CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 25, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

FbwRelease 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-0092,0000~~6
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLA ;:.
C,ECL_ASSfFi-D
CLA:.S (..,, NC FD
TO: T.
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
E
25X1
25X1
OCI NO. 1954
25 December 1953
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OSD REVIEW
COMPLETED
DOS REVIEW
COMPLETED
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 tow Aft
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared pri-
marily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of
all current situations. Comments and conclusions rep-
resent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current
Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved Foielease 2004/0"ri-RDP79-0092%000200050001-6
SUMMARY OF CONTEN 1R T
THE SOVIET 'WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
SOVIET TACTICS AT THE PROPOSED BERLIN CONFERENCE . . Page 6
Soviet diplomatic hints and propaganda have
indicated that at a foreign ministers' meeting the
USSR will reaffirm its basic position on Germany
and Austria while adopting tactics designed to
avoid Western challenges.
YI POM-SDK's ECLIPSE COMPLICATES QUESTION OF
RHEE' S SUCCESSOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The recent expulpion from the South Korean
Liberal Party of former prime minister Yi Pom-sok,
previously considered President Rhee's most likely
heir, complicates the question of the president's
successor.
MAGSAYSAY'S PROSPECTS AS A FAR EASTERN LEADER. . . . Page
Ramon Magsaysay has already been suggested as
the leader of an anti-Communist alliance in the Far
East; but he has yet to prove himself as the leader
of a government and has had little experience in
international affairs.
RECENT CHANGES AND PROMOTIONS IN THE SOVIET ARMED
FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The unusual number of promotions and changes
noted in the top Soviet military command since
March suggest a desire by the new Soviet leader-
ship to solidify its support in the armed forces.
COMMUNISTS GAINING INFLUENCE IN CHILEAN LABOR. . . . Page 1.3
The Communist Party in Chile is increasing rtq
influence in labor organizations. Communists now
control two important unions and are apparently the
only "activists" In the Chilean labor movement.
^''
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved Fd% elease 2004/0612CI-RDP79-0092 000200050001-6
SPECIAL ARTICLE. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATO
TD-EFENSE EFFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The 1953 annual review, approved at the un-
usually harmonious NATO ministerial meeting on
14-16 December, reveals that the problems arising
from the rapid build-up phase are now being re-
placed by problems peculiar to the "long haul"
concept of the NATO defense effort.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved Fo&Release 200410 C -RDP79-0092 000200050001-6
The Soviet reply to President Eisenhower's atomic energy
proposals, devoid of the vituperative language which has been
the leitmotif of the average Soviet note, was evidently in-
tended for serious consideration. It seems apparent that the
Kremlin desired to erase the bad effects on world opinion of
its initial brusque propaganda rejection of the president's
suggestions. In addition, Moscow probably realized that in
order to probe the American position, it would have to make
an answer which had at least some semblance of reasonableness.
The reply, however, gave no hint that a basically new
Soviet position would emerge at forthcoming talks. On the con-
trary, the Soviet proposal centers on the need for "uncon-
ditional pledges" not to use atomic weapons and the establish-
ment of strict international control to guarantee the pledges.
The statement in effect returns to the familiar conditions
which the USSR first advanced in 1946 and has not since sub-
stantially altered. In the part of the statement listing
points for discussion at a possible conference, however, there
was an apparent tactical shift from the Kremlin's previous
position that the first step in a program to control atomic
weapons must be the destruction of existing stocks, with simul-
taneous strict international control subject to UN Security
Council veto.
The failure of the Kremlin to offer a significant change
in its previous proposals suggests that the forthcoming talks
may revolve around essentially the same issues which have long
prevented any action on this question in the United Nations.
In such talks, while posing as a popular champion, the USSR
can stall progress by continuing to insist on unacceptable
conditions.
Within the USSR, the Soviet leaders, by reappointing five
individuals as deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Min-
isters, took a further step toward re-establishing the admin-
istrative structure which existed before Stalin's death. In
March, the Council of Ministers was reduced from 57 ministries
to 25, and the presidium of the council, comprising the chair-
man and deputy chairmen, was cut from 14 to 5 men.
