AFGHANISTAN HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00891A001300050001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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ARNINC
document contains information affecting the national
?nse of the United States, within the meaning of Title
, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
ansmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law,
Exempt from general declassification sched-
ide of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
58(i),(2),(3)
Automatically declassified on
approval of DCI
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INTRODUCTION
1. GEOGRAPHY
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Ill. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
W. SUBVERSION
V. LEADING PERSONALITIES
VI. ARMED FORCES
VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
VIII. US INTERESTS
Afghanistan
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Afghanistan is a fiercely independent, underdeveloped nation, which is
still fairly isolated from the rest of the world. Despite basic conservatism and
Islamic and tribal traditionalism, the government is slowly modernizing the
economy and political and social institutions. In foreign policy, Kabul has
usually taken a neutral position. This does not prevent the government,
however, from attempting to play the great powers, including its huge
neighbor to the north, against each other.
Afghanistan
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I. GEOGRAPHY
Afghanistan, a landlocked country, is bordered on the north by the
USSR, on the west by Iran, on the south and east by Pakistan, and has a
short border in the northeast with China.- Its area is about 250,000 square
miles with a maximum northeast-southwest extent of about 950 miles and a
maximum northwest-southeast extent of about 500 miles. About 70% of the
area consists of rugged mountains (the most important of which are the
Hindu Kush) and hills. Both north and southwest are arid plains. Afghanistan
has hot dry summers and moderate, less dry winters. Annual precipitation is
less than 15 inches in most of the country.
There are several significant-but so far largely unexploited-deposits of
iron ore, plentiful coal deposits, and natural gas deposits estimated at nearly
300 billion cubic meters.
Estimates vary by as much as two or three million, but the government
estimates the population at about 17 million. Density is heaviest in the
northeast and along the northern border. The major ethnic groups are
Caucasian Pushtuns (up to 50% of the population) and Tajiks (25%), the
Mongoloid Hazaras (9%) and the mixed Uzbeks (9%). About 87% of the
population are Sunni Muslims and 12% Shia Muslims. The remainder of the
population belongs to smaller branches of Islam, or are Sikhs, Hindus,
Christians or Jews.
Pushtun is spoken as a native tongue by about half of the population
(primarily Pathans) and Dari, a dialect of Persian by about 35%, including
the Tajiks and Uzbeks.
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Economic growth in the past decade has been about 2% annually,
roughly the same as the population growth. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in 1970 was about $1 billion, or below $100 per capita.
Agriculture and nomadic herding provide the livelihood for about 80%
of the population and account for about half the GDP. Modern industry
contributes only two to three percent.
Afghanistan has 1,400 miles of modern highways, but parts of the
country have virtually no roads, and all but the main highways are primitive.
The only important navigable waterway is the Amu Darya on the northern
border. Both airlines-Ariana Afghan Airlines, an international carrier, and
Bakhtar Airlines, a domestic service, that is considered unsafe by US offi-
cials-are government owned, as are the country's underdeveloped tele-
communications systems. There is no rail system.
Over-all economic policy is carried out through a series of five-year
plans, the fourth of which was to begin in March 1972 with projected
expenditures of over $300 million for development. The plans have been
directed almost exclusively at the public sector. The USSR has been the
largest contributor.
Afghanistan usually exports only about two thirds as much as it
imports. More than half its imports in the past decade have been financed
through foreign aid. The USSR is its major trading partner, but India, the
UK, US, West Germany, and Japan are also important. Major exports are
fruits and nuts, Karakul skins, and natural gas. Afghanistan's opium produc-
tion-all illegal-was about 100 tons in 1971.
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Despite both British and Russian attempts to extend their influence,
Afghanistan has maintained its independence since 1747. The Mohammadzai
Dynasty has ruled the country since 1818. The branch now reigning came to
power in 1929. Although Zahir Shah became king in 1933, the country was
actually governed by his uncles until 1953 and then by his cousin,
Mohammad Daud, from 1953 to 1963. In 1963, the King dismissed Daud
and began an "experiment in democracy."
Under the 1964 constitution, the King has extensive powers, and
although he prefers to remain aloof from everyday affairs, he is the domi-
nant figure in the government. The prime minister appointed by the King
and the cabinet administer the day-to-day operations of the government.
The efficiency of the various ministries is seriously impaired by wide-
spread inefficiency, overcentralization of decision making, inter-and intra-
ministerial disputes, and the limited education of most civil servants.
