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Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 ?R63 Secr Dominican aepub-ic Handbook TG RES e Cri ENT5 NOE:As= Ana UST k tk Secret N2 104 No. 0585 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. GROUP 1E:ducted front automoilt downgrading and dedo.ificorion Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 209MBRETIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Page TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. GEOGRAPHY Location and area 1 Topography 1 Climate 1 Human resources 2 II. ECONOMICISACKGROUND Growth rate and trends 1 Main sectors of the economy 2 Fuels and power 3 Transportation and communication 4 Economic policy 5 Foreign trade 6 Balance of payments 6 III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS Historical summary 1 Structure of the government 3 Voting 5 Political dynamics 5 IV. SUBVERSION 25X6 VI. ARMED FORCES Military budget 2 Manpower 2 VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS VIII. US INTERESTS IX. CHRONOLOGY AND TABULAR DATA MAP Dominican Republic i Mar 72 25XT SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12: CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 SECRET INTRODUCTION Geographic proximity and chronic political instability have brought the Dominican Republic to the more or less permanent attention of the United States. The blessings of a benign climate, fertile soil, good harbors, access to busy shipping routes, and the relative absence of racial tensions have been largely dissipated by chronic social tensions and the failure to develop effective political institutions. The inauguration in 1966 of President Joaquin Balaguer saw the start of a period of relative civil tranquility and modest but steady economic re- covery from the effects of the civil war of 1965. These trends have con- tinued into Balaguer's second administration. The gains are tenuous, how- ever, arid their permanence, much less their growth, is continually menaced by lack of economic and social reforms and by Balaguer's personalistic and highly centralized style of government. Nearly 60% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming on small plots of land. Little more than a third of the population is literate; managerial talent and technical skills are in short supply; and one of the highest sustained rates of population growth in the world further compli- cates any plan to improve economic and social conditions. Neither the upper class (less than 1%) nor the small emerging middle class (5-15%1 is conspicu- ously wealthy. Nonetheless, the contrast between the economic well-being of these groups and the poverty of the majority of the population is obvious and a source of ':ension. Leftist and Communist forces are small, and their fragmentation has kept them from becoming a serious threat since 1965. It remains to be seen whether the authoritarian nature of the Balaguer regime, the prospect of a third term for Balaguer, and the absence of political alternatives will increase the chances of a new explosion of violence from which leftist extremists might benefit. Dominican Republic SECRET Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 0 in 0 Approved For Release 200?4E6R.EE-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 I. GEOGRAPHY Location and area The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern two thirds of the island of Hispaniola, the second largest island in the Caribbean (Cuba is the largest). Its northwestern coast is about 600 nautical miles southeast of Miami, Florida, and the southwestern tip of the country is about 420 nautical miles north of Maracaibo, Venezuela. Puerto Rico lies 60 nautical miles to the east. Roughly triangular in shape, the Dominican Republic, exclusive of the offshore islands, occupies an area of approximately 18,800 square miles. Topography Extensive areas of rugged, complex highlands separated by valleys and a coastal plain make up the Dominican topography. The highlands, which cover about 60% of the country, consist of four parallel, northwest-southeast trending ranges separated by valleys; one east-west trending range; a hilly peninsula; and many small, isolated groups of hills and mountains scattered throughout the plains. The highest elevations in the Caribbean islands are found in the Cordillera Central of the Dominican Republic, where many peaks exceed 7,000 feet. Pico Duarte is the highest, rising to a height of 10,414 feet. The remairing 40% of the land area consists of three generally parallel interior plains; a broad, gently rolling southeast coastal plain and a number of smaller, narrow coastal plains; and several small, scattered intermontane valleys and bas ns located in the highlands. Most of the population and cultivated areas are concentrated in the Valle del Cibao, the northernmost interior plain, and on the broad southeast coastal plain. Most of the plains are subject to damaging earthquakes. The coastal areas between Bani and Barahona in the vicinity of the capital city of Santo Domingo on the southern coast and near Nagua on the northeastern coast experience damaging seismic sea waves (tsunamis). Climate The Dominican Republic has a tropical and strongly maritime climate dominated by rnoistu re-bearing trade winds. The varied but predominantly mountainous topography causes pronounced variations in rainfall, Dominican Republic Mar 72 SECRE'r Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002811M2R 0142RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 temperature, and cloudiness, but most of the country has a wet season from May through October or November and a dry-to-less-wet season during the remaining months. Seasonal temperature variations are slight; the lowlands are hot throughout the year, and the highlands are cool. Human resources The US Census Bureau estimated the population as of January 1971 at 4,128,000. The annual growth rate is estimated at 3.0%, and life expectancy at birth for the period 1965-70 was put at 52.1 years by the Latin American Demographic Center in Santiago, Chile. In 1966, about 47.3% of the popu- lation was estimated to be under 15 years of age. Males outnumber females 102 to 100, according to the 1960 census. Dominicans are predominantly mulatto, a mixture of former African slaves and European immigrants. Of the indigenous Taino Indians who welcomed Columbus in 1492,!scarcely a trace remains. The tiny upper class, a social rather than an economic entity, is largely white, although the mixing of blacks and whites has been so thorough over the years that few ethnically pure specimens of either race are found in the population. There is an awareness of race, however, and lighter color and higher social and economic status tend to go together. Still, the Dominican Republic has been spared the kind of race consciousness that generates social antagonism. Class distinctions are based primarily on wealth, employment, and education. At the upper levels, family background is an important factor. Family ties are important at all levels of Dominican society, and family loyalty takes precedence over the demands of the community and the state. Most Domlnicans are country dwellers. Santo Domingo and Santiago de los Caballeros are the only sizable urban areas, accounting for about half of the urban population. Urban dwellers are listed as 40% of the total popula- tion, but this is somewhat misleading since it includes people in all populated sections with more than 7,000 inhabitants even though not all actually live in an urban environment. The over-all settlement pattern is one of small, agriculturally oriented areas. Nearly all population centers are located on the plains. In the highly productive areas around Santiago de los Caballeros, density exceeds more than 600 persons per square mile, but the Valle del Cibao as a whole includes uninhabited areas with good land. Population is particularly sparse in the extreme east and far west. Dominican Republic I - 2 SEUKET Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002REA'2R E1N-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Theoretically, education is free and compulsory for all children be- tween the ages of 7 and 14, but neither schools nor teachers are adequate. Although estimates of literacy vary, probably not more than 35 to 40% of the population is literate. Predictably, literacy rates are lowest among the peasants, who make up about 70% of the population. The potential labor force is estimated at 1.3 million. Reliable statistics on the rate of unemployment are lacking, but unemployment and serious under-employment is roughly estimated at between 25 and 30%. About 73% of those employed work in agriculture, about 8% in industry, and the remaining 19% in services and other activities. Most of the available man- power is unskilled. The demand for skilled technicians, professional, manage- ment