CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000100100001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 7, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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7 August 1953
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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STATE review(s) completed.
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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
THE SOVIET WORLD o, o a a o o e o n o 0 0, a o 0 o d Page 4
SOVIET NOTE ASKS BROAD CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
T E N S I O N..... o a o a a o o a o o a o 0 o a o o s o Page 6
In its acceptance, with reservations, of the Western
powers' request for a foreign ministers' meeting on
Germany and Austria, the Soviet Union made it appear that
it at least desired to broaden the conference agenda to
include measures for reducing international tensions.
SOVIET MANEUVERABILITY ON GERMANY LIMITED o e o 0 o Page 8
The Soviet note of 4 August underlines the USSR's
policy of maintaining its position in East Germany
while applying the flexible tactics of the conciliatory
policy to the strategy of weakening West Germany's
contribution to Western strength.
EFFECTS OF A KOREAN TRUCE ON OTHER FAR EASTERN
PROBLEMS o o? a o a o e o o, o o, o 0 0 0 Page 11
A truce in Korea will enable Peiping to strengthen
itself at home, and will enhance its capabilities to
make trouble elsewhere. It will also lead to pressure
in the Far East for closer political and economic rela-
tions with Communist China.
POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN IRAN o 0 0 o a o , a , 4 , o , , Page 13
Approval of Mossadeq's unconstitutional plan to
dissolve the present Majlis is expected in the nation-
wide referendum being held in Iran. General elections
are then to follow, but there probably will be consider-
able delay.
PRESIDENT QUIRINO'S ILLNESS COMPLICATES PHILIPPINE
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN o a. o 0 0,, o, o, o Page 15
The critical question for next November's Philippine
presidential election is still whether the voters are to
be permitted a free choice. Meanwhile, the three-cornered
campaign has been considerably complicated by the pre-
carious state of President Quirino's health.
r.XTIAL~
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NATURE AND EXTENT OF PROBABLE SATELLITE INTERNAL
CONCESSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
The continuing modifications of Satellite internal
policies indicates that the conciliatory measures, first
noted in East Germany in early dune, will be pursued
despite initial difficulties.
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THE SOVIET WORLD
The Soviet Union expressed definite reservations in its
4 August note answering the 15 July invitation of the three
Western powers for a foreign ministers meeting on Germany and
Austria. The USSR proposes to broaden the conference agenda
to include "measures for the lessening of tension in inter-
national relations." It also makes an appeal for giving
Communist China an equal voice in any big-power deliberation,
alleging that the United Nations charter grants China this
coequal responsibility.
At the same time, statements by a Soviet official at the
UN suggest that the USSR may wish to avoid participating
directly in the political conference called for by the Korean
armistice agreement. Soviet delegate Tsarapkin, in conver-
sations on 31 July at the UN, cited the paragraph of the truce
agreement calling for the political conference and pointed
out that it called for a conference "of both sides," He
indicated his inability to understand the belief among UN
delegates that the General Assembly had the specific respon-
sibility for naming participants for the conference.
A few days earlier, however, Tsarapkin had commented
that should the USSR participate, there would have to be a
larger membership and "some kind of voting procedure." This
alternative probably referred to a conference along the lines
of a Soviet UN resolution of 3 December 1952 calling for an
11-member commission, including the big four, Communist China,
and North and South Korea, in which the Communist members
would exercise a virtual veto,
Tsarapkin's subsequent expressions apparently reflect
later instructions to express a preference for a limited
conference along the lines of the Panmunjom negotiations,
The Kremlin may consider that overt participation in the
conference would have disadvantages overbalancing the propa-
ganda opportunities of the forum and that it can better
exploit differences among the non-Communist powers over
broader Far Eastern questions from a flexible behind-the-scene
position.
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The appointment of Gen. Nam I1, who holds dual Soviet-
North Korean citizenship, as North Korean foreign minister
gives Moscow a spokesman of proven reliability and effective-
ness and indicates the importance it attaches to North Korea's
role in the political conference, The status of representa-
tives of the Chinese People's "volunteers" in a conference
"of both sides" is not clear, although Chinese insistence on
direct representation seems likely.
Moscow will strongly back probable early Communist
demands for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea,
which Peiping radio described on 2 August as "a decisive pre-
condition for the peaceful settlement" of the Korean question.
The USSR's alliance with Communist China will also require
it to support, behind the scenes, China's demands concerning
the UN and Formosa which may be advanced at a later stage.
