FY 1975 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100050013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 5, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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-March 5, 1975
(Revised]
FY 1975 KIQ STRATEGY E~CP?RT
KIQ 1: What mayor trends and charges are Zi7teZy in
Soviet foreign policies relating to the US? Include the
Soviet perception of the ZeveZ, nature, and geographic
focus of the competition with the US.
I. This KIQ is unusually broad, and much of the work rele-
vant to it will be covered directly under KIQs 2 through
6. The following cluster of amplifying questions is
specific to this KIQ.
A. How do the Soviets read US intentions toward the
USSR? How do the Soviets evaluate US strengths
and weaknesses as a competitor with the USSR? What
implications for themselves do they see in the US
executive-legislative balance of power, and the up-
coming presidential campaign and election? What are
Soviet objectives vis-a-vis the US? What is the role
of military power in Soviet foreign policy?
B. What effects are external problems, e.g., the Middle
East and the Persian Gulf, having on the Soviet
view of the U5-USSR bilateral relationship? What
is the effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict on Moscow's
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behavior toward the US? In such third-area problems,
what important burdens does the maintenance of US-5o-
viet detente impose on Soviet policy? What oppor-
tunities does it confer? The reverse is equally im-
portant: what third-area burdens or opportunities are
so important that they might lead Moscow to alter
its policy toward the US?
C. In which of the above areas are significant dif~
ferences of leadership opinion plausible, probable,
or demonstrable?
II. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY
A. As for collection, these questions rest on intan-
gibles, and collectable materials for answers will
Lions.
B. The analytic work required is primarily a continua-
tion of longstanding efforts. In addition, we will
KTQ 1 - 2
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SECRET
increase the analytic work on Soviet decision making
in foreign policy in order for the US to better
understand and if possible to predict and influence
Soviet choices.
~5X1A
2. The impact on bilateral Soviet-U5 relations of
third-country problems, will be examined in a
revised NIE 11-10-75, which will be completed in
the second half of FY 1975. Implications for
the US of Soviet Policy Toward Southern Europe
will underlie NIAM 11/20-1-75.
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produce some interim results on decision-making.
KIQ 1 - 4
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March 5, 1975
(Revised)
FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPaRT
KIQ 2: What internal trends and developments are ZikeZy
to affect Soviet behavior, both in the near and "long terms?
I. This is a long-term problem requiring research efforts
extending over a number of years. Some of the salient
topics are:
A. The leadership -- in the short run, its stability in
the light of doubts about Brezhnev's durability and
the process of the upcoming 25th Party Congress; areas
of significant agreement and disagreement; in the
longer run, the characteristics of the next genera-
tion, including policy views and internal groupings.
B. Economic management -- the distribution of elite
opinion on the questions of Western involvement in
the Soviet. economy, improved centralized administra-
tion, and decentralization; the role of regional and
enterprise economic managers vis-a-vis centralized
economic control.
C. The potential for pluralism -- at the policymaking
level, this means primarily the involvement of addi-
KIQ 2 - 1
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tional institutions; at the sociopolitical level,
the degree of autonomy and integrity available to
such groups as the professions, and the nationalities.
II. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY
Callection
~5X17Z
While internal Soviet trends and developments have
high priority in all these collection systems, in-
creased dialogue between collectors and analysts
and tailored requirements will be required because
of the importance of understanding Soviet political
and policy process (beyond fact and event) to a qual-
ity performance on this KIQ.
5X1 nal sis
KIQ 2 - 2
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in the second quarter of FY 1975 a paper on the spec-
tram of elite opinion concerning centralization vs.
decentralization.
D. Finally, the NIO remains concerned that heavy demands
far current intelligence support of policy and other
research priorities result in insufficient intelligence
community analytical talent being devoted to research
and in-depth analysis on important Soviet internal
political matters,
KIQ 2 - 3
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March 5, 1975
(Revised)
FY 75 I:IQ ST6~ATEGY DEPORT
KIQ 3: What are the policies and activities of the
Soviet Union with respect to maintaining and expanding its
influence in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East,
and the Indian Ocean?
I. MORE SPECIFICALLY
A. In Eastern Europe:
1. What are the Soviets doing to enforce politi-
cal, military and economic integration and
conformity in Eastern Europe? How successful
are these efforts?
B. In Western Europe:
1. What is the present Soviet analysis of Western
Europe? How do the Soviets hope to encourage
those trends which they favor and to block those
which they oppose?