Since August 1953, with strict political control assured
and with a new economic program under way, many of the former
ministries have been recreated. The reappointment of Sabur-)v,
Pervukhin, Tevosyan, Malyshev, and Kosygin to the positions
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved FooRelease 2004/0fg-RDP79-009200200050001-6
which they had previously held suggests that with the increased
number of ministries,it is again necessary to create another
echelon of responsibility above the individual ministers.
The principal distinction between the present set-up and
that which existed under Stalin is the absence of any deputy
chairman in the agricultural field, which now comprises three
ministries. Responsibility for this vital area possibly is
being retained by Premier Malenkov, who has been active in
agriculture since World War II. On the other hand, it may also
be handled through party channels by First Party Secretary
N. S. Khrushchev, who has assumed public leadership on agri-
cultural matters since September.
The editorial treatment by the Soviet press of Beria's
indictment and workers meetings demanding the death penalty
appear to be setting the stage for an announcement that Beria
and his associates were executed following a secret trial..
The Kremlin announced that Beria was to be tried under the law
of 1 December 1934. This is the same law under which Marshal
.Tukhachevsky and seven generals were tried in camera and put
to death in 1937. The law provides for a "trial" in which
neither prosecuting nor defense attorney nor the accused is
permitted to participate. The present situation indicates a
desire by the collective leadership to dispose of the case
quickly.
The main Pravda editorial on the charges against Beria
has obliquely indicated that only since Stalin's death has
it become possible to eradicate a situation whereby one man
could use the MVD to institute an arbitrary rule of terror.,
Although ostensibly attacking Beria, the leaders are once again
attributing to Stalin the main responsibility for a system of
terror from which they would prefer to dissociate themselves.
A further example of this attempt at dissociation was
contained in the treatment accorded to Stalin's birthday can
21 December. In recent years this has served as an occasion
for adulation, with all propaganda media directed toward
proving his genius in all areas of life. This year the day
passed in a significant silence.
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved For Release 2004/01yKq4RDP79-0092?&600200050001-6
SOVIET TACTICS AT THE PROPOSED BERLIN CONFERENCE
Soviet diplomatic hints and propaganda have indicated that
at a foreign ministers' meeting the USSR will reaffirm its
basic position on Germany and Austria while adopting tactics
designed to avoid Western challenges.
As the initial device to postpone a discussion on Germany,
the Soviet delegates probably will demand discussion of a five-
power conference including Communist China. This would be in
keeping with Soviet propaganda that the proposed conference
can in no way replace five-power talks.
Failing agreement on this issue, the Soviet delegation
probably will raise the question of a European security system
as a means of dividing the United States and its European
allies and sidestepping the problem of all-German elections.
There is considerable evidence that the Soviet Union will urge
a series of bilateral arrangements and not consider a broad
security system with a European community which it has con-
sistently attacked as an aggressive organization. In a manner
similar to the 26 November note, a Pravda editorial of 10
December pointed to the French-Soviet treaty as a basis for
European security and emphasized France's role as a great power.
Ambassador Bohlen believes that the Soviet propaganda on Euro-
pean security is intended to convey the impression that security
should be achieved by European nations headed by the Soviet Union
without the direct participation of the United States.
There have been some indications that the USSR may attempt
to avoid the specific challenge of free German elections by
treating Germany as only a part of the general problem of
European security. In this manner the Soviet delegates could
point to American overseas bases and EDC as proper subjects for
discussion in connection with a German peace treaty.
The Soviet Union in any four-power conference probably
cannot avoid the German question indefinitely but will probably
continue to adhere to its position that a broad consideration
of a German peace treaty with particular reference to the
establishment of a provisional government must precede discussion
of free German elections. Statements by East German spokesmen
indicate that the USSR will demand that East and West Germans
be invited to the conference, and a 20 December Neues Deutschland
editorial contends that Molotov will support East German demands
for participation.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved FoPAR+elease 2004/061FRDP79-009200200050001-6
Soviet representatives will probably continue to maintain
that free elections are a matter for the Germans to determine
without outside interference. Similarly, the USSR is likely
to cite other problems, such as East-West German trade and.
zonal controls, which require solely German consideration and
which provide an opening wedge for eventual all-German talks
on unity..
