INTELLIGENCE PANEL OF THE NSCIC WORKING GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 10, 1975
• Content Type: MIN

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INTELLIGENCE PANEL OF THE NSCIC WORKING GROUP
Third Meeting, 1400 hours, 10 March 1975
Minutes
Members present: Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC, Chairman
Mr. George Carver, D/DCI/NIO
Dr. Edward Proctor, DDI/CIA
Mr. Arthur McAfee, DD/INR/State
Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe. Jr.- nn/DIA
NSA/CSS)
DCI/IC/CS,
e u ive 3ecre ary
1. General Wilson reported on activities to date of
the NSCIC Working Group, emphasizing the effort has been
primarily educational in nature and has focused on the
elicitation of comments from Working Group members. He
described the difficulties involved in initiating an active
Working Group program as stemming from a number of factors,
including the inactivity of the NSCIC itself. General Wilson
emphasized that efforts are still under way to develop a
constructive program under the "guidance and feedback"
mission of the NSCIC.
2. General Wilson invited members of the Panel or their
deputies to attend the 12 March meeting of the NSCIC Working
Group, indicating the main purpose of their presence would
be to enable them to raise questions and offer explicit comments
where appropriate.
3. General Tighe thought Panel attendance at at least
one Working Group meeting would be a good idea, and he wondered
whether the difficulty the Working Group was having in getting
a program under way might really stem from the heavy work
schedules which each of the members had.
It. Dr. Proctor asked whether there was a clear under-
standing of the role the Working Group was to play, and
General Wilson said such role may be only partly understood.
He pointed out it had been decided to defer consideration
of Terms of Reference until after the Group's program was
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5. Mr. McAfee noted the average policy maker is so
overrun with responsibilities he has no time to ponder
guidance--but might respond to initiatives from the Intelli-
gence Community.
6. Dr. Proctor said he felt it was important to tell
consumers how they can make the intelligence machinery work
for them--where to go and what levers to push or wheels to
turn.
7. General Tighe commented that about every six
months someone suggests a return to the Eisenhower days of
regularly issued policy guidance, but he considered this a
vain hope. He wondered if the Working Group might be stirred
to action by using them as a sounding board to elicit support
in problem areas involving FOIA and the Congressional Select
Committees.
8. Mr. Carver doubted that, given the personality and
operating methods of its chairman, the NSCIC would really
become a functioning entity, and he noted the limitation
this posed to the effectiveness of a Working Group.
Agenda Item 1: Guidance from the NSCIC to the DCI
9. General Wilson referred to the IC draft paper,
"Proposed Guidance from NSCIC to the DCI," which had been
sent to panel members on 20 February. He noted this was a
strawman.
25X1A 10.1 1 provided a redraft prepared by NSA and
General ig e als771uted a complete revision of the paper.
11. Dr. Proctor was convinced neither the paper nor
its revisions would fly. He considered the real question
was how the Working Group can be used. How can consumers
help the Intelligence Community? They can be told how to
use intelligence--so they can then tell the Community what
is wrong with the product. He felt it was up to the Community
to raise with the Working Group the problem which the Community
wanted fixed. Dr. Proctor suggested the draft guidance
paper not be raised at the Working Group meeting.
12. General Wilson agreed, and said he would not
further pursue the paper.
2nda Item 2: A proposed program for the NSCIC Working Group
13. General Wilson distributed copes of a memorandum
for NSCIC Working Group members, "Proposed Program for the
Working Group," and described the three basic elements of
the paper--action projects, informational papers and briefings.
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14. "The explicit expression of uncertainty in
intelligence estimates" was the first information paper
listed, and General Wilson noted that Working Group members
had indicated strong interest in this topic. Mr. Carver
thought the topic worth raising, but he noted there are
pressures both for and against quantification of uncertainty.
He felt it would be worthwhile to alert the Working Group as
to the difficulties involved in the phrasing of estimative
judgments. General Wilson agreed, and felt the paper should
be primarily descriptive in nature. General Tighe said that
at some high levels quantified judgments are not acceptable,
and he wondered whether any paper on this subject might not
end up more confusing than helpful. General Wilson said the
paper would respond to questions which the Working Group had
raised, and he asked if there was any objection to preparation
of such a paper. No objection was raised.