A forthcoming Soviet policy to rehabilitate North Korea
is shown by Malenkov's and Molotov's promises of assistance.
Communist China and Poland have also passed measures to send
"machinery, installations, and other materials and technical
aid." Continued Communist aid to North Korea apparently is
designed to match promised US and UN economic aid to South
Korea,
In Germany, after nearly a week of limited attempts to
intimidate Germans getting food in West Berlin, the East
German authorities suddenly stopped the sale of rail tickets
to Berlin, effectively isolating the city from the Soviet
zones It was also reported that the seizure of food and
identity cards had been stepped up, to prevent East Berliners
from getting food. These stricter measures may be a reflec-
tion of stronger Communist party control as a result of the
reorganization on 27 July of East Germany?s Socialist Unity
Party.
The intensive propaganda campaign against the food
offer appeared to have been a_complete failure, Reports of
new strikes and riots again faced Communist authorities with
the choice of maintaining order through the most rigid
security controls, possibly including direct Soviet assistance,
or making new concessions in an attempt to undercut popular
resistance.
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SOVIET NOTE ASKS BROAD CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS
The Soviet Union's note of 4 August accepted with
definite reservations the 15 July request of the three West-
ern powers for a foreign ministers' meeting on Germany and
Austria. It appears that the USSR at least desires to
broaden the conference agenda to include "measures for the
lessening of tension in international relations."
On Germany, the USSR is ready for an all-inclusive
discussion of "the German question, including the problem
of the restoration of German unity and the conclusion of a
peace treaty," but without the embarrassing precondition of
discussing tree elections. The Austrian problem is subor-
dinated, but tied to that of Germany with the assertion
that "it goes without saying" that settlement of the German
problem could also contribute toward an Austrian treaty.
The USSR suggests that the composition of any group to
discuss the various outstanding international problems is
still open to question, In this respect an appeal is made
for giving Communist China representation in big-power
deliberations on the grounds that "serious current problems"
in Asia cannot be resolved without Chinese Communist par-
ticipation in the discussions.
Moreover, a reference to China's "legitimate rights in
all international affairs" suggests continued Soviet support
for Peiping's claims to China's UN seat and sovereignty over
Formosa. The note points out that ignoring the Chinese
People's Republic "would not be in the interests of main-
tenance and strengthening of peace and international
security," but it is not clearly specified that Peiping must
participate in discussions on Western Europe.
In its effort to broaden the agenda the USSR not only
asks for consideration of measures which would promote a
general lessening of international tension, but adds the
issues of disarmament and "foreign military bases on the
territory of other states." The injection of the latter
issue will intensify existing irritations on this subject in
a number of countries from Denmark and Italy around to Japan
and South Korea.
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While agreeing to a discussion on Germany, the note
carefully points out that the present Allied position cannot
contribute to unification under an all-German democratic
government or to a peace treaty, and will leave Germany
divided. Characteristically, it passes over the problem
of free all-German elections,
The West Germans will probably regard the present note
as Moscow's "No" to German unification. Most West Germans
expected a note dealing in detail with the German problem;
instead, they will feel they have been given a curious
collection of generalities. This note will be regarded
as an evasion of the issue by both the Social Democrats, who
fervently desired the USSR to move ahead on unity, as well
as by Chancellor Adenauer's coalition followers who feared
that it might do so. The faint hope it holds out of German
unity is not likely to persuade the! many undecided German
voters to support the Social Democrats over Adenauer in the
6 September general election.
Austrian opinion will be greatly disappointed by the
subordination of their treaty problem to that of Germany.
In France, in view of the general pessimism regarding
the chances for an East-West detente following the dispatch
of the 15 July notes to the USSR, any Soviet tendency to
encourage talks could be expected to lead to insistence by
the French government that they be held. The Soviet call for
inclusion of Communist China will probably strengthen this
insistence. Both the French public and government have been
giving the highest priority to finding prompt means of
lightening the Indochina burden, and Foreign Minister Bidault
has reflected the eagerness of the press to see a general Far
Eastern settlement grow out of the prospective arrangements
on Korea. The Soviet emphasis on German unification natu-
rally tends to reduce the appeal of the note for the French,
The British government can be expected to recognize
fully the note's propagandistic character and divisive intent.
It is not likely to be under serious pressure from public
opinion to include Peiping in any early big-power talks,
despite the widespread British sentiment for eventually
considering the admission of Communist China to the United
Nations in connection with a general liar Eastern settlement.