and supervisory personnel far exceeds the supply. Most Dominicans live at a bare subsistence level, and both the rural and urban poor have severe health and sanitation problems. Civil unrest, lack of capital, too few technicians and skilled workers, and the apathy and ignor- ance of most of the people are major obstacles to the development of adequate public health programs. Most Dominicans are baptized in the Roman, Catholic Church, but, according to a church-sponsored survey made in the early 1960s, only 10% regard themselves as practicing Catholics. Dominican Republic -3 Mar 72 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 25)(1 Approved For Release f&bblilt: CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND Growth rate and trends Economic performance in the 1960s was seriously affected by the political instability that plagued the Dominican Republic after Trujillo's assassination in 1961 and the civil war in 1965. Gross Domestic Product declined 13% in 1965, recovered by 1967, and has since increased by about 23%. Per capita GDP in 1970 was still less than three fifths of the Latin American average. Relative political stability under the Balaguer government, combined with high sugar sales to the US market at preferential prices and substantial inflows of official and private capital, enabled the economy to grow at the average rate of 6.6% during 1969-70. At the end of 1970, the balance of payments showed a surplus of $6 million. Rapidly rising imports in 1971, however, are expected to cause a substantial deficit despite the considerable inflows of capital. Sugar sales account for about half of Dominican export earnings, and preferential US sugar prices are essential to continued balance cif payments equilibrium. The economy remains heavily dependent upon external assistance, despite a decline in new commitments from $110 million in 1966 to about $50 million in 1970. The estimated growth of industrial production, including sugar proc- essing, was 9.4% in 1969 and 10.7% in 1970. In 1970, it contributed 17% to GDP. Since 1966, there has been some improvement in operations of the State Enterprise Corporation (CORD E), which manages government-owned interests. CORDE generates nearly 22% of industrial salaries and wages, excluding the sugar industry. The Investment Fund for Economic Develop- ment (FIDE), set up jointly by the Central Bank, AID, and the Inter-Amer- ican Development Bank, has been a steady source of financing for industry. In 1970 private enterprise made major mining investments in a ferro-nickel project and in a petroleum refinery scheduled for construction in 1971. Agriculture became one of the fastest growing sectors as a result of improved weather in 1969-70, and in 1970 output of many food crops reached record levels. Among agricultural commodity exports in 1970, sugar and cacao exports surpassed the 1964 levels, but coffee exports did not. Dominican Republic Mar 72 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12: CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release SEVOR/RTCIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Main sectors of the economy Agriculture is the principal sector of the Dominican economy, employ- ing most of the labor force and contributing about 85-90% of the value of exports. Poor farming methods, bad weather, and political problems caused agricultural production to fluctuate widely during the 1960s; however, government agricultural improvement programs, relative political stability, and good weather made possible a 9% rise in agricultural production in 1969 and about a 5% rise in 1970. Sugar cane is the most important crop, and its cultivation and proc- essing is the most important Dominican economic and industrial activity, contributing about 7% of the GDP and accounting for about half of the country's export earnings. Seventy percent of the sugar crop is produced by government-owned estates, 25% by the US-owned La Romana Estate, a subsidiary of Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., and the remainder by private Dominican interests. Climate, soil, and rainfall are suitable for agriculture, but extensive subsistence farming and inefficient methods prevent full utili- zation of the country's agricultural potential. Coffee ranks as the second export crop. The Dominican Republic is a member of the International Coffee Agreement but has failed to fill its basic quota (25,560 tons in 1969) for several years. Cocoa and tobacco are also grown for export. During the 1960s, livestock production increased at an annual rate of 5% and currently accounts for one third of the country's total agricultural output. Beef exports have increased substantially since export taxes were repealed in 1967 arid Dominican beet was subsequently approved for export to the United States. By 1969, beef exports had reached nearly 5,000 tons, but in 1970, they fell to 3,400 tons. Although production of food crops for domestic consumption has risen steadily, it has not kept pace with requirements. Consequently, the Domin- can Republic imports substantial quantities of foodstuffs. There are significant bauxite and nickel deposits, some commercially exploitable copper reserves, and limited iron ore, gold, silver, and platinum deposits. Bauxite is the most important non-agricultural export. Nearly 1.3 million tons were produced in 1970, all of which was exported to the United States. Proven reserves are estimated at 20 million metric tons, averaging 45% alumina. Bauxite is mined by Alcoa Exploration Co., a subsidiary of the Dominican Republic 11-2 SEGRE 1 Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Relpasp iCEC/dliFir CIA1DP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 1?1111,- 25X-1 Aluminum Company of America, under a concession granted until the year 2007 with an option to renew for 20 additional years. Nickel will become a major foreign exchange earner when the Falcon- bridge ferro-nickel processing plant becomes fully operational in 1972. Ferro-nickel reserves are estimated to be sufficient for 25 years of operation at a production rate of 28,500 tons per year. The complex is owned by Falconbridge Dominicana, a subsidiary of Falconbridge Nickel Mines, Ltd., of Canada. Smaller interests are held by the Dominican Government and by the US firm, Armco Steel Co. Manufacturing accounted for 17% of the GDP in 1970 and employed about 10% of the labor force. Food processing and beverage industries contribute more than three fifths of the total industrial output. Light consumer goods, manufactured under high protective tariffs, account for the remainder. Sugar milling is the most important industrial activity, and the gov- ernment owns 12 of the 16 sugar mills. Since President Balaguer set up the State Sugar Council in 1966, the government-owned mills have earned a profit. The largest nongovernment-owned mill belongs to the US enterprise, Gulf and Western Industries, Inc. The rest of the manufacturing sector produces mainly for the domestic market. Low quality and high production costs require protective tariffs to allow the plants to operate profitably. Consfruction, both publicly and privately financed, accounted for 5% of GDP in 1970. Fuels and power The Dominican Republic has few energy resources; none of the known petroleum deposits is commercially exploitable, and hydroelectric output is insignificant, although its potential is considerable. In 1966, the import of petroleum products rose to 500,000 metric tons. When the joint government - Shell International Petroleum Co. refinery now being built near Santo Domingo is completed in 1974, its 30,000-barrel-per-day capacity is ex- pected to be adequate for domestic fuel requirements. Import demand is then expected to shift from petroleum products to crude oil. [Dominican Republic 11-3 SECRE 1 Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 SECRET Electric power production was about 710 million kilowatt hours in 1970. The per capita production of 175 kilowatt hours is less than half the Latin American average. The system is overloaded and power blackouts are routine. Five sixths of capacity is concentrated within a 25-mile radius of Santo Domingo, and most of the remainder serves the sugar cane area on the north coast. When the Tavera and Valdesia dam projects are completed, over-all electric power capacity will be increased by about 55%. Transportation and communication Transportation and telecommunications systems compare favorably with those of other Caribbean countries. The basic transportation network consists of 6,000 miles of roads and highways, 3,000 miles of which are concrete or bituminous, 1,400 miles of improved earth, 800 miles of unim- proved earth, and 800 miles of gravel-surfaced roads. Most concrete roads and the bituminous sections of the three major routes that radiate west, north, and south from Santo Domingo are in good