Completing the assessment of Soviet solid-propellant applications are leas
strategically significant devices such as seat ejectors, mortar launchers, ammuni-?
tion, etc. (SECRET) -
Current Applications
a. Air-to-Air Applications of Solid Propellants
Air-to-air missiles characteristically are small in diameter. The
propellant in the Soviet AAMs is assessed to be a solid, and an extruded, double-
base formulation seems most logical, especially for the earlier air-to-air missiles.
Assignment of the propellant characteristics is predicated on expected develop-
ments within the time frame precc;cling ti-:e initial appearance of the.missil~.
(.SECRET) -
(1) The AA-1 missile is a native,Soviet development which had its in-
ception around 19~ 1- 1952 and became operational in five years . It is believed to
The propellant is assessed to have a specific impulse of 195 seconds and a burn-
tiine of 4 seconds. (SECRET)
have a single extruded double-base grain slightly less
(2) The AA-2, quite similar to the U. S. SIDEWINDER, became oper-
ational in 1959, two- years after the AA- 1. As with the AA- 1, the AA-2 is presumed
to have an extruded double-base grain. The grain is smaller in diameter
impuls e
but has a shortened burning time - 3 seconds - and an improved specific
of 220 seconds. (SECRET)
(3) The AA-3 is believed to have become operational in 1961, two
years after the AA-2. Again, the propellant is assessed to. be a single extruded
double-base grain with a specific impulse essentially the same .as the AA-2, i. e. ,
220 seconds, but with a shorter burning time, 2.2 to 2.4 se-conds, and an increased
diameter (SECRET) - '
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SECRET
25X1
25X1
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(4) The AA-4 is believed to have become operational around late 1963
and was seen on a FLIPPER as early as 1961. It is also assessed to have used
composite propellant which has a burning time of 4 seconds an im roved specific
impulse,- .230 seconds, and an increased grain diameter, (SECRET)
(5) The AA-5 is thought to be slightly larger than the ~AA-4 in both
length and diameter. Its propellant is presumably the same as the AA-4; a com-
posite propellant; specific impulse, 230 seconds; but with aburn-time of 4 seconds.
The improvement of the AA-5 over the earlier air-to-air missiles is in the use of
lighter weight fabrication metals from which is expected atwo-fold benefit. First,
an increase of 50 percent in range; secondly, the possibility of a nuclear warhead.
Although the AA-5 and the AA-4 were originally seen at the same time (at the
Tushino Air Show in 1961), the AA-5 is expected to become operational sometime
in 1964, about one year after the AA-4. (SECRET)
b. Air-to-Surface Applications of Solid Propellants
The Soviets are not believed to have any solid propellant missiles de-
signed specifically for an air-to-surface mission. All known Soviet air-to-surface
missiles have been assessed to be aerodynamic air-breathers using akerosene-type
fuel. However, the AS-4 might have a small liquid rocket boost. The AA- 1 has re-
cently been assessed to have an air-to-surface capability on a line-of-sight basis.
No long-range air-to-surface missile using a solid propellant (akin to the SKYBOLT)
has yet appeared. (SECRET)
c. Surface-to-Air_ Applications of Solid Propellants
No Soviet surface-to-ait missiles use solid propellants exclusively.
However, four such defensive missiles do use solid propellant boosters. (SECRET)
(1) The SA-2 miss_ ile, the Guideline, uses a solid propellant booster
,whose prototype was associated with vehicle of the late .1952 time period designated
32-B, of which about 50 were built. The Guideline itself became operational in
early 1958 and has been in mass production since that time. It is widely deployed
throughout the Soviet Bloc and also in Cuba. It is also deployed in Iraq, Indonesia,
-and India. Within the~Soviet Bloc there are over 1000 SA-2 launch sites .with at
least six missiles at ea~ic site. The solid propellant in the booster is assessed to
''be 14 extruded double-base grains, each about 4 inches in diameter, which have a
delivered specific impulse of 210 to 215 seconds . The weight of the combined grains
is 1, 210. pounds; burn-time, 4. 3 seconds; and a total impulse of about 260,000 pounas-
! seconds. (SE.CRET)
(2) The booster for the SA-3 missile, the GOA, is estimated, from
limited intelligence information, .to have a delivered thrust of 24, 400 pounds derived
from a propellant with a specific impulse of 210 seconds. The total propellant
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SECRET
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weight may be about 500 .pounds, burning-time, 4. 3 seconds. The booster is be-
lieved to have 14 extruded double-base grains. The SA-3
system became operational in 1961 and is deployed at about _100 sites -within the
Soviet Union, primarily at coastal approaches . (SECRET)
,-
(3) The AM-1 missile,. the GRIFFON, appears to be a scale-up of the
Guideline. The solid-propellant booster is believed to be of increased size, having
an assembly of 12 extruded double-base grains,. The
propellant is assessed to have a specific impulse of 215 to 225 seconds, a 4-second
burning time; and a total weight of 4780 to 5420 pounds, delivering a thrust of
around 260,000 pounds. ? Apart from the. fact that this booster has grains about
twice the diameter of those in the Guideline booster, it is not significantly different
from the Guideline. booster, whose development began. more than 11 years al;o.
(SECRET) ?
(4) Anew missile, as yet undesignated, which was first shown in the
1964 May Day parade uses 4 small solid-propellant- boost devices, which are es-
sentially RATO.boost.units. Each unit is assessed to have an extruded?double-hale
grain with a specific impulse of 205 seconds, a burning-time of 3 seconds and a
propellant weight of 340 pounds. (SECRET)
d. Surface-to-Surface Applications of Solid Propellants
(1) Free-Flight Rockets ,- There are seven artillery rockets
the Soviet Army. Six of these use extruded double-base grains.
in use by
high-explosive rocket contains