MEMO FOR MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE ADVISORY GROUP FROM E.H. KNOCHE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00498A000400020040-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: August 19, 1976
• Content Type: MF

SECRET
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COMPT
19 August 1.976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Executive Advisory
Group
1. Attached is a very interesting first-cut report from Cord.
Meyer who is, as you know, looking into strategic warning and
crisis management areas. Cord's report is circulated for your
information.
2. There are a few actions worth considering. With regard
to paragraph 2, the DDI is requested to develop ways and means to
stress the importance of strategic warning among those analysts
whose duties embrace the warning function. The DDI is also requested
to encourage a more active SWS in seeking input and views from. the
Agency.
3. With regard to the staffing problem described in paragraph
3 and Cord's recommendation, the DDA is requested to take this
matter under consideration and give me his advice.
25X1A
E. H. Knoche
Deputy Director of Central. Intelligence
Attachment:
ER 76 /5015
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12 August 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Depu
ty Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
: Cord
Meyer, Jr.
SUBJECT
: Revi
Supp
ew of Strategic Warning Staff and
ort of It by Agency Elements
1. Per your request I have reviewed the functions of the Special
Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning and the Strategic Warning
Staff. In the course of this review I have consulted with. General Faurer,
Hal Saunders, I and the heads of those offices within the
Agency which support and work with SWS. My conclusions are as
follows:
a. Adequacy of the SWS Basic Charter as Contained in
DCID 1/5 - There is general agreement that a small and
qualified staff, such as SWS, should be focused on, the specific
problem of strategic warning defined as the threat of attack
by the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, China and North Korea,
In spite of the unlikelihood of such an event we must afford
the luxury of a small and expert group with this responsi-
bility in view of its importance to our over-all mission. The
location of the staff in the Pentagon has worked satisfactorily,
as has General Faurer as Special Assistant to the DCI.
b. Access to All-Source Intelligence in the Strategic
Warning Field - The staff has access to all the information
that it feels it needs from DIA, NSA and from the components
of the Agency. One gap is the unavailability of NODIS traffic
from State but there is no solution to this problem other than
to proceed as you are doing with the top levels at State.
25X1
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c. Publications - The monthly SWS Report and the weekly
Alert List show that the staff is alert to new developments
and techniques in the strategic warning field and the publications
seem to be well received and responded to by customers both
in the military and in the Agency.
d. Periodic Review of SWS by the Strategic Warning-
Review Group - Periodic review is called for by DCID 1/5 and
the most recent review was conducted 11 June 1976, copy attached.
I have found nothing to cause me to disagree with its findings.
2. Suggestions were made for additional activity by SWS. The
Director of OCI admits that over time there may have been some
atrophy in the sense of responsibility for strategic warning by the
analysts and he would welcome the assistance of the Director of SWS
in a seminar or series of briefings bringing them up to date on develop-
ments in this field. In addition the Acting Deputy Director of OSR
suggested that the Director of SWS might be more active in seeking
input from the Community and stated that OSR would be glad to contri-
bute studies on specific issues in the strategic warning field.
3. Staffing Problem - DCID 1/5 states in general terms that the
members of NFIB will "provide full-time senior professional intelligence
personnel" to the SWS, but there seems to be no other formal document
defining the over-all size of the staff or requiring NFIB members to
provide a specified number of people at a particular grade. General
Faurer and first Director of SWS, agreed to the need
for a professional staff of 10 analysts in addition to the Director. This
number reflected a desire to have broad community representation,
but to stay within the general requirement that the staff be kept small.
The plan was to have two representatives from CIA, DIA and NSA,
and one from State and each of the Services. In the 18 months of its
existence, the SWS has operated with six or seven analysts on duty.
At present, the on-board complement in addition to the Director is:
DIA
0-6* & GS-15
NSA
GS-14 & GS-12
CIA
GS-13
Air Force
0-5
--Serves as Deputy Director of SWS
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In addition the Army has designated an 0-4 who will report
on 13 September and the Marine Corps has volunteered to assign an
officer. Both Navy and State remain reluctant to participate.
Both General Faurer and believe that the formal 25X1
establishment of a Table of Organization with the required slots
would be of great assistance. All offices that now contribute personnel
to the staff must use one of their own slots for the assigned individual,
and in the case of smaller components this can work a real hardship.
Somewhat longer assignments would be beneficial to the staff and
would be easier for an agency to make if it could retain and temporarily
refill its slot. The Special Assistant and the Director of S'VV'S would
have a stronger hand in the selection of people with a resultant improve-
ment in quality. There is unanimous agreement among all those con-
sulted that such a change would be beneficial to the staff, if the slots
can be found.
Recommendation: Consideration should be given to the
establishment of ten slots under the DCI for the SWS.
25X1
Cord Meyer: Jr.
Attachment: As stated
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24 August 1976
REFERENCE: Memo dtd 19 Aug 76 for
Members of EAG fr DDCI
w/att re strategic warning
and crisis management areas
(DDA 76-4195)
Discussed the attached with Jim
Taylor on this date and he is going to
forward to us a position paper on the
question of the positions. At first
blush he seems to be of the opinion that
these slots should come from elsewhere in
the Community and that the Agency shouldn't
be asked to cough them up. On the other
hand, if the Agency doesn't cough them up,
the proposal will probably die a slow
death and never get off the ground.
Michael Malanick
A-DA
Att:
Ref memo
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