condition. Branch routes connect these three highways, and other routes extend to isolated areas of the interior. Two main highway connections with Haiti are made at Dajabon in the north and Elias Pina in the south. Neither rail nor inland waterway transportation is significant. Small, privately owned bus, truck, and taxi companies transport passengers and freight. Two domestic (Compania Dominicana de Aviacion CDA, and Aerovias Quisqueyana, C por A.?AC) and five foreign airlines link the Dominican Republic with nine countries and 13 cities. Government-owned CDA recently concluded a civil air agreement with the United States that will permit it to fly to New York as well as to Miami. AC, privately owned, operates scheduled passenger services linking Santo Domingo - San Juan, Puerto Rico - Santiago de los Caballeros. It also operates a cargo charter service throughout the Caribbean. Additional air services are provided by the recently revived Alas del Caribe, three cargo charter carriers that use four heavy transport aircraft, and five agricultural aircraft companies that carry out country-wide cropdusting operations using a fleet of 16 specially de- signed light aircraft. The country has 25 usable airfields and one seaplane station. Ten of the fields are military; three are joint military/civilian fields; three are civilian; and the remainder are privately owned. The fields are fairly well distributed throughout the country. The heaviest concentration is along the sugar cane belt on the south coast. Most are within reach of road, rail, or water transportation. Dominican Republic 11-4 SEUKET Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 SECR FT The telecommunications service, one of the best in the Caribbean area, has undergone continuous expansion and modernization since the mid- 1950s. Most cities and towns are connected by telephone and telegraph lines. Internal telephone service is provided by the Canadian-owned Cia. Domini- cane de Telefonos, C. por A. There is wireless telephone communication to all parts of the world. The republic is served by All America Cables and Radio, Inc., with offices in Santo Domingo, Puerto Plata, and Santiago de los Caballeros, and by RCA Communications. Service and equipment are most heavily concentrated and most efficient in the urban areas. Seventy-two percent of the 40,200 telephones are in Santo Domingo. Effective national radio coverage is provided by 84 AM and 4 FM stations. There are an estimated 400,000 radio receivers in use, and 250,000 television sets receive the transmissions of three television stations. Economic policy Conservative economic policies imposed during President Balaguer's 1966-70 term repaired much of the economic damage caused by the civil war of 1965, but the pace of recovery was slowed by cautious monetary and fiscal policies which tended to inhibit private investment. During 1966-69, government austerity policies succeeded in slowing the inflationary trend of the politically and economically volatile early 1960s. Still, in 1970 the cost-of-hying index rose 5%. Public investment, financed partly through foreign aid but increasingly from domestic savings, has increased substantially under the Balaguer gov- ernments. The public sector's share of total investment grew from one fifth to three eights from 1965 to 1969. Political effect, however, sometimes took precedence over economic considerations, thus robbing government expend- itures of full economic impact. The National Planning Office's National Development Plan for 1970-74 calls for government investment of $530 million over the four-year period, primarily in agriculture and irrigation, transportation and communications, and energy production. Tax relief, import preferences for firms producing for export, credit to new industries from the Central Bank Investment Fund for Economic Development, price supports, and government storage facilities have been made available to encourage private investment. But the government's desire to encourage private investment is often frustrated by policies inconsistent and sometimes in conflict with its goal. Various pieces of legislation that will better define government policy are being considered. Dominican Republic SECRET Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 25X1 rApproved For Releas 20CHAOREffA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Because the numerous enterprises formerly owned by Trujillo and his associates were nationalized, government ownership is fairly extensive. In addition to most of the sugar estates and mills, the government controls 33 firms that produce a wide range of products. It has a minority share in 16 other enterprises. The Dominican Corporation of State Enterprises (CORDE) manages the government-owned interests. Indirect government control is exerted over the rest of the economy through price regulations, import restriction, and credit and money policies. The second Balaguer administration, which took office in August 1970, has shown greater interest in long-range economic planning, but the pro- jected pace of economic growth from 1970-74 is probably overly optimistic. Continued reliance upon external financing, large sugar exports to the US market at preferential prices, and political factors will continue to influence the economic planning and performance of the government. Foreign trade Foreign trade is essential to the Dominican economy because of the country's narrow resource base and small domestic market. During 1965-70 imports averaged 18% of GDP, while exports averaged about 14%. Consumer goods, the largest component of imports, include raw materials, semi-fin- isheci goods, machinery and equipment, and fuels. Sugar and sugar cane by-products are the most important exports, earning 56% of export revenues between 1964-69. Other agricultural products supplied an additional 30% of earnings. Bauxite is the largest non-agricultural export; earnings from this source grew from 5% in 1964 to 8% or more during 1965-69. The United States supplies over halt of the Dominican Republic's imports and buys nearly 80% of its exports. Balance of payments Balance of payments showed a surplus of $6 million in 1970, due to large sugar exports to the US and substantial inflows of capital. Rapidly rising imports in 1971, however, are expected to cause a substantial deficit, despite the continued inflow of private and official capital. Dominican Republic 11-6 SECT( E 1 Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 200$EUR:MI-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 1111. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS Historical summary Harried through their long history by poverty and isolation, foreign occupations, dictatorships and varying degrees of anarchy, the Dominican people can scarcely be faulted for lacking national pride and purpose. Nor is it surprising that their country is virtually barren of the traditions, institu- tions, even the impulses, required to produce government respectful of the rights and responsive to the needs of the people. The colony of Santo Domingo was the first permanent European settlement in the New World, but its pre-eminence as the political and commercial center of Spain's American empire was quickly lost as Spain's interest shifted to richer conquests in Mexico and Peru. By 1550, the all-but-abandoned colony was languishing in poverty and neglect. There was a modest resurgence of prosperity in the 18th century, but, even so, by 1789 the colony's population had grown only to 125,000 of whom 15,000 were slaves. In 1795, Spain ceded the future Dominican Republic to France, but pressing European commitments prevented France from taking an active interest in the acquisition, and in 1805 the colony suffered its first invasion from Haiti. In 1809, when nearly all of Spain's New World colonies were in rebellion, Santo Domingo sought the protection of Spanish rule and did not declare its independence until 1821. Nine weeks later, it was again invaded by Haiti. The 22-year Haitian occupation well-nigh gutted the country, spiritu- ally and materially. The church as an institution was crushed; the university was closed; governmental machinery was demolished; the more enterprising and able citizens fled; the bases of the modest economic revival of the 18th century were wrecked. When the Haitians were finally expelled in 1844, the rigors of independence were too much for the politically and economically destitute nation to handle. The idealistic leaders of the drive for independ- ence from Haiti were soon exiled and power was then traded back and forth between a pair of dictators, Pedro Santana and Buenaventura Baez. "Brazen opportunists" is the politest of the epithets historians have applied to them. Well-founded fears of another Haitian occupation once again drove the country to reunion with Spain in 1861. When the experience proved