SINO-SOVIET AIR DEFENSES FAR EAST (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000500250003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 157
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 27, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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Approved For Release 2003/12/19 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000500250003-0
 ""SECRET
COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
#U:..7 ~-~'ytlc-
C
SING -,SOVIET AIR DEFENSES
FAIR EAST (U)
(S!iADFE) (U)
COILED AND Pr 1DUCWD SY
FLE INI"ELLIGF_NCE - ENTER. PACIFIC
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
DECLASSIFIED DOD DIP 5200-10
GRP 1H
 FLEET IIIrELLIGERCE CENTER PACIFIC
Navy ?128 No. 1275
tin Fleet Po at Office
San Francisco, California
_ In accordance with reference (a).
2: St.u-Sovfat Air Defenses: Far Em S[~(SSA~'E) promulgated 6y CO, FICPAC Sc- eletter,
Trial 00991 of 17 December 1962 ,(s hereby canceled and superseded.
3. Tho'ele,sification of the information c6Acatnad In this publication is SECRET and
mm.t not be released to foreign govermesnts. This publication shall be transported,
stowed, safeguarded, and ? ounted for 18 a ordance with the instructions contained I.
reference (b).
4. Reproduction of this doci cy is not suthorited without the_perni..... of the Com-
mander in Chief U. S. Pacific Pleat; hwevar, ea:tra.t. eery be suds fr- this publication
e, necessary. for operation. and training of United States Force,, provided such e ts
aca stow=s safeguarded, accounted for; and destroyed in accordance with the provisions
of reference (b). R.gaest. for additional copies of this publication should be addressed
to the Commandsr in Chief U. S. Pact fic Flast via the adrdnistr,tive chain of commend with
copy to Commnding Officer. Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific. Such reque,ts should
contain a .-cement of Justification. -
Sub3t/ gin*.-Soni.t Air Defenses. For East (SSADVE); prnnolgsc~ion of (11)
Soft (a) CINCPaf?LTISSr 05450.1C (SOWAL)
(b) OPIAVISST 5510.15
1. Thle lntalligenci publication provides inforeation pertaining to --c SL,,-Soviet
tine Air'Dafan.s In the CINCPaCFLT are, of interest in the Far East and is promulgated
FICPAC/33:Jee
3800.7
5er 00717
27 September 1963
Fronk Commanding Officer. Fleet Intelligence Cancer Pacific
To. Distribution List -` -
S. This publication shall not be carried in aircraft for use therein; however, ertrscte
may be carried in United States aircraft when necessary for use in training and operations-
Loch extracts shall not reveal the extent of the collection and evaluation program.
6. This dotusmnt contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the raring of the Espionage Lewis, Title 18. Section 793. 794 and 798, U. S. Code.
The tranamtasion or revelation of its contents to an unauthorized person 1s prohibited
by law.
7. Comments and recommandationa for leproving the concmc end/or [ornuc of this publication
? desired ad should be addressed to the Cnding Officer, Fleet Intelligence Center
Fact fit.
Distribution i --DOWNGRADED AT 12-9P6RINrERVAlSr-
(Sea pig. iii) NOT AD1R(AIICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.10
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~co6ar 1963
 TASLS Or CO6I18tS
enn_mvrei - D SZS. FAIL Zan'
PART I
~f ljl , Yeti- loan
:~ ~. ' anov7 I ................
...........f --??----??- 1.1
1" AIR DIFEWS9 ORGAXlZATIOl
1.1
1.2 ' IR Os1vSS @UATiORS............... 06 ............................
.1.2.1 Tracking Opatariooa ............................................... 1.1
1.2.2 Iocaicapt Operatiwa........1 ..................................... 1.1
2.2.3 Anti-aircraft Arcillarr and &afara-to-Air Missile Operatiwt..... 1.2
1.3 SII.Cl201RC S40IP"m ........ ........................................ 1.2
1.3.1 "Fly Yarolq and Surva1l1anca Radars .............:............... 1.3
1.3.2 Night Finding ..................................
............. 1.5 1 1.3.3 olrooed,Centralled Intercept Red"-- ................. ~. _.` .....??? 1.5
1.3.4 Acaoteittw and Fits CM=01 Radar ................... may`........
1.3.5 . Airbor- Aid-to-Iatercapt Radar: ................... ...... ._1.7
1.3.6 Identificatiw prleod-ord-....... ............................... 1.T
1.3.7 Air Dafanr Com!ratiwe........................................
1.3.1 Active Sl.ctrooit Co-terasasorea ............................... 1.9
1.3.9 paaeiwe Datertim ...............................................: 1.9
1.4 e.e.T VY1m0 RADAR PICmT SHIPS .................................. 1.9
A .A.2 And-Aircraft Art111er7 ......................................
1.1.3 ? lorfata-tn-air masibs ..............:........................... 1.15
1J.4 Interco tore ...................................................._.,
1.1.3 tom.tuctona .............................................L::: 1.16
n6Ei AIRPRATT .....................:..........................
1.6 A !1-AIRCIAIT AR193ta1 (ALL) ..................................... 1.10
1.7 on= MQm1TZS ................F.................................. 1.11
1.7.1 ffifacs-to-Atr (SAW .......... ......................:..---...... 1.11
1.14
1.7.2 S4-2 Lea Altitude Capabilit7?? ?.???????????????.......-?-??" ...... 1.13
1.7.3 Air-to-Air (AMD ......................................
e. 1.1 TACTICAL Cmt6IDmAT10ES..4 ....................................... 1.15
1.15
Detection mad Tractiog.??????????????????.????????... ..... 1.15
No= VIEIAM AIR DQmSSS .......................... .......... 1.16
Vie. I Air Defenw OrRanieatiw .......................................... 1.B
rig? 2 FL_ of Al, Dots.. Caeaamiutiws ............................... 1.S
FIR. 3 - Aatartit Oaapw Ragagaroc Time ............................. . .... 1.10
Pis. 4 L-2 SAM BLUE Dnar Cwatraction ................................. 1.12
12
rig. 5 Typical Op.raiioeal 54-2 SAM site ............ ................. ........ . 1.12
p4. 6 . SA-3 Site at ~gyl.. ....................................... 1.13
rig. 7 TYPICAL 54-3 j~at ........................... ...............
* pig. S Yd Sptea we 450 450 gY7oe altitude Tarat....... ? ? ? ? ? ?....: ---"-- 1.14
ORIGINAL
~1~Ocf eWr 1963
 3.6 -. ~. Msevesioq o2 be Qrika lav.crac/ov 1141E: Iigalficant ehaf.s to the tertwal portion of this pa611c.tton arc indlc.ted,e7 thr
s7ebol'^ '~' " in the earIin of the page.
ORIGINAL vi SECRET
I October 1963 ' - .. -
 SIND SOVIET RDC All DEFENSE SYSTEM IN TIM PAN EAST
1.0 INTRODUCTION. The purpose of this publication is to present a concise somary of the
Sion-5001st Slot Air Defense Systm in the Fag-East. (A more detailed study of this nature
can be found in the .SIPS publication, Air Defenses, Slno-Soviet Slot).
Part I of this publication discusses the characteristics, performance. capabil itles and
llnttations, and deployment of the equipment cosprislog the air defense system. A emery
and- conc'lusioos, Which should be considered 10 mission planntng,in given under Tactical
Tmsldarettens (Para 1.8). -
Part II of this study contains a Roder gerlron Nomogram for decetmioing the radar line-of-
sight horizon for aircraft at various altitude.
Part III discusses the construction and u of Strike Penetration Templatea,,hich provide
a graphic solution for the problea of the possible points of interception by fightar aircraft.
and PtJZ T>'ML.ATLS.
Part IV contains graphic locations of Installations vito explanatory tettual material, sad
tables of Slno-Soviet,a(r defense equipment.
