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November 26, 1976
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DD/A ph-rI.stry Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP79-00498A0007 QD29 =,T l STATINTL 2 6 NOV 1976 MM FUR; Assistant to the Director TINTL Deputy Director for Operations Training Director of Training Deputy Director for Administration INPOMATIO : Deputy Director for operations SUBJECT Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public Appearances Before Academic Groups 1. The attached article from Counters makes unpleasant reading. While it is highly tempting to hrough the article on a point by point basis contrasting "what I said" to "what they printed," I believe the article is more useful as a vehicle through which to assess the risks and benefits which may result from public appearances by Agency officers before academic and civic groups. 2. As I noted in the memorandum prepared after my visit to Austin, the attitudes manifested by try questioners ranged frog "skepticism to hostility." The most difficult questions for me to handle dealt with the usual bugaboos-- covert action, assassination, and the "rogue elephant" conception of the Agency. These aspects of my talk are hardly touched upon by Counters , instead, they feature South Korea, which at the time felt was a minor part of ray talk. (The line of questioning had been, "Why is it the CIA is so frequently lined up with repressive dictators like Park?" y response had been an attempt to outline historic and geographic factors which have led the South Koreans to take a harder internal line than we, a comfortable half- world away, feel is necessary. I cited the number of assas- siaation attempts Park has already survived, the resultant "siege mentality" in Blue [louse and the great need for a peaceful change of power in South .urea--something they have never had.) The Counterspy distortions, if brought to the attention of the out 3 K67-eans, could :mako the job of the that much more difficult. This I regret deeply. Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP79-00498A000700050029-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP79-00498A000700050029-8 Appearances Before Acadewic Grduus ILLEGIB The point is, however, that any time an Agency officer gives responsible answers to tough questions posed in a public forum, the door is open for those opposed to the Agency to twist what has been said into something of potential embar- rassment to us. On the other hand, if we do not offer responsible replies to our questioners, our public appear- STATINTL ances may be counter-productive. STATINTL 3. aring about the Counterspy article, I called in Austin to alert him. lie had had no word of the article and said that he had seen nothing on my appearance in the Texas Unive si newspaper. (A student TATINTL reporter attended the talk.) reported that Ur. Weintraub, who invited me to speak, had remained posi- tive about my ap earance, and that no negative feedback had STATINTL been received. also reported that ten to twelve "high quality applicat ons" for CIA employment had been received either from those who attended the talk or from I H I IN I L those who had heard about it. (Two applications STATINTL cited sa a 1 were from black students at tie law STATINTL school.) W said he remained enthusiastic about future appearances by Agency speakers and hoped to set one up at either LSU or Tulane early in 1977. (I have alread d an invitation to speak at USC in December. M&e the Office of Personnel recruiter in the Los Angeles area, has arranged this.) STATINTL 4. 1 believe that the paragraphs above set the dilemma quite clearly--my appearance in Austin has resulted in a possible problem for the but has also brought in some high quality appli.can s an mprovod some student and faculty perceptions of what the Agency is like today. S. I am perfectly willing to continue to snake appearances of this sort and to do my level best to give the Counters genre as little as possible to work on. If we continue nth such appearances, I believe we must recognize that more articles like the one in Counterspy are a distinct and unpleasant possibility. STATINTL 09M Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : gIA-RDP79-00498A000700050029-8 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP79-00498A000700050029-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP79-00498A000700050029-8 ,? CPYRGHT. Cau ,v r~' RsPY v o t, 3, / S . 