unre- warding, efforts were then made to interest the United States in establishing a protectorate over the Dominican Republic. The US Senate refused to ratify the treaty. Dominican Republic Mar 72 bk,(}_KE 1 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 200SWIMMRDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Chaos, a brief experience of representative government under Ulises Espaillat, followed by worse chaos, culminated in 1882 with the emergence of Ulises Heureaux whose 17-year dictatorship one historian characterizes as "perhaps the most pitiless tyranny in the history of Latin America," rivaling only the future rule of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. Heureaux was assassinated in 1899, and during the next six years the country experienced four revolutions and five presidents. A brief period of recovery under Ramon Caceres ended with his assassination and the outbreak of civil war. The habit of raising revenues simply by printing currency and floating ruinous foreign loans had brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy, and threats of European creditors to send battleships to collect unpaid debts prompted the United States to take control of the Dominican customs house and begin to repay the foreign loans from customs revenues. Meanwhile, the political situation managed to degenerate further, and in 1916, fearful that a foreign power hostile to the United States might take over the country, President Woodrow Wilson authorized military occupation of the Dominican Republic by the US Marines. The occupation had several permanent effects upon the country. Road construction irreversibly broke down regional isolation. Centralization of authority reduced the power of provincial leaders, whose rivalries and ambitions had been a major cause of the chaos and anarchy that prevailed when the hold cif dictatorship or foreign occupation relaxed. To contain and control chronic domestic disorder and violence, the occupation authorities organized a modern unified National Constabulary. These and such construc- tive undertakings as improved sanitation, communications, and education facilities were unfortunately, if inevitably, accompanied by arbitrary assump- tion and at times abuse of authority by the occupying military. The con- stabulary later served as Trujillo's vehicle to power, earning him the bitter title "bastard son of the occupation forces," and earning the US lasting hatred as the accomplice, however unwitting, of Trujillo. In 1924, the occupation ended, a new constitution was promulgated, and Horacio Vasquez was elected president. The relative order and freedom of the early days of his administration dissipated as his term wore on, and when Vasquez, who had extended his term from four to six years, left the country for medical treatment, conspiracies against his government ripened. In 1930, an attempt was made against the shaky government, and the former constabulary, now the National Army and firmly under Trujillo's control, refused to come to its rescue. The government fell, and Trujillo became president. Dominican Republic III -2 SECRET Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 20020/3RI1K-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Between 1844 and 1930, the Dominican Republic had had 50 presi- dents, 30 revolutions, and 22 constitutions. For the next 31 years it had one leader, one government, and one policy. The objectives of keeping Trujillo firmly in power and satisfying his greed for wealth were, until quite near the end of his rule, achieved with an efficiency as murderous as it was effective. Trujillo was assassinated in 1961 by former associates. Between his death and the Inauguration in 1966 of President Joaquin Balaguer, there were eight governments, three coups d'etat, a civil war, and a foreign military intervention. The divisions and bitterness engendered by the civil war and subsequent US military intervention in 1965 continue to influence Domini- can politics. Under Balaguer, the country recovered from the devastation of the civil war and made modest, although poorly coordinated, socioeconomic progress while enjoying relative political stability and political liberty. Balaguer was returned to office in comparatively peaceful and honest elections in May 1970 with a 57% majority of the vote. In his second term, President Balaguer encountered stiffening resistance to the government's increased use of repression to contain radical revolu- tionary dissent. Fears are growing that Balaguer will seek yet another term of office, and demands that the government take broader socioeconomic re- form measures are intensifying. Structure of the government Most of the country's 27 constitutions have been notable only for their irrelevance to the actual administration of government. A short-lived excep- tion was the constitution of 1963 promulgated by President Juan Bosch that emphasized the government's responsibility to initiate social and economic reforms. This idealized statement of governmental responsibility was inter- preted by many in the church and the military and by businessmen and landowners as the foundation for revolutionary change. The Bosch constitu- tion was abrogated after Bosch's overthrow in 1963, and the present con- stitution, adopted in 1966, contains none of the controversial features of the 1963 document. According to the constitution, the Dominican Republic is a representa- tive democracy. Power to govern is vested in an elected president and the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. The constitu- tion es tab I ishes the political subdivisions of the National District Dominican Republic I II - 3 Mar 72 StA_A_KE 1 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002IMRItg-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 (encompassing Santo Domingo) and 26 provinces. The provinces are further subdivided into municipal districts. The provincial governors?all of whom are women?are appointed by the president. The National District and the municipal districts are administered by elected mayors and municipal councils. Congress consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputes. The National District and each province elects one senator by direct vote for a four-year term. The chamber is composed of 74 deputies, also elected for four-year terms. Each province has a minimum of two seats, and the more populous provinces are allotted one seat for every 50,000 inhabitants or fraction over 25,000. Congress holds two regular sessions per year and can convene extraordinary sessions at need. Congressional powers are mainly legislative and fiscal. Congress levies taxes, approves the budget, and may amend the constitution by a two-thirds vote. Also, it passes on contracts, treaties, and conventions negotiated by the executive. Legislation can be initiated not only by members of Congress but also by the president, by the Supreme Court of Justice and, on electoral matters, by the Central Electoral Board, In practice, Congress has traditionally been a rubber stamp for the executive. Strong congressional leadership independent of the executive is unknown. Members of the judiciary, including the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, are elected by the Senate. The Supreme Court, consisting of at least nine men, has sole jurisdiction over actions against the president, members of Congress, and other specific public officials. It hears appeals from lower courts and exercises administrative and disciplinary authority over them. In fact, the judiciary is ineffective and traditionally is a source of political patronage. Although President Balaguer has strongly criticized judi- cial irresponsibility, corruption, and leniency, he has done little to improve the situation. The president is directly elected by popular vote every four years and may succeed himself without restriction. A presidential candidate must be Dominican by birth, at least 30 years old, and may not have been on active police or military service for one year before election. The president's duties are assumed by the vice president should the president vacate office. If there is no vice president, the presidency is temporarily assumed by the president of the Supreme Court of Justice until a new president is elected by Congress. The actual powers exercised by a president far exceed those granted by the constitution. Tradition expects a strong executive, and his effectiveness in office requires it. Dominican Republic III - 4 Sk,UKE1' Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 200?MaRE1-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Voting Voting is obligatory for all Dominicans over 18 years of age and for all married Dominicans regardless of age, except for members of the armed forces and police who are forbidden to vote. Election results are determined by simple plurality for president, senators