AREAS HIGHLY SUSPECTED TO CONTAIN SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHING FACILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05449A000200010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 21, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
TOP SECRET
oC py t
C E N T R A L INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
21 February 1962
SUBJECT: AREAS HIGHLY SUSPECTED TO CONTAIN SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHING
FACILITIES
The Problem: To prepare an up-to-date list of areas in the USSR
which are highly suspected to contain ICBM launching facilities,
but in which we cannot at present confirm the existence of such
facilities.
Highly Suspected Areas
1. We conclude that five areas, other than those containing
confirmed complexes, can be designated as highly suspected to con-
tain ICBM launch facilities at this time. (See Map, Confirmed ICBM
Launch Complexes and Highly Suspect Deployment Areas.) The highly
suspect areas are listed in the Table, together with brief sum-
maries of the evidence and criteria used in making our judgments.
This report, prepared by a CIA/DIA Task Force, is a part of the
continuous review of evidence from all sources by USIB agencies
and presents the current status of suspect ICBM deployment areas.
In preparing this report, we have reviewed previous GMAIC
studies on deployment of ICBM complexes and have examined other
areas suggested by new information, including those contained
in lists supplied by SAC.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
TOP SECRET
Two areas highly suspected to contain first generation ICBM launch-
ing facilities (Plesetsk and the Kola Pen) are in Northwestern USSR.
One first generation area (Ufa), and two second generation areas
(Perm and Omsk) are located in the broad, region bounded generally
by 54? to 600 North latitude and 400 to 90? East longitude, within
which all six confirmed second generation ICBM launch complexes
are located. We are able to designate a specific suspected in-
stallation in only two (Plesetsk and Omsk) of the five highly sus-
pected areas.
TABLE
Areas Highly Suspected to Contain ICBM Launch Facilities
1st Generation System
Plesetsk KEYHOLE photography reveals a large, secure
SAM defended installation near Plesetsk.
The function of this installation cannot
be determined through existi
listed, Plesetsk is the most highly sus-
pected, and it is accepted as such in cur-
rent estimates.
Kola Peninsula The area extends along the railline con-
necting Murmansk, Olenya and Kandalaksha.
Available KEYHOLE photography is not
ad.cquate either to confirm or negate ICBM
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
TOP SECRET
Available KEYHOLE photography is not ade-
quate either to confirm or negate ICBM
launch facilities in this area. Evidence
in 1960, notably a missile sighting by a
legal traveler, suggested an ICBM launch
facility in the area north and east of Ufa.
2nd Generation System
Available KEYHOLE photography is not ade-
quate to either confirm or negate ICBM
launch facilities in this area.
KEYHOLE photography does not reveal an
identifiable ICi complex. An install-
ation about eight n.m. northeast of the
city, detected in December 1961, may be
an ICBM launch complex support facility
in very early stages of construction.
2. The areas listed in the table are highly suspected on the
basis of evidence available at this time. Each may contain one or
more IC 4 complexes. The highly suspected areas are designated as
first or second generation according to the timing of the evidence
leading to suspicion. Although construction of first generation
complexes has probably been completed, second generation complexes
are believed to be in various stages of construction, with launchers
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
TOP SECRET
at some of them likely to become operational in the first half of
this year. Because the program for construction of second gen-
eration launching facilities is now under way, new starts can be
expected throughout the coming months.
3. For these reasons and because of our past experience with
lists of this type, we do not believe that the Table includes all
areas where ICBM complexes will be found. in the future, nor do we
believe that all of those areas listed will in fact prove to con-
tain ICBM launching facilities. Of the six second generation launch
complexes which have been confirmed, only one was indicated by COMTNT
and collateral data prior to KEYHOLE confirmation, although two
others are in areas which had previously been suspected to contain
first generation complexes. Moreover, while the available COMINT
and collateral evidence varies in quality, it is generally frag-
mentary and inconclusive, largely because of the tight security
the Soviets are maintaining over the ICBM program. For these
reasons, we cannot rely on non-photographic evidence to contribute
substantially to the basic problem of locating ICBM complexes at
this time.
h. Based on the location of confirmed ICBM complexes and
other criteria, we regard the region between 54+0 and 600 North
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
TOP SECRET
latitude and 40? and 900 East longitudes as the "prime," i.e., most
likely, region of additional second generation deployment activity.
(See Map) In addition, northwestern USSR is a highly suspect re-
gion for the deployment of the first generation ICBM. The frag-
mentary nature of the COMINT and collateral evidence makes it im-
possible at this time to pinpoint additional highly suspected de-
ployment areas within these general regions? It is our judgment,
however, that search of the regions described in this paragraph
would be as likely to reveal additional ICBM complexes as would
search of the highly suspected areas we have listed.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
TOP SECRET
Areas Excluded from Table
6. The Dolon-Semipalatinsk area, listed as a suspected area
in BIB 11-8/1-61 last September and considered by GMAIC as a pos-
sible ICBM deployment area last November, is not included in the
Table. Recent KEYHOLE coverage leads us to believe that there is
no ICE! launch complex within 50 miles of the Dolon airfield. Con-
siderable
7. The Ka -shin area, listed as a suspect area in NIE i1-8/1-61
and considered by GMAIC as undetermined, has also been excluded
from the Table. While the KEYHOLE coverage and COMINT evidence of
the Kaiirshin area does not warrant negating the area at this time,
we believe the evidence is not sufficient to list Kanrshin as a
highly suspect area.
8. The Svobodny-Vozzhaevka area, extending along the Trans-
Siberian railroad between these two locations,has also been excluded
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78TO5449A000200010001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78T05449A000200010001-0
TOP SECRET
from the Table. It was listed as a suspected area in NIE 11-8/1-61,
but is now considered doubtful by GMAIC. KEYHOLE coverage is not
adequate either to confirm or negate the presence of ICBM launch
facilities in this area.
9. Aside from the changes indicated by this report and a few
other minor adjustments of no consequence to the present problem,
the GMAIC evaluations of specific areas attached to the USIB
memarandx~m of 16 November 1961 remain valid. We have also examined
additional areas suggested by SAC in a list transmitted to CIA on
29 January 1962, and have found none which we regard as highly
suspect at this time.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78T05449A000200010001-0
 /co N IRS D M L U CH~CONtRLE) E ND
GHLY/SUSP~E T ~D~PL YI~E A~f EA,~THE \U~'SR
? CONFIRMED 2ND GENERATION I
0 HIGHLY SUSPECT ICBM DEPLOY
PRIME REGION (MOST LIKELY) FOR
2ND GENERATION ICBM DEPLOYMENT
BEST SUITED REGIONS FOR
5000 NM ICBM
35594 .12
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78T05449A000200010001-0
TOP SECRET
40 0
$ttt U4
t
N
setsk
ny~iya Sa
Itatka
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP78T05449A000200010001-0
60
I 10