1.1 AIR DEFENSE ORGANIZATTDN.
The Soviet Air Defense Commend, known as PVO, is on equal scarf level with the ground, a wl. And air services. Pareoneal, eqaipteeni. ad facile ties are furnished to the PVO by
all elements ne sorry t
the Other sonic... The PVO exercises operational control over
direct air defense s along cM perLphery of, and wLthio?the Soviet Union. This co~nd is
divided tots air defense districts which a e further subdivided. loco air defense se - Both
the district and setter headquarters race lve Information from any warning radar it-, ..alto this raw data, and dlssenisate data and orders. The air defense district c ordinator
the air defense activities of the sectors, which are considered to be the most important
element in the air defense chain-of-n d. The sector HQ, which is directly responsible for
the air battle, plots lvcoming raids and makes decisions on launch end intercept.
The structure of the air defense Seism is being modertted continuously. With the deploy-
sent of the Semlauthmstlc Air Defense System (SADS), the air defense organisation I. ez
psctd to ndarge an alteration that will result in improved efficiency. With lncorportat ton
of SADS, target Ad intercept data will be handled by casputers In the tonal headquarters;
Air DefaoseZones, inmprportating several sectors, will supplant the sector ac the mat
Important element in splfs air defense chain-of-co?ad.
CHICQr ad ODRIS VZRY.AN Air Defense Organisations ? e modeled after the PVO with o
more di.trl.ta wbdivldad into sectors. The CSIG(7f headquarters is at PEIPING and the NORTH
OPAN headquarters I. at n.. Although the air defenses of each country are separate
and Independent systems, close liaison exists among the three countries.
1.2 Ape IIEFEt2 O1'ERATIONg.
r
The Sestets have developed and deployed an eztenaies "Yates of Early warning (Ed) and
Droned Controlled Intercept (CCI) radars, fighter Interceptors supported by Anti-Aircraft
Artillery (AAA), ad Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM). Ibis syatm 1s difficult to penetrate
without detection ed,oppoaitien. Passive detection devices and early warning radars which
elect the Yet-, around controlled intercept red... which provide positioning inforeatlon
for fighter direction, and widespread deployment of AAA ad SAM defenses ? r nd Important
target. pose a serious problem to be considered in attach ml?sion planning. w
1.2.1 TRACr2NC OPERATIONS. The slow of information a the se or ievel is ?a [olslws:
The EW radars, passive detection equipment, and visual observers (visual obse rvers ? t ill
used to NORTH WNEA ad tllIM) pass information of an oncoming raid to the CCI cads, secon-
- troller I. order to obtain a three dimensional position of the attacker.. The rector filter
center r ceives these in2ote, this Information is plotted. on tracking sd identlficatlon
operations are Initiated. Inforeatlon is probably correlated with adJacen[ filter center and
forwarded to dl strict filter centers. AAA and SAM batteries I. the vicinity -,le rtedsof
the possible 'bogey" or the sector headquarters ad attempt to acquire the /atoms ne aircraft
on their .tqulsitlon radars. If a raid _t be identified. and ? fighter scramble is
ldlceted, the sector filter center probably passes Loformatton t the CCI controller to
asslet early identification of attacking aircraft on the CCI scope.
1.2.2 tEEEOEEPT OPERATIONS- Oivisiocal or regimental CCI c It' of lace v cto au-
raft to intercept, but they probably do no under the general c rol of the local sects
strol of Interceptors does n t
omeaeder. Soviet procedure for the _..:Z (eon-data link) c
differ significantly from western procedures The technique ussed nay be catergorlted as o
follows Close control, loose controI. gnoadcart control. end earricr or Coobat Alt ratrol
col. Oder Close trol, the CCI c troller l strocta the pl lot ?u to heading., speed,
ne .Seca
and aItLtde to fly; rdlalive burring to the target team to go; and other
to permit the pilot to detect the target and convert to a firlog peas. Goolet ci 1 le
essentially a degraded fom of Close Control in which the controller transmits infnnsrc(on
 on money forces. sorb ^s raid number.. positron.. heading,, velocity. and aItituda or to the information
leader. of airborne interceptors. The formacloe leaders meat then avigete co the target area
nd affect c.etact. If large mabare of aircraft ? e tnvolovad. Broadcast control, "b -b La a
degeded foss of Loose control-and a-de.peration Lac-11+y be need. Under Broadcaot co ttrol. n
s.stfae on the position, v locity. hnding'!t_ altitude of the attacker I. of b or
inf
validity For eraepl.. the inforrtlon may ha bard on nothing wore than interpretation of
)amatng.[robe.. Interceptor. under Broadcast Control are normally deployed in patru\or search
type
gaMK 100Cesna or Combat Air Patrols (CAP) are often used by the Soviets to isM specific target,
as approaches to target. after an incoming raid he. been detected. The fofmation laedar. If a
CAP are normalcy uvder Close or Loose control tmtil the battla,is Joined. Consequently, Barrier
patrol..111 normal}y b.,placed within 125 IDi of a grouA3 coattollar Thin tKhnigI. requires
fotmecton. to be !: eittaned eeference points and rapt in one lo.ation to soar[ the ..am.
Zola pr...der. tpaea117 Zr valmaba reducing "at- reaction [ion a"Lost high speed psa-
rration.. CAP ellae. a very high density of Soviet interceptors in many areas. Although economically dlaedvent.gooss.'this parsit, high employment of the tool force. Since the majority
of BaSet inrareaptocs Ka:net capable of All-Vuther interceptions. this techotque ovoid be
fmaalble only during period. of gdad visibility.
It is estimated that GCI situ are capable of controlling .Ionltaaously a saniaa of abort six
lnteraptnes under Closecontrol and greater meb.1e tinder Loose or Broadcast Control. To avoid
se-rims of the alt control system. fighter. may be scrambled and vectored in group. of four
or some and Close control Instructions given only to the designated leader of the formation.
Is the car of All Weather fighters. interceptors scold be scrambled at intervals to permit
at the race of approximately nb intercept every floe ednutaa.
fqp= (Date-link) will improve the dace handling and processing capacity and increase the
raid handling capability for an air defense sector. It Is estimated that the nee ",ca is
da.igeed pa aceaedeb a suits of 100 trailas~ggat any one time - 50 targets old50 interceptors.
A p@ data- grand-to-air eyetam for 1BteWeptor control Will give the Soviet, a substantial
increaa in the saber of interceptor. which' can be controlled over each YET coaamtcation
c anal.
1.2.3 ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND SO?PACZ-TO-AIR MISSILE OPERATIONS. Anti-Aircraft Arti-
11.ry (AM). which 1. et111 of coneldarabla lt@ortanea In the depenoive posts. of the 11oc
atlme, and surface-to-air sd wiles (SAM) are controlled by the atr defense districts. An
At- lat.n. officer at tba district control tinter controls the AM and SAM batteries within the
di.trlct. At tkg eerier level, a SAN/AAA liai -Ricer coordiata. the irtIvitiae of fighters
lnternepteia vflh tbk individual AAA/SAM batteries within the sector. When the threat aovea
coward the-AM'- of responsibility. data free ten acquieltton radar are used to a.. go at6
target to a specific battery. The fire-control radar to the designated battery than track, the
target and fends Information to a fire-control director vhlch cants. the firing data and cc.tr.la the pone. Fire-control radar, usally are auigad on tie. bioi, of one radar for Inch
battery of 4 toe gems: however, order of battle information ohm, that Ceara er not enough -
tadar. to satisfy this requirement in U.S.S.R.,, The ratio is even toner in NORTH RORER and
t>IDNA. ~ :1
A. Lcb AAA. ecqui.ition radar. acquire the. target and provide the ace?ary information to
the PAN SONG drills control radar for cracking the incata raid ac SAM sites.
1.3 C ROMMM
glectr In equipaent is essential to the edero air defense ystem. Early Vetoing radar,
start the .y ton: Ground Controlled Intercept radar, provide popitioni.g information for
fighter din it=. and Surface-to-Air Missile and Anti-Aircraft Artillery cites require acgoi-
aicion,ied P to Control' radar.. Alan Important to the .derv air defer qs[u are Airborne
Aid-to- - apt radar, shin era installed I. some of the Soviet interceptor,. comewmiatione
and data-Ilsyatmeo stitch ararequlred for rapid dlaee.tatioe of vital information. elec-
tr..lc taint sores. a.d Id.nctfic.tia Friend-or-Poa once...
rbst St eov1K alectronie equipment S. a? sophisclared than that of the United Sate..