2. How are the Soviets likely to respond to re-
cent developments in southern Europe, including
changes on the Iberian peninsula; prospects
for communist participation in the governments
of Italy, Portugal, Greece and possibly Spain;
KIQ 3 - 1
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a more palatable Greek government; the stress
of conflict in Cyprus on the USSR's Turkish,
Cypriot and Greek equities; the increased dis-
array in NATO stemming from the Cyprus situation?
C. In the Middle East and India:
1. What are Soviet policy and activity with respect
to an Arab-Israeli settlement; Soviet efforts
otherwise to recoup lost influence in Egypt?
2. Are the Soviets providing advanced weapons to
states in the area with the intent and effect
of altering the local power balance? What are
Soviet plans and progress in obtaining military
access and facilities in the area?
3. What significant changes may occur in Soviet
relations with India; with Iran, Egypt, Syria,
Iraq, and the Palestinians; with Israel?
4. What is the Soviet attitude toward the possi-
bility of another Middle East war?
II. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY
A. All collection techniques and sensors will collect
on this KIQ, with increased reporting especially on
KIQ 3 - 2
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B. In analytic terms, efforts will be concentrated on
c arrant intelligence and policy support work, such
upcoming Soviet-FRG summit and various papers which
will be required on Middle East peace negotiations.
~25X1A
KIQ 3 - 3
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DRAFT 21 August 1975
STRATEGY REPORT FOR KIQ #4
KIQ #4: In the Sino-Soviet relationship, what are the
capabilities, intentions, and expectations
of the two sides -- conflict, confrontation,
accommodation, or continued uneasy stalemate?
Amplification:
their triangular relationship with the US? How does
each_ perceive the l everage to x~u"Y', and on what i ssues?
Sino-Soviet competition in these areas? How, particularly,
will the USSR and China each perceive its various
equities and opportunities in Korea and in Japan?
Collection Strategy:--
What sources and mechanisms does each side have
to view, evaluate and influence the other?
What view`s of the other party are held by key
individuals and groups in the Chinese and Soviet
1 eadershi ps? ;,_ -
How confident are the Soviets in their knowledge
of the precise locations of Chinese missile sites and
of the pace of Chinese weapons development?
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March 5, 1975
(Revised)
FY 75 KIQ STl'~TEGY P~PORT
KIQ 4: What are the capabilities, intentions, and ex-
pectations of the tu~o sides in the Sino-Soviet relationship
-- confrontation, reccnciZiation, or continued uneasy stale-
mate?
Include reporting on significant qualitative or
quantitative changes in the military balance be-
tween the. USSR and China, as it exists and as it
is perceived by the antagonists.
I. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STR.A.TEGY
A. The community will collect, primarily through satel-
lite photography and secondarily through COMINT, in-
formation on changes in the Sino-Soviet military
balance. Information on the intentions and expecta-
tions of the two sides will come chiefly from human
sources (foreign service, clandestine, attache and
also military service overt collection) and COMINT.
B. The Community will be alert, not only to the possi-
bility of a further political deterioration and/or
military action, but to the possibility of an upturn
in Sino-Soviet relations, particularly if Mao should
pass from the scene. A close watch will be kept for
any signs of new overtures from either side and for
KIQ 4 - 1
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any reliable indications of how the Soviets view the
leading personalities and likely policies of post-Mao
~5X1A
will continue its ongoing Bayesian analysis of the
likelihood of hostilities and the level of tension.
KIQ 4 - 2
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March 5, 1975
(Revised)
FY 75 KIQ ST~tATEGY REPORT
KIQ S: What are Soviet economic policies toward the
developed West? Particular attention should be given to
importation of teehnoZog~. Large-scale trade in food and
materials is also important.
I. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY
A. The key collection needs are:
1. Information on the current and prospective
transfer of advanced technological information
and products, particularly those with potential
military application, to the USSR from the US
and other countries.
2. Continuing efforts to acquire advance information
on changes in short-run Soviet intentions in
foreign trade, particularly in agricultural
products, and the USSR's foreign exchange position.
3. Information on Soviet long-run planning for
technology inputs, joint development projects,
and foreign trade in agricultural products,
energy, and raw materials.
4. The Soviet view of world economic problems: im-
KIQ 5 - 1
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plications for Soviet interests, Moscow's propen-
sity to exploit Western troubles or to seek co-
operative solutions.
?~",,~ B. With respect to (1), all agencies will collect.
will be sought in open sources and in US-Soviet bila-
teral exchanges.
C. The key analytic requirements are:
1. Estimating the degree of Soviet success in ob-
taining technology of military value and trans-
lating it into specific military gains.
2. Estimating the effectiveness of Soviet assimila-
tion of foreign technology.