and mayors. Proportional repre- sentation determines the allocation of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and places on the municipal councils. Political dynamics Instability and violence, ruthless dictatorships, and foreign inter- ventions have prevented the development of political institutions and parties through which public demands can be presented and satisfaction obtained. Lacking political institutions, groups in conflict have traditionally resorted to direct and violent confrontations. The civil war of 1965 is an extreme example of the phenomenon, as was the more recent display of terror and counter-terror by the government and elements of the political opposition. Of the several political organizations that were formed after Trujillo's assassi- nation in 1961, most proved to be transitory alliances of civilian/military cliques and were unable to accommodate the vastly increased number of participants in the political process that resulted from the downfall of the dictatorship. Political force is exerted mainly by the military and the conservative business and financial community rather than by political parties. Force has frequently been the deciding factor in Dominican politics. The unified military was Trujillo's main instrument of power. Factions developed after his death and made common cause with various civilian groups. Since the civil war in which members of the armed forces were in open armed conflict with each other, the military has managed to compose its differences, motivated by self-interest and curbed by the executive's custom of shifting military commanders from post to post to prevent the development of support that might tempt an officer to try his political luck. Political parties have not prospered under President Balaguer. After the 1966 election, and again in 1970, he offered posts and preference to leaders of minor opposition parties that had contested the election. The leaders for the most part accepted the posts, and their parties, never very vital to begin with, have since drifted toward disintegration. The President's purpose was to protect his government by eliminating potential hotbeds of conspiracy against it. Dominican Republic 11-5 Mar 72 bECRE 1 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/bkietRaWRDP79-00891A001100070001-4 At present, the Reform Party (PR) and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) are the only parties of significance. The PR is important not because of its political ideology--it has none?but because it is the party of President Balaguer. The glamour of former president Juan Bosch, founder and leader of the PRD, is an important asset, but it is the party's reformist ideology and large membership that allow it to qualify as a non-personalist political party that would probably survive the loss of Bosch. The PRD did not take part in the 1970 election, swelling Balaguer's majority and depriving itself of patronage and exposure. Since the election, Bosch has devoted himself to re-establishing his control. over the party. He has imposed a policy of non-violence because he is afraid that a violent assault on the government would simply precipitate a military take-over that would postpone in- definitely his hopes of coming to power at the head of a reform government. His current tactics have alienated some of the younger, action-oriented PRD members, although defections have not yet become serious and Bosch's leadership has not been directly challenged. The PRD's present policy of preparing itself to take advantage of political developments rather than actively trying to change the political atmosphere will no doubt be modified to permit more positive maneuvers as the 1974 election comes closer. The left and the extreme left do not participate legally in the political process. They are weak, disunited, and badly led. Although the more violent factions are capable of sporadic incidents of terror, even including the assassination of President Balaguer, the extreme left could not subsequently take over the government or even assume a significant political role. A repressive government controlled by the military would be the probable immediate outcome of a successfu' leftist attempt on the life of the Presi- dent. Stability and economic recovery were the principal aims of President Balaguer during his 1966-70 term. US aid and support and cautious fiscal and economic policies helped the government to achieve the latter objective to a remarkable degree. In the first term, stability was attained through the President's skillful manipulation of various sectors of influence to maintain their support, because the opposition, left and right, was weak and divided and because the country was worn out with the violence of the post-Trujillo years and the shock of the civil war and the US military intervention. The government largely avoided outright repression against intransigents of the right and the extreme left during this period. During Balaguer's second administration, which began in August 1970, the people have become increasingly impatient over the President's insistence Dominican Republic III - 6 Mar 72 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2002S1KiIEIN-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 that stability is the first priority of government. Growing demands for more in the way of socioeconomic improvement are pressing the government to introduce reforms. In September 1971, the government used terror to intImidate or eliminate the radical revolutionary left. The opposition PRD seized on this tailor-made opportunity to embarrass the government, forcing Balaguer at least temporarily to abandon violent tactics. Still, there are no signs that support of the government is weakening, and the second administration's greater emphasis on economic development may pacify some of the dissenters without alarming the conservatives. Balaguer is the essential man in government, and his removal or incapacita- tion would trigger a disruptive scramble for power. Dominican Repiblic 111 - 7 SECRET Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 NOISH3A9I1S Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002?)(18(1211A-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 IV. SUBVERSION No faction has a monopoly on subversion in Dominican politics. The extreme left, the non-Communist left, the right and far right, and factions of the military have all conspired against various post-Trujillo governments, occasionally resorting to violence to achieve their political ends. The well- established Dominican tradition of conspiracy and conflict to settle political differences, the absence of a sense of nationhood and civic responsibility, and the fragility of the tradition of constitutional government encourage apathy and indifference in potentially stabilizing political moderates. The Communist left in the Dominican Republic consists of six parties and several subfactions, having an estimated total strength of about 675 militants and 780 sympathizers. Ideology ranges from the current conser- vatism of the pro-Soviet Dominican Communist Party (PCD) to the radical revolutionary extremism of the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), the Communist Party of the Dominican Republic (PCRD), and the badly splin- tered pro-Cuban 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4) and various splinter groups. The PCD, probably the best organized party, has the largest membership (475 militants and sympathizers). As a result of its present policy of non-violence, it has joined in a loose collaboration with Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), which also opposes the use of violence. Disagreement among the radical extremist groups has erupted from time to time in violent and sometimes fatal confrontations that have weakened the contenders. The MPD was the most activist and terror- prone of the Communist parties. Its leadership and ranks have been deci- mated by government police action, severely limiting its effectiveness. In the early 1960s, the MR-1J4 was the largest leftist party in the country, but by 1968 internal disagreements had split it into seven factions. Its membership has declined from 5-8,000 members to about 350 members and sympa- thizers. The Communist movement has never been strong enough in itself to constitute a major threat to political order. But Communist insurgency, terrorism, and political agitation have been important disruptive factors. During the civil war, the Communists gained political leverage by participat- ing in the constitutionalist movement (the groups that sought to restore Juan Bosch to office). They emerged from the war with increased prestige and membership, having obtained a leading role in the student movement, increased their influence in labor, displayed and enhanced their paramilitary capability, and taken part