SINO - SOVIET BLOC MISSILE AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000500300075-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 75
• Publication Date: June 1, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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Approved For Release 2003/12/19 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000500300075-5
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SING> - SOVIET BLOC
MISSILE AND S-PA-C-E
TECHNOLOGY-
MK 2 -65
JUNE 1965
-Army Missile Cbmmo-nd
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Material contained in this- series of documents is considered
to be of such a sensitive nature as to require special consid-
eration in its distribution. Recipients are cautioned to insure
the NEED-TO-KNOW status of subordinate agencies prior to
distribution to them.
THIS DOCUMENT WAS COMPILED AND
PUBLISHED BY THE ARMY. MISSILE COMMAND AFTER
APPROVAL IN THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE- AND THEREFORE CONTAINS -
AGREED DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE.
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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND-METHODS INVOLVED
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FOREWORD
MK 2-65 is the latest in a series of quarterly reports on developments
at Sino-Soviet missile facilities that are based on the latest photographic
analysis combined with other available intelligence information
This report, utilizing information that was compiled.up to 30 June 1965,
was prepared by the Directorate of Missile Intelligence of the U S. Army,
Missile Command,-Redstone Arsenal, Alabama with support from the U S. Army
Photographic Interpretation Center, Washington, D_ C., and the National
Photographic Interpretation Center, Washington, D C.
Comments or queries relating to this report should be submitted to
the Commanding General, U. S.. Army Missile Command, ATTN.- AMSMI-Y,
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. -
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TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Section. Page
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I SUMMARY ---------------
------------=----- 11-1
II. DEFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEN?IS -----------
II-1
A.-Antimissile Missile Systems-------
1. Current Assessment of Sary Shagap Antimissile
Test Center (SSATC).Development-------.------.-- 1a 1-1
a AMM Programs------------------------7------ LI_1
b Launch Facilities---------- =.--------- '-- II-5,
C_ Reflected Launch Activities-----.---- II-11
2. ANN-Re ate Deployment-------- - -------------- II-19
3. Preliminary Analysis of GALOSH. Missile ----------- 11-31
4. Indications of Continuing AMM Test Activity ---11-33
B. Defensive-Related Activities ---------------------- I1-37.
-- --- ---------- III_1
III_ OFFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS--------
A. Tyuratam Missile Test Range (TTMTR) Research and.
Development Facilities ---------------------------
I- _ III-i
Complex.A------------------------------------- 111-1
2. Complex B---------------------------?---------- III_1
3. Complex C-----= ------------------------------- III-1
4_ Complexes D, E and F------ _______________s___ III-1
T
5. Complex G-----.-------------------------------- ---- 111-3
6.. Complex I ------------------------------------- ICI-9
7.. Complex J ---------------------------------------111-9
8. Complex K -------------------------------------- 111-9
9. Launch Group L-------------------------------- III-9
B. Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range (KYMTR),Research
and Development Facilities ------------------------- 111-9
1. Launch Area A---------------------------------
2. I-11
Launch Complex B -------------------------------T_II-11
3. Launch Complex C------------------------------ III-11
4_ Launch -Complex E ---------------------------- 11I-15'
5_ Launch Complex G------------------------------ III-15
6 Launch Complex H ------------------------------ -111-15
7. Tactical Rocket Forces Training Area---------- 111-15
C,. Emba Missile Test Range--------------------------- -I11-15
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IV. CHINESE COMMUNIST MISSILE PROGRAM------------- ----- 1V-1
A. Summary -------------------------------------------------- IV-i
B_ Cruise Missile Launch-Complex=at Yen-t'ai-------------- - IV-1
C. Additional SAM Sites in Ch,ina-------- -------------- ------ - IV-1
D. SCTMTC Rangehead Activities=----------------------------- - IV-3
A-1
Figure - ' Page
1. Map of Soviet Missile Test Ranges--------------;---------------- vi
2. Line Drawing of Sary Shagan Missile Test Range---------------- 11-2.
3 Line Drawin of-Ka ustin Yar SAM Ran ----------- - -- II 3
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4. Launch Complex B, Sary Shagan Antimissile Test Center(SSATC)- 11-4
5. Concept of Additional Launch"Positions at Complex B,SSATC----- .I1-6
6- Line Drawing of Launch-Sites 5 and 6(showingo Electronic
Sites C and D), Complex A, SSATC=--------------------- o---------- 11-8 9 ,
7. Launch Sites 1.- 4, Complex-?A, SSATC -------------------- _----- II-10
8. Target Missile and ANN Testing Associated with.Chelkar and
Makat --------------------------------------------------------- 11-14
9. Target Missile and AM Testin Makat - 1961,.Kapustin Yar -
25X9 I----------------------------- 11-16
;10: Possible ATBM Association of SSATC Activity------------------- II-17
11. AMM/SAM Launch Complex,.Tallinn------------------- -------------- =I-20
12. Northwest Probable AMM Launch Complex, Leningrad ------- ------- 11-22
13.---Photograph-of Model of-Leningrad BEER CAN Electronic Site:
Top View------------------------------------------------------ 11-24
`14. Photograph of Model of-Leningrad BEER CAN Electronic Site:
Side View----------------------------------------------------- 11-25
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otograph of Model of Antenna Structure at Electronic Site C,
-Complex A, SSATC ---------------------------------------------- I1-26
16. Photograph of Model of Back-to-Back Antennas atop BEER CAN---- 11-27
17, Dual HEN HOUSE-type Structure, Olenegorsk--=------------------ 11-28 18-. Triad Areas, SAM Site E33-1,Moscow ----------------------------- 11-30
19. Photograph of GALOSH Missile Displayed in Moscow Parades------ 11-32
20. Flyout Envelope of. GALOSH Missile -------------------------------- 11-34
21. F.lyout Envelopeof GALOSH Missile: Isp = 260 seconds (vacuum)- 11-35
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22. Orientation of Instrumentation Sites 142 15. 16 and 17 at
SSATC-------- ----------------------- 7---- ---------- =--=--~ _ Ii-36
23. SSATC Target and AYM Launches ----------------------------- 11-38
.24. Launch Complex A, Tyuratam Missile Test Center------------ 111-2
25:- Launch Area G1 - G2, Tyuratam:M fissile Test Center--------- 111-4
26. Launch Area G3 - G4. Tyuratam Missile Test Center ---------- II1-5.
27. Launch Area-G5 G6, Tyuratam Missile.Test Center --------- 111-6
.08. Launch Area G8 - G9. Tyuratam Missile Test Center--------- 111-7
29. Launch Complex J. Tyuratam Missile Test Center------------ 111-8
30. Launch Area 1C, Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka Missile Test
.Center----------------------------------------------------- III-10
31 Launch Site 2C, Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka Missile Test
Center ---------------------------------------------------- 111-12
32. Launch Site 5C-l,*Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka Missile Test
Center ----------------------------------------------------- III-1%
33 Launch.Area, Emba Missile Test Center --------------------- 111-14
34. Missile-Related'Locatior3s in Communist China-------------- IV-2
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1. SSATC Participation in Firings------------------------------- 11-12
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Construction of the Sary Shagan Antimissile Test Center (SSATC)
was first. indicated in the 1956-1957 time?frame. The instrumentation
ring, designed and positioned specifically for observation of anti-.
missile missile launchings and incoming vehicle re-entry flight paths,
was essentially complete by 1960. Construction and alterations, as
well as an extension of range instrumentation, are continuing, but
the basic purpose of the range has not been altered by this activity.
It is believed that the evidence does not indicate basic SAM
developMental activities at-the SSATC. In-fact,-there is ample
evidence to substantiate a separbte Soviet R&D program to develop
an antitactical ballistic missile system (ATBM), including the
Sary Shagan timing signal intercepts, a portion of which can be.
broken out as a strong indication of ATBM system tests. This sep-
arate and distinct program is also supported by the continuing_
activities noted at Sites l- and 20, Complex A,_in photography, the
'identification of SA-2-type equipmdhts-, the position layout of
.Instrumentation Sites 11 and 12, the grouping of identifiable impact
craters, and the identifiable program involving the D04 group in 1961.
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h c coverage of the' uratam Missile. Test Range (TTMTR),
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2 5X1 D provided evidence of continuing construction
The most significant new facilities include a possible
that area
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new launch facility (A4) at Complex-A, another, launch pad (J2) at Com-
plex J in the initial stage of construction and the .L-group of launch-
ers that has been expanded to 10 launch silos. The possible new
launch pad (A4) is approximately.400' east of A2 and appears to be
a rectangular, rail-served concrete pad.
25X1 D Covers a of the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range (KYMTR) on
Irevealed several missile exercises in that area but
not any major new developments.
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Several vehicles were identified, around the Northern Ramp in
Launch Area A which is believed to be a naval-related facility.