15. "A Handbook on Production responsibilities in the
Intelligence Community" was the second of the proposed
informational papers. Mr. McAfee asked if this had not
already been done for the Select Committee, but it was
agreed it had not. Dr. Proctor referred again to his automobile
example--"Just tell them what levers to push and what wheels
to turn." Mr. Carver was concerned that any effort in this
field would "hurt rather than help." Dr. Proctor, however,
felt that a paper, not more than 5 pages long, might be
useful. It could cover matters such as what an NIL is for,
and who is the focal point; what the NID is for and who is
the focal point; if a customer is not certain what he wants,
how does he contact the proper intelligence office, etc.
General Wilson said a paper would be prepared to cover the
subject in a "gross, broad sense."
16. "U.S. Foreign Intelligence Priorities," the third
informational paper on the list, had been proposed as a
descriptive summation of the intelligence priorities presented,
worldwide, in the just completed revision of the Attachment
to DCID 1/2, but the Panel discussion immediately turned to
the kind of reports consumers might be provided on what the
Intelligence Community is producing. I Isaid he 25X1A
thought there would be interest in a report as to what E
guidance documents are produced and on what schedule. Mr.
Carver said NIO issuances cover what estimates have been
issued and what are being worked on, but he wanted to avoid
being put in a strait-jacket through a future-projection of
planned estimates. He said the present NIO reports were
deliberately designed for a particular audience and he
doubted their usefulness to a body such as the Working
Group.
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17. It seemed to Dr. Proctor that each Working Group
member wanted to know if his needs were being taken care of,
but he was not really interested in what was being done for
others. This being the case, each should ask for what he
wanted, and if the Community is not already responding then
there can be a discussion as to what can be done. He noted
that DDI used to put out a monthly report, but discontiz2ued
the effort because only specialists were interested. He
felt that if a special report were prepared for the Working
Group it would be "looked at and lost."
18. General Wilson said if he were the Joint Staff
Director or a State official, he would like to see a listing
of what the Intelligence Community is publishing so he could
note what he was interested in and could ask questions if he
needed something else. He asked if this would give the NIOs
problems, and Mr. Carver said no because the NIOs maintain
liaison contacts which meet this need. Mr. McAfee said the
INR office directors meet with the Assistant Secretaries of
State on matters like this. Mr. Carver said that dissemination
of the NIO monthly report could be expanded.
19. General Wilson said he did not envision a new or
separate report being required, but he was concerned about a
proper response to the Working Group. General Tighe doubted
that the Working Group actually was a cohesive group as
regards interest in intelligence products, and he hoped it
would be possible to avoid institutionalizing any new report.
Mr. Carver expressed concern that any such report could
become a FOIA item and unnecessarily involve the NIOs.
20. No Panel decision was taken as to what the next
step should be.
21. The fourth of the listed informational papers was
"A Handbook on the U.S. Intelligence Community." General
Wilson said the IC Staff had this under way, and General
Tighe said both CIA and DIA had packages which might prove
useful.
22. The fifth proposed informational paper, "The
compartmented intelligence classification system" had been
suggested by RADM Hilton, but General Wilson indicated he
did not know why the topic had been raised for Working Group
consideration. Dr. Proctor wondered if the Working Group
really were interested in whether compartmentation really
involves differences in communication. channels, in couriers,
etc. General Tighe said J-2/J-3 had collaborated on a JCS
paper on compartmentation, but J-5 does not consider the
system satisfactory, and he wondered If RADM Hilton was
looking for support for the J-5 thesis that compartmentation
Is not really needed.
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23. General Wilson said he would advise RADM Hilton no
paper would be prepared on this topic.
24. Dr. Proctor asked if it was intended the papers
which had been discussed would go forward to the Working
Group as briefings or as papers. General Wilson said he
intended to provide the Group with papers, and back this up
with briefings and/or discussions as appropriate at meetings
of the Group.
25. Turning to the list of proposed action projects,
General Wilson first noted that the Working Group had raised
the possibility of its becoming involved in the development
of KIQs, but that he had said it was the Group's role to
express needs, but then to let someone else turn these into
intelligence requirements. The first of the proposed action
projects, "Inputs to Key Intelligence Questions for FY-1976"
was intended to define a proper role for the Working Group.