LlevartheLse this apparent daftcancy i. oo.enhit offset by the deployment of eg.ipments in large
...hers. ? 1 11
Dy far mach, t important of all electronic equipments in an air defense system are the
radar. ich for. the eye. of the , rust re. The rad.r assorts. that are associated with air
M
defense and ~awhhl!eh will be di.cu.sedtin chic study are: Early Warning and Surveillanoa, Ground
Controlled Idcarcept. Haight Finding, Arquialtion and Fire Control. Identification Pried-or-Poe,
and Airborne Aid-to-Intercept radars. Radar, are further subgrouped according to their frequency
.e.g. by a carrier-band letter deals ator, such a. I, L, or S band.
Detailed studies f the Bloc elactrmtic equipment can he foundio ONI 26-10 and Electronic
Int?llleonco R.eort RACBIAIS 61.
-BABA! P8W0Og7 CATEGORIES -
1550-5200 19-6.0
C 3900.6000 6.0-3.3
g 5200-10 900 7.3-2.7
O t.. _ 10-900-36!000 2.7-.83
ORIGINAL 1.2 - SCCALT
1 October 1963
 1.3.1 EARLY VAK1rl00 AND SURVEILLANCE RADARS. There are three primary frequency ranges
utllired by all the Soviet EV and Surveillance radars. These a : VHF, L-Band, and 5-band.
Although the VHF radars are more widely deployed, the S-hand radars playa mare prominent role
So. the air defense [yet-.
Radars operating withl. the VHF frequency bead Include the DIIFLSCST/HI IRI100 famille..
00 REST. FORE REST, and TALL KING.
TALL KING in relatively new and considerably different from the earlier 11W radars. It is
a powerful high performance piece of equipment that lncrea me? the Soviet line-of-sight detection
range to approxtaatoly 400 WI. This radar is being deployed along the Soviet coastline and.
when completely deployed, will he an extrerly important elernt in the Sw1et early warning
detection syetec.
FORK REST Is another VHF yagl-type radar similar In appearance to the SNIFEREST. Little
im[armation 1s available thr. radar, but there In speculation that it may be an lnerpenaive
continuous wave, or pulse hoppler radar with an effective low-altitude coverage capability.
Thla hypothesis however cannot he verified at the present tine.
There have been recent intercepts of signals from, still another new VHF radar MOONCONE
* emtaating fron Coasml at China. At present no lobe pattern data ? available upon which to
mat-et a coverage dlagrae, but the Fleep Air teconnalsaance Squadron One .stunt.. that the
seder may beLmilac to the SPOORRLSr with a range capability epproachibg that of the TALL SING.
Once again United information preclude. ? accurate estimate of performance capabilities.
Many of the older VHF LV radars In the KNIFEKEST/R0S/DUMBO feel lie, are used for back-up
and gap fillers for peLaary site..
S-band radar. consisting of the TOKEN/STRIKEOUT/SLANT MESH. SIC MESH/SIC BAR, and BAR IDCK/
GROSS OUT represent' Lmprwene nt. 1e range. altitude coerage. ECCM, and performance w the
alder VHF radars. way of chase "S -band radars" hayean eddLtionaf EV been operating Sn the
550-570 magacycle region (L-band).
Th. only radar of any consequeoc. knees to be operating I. the L-band I. the FLAT FACE.
It 1s one of the few Soviet radar, of radically new design. Its high mobility and good low-level
detection capability render It quite versatile.
the ran characteristic, of the significant Eli and s,uvelllance radar: to [he Far Esst
,mill be discussed I. the follwinR paragraphs. Signlflcant.characteristics are . 1 so it hued
in -hot., fora for easy reference In Table I of Part IV of this sandy.
?. VHF Band.
(1) H 8000 - An obsolescent equ/pret with n earl-Jon feature.. It has been virtu-
ally phased out in U.S.S.R. with a few net. remaining in Co?lnlst CHINA and several I. NORIN
KOREA.
(2) GQFEREST - This radar caspriaee a major portion of the radar, currently in u
It .. a range capability ceaparable to the early S-band radar, and may have a limited height-
finding capability; however. resolution and Iow altitude capability I. inferi or. Anti-Jaaaing
futures ? reportedly Included, but haveresulted 10 Relied Improvement. recent a errtee.
in the Soviet Orion indicate that this radar has a good anti-chaff (ECCH) capability.
(3) SpOORiIEST - ihl? set i. used ? acquletrion radar for the SA-2 SAM ".Lee and in
eO IN role. The new SPOONKEST B t. eteccrontcally culler to the NIFEREST and may gradually
replace NIPESEST I. Important areas.
(4) TALL KIND - This latest type of operational radar I. a permanently counted parabolic
mash reflector 115 141 feet with a detection range of about 400 NM against mall targets at
an altitude of 125.000 feet. It has better low altitude coverage than NIFEREST and eutrenely
good high altltnde coverage.
(5) SLR-270 - The cost widely used radar on the CHINESE mainland. It is a codified
.mambo of older U. S. radars and he. good high altitude coverage capability. It i. of Chinese
mavufaceure and has a limited height finding capability through lobe awitchlog.
(6) FORK REST - A VIR radar that has recently made Its first appearance In the Far East.
Little infocrt(on 1, ovaliable on this radar at the pre meet ties.
(7) LOON CONE - The lace.. CHICOM produced EV radar. IWI CONE he, parameter, similar
to SPOON REST and TALL KING with range estimates the sane as the latter. This not was
formerly n+mad by IRK code 6KOg (6000).
b. L-U d. (1) FLAT FACE - Ihl? radar Lm designed for. altitude coverage. Although it I.
apparently being used a eedt~s range surveillance radar, and possibly for CCI. It has the
potential for u mobile ecqutcitron radar for a SAM system. It 1s estimated to have
moving target Indicating (MTL) circuitry and anti-Jae capabtl idea.
(1) TOKEN/STRIKE OOr/SLANT MESH - TOKl3J I. a V-bean radar that c an be used both for
Di and OCI. STRIKE OUT to a aodifirutlon of TOM to which the slant reflectgr he, been repoeiti-
'daad horitontally to Improve the high altitude coverage. TOM and STRIKE OUT are the Lira[
generation S-band radar Although lift doe net exist on these radars, halted anti-Jae
capabilities do exist. SLANT MESH is a V-bean radar stmllar to TOKEN with equal rag.
 132
capabilities. S(JI(t' IESB has 7 S-band frequencies rather than the 5 used by TOKEN and may
imgen,a`tts anti-Jo capability. The V-bean crostreccim of Tai and Slwxr 0001 It... tbe.
fair height-finder and GGI capability.
(2).SIG WEE/SIG S4 SIG IESB is an improved and larger versim of the 10211. This
radar utilizes S S-Mm frpworles and one L-band (570 vegacycles) frequency. BIG SVO 1s
electronically identical to BIG 1008. but the construction of the reflectors are similar co the
BAR L. Both BIG 10.SB am BIG SAY .,e ascteted to have IQI. and the 570 megacycle frequency
'may Improve the anti-J= capability of chose radars. Since both radars ep..ate on the V-beam
priv.iTL. they maybe used for'GCI Is wall as Env.
(3) BAR I.GGS/CBDSS Oct - Thar era Second ;S-r?cloe devalopsnota of 111III OUT. They
usve long range and high altitude capabilities. The 570 megacycle L-band bra is lnclodrd
bead-frequencies which. along with Sift. entreats the capability of the radars at
with the 6 S
e
1- aItAt?daa and Ln an am eovlrcoment. These radars do not have a GCI capability.
.(4) CROSS SI0T - A CHICON developed and Youfattured radar. It i.. Permanently
mennred radar and has an impressive range and low alcit d. detection capability.
SIfg71Gf8 AID II30OSITI08 OR, E(a gADAR5: The Soviet approach to the Solution of the detection
and tracking problem is one of brutm force. New radars are added to the lrventory at
established site. supplamantiog rather than replacing the older radar "n the vicinity.
