TRENDS IN SOVIET ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE [ASW] CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000500370079-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: October 11, 1965
• Content Type: IR

OSI-SR/SC/65-13
11 October 1965
Directorate of Science and Technology
Office of Scientific Intelligence
Handle in designated controls
Trends. in Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
Capabilities
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 TRENDS IN SO
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Scientific Intelligence Report
IET ANTISUBMARINE (ASW) CAPABILITIES
Project Officers
OSI-SR/SC/65-13
11 October 1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Science and Technology
Office of Scientific Intelligence
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TRENDS IN SOVIET ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) CAPABILITIES
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is believed that the ASV capability of the Soviet Navy does not constitute a
significant threat to U.S. nuclear powered submarines, including on-station
Polaris submarines. Despite the modest improvements in weapons, detection
systems, and operational tactics which have taken place in recent years, Soviet
ASV capabilities against conventional and nuclear submarines in the open seas
are virtually nil. Within regional areas of responsibility (coastal waters adjacent
to naval bases), the Soviets probably now possess the capability to conduct ef-
fective ASV operations against conventionally powered submarines. Against
nuclear submarines in coastal waters, the capability remains very poor. The
inability of the Soviets to effect initial detection of submarines, particularly in
open ocean areas, remains their primary problem.
The USSR almost certainly will endeavor to improve its ASV capabilities by
the development of improved sonar and more effective weapons for surface ships,
submarines, and aircraft.
A very great an unprece-
ented expansion, both qualitative an quan i a ive, of Soviet naval forces would
have to take place in ; order for the Soviets to be able to conduct effective ASW
operations in open ocean areas. However, there is no evidence that such an
expansion is impending or planned. Accordingly, it is believed that the Soviets
will have only a limited capability to detect, identify, localize, maintain surveil-
lance; and destroy -submarines operating in the open seas over the next five
years.
General -
Since the late 1950's, the Soviets have made an effort to improve the capabili-
ties of their ASVV forces through the introduction of new ships, weapons, and de-
tection devices. New classes of ships include the Krupnyy, Kynda, and Kashin
guided missile destroyer types which have AS\V as part of their mission; Petya
and Mirka ASW escorts; Poti-class subchasers; and the R, F, and N-class sub-
marines which have a potential for ASW. New weapons introduced include the
MBU 2500 to 4500 series ASW rocket launchers and the ET-80A torpedo. New
detection devices include active scanning sonar and experimental submarine
passive listening arrays of large size. Aircraft configured for ASW include the
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land-based MI-4 helicopter and the BE-6 seaplane. Increasinguse is being made
of naval TU-16s; the new turboprop seaplane BE-12 has been developed; and an
ASW version of the IL-18 may be introduced.
Active sonar systems presently in use do not appear to be particularly
advanced. Operating frequencies that have been identified are 14-16 Kcs,
17-22 Kcs, and 24-30 Kcs. most of these are searchlight sonars, but it is be-
lieved that the most recent destroyers are equipped wit
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Some Soviet fishing trawlers have. been equipped with relatively high power
(sonar sets for fish finding. While a trawler has serious limitations as a sonar
platform, these fish-finding sonars may be used as an early warning system
!against targets of chance encounter.
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Hydroacoustic Shore-Based Systems
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Present Soviet shore-based hydroacoustic equipment consists mainly
of short range harbor defense equipment, both passive and active. The esti-
mated range of the passive shore-based harbor defense system is approxi-
mately 12 nautical miles (nm) against a noisy target, while the searchlight
active system * is estimated to have a maximum range capability of about
5 miles under good sonar conditions.
The detection range for the standard air-dropped sonobuoy, which is
large and heavy, is probably less than three miles against a noisy target.
* See SID/SC/65-7, July 1965, TOP SECRET CODE\VORD.
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A smaller size operational sonobuoy, which evidently has been in serial pro-
duction since at least 1964, was recovered recently. The new small buoy has
the same operational capability as the older and larger one. It will permit an
ASW aircraft to carry approximately three times as many sonobuoys, and con-
stitutes a significant improvement. The new buoy will undoubtedly become the
standard Soviet sonobuoy in the near future. Sonobuoys using fully transis-
torized circuitry, having longer life and greater detection ranges, could be
operational by 1970.
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The Soviets have installed the large standard sonobuoy's electronics and
hydrophone in a variety of large containers (often mine cases). These are
emplaced by ships and are usually moored. In some instances, the life of
these buoys, which have large battery capacity, is as long as 36 days. A new,
large, long-life, moored passive buoy with a directional hydrophone. is now
in operational use. Its rel robabl limits its
detection range, however.
Magnetic Detection Devices
The Soviets have installed magnetic detection devices on AS\V aircraft. The
range of effectiveness is estimated to be 600 to 900 feet (total air and water
path). By 1970, these ranges could be somewhat improved. Nevertheless, the
extremely short range of such devices precludes their use for area search and
limits their application to localizing the position of a submarine whose approxi-
mate position has been established by other means.
The Soviets are conducting basic research on the nuclear-radiation, infrared-
and visible-optical, electromagnetic, hydrodynamic, and surface-film phenomena
of. the ocean that may be applicable to the detection of submerged submarines.
There is no evidence, however, that this research has reached the stage at
which a practical detection system could be developed. No experimentation at
sea involving these phenomena in conjunction with submarines has been noted.
Weapons
Soviet long range ASW rocket weapons consist of the AIBU series of AS\V
rocket launchers. The latest versions are loaded automatically. Some Kashin-
class destroyers are fitted with six-barrelled AIBU-4500A rocket launchers.
The rockets have a 5,000 yard range, magnetic -influence/contact fuzes and
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can be reloaded in 45 seconds. Some of the other destroyers and ocean going
escorts are fitted with 12-barrelled MBU-2500A launchers, having 2,500 yards
range, magnetic-influence/contact fuzes, and can be reloaded in 90 seconds.
Backfitting of some version of the MBU series on all ASW units not so equipped
is under way. These rockets would not be very effective, however, against high
speed submarines.
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the Soviets. Even with the highest priority, it is riot believed that the Soviets could 25X1
develop an ASROC/IRARA-type ASW rocket, together with the long range sonar
required, before 1968 at the earliest.
The only operational ASVV torpedo known'to be available to the Soviet fleet
is the ET-80A passive acoustic homing torpedo, which became operational in -
1962. It can attack cavitating submarines to a depth of 750 feet and has a speed
of 23 knots for a maximum range of about 12,000 yards. Because its homing
system is passive,- this torpedo is not effective against quiet submarines. It is
also too slow to hit submarines 'proceeding at speeds greater than 20 knots.
The Soviets are capable of using submarines to carry out extensive, unde-
tected mining operations in areas remote from the USSR. The Soviets now have. a
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moored contact mine, with antennas which can effectively mine from the sur-
face down to 260 feet in waters as deep as 1,500 feet. Existing influence mines
are effective in waters less than 180 feet deep. By 1970 it is expected that the
Soviets will have a moored, contact-firing mine, with antennas which can ef-
fectively mine from the surface to 350 feet in water depths up to 2,000 feet.
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