2. Donan1? Gregg , ve Is. CIA. Cold Ov r r?w Pe,:r1: By Steve McGuire years in the CIA in Asia. Ten of those years were spent in station in Korea until last year. Gregg spent 18 of his 25 sounding such a warning includes being the CIA chief of nam. The agent was Don Gregg whose background for Park like the one in which Diem was assasinated in Viet- left it open whether the CiA would support a coup against will probably not live to serve out his term. The CIA agent runs for another six year term, as he is expected to do, he ing at the University of Texas, warned that if President Park On October 6, 1976, an upper echelon CIA agent, speak- Korea. , Japan, the rest in the Marianas, Vietnam, Burma, and The occasion for these surprisingly candid remarks was a trip to Austin, Texas to give a lecture for a course on Weintraub. Gregg had expressed an interest in meeting with "Policy Makers in Government" directed by Dr. Sidney foreign students and the Center for Asian Studies was pre- and about General Park. He stated that South Korea must Gregg had much to say about his work in South Korea vailed upon to provide a meeting place. information about coup attempts. Whether they will con- ever, the CIA feels that a coup right now might encourage the North to attack, so they continue to provide Park with South Korea's first peaceful change of government. Flow- could then be a national hero and also be responsible for best thing which Park could do would be to resign. tic mation about the North. Gregg personally feels that the depend on the American CIA to provide intelligence infor- . Hollingsworth, former allied commander along the DMZ in Gregg had high praise for Lt. General James F. `Holly' Korea. An article which appeared in the Wall Street Journal recently (January 13, 1976, p. 1) pictured Hollingsworth as' Korean War in'nine days, four days of 'real violence' and mies. Hollingsworth claimed that he could end another an. old-style general whose primal instinct was to kill com- five days to clean tip. Gregg said he agreed with Hollings- worth's assessment of a nine day war, and stated that the WSJ article was an accurate description of Hollingsworth. the Korean Admiral with the charge. Of course the Korean which they were not supposed to have. Gregg reported his information to a U.S. Admiral who promptly confronted caught the South 'Koreans with sophisticated weaponry Gregg told an 'amusing' story about how the U.S. once Adii iral then proceeded to chew Gregg out about his denied it and the U.S. Admiral believed him. The U.S. the Koreans were building a berth for the weapon. Sure enough they were and the U.S. then confronted the Koreans with the evidence. Gregg evidently thought that placing sophisticated weapons in Korea's hands was real funny. We are lucky that they did not decide to use them. The CIA evidently wants to keep Park and his boys from getting too far out of hand. They can have their fun as long as they do not get carried away. The CIA was involved in saving the life of an opposition leader in Korea who was on a fast boat headed out for the bay with rocks tied around his feet. In another incident the Korean CIA head was removed after he committed a brutal murder of a professor. Regarding Cuba, and the attempts to kill Castro by the CIA-backed Mafia hit men, Gregg said that he once asked why Richard Ilelms failed to tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots against Castro. Gregg was told that Helms kept quiet because Bobby Kennedy knew about the attempts but said nothing, so Helms did likewise. Gregg characterized Kissinger as a man who likes intelli. gence information. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Kiss? inger has been one of the CIA's most `avid customers'. Kissinger disliked the CIA during the Vietnam War because they kept telling Kissinger that the South Vietnamese were going to lose. The CIA was a major soul .e of information during the Angolan conflict. Gregg stated that the CIA was only involved in a reporting role until after Cuba became involved. However, in order to get into Angola to provide reports, as Gregg put it, training some military troops was a quid pro quo for being allowed near the action. Gregg claimed ignorance of the rumors that Saipan was a major nuclear weapons base. lie said that the Mariannas were not overflowing with CIA men, and that the CIA was not involved in squelching dissent on the islands. From 1953 to 1963, Gregg was involved in covert activities in Japan. Japan was a case where, as Gregg put it, the CIA `did their job right'. Apparently meaning that. the radical left opposition, such as the Communist Party of Japan,'was kept from acquiring popular support. The CIA, employing one of their favorite techniques, provided sup- port for moderate left opposition parties such as the Socialists and the Social Democrats. While engaged in these covert activities, Gregg was employed as a civilian working for the Department of Army and an employee of the American Embassy. Later, Gregg worked directly with the Japanese police. Between the years 1970 to 1972, Gregg served in Vietnam, where he began his CIA career in 1952. He was Gregg suggested that aerial surveys be made to see if the head of Bien Boa section, but made no mention of Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP79-00498A000700050029-8 CPYRGH ` Approved .For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP79-00498A000700050029,8 Aeration Phoenix. Regarding CIA involvement in the overthrow of Allende's regime in Chile, Gregg said that the election of a Marxist in South America posed a threat to the U.S. govern- ment's design for South America. It was essential that Allende be overthrown as a lesson to other Third World ountries that the U.S. will not tolerate any Communist governments which it feels threaten U.S. interests. On international terrorism Gregg felt that Libya was the `patron saint' of the terrorists. According to Gregg, Libya appears to be the country which is providing a substantial part of the financial and moral support for the terrorists throughout the world. After the general meeting with Don Gregg a number of professors gathered in the plush surroundings of the Uiii ersity of Texas faculty club for a cocktail party. Don regg and Bill Wood served as both the guests of honor and the hosts. After drinks someone asks, "Whats your sign, on?? "Sagittarius," he said. - "I knew it,'a fire sign, a sign of adventure." Don adds, "I don't regret my twenty-five years in'the .LA. After all, what did the rest of my classmates do in that time, just divorces and dull jobs. I joined up because it vas the thing to do at that time." In -the midst of the polite clut-chat the C.I.A. gets down to "brass tacks". Dr. Jannuzi, director of the Center for sian Studies, is collared and given the hard sell, to allow he C.I.A. to train their people at the Center. Jannuzi quivocates a bit, "We can't give them any special treat lent. Wouldn't a place nearer Virginia be more con- enient?" Nervous at the obvious jeopardy in which such an rrangement would put the reputation of the Center, he pparently resists their blandishments. Dr. Sidney Weintaub, who had invited Don Gregg to peak at the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs, catches people o remind everyone of the excellent opportunity to meet nd interact with policy makers. Dr. Weintraub had been Ontuttre,J from page 25 a carry out similar, if less ideologically amplete, political actions. Early in June 1972, acting on a series if tipspolice trapped most key members f the Red Army Fraction; Baader, aspe, and another leader Holger loins, were captured in a dawn raid on heir Frankfurt hiding place and Ensslin as apprehended while shopping in a lamburg store. On June 15, Fritz Roderwald, in whose ouse Meinhof had been hiding, called he police inspector in charge of the Han- ver Bauder Mcinhof Kommando (a orce resembling American SWAT teams n most German cities) and turned her n. Rodenvald, a 33-year-old teacher, awe to regret his decision and turned approached twice by Bill Wood with the offer of a speaker from the C.I.A. including one time shortly after Wein- traub's arrival (Fall 1976). ' Bill Wood, the personnel director of the local C.I.A. office is everywhere with a cherry hello and a, "1 don't be- lieve. we've met." No one escapes being asked: "Do you think this sort of thing is worth while?" The universal answer is affirmative, although some for different reasons The process, begun earlier, in the afternoon, discussion session of stressing the idea that the C.I.A. is basically an "alright" group of people devoted to peace and democracy, 'continues unabated. There might have been occasional cases of overzealousness but now the "company" has matured. The less public process of establishing liaison with the academic comtitunity engaged in foreign area studies also continues unabated. The foreign area studies centers repre- sent valuable sources of training and expertise to the C.I.A. and the centers'are highly dependent upon an always uncer- tain grant funding. Grant support is a powerful inducement even when balanced against the pall of suspicion that would accrue in due time to all of the center's associates and students. That this might be morally wrong, that area specialists should not be agents of a particular government, and that they may be accordingly shut out of their coun- tries of interest, is not brought up. Bill Wood, always his effervescent self, attempts to recruit where possible, "When you''get to the job hunting stage give me,a call down at the Federal Building." In gen- eral, the urbane, sophisticated approach seems to have an almost narcotic effect on the fascinated faculty. In conclusion, Gregg maintained that the CIA, through- out its history, was only doing what it was told to do. This includes both the `legal and illegal' acts which the CIA com- mitted in the name of democracy. After all, Gregg noted, the CIA is really in the `people business'. We know that, and that's what bothers us, because we do not know which people. u prison conditions described as "inade- quate" to "purposefully cruel." One woman died from cancer because prison doctors refused to diagnose her symptoms. Holger Meins died from in- adequate medical attention during forced feeding after a long hunger strike