Several missile-like objects were noted'in the support area of Launch
Complex B, but none could be identified as to specific type. Launch
Area 1-C, consisting of two rail-served launch pads, is now complete
-and usable; the old launch pad in"this area has apparently been,
abandoned. This area could be related to an expansion in the COSMOS
satellite program. In Launch-Area 2-C an S-S-4 training exercise was
underway at the south pad and modifications were being made to the
north pad. An SS-5 training exercise, probably' a dry fire exercise,
was underway at the north pad in area 5C;-1; Launch Area 5C-2?is
apparently abandoned. Launch Complex H, which is still under con-
struction, should be completed in a few weeks; the launch pads in
this area are only about 435' apart, which suggests that a'small
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weapon will be fired from th-is area when completed. Limited training
activity in the Tactical Rocket Forces Training Area involved three
SCUD units, two in the area behind Launch Complex E and one near the
area and Support Area A.~ The launch area was active and contained
objects in the center of each launch pad. Judging from,their size
and configuration, these objects could have been missile transporter-
erector-launchers. The test range continues to be used in missile
testing, but no specific system involved in this testing can be
identified.
In China a tcwo-pad coastal defe.nse cruise missile haunch complex
was discovered near Yen-t'ai on the Shan-tung Peninsula, and five
moreISA-2-type SAM sites were identified - two at Lanchow, one at
Pao-t'ou and two at the Shuang-ch'eng'-tzu Missile Test Center (SCTMTC)
rangehead. A probable missile exercise was underway at the-south pad
10 vehicles or pieces of equipment were parked at the motor pool of
This activity tends to confirm the probability that SAM operations at
rangehead are moving into a more active phase.
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(1) Construction of the Sary_Shagan Antimissile Test Center
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ring was essentially complete by 1960 and was designed and-positioned specifi-
cally for observation-of antimissile missile launchings and incoming vehicle
re-entry flight paths.. The difference in basic missions of the Sary Shagan
range and the surface-to-air missile range at Kapustin Yar is clearly evident
by comparing the layouts in Figures 2 and 3. -
(2) Construction and alterations, as well as an extension
of range instrumentation, are continuing at the SSATC; this type-of con-
struction activity is normal and expected as individual program requirements
change. The-basic range purpose has not been altered by. any construction
or modifications, but an extension toward the rangehead along the trajectory
line was evident in with the initiation of construction of inistru-
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mentation sites 14 t roug Developments on theooverall.range and in the
program indicate that 1962 was a critical year. Cons idering,'oLLer significant
construction starts such as the Triads in 1961, the termination o; GRIFFON
testing from Sites 5 and _6 and the range extension, it would ap cea.r.that an
entirely new phase of development activities was=intended and-planned for as
early as 1961..
at the SSATC_
(3) It is believed that the-evidence does not indicate basic
SAM developmental activities at the SSATC: Kapustin Yar_is well established
as the Soviet SAM R&D testing range. In addition, the Emba-range_is suspected
to be a tactical missile range and could support some tactical- SAM function,
as suggested by the tentative identification of GANEF at one of the launch
sites. It"would be misleading to conclude that the SAM program does not
benefit directly from SSATC antimissile developments, but.it is felt that
application of these developments would be at the primary SAM ranges and not
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(4y There is ample evidence to substantiate a separate Soviet
R&D program to develop an antitactical ballistic missile system (ATBM), including
Sary Shagan timing signal intercepts,a portion'of,which can be broken out as a
strong indication of ATBM systems tests. This separate and distinct program
development is.also supported by the continuing activities noted at Sites 1 and
2.. Complex A, in photography, the identification of SA-2-type equipments
(missiles and launchers), the position layout of Instrumentation-Sites 11 and
12, the grouping of identifiable impact craters and the identifiable program
involving the D04 Group in 1961. -
(5)' Photog?-aphy.substantiates a general facility shutdown
(excepting Electronic Site C) of Sites 5 and 6, Complex A,and a termination
of AMM tests from these sites. The Soviet decision not to deploy the GRIFFON
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INSTRUMENTATION
SITE 8
4T0o '
KAPUSTIN YAR / A/P /
TYURA TAM
INSTRUMENTATION
SITE 6 1
IMPROVED ROADS
UNIMPROVED ROADS
TRAILS
INTERFEROMETER
BUILT UP AREAS
SCALE I:I,000,000
10 0 20
II I I
NAUTICAL MILES
PLOWED'
AREA
INSTRUMENTATION
SITE 9p
INSTRUMENTATION SITE 12 -
A/F
INSTRUMENTATION SITE I I
PROBABLE IMPACT
AREA
~URE 2. LINE DRAWING OF SARY SHAGAN ANTIMISSILE TEST RANGE
INSTRUMENTATION
i~ SITE 10
A/F
LAUNCH COMPLEX BCOMMO SITE 3
C J A/F
INSTRUMENTATION
SITE 4
OMMO SIT, I
HOUSING
uli..Lli.ua
RMARSITE I
RADAR SITE 2
DIRT MMO SITE 2
STRIP INSTRUMENTATION SITEI
A/F
INSTRUMENTATION SITE 3
BASE SUPPORT COMPLEX ( .
~INsTRuMENTRTIou' i ITE 2
r0
E
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missile system, which underwent R&D at these sites, is clearly evident by the
construction changes to the Leningrad.complexes where construction changes
that are similar to.Launch Sites 3 and 4 are being made- Analysis of the
observed R&D testing program clearly indicates a continued program involving
the launching of target missiles to ranges around 500 and 800 nm- The length
of the launcher rails on several of the launch positions at Sites 3 and 4 6
(excluding pads 5 and 6 of Site 3) indicates that the intercept missile is
shorter than GALOSH. The electronics associated with Launch Sites 3 and 4
are not indicative of an AICBM system if these radars are the only ones used
with the missiles fired from Sites 3 and 4 However, if:the GALOSH is fired
from pad 5, Launch Site 3, and the radars are connected with other radars
such as HEN HOUSE-and-the Triads, it is possible that two different missile
systems are under development at''Sites 3 and 4. Since it is possible that
GALOSH is launched from the revetted launch position at Site 3, the develop-
ment of an area defense weapon system would explain the indicated systems
deployments at Tallinn, Cherepovets au.d Leningrad.- If only the ranges of
target missiles are considered, the tentative-conclusion would be-that the
programs involving Launch-.Sites 3 and 4 and the indicated deployments are
for an anti-MRBM system. The final determination depends on whether GALOSH
will be deployed at Tallinn and Cherepovets-_
(6) A third alternative that may explain the SSATC
activities and developments is that the Soviets have been. successful in
developing an effective SAM system as?a resiult`of the AMM system program
and are intending to deploy it in this role at Tallinn, Cherepovets and
Leningrad.
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Since the initial identification in of launch
facilities'at the SSATC, consisting of two major areas Complexes A and B,
a considerable expansion has been observed in the launch areas. Little
activity has been detected in the last year or two at some launch positions
whereas other positions have been extremely active. When first observed,-
Complex B consisted of three launch positions, designated areas A, Bl and
B2. At the -same time Complex A consisted of four sites - two SA-2-type
sites in the southern portion, designated Sites 1 and 2, and two in the
northern portion, designated Sites 5 and 6'. The following pars raphs
describe the changes that have occurred in each complex since .25X1 D
and the activities at each site.
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When first observed in= Complex, B (Figure
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4) appeared complete and vehicular activity was noted in the launch areas.
Cloud cover and obliquity of photography hampered analysis, but all facilities
were observed to dome extent. Site A of Complex?B was separately.fenced and
consisted of a large, generally rectangular prepared pad with a launcher
centered in the western half of the.prepared area; .it appeared complete and
no significant change in facilities. has been seen to date.. Sites Bl and'B2
were prepared semicircular pads with a launcher located at-the center of the
straight side of each site. Site Bl has an.excavation surrounding the launcher
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and -Site 32 is almost =lat. A bunkered probable control position--is located
I between the two launch sites and the area is road-served, as is Site A. Several
instrumentation sites surround the launch area and were connected by -cable to
the launch sites. -A-completed missile storage and checkout facility was
5X1 Dbserved in on the main road leading from the suppdrt area-to the
11 launch sites. Little; if any, change has.been observed in any of the above
facilities since however, two additional launch positions have
25X1 Dbeen constructed (Figure 5).
25X1 D These two sites were added within the secured area of
x B between The easternmost site, consisting of a -looped road,
1 D was present in butdid not appear cleaned up or finished. The
presence of a launcher, could not be determined at this time; however, the
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although unlikely, cannot be excluded. By the- end of the first
looped road and launch position were present,-but as late as the
area was not cleaned up and completed in every detail.: The second site,
2 5X1 D consisting of a looped road and launch position, was added between
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and cabling from the triad-facility to the new launch
position was also observed. Activity was noted in the looped road area in
looped road oni
]but was not present on II 25X1 D
The looped road launch areas again appeared active on
Coverage in Qhas
provided little additional evidence of-activity at these launch areas; how-
ever, the one high resolution coverage on .did provide more accurate
and more detailed information on the entire Complex B.