A. Lan be ten in Part IV of this report. the EV coverage is -PI Is along the comm,niot
Tar gaetern re twat. Even in the Par North the castal are. 1s dotted with radar lnstallat-
ims. It I. becamisg L.cr.sin&I, apparent that the Soviets are establishing "Prtwry EN/CCI
Sits." .tong the periphery and that thee. primary .110..1. being .tandardioed with the
;L-s"
de. It ,more of the bast Soviet EN radars (RARI.OCR or TALL KIM); a bakght finder
radar (ROCS CAKE. STORE CAKE. SPQ0B CASE. or SIDE NET); a V-beam radar for IV and GCI back-up
(T? 0, BIG 1~); VHF Of back-up iadar. (BNIPERESP and SPOOKIEST): and a radar with a limited
bilic (PRAT PACE).. Along the cast of the Soviet maritime provinces
r
a
e r
age
loa .1 i.u : ove
p
I ?' tit.m, the primary sites are pieced at Loterala of it= 7D-50 S8.
Tha Soviets provide i portent aroma with very deny radar coverage. elsewhere they
maintain relatively shall- cove by EV/GCI radars.
Apparently the CRIGCKS are quo establishing "Primary Sites". The .or-l C81CQ1 primary
.its oOnSist. of: A CROSS SOT. SCR 270, and QIIPERESP or 0.010. A TOM or BIG 0150
V-beam radar Supported by a ROCK CAKE height finder may be7 located at a primary site to
provide a GCI capability. Virtually all of their important radar Sit.. have the CROSS SLOT
and/or SCR 270. .
Th. "am 0ORBA3 early warning radar. are SOS. ENIOR `?-A. TJBI 18. SCE-270. and
TOtg. ' 9D led BT-271 earl!- search radar. My air be need In en get r1le. Sock 10.01+ of
LR=TS =WA are gives an Of radar coverage within the capabilities of these bsolescent
equipaOnt.. T? 15 the -at effective bV radar I. 710RTE fRZA wh.n employed in an iii role.
CAPABILITI68 A1i0 LIIQTATIpgS OP N RAOAR1: One of the primary strength, of the air defense
Sys- in the billty to deuct targets at long ranges. Extensive deplofee.t of radar
ieitallatima permit. overlap coverers. and .1100. -1.tenence and repair of equip-o. with-
0.1 1T0 of complet. .-age.
lot. - -?
are cautioned net td attempt to utilize radar lob, pattern. to forecast radar
detection probabllitls0. Tb.., diagram. are useful Only 10 determining order-of-magnitme
probabilities for individual Ientered radars. The probability of detection by a y.tem of
radars is a function of the paramatere of all the raiders vhtt4.-}fight be brought to bear On the
Cargo[. Thta probability can be c.,uted ... uratsly only t involved yrocesrs.
taot that System capabilitie-ac b, conaidere(ci0 beat be explained through
The .ta w
example: Suppose that. at a given point In .pare. it b.. been fo.md that three radar can
bear on the attacking aircraft. and that each of chase radar, has a 501 probability of detect-
LOS diii sircrift. All other cmoideratLm..aslde. the law. of probability eggest that ?
although each of the., r?dar,L-aitivg individually ha. only a 50-50 chance of detecting the
attacker, the three in concert have an 87.5% probability of detection..
? A major weakness in the air defense system of the Soviet Bloc in its poor capability to
da_caet and crack Is ?Itit d..1....ft. Early Vetoing range. are normally limited to line of
sits; however, ducting conditions, which are always present to soma extent ove ~ater.My
permit detection beyond the radar borinm. Ground clutter and terrain Making r r0.d
tracking extrealy difficult at lw ?lcitnds Over land ?r-s.
The-SOviecs are attemptieg to improve their low altiiuda apabllity with Iffl circuitry
.. t improve, the tracking capability of radar. a0.ly provide in
in chair never radar Iff
tb ey.
aircraft; bovevar, conventional pulsed radar., even those having agal
wrnLos of targets Over land or rough rater and belw a few
adegat. data for 100-?ltituda
hundred feet alett,da. _
The POX future 1e not normally utilised vban the radars are bei used for Ew. Since the
of W1 r.wlt. in a ma kad doer.... Ln detection range, is isng Ind mostly for 4LI
lpoeea. Thvs, the lw aiticme detectiontba capability of individual EN ace. is.till cmaidered
epse ?
poor. B.vever, tb+ Soviet'. heavy concentration of RovradaraiCite over l+appingt cc overage makes it ?
at It ? _
appear fusible for them to track targets, at e y.
ORIGINAL - - I.4
1 October 1067
 a: The Soviet capability may he a. rlted aEfollws:
(1) The Soviet's coymlm of primary sites hesa good capability for detecting a
high altitude target (30.00 feet and above) at to the POP 1isiCad raages (220 NM) of BAR LOCI(
and arc NESR. If the site I. eq.1ped with TALL KING, apgbility'eaiats to detect targets out
to 280-300 NH -hen the target is flying at or above th'5O-60.00 foot line-of-sight aItituder
associated with these ranges. u
(2) For altitudes below those scared above, all aircraft regardleea of sine c
aspect to be detected at ranges equal to the radii horison for flight altitude. - an
(3) In arms not covered by primary radar sites it -is probable that detection will
not occur until the peatratw I. within 150-160 RM of the coast.
b. The*CHICOM capability is as follows:
(1) The d range capability along*.th, CHICON coast eoteods out to 160-225 NM
*against penetrators flying at altitudes in excess of 2D,000 feet. Sites containing LOOS CONE
will probably permit EN coverage out to the radar-Lim of might horitoo at all operating
altitudes.
(2) The CHICOM-produced CROSS SLOT isstinted to have v good low altitude detecc-
Soo capability. Although the -J-11, of their radars do not have such a capability, detection
. .._Id be mutated for planning purposes at or Slightly 6.yo1g the radar horinoo for flight-
ad
aitltude.
e. The L
KOREAN capability fa as follows:
?
-biiity of V-beam TOg8-ty
an 651 radar.
prLeary
#5/401
C0ICONS have received oni
an. SIDE RET ba. been colocat.d with TALL RING At many. The
ROCK. CAKE which they are using to Improve the height finding capa-
e radars and to establish GCI it.. by ..locating A ROCK CARE with
not possess any holghc.flnders, but have Iledted BP capability using
CAPARTLITI85 AND LtMITATIdR5 OF W RADARS: ROC& CALL and SIGNS CARE have the capability of
dacerainiog altitude data's out to A ssalsm range of 180 NM and 220 104 respecclve ly. The SIDE
NET I. earimatad to h.... . ..... boa l.... ..... ._ .~- ----- _._._
The NORTH KOREANS do
the V-beam TOKEN.
All the height flndnj radars are onc.ncrated In a nrrw frequency range I. the'S-band
which Ask.. the.. rad.r. .u SCaptihleto Jael.g. SPONGE CALL and SIRE NET are estimated to
(1) The Ev range capability 11 150-225 NM against the high flying attacker over
(2) Although 1ow-1evnl detection is not expected to be good detection should
e
b
astiented at the radar line-of-sight horizon for flight altitude-
1.3.2 REI(Wr BINDING RADARS. The height Cinder. used In the Soviet Far Cast are the RRYS
*Cou. STORE CARE. SMIOE CALL, and SIM NET, all of which are essentially the Sam in signal
c.''paraaetars. The,.SPONGE CARE And SINE NET are nav radars whose perfor?ace he, yet to be
Ylrmiy evalmted; hot It Is capected that the performance of these radar will ..zed the earl-
ier height fieders. Th. STONE CAKE has a greater. mango capability and a better radiation
pattern than the ROCK CARE and in utilised at the sore lpportant GCI sites. Refer to Table I
1.3.3 GROUND COHTROI.IEp INTERCEPT RADAR. A CCI capability vas first achieved using the
V-besm TOKEN type radars. These relatively halted Sets are now being soperceded by the more
accurate ES/IF combinations for this operation. Although TORSN. SLANT MESH, BIG BAR, and BIG
ROSH are lodependevtly capable of providing the three diaonlonal positioning needed for-fighter
control. the inherent wakooaaes of the V-hems radars In height finding may be overcoa In
important locations by placing an HF radar nearby.