Significant progress has been made toward implementing the constitu-
tional provisions for a multi-tiered court system headed by a supreme court
with both judicial and administrative responsibilities. The Afghan judicial
system, however, is still susceptible to bribery and political pressure. The
legal code is based on the Sharia law derived from the Koran, with some
infusion of Western legal concepts.
The Parliament (Shura) is bicameral. The lower house (Wolesi Jirga-
People's Council) consists of 216 members elected for four-year terms. It is
the more powerful branch of the legislature, with powers to remove the
cabinet. In case of disagreements with the upper house over legislation, its
bills take precedence. The lower house has grown increasingly important in
Afghan politics, although it is still hampered by lack of experience, the
absence of internal political organization, and a quorum requirement of two
thirds of the membership that often delays sessions.
The upper house (Meshrano Jirga-Council of Elders) wil consist of 84
members, a third appointed by the king for five-year terms, a third directly
elected for four-year terms, and a third to be elected by provincial coun-
cils-which have not yet been established-for three-year terms.
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The Grand Assembly (Loya Jirga), which has the power to amend the
constitution and has traditionally approved the most important policy deci-
sions, is viewed by some as the ultimate political power in Afghanistan, but
it meets only rarely-the last time in 1964, to approve the constitution. It is
composed of members of both houses of parliament. When the provincial
councils are established, their chairmen will also be included.
Afghanistan's 28 provinces (waliyats) are ruled by governors (walis)
appointed by the King. The provincial councils will perform as local legisla-
tures when they are formed.
The policies of the government are influenced by the tribes, which want
a minimum of central government interference in their affairs; and to a
lesser extent by leftist students and ultra-conservative religious leaders. The
support of the military, of course, is essential for the monarchy's survivial.
Each ethnic group usually shows some degree of unity on issues that directly
affect its interests; for example, Dari speakers have opposed measures de-
signed to enhance the status of Pushtun. On the whole, there are no well
organized pressure groups which have tried to move the government toward
any particular policy. Although no official political parties exist, informal
political groupings-most of them student-based-are becoming more active.
All Afghans 20 and older, except the military and security forces and
members of the Supreme Court are eligible to vote. Turnout in elections has
been light, and malpractices have been widespread.
The National Police (about 11,000 men) and the paramilitary Royal
Gendarmerie (14,200)-both subordinate to the Ministry of Interior-are
officially responsible for law and order. Despite corruption and lack of
training and equipment, they have usually been able to cope with disorders.
Nevertheless, internal security ultimately depends on the military (see Sec-
tion V 0.
The principal civilian intelligence organization, the Department of Na-
tional Protection, reports directly to the Prime Minister, and is concerned
primarily with domestic subversion.
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IV. SUBVERSION
The hard core membership of Afghan Communist groups numbers only
a few hundred, and is divided into several competing organizations. The two
most important-Parcham and Khalq-are pro-Soviet; several smaller groups
lean toward the Chinese. Although Moscow and Peking probably give some
help to local Communists, current Soviet policy objectives preclude en-
couraging anti-government activity, and Peking's influence is minimal. Much
of the Communist following comes from students.
There are a number of potentially subversive non-Communist groups.
Although former Prime Minister Daud still entertains hopes of returning to
power, he probably lacks the following to be a serious threat to the
government. Conservative religious leaders have on occasion caused con-
siderable civil disorder in their efforts to prevent modernization, but their
influence is declining. The military is loyal to the monarchy.
The Pathan tribes have played a major role in Afghan politics and could
pose a serious threat to the government. There appears to be no issue likely
to unite the tribes against the monarchy, and if such an issue should appear,
the government-itself dominated by Pathans-would be more likely to
accommodate the tribes than oppose them. In the past, Pakistan has directed
a good deal of propaganda at the tribes, but it was primarily trying to
discourage their involvement in Pakistan's Pathan areas. India's clandestine
contacts with tribal leaders have been directed against Pakistan not
Afghanistan.
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Mohammad Zahir, King of Afghanistan: Zahir, born in 1914, became
king in 1933 when his father was assassinated. In 1963, Zahir, hoping to
avoid the upheavals that have occurred in other developing nations, began his
experiment in democracy. Although considerable power has been given to
parliament and the prime ministers, the King continues to dominate the
government and makes all important decisions.
Ahmed Shah, Crown Prince: Many Afghans consider Ahmed Shah,
born in 1934, as incompetent, and even though he is being groomed to
succeed his father, he could be replaced by one of his brothers or become
the figurehead for a group of politicians or soldiers.
Brigadier Abdul Wali Khan, Commander Central Forces Corps: Prince
Abdul Wali, the King's cousin and son-in-law, may be the second most
important person in the country. Born about 1925, he has strong support in
the military, is close to the King, and when the King dies could well become
the real ruler of Afghanistan.