(a) Launch Sites 5 and 6: Sites 5 and 6 were in a
late stage of construction in with all facilities present and
were probably usable at that time; however; later coverage did show that
the areas had been cleaned itp and construction-related. equipment had been
I removed' Unfortunately, coverage of these sites between and mid-
was of insufficient quality to determine the-degree of activity. Good
25X1 D qua11ty coverage subsequent to 0 revealed little if any change within
I the launch areas, giving a general impression that little activity occurred
during this time. The better quality coverage of including
the high resolution coverage of provided the best infor-
mation concerning the two launch sites. The'l _j coverage provided
sufficient detail to identify the launchers at Sites 5 and 6 (Figure 6) as
the or1y- good candidates at known SSATC launch facilities for the GRIFFON
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missile. This same coverage indicates that Site 6 was probably never com-
pleted as excavations necessary for duplication of Site 5 were left as
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electronic area included activity during several periods of photographic .
coverage which showed changes to this area.. The two outrigger electronics,
consisting of back-to-back antennas, were still under construction in
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25X1 D1960, and the smaller- esectroni c site ~n_e_r the control building was also
incomplete All three were,probably completed by late I Although the
coverage lacked cettail; both outrigger shadows appeared identical by
hereas the northern outrigger had consisted only of a ped-
estal inE The smaller electronic facility was covered.by_a 50'
, ome in Between an addition was made
25X10,, the T-shaped building in the central control area.;-An environmental
25X1Dshelter that was placed over the northern outrigger by [-
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wen.photographed in Photographic coverage has
indicated a. continuing activity within the electronic area from
to the present time. -
25X11D b -Launch Sites 1 and .2: Launch Sites 1 and 2 were
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and vehicles. Launchers on position in Site 1 appeared similar to SA-2
a so o served in and were either complete or in a late stage of
construction. Their similarity to the SA-2 surface-to-air system sites and
the frequent movement of equipments and vehicles suggested that they were
designed'for a transportable system that was robably derived from the SA-2
system. 'High resolution coverage o(V F _j (Figure 7) provided evidence
that the missiles were of the same general configuration and size as the
GUIDELINE missile- Two probable radars that-were similar, but not identical,
to a FAN SONG were seen in the center of Site 1 along with a number of vans
~J indicated that Site 1 was occupied on every coverage where sufficient
detail was available to determine activity and site
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25X1 east two occasions. D
first observed in an early stage of construction in The
original configuration of the two sites was complete or nearly- complete by
and their associated electronics were probably complete by
X1 iI Little change has been observed in Site?4 since~ except for
equipment and vehicle, movements; however,'several modifications have been
made-to aportion of Site 3. Prior to the modification of Site 3, additional
-hardstands were constructed near the electronic facilities which serve
I Sites 3 and-4_ At: the time Sites 3--and 4 were under construction, an
expansion in the support facilities was also observed
In the missile
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25X1 CPut and -storage area, additio facilities were under construction in
and were completed by T If At least 37 additional buildin s had
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been added to the Headquarters and Administration area by
more were constructed by 25X1 D -
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Site 4 consists of six launch positions surrounding
a central control; the launch positions are connected,-by cable to this central
area. Each launch position contains a launcher that 25X1
is similar, but not identical, in configuration to e 6A-2 launcher, a V-
shaped road containing a van/equipment at the terminal of each fork of the V,
and-two small pieces of equipment between the two roads. The launcher is
centered at the a.pex.of the V and is surrounded by a prepared area that is
approximately 50' to.60'"in diameter. Each launch position is road-served
and all the equipment appears to.be transportable. The central control
area, consisting of a circular prepared area with read access and containing
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connected by cable
at -least vans and 2 or 3. other "unidentified objects,
to the three electronic positions in Electronic Site 3.'
Coverage of Site -4 in 0 revealed that the 25X1
site was complete and equipment was present in-.both the central control area-
ar_d in two of the launch positions. Coverage of late 0 did not 25X1
reveal as much activity; hcwevei, haze hampered analysis. Heavy snow cover
25X1 D on precluded detailed analysis of activity at Site 4. On 2 25X1
every launch position as well-as the central control area contained
equipment and the site appeared extremely active in contrast to Site 3 which
The three-associated electronic positions in Electronic
had little activit
y
. Site B also contained a number of vehicles/equipment. Coverage of II 25X1
~di3 not indicate any activity at either Site 4 "or Site 3; however,
25X-1 D interpretation was. again limited because of haze and cloud shadow.
^ Two long hardstands and revetments in Electronic 25X1D
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25X1 D well as the three electronic- positions, were cleared of snow both in l LOA I I1
Pads 1, 2 and 3 of Site 4 were also cleared. of snow
an appeare active or_ both dates The roads to pads 4, 5 and 6 of Site 4
were also cleared, b-t the pads themselves did not appear to be in use. Every
detailed coverage since has revealed activity at Site 4, usually
on pads 1 through 4 and on sorge occasions at the other two pads..
Although Site 3 origiflally appeared similar to Site
4 except for the pair of structures on pads 3 and 4 of Site 3, several major
changes have been made in the sites. Pads 1 and 2 have remained similar-to
the pads of Site 4, and on a few occasions appearedactive-at the same time
a s those of Site 4. The most significant change to S^te 3 has been the con-
struction of a.large revetment around pad 5 and a change,ir. the pad config-
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for the 'revetment. .ma- have bes early as but the complete
.may begun as
of the revetment was not present until During the
same period of time a large tower, probably for microwave conunications,
and an associated structure were completed in the area adjacent to pad 5.
which required, the realignment-of the security fencing,surrounding the two
X1 D launch sites ,The exact time of completion of the pad 5 modification is
unknown, but it certainly did not occur before late 0 ?and probably not
before the first quarter of II..Based upon the high resolution coverage
of it is apparent, that the revetment-contains a V-shaped
pattern with tworsmall objec s'at c-ne`end and presumably. a launch position
at the opposite'end. inside aimensions of the revetment are 185' by 65'.
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uration. At'the same time pad 6 was also altered to form the same config-
uration as pad 5 but without the revetment.. Some preliminary earth moving
Target missiles have been launched from. several different
launch points into the Sary Shagan area for the development of Soviet ABM
systems. Very little information is available from these launchings to
make an assessment of -the detailed technical characteristics of the systems
or subsystems being tested, CJMINTT, however, does indicate that the Soviets
have had and have carried out well-planned programs in their ABM development.
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.TABLE 1. TABULATION. OF SSATC PARTICIPATION IN FIRINGS-
Kapustin* Kapustin*
Launch Point' Yar Yar
Makat ' Chel-kar
SP-12 SP-5
SP-2 D-4B
Missile
8K65
8K63
8K6
Range(Approx)'
1050
1050
780 51.7-
275
YEAR
QTR
1957 .
3rd
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8
4th
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1958
1st
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2nd
3rd
4
4th
5
1
1959
1st
1
2nd -
-
6
3rd
3
4th
-4
2
1960
1st
5
2nd
2
3..
1
3rd
18
-
2
4
4?th
2
9
9(5)
1961
1st..
2
10
2(2)
6(5)
2nd
10
3(3)
3rd
10
-
11
4th
-
19(5)
8("5)
5(5)
196Z
1st
6
1(1) "
2r
19.(3)
-
3(3)
1(1)
3rd
9
4th
3
22
6(2)
st
9(3Y
2nd
7
2(1)
3rd
13
2(1)
4th
13'
.2(1)
1964
1st
11
4(4)
2nd
3
3rd
13
4th
8
19-63-
st
2
2nd
3
3
3rd
-
4th
-
TOTAL
9
234(8)
33(17)
37(19)
18(1)
16(5)
there is no way to determine the partictpation.of SSATC
since the communications link had been deactivated. All firings to the area
have been included since that time.
() Numbers in parentheses indicate possible intercept attempts.
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I I approximately 50 SS-4 missiles in which
the SSA TC indicated are interest were launched from Kapustin Yar.to=Sary Shagan.
Since that time, the Sary-Shagan interest or degree of.participation cannot be
determined for each individual SS-4 firing; but-'approximately 180 additional
firings have.been conducted to the area from Kapustin-Yar. Eight of these
have been accompanied by timing signal sequences which probably resulted in
AMM launches. (Five launchings were associated with the nuclear tests in
October ?1961 and three were conducted in a normal test environment in June
1962.) -Nine SS-5 missiles were also fired from Kapustin Yar to the Sary
Shagan area. The SSATC indicated an interest in the first two of these firings,
but again the degree of'their interest in later firings is unknown.