ES/lF cmb/natlw0 ar appearing at the Sa ieportant RUSSIAN GCI "primary ahem The
* colocat/en of an HF and E1+ radar may not necessarily determine a GCI capability at the site,
but Such a capability will be give, to EN/lwcombiation. in this publication. Considering
* range and degree-of sophistication, BAR IOCIVSPONG CAKE and TALL RING/SIBS NET are the nest
iporcant tombination A.
The CHICOKS have received from the U.S.S.R, the TOM And BIGM$SH V-bean radar. -hick are
often colotated with a ROCK CAKEI height finder for improved GCI capability. ROCK CAKE height
finders ay be used vlth.an EN radar for CCI coverage.. _
NOUfl IMO"*. entire GCI capability I. provided by TOR .
DlSPoSITffl Q GC RADARS: The Soviet. provide important industrial and military areas with
dense GCI radar c Iweragal elsewhere they maintain A relatively dlspeb sad radar covetage.
ORIGINAL 1.5 SECRET
1 October 1963
 SECRET
Most. of the Soviet a si has untinows overlapping coverage against high altitud. aircraft.
The CRICOO haw. deployed a V-bean radar at, or in theclass vicinity of. mat of their
airfields supporting interceptors. They bas also placed oa or cora GCI sites our iq.oruoc
industrial ad population areas. In other areas the deploynnt of OCI site. is sparse, but 1..
adequate to per0lt overlapping coverage along the anti re coast of the CIQ8ESE Ylnlad.
NORTH KOREA hi deployed TOKENS 1. sock fashion as to provide coverage along the periphery
Hof chahe acogrunt.
I phryics in Part IV of this study `ay be consulted far current radar order-of-battle
inforsattoa.-~ .
200 feLITIgS A1t0 LIXITAT'IOIIS OP CCI RADARS: It is unlikely that a law flying aircraft (belw,
200 feat) viii be er.ued cmtipswely by an individual sere; however. sporadic tracking my
attar obers acre than one site can cover the attack. Ground clutter an terrain Ysking eke
aircraft radar trackltg ad "Cl eitrs.ly difficult at such a altitude. It I. unlikely that
` a[tackfog aireraft flying lnLend at altitudes below 500 feet will be adequately tracked for OCI
central of loterceptor..
At endlos to high altitudes. the following ss arises the Slot's capability:
a. The average Pouter OCI capability against .edam to high altitude cargeu130.000
to 100.000 feet) of the A-3e reflective area is approninetely 200 1t. The TALL 1100/SIDE NET
conbiatim my base a OCI capability out to the radar line-of-sight harirm.
b. The average CHICQS CC1 1 capability a"last -dim to high altitude targets would be
110 HNprovided by TOKEN or 158 H0.provldd by.glG MESH. It I. doubtful that the CHIGOES would
atteept to angage a tragat at ranges in eaceas of 125 RM frm the cast.
c. The NORTH KOREAN OCI capability does not e>?ed the 110 NH GCI range of TORN radars.
d. ROCK, CAR and STONE CAR. the mat coYOn height finders In the Far East, have the
capability of dstar.dntng altitude data not to a musses range of 180 KH and 220 lOt respectively
up to the easiness altitude. of all operational aircraft.
tick of sstiei%ccory high altitude helghr-fading lnforwatlon I. areas where ROCK
CAR/sIONe CAR/I gl CAR/SIDE NET hews not been deployed I. a waka.s of the 61 ".--
Table I in Part IV of this study contains perforYnce parascers for the GCI radars used
In the Fat East. - -
1.3.4 ACQUISITION AND FIRE CONTROL RADARS. The radars coamnly used, for acquisition in
she Soviet alm tountri.. in the Far East are: RNIPERIST, CROSS FOR.- SPOOFOIESr and FLAT FACE.
Tha characteristics of SHIEERESr, SPOOY-ST, and FIAT FACE are discussed under CTi and Surveillance
radari (paragraph 1.3.1)- ernca this 1. the prlwary function of these radars. GROSS PORK, a ion
posered and short-ranged radar operating In the VAT frequency range, is the Soviet version of
ohs O.S. 008-402.. It is used prinerily for AAA acquisition,. but my be nssd as a EW gap -filler.
Tha'Sdmet Slat inventory of flrg control radars continua of WHIFF, FIR CAN. TRACK DISH. and
FIR W all of Which operate in the S-bad. WRIPP"1s a Soviet Ropy of the U.5. SCR-584
rhith has Y March track uoge of 64 SH/22 01 respectively. FIR CAN utillrea any oa of four
fixed frequaocipa frm 2860 to 3040 Ygacycles. bat a thirty to forty einuca tine period I.
required to h&4& the tuba, is-order to altar frequencies. Its search/trach range Is nati erad
to be 43 17723 NMLlpapictively. FIR WHEEL. a newer fire control radar, has a search/track
range 70 11/35 IN. Lc7Fir1R16E CAN and RRE WRd are astioted to have XCI.
-Ag SONG Is the guldence radar used with the*SA-2 Surface-td-Air Missile iysta. There
a e coo versions of the NAN WHO -- one operating in the S-and and one in the C-band. The
8-band sell is the Yrllar/(.,dal and was deployed ettenaively with the initial rapid daploy.snt
.. cf the SA-2 015551.5. The/C-bad 1s nw replacing the S-bad TAN SOIL at may sites and
gdRl.Ynt~sg the S-bad set at may other sites. - -
Th. C-bad FAN SOIL is a dev.lopeentlof the S-ad nodal. and although its physical appear-
ems is u lu, ice electronic sediflcatim have resulted in an increased range capability to
33 3H .gal at a 1 gars aster caret, and a frequemy'dIversity which will dilute the )arsing
capability of attatklog aircraft. Another i.proveent I. the C-ad mdel is the arrwer brae
shape which will isprove Its lw, altitude parfor.ants without Y)or.aics mdlfioatims.
Sine. may of to Soviet radars operas, in the S-ad, the deploy-.t of to C-band will
reduce the problea of interference frm nearby radars operating at the sane frequency.
The conesd gnfdance signal associated with FAN SONG operates in the 700-eO0 negacyclea
frguscy range.
Ic In ostieied that up to three at-Iles could be controlled staulaawsly by each PAN
SA MILITICS Aim LIMITATIONS Q ACWISITION AND PC RADARS: 'Iha CROSS POR ad RIIISISL
acgelat[1m ca4ra are of cater unsophistluted de alto. but should perforce satisfactorily
against aircraft above 1,000 to 2,000 feat. eats this, the p.rforYms of these galpnems
is coeaideied poor. FLAT FACE. designed prinerily for is attitude coverage, should be able
is detect targets done to 100-200 feat out to the line-of-sight ranges.
PAN SONG radar is esti.ted to be capable of tracking at altitudes down to 1500.2000 fee.;
hoeseer. terrain feature and other eatructlas around the SAM sites my Matt this low
alts cud. capabilityX iN rAN-ad-FIR WHIM be. a good law altitude capability down to 3000
fast. Their iapeblittj detreas. rapidly frm 3000 to 1000 feat and does not exist below 1000
feat. _
l-l^ -
ORICINAI 1.6 SECRET
1 "r 1963
 SECRET
DISPOSITION OF ACQUISITION AND FC RAUARS: The Soviets have all of chr-above radars. earePt
the FIRE WHEEL, deployed in the Far Fast__
The r,data supplied to the coils by-the Soviet Union are the YNIFF. FIRE CAN, FINE
WHEEL. FAR SONG for tacking. aqd -(ho IX42gCSt. CROSS FORE. Wl180, FLAT FACE. and some TOKEN. -
for target acquisition. They alio utilize the BEAM TRACE -- a searchlight control radar --
fez cracking Lou flying-target.. '
IN KOREA has been e4r~(pped with WHIFF. FIRE CAN and BEAM TRACK for cracking, and
IWIFERESr and aor TOREOs fon-.Earget acqulaltton.