3. Analyzing Soviet alternatives to US suppliers
in the technological field.
KIQ 5 - 2
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4. Analyzing the role of technological policy in
Soviet internal debate and detente policy.
5. Responding to ad hoc requests for analysis of
particular proposals, e.g., individual joint de-
velopment schemes.
D. With respect to (1), the Scientific Intelligence Com-
mittee of the USIB will produce a study in the second
quarter of FY 1.975 on the military applications of
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KIQ 5 - 3
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selective service inputs will continue to develop
military-related intelligence on the economic, tech-
nical, and strategic implications of technology
KIQ 5 - 4
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March 5, 1975
(Revised)
FY 75 KIQ ST4;l4TEGY REPORT
KIQ 15: What progress are the Soviets making in expanding
their international political influence through the use of
their distant fleet operations and sea-poser presence?
I. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY
A. This KIQ calls for a close examination. of how well
the Soviets are doing in pursuit of their political
objectives in third-world areas by using the navy as
a political instrument. It will be addressed in
NIE 11-15-74, and also in NIE 11-10-75. The latter
will in addition consider the other instruments of
Soviet policy ~_n the Third World, in the second half
of FY 1975.
B. In collection terms, the community will continue to
collect the data on Soviet naval activities in dis-
tant areas, of the kind presented in Annexes B and C
on political reactions and trends in the countries
chosen for detailed analysis.
KIQ 15 - 1
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March 5, 1975
(Revised)
FY 75 KIQ STRIA i EGY "~EPOC~T
KIQ 30: What are the prospects for Yu.gosZavia foZZowing
the departure of Tito?
Consider especially the potential political role
of the armed forces, and Soviet efforts to increase
influence.
I. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY
A. Principal collection contributors are likely to be:
~5X1A
B. On the general post-Tito scene, a SNIE will be pro-
duced immediately upon Tito's departure, addressing
prospects for the first 6-12 months of the new re-
gime. It will include a list of indicators to pro-?
vide alerting to any subsequent phase of major
changes in post-Tito Yugoslavia.
C. In a more intensive analytical focus of the politi-
cal views and associations of the Yugoslav armed
forces, CIA will produce a research study of the
Yugoslav party, army and state. Several specialized
KIQ 30 - 1
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studies of aspects of Yugoslav armed forces' effec-
selected members of the Yugoslav high command.
KIQ 30 - 2
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FY 75 ~ At least one in-depth analysis wj.ll be required on
the impact of US military aid levels on the effectve-
ness and .morale of-the RVIVAF,
KIQ 41 - 2
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5. One analytical study will probably be required
during the year on the internal strengths and
weaknesses of the Cambodian Government (the GKR).
6. One analytical study will probably be required on
the stability and prospects for the coalition govern-
ment in Laosa
7. At least one in-depth analysis will be required on
the prospects for constitutional government and for
a continuation of civilian government in Thailand.
II. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ
A. Collection
1. The Central Intelligence Agency accepts on obligation
to collect intelligence on all the categories of infor-
mation .listed in section I(A~ above. The CIA under-
. stands that it will be the primary collector of infor-
K12 41 - 3
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25X1A
25X1A
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on categories #1 and #3.
KIQ 41 - 4
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B, Production
25X1A
This will fulfill category #1 of the analysis and pro-
duction requirements listed in section I(B) above.
2~1
~5X1A
III. RECOMMENDATIOiVS FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. Both the intelligence collection plans and the intelligence
production plans of the community are adequate to meet
the requirements of this KIQ in FY 19'75.
B. The National Intelligence Officer recommends no change
in current collection and production programs.
ItIQ 41 - 5
25X1
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March 7, 1975
FY 75 hIQ STRATEGY REPORT
KIQ 66: Who are the major producers and traffickers in iZ-
l.icit narcotics, and what are their methods of operation
Include the location of their production areas, labora-
tories and storage facilities, and how and by what routes
and timing they move illicit narcotics to the United
States?
I. COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY ON THE KIQ
A. Collection. The collection of intelligence on KIQ 66
should focus on providing a timely and detailed flow of
information on the subjects delineated in the KIQ, es-
pecially these dealing with the major producers and
major international traffickers of illicit narcotics,
particularly heroin and cocaine. The majority o.f in-
telliaence collected on this KIQ will be actionable
field reporting on the modus operandi of specific in-
dividuals on the Major International Narcotics Traf -
fickers (MINT) F,egister for enforcement utilization
by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
B. Production. Finished production within the Intelligence
Community on this KIQ is limited, in large part because
the major user of intelligences on this subject, the DEA,
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is more concerned with actionable intelligence. None-
theless, there will be occasional ad hoc times in the
various production vehicles of the respective intelli-
gence producers on the overall production, trafficking
and enforcement situation within key geographic areas.