25X1.
The first eight launches from -a downrange launch site occurred
and four additional Ilaunches'occurred in the third quarter IL One
possible "SP-2" operation 0 has been tentatively -related to an AMM
intercept,=but the evidence is not conclusive.- Since no other AMM intercepts
against target missiles from "SP-2" have ever.been intercepted, the. association-
remains tenuous. -
The early stage of construction at the SSATC (known from COMINT
evidence) and-the degree of completion in preclude the use of the
"SP-2" firings of 1957 and 1958 as tests of the AMM system, but they could
have been used. for feasibility testing of off-the-shelf electronics items
and for checking some of_the impact area equipment as it was installed for
use in a re-entry measurement program. .4.,
The first SS-3 missile firings. from "SP-5", another downrange
launch point (48?07'N, 59?35'E near Chelkar), occurred in the last quarter
of 1958 and had a range of about 520 nm_ These firings, as well as the first
13 firings. from "SP-2", were to the "T-l" impact area -and-all are believed to
have been associated with, or for the benefit of, instrumentation surrounding-
the impact area. The two SS-3 firings in 1959 from "SP-5" were-to a new impact
area, designated "T-5", as were the next three SS-3.firings in the second and.
third quarters of 1960. Field site launchings in 1960 of surface-to-surface-
missiles are believed to have been a final.checkout of the complete AMM
XI D electronic system. The loss of readable range. traffic in late 1960 prevented
the'identification of the impact area utilized in the "SP-5" firings beginning
in 'and in--all subse uent firin s from a 1 " h'
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SS-3 target missile and 19 AMM launches occurred, and several additional
operations may have resulted in cancellations or"failures (Table. 1). No
operational-activity involving "SP-5" has been intercepted since 25X1
and there is no evidence of a planned renewal of this, phase of the test program.
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g
y
unc point.
is
unfortunate loss at the very beginning of .the intercept test program at Sary
Shagan has left many unanswered questions concerning the Soviet concept of
AMM research and development, - -
the major testing
efforts-involve-target missiles from SP- and probable intercept'tests .- vi
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 25
*-A
i TARGET MISSILE LAUNCH
F FAILURE
C. CANCELLED
UND UNDETERMINED
N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M
1960 1961 1962 1963 .1964
FIGURE 8. TARGET MISSILE AND AMM TESTING ASSOCIATED WITH CHELKAR AT MAKAT
0
m
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This lack of further activity cannot be satisfactorily explained, but the two
most probable explanations are: (1) completion of that particular R&D phase,
or (2) depletion of the Soviet surplus inventory'of SS-3 missiles.
The early and predominant use of SS-3 missiles in the AMM
program may be explained as follows: only .a limited number of SS-4 missiles
was available because the system was undergoing research and development,
SS-4 missiles were being fired'by the KYMTR for their own programs,and the
SS-4 deployment program was underway which required the Soviets to use the
older SS-3 for the initial AIM-related efforts.
Launchings of the SS-4.asa target missile from a. new
downrange launch point near Makat occurred.during the first half of 1961,
but only five target missiles were-launched and AMM intercepts?were conducted
against all five .targets. The utilization rate of target missiles-for AMM
intercept attempts has not'been observed at any other time except for the
last four SS-3 launchings from "SP-5" in 1962 and the four valid operations
in 1964. Following these five launchings, no further activity from Makat
was observed 29 target missile
launchings from Makat and 12 AMM intercept attempts from the SSATC have been
conducted; but no further operational activity from other downrange launch
points has been identified.
Figures 8, 9, and 10 show the different-tests that have
been associated with the SSATC since the Chelkar tests began in
25X1 D
25X1D
25X1 D
Figure 8 shows the target missiles and AMM tests that have
been associated with Chelkar and Makat- From the data it looks as if almost
the same test program.was carried out in both of these test phases. Be-
ginning with the Chelkar launchings in there were 27 target
missile launchings (including one failure) with 22 periods of AMM activity
(4 failures; l cancellation and 1 unidentified) extended -over a period of 18
months. The Makat activity that began in -lasted fbr 16 months,
and consisted of 25 target missile launchings (no failures) with 15 periods
of AMM activity. Other similarities in the two programs are:
25X1 D
25X11
1: Each program tapered off after 15 target missile launchings;
2. Chelkar had 15 target missile launches in 5 months, Makat
had 15 target missile launches in 4 months;
3. Each program had two periods when 6 target missiles were
launched in one,month_
4. Both had a lull before the test. phase was completed with
four target missile launchings andfour AMM intercept
attempts-
25X9 - Figure 9 shows the Chelkar and Makat launchings again, and
includes the 1961 Makat launchings the activity from Kapustin Yar in 1962 and
These tests could have possibly been
for final system checkout or for feasibility testing for-the next phase in
the development period. Antitactical ballistic missile activity, which was
initially reflected in 1961, has continued to. be noted-up to
(Figure 10), 11-15 I
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25X11
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 N D J F M' A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A .S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S'0 N D J F M A M
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
FIGURE 9. TARGET MISSILE AND AMM TESTING, MAKAT-1961 , KAPUSTIN 19621 1
 25
0
0v
In
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w w~~s---M,-
IA SON D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0
961 1962 1963
TARGET MISSILE LAUNCH F- FAILURE
D AMM LAUNCH
ACTIVITY? OCCURED?BUT
SUCCESS IS UNDETERMINED
IGURE 10. POSSIBLE ATBM ASSOCIATION OF SSATC ACTIVITY
N D J F M A M J J A SON D J F M AM
1964 1965?.
COMMUNICATION GROUPS ASSOCIATED
WITH ATBM DEVELOPMENT
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'Information concerning SSATC'target'missile firings and ABM
intercepts between F_ I indicates that the Soviets probably
25X1 D
attempted to adapt the SA-2 missile,system in an antitactical ballistic missile
role. Two phases of test activity were-reflected on .the D04 communications
group: the first phase consisted of possibly 11 target missile launches or
2 5X1 D3ttempted launches during with no apparent AMM attempts;.the
second phase included five target missile launches and the launching or in-
25X1Dtent to launch five'ABMS during I Both phases of testing had a number
of failures, and the test program is believed to have been unsuccessful since
no further reflections of the activity have been detected -
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The D04 group v/as positively identified on - 25X1 D
although it may have been active as early as The group consisted 2 5X1
of a control station at Sary Shagan'and an outstation at the unlocated
target missile launch point, its communications being-made up of Morse traffic
and timing signals- Radio frequency usage-suggests that the outstation was
located between 150 and 250 nm from Sary Shagan; however, timing signal data
concerning the valid operations suggest a much shorter range in the order of
35 nm, Although the inconsistency of frequency cannot be satisfactorily ex-
plained, it is thought that a shorter range target missile was used.
Procedures observed on the D04 link-during the operations
were consistent with those observed on other SSATC communications groups..
In some instances the wide pulse in the timing signal was not reported for
what. appeared to be valid launches; however, when tapes were available,
it was found that a wide pulse was present. It has been assumed that all
.,operations which contained other valid launch indicators exce
t the wide
p
pulse were valid launches'. During this period, the local SSATC timing 2 5X1 D
signal a
d f
ppeare
or the first tiiii
me-n range communcatons and was first ^
observed participating in D04 operations on -- --I when it was s-1- -a
he
04 c
/
on ~~,_ during signal.
-- _
Considerable difficulty was.noted in the operations and.at
least six postponements/cancellations were observed during the first phase
of activity. Attempts were made to fire two target missiles-within 'a prox- 25X
imately 10 minutes and apparently utilizin the same countdown-on II
25X1 D and possibly on. but-the successful launch 25X1
and flight of both missiles.werenot achieved until I TFao missiles 2 CJ D
25X1 D were also successfully launched-on however, the launches appear
to have been failures on this date. The large number of delays,-the numerous
cancellations/
ost
p
ponements and the failurtif bh
e rao oot target missiles and
AMMs suggest that the tests were unsuccessful. However, if the test objectives
were feasibility testing of an existing surface-to-air system in an ABM role,
the test series may have been successful in determining limitations of the system
and requirements for modifications to this role. -
Between 1959 and 1961, Soviet authors.prorosed that existing
SAM systems be modified to provide an antitactical ballistic missile defense.
An examination of known Soviet-SAM_systems indicates that the SA-2-system
would be the most likely candidate; but even with this system it appears-that
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considerable modification would be required. Considering the time of the D04
tests in the light of the apparent difficulties and the lack of later testing,
feasibility testing of the SA-2 system seems the most likely objective of the
test series- The presence of SA-2-type sites at Sary Shagan., which were prob-
ably completed prior to. the D04 activity, provides evidence of-interest in the
SA-2 system in an ATBM role.