Abdul Zahir, Prime Minister: Dr. Zahir, who became prime minister in
1971, at first gave promise of reducing the animosity between parliament
and the executive. He has encountered major difficulties with the lower
house, however, and has been unable or unwilling to deal with the en-
trenched incompetence and corruption in the government. He will probably
be replaced before the end of the year.
Mohammad Musa Shafiq, Foreign Minister: Shafiq, reportedly a highly
intelligent and ambitious man, is expected to succeed Prime Minister Zahir.
In September 1972 he took over most functions of that office. As foreign
minister, Shafiq has attempted to make Afghanistan's foreign policy more
activist, without changing its basic neutralism.
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The Afghan armed forces would be unable to halt a full-scale invasion
by any of the country's neighbors, but, barring a well organized tribal
rebellion (which would test army loyalties in any case), they are capable of
maintaining order domestically. Although the Afghans have received large
amounts of Soviet materiel, they do not have the capability to use the
equipment effectively.
The army's 68,700 men are organized into three corps with some
independent divisions. There are 10 infantry divisions, three armored divi-
sions, and several independent brigades. (Afghan units are considerably
smaller than those of neighboring countries; for example, an Afghan division
is roughly equivalent to a Pakistani brigade.)
The Air Defense Force of 8,100 men (including 5,300 army personnel
not counted above) consists of army radar and anti-aircraft units and the
Royal Afghan Air Force. The air force has over 230 aircraft, including SU-7
and MIG-21 jet fighters and IL-28 light bombers. Poor maintenance of
equipment and a lack of training severely limit the effectiveness of the air
force.
The bulk of the army is stationed near the Pakistan border, because
Pakistan is seen as the major military threat and also because most of the
potentially dissident tribes live in this area.
The military budget-excluding funds for the gendarmerie-for the
fiscal year ending 21 March 1971 was almost $29 million, or nearly 20% of
the total budget and 2.9% of the GNP.
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The Soviet Union supplies almost all of Afghanistan's military aid and is
the largest source of economic aid-about $700 million so far. It is also
Afghanistan's major trading partner. As a result, Afghanistan has been
careful to avoid positions and actions that would offend Moscow. The USSR
appears content to follow a policy designed to deny any third country great
influence in Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the Soviets are attempt-
ing either to dictate policies to Kabul or to establish a Communist govern-
ment there.
The Afghans have consistently tried to offset the influence of one great
power with that of others. Most Afghans see the US as a counterweight to
the USSR. The Afghans have long had close relations with Germany, and the
West Germans have more influence in Afghanistan than in most Asian
countries.
Although they share a common border, Afghanistan had few contacts
with China until the mid-1960s. In a move to offset Soviet influence,
however, the Chinese have since extended grants and credits totaling $72
million.
Afghanistan's most serious foreign policy dispute has been with
Pakistan over Pushtunistan, the area of Pakistan inhabited by the Pathans
which is sometimes extended to include Baluchi areas as well. Over the years,
Afghan demands have ranged from outright independence for these areas to
greater autonomy for them within Pakistan-the government's current posi-
tion. I n the early 1960s, the issue led to very tense relations between the two
countries, but since then the Afghans appear to have recognized that they
are incapable of putting much pressure on Islamabad. Not only is Afghanis-
tan militarily no match for Pakistan, but a substantial part of Afghanistan's
foreign trade must pass through Pakistan.
Afghanistan and Iran have had difficulties over the distribution of the
waters of the Helmand and other rivers shared by the two countries. After
years of sporadic negotiation, the issue now appears to be approaching
settlement.
The Afghans have viewed India as a counterweight to Pakistan and took
no active part in any of the Indo-Pakistani wars. In the wake of the Indian
victory in December 1971, however, some Afghans are beginning to think of
India more as a potential threat than a protector.
Afghanistan has consistently backed the Arabs against Israel, but on
most questions the main objective of its foreign policy has been to offend
neither its neighbors nor the great powers.
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Afghanistan is interested in good relations with the US, primarily as a
means of offsetting Soviet influence in Afghanistan.
The US has no defense commitment to Afghanistan, but does train
about 20 Afghan military men in the US every year. The US is the second
largest aid donor to Afghanistan-after the USSR-having supplied a total of
over $400 million in loans and grants since 1959. US business investments
are about $350,000 or 5% of foreign investment in the country. The value of
annual Afghan exports to the US varies widely, sometimes amounting to over
$10 million. Imports from the US generally run a little more than $10
million.
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