ZI. COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION OBLIGATIONS ACCEPTED BY EACH AGENCY
A, Collection
25X1A
25X1A
KIQ 66 -- 2
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B. Production
tion vehicles.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The collection and production assets devoted to the KIQ
are adequate to meet most of the requirements in FX 1975.
B. In three specific areas, however, the National Intelli-
gence Officer makes the following recommendations:
1. To insure that the KIQ is adequately covered, it is
recommended that ste s be taken to encourage and
increase the exchange of information between the
the Intelligence Community and the Drug Enforcement
Administration so that riority collectionrequire-
ments can be identified.
2. Given the involvement of foreign military services
~5X1A
with various aspects of the problem, it is recommended
3. It is further recommended that DEA be invited to?par-
ticipate in USTB deliberations on narcotics matters.
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FY 75 KID STRATEGY REPORT
~:IQ 67:
'
to:~
effective arz the anti--narcotics programs a f the
countries
in
categories 1 and 2 designated by theme Cabinet
Committee
on
International PJarcoties Control as of priority
interest
to
the U.S. government's international narcatic
s
control program?~'
Include the willingness of these governments to
cooperate faith US efforts to expose and prosecute
producers, traffickers and their collaborators.
I. COLLECTION A~VD PRODUCTION STRATEGY
A. Collection. The collection strategy on KIQ #~6? should
focus on providing a timely and detailed flow of
information on the subjects delineated in the ~'.IQ.
Particular attention should be given to:
Target A: Information on the plans and intentions _
of the priority countries designated by the Cabinet
Committee on International Narcotics Control. This
should not only include their anti-narcotics activities,
b~a~. also t eir ~cillingness to commit resources to
s~:ch activities, and to cooperate. and share infor-
ration ;~rith the US in combating the production and
f 1o~:r or narcotics .
Thai Zand, Burma,
ance, a zs an, an o om za; consz eration is being
given to adding Ecuador, India, and other countries. It should
be noted that countries may be added to or dropped from these
categories by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics
Control as circumstances dictate.
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~5X1A
Target B: Information on the capabilities and perform-
ance of the priority countries in carrying out anti-
narcotics activities.
Target C: Informati?n on the degree to which anti-
narcotics activities are supported or opposed by
politically influential groups within the designated
countries.
Target D: Information on the role which licit and
illicit narcotics, or activities associated with nar-
cotics, play in the designated countries' economies.
Target E: Information on the existence of corruption
within these and other countries which inhibits or
prevents effective anti-narcotics programs.
B. Production. Production within the Intelligence Community
on this KIQ will be concentrated in the production vehic-
les of the respective intelligence agencies. In
addition, at least one study -- probably Interagency --
should be undertaken on the KIQ during the fiscal
year, possibly including some of the questions raised
in KIQ #66.
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KIQ 67 - 3
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to identify those individuals who inhibit or prevent
effective anti-narcotics efforts and collaborate with
or protect major narcotics traffickers and producers.
~5X1A
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A~ The collection and production assets devoted to this
KIQ are adequate to meet the requirements of this KIQ
during FY 1975. It should be noted, however, that the
world-wide scope and unique nature of the KIQ will make
it incumbent on all members of the Intelligence Commun-
ity and DEA to insure that information on the KIQ is
provided to the wide range of users and consumers who
are involved with the problem.
B. The National Intelligence Officer recommends
DEA be invited to participate in USIB deliberations on
narcotics matters.
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(Revised)
FY 75 ~I!~ ST~~~TF~Y RE?n'-?T
KIQ 68: What are the composition, intentions, and capa-
bilities of foreign terrorist or extremist groups?
Include their sources of funds and weapons, the
possibility of seizure or production and use of
weapons of mass destruction (BW-CW as well as nu-
cZear), the issues with which they identify,
their relations with other Zike-minded groups,
the extent of government support or opposition,
.their impact on government policy and stability
in their host countries, and any evidence that
Moscow or Peking is influencing or rendering
direct support to the terrorist groups.
I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY
Assessments of the current and likely future per-
formance of foreign terrorist groups are needed, with
those of the highest priority being the Fedayeen organiza-
tions currently active internationally and the Latin
American groups active regionally. Current data are
required to support US government programs designed -to
protect both US and allied facilities and personnel
from hostile acts by these groups and to support US
policy-makers' efforts to resolve the international
terrorist problem.