Assuming that the SA-2-type sites were the launch point of
the antimissile missile,' it is likely that an impact area nearer to the sites
than "T-1" would have been utilized. Timing signal d$qta indicate a target missile.
flight-time of about 185 seconds, with ABM launch occurring approximately 126
seconds after target missile launch. Using a SCUD target-missile with a nuclear
warhead configuration and a flight time of 185 seconds, a"range of approximately
35 nm could be achieved. To achieve reasonable intercept altitudes and ranges,
an impact area somewhat closer than "T-l" would be required if launch of the
ABM occurred at one of the known SSATC launch-areas. Frequency. usage of the
D04 group is not consistent with the suggested short ranges; however, longer
range target missile firings may have been planned if the first series of
tests had proven successful.
25X1 D .
The next reflected ATBM association occurred froml _J
when the D17 group was noted'active. ?The D17 group control
was located at Sary Shagan, and the D17 B outstation was probably located in
the general area. of Dzhezkazgan and "SP-2".
Although it cannot be proved from timing signal data that valid
launches occurred at this time, a renewed interest in short range target missiles
is indicated..) The only other short range target missile interest since 1963
has been reflected on the local Sary Shagan timing signal in late 1964 and early
25X1
1965 E 25X9
25X1 D that occurred in 25X1 D
in-
(Figure , it can
25X1
volved in some type ot development from
in what appears to be a well laid out development program.
From COMINT data,`it is suggested that the SA-2 was involved
in the D04 activity in 1961_ It. is possible that an SA-2-type system-has
continued to be under development for use. in an ATBM role since the activity
in 1961. Available data suggest that a new ABM was probably used in the Makat
activity that began in December 1962.
(1) Sites I and 2
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Activity suggests a continuing effort or interest
in an SA-2-type antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) program. The electronics
associated with this system (ATBM-2) does not appear to include.FAN SONG con-
figured radars, but rather smaller, possibly more mobile' radars. Previous
II-19
D
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studies. of SA-2 system capabilities, in an ATBM role, have indicated a lack
of electronic capability. and system mobility. An ATBM system with short system
reaction times and sufficient electronics could employ a GUIDELINE-like-missile.
The probable ranges of the target missile associated
with Sites 1 and 2, as,.implied byl~ ata, are estimated to be less than
50 nm; however, the possibility exists that the 150 nm field launch point may
be utilized for target launchers. The probable field launch sites about 45 nm
NW of these sites are good candidates for SCUD-like missiles. A 7- to 12-second
dead-time launch envelope normally associated with the guidance function of the
GUIDELINE missile is also suggestive of target velocities compatible with SCUD-
like missiles.
The continued effort at Site I over the past years is
more than suggestive of R&D testing and indicates an anticipated missile system
with a real potential.
(2) Sites 3 and 4
-The electronic area associated with these sites is
similar in configuration to the probable electronic areas at Tallinn, Cherepovets
and the Leningrad ABM complexesa. The general alignment of the electronic launch
area (NE) suggests that the area of interest is NE; however,-the known impact
areas lie WNW of these sites, which indicates that launchings probably have
been conducted broadside to the apparent site alignment.
The separation distance between the electronic and
launch areas (ab'out 2500') favors a vertically launched missile and the distance
possibly, is dictated by the elevation acceleration rate of the missile. The
electronic area could be positioned to favor both elevation and azimuth slew
rates required of a vertically launched missile: This apparent orientation
suggests that the electronic area is associated. with missile guidance and
track functions. The size of the associated radars favors a missile or target
tracking function as opposed to as target acquisition function.
(3) Tallinn
The construction effort is continuing at this site,
some revetments containing launcher-related equipment similar to that seen at
Launch Position 5-, Site 3 (Figure 11), Complex A, SSATC. The dual rails appear
to be V-shaped, and are elevated a few feet above the floor of the revetment.
No electronic equipment has been observed at this-site, but the`hardstands
will 'probably support equipment similar to that observed at the NW Leningrad
ABM complEx. - -
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The slant range requirements for this site would be in the order of 100 -.200
nm for the defense of Moscow proper. These long range intercepts would require
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acquisition capabilities far in excess of those of the small radars that are
believed to be associated with the system. If these sites are to be utilized
as forward defense sites, the suspected altitude of intercept would suggest
that the long range acquisition would be. performed by a remotely located in-
stallation such as Olenegorsk The DOGHOUSE installation could function as
an early warning/acquisition radar for this system, but the remote location
of Cherepovets'would present formidable data handling problems.
(5) Leningrad 25X1 D
-all site modification/addition to the
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The first : ove
at the NW Complex (Figure 12)
Leningrad ABM complexes was observed in
when five elevated equally spaced mounds were c structed outside the southeast
corner of the complex. Later-obs'ervations revealed that three of the mounds
contained electronic equipment and some of the launch areas had undergone modifi-
cations; that-is, the installed launcher and equipment appeared to be similar
to those at Complex-A, SSATC..- : . .
25X1 D The modification to the NE complex,-which was initiated
about I I included elevated hardstands that-appeared to be under construc-
tion in the old complex control center area, one position,,consisting of a 50'
elevated mound with a 300' base. The location of these probable electronic areas
in a peculiar position suggests that the-electronics:is~ limited or favors a
pears to be undergoing similar modifica-
x a
l
o
p
mp
e
The SW c
tion since elevated hardstands are being constructed east of the probable complex
control center-
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25X1 D In order to better evaluate the electronic installations
seen at the Leningrad,outrigger or BEER CAN Sites, scale models were made of one
of the AERR CANS and of the outrigger at Electronic Site CZ. Complex A, SSATC (as-
-seen in and then photographed-
Figures 13 and 14 are photographs of a model of the
Leningrad BEER CAN electronic site, Figure 15 is a photograph of the model
o#-the antenna structure seen at. Electronic Site C, Complex A, SSATC: the
model was made with an end box on each of the large dishes; however; the
quality of. the photography does not permit confirmation that the actual antenna
does in fact have these end. boxes. -
It is felt that the antenna structure was originally
intended to be emplaced on top of the BEER CAN-.structtr es at Leningrad in the
deployment of the GRIFFON missile system, Since the GRIFFON Is no-longer ex--
pected to. be deployed at Leningrad, it is unlikely'that' the antennas will
appear on top of the BEER CANS. Figure 16 is a photograph of a model of the
back-to-back antenna array atop BEER CAN. and shows how these installations
would have probably appeared had the Soviets completed them. An analysis of
these antennas was presented in MK 1-65, published in
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FIGURE 15. PHOTOGRAPH OF MODEL OF ANTENNA STRUCTURE AT ELECTRONIC
SITE C, COMPLEX A, SSATC
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25X1 D A new signal from 'a frequency-scanned radar that
bears close resemblance to the BVO1.(formerly BUEB) was detected on
Iiuring the period A probable source for thi
is the original HEN HOUSE radar at Sary Shagan, but the characteristics of
the signal suggest that the intercept may have been from a test of a prototype
system similar to that being installed at Olenegorsk.
The az-imuth.sector scanned by the radar, which_is.
believed to be. about 350, is, probably the result of the radar frequency scan:
.; This 350 sector is more compatible with the relative orientation of, the HEN
-HOUSE radars at Olendgorsk (Figure 17) than the..BVO1 signal.
The signal characteristics bear some relationship
to the BVO1 signal: both signals have the same number of pulse groups/sweep
and approximately the same frequency; the PRF of the new signal is one-half
that of the BVO1, its sweep period is two times that of the BVO1. The two
signals differ in pulse. duration and grouping; the characteristics of the
new signal-are listed below:
1.
P.RF:
48.8 pulses/sec
2.
Pulse Width:
1000 + 20 microseconds
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Frequency:
153.7 to 162.2 + 0.5 megacycles with a periodic..
sweep from the lower limit to the upper limit and
an abrupt reset.
4.
Sweep Period:
10.49 second-s- (normal) -
5.
Pulses per Sweep:
512
-1
6.
Pulse Grouping:
Each pulse is a single pulse rather than.the 4-
pulse group of BVO1. However, the pulses are
divided into two interlaced groups, each with a
PRF of 24.4 cps.
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The characteristics of this signal strongly
indicate a radar designed for long range. detection'rather than precision
tracking. The,PRF gives an unambiguous range of 1660 nm and possibly an
unambiguous range of 3220 nm if the two interlaced pulses can be distin-
guished by the receiver. The lengthening of the pulse .duration of 10 signi-
ficantly increases - the long range detection capability, but degrades the
range accuracy unless pulse compression is employed. Angular accuracy cap-,
ability'is degraded by-the lack of-the BVO1 pulse grouping, although it is
possible that the arrangement of the.two interlaced pulses may partially compen-
sate for this degrading.
