SUPPLEMENT 10 TO JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05449A000200140001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 30, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUPPLEMENT 1O
TO
JOINT EVALUATION OF
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA
Guided Missile and Astronautics lnte TT g1~111`Committee
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
National Photographic Interpretation Center
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SUPPLEMENT 10
TO
JOINT EVALUATION OF
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA
PREPARED BY
Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
National Photographic Interpretation Center
30 OCTOBER 1962
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NOTICE
The following brief report is based on very preliminary screening
of low-level photography made on This re-
port has been delayed until some coverage of each of the MRBM sites
was received at NPIC and the following evaluations are based on evidence
available at
SUMMARY
1. Available data does not indicate Soviet preparations for disman-
tling or vacating any offensive missile site in Cuba.
3. There is clear evidence of other construction at the San Cristobal
MRBM sites since
4. Many of the missile erectors at both the San Cristobal and Sagua
La Grande MRBM sites have been removed from their hardstands and
are no longer visible. There is evidence that at least one of these erectors
has been concealed in the woods, as have the majority of the missile-
associated vehicles.
5. On the other hand, launch stands, cabling, and other components
of the launching complexes are still in place at each of the MRBM sites.
If the sites were being dismantled, we could expect the cabling to be re-
moved first.
6. The Soviets have extended their camouflage and concealment of
launch facilities and equipment since
7. The IRBM sites at Guanajay were not covered on photography
available at this time.
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8. Only the support area was clearly photographed at the Remedios
IRBM site and approximately fifty vehicles continue to be parked there.
9. There is strong evidence that the SA-2 site at Chambas was
prepared to engage the U-2 as it crossed into Cuba on
Fighters also reacted to this flight but apparently failed to reach U-2
altitude. We believe that an intercept by the SA-2 site at Los Angeles
(near Banes) remains the most logical explanation for this loss.
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SAN CRISTOBAL
MRBM COMPLEX
SITE I
SITE 2
SITE 3
SITE 4
GUANAJAY
IRBM COMPLEX
SITE I
SITE 2
SAGUA LA GRANDE
MRBM COMPLEX
REMEDIOS
IRBM COMPLEX
i
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MAVEN I I I
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 NPIC H-0035 NO 611
PHOTO COVERAGE OBTAINED.
HIGH ALTITUDE LOW ALTITUDE
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WESTERN AREA
SAN CRISTOBAL
MRBM COMPLEX
CENTRAL AREA
SAGUA LA GRANDE-
MRBM COMPLEX
14 15 16 17I 8I 19 I20I 21 22 23I 24
REMEDIOS
IRBM COMPLEX
T F S 5
25 26 27 28
? FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY IS ACHIEVED WHEN A SITE HAS REACHED
A STEADY STATE OF READINESS WITH THE ARI LITY TO SALVO ITS FIRST
MISSILE LOAD WITHIN ABOUT 6 TO 8 HOURS AND WITH THE ABILITY TO
REFIRE WITHIN A TO 6 HOURS.
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