by RAF prisoners. Meinhof and others were subjected to "sensory deprivation" -a new form of torture, in specialized cells, preventing all human contact. Many people have recurring hallucina- tions from such treatment. Meinhof her- self was in a sensory deprivation cell for one six-month period and then again for two weeks last Christmas, but by all ac- counts had a tough mind. But the RAF organized inside the dozen jails the government sent them to. Chancellor Schmidt's words after Mein- hof s arrest when he called Mcinhof and the Red Army. Fraction "the most serious challenge in the 26-year history of our democracy." CounterSpy editor Winslow Peck, con- tributing editor Philip Agee, and two former Military Intelligence officers, K. Barton Osborn and Gary Thomas, were the first witnesses called by the defense in Meinhofs trial last summer. They tried to testify on the use of German soil for the conduct of the war in Indochina. The defense hoped it might mitigate the sen- tences of Meinhof and her companions who were moved to protest U.S. aggres- sion in Vietnam. But the court's presi- dent prevented the testimony and said it would only assist the "terrorists " He ver the reward money he received to the Meinhof continued to influence the further ruled that th,re could be no de- l lrike Mcinhof /r-]~ ~},JC{{ wLdRei e-QQ?Q/08f3s1 fi r(rlli~ ?P790~0+49& 67 Q@?5Q029t ? -01 4C1ASS Fl ED ^ CONFIDENTIAL ^ SECRET ? ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET ( SUBJECT: (Ophonol) =y~'-:~ Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public_, NTL Appearances before Academic Groups FROM EXTENSION NO. OTR 76-6852 DD/OT/OIR DATE 26 November 1976 TO. (Officer designation, room number, and } ildi b DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom ng u RECEIVED FORWARDED INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) STATINTI Director of Training 4 To 3 and 5 D you are aware, on 2. is an influentially capable briefer who does an i ll b exce represent ng ent jo 3' DDA UE yg ,; the Agency. We have discussed 7D18 Hqs ` r in some detail the briefing d -- - that le to the Counterspy `. article, and I am convinced that Don's presentation and 5 subsequent answers to ques- ' A/DCI tions were handled with lF04 Hqs candor tempered with the 6 - - - - -- - necessary amount of dis- creetness. It is suggested that the benefits derived --- from these orientation 7. briefings far outweigh the damage done by irresponsible - - - articles, such as the one a. appearing in Counterspy. It is strongly recommended that - -- i - - we continue with the or en- 9 tations, ensuring that we critically select the briefers -- - - - i - - - - cular based upon the part 10. situation and sophistication of. the audience. This has - - - -- - - 11. - been done in the past for briefings provided by OTR and will continue. 12. 1 - D/OP per DOA w/att ?-~' DDA Subj ect /att 13. DDA:JFBIake:der 1 Dec 1976) ,f arr'y . 1. .water Director of; Training 1.4. STATINTL 15. 0489A,=70049 STAT tKNAL FO 3-62 RM 610 uyEDPTO S SECRET CONFIDENTIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED Ap rev eli R L C I A IO T "awww D S CONFIDENTIAL SECRET ..3FZfFICIA OUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INIT LS 2 3 1 76 4 ~ bbd 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks : FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM. NAME, ADDRESS AMC) PHONE NO. DATE D 0700050029-8 0 Ap 0700050029-8 FORM No, 237 Use previous editions (40) 1-67 Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP79-00498A000700050029-8 San Antonio EXPRESS-NEWS-Sunday November 21 1976 Page 7 Central Intelligence Agency director George Bush will be the, principal speaker at the annual meeting and dinner of the Greater San Antonio Chamber of Com- merce. The meeting will be held Dec: 14 in the Convention Center. Bush's professional car- eer,spans industry, politics and public service. Before assuming his current post at the CIA, Bush was the chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, Peking, Peoples Republic of China. He was the chairman of the Republican National Committee from January 1973 to September 1974. In 1971 he was appointed permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations. Bush was U.S. congress- man from the 7th District, Texas, from 1966 to 1971. Bush's career began when he was commis- sioned, at age 18, in the U.S. Navy. From 1942 to 1945 he was a carrier pilot with the 3rd and 5th fleets in the Pacific Theater of Operations. After the war he entered Yale University and grad- uated in 1948 with a B.A. in Economics. lie worked as an oilfield supply salesman in Mid- land for three years and in 1951 formed Bush-Overby Oil Development, Inc. In 1953, he co-founded the Zapata Petroleum Corp. in Midland and a year later the Zapata Off-Shore Co. of Midland-Houston. He resigned as president of Zapata Off-Shore in 1966 Approved For Release 200G/O3F3lgre?IA--RDP79-00498A0007