?(3) Moscow.Complex
The Triad-facilities at Moscow-SAM sites have
undergone little change since the publication-of MK 1-64. No additional
construction has been observed at E-15 since I I' The buildings
for a second-Triad are in an early stage of construction at E-33 and E-05.
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25X1
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The environmental shelters have been placed on the large building of the first
Triad at E-33. (Figure 18) Ground scarrings that were initially observed on
su st?tTat Triad will b const t d - E-31
e a e ruc
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25X1 D
25X1 D
(1) The GALOSH Missile was first shown 3-n the
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in diameter., The container is mated to a 2-axle bogie and pulled by a 4-axle
tractor.
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Preliminary Analysis of: GALOSH Missile
IJ (Figure 19) Moscow parade, and subsequently in the Moscow yarn d-7
2 5
The missile-is transported in a?cylindr.ical container that is
(2) The GALOSH missile was seen again on-the Soviet video
release, "Rockets on Guard for Peace", whit) provided the engineer with the
general vehicle configuration that heretofore was only a '.'best estimate."
(1) The best present estimate is that the GALOSH is a
two-stage missile;-both stages are assessed to be solid. The missile design
performance lies between the U. S. SPRINT and the ZEUS. -
(2) The important indications'from the preliminary
engineering analysis are that the GALOSH may. be designed to achieve intercepts
within the atmosphere as well as have an-exoatmospheric mission capability.
Previous estimates only indicated a long range high altitude (exoatmospheric)
(3) Significant features of the GALOSH configuration
(a) The absence of aerodynamic control fins on
the sustainer stage indicates a reaction control, spoiler or some form of
jetavator control. -
(b) The second stage is designed to achieve
minimum drag. The ramifications of these two features are critical, especially
in (a) above, in assessing the vehicle's mission capabilities. The control
system is. important in determining how far the GALOSH is controlled along an
intercept trajectory, A detailed analysis of the possible control system is
being made to assess the guidance constraints and vehicle maneuver capabilities
so meaningful parameters can. be established.
(4) A preliminary analysi$ of the effect of mensuration
on vehicle performance has been: made. Calculations show a fairly insensitive
effect of sustainer length and cone angles on vehicle performance. A 40 semi-
apex angle for the sustainer section was used as a base for calculation. Plus
10 (50 semi-apex angl-e) does not meaningfully affect gross performance. A
booster length of 22'-23' is compatible with external indicator on the GALOSH
container and the video mensuration. - -
11-31
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(5) Preliminary conservative performance parameters
Thrust
.1,014,000
25.3,500
Burntime
6.5
6.5*
-Propellant weight
30,720
7,860
Propellant flow rate
4,726
1,181.5
Initial weight
45,000
15,000
Specific impulse(SL)
214.5
214.5
(6) The: missile flyout envelope of range vs altitude
and txme_is wm in Figure 20. Launchangles (QE) were varied and the missile
followed a ballistic path after burnout. Performance data are as shown above.
The effects of increasing specific impulse to 260 seconds (vacuum)-with
other factors held constant, can be seen in the. trajectories shown in Figure 21.
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The instrumentation sites at SSATC were examined from
the viewpoint of trying to establish an area for -interceptor flight tests
that would not necessarily involve a target missile. -
A missile the size of the GALOSH would involve a test
range with distant instrumentation.points since the flyout-of the missile
would be observable at ranges exceeding 200 rim. The most likely candidates
for this type of instrumentation at SSATC are sites 14, 15, 16, and 1.7. It
is interesting to note that these sites. are located on a line with an azimuth
25X1 D
of 0 and that each site has a radar B oriented at a near right angle to
this azimuth (Figure 22). A missile launched from Launch Complex B on an
azimuth of would travel parallel -to sites 14, 15, 16',.and 17 at a ground
range of approximately 32 rim. The ground range along this azimuth from Launch
Complex B to a perpendicular from Instrumentation Site 15 is-approximately
225 run. The range to the closest of the 4--sites, Instrumentation Site 17, is
110 rim. It appears that-these-.4 sites would . provide very good coverage of
the GALOSH flight. - -
Construction activity started on. the E-shaped buildings
in the summer and fall construction of the
buildings appeared compl-ete, but activity was still taking place as indicated
1-... .. .. 7 .... .... ...... A ..., _ -..... -.... TL _ F .. -. 4 7 ~ ~ -... ?-e.a ,r-. 11_ 1. a? C 1-. e f a 11 _F
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path would-pass within a ground range of approximately-3 rim-from Instrumentation
Site 6. The Soviet video tape showed'some of the equipment that is believed to
*Estimated for a maximum acceleration condition only.
II-33'-
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be at Instrumentation Site 6, including what appeared to be a radome designed
for high angle or overhead tracking. This piece of equipment at Instrumentation
Site 6 would be able to track .a missile flown from Launch Complex B on the pre-
viously mentioned azimuth of 0 25X1 D
Communications between the field launch site at Makat 25X1
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0 Early photographic coverage of.Makat was too.
25X1 D infrequent and failed to provide good detailed coverage that was needed to
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the Makat area in lat
reflected firings. Coverage of 25X1
jrevea ed activity in the launch area that
coverage of the Makat area was obtained during the remainder of-thel
reflected Makat firings; however, several coverages subsequent to the most
recentiIreflected firings in revealed activity at Makat.
25X10
25X1 D High resolution coverage of the Makat facilities on
provided good detail of the entire area." The launch"facilities
are almost identical to the SS-4 field launch sites observed in Cuba in 1962.
The launch site (48?02'N,53?41'E) is located 6.7 run northwest of the FLIM FLAM -
site and is connected by road to the support area and the airfield near the
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FLIM FLAM site. Missiles-are probably off-loaded at a secured rail transload-
ing area at Zhamansor and brought by road to the main support area. From the
support area the missiles-are probably taken by road to the launch facilities
that include a missile checkout area containing a missile checkout tent (identical
to those seen in Cuba),-a nearby warhead storage building (similar to those observed
under construction in Cuba in 1962), and two other areas that are probably used
for support and instrumentation.
25X_1 D After obtaining the high resolution coverage, previous
coverages were reviewed. It is now apparent that the?Makat launch facilities were
25X1 D active on and the main
support base was active on: although there was no activity in the, 25X
launch area. The main support base was also active on however, no
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coverage was obtained of the launch facilities on this date.. Since the
reflected firing in March 1964, only four launches have been detected
Based upon the activity
serveu in pnu ogragirreZr era hat target missile firings
continued throughout the last hal-f of 1964 and that more than the four detec.ted-
firings have.occurred in 1965.
The video tape released bythe'.Soviets in May 1965 contained a
possible launch of the GALOSH missile. The only identifiable object other
than the missile container was a tower of lattice construction topped with
a square platform. The camera angle was such that the erector mechanism
was not visible.
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 U,
m
A
m
1957
1958
71 F
J F M A M J J A S 0 N
D
J F M A M J J
A S
O N D
1959
1960
J F M A M J J A S 0 N
D
J F M A M J J
A S
0 N D
1-7
F^
N
TARGET LAUNCH
AMM & DATE
. KAPUSTIN YAR- ONLY THOSE
TARGET MISSILES REFLECTED
IN SSATC COMMUNICATIONS
ADDITIONAL ACTIVITY RE-
FLECTED IN LOCAL SSATC
TIMING SIGNAL OF WHICH A
INGS-1
)E UNDETERMINED
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 25)"
29
26
24
22
F
22
17
F
17
4
1961
**1962 .
26
21
27
25
25
21
7
7
21
29
'21
7
7
20
30
21
5
10
4
1
P
13
30
16
9
10
4
fi I
21
6
30
5
5
IO
0
19
12
21
s'9
5
10
4
t t
30
4
21
11
`f,~
'16
4
10
4
22
39
,II
16 8
6
21
4
6
4
.6
INCLUDED AM M SEQUENCES
IN PRACTICE. TESTS PROB-
ABLY INCLUDED AMM
SYSTEM TESTS
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shown in the film.
The shape of the tower-and its relative closeness to the launch _
position eliminated all knowri-launch areas except Complex B,"SSATC. Both -
loop roads at Complex B have towers that appear similar to the-one in the fi-lmed
sequence. Based on the geometric layout of the area, it would-be possible to-
place a camera in-such a position to exclude all but one of the towers as -
-2 5X1[ long dark object was visible on the loop road and appears to resemble the
GALOSH canister and prime mover- however, it is not possible to make a positive
identification. This object, had been removed before
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time Launch Complex B, SSATC,
The location of a new type antenna having a spherical shape that was
observed in the Soviet video tape, has been identified as Instrumentation Site
6, SSATC, based upon the facility consisting of-a large (110') dome and a
smaller dome separated by a building and a third uniquely configured dome (new
type antenna). The new antenna dome measures 50' in diameter, and is supported
by a large yoke structure that appears to have an East-West orientation. Move-
ment of theyoke in the supporting. base structure by a rack and pinion drive.
would permit the rotation-of the sphere ? 900 about an axis parallel to the
earth's surface. Pivots'at the ends of the yoke permit rotation of the sphere
+ 900 about an orthogonal axis. The sphere appears to have embedded in its
surface a reflecting dish antenna, approximately 35' in diameter, that looks
overhead when the two rotational axes are parallel to the earth's surface.