The graphic. in Part IV aaf this study contain the AAA order-of-battle in the Far East and
the eonfireed acgoi.ition and fire control radar. -
1.3.5 AINJORNE AID-TO-ti IEIRCEPI RADAR. The currently operational AAI radars ? not etci-
eated to have M. Souu of this. the Soviet AAI radar effective s I. poor against target.
flying belw 3.000 feet. The Airborne Aid-to-lntercept radars discussed belw are in-lied
tothe Sevlet Slot interceptors in the Far East. In Part IV of this study Table I gives
specifies of the AAt radars, and Table 13 shwa the radar, to he ezpected In the various Soviet
fighters.-
SCAN FIX - This is the only S-band radar installed in Soviet interceptors. It is a
range-Doty radar having a eaolaao, range of about 3 NM.
b. SCAN ODD - This I. an I-band search/track radar. Its search/crack range, are 5 6TH/
3 W respectively.
~j. SCAN ODD (ardiftedl - A codification of the SCAN ODD antenna which has resulted In
an iocreaand wrch/track fag to 8 SKI 6 NM respectively.
6, ~'j2
A. SCAN T?lra - 'band starch/track radar having ranges of 12-16hT1/8-16 hTl r .Scr.. trptc.l L.-2 Lt1 .t ST< p:L.ltl.a+1 t al tM et aat le
Iaachere to clrcut.r p.t n 1. ct7lt.1 0/ .I1 G-I Ll'lta e., ...,. ..r t.t ivha th th. r~...e
ntrrlrk rail c.u.e ..rt..m. to tb. .ppe.r.uc. of tier ..t..
ILLEGIB
2ILSSL 6:
L4-2 LAM SIZE r C COCilet[.TIO1
ILLEGIB
L tC1W. 1.11 S.SCLT
1 lfcibber 1563
 vas ecently ph oc ogr aphed Lrw lw altitude. Pre lief nary
Av lysi 3 dic s!a te atat Ode the ssa
tates th siteris o cupied. The launch pads, gu(d a nee a and pro-
bably hold a r.. ....... d, and each s cafn eSulps nc. One - of eQu1p-
meot In the gldanc a appea soaeehatmhlghero than the csrovndi ng .t execs nc and
couldpbe the -3 guidance radar
A
lThe SA-3 is the thud g.wanton or let S system. bepestablc vfthl. 0,e USSR vas
and 47 sites a w ", ieved to be a tabu she d. vat i. ble
f L- dl .earned L. 1961, e
data ? e lnsufftclent to :' it determination of c hastier izt is or per fcr>once cap-
r ab111t1es, but the systeto pr obabiy designed to provide iR,rovcd defenze-eapabtll ties
?[ lw altitude.
Analyst. of the vlasile guidance radar -----d at Odessa indicates thlc fc pos-
eibly operates on the t .ekwhi le-scan pricipletoed in earlier Soviet S;..Y s
If this analysis is valid, the SA-3 eyetev -"I-
ay not be the v leo alt is ude n est-
imated. gwever, the meager quern tl ty of pertine nt lntelli6ence could be misleadl ng.
le vie,, of the obvlau. Swiec needfor . s !w altitude defense, and the lack
of any isdtration a v SAM ay stem a ceps then SAF3ris bei og developed or deployed, the
present eattmate as carried io the SSADFE must be considered valid far the present.
ORIGINAL
I October 1963
 SECRET
1.7.2 SA-2 LOW ALTITUDE CAPABILITY: The SA-2 eyscen was designed to be car effective in
* the m4iom to high altitude ranges. This system. though not designed for low altitude, has s
capability against low altlt,de pens rator.. Bwever, it doe. no appear that coat site. haver
been ideally located for optid lovcaltLtvde defense. Cultural and terrain Busking occurs to a
large ascent at a amber of Bites with elevation obacructlon angles of ten degrees or larger in
for direction.. The capability of the PAN SODO guidance radar to track low altitude targets
.?ataly is a acmplea problem and varies with each site. Under ideal siting conditions. such
overlooking an water approach or very flat wooded terrain, tracking may be possible to
altitudes as low a 'J00 feet. However, when masking does ocus and thin Ls the anal -se.
cracking is not pox le below the obstruction angle. This is ? basic weatme.s If the system
as deployed.
In di.ceaalvg the SA-2'lw altitude c.pability, the alert . of the unit, and the tim-
lines, and scant of early-warning information a significant factor.. Aasming the worst
poa.ibla case for the attacker. the SA-2 site will hews early-warning Lnformation frm early
warning and-acq,i,ition radars. the It. will be fu11y alerted and r?ed, and ch. Guidance,
radar will be sieved in the gral direction of the target. -
A graphic presentation 0;m he dssi In intercept capability, based on these ass-ptiona, for
? target traveling at 450 knots in a clear elect roni evceenviroment is show in figare B. The
target is flying a cour that viii pea. directly r the site. Obstruction angles of C'_ and
firm degrees have been .operiposd to Show relative Position of pickup of the target by'the
guidance radar FAN BOND. Due to the closeness of the target to the site, the radar reflective
of the target playa no part in the radar detection capability of the FAN mfg:.- The
NTN Lntarespt capability of the SA-2 is be fed on the velocity of the target, the time required for
the system tc lock on. track the target. launch the missile and the d sail, flight time to the
Intercept point. The_ elapsed tir for the systfiring sequence .1s approximately 26 seconds,
which Meeamas ? lidtiogfactor a. the target .;;r aches at the Iwer altitude.[ As shown to
Fig.. B. 'Lunch angles from 30 degrees to 60 degrees are Shown ? straight lines vtth T's
indicating possible intercept points. Frim the figure it can be seen that bolos 2.000 feet
fora 2 degree obstruction angle, or 4,000 feet for a 5 degree dbstruction angle, the system
has on intercept capability. In addition to the 6.tructL- angle limitation. a 4.2 lOt
bedapharicaI radar and missile dead tone mats arwnd each SA-2 site.
I
SA-2 SYSTEM
YS
450KT LOW ALTITUDE
TARCET
PINK "'T'O"
a a
VA
O DETECTION g START TRACK
-O m,f9LE taunts
Ef SECDnO! EtaeSED reef
x PO.-LE ,av...EPT
TRUCTI on
an. tES
PIeet B: L-2 SYS 4 VS 450ET L J ALTITUDE TARGET
DEPI.OYLENi' 2! SURFACE-T'O-AIR MISSILES: See page 4.5 and 4.6 for location of all confirmed
SA-2, Ss-0. nd general SAM site. to the Far East.
 %I . AIR-TO-AIR (AAN); The Soviets have designed se ral of their new generation Inter-
ceptoar3ound, and have backfitted some of their older intercept ore ,)rich AAN's. Although the
CRICINIS and tRIRISI KOREWS posses. aircraft capable of c rrytng MN's, they a stimated to
have AAN'? ?t the present [l me. 'They will probably rely upon the U.S.S.R. for their future AAN
capability.
The folloeing ? the currently operational SAN', conpatibl. with the jet interceptors
located in the Far East:
AA-1 (ALKALI): This I. ? beam-rider missile. Although SPIN CAN, SCAM THREE, SCAM ODD
and SCAN AAI radars can be utilised for beam-rider missiles, the M-I has been observed only o
the FARMER E and the FISBPOT B which a equipped with SCAN CAN and SPIN oily radars respectively.
The launch aircrafc'I, 1lpited to a lead pursuit tell attack against maneuvering targets. At
?I[ltude? below 10,D00 f ey the vl san e. mu t be !7th ched )rLChtn ? 45? angle of the [light path
of the target. The FAR1 E must be withins2 KN e FISNPOI' B must be vi thin 3.5 - 4.0 EN
of the target. The pitch-up capability. of the M-1 I. united at all altitude. and men-enlsten[
above 50.000 feet.