in anti-US demonstrations. Intense disagreements Dominican Republic Mar 72 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 200SWIR:10A-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 over tactics and ideology developed almost at once, however, and since 1966 often violent quarrels among the Communist parties have cost them much of the prestige and force that they gained during the civil war. A second important factor in the decline of the Communist parties has been the Balaguer government's continual campaign of harassment and, more re- cently, the use of outright counter-terror. The parties have been kept off-balance, disorganized, and intimidated, and death or exile has robbed them of a number of talented leaders. Little discernible progress has been made in efforts to unify the various leftist factions. The various Communist groups are capable of sporadic acts of terrorism and violence, but they could not sustain a campaign that would seriously threaten the stability of the government. Even should they destroy the government by assassinating the President, they could not themselves assume power. Before they could play a significant political role, the Communist groups would have to unify and then collaborate with a substantial section of the non-Communist left. In order to come to power, they would require significant military support, or at least acquiescence, at present a very remote possibility. During the 1965 civil war both the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC) and the PRD engaged in violence and subversion. Since the 1970 election, the PRSC has steadily lost strength. ,The PRD, under former President Bosch, has forbidden participation in acts of violence or terror because of the danger of precipitating a military crackdown. For the time being the PRD will probably stick to this policy, but it would no doubt try to take advantage of any threats to public order that might improve the party's chances of exercising real political power. The dramatic revelation over nationwide television by President Balaguer on 30 June 1971 of an antigovernment conspiracy headed by former General Elias VVessin y VVessin, leader of the far right Democratic Quisqueyan Party (POD), revealed the willingness of the right to use sub- version as a poli heal weapon. Military support of Wessin, who was exiled on 4 July, appeared to consist mainly of scattered groups of sympathizers among the rank and file rather than within the officer corps of the military, however. The military has a history of political involvement. Factionalism has often led to tension and, in 1965, even to armed conflict between military factions. But President Balaguer, by regularly shifting high ranking military and police officers before they can form power bases of their own, has so far kept military support of the government essentially intact. As long as the government retains the loyalty of a united military, danger of a successful coup from either the right or the left is minimal. Dominican Republic IV - 2 Mar 72 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X6 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 S3 3O4 CI3 WHY Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 25X1 25-X1 Approved For ReleaWMC84.12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 VI. ARMED FORCES The Dominican military establishment consists of a 10,174-man army, a 3,194-man navy, a 2,925-man air force, and an 8,636-man National Police Force. The president of the republic is the commander in chief of the armed forces, acting through the secretary of state for the armed forces, who may be either a military officer or a civilian. The chiefs of staff of the army, navy, and air force are appointed by the president, ostensibly upon the advice of the secretary of state. The individual services are organized on the traditional military staff pattern of five sections: personnel, intelligence, operations and training, logistics, and civil affairs. The national police chief is appointed by the president. The formal missions of the armed forces are defense of the republic, defense of the constitution and laws, maintenance of public order, and the promotion of social and economic development through civic action pro- grams. The army grew out of the national constabulary organized by US military authorities during the US occupation of 1916-24, and it still functions more as a civil guard than as a typical military organization. The armed forces, as long as they are themselves united, are capable of maintain- ing public order against threats from political extremists, and, in combina- tion with the National Police, could handle serious civil disturbances. The Dominican military is superior to that of its traditional enemy Haiti and could repel a Haitian attack. But it could not defend the country against attack by a modern force comparable in size to the Dominican forces. The army's over-all technical capability to perform its mission of territorial defense and maintenance of internal security has improved as a result of the US Military Assistance Program. Collaboration between the military services has traditionally been poor, and the Joint General Staff has failed to function effectively. A new secretary of state for the armed forces was appointed in July 1970 and has indicated interest in improving the performance of the staff. The Operations Center of the Armed Forces, created in 1970 as a joint organization with directive authority, has not fulfilled expectations. Dominican Republic SECRE Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 200Militici4-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 There is no central control of the logistics system. Military personnel in logistics positions are frequently transferred in an effort to control graft in the procurement system, a procedure which prevents the development of a professional Quartermaster Corps. Because of the heterogeneous supplies and equipment and the tendency to supply on an as-needed rather than on a planned basis, the armed forces' logistics system is haphazard and inefficient. No munitions have been produced in the Dominican Republic since 1964. The country depends on the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada and Western Europe for military equipment. The army has a large but unstandardized supply of small arms and ammunition. Artillery and armor are old. Dominican ships and equipment are mostly obsolete, and, except for two fleet minesweepers and three 85-foot Sewart motor gunboats acquired since 1965 from the US and some service craft, the navy's ships are old and in fair-to-poor condition. As of June 1971, the air force's inventory stood at 59 aircraft, 38 of which were operational. Military budget From 1963 to 1966, military expenditures averaged about 18% of the national budget, but President Balaguer's first term austerity program and his determination to reduce military spending to more manageable proportions have had a degree of success. For the fiscal year ending December 1971, 12% of the national budget was allocated to the military (US$32,392,978). Manpower The military manpower potential of the Dominican Republic was estimated in January 1971 at about 1,014,400 males between the ages of 15 and 49 of whom three fifths were considered fit for military service. Men between the ages of 18 and 54 are subject to conscription, but volunteers have supplied the needs of all services for many years. Military service is popular among the young men of the lower classes because it ensures relatively high and steady wages, regular meals, health services, and other benefits. A commission in the armed forces is a means of social advancement for young middle-class males. Enlistments are for an indefinite period and may be ended at the enlistee's discretion. There is no formal reserve organization. Military personnel are generally in good physical con- dition. Advanced military training is hampered by the generally poor educa- tional level of most of the personnel, officers included. Discipline is generally good. Dominican Republic VI - 2 bk,UKE.1 Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/VEGREIVIRDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Preoccupation with its political role has prevented the Dominican military from attaining much professionalism. Many high-ranking officers owe their success to loyalty to the regime rather than professional excel- lence. Mainly to prevent repetition of the politically motivated split that resulted in the civil war in 1965, efforts to professionalize the military have been made. Younger middle-grade officers who are better prepared tech- nically for their jobs are discontented, but their discontent springs mainly from frustrated ambition rather than from political disagreement with the administration's policies. Since the discovery that the antigovernment