To prolong the conference in an attempt to gain propaganda
advantage, the Soviet delegation may point to aspects of the
German and Austrian problems on which it considers the West
vulnerable. The specter of German remilitarization under
former "Hitlerite generals" has been a long-standing propaganda
peg used to counter Western challenges on Germany. Furthermore,
the possibility cannot be precluded that the USSR will appear
to favor troop withdrawal or reduction. To avoid the onus :)f
a breakdown, the Soviet representatives may attempt to dispose
of the embarrassing German issue by suggesting further dis-
cussion by deputies in a manner similar to the prolonged Austrian
treaty deputies' meetings.
If challenged by the West on Austria, the most to be
expected from the USSR is a renewed expression of willingn,=ss
to pursue the problem "through normal diplomatic channels" or
possibly an agreement to entrust it to deputy foreign ministers
at an unspecified time. Recent Soviet propaganda has cited the
necessity of first settling the German question because of an
alleged threat to Austria from a remilitarized Germany. The USSR
may even revert to its position that solution of the Austrian
problem is contingent on a Trieste settlement in accordance
with the Italian peace treaty.
7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved FoNWelease 2004/06S 1CRT RDP79-0092W00200050001-6
YI POM-SOK'S ECLIPSE COMPLICATES
QUESTION OF RHEE'S SUCCESSOR
The recent expulsion from the South Korean Liberal Party
of former prime minister Yi Pom-sok, previously considered the
most likely heir to 79-year-old President Rhee, complicates the
question of his successor. Unless Yi regains power or another
strong man emerges, there will be a prolonged period of chaos
after Rhee dies.
Prior to his ouster, Yi led the most powerful faction in
the Liberal Party, exerting a strong influence through control
of the Home Ministry, the national police, the provincial
branches of the Liberal Party, and the youth corps. The cooper-
ation of the finance and commerce ministers and their influence
with prominent businessmen guaranteed Yi ample funds, and in
last May's party convention he seemed in a good position to
achieve control of the entire party apparatus.
Since then, however, Rhee had become increasingly coi--
cerned over Yi's growing influence. The climax came in Aigust
when Yi's forces captured control of the National Society, a
powerful mass organization affiliated with Rhee's party. The
president thereupon began to undercut Yi by removing his ad-
herents from the party and the government, abolishing the youth
groups, sentencing to death a pro-Yi editor on charges of Commu-
nist spying, and breaking Yi's hold on the National Society.
Yi's ouster from the party in early December apparently
eliminated the one man long considered to have sufficient power
to inherit Rhee's authority. These moves are typical of Rhee,
who invariably cuts back the power of potential challengers.
He may have feared in particular that Yi's faction would obtain
control of the National Assembly in the elections scheduled for
next spring.
Within the assembly there is a group which desires to
regain for that body the power of selecting the president which
was stripped from it last year. Opposing this group are R.thee's
followers who want to retain the present system of popular
election by which they hope to remain in power. If the Rhee
group fails to act quickly after Rhee dies, the assembly could
repeal the law on popular election and name a president itself.
Whether such a dispute would result in a breakdown of the
government would depend on any leader's ability to stage a
successful coup and, in turn, on his control of the army and
the police. Yi's eclipse, should Rhee die in the near future,
increases the chances of political infighting among several
lesser individuals and of a military coup if army leaders
became convinced that the political struggle was leading to
national disaster.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved Fon&elease 2004/06 fi*,RDP79-00927%WO0200050001-6
MAGSAYSAY'S PROSPECTS AS A FAR EASTERN LEADER
Ramon Magsaysay, who is to be inaugurated as Philippine
president on 30 December, has already been suggested as the
leader of an anti-Communist alliance in the Far East. While
Magsaysay has shown his popularity with his own people and
revealed exceptional qualities of leadership as the secretary of
national defense, he has yet to prove himself as the leader of a
government and has had little experience in international affairs.
