MULTILATERAL COORDINATION OF DRAFT DCIDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00632A000100030011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 25, 1972
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2S0E/CKETCIA-RDP79-00632A0001090360112-
SEP 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support
SUBJECT : Multilateral Coordination of Draft DCIDs
1. This memor
paragraph 9.
suggests action on your part in
2. Reference is made to the request that the Office o
Security review all the draft DC1Ds for the purpose of determining
whether there are any problems from a security standpoint. This
is to advise that the draft DCIDs have been thoroughly scrutinized
and, with one exception, this Office interposes no objection to the
formal approval of the DC1Ds during the multilateral coordination
process scheduled for Wedn.esday, 20 September 1972. We continue
to take strong exception to the proposed DCM on "Compartmentation
of Sensitive Intelligence and Intelligence Information, " and this
memorandum sets forth our reasoning for adopting this position.
3. The draft DC1D on Compartmentation proposes the
establishment of a Special Security Center, under the Director of
Central Intelligence, in order to advise, assist and generally act
for the DCI in the discharge of his responsibilities in the establish-
ment of community controls for the compartmented protection of
intelligence. As proposed, the Chief of the Special Security Center
would report to and function directly under the DCI, while having
the responsibility of coordinating with the Security Committee.
Most of the functions of the DCI Special Security Center are obviously
in the area of security, and the SSC would be administratively, tech-
nically and logistically supported by the Office of Security.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/11/22
: CIA-RDP79-00632A000100030011-5
Approved For Release 2002/11/SUMP79-00632A000100030011-5
4. This Office does not consider the proposed DCID
advisable on the basis that it creates a unit of undetermined
size and composition for the purpose of carrying out basic
security responsibilities without overall policy guidance, direc-
tion, and control from one logical focal point. In effect, it
creates a small second Office of Security.
5. By terms of the 25 April 1962 agreement between the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, the
Office of Security was assigned the responsibility of providing
uniform security policy to the National Reconnaissance Office.
More recently the 1969 agreement between the DCI and the
Secretary of Defense resulted in the delegation of similar respon-
sibility to the Office of Security in developing and overseeing a
security system for another interdepartmental program of high
sensitivity. In substance, the existing Special Security Center
has served as a coordinating focal point for the establishment of
security policy on several compartmented programs (not including
interdepartmental Special Intelligence).
6. The draft DCID on "Coordination of Maintenance of
Security' again establishes the United States Intelligence Board's
Security Committee which is traditionally chaired by the Director
of Security. The proposed mission of the Committee, is to advise,
assist and generally act for the DCI in the discharge of his respon-
sibilities with respect to the protection of intelligence and intelligence
information; to assiet in the development and promotion of coordinated
and practical security practices; and to foster the objective of provid-
ing adequate security protection consistent with the coordinated appli-
cation of intelligence resources and the efficient employment of
intelligence products. It is our considered opinion that the mission,
functions and community responsibilities of the proposed DC/ Special
Security Center would conflict with and/or otherwise duplicate many
of the activities being performed by the Security Committee of USIB.
Although the draft proposal on Compartmentation of Sensitive Intelli-
gence suggests that the DCI Special Security Center should "coordinate"
with the Security Committee to ensure compatibility of compartmented
procedures with general security practices, it would be inevitable that
2
Approved For Release 2002/11SEGRUP79-00632A000100030011-5
r-r
Approved For Release 2002/11/4kgpi-EqP79-00632A000100030011-5
inconsistent and incompatible policy positions could be applied on
security issues of interest to both components. The problem might
possibly be alleviated to some extent if the Director of Security is
also designated as Chief of the DCI Special Security Center, but we
believe it would be in the best interests of all concerned if the Special
Security Center continues to function under the cognizance of the
Office of Security.
7. Another problem in the proposed DC1D on Compartmenta-
tion relates to the placement of the SI milieu into the DCI Special
Security Center, apparently on the premise that the Director of
Central Intelligence would drastically cut back security controls in
the area of Special intelligence. This concept brings into play and
Immediate focus the theorem that Security is a command function.