This mechanism, therefore, is believed to have been designed for tracking
overhead targets. -
remains the best
Four probable waveguides were observed on each axis of the antenna.
The best estimates from scalings suggest that the operating frequency is pro-
bably between 0.9 and 1.2 KMC. Two large varies attached to the yoke could
possibly perform a wind-loading or counterbalancing function.
A?b.rief analysis-suggests that this antenna is a monopulse/target
tracking-radar-with possibly a single 20, 38 db beam for transmitting and
four similar beams, properly offset in angle, for monopulse reception.
A three-dish radar, consisting of two FIREWHEEL dishes LJ and a
smaller dish mounted on a single pedestal, was also shown in the film. The
top dish feed appeared to be identical to that of a FIREWHEEL.feed, but the.feed
for the bottom dish was not visible.. These two dishes may be used in a =role
as a missile tracker array and the small dish could possibly serve some command
function. - -
A arabolic dish antenna associated with what appeared
to be a la - lated radome was shown in a film sequence that showed a
man climbing up a flight of stairs alongside a massive concrete pedestal mount.
On top of this mount was a bi-axis pedestal that would probably permit the antenna
to track at high elevation angles.. An analysis made of the photography of SSATC
has revealed that this radar has-a probable frequency range of 1.2 to 1.6 KMC,
and a half-power beamwidth of
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The HEN ROOST North (receiver) at SSATC was also shown-in the film.
It appears that the intenna.structure consists of-two offset fed parabolic
cylinders, one cylinder being mounted above and slightly to the rear of the
other. The upper antenna is tilted back to face higher elevation angles.
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III. OFFENSIVE-MISSILE SYSTEMS -
A. T uratam Missile Test Range (TTMTR) Research and Develop-
2 5X1 D The rangehead area was almost entirely covered
25X1 D of-the additional facilities noted in this area, the
most significant were a possible new launch facility (A4) at Com-
d (J2) at Complex J in the initial stage
h
pa
plex A, another launc
of construction, and the L-group of launchers (see MK-1-65) that
.has been expanded to 10 launch- silos.
1. Complex A (Figure 24)'
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There were no. significant changes noted at pads Al'
and A2. Launch Site A3 appears to be almost complete, but seve-
ral pieces ofequipment in the area indicate that the facility is
not-yet ready for use. The silo door is open and appears to be
identical to those at Complex I and B2,' as well as those at the
.type IIIA sites. A possible new launch pad (A4), approximately
400''eas-t of pad A2, appears to be a rectangular, rail-served.,
concrete pad. The purpose of this new pad is not presently known
nor-can the unusual arrangement of the rail lines associated-with
the pad be explained. -
2. Complex B
The silo door was open at-Ba and the launch area
appears. to be completed. Launch Area B3 is confirmed as a soft
pad with a launch,.stand in the center. This facility may have
been used for the triple satellite launchings in the fall of 1964
and the spring of-1965. No.significant changes were noted at pad
Bl.
Only a portion of the complex was covered. Two
RIM buildings are under construction approximately I Pm west of pad
Cl.
Several fuel/oxidizer
equipment that were seen in the area
have been troop training firings..
4. Complexes D, E and F
trailers, vehicles, and other
were probably used in conjunc-
these are believed to
There was no coverage of Complexes
only non-stereo photography of Launch-Complex F.
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Complex G was covered by-good quality stereo photography.
a. ' Launch Area G1 - G2._ (Figure 25)
An erected missile; approximately 95'-long, on pad
G2, which has been previously associated-with the SS-10, may be an
indication of the size of the SS-10. Since no ICBM launchings have
been detected since the date of photography, this missile probably has
not been fired. -
The gantry on pad G4 appears to contain a cylindri-
cal object about 80' high with three light-toned cylindrical objects,
- approximately 25'-high, at its base. The 25' objects look like -tanks.
strapped around the higher cylinder and all are believed to be missile
components. Apparently a missile is being assembled in the gantry,
but in its present state this assembly does not resemble the 1I long -
missile seen previously at this pad.
ec. Launch Areas G5 - G6 and G8 G9. (Figures 27 and 28)
The.gantr.y was on pad- G5, and a piece of equipment.
about 75' long, possibly a missile trailer, was parked on the pad. A
cylindrical object, approximately '60' lon g.was., erected -on pad G6 and,
was supported by braces at its mid-point. 'A probable missile trans-
porter (tractor and trailer), approximately 95' in overall-length, was
.located about 500' southeast of pad.G6 and may have been moving at the
time of photography, The object erected on G6 is not a complete nissile
and may not even be a missile component. Although this object could be
a section of missile tankage, it also resembles a canister or container
of some type.- A similar object on a transporter at pad G9 appears to
be of a single diameter.
It has been suggested-that G5 - G6, and G8 - G9
are launch fac.ilities for a Minuteman-size solid propellant ICBM.
The three-stage solid ICBM seen in the 9 May parade in Moscow is
of that size and the-dimensions of the transporters at the-range
seem to fit this system. If the 60' long object-seen at the range
is an environmental container for a-solid propellant-ICBM; this
dimension would also fit_'
The activity, equipment and vehicles in the area
indicate that G8 - G9 are in an operational status, both silo doors
being open on the date of photography. G5 and G6 were reported as
complete in MK-1-65.
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The silo is-not yet up to ground level. Small
silos are locatedat the extremitie's and intersection of the legs
of the electronic facility, indicating hardening of the installation.
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The silo is probably complete, but the surrounding
area does not have a clean, finished-appearance. Small silos that
are similar to those at G7 appear to be located at the extremities
and intersection of the legs of the L-shaped-electronic facility.
The large assembly/checkout building appears to be
complete.. Two parallel scars, possibly gantry tracks under con-
struction, are approximately 60' apart and extend some 3,000' from
the building in the direction of the large excavations. A second
large excavation, probably a pit for a launch pad, is being dug
approximately?1700' west"of the original pit. The rail line has
been extended and divides into a Y configuration; it terminates-
between-the two excavations. The eastern excavation is designated.
J.l and the western excavation J2. As mentioned earlier, the com-
plex is probably being build for development of large 'space vehicles.
Construction continues atlaunch-area Kl - K2 and
neither silo is yet up to ground level. The control bunker'at
K3 has been re-backfiIled and the electronic facility appears
complete.
All launch sites are double fenced and have mounded
earth-level accesses to the silo. A control bunker is under con-
struction at L1, adjacent to the L-shaped electronic facility.
Small silos are under construction at the extremities and inter-
section of the legs of the electronic facility.
' 25X1 D provided good quality coverage of all the
surface-to-surface missile facilities at the test range and revealed
several missile exercises but not any major new developments. The
following is a brief description of the activity at each of the
areas:
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1. Launch Area A: There was no missile activity _
identified in-this area;-however, several vehicles-were identified
around the Northern Ramp' which is belied to be a naval-related
2.. Launch Complex B: There was a. high level of -
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activity.-throughout this area, but no activity could be identified
in the cruise missile training area behind the-complex. There
were several'missile-like objects in the support area, but none
could be identified as to specific type. Thus far, there has
been only one cruise missile launch to Kapustin Yar this year.
3. Launch Complex C: Launch Area 1C, consisting
of two rail-served launch pads, is now complete and usable
(Figure 30)- The launchers on the two new pads resemble the-one
previously located on the old launch pad, which has apparently been
abandoned. The purpose of this area is not clear, but could be .
related to an expansion in the COSMOS satellite. program, An SS-4
training exercise was underway at the south pad in-Launch Area
2C while modifications were being made to the noFh-pad in this area
(Figure 31). Vehicleslpieces of equipment indentified at the south
pad were:
SS-4-missile,on transporter
Erector. in position
Power convertor
Generator'
Theodolite position -
Cables
2?oxidizer trucks with prime movers
1 fuel transporter with prime mover
.11 checkout vans and cargo trucks
The vehicles at this launch pad were positioned in
practically the same way as those of an SS-4 launch site that was
identified in Cuba in 1962.
No activity was noted'in Launch Area 3C, but two
-empty missile transporters were located on the south dumbbell.