plotting by former General Elias VVessin y VVessin drew some support from the ranks, President Balaguer has sought to satisfy some of the grievances of the enlisted men in order to reinforce their loyalty to the administration and insulate them from blan- dishments of politically ambitious military officers. Four sections, J-2, G-2, M-2 and A-2, responsible respectively to the secretary of state for the armed forces, the Army General Staff, the Naval General Staff, and the Air Force General Staff have the following respon- sibilities: J-2: The staff of 15 to 20 officers and enlisted men drawn mostly from air force personnel are responsible for monitoring the activities of both military and non-military personnel who are opposed to the government; G-2: Three officers and 23 enlisted men are responsible for supporting the personal security of the president, monitoring and neutralizing leftist and Communist activities directed at army personnel and keeping tabs on anti- government activities generally; M-2: Five M-2 officers are stationed at consular posts abroad to deal with contraband and related matters. Fifty to 60 collaborators, all of whom are on active duty with the navy, and 13 port captains, also active duty naval officers, are responsible for assisting in providing personal security to the president, monitoring the activities of known Communists and antigovern- ment organizations, supporting anti-invasion and anticontraband recon- naissance patrols and performing limited counter-intelligence duties; A-2: The ten members of A-2 contribute to the president's security force, conduct background investigations on all air force recruits, and carry out limited counter-intelligence responsibilities. Dominican Republic VI -3 SECKE Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 SNOLLV131,1 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 200MIRECI14-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS The close relationship between the Dominican Republic and the United States dominates and, to a large extent, determines over-all Dominican foreign policy. The notable exception is Haiti, where a long tradition of suspicion and enmity heavily influences bilateral relations. Their common border has been closed for several years. The death of President Francois Duvalier in April 1971 alarmed Dominican authorities, but the smoothness of the transfer of power to Duvalier's son, President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier, allayed the Dominican Government's fears. President Balaguer has refuse() to permit Haitian exiles to use the Dominican Republic as a base for anti-Duvalier activities, and there has been a slight warming of the normally cool relations. Dominican interest on international issues, including hemispheric issues that do not bear directly on Dominican affairs, is minimal. Because the United States and Western Europe are the Dominican Republic's main tradIng partners? the country has had few economic ties with its Caribbean and South American neighbors. In 1969-70, the government became inter- ested in economic cooperation with Puerto Rico and members of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CAR IFTA), but difficulties with Puerto Rico have since dulled the attraction, and this aspect of trade will probably remain relatively minor for some time to come. Relations between the Dominican Republic and Cuba have been hostile since Fidel Casiro came to power in 1959. Successive Dominican govern- ments have given full support to OAS measures condemning and isolating Cuba and to US policy regarding Castro. The gradual growth of Latin American sentiment to recognize the Castro government has been coolly received by the Balaguer government, which considers that any such unilat- eral action on the part of OAS member nations would weaken inter-Amer- ican solidarity. The Dominican Republic does not maintain diplomatic relations with any Communist country but has exhibited interest in establishing commer- cial relations with some Eastern European countries. It has generally cordial relations with the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and other Western Euro- pean countries. It has economic ties to Japan and friendly relations with Nationalist China. Dominican Republic Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 200M3Rit1k-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Dominican governments have shown little interest in the United Na- tions and have regularly followed US initiatives. The Balaguer government is somewhat wary (31 the UN because of the support the constitutionalists found there during the 1965 civil war. In hemispheric affairs, President Balaguer believes that the OAS takes precedence over the UN. Dominican Republic VII -2 _,U.K.t. Mar '72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 S1S3t13.LNI Sn Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 200108),RECfrA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 VIII. US INTERESTS Since the 1965 civil war, the United States has authorized economic aid in the torm of loans and grants to the Dominican Republic totaling $338 million ($92 per capita), of which $287 million have been disbursed. In addition, special sugar quota allocations have raised Dominican sugar sales to the US. Most of the country's gain in export earnings has resulted from these sales. The US is the country's most important trading partner, buying nearly 80% of its exports and providing 55% of its imports. US private investment in the Dominican Republic in 1970 was estimated at about $170 million. Major US firms having interests in the Dominican Republic are the Alumi- num Company of America (ALCOA), Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., and American Can Company. Chase Manhattan Bank, First National City Bank of New York, and the Bank of America are all represented in the Dominican Republic. Since 1962, the Dominican Republic has had a bilateral military assist- ance agreement with the United States, and Washington has supplied about $19 million in loans and grants. The Dominican Republic is a signatory to the Rio Pact and is a member of the Inter-American Defense Board. Dominican Republic Mar 72 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/0g4ZjJaspDP79-00891A001100070001-4 IX. CHRONOLOGY AND TABULAR DATA Chronology of Key Events 1821 Dominican Republic proclaims independence from Spain. 1822-1844 Period of Haitian occupation. 1844-1861 Independence. 1861-1865 Period of Spanish rule. 1916-1924 US military occupy Dominican Republic. 1930 Rafael Trujillo begins 31-year rule. 1937 Massacre of thousands of Haitian squatters by Dominican army. 1959 (June) Abortive anti-Trujillo invasion launched from Cuba with Castro support. 1960 (August) OAS votes sanctions against Dominican Govern- ment for plotting assassination of Venezuelan President Betancourt. US and other hemispheric governments break diplomatic relations with Trujillo regime. 1961 (May) Trujillo assassinated. (November) US fleet supports President Balaguer; Trujillo leaves country. 1962 (January) Balaguer forms Council of State, OAS removes sanctions, US resumes diplomatic relations. (16-18 January) General Rafael Rodriguez Echavarria leads a short-lived coup. Council of State regains control with Rafael BonneIly as President and in September announces presi- dential elections scheduled for December 20. (20 December) Juan Bosch elected President. 1963 (25 September) Armed forces leaders oust Bosch and install provisional civilian triumvirate; US suspends relations and aid. Dominican Republic Mar 72 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/0A1CMAIRDP79-00891A001100070001-4 (14 December) US recognizes Dominican Government. 1965 (24-25 April) Revolt by pro-Bosch military officers results in overthrow of Triumvirate and precipitates civil war. (28 April) US Marines land to evacuate US and third-country nationals and restore order. (6 May) OAS votes to establish Inter-American Peace Force (1APF) in the Dominican Republic. (31 August) Civil war officially ended as opposing forces sign Act of Reconciliation and Institutional Act, negotiated by OAS ad hoc Committee. (3 September) Hector Garcia Godoy takes office as provi- sional president, later schedules presidential elections for 1 June 1968. 1966 (1 June) Joaquin Balaguer is elected president, receiving 57% of the vote to Bosch's 39%. (1 July) Balaguer is inaugurated and the provisional govern- ment officially ends. (20-21 September) Last IAPF troops depart, ending 90-day phase-out. 1967 (31 August) Balaguer closes Haitian-Dominican border, bring- ing relations to low ebb. 1968 (16 May) Municipal elections; Reformist Party wins 66 municipalities, Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC) 2, and Independents 9. 