This system la vulnerable to countermeasures in the guidance radar and the missile guidance
ce ever. Bien possl bleu the cedar should be Jarred to prevent or delay detection. If detected.
track breaking techniques should be used.
b. AA-2 (ATOLL): This is an infrared homing missile having a maximum range of 5.5 SM
with a CEP of 10-15 fest'and a velocity of Mach 2.0 plus the speed of the lauch aircraft. Its
se I. limited to clear-air conditions. The Lunch aircraft =at be in a lead pursuit ? ack
with a madam of 2 G's at time of launch.. The AA-2 is most effective at high launch'altitudes
due to the lower air density. It has been 'observed on the FISHBER C. but may be used with .net
interceptors.
AA-3 (ANAB) : This is a semi-active radar homing missile having a mecimn range of
7-13 M with a CEP of 15-20 feet. Its taunching ?lrc raft mu t be equipped With a rch radar
operating I. t=y -band and _-t Lunch the missile in ( lead pursuit attack. The FISHPOr B has
been observed log this weapon.
For fighter aircraft and AM compatibility, refer to Table II in Fart IV of this study.
'The following sumarisea the important-factors of the Sino-Soviet Bloc air defense system
to be considered to attack feel on planning..
1.8.1 DETECTION AND TRACLIIC. The Sino-Swiec Bloc ha. the capability of detecting aircraft
I. long r.Ms. and at high alit tulles (our to 150-220 Rf range? and above 20,000 feet), b
their
Iw-Ievsl detection and tacking capability is c nsidered to be a mayor weakness. It a unlikely
n
that a lw-flying aircraft (belw 200 fee[) will ohr tracked continuously by an individmual site;
further,ore,, it 1? unlikely that the GCI system as a whole has adequate cracking capability of
attacking aircraft below 500 feet for the GCI coottbl of interceptors. Ground clutter and terrain
masking sake tracking by pulsed radars estremely.Allflcul[ at lw altltudes; therefore, the
attacker gains at gnifican[ advantage by penetratingr at very )w altitudes.
For planning purposes, hwever, detection andr
tacking should be estimated at or slightly
beyond the radar hurtsen for flight-altltude. Vhere fuel re s provide 141 ode in selection
of a penetration route, the et acker should select a tou[e whe ee radar range and/or concentration is
least.
1.8.2 ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY. Medium and heavy fire-controlled AAA is effective between
2,000 and 45.000 fee c, but below 3,000 feet 1t. effectiveness rapidly decrees se s, and halos 500
feet, only barrege?.firing has any capability to destroy the target. Th e 57 me gun in USSR and
the 57-m gun in NORTH KOREA and CHINA are the most serious threats against lw-flying aircraft.
1.8.3 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES. The SA-2 SAM yetem, opera[inal Ln [he Far Ea s[, vas de-
signed for high altitude targets op to I00,000 feet with optimum design tlcudes between 20,000
and 40,000 feet. Its estimated ndnf~ altitude capability la 1,0 o00 to 3,000 feet, depending
upoe siting condition. To take advantage of the lima tattoos of the S,.2 SAM syacem, a acker
who is forced [o pass within the vicinity of an SA-2 site should choose an altitude below 5DO
feet and/or should take advantage of terrain features which world obscure coverage by the FAN SONG
radar
Until mo e information bocomes available v the new SA-3 missile system, the best a[,0. I. to ovoid 5A-3 it.. by 12-15 miles which is estimated to be its maclm range.
1.8.4 INTERCEPTORS. The Soviets and their Satellites have an abundance of clear-air-day-
flghters with a n optimum operating capability at altlt.d.. between 5,000 and 45,000 feet. This
o[ op[lamePability vast be avoided by ? .eking aircraft or r Attrillon may r sult.
TheaSoviet interceptors are relatively Ineffective below 1.000 fee candvare area mated co be
e
completely ine[frcelve belw 200 feet.
The all-weather fnterceptorslould experience e m difficulty in being vectored c a
o
aircraft by GCI sites when the attacker I. belw 500 fee[, their AAI radars which are not
eg sipped with MI would be ineffective below 1,000 feet.
Store the enemy's ability to eliminate the attacker a a threat falls radically when the
attacker is purr land, the time be wren deter [f on ahd landfall should be reduyed. whenever
posalble, to the reaction time of the air defense system required to launch interceptor ?.
 511037
1.8.5 C044NLCATIONS. Another weakness in the air defense eyries of tte 51 Soviet Bloc
to poor coxwmicatlons. Cox Stations linit each control center to a maxte= of 5-6 raids;
however, the 5AD5 which is already ope-tioral are nd Vladivostok rill raise this ].init. Caomi- ?
cation facilities existing outside ?lor oceplexes may be saturated by a rev attacks occuring
eimrltaneoualy Cours.. speed, and altitude changes at rands intervals by a relatively sea11
s,ber of ineooing raids should overload the circuits. -
1.8.6 ELECTRONIC COUSIERMEAAIRES. The c 1st countries in the For Fast have excellent
puss" detection capabilities; hence, all a lectro=agnetic radiating equipment should be used
sparingly-preferably not at all.
Many of their radars a susceptible to faxing, since' they operate in harrow Frequency range.
and are not equipped with ECCY.devices. The DECK equip -t now being deployed to the Fleet will
take advantage of this -knees.
1.9 BCRTR VIEZNAN AIR 1[37#315.
The Air Defenses of Barth Vietnam convict prisarily of a sizeable Anti-Aircraft Artillery force,
augmented by an Fatly Warning Network consisting ofRadar and Visual Observers.
The AAA Force, a eoimponent of the North Vietnam People's Arty (V?k), is equipped with Soviet equip- ?
meat and equipment captured iron the French. This force received experience against the French,
and is considered to be effective under cnobat conditions. North Vietnam AAA Sts are equipped
with 85?, Bros, 76ra, 37= guns, and 12.7 ? machine guns'of kV II vintage, but considered to be
J. good operating condition. Sufficient WHIFF and FIRE CAI: fire control radar has been located in
Borth Viet" by ELIST to indicate eome -di- AAA is radar controlled.
Jet aircraft =m ions have not been observed in Borth Vietnam. Presently Borth Vietnam has
eoee
propeller dritraining aircraft and en a transport type aircraft. Haiphong/Cat Bi, rani Cia
Iasi. and Baipbong Cleo An ar capable of supporting sustained jet fighter operation.. Hwever,
[here is no OCI L. North Vifpnaa at present due to lack of height finding radar.
Early Yarning coverage for Borth Vletram is provided by Soviet built RUS and II;IFMEST Radars, and
Chinese supplied SCR-270 and one CROSS-SLOT. The gsriove deficiencies in Inw altitude, and long
range coverage of the RCS and KNIFF111T radAra are owmoce by the capabilities of the SCR-270.
Roweve , .date of operator training, lack of trained ewintenanee technicians, and poor occz:nnieationo
contribute. to a lesser capability in Fatly Warning detection than the Communist Chinese possess.
The Air Defense District Headquartersat Hanoi ties together the existing air warning net of de-
ployed radars with the AAA forces. It is probable that Worth Vietxs is tied into the air defense
Aircraft flying at altitude over the Gulf of Tonkin will probably be tracked eontinueusly by the
Co?mist South China Radar Net and sporadically.by the North Vietnam Radar Net. Aircraft flying
below A000 feet may be tracked by Chinese Radar- if above the radar horizon, but will probably not
ha detected by the Bo Vietnam radars. Ground observer posts will possibly detect aircraft
flying along the North Vietnao coastline, but are limited by lack of ern eumioatio c. Air-
craft flying at low altitude over land areas of North Vietnam will not be tracked by the radar net.