Also, there was no significant activity noted at area 4C, but
several missiles-and associated pieces of equipment were noted
in that area- -
An SS--5 training exercise was noted at the north:
pad in area 5C-1 (Figure 32)- In addition to the missile erector,
there were two SS-5 fuel transporters, two possible oxidizer trans-
porters, and several other vehicles. This was probably a dry fire
exercise since the missile was in a reverse position on the pad.
There have been no changes in the condition of Launch Area 5C-2,
which is apparently abandoned.
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4. Launch Complex E: A few vehicles were located in
the launch area, but no missile activity could be identified.
represents the first
of this facility. From an analysis of the area it
not appear to-have been used nor were there any vehicle tracks
around the launch pads. This ax'ea-appears to be completely in-
active and may never have been used. It-bas been assessed as the
SS-2 training area and the last SS-2 launch. was in 1961.
6. Launch Complex H: This-area is still under con-
struction but should be completed in a few weeks.. The launch pads
are only about 435' apart which suggests that a small'weapon will
be fired from this area when completed.
7. Tactical Rocket Forces Training Area: Limited
training activity was identified at this-area, with three SCUD
units being noted. A motor pool near the. barracks area 'contained
about 45 vehicles, three of which are believed to be SHADDOCK
transporters. There were three separate field training exercises
noted involving SCUD missiles. "Two of these units were located.
in the area behind Launch Complex E,-and the other unit was located
near the barracks area at Launch Complex A. The unit at Complex A
.contained two TEL's, one A-frame crane, two semitrailer transporters
and approximately 27 additional vehicles. Both units behind Complex
E were approximately the same size; each had a sufficient number of
tents to house approximately 450 to 500 men and the field kitchen
could be identified at each area. A meteorological radar (END TRAY)
was associated with each unit. A transloading exercise was under-
'way in one of the areas.
2 5X1 D The Emba Missile Test Range was photographed on C
this coverage included all-facilities be-
tween the-launch area and Support Area A. (Figure 33). Some
high hights-of this photography were:
The.launch area was active and contained objects in the
center of-each launch pad which, from their size and configuration,
could have been missile transporter-erector-launchers. The current
assessment of the launch area is that it continues to be active,
but a..particular missile system cannot be associated with the in-
stallation. The objects identified on appear to have a
different configuration than the one identified on
Some construction is underway in the. launch area.
The area just-east of the launch area contains one drive-
through building having small entrances,. which correlates very well
with the identification of small missiles- being tested at Emba.-
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25X'9
Numerous aircraft, including BEAGLES and FAGOT/FRESCO'S,
were identified at the airfield. The BEAGLE and FAGOT/FRESCO's
may not be operational, but may have. been parked in the area for
camouflage and deception-since aircraft of. this type have been-
seen under similar circumstances at storage, MRBM deployed sites
In summary, the Emba test range continues to be active
and missile testing is' continuing. It appears that more than
one type of missile is. being tested at Emba, but a specific type
of missile system. cannot be identified.
111-16
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Chinese Communist missile highlights during-the last
three months-included the discovery of a probable two-pad coastal.
defense cruise missile launch complex near Yen-t'ai on the Shan-
tung Peninsula,-and the- identification of, two more SAM sites .at
Lanchow, one at Pao-t'ou and two at the Shuang-ch'eng-tzu Missile
ment parked at the motor'pool of the SSM/SAM Assembly and Checkout
Area -- thus tending to confirm the probability. that SAM operations
at the rangehead 'are moving into a more active phase, as noted in
MSS 21-65. Figure 34 shows place locations. -
B. Cruise Missile.Launch Complex at Yen-t'ai
25X1 D revealed a probable two-pad
coastal defense cruise missile launch complex 4 nm-north of Yen-
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at 37?37'N, 1210 23'E. The launch facilities resemble those
of the two-pad complex near Port Arthur, on the opposite side of
the Po-hai Straits.
The Yen-t'ai complex consists-of two probably-revetted,
unoccupied launch positions and four missile hold positions. A
possible missile storage area lies 2 nm west of the launch positions,
and an adjacent probable support facility has.about 10 buildings
and an open-storage area.
If the Chinese deploy a 35 nm cruise missile system-to
both the Yen-t'ai and Port Arthur complexes, their range envelopes
would nearly meet in an area slightly east of the center of the
Po-hai Straits.
The discovery of five more SA-2-type SAM sites in China
during the past three months brings the total of possible tactical
sites to 17* with at least four of these 17 possibly or probably
occupied. Two of the five additional sites are at Lanchow: Sites
B 29-2 (36? 08' 30"N, 103? 22' 45"E) and E 14-2 (35? 29' 45"N,
104? 24' 25"E). Of the remaining three,.one is at Pao-t'ou (A 02-2;
*There are at least 10 other-SAM-associated sites in-China, including
2 R&D sites, 3 currently or formerly associated with training, and
5 former tactical sites now probably abandoned. As of
SAM-associated sites have been noted in China.
TOP SECRET
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 25)
COP01MUNIST CHINA
GARY i
SHAOAN
"?L ~? KU-CH'E.
f ernmu ?
?KA8NOAR WU-SHIH
1 ~
KASHMIR
NEW
? DELNI
KOKO NOj
I20? ID2?
? 1S1 `~
KH AROVSK
? HSI-NING
LANCHOw i --~-_-f
CHENO-CHOU ?
?SIAN
I I
?M0NG0LIAI .
?SHUANG?CH'ENG-TZU.
?CHIU?CH,UAN
-T'A-LA SYING-PAN
.?URUMCHI 1'\
BURMA' .I ?VIETNAM
LAOS \
FIGURE 34, MISSILE RELATED LOCATIONS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
?TURFAN
?MA?MI
 TOP -SECRET
400 45' 20"N, 1100 04' 30"E) and the other two (400 44' 30"N,
1000 03' 10"E and 400 44' 30"N, 1000 03' 00"E), are at the SCTMTC
rangehead, about 8,000 feet south and 15.6 nm south respectively,
from the SAM R&D Launch Complex (41? 02' 38"N, 1000 31' 10"E).
Pao-t'ou Site A 02-2 is of particular interest in that
the coverage is of sufficient resolution to permit a de-
tailed stu y of the facilities.
25X1 D revealed f'our 'fenced- in launch
areas, and within each, a launcher and transporter with: missile.
Four missiles were in the launch areas and one was in a missile
hold area; possibly three more. were in a support area, and possibly
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one was in a tent area.north of the.si.te. There were 46 small,
tents and 3 large tents were in the vicinity, and a guidance area
was occ by a Probable FAN SONG-type radar, 4 vehicles and 7
.25X1 D vans. showed that two new launch
positions had been added-to the site since. 0 The position-
ing of loaded transporters inside the fenced-in launch areas would
reduce the reaction time of this SA-2-type site as compared to its
Soviet SA-2 counterpart.
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' 25X1 D showed a probable missile
exercise underway at SSM Launch Complex A, Site No. 1; however,
clouds and haze obscurred details. flurry
of supported air activity at Shuang-ch en.g-tzu airfield
("Poi "). may have been related to this probable exercise. The
25X1 D air activity involved a probable IL-14 landing at "Point 14" on
the flight of probabl -the same aircraft from "Point 14"
to Wu-kung -via Wu-wei on and its return to "Point 14'-' on
125X1 D 0 and two departures (one of them possibl involving the same
aircraft) from possibly "Point 14" for Ha-mi on
1 The Ha-mi flights suggest the possible involvement of the
Wu-shih-t'a-la airfield.("Point 03")'in the above "Point 14" activity,
--particularly in view of the flight of two AN-2 aircraft from Urumchi
2 5X1 D role to "Point 03" on II Although the complete
role of the-"Point- 03" airfield remains unknown, it is suspected
that in addition to its involvement in support activities to the
Lop Not nuclear test center, it may also be supporting SCTMTC impact/
instrumentation facilities in the approximate 650 nm downrange area,
TOP SECRET
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Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence------ 1-4
(M&S) (1)
(SR Div) ( 1)
(WW Branch) (1)
(SPAD) (1)
Air Force, Assistant Chief of.Staf?,
Intelligence ----- -------------.--------- .5-6 2
Army Materiel Command ------------ 7 1
Advanced Research Projects Agency----------_ 8 1
DDI Special Center, CIA--------------------- 9-2.8 20
Defense Intelligence Agency ------------------- 29-35 7
(DDR&E) (1)
(JCS) (1)
DMI, Army Hq_, DND, Ottawa------ ------------ 36
-25X1A
oreign Science and-Technology Center------c 38 1
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North American Air Defense Command----------
National Photographic Interpretation Center-
National Security Agency--------------------
Office of Naval Intelligence/Scientific
45 1
46-51 6
52-53 2
and Technical Intelligence Center------ 54-55 2
.Strategic Air Command----------------------- 56 1
Army Missile Command------------------------ 57-60 4
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/19 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000500300075-5
Approved For Release 2003/12/19 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000500300075-5