26. General Tighe objected to any Working Group involve-
ment in the actual drafting of KIQs, and Dr. Proctor noted
any such involvement would really be by staff members rather
than top level consumers. Mr. Carver said he would welcome
a statement as to what policymakers needed, but if they were
invited to express their needs it must be understood "their
prose" may not be reflected in the KIQs which result. He
welcomed suggestions and would give review and full consider-
ation to any statements of interest which the Working Group
provided.
27. General Tighe said, however, the suggestions
should come forward officially from organizations and not
through the Working Group as a corporate body. To General
Wilson this posed a dilemma since the NSCIC is charged with
providing guidance, yet it was being argued the guidance
should come only from the separate organizations. As General
Tighe viewed it, if the Working Group took itself really
seriously it could become a super-USIB, and unless that was
what was desired, care should be exercised in getting the
Group too deeply involved in the expression of needs for
intelligence. Dr. Proctor said that if he felt the inputs
would "reflect true needs" he would favor it, but he was
confident that would not prove to be the case.
25X1A 28. noted the Panel had been convinced any
request for policy guidance would not fly, and to him any
request for statement of needs was merely another approach
to the same problem.
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29. General Wilson said that if the Working Group
could not do something in this area, it would have no reason
to exist. General Tighe said the approach assumed the Group
members function as individuals and riot as a corporate body.
General 'Vjilson again asked--if the Group members cannot come
up with an outline stating the areas of greatest intelligence
interest which should be considered in the KIQ system, then
why have the Group? '
30. Dr. Proctor asked why the Group could not be asked
to comment on KIQs after they had been formulated. General
Tighe thought this would be worthwhile. Dr. Proctor said
that if "intelligence needs" were requested, as in the
proposal, each Working Group member would feel he had to
come up with a listing of ten. Mr. Carver questioned whether,
in fact, the real needs of senior levels would be reflected,
but that if a list of 50 such needs were assembled and then
cut back to 20 or 30 in priority order it would be valuable.
31. General Wilson said the Group might be asked how
they would change last year's KIQs in preparation for next
year. Mr. Carver said this is how the revision of the KIQs
works. Each NIO has an inter-agency group, which examines
this year's KIQs, discusses the need for changes, talks with
both consumers and Community elements, and then is ready to
go to the DCI and USIB.
32. General Wilson asked if there was any problem
involved in providing the FY-1975 KIQs to the Group for
their review. No objection was raised, and General Wilson
said the Project, as stated in the proposed memorandum to
the Working Group, would be "turned around."
33. The second proposed action topic, "Provision of
Consumer Guidance to the Intelligence Community,' led Dr.
Proctor to ask if this were not already being taken care of
in the KIQ project. Mr. Carver said that since channels for
consumer guidance now exist, care should be taken to ensure
the NSCIC actions were additive and not duplicative. He
felt detailed comments on this year's KIQs would be a helpful
25X1A type of consumer guidance. I mnoted that both DTA
and NSA had different sets o consumers not represented on
the Working Group.
314. General Wilson indicated he wanted to talk on the
subject of provision of consumer guidance when the Working
Group met. Mr. Carver wondered whether the men who sat on.
the Working Group actually could speak for their NSCIC
member, e.g., could Richard Ober actually speak for Dr.
Kissinger.
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35. Re the third proposed action project, "Critique
,of Intelligence Estimates,_ the consensus was that such an
effort could prove useful. Mr. McAfee said that if the
views of "top people" were desired, the less formal the
project the better. General Wilson said the PRD/IC considered
there is a need for a specific contact in each organization
from whom feedback could be elicited. General Tighe doubted
that any principal actually would analyze an estimate, 'he
would have his staff do it for him. General. Wilson thought
that if readers could score the estimate with an "academic
grade" it might prove helpful. Several panelists thought
marginal notes would be useful. General Wilson said IC
would work something out on this.
36. Mr. Carver wondered whether this third project and
the fifth one, "Systematic Consumer Evaluation of Current
Intelligence Products" should be separately handled, but it
was agreed they should be.