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SOVIET MANEUVERABILITY ON GERMANY LIMITED
Soviet foreign policy suggests that the USSR will
attempt to maintain its position in East Germany while
applying the flexible tactics of its conciliatory policy to
its strategy of weakening West Germany's contribution to
Western strength. The Soviet note of 4 August underlines
this policy and there is no indication of any Soviet intention
to withdraw from Germany.
The Kremlin's repeated declarations in favor of a
unified Germany have apparently been intended primarily to
delay and confuse Allied attempts to integrate West Germany
effectively into a rearmed Western Europe.
Shifts in Soviet tactics towards Germany in the past
have largely appeared to be reactions to steps taken by the
Allies in building a strong West German government linked
with the West; for example
1. The development of Allied plans for a West German
government led to the Berlin blockade from June
1948 to June 1949.
2. The establishment and increasing integration of the
West German government into Western Europe was
matched by the creation of an East German regime
and its progressive Sovietization, beginning in the
fall of 1949.
3. Western initiatives toward West German participation
in European defense were countered by East German
proposals for all-German talks in the fall of 1951
and a barrage of Soviet notes in 1952, including
a peace treaty offer.
As progress toward EDC ratification has dragged, the
Kremlin has not found it necessary to make more acceptable
unification offers than those which the West has already
rejected. Nevertheless, some new offer has been expected,
designed to exploit the fall elections in Germany, the
indecision in various national legislatures on ratifying EDC9
and the popular hopes already aroused in Europe by the new
tactics of the Kremlin's peace offensive,
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The liberalization measures which began in East Germany
on 9 June, while probably motivated primarily by the need
of countering serious internal discontent, also appeared to
be the prelude to a new propaganda campaign for German
unification. The East German politburo announcement of the
first concessions said that their chief aim was the resto-
ration of German unity, a claim repeated in press and radio.
The 16 July demand of the East German government for
all-German talks on free elections and a peace treaty,
quickly supported by the official Soviet newspaper in
Germany, was a hackneyed proposition which had often been
rejected in West Germany. This remarkably weak bid failed
to undermine Adenauer since West Germans of all major parties
joined in attacking it.
The 22 July Pravda editorial which attacked the Western
foreign ministers' rms for a four-power meeting also failed
to offer anything new. It repeated the familiar line which
had been made clear in the note exchanges of 1952 and the
Pravda editorials of 25 April and 24 May of this year.
These various policy statements have outlined a Soviet
position which is basically inflexible on at least four
points and leaves little room for maneuver:
1. A big-power conference must be called to draw up a
peace treaty.
2. The treaty must recognize the present Oder-Neisse
boundary.
3. A united Germany must not be militarily allied with
the West.
4. Free elections can be discussed after a peace treaty
has been drawn up, but they cannot be subject to
the international supervision favored by the Western
powers.
The Soviet note of 4 August, in reply to the Western
foreign ministers' call for a four-power conference, does
not represent any change in this basic policy, and under-
lines the narrow limits within which the Soviet Union appears
ready to bargain. It repeats most of the criticisms of the
Western terms for a conference contained in the 22 July Pravda
editorial.
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The note does not mention the Oder-Neisse boundary, and
gives no hint of a changed position on this issue. While
it does not include a demand for German neutralism, it
attacks the remilitarization of Germany. It attacks the
Western plan for a discussion of free elections and suggests
an agenda on German unity and a peace treaty without any
mention of elections. It does not mention the East German
plan for preliminary all-German talks, and makes no reference
to Moscow's previous suggestions for some form of East and
West German representation at the talks.
The note may be followed by more tangible gestures to
show Soviet good faith and interest in a solution to the
German problem, such as an attractive trade offer to West
Germany, a return of prisoners of war, a.cut in reparations,
and the removal of occupation costs.
It gives even less attention than in the past to the
necessity for free elections, which is a firm Western demand.
The recent disturbances in the Soviet zone must have shown
the Kremlin more clearly than ever that free elections
would mean a crushing defeat of its puppet government in
East Germany. The Soviet position, therefore, remains weak
because it cannot long escape the basic issue of free
elections, which would undermine its position in Germany.
The firm grip of Soviet military power over East Germany
remains unshaken. Any Soviet withdrawal obviously resulting
from the pressure of popular unrest is unlikely, not only
because it would sacrifice the still-sizable stake in
Germany, but because it would shake Soviet prestige through-
out the Orbit to a dangerous degree.