The Office of Security shares the views expressed by rios Agency
components which commented on this issue in th Report. 25X1A
In substance, it has been strongly stated that any radicalchange in
the SI system will be strongly contested by the National Security
Agency, and we should be absolutely certain what direction should
be pursued on this controversial issue. Controls placed upon Special
Intelligence information have international ramifications which are
best known to the SIGINT Committee and the National Security Agency.
In order not to fragment security responsibility for this vital source
and method, it would appear to be a great mistake to divide security
responsibility and authority between the SIGINT Committee and a
newly created organization. We foresee many complex problems,
conflicts and, at best, genuine misunderstandings and confusion
resulting from such a decision.
8. In summary, the Office of Security opposes the establish-
ment of a DCI Special Security Center, loosely affiliated with the
Office of Security, on the grounds that:
A. The organizational security
under the DCI, is inadvisable in tha
Office of Security.
ructure, directly
t creates another
B. There would be duplication and overlap of
responsibility with the USIB Security Committee.
3
Approved For Release 2002/1sEcRETDP79-00632A000100030011-5
Approved For Release 2002/11/22S@RE0T9-00632A000100030011-5
C. Dividing security responsibility and authority
between the SIGINT Committee and a newly created
organization, not a part of the overall SICINT command
and policy structure, would cause conflict, misunder-
standing and confusion at the possible expense of security.
9. Based upon the above, it is strongly recommended that
the Deputy Director for Support not concur in the establishment of
a Special Security Center outside the Office of Security. Although
unaccepted, this has been our position during the development of
the draft.
Distribution:
Orig - Return to OS
2 - DD/S
SECRET
/Iowa rcl J ? CPI bo r n
Director of Security
Approved For Release 2002/11/22 : CIA-RDP79-00632A000100030011-5
25X1A
TOO.
Approved For Release 2002/11/2Et jkitEl?9-00632A0001000
Wi I
SEP 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support
suBsrcT : Multilateral Coordination f DraftDC/Ds
I. This memorandum suggests action on your part in
paragraph 9.
Z. Reference is made to the request that the Office of
Security review all the draft DCIDs for the purpose of determining
whether there are any problems from a security standpoint. This
is to advise that the draft DC1Ds have been thoroughly scrutinized
and, with one exception, this Office interposes no objection to the
formal approval of the DCIDs during the multilateral coordination
process scheduled for Wednesday. 20 September 1972. We continue
to take strong exception to the proposed DC1D on 'Compartmentation
of Sensitive Intelligence and Intelligence Information, and this
memorandum sets forth our reasoning for adopting this position.
3. The draft DC]]) on Compartmentation proposes the
establishment of a Special Security Center, under the Director of
Central Intelligence, in order to advise, assist and generally act
for the DCI in the discharge of his responsibilities in the establish.
ment of community controls for the compartmented protection of
intelligence. As proposed, the Chief of the Special Security Center
would report to and function directly under the DCI, while having
the responsibility of coordinating with the Security Committee.
Most of the functions of the DCI Special Security Center are obviously
in the area of security, and the SSC would be administratively, tech-
nically and logistically supported by the Office of Security.
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/11/22 : CIA-RD
P79-00632A000100030011-5
Approved For Release 2002/11/22
ag9-00632A000100030011-5
4., This Office does not consider the proposed DCID
advisable on the basis that it creates a unit of undetermined
size and composition for the purpose of carrying out basic
security responsibilities without overall policy guidance, direc-
tion, and control from one logical focal point. In effect, it
creates a small second Office of Security.
5. By terms of the 25 April 1962 agreement between the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, the
Office of Security was assigned the responsibility of providing
uniform security policy to the National Reconnaissance Office.