37. The fourth proposed action project, "Policy guidance
re collection activities against friendly countries," was
mentioned only briefly and the panelists agreed this was not
a suitable project for the Working Group.
38. General Wilson asked if there were any additional
ideas for possible Working Group projects. There were none,
and the meeting adjourned with an understanding the memorandum,
"Proposed Program for the Working Group," which had been
discussed would be revised in the light of the discussion
prior to being presented to the Group on 12 March.
tive Secretary
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE,
WORKING GROUP
Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting
1030 Hours, 12 March 1975
White House Situation Room
Chairman: Lt Gen Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC
Members present: Mr. Leslie H. Brown, Dept. of State
(representing Mr. George S. Vest,
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs)
Mr. Robert F. Ellsworth, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs)
Mr. William N. Morell, Special
Assistant to the Secretary on National
Security, Department of the Treasury
RAdm Robert P. Hilton (representing
Lt Gen John H. Elder, J-5 (Plans and
Policy), JCS)
Mr. Richard Ober, NSC Staff, Executive
Secretary of the NSCIC
Briefers: Mal General Lincoln D. Faurer
Others Present: Lt General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., Intel Panel
Mr. Paul Walsh (for Dr. Proctor), Intel Pane].
(for Mr. Carver), Intel Panel
VADM Earl ec anus., with Mr. Ellsworth
RADM Donald Harvey, with RADM Hilton
Captain Gerald N. Dyer, with RADM Hilton
with Lt Gen Wilson
kith Lt Gen Wilson
Agenda Item 1? Approval of the Minutes of the 29 January
Meeting
1. The draft minutes were approved subject to changes
Mr. Ober proposed in paragraphs 27, 29, 31, and 33. Revised
pages 6 and 7 of the 29 January meeting are being provided
each member.
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Agenda Item 2: Improvements in the Handling of Warnin..
Information
2. General Faurer's a er on "Changes in the Strategic
25X1?A Warning Mechanism" and paper on "Small-w
Warning" had been distr u e previously.
3. General Faurer reported his Strategic Warning
Staff of 10 analysts was still being assembled. The CIA,
DIA, Army, and Air Force analysts are on duty; and the NSA, State
and Navy analysts are expected shortly.
4. It is planned a report will be issued the last
Tuesday of each month as a synthesis of warning indications.
General Faurer said contributions were welcome and informal
coordination should surface any differences in interpretation,
but he wanted to avoid having to present the least common
denominator in order to effect coordination.
5. During the month as subjects suggest themselves
the Warning Staff will prepare special reports if it appears
the Staff can make a contribution beyond that-of the individual
current intelligence agencies. In a typical month, General
Faurer expected "only a handful" of such reports to be dis-
seminated. His Staff will also issue research reports not
substantive in nature, but dealing with the methodology of
warning. He also will issue Strategic Warning Notices,
purpose of Which is self-explanatory, focus of which will be
on the "Big-W" problem, but his Staff will be alert for any
Soviet or PRC activities relating to "little-w" warning.
6. Mr. Ellsworth said he hoped the system for providing
warning to users would err on the side of fast reaction and
under coordination. He also hoped there would be a system
for follow-up to Alert Memoranda and regular reporting on
development related to the alert.
7. General Faurer agreed. He said the Alert Memorandum
goes beyond the "Big-W" problem. It is his intention to
recognize a warning need to follow-up, to monitor the situation,
and to turn the reporting off as appropriate. He said that
within DIA "little-w" problems would be handled the same
way.
25X1A 8. Isaid an Alert Memorandum must be
issued quicKly wnen, tor instance, the development is 15
percent likely rather than 50 percent. He noted that once
the Alert Memorandum is issued, regular current intelligence
reporting will provide a follow-on. He felt any "De-alert
Memorandum" would be beyond the fact.
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9. Mr. Ellsworth said the consumer might not be aware
the problem situation was over, and he would still like to
;know when this had occurred.
10. Mr. Walsh said the reporting probably would indicate
when the crisis was over, but if a special collection effort
had been mounted, there would be an obligation to turn off'
this effort.
11. General Wilson said that careful consideration
must be given to situations in which "pulling down the flag"
would be useful, and it probably would be better to err on
the side of issuing such a report.