West German rearmament would not yet appear to present
as great a threat to the Kremlin as would a united, non-
Communist Germany, which might eventually align itself with
the West. Under these circumstances, the USSR is unlikely
to sacrifice its power position in East Germany to any plan
for a unified Germany which would be acceptable to the West.
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EFFECTS OF A KOREAN TRUCE ON OTHER FAR EASTERN PROBLEMS
An effective truce in Korea, permitting reduction of the
Chinese Communist activity there, will enable Peiping to
strengthen itself at home and will enhance its capabilities for
making trouble elsewhere. The truce is expected also to reduce
awareness of the Communist threat in much of the Far East and to
lead to greater pressure in some quarters for closer political
and economic relations with Communist China.
The stated views of United Nations members indicate that
Peiping has no immediate prospect of occupying Taipei's UN seat.
These views also reflect, however, a widespread feeling that
Peiping should eventually be admitted, particularly if the
Chinese actions at the postarmistiLce political conference sug-
gest a genuine intention to remain peaceable. There are also
indications that some non-Communist states favor the neutrali-
zation of Formosa, possibly under a UN trusteeship.
As most Western countries have agreed to maintain their
economic sanctions against China for some time and Peiping must
continue to support its armies in Korea and Manchuria, no import-
ant changes in Peiping's economic circumstances seem immediately
in prospect. The large standing army will be a continuing prob-
lem for the regime. Many reports have suggested that the most
important long-range effect of a truce on Peiping may be the
diversion of some part of the Soviet military expenditure in
Korea to industrial aid for China.
Chinese Communist military strength in Korea will probably
remain unchanged at least until the question of the withdrawal
of foreign forces is settled in the political conference. The
present strength of Chinese air and ground units in the Korean
theater is likely in any case to be maintained in Manchuria.
Chinese Communist forces stationed near China's periphery
are currently capable of invading any or all areas of the South-
east Asia mainland and the Indian border without reinforcements
from Korea. The rotation of Soviet-equipped armies to these
points, which is under way, would enhance Peiping's capabilities
for such operations.
Nationalist China has been apprehensive of a Korean truce,
fearing a Communist attempt to discuss in the political confer-
ence China's UN seat and the status of Formosa. In view of
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Peiping's frequent suggestions that it will first explore
political means for extending its control over Formosa, an
early Communist military operation) against the island appears
unlikely. Moreover, it is generally believed that the Commu-
nists' naval weakness will continue to prevent an assault so
long as the US 7th Fleet is committed to the island's defense.
Japanese pronouncements have indicated that an effective
Korean truce will lead to a decline in Japanese awareness of the
Communist threat and thus to decreased official and
port for rearming Japan. Japan must find a substitute b for the
special economic support provided by UN military procurement.
There are indications that pressure will increase for political
and economic relations with Communist China, that resentment
over American bases in Japan will intensify, and that there will
be a stronger emphasis on economic rather than military aspects
of the mutual security agreement.
An increase in deliveries from Communist China to the Viet
Minh, averaging about 1,000 tons a month so far this year, seems
likely. The French also fear Chinese troop support of Ho Chi
Minh's forces, despite a lack of evidence of any preparations.
Some observers anticipate peace overtures from the Viet Minh in
an effort to disorganize French :City and split France and the.
United States. the possibility of a genuine
peace bid based a ommun st assumption that a referendum
under neutral auspices would result in a Viet Minh political
triumph.
Other governments bordering Communist China, with the possi-
ble exception of Thailand, are not reported to fear an early
Chinese Communist invasion of their countries. Neither is there
any current evidence, as distinguished from press speculation,
that Peiping is contemplating such an operation. Statements
from Burmese officials, moreover, suggest that an agreement may
.conceivably be reached with Peiping for assistance in expelling
Chinese Nationalist forces from Burma.
In Korea itself, both Pyongyang and Seoul have made clear
in post-truce pronouncements that the truce has not altered their
long-range objectives. The Communists continue to call for
"unification," and President Rhee is still seeking assurances
of American support for a resumption of hostilities if the
political conference fails to unify Korea under his authority,
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POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN IRAN
Approval of Prime Minister Mossadeq's unconstitutional
plan to dissolve the present Majl:Ls is expected in the nation-
wide referendum which is to be completed in Iran on 10 August.