More recently the 1969 agreement between the DCI and the
Secretary of Defense resulted in the delegation of similar respon-
sibility to the Office of Security in developing and overseeing a
security system for another interdepartmental program of high
sensitivity. In substance, the existing Special Security Center
has served as a coordinating focal point for the establishment of
security policy on several compartmented programs (not including
interdepartmental Special Intelligence).
6. The draft DC ID on 'Coordination of Maintenance of
Security' again establishes the United States Intelligence Board's
Security Committee which is traditionally chaired by the Director
of Security. The proposed mission of the Committee, is to adviee,
assist and generally act for the DCI in the discharge of his respon-
sibilities with respect to the protection of intelligence and intelligence
information; to assist in the development and promotion of coordinated
and practical security practices; and to foster the objective of provid-
ing adequate security protection consistent with the coordinated appli-
cation of intelligence resources and the efficient employment of
intelligence products. It is our considered opinion that the mission,
functions sad community responsibilities of the proposed DCI Special
Security Center would conflict with and/or otherwise duplicate many
of the activities being performed by the Security Committee of USIB.
Although the draft proposal on Compartmentation of Sensitive Intelli-
gence suggests that the DCI Special Security Center should "coordinate'
with the Security Committee to ensure compatibility of compartmented
procedures with general security practices, it would be inevitable that
Approved For Release 2002/11/26EGREFT79-00632A000100030011-5
Approved For For Release 2002/11/22i. ofki 79-00632A000100030011-5
inconsistent and incompatible policy positions could be applied on
security issues of interest to both components. The problem might
possibly be alleviated to some extent if the Director of Security is
also designated as Chief of the DCI Special Security Center, but we
believe it would be in the best interests of all concerned if the Special
Security Center continues to function under the cognizance of the
Office of Security.
7. Another problem in the proposed DCII) on Compartments-
don relates to the placement of the SI milieu into the DCI Special
Security Center, apparently on the premise that the Director of
Central Intelligence would drastically cut back security controls in
the area of Special Intelligence. This concept brings into play and
immediate focus the theorem that Security is a command function.
The Office of Security shares the views expressedby various Agency
components which commented on this issue in the eport. 25X1 A
In substance, it has been strongly stated that any radical change in
the SI system will be strongly contested by the National Security
Agency, , and we should be absolutely certain what direction should
be pursued on this controversial issue. Controls placed upon Special
Intelligence information have international ramifications which are
best known to the SIGINT Committee and the National Security Agency.
In order not to fragment security responsibility for this vital source
and method, it would appear to be a great mistake to divide security
responsibility and authority between the SIGINT Committee and a
newly created organization. We foresee many complex problems,
conflicts and, at best, genuine misunderstandings and confusion
resulting from such a decision.
8. In summary, the Office of Security opposes the establish-
ment of a DCI Special Security Center, loosely affiliated with the
Office of Security, on the grounds that:
A. The organizational security structure, directly
under the DCI, is inadvisable in that it creates another
Office of Security.
B. There would be duplication and overlap of
responsibility with the USIB Security Committee.
Approved For Release 2002/11/2gAg.79-00632A000100030011-5
Approved For Release 2002/11,2EeRpP79-00632A000100030011-5
C. Dividing security responsibility and authority
between the SIGINT Committee and a newly created
organization, not a part of the overall SICINT command
and policy structure, would cause conflict, misunder.
standing and confusion at the possible expense of security.
9. Based upon the above, it is strongly recommended that
the Deputy Director for Support not concur in the establishment of
a Special Security Center outside the Office of Security. Although
unaccepted, this has been our position during the development of
the draft.
Distribution:
Orig Return to OS
2 - DD/S
SECRET
Howard
Diroctor
"'Osborn
Security
Approved For Release 2002/11/22 : CIA-RDP79-00632A000100030011-5
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/11/22 : CIA-RDP79-00632A000100030011-5
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
TO:
DD /Support
ROOM NO.
1 BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING 1 EXTENSION
FORM NO .0A
1 FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
Approved For Release 2002/11/22 : CIA-RDP79-00632A000100030011-5