25X1A 12. I thought a summary-Alert Memorandum
would be mos e y when the crisis situation changed
direction or intensified rather than abated.
13. General Wilson emphasized that the present arrange-
ment for the handling of warning was not easily arrived at.
He noted there had been some sensitivity on the .part of
? civilian elements of the Intelligence-Community to having
the Strategic Warning Staff in the NMIC alongside the NNCC.
The advantage was that this put the Staff at the hub of
indications activities and, in the event the situation
escalated to use of U.S. forces, next to those who would
act. The disadvantage was that political and economic
aspects would be particularly important in some situations.
It was to ensure that the Strategic Warning Staff was properly
balanced that provision was made for providing civilian
analysts to augment the NMIC Staff. He felt that if State,
CIA and NSA provided the proper kind of analysts, there need
be no concern about the handling of political and economic
indicators. General Wilson said that when time is of the
essence, General Faurer may issue strategic warning notices
directly to the President and the NSC, with concurrent
dissemination of the DCI and USIB Principals, but that
normally the strategic warning notices are to go to the DCI,
who will notify the President and NSC and take such other
action as he deems necessary.
14. Mr. Morell asked if the group would look at the
time involved in production as well as the time involved in
field reporting and in dissemination. He said he had noted
delays in field reporting, and in Washington needed data may
not reach the analysts quickly. He felt the Working Group
should pay attention to this. General Wilson suggested
discussion of this matter be deferred until consideration of
the Group's working program.
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25X1A 15. said the "Small-w" warning problem and
function Involves the entire Intelligence Community and
timeliness of reporting is an across-the-board problem. He
felt overseas reporters should be sensitive to the timeliness
of the information they were dealing with.
16. Mr. Morell considered that production analysts
were more aware of developing situations than field reporters
and that the analysts should alert the field elements as to
situations which are being closely watched in order to
encourage timely responses.
17. Mr. Walsh said delay in reporting on a recent OPEC
meeting was an example, but an aberration. He said that CIA
alerts overseas stations when there is interest in a particular
situation. There may be delays in Washington, but analysts
need time to question the facts and to make the data more
meaningful to users.
18. Mr. Morell said he was thinking of the flow of raw
material to analysts, and Mr.. Walsh said that the automatic
cable dissemination systems under development would help..
General Faurer said he was surprised with the frequency with
which telephones are used to convey first impressions, par-
ticularly with attaches. Mr. Walsh said he felt DIA was
ahead of CIA in this. Mr. Morell said Treasury finds telephone 25X1A
contact useful.
20. Mr. Brown asked how "Little-w" and current intelli-
gence connect. He noted State officials get daily briefings
which cover the same material he felt Alert Memoranda might
deal with. He asked if questions of timing or of the use of
separate groups were involved. General Wilson said the same
people may be involved, but the Alert Memorandum belongs to
the NIOs and current intelligence is a responsibility of the
DDI.
u
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25X1A 21. said the principal difference between
the Alert emorandum and normal current intelligence reporting
is the matter of focus. The NIB may cover 15 or 20 situations,
but the Alert Memorandum is a vehicle by which the DCI can
inform senior officials of particular matters on which-he
considers they should focus. Mr. Morell said that at the
NSCIC meeting, Dr. Kissinger had indicated he needed something
like an Alert Memorandum. Mr. Walsh said the Alert Memoranda
serves as a means of focusing analyst attention on warning
25X1A implications. I ladded.it also enables a clearer
accountability, an o r. Ober and Mr. Walsh noted that
the Alert Memorandum would facilitate post-mortems on intelli-
25X1A gence performance in crisis situation.
D
and planned cable dissemination improvements.
0
23. Mr. Walsh said the Machine Assisted Dissemination
(MAD) Program enables analysts to "eyeball" computer printouts
and request what they want. The Automatic Cable Dissemination
system, expected to be available in about 18 months, will
enable analysts to receive cables without waiting for them
to be indexed, as is now the case with MAD. Another develop-
ment, several years off, will provide analysts cathode ray
tube (CRT) support.
24. Mr. Morell asked.if this would be anything like
the NSA system for electronic interrogation of files.