The Tehran area, which voted on 3 August, has already given
overwhelming support to the proposal. The prime minister has
publicly stated that general elections will be held, but there
probably will be considerable delay.
Mossadeq decreed that the referendum would be by a non-
secret ballot. Since voters must include full identification
on their ballots, there is little doubt that the referendum
will approve dissolution of the Majlis, the constitutional
prerogative of the shah.
Mullah Kashani and other opposition leaders have called
for a boycott of the referendum. Abstention, however, will
not block Mossadeq, as he has the vote of his own followers
and the full support of the Tudeh.
Mossadeq has promised elections for a new Majlis follow-
ing the referendum, but normally several months are needed to
conduct the actual balloting. Rigged elections are standard
practice in Iran. During the last elections, the Mossadeq
government used both legal and illegal means to ensure victory
for its candidates, yet it did not secure complete control of
the legislative body. There is nothing in the situation today
suggesting that Mossadeq could secure the election of a more
docile Majlis.
Though the Tudeh is supporting the prime minister in the
referendum, in a parliamentary election it would run its own
candidates against Mossadeq and some would probably be suc-
cessful. In a new Majlis, if and when assembled, Mossadeq
accordingly would find himself faced with a small but militant
Tudeh bloc, as well as a rightist opposition, whose election
he could not entirely prevent.
Tribal chiefs, army officers, the landed gentry, and the
supporters of Mullah Kashani could, if united, defeat Mossadeq.
In the rural districts where Communists are increasing their
activities, the landlords still control most of, the peasant
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vote. Many of their candidates could be defeated only through
wholesale terrorism on the part of the pro-Mossadeq forces.
Thus, Mossadeq might increase his own support in a new
Majlis, but the anticipated Tudeh and conservative opposition
would not lend themselves to easy manipulation. The Tudeh
would probably support his anti-Western policies, prod him on
to more extremist action, awaiting the day when it could take
over. Tudeh representation in a Mossadeq cabinet is not an
impossibility.
Faced with the prospects of a new Majlis not fully sub-
servient, Mossadeq will accordingly tend to procrastinate on
the elections. Aware, however, that the expiration in January
of the powers voted him by the Majlis will remove the. last
vestiges of legality from his position, he will probably call
for elections at the last possible moment.
The prime minister's flagrant violation of the secret
ballot in the referendum seems to indicate uncertainty over
his actual popular backing, although he insists that the
people will support him fully. The considerable conservative
and rightist plotting to remove h:Lm may increase in the com-
ing months, particularly if he takes more arbitrary action.
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PRESIDENT QUIRINO'S ILLNESS COMPLICATES
PHILIPPINE PRESIDEN'.rIAL CAMPAIGN
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The critical question for next November's Philippine
presidential election is still whether the voters are to be
permitted a free choice. Meanwhile, the three-cornered campaign
in which former Defense Minister Magsaysay and Carlos Romulo are
contesting the re-election of Quirino has been considerably com-
plicated by the precarious state of the president's health.
With their popular appeal at low ebb and with their candi-
date critically ill, Quirino's Liberal Party stalwarts have
shown no willingness to let go their hold on the executive
power. Tension has increased and
an out rea o v o ence is e y, nce ac ona s a candidate
Magsaysay retains the loyalty of many army officers, such vio-
lence could not be easily suppressed.
Quirino, now at Johns Hopkins hospital in Baltimore, will
in all probability, stay in the race if he recovers sufficiently
to return to Manila and make a few public appearances. The
Liberals apparently feel that they are in a position to rely on
their organizational strength and control of executive power
rather than depend on active campaigning by their candidate.
If Quirino were obviously incapacitated, the Liberal Party
leaders might drop him, but they would probably insist that he
retain the presidency until the elections. Most reports suggest
that Jose Yulo, his running mate would be moved up to head the
ticket.
Carlos Romulo's Democratic Part an understanding with
was a distinct possibilit y, or at least a part of them,
y, should Quirino bow out.
All the evidence indicates that Magsaysay is by far the
most popular of the three candidates, though handicapped by
political immaturity. His campaign, aimed at the villagers,
is intended to overcome the traditional Philippine habit of
voting. according to the dictates of local bosses. Although he
is surrounded by seasoned Nacionali:sta politicians, who would
themselves bring little change to the country, Magsaysay as the
head of the winning party might be able to bring about more
effective government.