A. Collection. The principal types of information
on which a continuous flow of reporting is
desired are:
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1. Refinement of identifying data on the leaders
and prospective leaders of foreign terrorist
groups such as the following representative
groups:
a. Middle East
PFLP
PFLP-GC
b. Latin America
c. Worldwide
2. Identification of foreign terrorist groups which
appear to be developing a capability to affect
U5 interests.
3. Information on the intentions of these groups --
plans for the future, areas of operation,
prime targets, modus operandi, issues with
which the groups identify, and interrelationships
between groups.
4. Data on the capabilities of these groups --
sources of funds and weapons, and the possibility
KIQ 6 8 - 2
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of seizure or production and use of weapons
of mass destruction (BW-CW as well as nuclear).
Data concerning sources of personnel and
their recruitment, training, motivation and
morale.
5. Information on the impact of the terrorist
groups' activities on host or other affected
governments' stability and policies toward
the US.
6. Evidence that Communist countries are in-
fluencing or rendering direct support to the
terrorist groups.
7. Information reflecting on the viability of
international terrorist organizations.
B. Production. The following types of intelligence
analysis and production will be needed during the
year.
1. Ad hoc current analysis and reporting on all
aspects of the KIQ in the community's daily
and weekly publications.
2. Special memoranda and briefings on fast
breaking developments on subjects of high
interest to US policy-makers.
KIQ 68 - 3
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3. An analysis of the real 'level of threat posed
to US interests by the principal international
terrorist organizations.
4. Analyses of the composition of the terrorist
groups with emphasis on the views of their
leadership, their plans and intentions, and
capabilities to initiate actions inimical to
the US.
5. Assessments of the extent of host government
support or opposition and of the evidence (if
any) of influence and/or direct support from
Communist countries.
IL. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ
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KIQ 6 8 - 4
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B. Production
2. CIA will continue to produce its weekly terrorist
report for selected high-level readers.
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KIQ 68 - 5
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8. An assessment will be produced addressing the
viability and probable policy evolution of
the major Palestinian terrorist organizations
over the next i-3 years.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Both the intelligence collection and production plans
of the Community are adequate to meet the requirements
of this KIQ and, thus, no changes are recommended. Closer
cooperation between the members of the Community, however,
will be necessary. During the discussion of this Strategy
Report, it was apparent that considerable collection and
basic analyses on the various terrorist organizations
have been and continue to be done to meet departmental
needs. Frequently, only limited distribution of the
products of these efforts is made to others concerned
KIQ 68 - 6
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and the recently published Interagency Memorandum,
"The Status of Cuban Subversion in Latin America," touches
briefly on the terrorist problem in that area.
KIQ 68 - 7
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March 7, 1975
FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT
KIQ 69: :That indications are there that the oiZ exporting
countries plan to use their increasing u~eaZth for poZitica.Z
or sub?~ersive purposes? ,
Include such activities as Zoccns to third parties
for tha purchase of arms and Zoa~:s and subsidies
to political groupings or national government.
I. CO~h~IUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY "
j^Thile the potential exists for all oil exporting coun-
tries to utilize their increasing wealth to support po-
litical or subversive movements within othar countries,
this KIQ Strategy Repart focuses on those countries
*ahich at tunes have exhibited a propensity for using
their reealth for purposes inimical to T~;estern .inter-
ests, e.g., Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran.
A. Collection. The principal types of information
on which a continual flow of reporting is needed
are:
1. The identity of
a. foreign govern~-~~er.ts and
b. foreign political groups
that are currently receiving financial support
from one of these countries ~:or political or
s~wb~~ersive purposes .
KIQ 69 1
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for the decision to support foreign political
or subversive action and the interrelation-
ships, if any, between these countries.
4. The identity and motivation of individuals
or groups wit'nin the governments of
-.countries supporting foreign political
or subversive action that are opposed to _
-this support.
S. The form and volume of support to the
entities identified in I above.
B. Production. The following types of intelligence
production will be needed during the year.
1. old hoc current analysis on all aspects of the
..
in the above countries that are responsible
2. The plans, objectives, capabilities and
leadership structure of the entities
being subsidized.
3. The identity and motivation of the
-individuals, groups, or bureaucratic elements
ch~~~?ges in the paiici~s of Cht~se countries
to:~ard the support of foreign political
~KIQ, particularly the plans of the entities
being supported an-d ;the volume and origin.
of support.
. Periodic assessmznts o~ the Likelihood of
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and subversive entities .and the xelation=
ship betcaeen this support and US policies
~r actions.
II. AGENCIES ;~JOR;