25. Mr. Walsh said that such developments are technically
25X1A feasible, as indicated by the NPIC files and progress being
made with COINS, but compartmentation still poses problems.
25X1A
27. As related ents, General Wilson also
25X1A briefly described the system, in which seven--soon to
be 11--watch officers can e on-line at the same time, and
the meet-me-bridge being developed for secure voice interface
among intelligence analysts. I Iwill be an extension 25X1A
of this conferencing technique, so at a combination of
printer and CRT can be used for analyst conferencing on
text. He said these developments were intended to assist in
the handling of intelligence during crisis periods and the
handling of crisis situations by enabling more rapid coordination.
5
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A enda Item 3: DCI Objectives for the Intelli eg.nce
Community for FY-l97
28. General Wilson said the substantive Presidential
intelligence objectives for FY--1976 were essentially an NIO
document, with inputs from a number of sources----major among
which would be the comments of the Working Group. He invited
comments.
29. Mr. Ellsworth said he had a number of specific
suggestions, mainly relating to more detailed guidance to
meet planning needs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
He submitted a set of written comments, and then noted that,
in general, these comments requested that all material
relating to the USSR be combined in a single objective, that
specific reference be made to the need for intelligence on
decision making in the Soviet Union, that weight be given to
intelligence on the Middle East, that there be specific
mention of Spain and Portugal, that nuclear proliferation
and CW/BW be addressed, and that attention be given to
Soviet knowledge of U.S. and Allied negotiating positions
affecting SALT, LTBT, and MBFR.
30. General Wilson recognized the validity of these
points, but wondered whether they might more properly be
KIQs.
31. Mr. Ellsworth said he felt the objectives paper
would be improved if it became more concrete. and less. vague
in nature.
32. Mr. Morell said he shared the general thrust of
Mr. Ellsworth's comments. On economic matters, he felt oil
and the recycling issue should be addressed separately. In
his view, Portugal, the Middle East, oil and recycling were
all buried in Objectives 5 and 6, which he described as
'tcatch ails." He said he would be more comfortable if
submitted the economic items.
33. Mr. Brown said he had struggled with the problem
of relating objectives and KIQs and that State preferred to
focus on the KIQs. Enlargement of the objectives list would
involve a large number of "e.g.'s." State had organizational
problems in preparing its comments, but he was more concerned
with packaging aspects of the objectives than with their
substantive content.
311. Mr. Ober said the NSC staff did not object to the
general nature of the Objectives, accepted the format, and
expected to focus primarily on the KIQs. lie said he would
specify word changes for the Objectives.
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35. Mr. Walsh said that if a general list, such as the
present Objectives, was tailored to become a "want list" of
everyone, it would lose its value. Ile preferred keeping the
Objectives general, using the.KIQs for matters of detail.
36. RADM Hilton questioned what was meant by "security"
in, Objectives 1, 3 and 5. If the word meant "military," it
should be so stated. He would put all the Soviet items in
one objective, and the PRC'items in one. He wondered how
Western Europe should be treated. Though much of the needed
material comes from open sources and the countries are
traditionally friendly, they could well be intelligence
targets.
37. General Wilson said "security"-and "defense" were
synonymous, and this would be clarified. He said the comments
made at the meeting would be provided the personnel who
would redraft the objectives and he would ensure the Group
was kept current on developments.
38. VADM Rectanus said the comments he.had provided
Mr. Ellsworth related primarily to re-formatting although
there were several specific additions to the list.
39. RADM Hilton wondered why "strategic" was singled
out in Objective 14, when what seemed to be meant was "military."
140. Mr. Ober said the NSC staff was interested in
getting something on the leadership in China into the list.
141. General Wilson said he would be back in touch with
the Group if any real problems arose in revision of the
Objectives. Mr. Ober added that he would run the OSD comments
through the NSC staff.
42. General Wilson commented that the Resource Management
Objectives for FY-1976 relate to the substantive objectives,
but address different problems. He noted there was close
collaboration in resource matters between the DCI and the
ASD(I).