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Quirino's death would not directly affect Magsaysay's drawing
power, would greatly weaken the Liberal Party and would entirely
change the position of the Democratic Party. The elevation to
the presidency of Vice President Lopez, who deserted the Liberals
to become Romulo's running mate, would sap the strength of Qui-
rino's Liberal Party henchmen by depriving them of control of the
executive apparatus. They would have the alternative of making a
deal with Lopez, from a greatly weakened position, or of trying
to prevent him from becoming president.
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Romulo's prospects in the event that Lopez becomes presi-
dent would be greatly dependent on the latter. If Lopez made
a deal with the Liberals, Romulo might withdraw and join the
Magsaysay forces. Lacking organization strength, Romulo has
from the outset been accorded little chance of winning. Though
the importance of his candidacy lies chiefly in its effect on the
strength of the two established parties, the support he has
attracted from the Liberal Party hats not greatly weakened it.
He has, on the other hand, gained strength from antiadmini-
stration groups which would otherwise have backed Magsaysay,
and he is in direct competition with the Nacionalistas for
campaign funds.
Most observers believe that the Democrats may eventually
form a coalition with the Nacionalistas. Negotiations reportedly
held in July between the two parties were inconclusive, presumably
because of the uncertainty caused by Quirino's illness.
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NATURE AND EXTENT OF PROBABLE SATELLITE
INTERNAL CONCESSIONS
The continuing modification of Satellite internal
policies indicates that the conciliatory measures, first
noted in East Germany in early June, will be pursued despite
initial difficulties, The Kremlin apparently believes that
these policies will ultimately strengthen Communist control
by reducing the stresses and strains which have developed in
the Orbit. So far, in addition to East Germany, this new
approach has been most evident in Hungary and Albania, and
limited steps to improve the lot of the peasants have been
promised or taken in Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
From the concessions granted or promised to date, it is
clear that the conciliatory tactics are designed to improve
morale and living standards. They do not represent any
surrender of the Satellites' long--range goal of communi-
zation. Indeed, East German and lEungarian leaders have
stressed that their programs, although they will result in
a temporary deceleration of industrialization and collec-
tivization, do not alter ultimate goals.
The essentials of the new programs, as outlined and
partially implemented by the East German and Hungarian
governments, include a curtailment in the rate of collec-
tivization accompanied by increased assistance to the
private farmer, a partial return to private trade, general
price reductions on basic consumer goods, and an increase
in wages.
At the same time, gestures toward a relaxation of harsh
police measures have been made and amnesty decrees have been
issued. Top party and government organs have been reshuffled
in order to create collegial leaderships allegedly more
democratic than one-man rule. The conciliatory programs may
also include some modification of the Communist campaign
against the church and a greater recognition of the individual
Satellites' national heritage and culture. Outside of East
Germany, however, there has been no evidence of the last steps.
The limited amnesties to date have brought the release
of only a small portion of prisoners, none of them political.
Similarly, Hungary's announcement that it will abolish all
internment camps by 31 October is open to question. Since
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this measure has neither been emulated nor publicized anywhere
else in the Satellites, it appears quite possible that it is
primarily a device of domestic propaganda. The camps may
merely be transferred from the Ministry of Interior to other
ministries.
The introduction of the conciliatory program contributed
to unrest in East Germany and caused considerable initial
confusion within the party in Hungary. In East Germany an
early tendency to deal leniently with the rioters has been
reversed. In Hungary the concessions have been greeted
with much skepticism by the populace, and arrests of some
collective farmers and industrial workers have been reported.
Nevertheless, there are no indications that the more
moderate economic policies will be discontinued. The Soviet
Union apparently believes that these methods are the most
feasible for reducing the stresses and strains in the Orbit,
and will thereby ultimately strengthen its control. At the
same time, such tactics also help the USSR's more realistic
efforts to divide the West by creating an appearance of
reasonableness and conciliation.
Since the new program resembles in many respects the
policies which the Tito regime has inaugurated in recent
years, Soviet leaders may calculate that it will stimulate
a desire on the part of certain Yugoslav Communists to seek
a rapprochement with the USSR.
If these modest concessions can be made by the Satellite
governments according to their own timetable, they may lead
to a relaxation of internal stresses and strains and also
abet Soviet foreign policy. If, however, the reforms add to
unrest, as they have in East Germany, the Communists may be
forced to reverse the present trend and resort to harsher
methods to maintain control.
18
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