ORIGINAL 1.16 SECRET
1 October 1963
 PART II
RADAR HORIZON h'21)CRAM
2.0 DESCRIPtION A:O EDKK :ATORY I`FOROlATION
2.0.1 THE OAOAS HORIZON. The thesrecital naxLma range in free space of a lossless radar
systea is determined by its pulse repetition rate. For targets near the surface of the earth.
however. aaafazo radar range is halted by the a rth's curvature. This hit i. a fonccibe of
the radar site height, target height, and a orrectlve factor for atnos pheric refry chi w. the
gweralna aqusuon is derived easily units siaple asthematlcs and an earth having a radio. 4/3
its actual maeurenent to allow for refraction:
(1) R e 1.23 ( /hl + /h2 ) nautical ni leg
wherein hl is the height of the radiating antenna in feet. and h2 is the altitude of the target in
faet, Ina Uniting range produced by this equation 1s /aeon ? the radar horizon. The radar hori-
o0 1s a theoreciul Ileac. If atmspheric conditions are such that the phenomnon of ductiog
ocnna. targets can be seen which lie beyond the radar horizon. Furthermore, ground or sea return -
may risk a target which is well within the radar horieco. In spice of these defects. though, the
concept is qul te useful. and the radar horizon should be considered the locus of possible detection
points, where radar power 1s of no c
As can be to free equation (I). the radar horizon is independent of the type, power, or
sophistication of the generating radar. It is dependent solely upon the elevations of the radar
and rarest. At loom ranges, and bigh altfcudes, the radar hurizoo range way --d the effective
range of low-powered radars by many riles. In such c es it is of afgaificant interest to attack
pl ers co de is mni ne a neon locus of probable detection positions by enpplemntlo3 radar horizon
infdraatlon with r iiae power eecinstes. These high altitude loci are generated by caning the radar
hurizoo It the eff ef-t lve range of the radar, whichever is less. Due to the na cure of cvrre or attack
techniques, this publication does not c Cain high altitude escinacea. law altitude horizon are
nuaffected by power considerations, since call Sins-Soviet radars are sufficiently powerful to
reach the required distance.
2.0.2 N2a3G0AY CONST00C1I0Y. A considerable reductionin the cave required for solution of
equation (1) can be lea llsed br using the f,11-i% technique: 11 ? prob lea I. governed by n
a
equation of the fern F (x, Y. e,) a 0, where F (x, y, c,) is a function of three variables s, y,
ands at leas[ one of which is a dependent variable. it is possible to construct an aiigvmnt
chart or nouogran if the goveznivg equ. [low la of the fore: fi(x) z fc (y) t f3(-)- It will be
noted that equation Cl) saclaf ice the vathenaclc.l requirexncs and hat norograa representation
is therefore possible. Details of c uctioo can be found in any standard mathematical handbook.
The Radar fior it= Sonogran which v onatwcted using this technique has been n Sered "page 2.2"
Reproduction of this page in its entirety is peneitied at the CO.FIDEXTIAL level. Remval of the
eolum idenclf lers and page title pewits reproduction as unclassified material.
2.0.3 MM' US" Part IV of this publication con-ins ,31* chart. which have been over-
printed with radar horizons for the 0 clad radars which doe the Pacific Coast of the Sine-Soviet
Bloc_ These her lions have been de?loped for aircraft aleitudes requested by the Fleet: the
50 tpoc horlcon v s included t
o sari, fy At tack Squadron requiremnts; the 2.000 foot horizon was
suggested by Patrol Squadron.. If, for s on, it is desired to construct a radar horizon
for awe other altitude. this ray be a con,li,hed tnrough use of the nonograa, It is also suggest-
ed that Al', deterniee what changes newly acquired radar sites case in the existing horizons by
using I. nmopra
Intueing the naxgrv It is necescry co knee two of the three parave tats: radar site
height. aircraft altitude, and radar horizon range. With any two of these factors know, the
.hire ray 'setouno oy alvply driving a 11n, co:uusding the two known quantities, and reading the
third where Into line intersects the appropriate scale.
In plotting horizons based upon newly acquired EOB, 1[ fs oe eesary to decerntne
site height for the radar. rlly the publiahiog acclvicy will assignca "PLO -. cy" o -
is-posici on for each sl to reported. Quite open within the fix accuracy stated terrain elevations
vary enaraously, and, since the choice of a sine c cab lishes the elevation of theradar, and there-
fore [he range of the cedar horiern, a prob lei exists. It has been the policy of the Fleet
Intelllgepce Center to choose the m t probable location having the highestelevatlw within the
fix accuracy a eed, This techniquesis re ?ended since all error are omatically on the high
side; and the estLnat,d radar horizon willcvsc probably lie beyond the actual horizon.
 ORICIP.AL'. 2.2 SECRET
I Cc-b- 1963
 PART III
STRIL:E P\i::E TATItx AND AAA TEMPLATES
3.0 DIS LT'SS101 OF TI!E STRIPS: FEx'TRA TIOD TESTLATI:. -
The Strike Penetration Teaplatea distributed [ the Fleet provide a graphic solution for the
problev of Possible points of interception. Poe so ludo i trap la res a
sufficiently
led for ovs? d condition Under m circus Lanc`s thee trple[e n solution Is
e [o w an t lie u and mde ra to faniliarlty with the a end conditions vIll pewit gx [al.
cfi on forrdevfationa,e,0.[ect ion position and fighter eeploynrn[ do n er Into eostru ct ion
of rthe [,.plates, but these factors are essential parts of too oeerall problev.'[ .
J. 0.1 PAEPARA2101 PRIIASOPilY. to order to provide a t graphical ..I-Loo C. the inte-
ry to know [ specific conditions that c111 exist s he t3E.v t..a
cept problev, St could bu n sa n
t to elscldn is flv teakc on tinitedn of tevplatcs c ring all po sib lc ondt: loos.
Unless .-Pilo.: nsdl rtOn the scope oft the problev, olu:ion fs lepea c[S Ca I.c
a -options, a -a[feally are introduced into the s -tins,
In to Inge "'I"".
since 3[ lr highly unlikely [la[sa ll of the .-d conditions 'ill c e:pond a ctly r the
auditions at the t(ae of the nlsslon. It issrecess, ry that the 'r sr introduced be r noble
and "safe"; that 1s, they .111 tend to predict intercept earlier thatr it probably -111 o Safe
error, vL11 be tolerated. Unsafe errors hill be tolerated only if snail, r if n alto rnattoo
exists.
3.0.2 ASSiT0'TIOIS. In the paragraphs to folios,, the assunpt ions de, and their effects v,
the problem hull be discussed.
(a) SCALE. The [caplet a prepared for .Sts, 311 Char Sln ce s alar
-as
distances vary filth latitude o theses charts, 1t fs n sary [ choose at latitude for
s a a c..rac a
rposs. nsrlly 40 latitude Is wed for his purpose. The tenpla ce
-r-.. e only
at 40oe . The ,c r introduced I usi ng the tenpkates at another latitude [s snaile(25\`:eath"400 vlli
ho 25.414 at LSoo 24.4DM et at 2414 at 3D^) and can safely be ignored.
(b) REPRODUCTION. A s od oral ing error o reproduction. 1'he or361ne is
e pre paled on linen uhith a reproduced o ..lid apara_i_ s Although rare is taken t
e 11 reprodu e[SOn, verist ion fro- the original can occur. Such can aline is stall enough
tos be negl:igible.
(t) FICMiER PEAFORM.L:CE. Although s sn ker performnee eturacterls[ its a e knq a in
each a fighter pe riot .ill depend upon u=p[ Ion fade rnlog c nfiaurat ion end poker
t:ingse rl,h t s red rvalues, 1[ fs possible [ sult ATICnhandbookaa for the .
[ight ers and de[cenInc va lucs for T- Airspeed, Line-to-Cifvb, and Dls [ante-have le d-During-Clinb.
These a suttnos a the m t significant and difficult a ociated filth the problev. It could be
possible [vpchoose o of [ e 411 SPEC tntereept solutions. however n of these solutions falls
oy under all-o alt uatfon a Ines la tiro
In If,, filth estleated eepl cx
predict eaxivua effort for des [ruction as far as possible fron principal targets.[[ If it is a aed
that the fighter is clean and u .o,inn o poker at all tiers during intercept, any e r Intro-
dared I. SAFE and the intercepii n positions predle led viii be eixlavv r rr These
assuaptions have been adopted for coat ruction of the [ecplates.
(d) MI t