143. Mr. Ellsworth suggested that the DCI task himself
to survey the response of users to intelligence products,
and Mr. Morell said he strongly supported this. He noted
this had been discussed at the USID, and Dr. Proctor had
made the point that procedures are in use to check with
consumers. RADM Hilton said he thought this would be part
of the Working Group action program.
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44. The Admiral also noted that not all of the resource
management objectives related to resource management. In
No. 5, he suggested that "provide" be changed to "coordinate."
45. Mr. Walsh said there was a difference between the
DCI responsibility to "provide" something and his coordination
role. As regards No. 5 (which relates to responding to
Presidential and Congressional reviews and investigati&ns),
the DCI must be in a position to "provide" the data.
46. Mr. Brown said this raised a problem, since in his
view Congressional investigators would not accept indirect
Community responses.
47. Mr. Walsh (after re-reading the objective) said
that "coordinate" would not bother him.
48. Mr. Morell noted that No. 3 addressed "foreign
economic intelligence guidance," but did not address political
or military intelligence guidance.
49. General Wilson said the specific items under
Objective No. 3 were those which had "burbled" to the top.
The list was not meant to be all inclusive, but to highlight
undertakings on which focus would be given.
50. Copies of the FY-1975 KIQs were provided members
of the Group for reference, and Mr. Ellsworth said Defense
would like a month to review the FY-1976 KIQs when the draft
is circulated.
Agenda Item LI: DCI Perspectives for Intelligence, 1976-1981
51. General Wilson noted that the draft before the
Group included only Parts 1 and II of the Perspectives.
Part III is still being written, and the DCI has asked that
a Part IV be added to "take a 20-year bite." This poses
difficult problems, but since technical systems now being
evaluated will have a long life, it is important that a look
be made far into the future so the Community does not acquire
capabilities which will not be useful after 1981.
52. VADM Rectanus commented that 20-year forecasts are
being made in other areas, without the benefit of an intelli-
gence input.
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53. General Wilson asked whether the major areas of
concern to Group members were reflected in the draft, which
had been prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff and
was still under review by the NIOs. The "Perspectives" is
a DCI paper, but at this stage is open to change.
54. Mr. Ellsworth submitted some written comment and
said he considered the draft so general it provided only
broad orientation with respect to the USSR, PRC and Western
Europe. He thought it would be helpful to have a clear
statement of the need of intelligence on decision making in
foreign governments. The paper made no mention of the need
to understand the workings of foreign governments. He felt
there was need for more attention in the-document in areas
such as the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia.
Also, attention should be given to important functional
areas, such as nuclear proliferation and arms trade. Mr.
Ellsworth also said it would be useful if the DCI would
disseminate a paper indicating the review cycle and draft
schedule for his planning and guidance documents.
55. Mr. Brown asked what review the Perspectives
document went through. He said there was objection in State
to one or another of the paragraphs. He asked whether the
paper represented a distillation of Community products or
was a CIA view of the world. explained the
"Perspectives" was not a direct distillation from existing
estimates. It was written in the Intelligence Community
Staff, coordinated with the NIOs, then submitted to USIB for
coordination and, after DCI approval, submitted to the NSCIC
for review.
56. Mr. Brown said he was still in the process of
obtaining responses in State, but that some of the statements
send State officers "up the wall."
57. General Wilson invited submission of the State
comments.
58. Mr. Walsh said that the Perspectives represent a
"new art form" and the mechanics to date may have been
faulty. He welcomed the idea of a considerable number of
people carefully reviewing the draft.
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59. VADM Rectanus asked if it was again intended the
"Perspectives" would be submitted to the NSCIC, and General
Wilson affirmed this. Mr. Walsh noted, however, that by
then it is too late to do much about changing the paper.
60. General Wilson admitted the Group was addressing
the paper while it was still in rough form, but this was
being done in the interest of obtaining substantive suggestions
at a time when they could best be used.
61. RADM Hilton said that if the "Perspectives" are
the DCI's views as head of the Intelligence Community, they
should reflect the views of the Community. General Wilson
replied that the paper is considered by.the USIB, and he
noted that last year the NSCIC passed the "Perspectives" to
the Working Group to see if any policy issues could be
identified.
62. Mr. Ober said the paper seemed overly pessimistic,
and he wondered how much time was available for its review.