1970 (24 March) US air attache kidnaped (subsequently released in exchange for release of 20 political prisoners). (16 May) Balaguer elected to second term with a 57% ma- jority. Balaguer's supporters also won 26 of the 27 Senate seats, 60 of the 74 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 75 of the 77 mayoralties. (16 August) Balaguer inaugurated. 1971 (30 June) Balaguer publicly denounces former General Wessin y VVessin for coup-plotting; Wessin is exiled to Spain i he following day. Dominican Republic IX - 2 Mar 72 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/61/ORTARDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 TABULAR DATA Holidays and Significant Dates 1 January New Year's Day (Official Holiday) 6 January Epiphany 21 January Altagracia Day (Official Holiday) 26 January Duarte Day (Official Holiday) 27 February Independence Day and Flag Day (Official Holiday) 19 March St. Joseph's Day March-June Movable religious observances: Holy Thurs- day, Good Friday (Official Holiday) Ascen- sion, and Corpus Christi (Official Holiday) 24 April Civil War (1965) 1 May Labor Day 31 May Trujillo assassinated (1961) 14 June Abortive Cuban-sponsored invasion (1959) 29 June Feast of St. Peter and St. Paul 15 August Crowning of Our Lady of Altagracia 16 August Restoration of Independence (Official Holi- day) 20 September IAPF departed 24 September Feast of Our Lady of Los Mercedes (Official Holiday) 12 October Columbus Day 24 October UN Day 1 November All Saints' Day 25 November Death of Mirabel Sisters (1960) 8 December Immaculate Conception 19 December Hotel Matus incident 25 December Christmas (Official Holiday) Selected Factual Data LAND Area: 18,800 sq. miles; 14% cultivated, 4% fallow, 17% pasture, 45% forest, and 20% built-on or waste PEOPLE Population: 4,128,000 (Jan. 1971 est); density, 220 per square mile; Dominican Republic IX - 3 Mar 72 25X1 SF,CRE'l' Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/0i#HCDP79-00891A001100070001-4 males 15-49, 1,014,000, approximately 61% are fit for military service; 51,000 reach military age (18) annually Ethnic composition: 73% mulatto; 11% Negro; 16% white Language: Spanish Religion: 95% nominally Roman Catholic Literacy: 35% to 40% of adult population GOVERNMENT Unitary republic; constitutional democracy; President, 27 member Senate, and 74 member Chamber of Deputies, elected by direct popular vote every 4 years; 26 provinces and a National District Political parties: Reformist Party (PR); Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD); Anti-reelection Democratic Integration Movement (MIDA); Revolu- tionary Social Christian Party (PRSC); Democratic Quisqueyan Party (POD). Leftist parties: 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4); Dominican Popular Movement (MPD); Dominican Communist Party (PCD); Communist Party of the Dominican Republic (PCRD). Voting strength in May 1970 general elections: PR-57%; MIDA-21%; PQD-14%; PRSC-5%; National Conciliation Movement (MCN)-3%; PR [)---abstained Suffrage: Obligatory for all citizens over 18 years of age and all married citizers regardless of age. Military and police personnel deprived of vote Next scheduled elections: general elections in 1974 Member of United Nations and Organization of American States ECONOMY GNP: $1.5 billion (purchasing power parity estimate, 1970); $360 per capita, real growth rate 1970, 6.6% Cost-of-living: 5% increase in 1970 Agriculture: sugar, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, rice Food: generally not self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs, except rice and beef; more than 15% of imports are foodstuffs including wheat, peanuts, beans, and dairy products Major industries: agricultural processing, particularly sugar milling; manufacturing light consumer goods, including beverages, tobacco, textiles; building materials, including cement Critical shortages: petroleum products, industrial raw materials, capital equipment Electric power: 254,000 kw capacity (1970 estimated); 710 million kw-hr produced 1970; 175 kw-hr per capita Dominican Republic IX - 4 Mar 72 SEC R E'1' Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/08Efaar-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Exports: $213.5 million (f.o.b. 1970); 48% sugar, 12% coffee, 9% cocoa, 6% tobacco, 7% bauxite, 18% other Imports: $306 million (c.i.f., 1970); foodstuff, capital and intermediate goods, petroleum products, pharmaceuticals and chemicals Exports to US: $167.8 million (1970), 79% of total Imports from US: $116.4 million (1969 estimate), 55% of total Trade/aid: unfavorable trade account, balanced by inflows of private and official capital in 1970. Economic aid authorizations (FY1946-70) from US: $198.8 million in grants; $257.4 million in loans; from international organizations: $82.2 million Exchange rate: RD$1=US$1 COMMUNICATIONS Railroads: 1,000 route miles; 65 miles of government-owned 3'6" gage and 935 miles of privately owned lines, mostly 2'6" gage Highways: about 6,000 miles; 3,000 miles of concrete or bituminous, 800 miles of gravel, 1,400 miles of improved earth, and 800 miles of unimproved earth Ports: 5 major ports, Santo Domingo is most important; 17 minor ports Merchant marine: 3 cargo ships (1,000 g.r.t. or over) totaling 6,147 g.r.t. or about 8,073 d.w.t. C:ivil air: 13 major transport aircraft, 9 of which are operational Airfields: 25 usable airfields, 9 with hard-surfaced runways; 22 former airfield sites; 1 seaplane station Telecommunications: domestic system based on islandwide radio-relay netvvork; 40,200 telephones and 400,400 radio receivers and about 1,250,000 TV viewers; 92 AM, 24 FM, and 6 TV stations; 2 submarine cables DEFENSE FORCES Personnel: total 16,293, army 10,174, navy 3,194, air force 2,925 (including 1,500 ground forces and paratroopers) Major ground force units: 3 infantry brigades and 19 battalions (11 infantry, 1 presidential guard, 1 military police, 1 armored, 1 artillery, 1 engineer, 1 ordnance, 1 transport and 1 communications) Aircraft: total 59; 6 jet, 40 prop, and 13 helos Ships: total 38; 3 patrol escorts (plus 2 inactive), 3 large submarine chasers, 1 submarine chaser, 4 motor gunboats, 2 fleet minesweepers, 1 medium landing ship, 2 utility landing craft, 4 auxiliaries, 16 service craft Military budget: 12% of 1970 national budget Dominican Republic IX - 5 Mar 72 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/M1C:ft MkDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Military Assistance Program: 1962-1970, approximately $18 million; fiscal year 1971: $1.065 million RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES Resident diplomatic consular and commercial missions: none Trade: negligible National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Material The following sections of the NIS are relevant: NIS Area 80 (Dominican Republic) GENERAL SURVEY (August, 1971) and the following specialized sections: Sec 21 Military Geographic Regions (August 1964) Sec 22 Coasts and Landing Beaches (May 1963) Sec 23 Weather and Climate (July 1963) Sec 23S Meteorological Organization and Facilities (March 1968) Sec 24 Topography (January 1964) Sec 25 Urban Areas (July 1964) Sec 32 Highway (June 1963) Sec 35 Ports and Naval Facilities (October 1962) Sec 41 Population (December 1968) Sec 42 Characteristics of the People (March 1966) Sec 43 Religion, Education, and Public Information (July 1965) Sec 44 Manpower (July 1965) Sec 45 Health and Sanitation (August 1963) Sec 57 Subversion and Insurgency (May 1967) Sec 61 Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry (July 1964) Gazetteer (March 1957) Map The best available reference map is: Esso Standard Oil S.A., Ltd.; Mapa de la Republica Dominicana; 1:678,000; 1963. Dominican Republic IX -6 S.EU_KE1' Mar 72 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 25X1 25X1B 25X1 ntecristi Puerta Plata POPULATION ANTO DOMINGO Persons per square mile 0 100 Fa? ? 1 200 400 600 800 309 0 39 77 /54 232 Persons per square kilometer Data from 1960 census Ma Mandel Approv LAND UTILIZATION PwCIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 SANTO DOMINGO 171 Cropland I !Cropland and pasture (mixed ' with forest, savanna, and scrub) I-1 Forest Scrub forest and thorn bush Savanna (some pasture and cropland) Swamp or marsh ECONOMIC ACTIVITY PRINCIPAL ZONES OF CULTIVATION Sugarcane Coffee Cocoa Rice Tobacco I Sugar milling 11 Textile mill 10 Tobacco factory gg Steel plant an Padre s de Macon, SANTO D. INGO g Cement plant IM Paper factory Fertilizer plant Cattle Bauxite Nickel International boundary Provincia boundary National capital Provincia capital Railroad Surfaced road Unsurfaced road Airfield Major port Populated places 0 Over 25,000 o 5,000 to 25,000 ? Under 5,000 Cabrera BAHL,' DE SAYIANA: ALTO 'SAND .Pedro SMchei] EuLsE1BO - Hato Mayor? Azua , BA IIIA DE OCOA DIST RI TO La Victoria ? Villa on. Mella. 01" ACIONALe Arroyo. Hondo SANTO aina DOMINGO Boca de Yum PUNTA SANTANILLA Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4