He said that two weeks was not enough to permit full consider-
ation in the NSC staff. He asked if informal communication
with the NIOs could be used as a means of providing inputs.
25X1A 63. said the DCI wanted the "Perspectives"
out by th L n rch, but General Wilson commented that
it might be`possible to back this off.
64. Mr. Brown asked who was reviewing the paper other
than the Working Group. Mr. Morell replied that the paper
was really moving along two tracks--the Working Group and
the USIB arena. He thought only one or the other should be
used, but RADM Hilton commented that Mr. Morell was the only
member of the Working Group who sat on the USIB. RADM
Hilton felt that the fact the Group had been reconstituted
as a "users group" was proof of the need for a users' input.
65. General Wilson described the "Perspectives" as the
DCI's personal document, in which he expressed himself on
matters with which he is concerned. The USIB principals
respond on the paper to the DCI as their chairman. In
addition the paper will go to the NSCIC via the Working
Group. General Wilson admitted this is not "a clean and
tidy process," but the Working Group had an opportunity to
make the document as useful as possible.
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66. RADM Hilton noted a semantic problem in that in
one place the PRC is described as the "second most important"
intelligence target, and in another place Western Europe is
described as "most important next to the USSR." He felt it
would be useful to include something on the impact of nuclear
proliferation and nuclear power. He also considered terrorism
was treated as an isolated event, but that sometimes it is a
multi-country coordinated threat.
67. Mr. Morell asked how much time was available to
comment, and would the Group meet again to consider the
paper. General Wilson said he would speak with the DCI and
be back to the members by telephone.
Agenda Item 5: Report by the Chairman on a Proposed Work
Program for the Group
68. Copies of General Wilson's memorandum, "Proposed
Program for the Working Group," were distributed. The
General said this was a preliminary thrust, aimed at pertinent
and feasible selections in the context of the NSCIC charter.
He described the program as consisting of action projects,
informational papers and briefings.
69. He noted that action is under way in the Intelligence
Community Staff to prepare all four of the information
papers described in the memorandum. He said the fourth
paper would be accompanied by a briefing. (These four are:
"Handbook on the U.S. Intelligence Community;" Consumer
Contact Points with Production Elements of the Intelligence
Community;" "The DCI's 'Family' of Intelligence Guidance
Documents;" and "The Problem of Expressing Uncertainty in
Intelligence Estimates.")
70. Only brief comments were made on the four proposed
action projects.
a. Comments on Key Intelligence Questions for
FY-1976
General Wilson said the NIOs were using the
FY-1975 KIQs as the base list for FY-1976 KIQs so a
review of the 1975 listing would provide a foundation
for addressing the 1976 KIQs, which are expected to be
available from the NIOs for review by the Group about
15 May.
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b. Critique of Intelligence Estimates
General Wilson asked if the 15 April deadline
for submission of the five requested critiques was "too
tight," but no member so indicated.
(NOTE: Paragraph 6b(2) of the memorandum inadvertently
omitted paragraph (c) which read as follows:
(c) The individual critiques would serve as
annexes to a summary report to be prepared under
auspices of the Chairman. The report and its
annexes would be submitted to the NSCIC with a
recommendation that it be sent to the DCI for
dissemination as guidance to the appropriate pro-
duction organizations of the Intelligence Community."
c. Systematic consumer evaluation of current
intelligence products
Mr. Morell noted that much of what Treasury
receives as intelligence products is not referenced in
either the project on estimates or the one on current
intelligence, and he wondered if critiques could be
prepared on other products. General ]ilson said he was
of an open mind on this. commented that if 25X1A
something is working well, Mere is no need to study
it.
d. Provision of consumer guidance to the
Intelligence Community
General Wilson briefly described the project
and asked Mr. Ober if he would be willing to chair the
subcommittee which would present a proposed method of
approach and study outline at the next meeting of the
Group. (Mr. Ober nodded.) General Wilson said that he
would be back in touch with the members on this project
by telephone in order to tie it down.
RADM Hilton said he had ideas concerning this
project since there were various documents used for
OSD/JCS dialogue which might be useful to the Intelligence
Community.
The meeting adjourned at 1217 hours.
F e
cutive Secretary
CIC Working Group
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