At least for the near future, Magsaysay's popularity at home
has probably reached its peak, and there will be some disillusion-
ment as he wrestles with domestic issues that cannot be solved on
a short-term basis, particularly the problem of land-tenure on
which the Huks base their appeal to the Philippine peasants. Any
strong efforts toward land and agricultural credit reform by
Magsaysay are almost certain to be resisted by the "old gtlard"
in his own Nacionalista Party.
Magsaysay inherits a nearly empty treasury and faces a
possible reduction of American aid. Unemployment has beer
growing, particularly in Manila, largely as the result of declin-
ing export earnings. Underemployment is chronic in the Philip-
pines, and can be eliminated only through extensive economic
development. Corruption and inefficiency are widespread in the
government and cannot soon be eliminated by a mere change in
administrations.
These domestic questions are sufficient to occupy Magsaysay
fully for at least the next six months. Even if he copes with
them successfully, he must then persuade his reactionary !acional-
ista Party colleagues of the feasibility of branching into
international fields. In the past, many of them have shown
little interest in international cooperation and some have
occasionally revealed an anti-American bias.
Of Asian leaders, apparently only Syngman Rhee and Chiang
Kai-shek are looking to Magsaysay for leadership and have
recently put out feelers in his direction. The Manila press
has commented unfavorably on the Rhee-Chiang discussions of a
defensive alliance, and Magsaysay himself is said to be opposed
to championing any anti-Communist crusade now.
Association with Rhee and Chiang would undercut any appeal
Magsaysay may now have for the Burmese and Indonesians, why in
any case look with suspicion on Filipino leaders as American
9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved FolwRelease 2004/06 IZMiFRDP79-00927900200050001-6
puppets. Indonesian officials reportedly are disturbed over
attempts in some quarters to boost Magsaysay as a future Asian
leader and regard current talk of this nature as presumptLous.
Few Southeast Asian leaders think of the area as a political
or economic entity and the various countries have few of the
economic or cultural ties which would appear to be a prerequisite
for any defensive grouping.
Nevertheless, if Magsaysay is successful at home, he would
appear to be the most likely person to lead the way toward a
resolution of the disparate outlooks obtaining in the area..
Should he attempt this, it will be important that he retain the
support of Carlos Romulo,who is the Filipino most qualified in
international affairs. Romulo's experience would be useful and
his Democratic Party could help to rally Philippine support for
a broadening of Magsaysay's role.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved Foi elease 2004/0 65 'IG RDP79-009274000200050001-6
RECENT CHANGES AND PROMOTIONS IN
THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
The unusual number of promotions and changes noted in
the top Soviet military command since March suggests a desire
by the new Soviet leadership to solidify its support in the
armed forces. This increased attention to the armed services
may be connected with recent evidence showing a de-emphasis.
of the public role of the MVD.
The promotions have for the most part involved pro-
fessional officers with combat experience, the most popular
group in the armed forces. Since the end of World War II,
these men have received little or no recognition for their
combat services. Two have now been raised to the grade of
marshal, one to admiral of the fleet, and five to army general.
These are the only known promotions to the highest military
ranks since World War II, except for 1948 when there were four
promotions to army general. None of those named has any
apparent connection with the top Soviet political leaders.
In addition to the promotions there have been several
shifts in the top military commands. The most important of
these was the appointment of Marshal Zhukov, who had been in
obscurity since the end of World War II, to the post of a
first deputy minister of defense.
There have also been several measure's which would have
the effect of raising the morale of the Soviet occupation
troops in Germany and Austria. Recent information has dis-
closed that families will now be permitted to accompany Soviet
officers to Austria. In Germany the restrictions on frater-
nization have been somewhat modified, permitting Soviet troops
to have greater contact with the German population.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved FolrRelease 2004/06$CINiiPRDP79-0092700200050001-6
Connected with these promotions and changes are sug-
gestions of an attempt to de-emphasize the public role of
the unpopular MVD, following Beria's dismissal, without
actually reducing its power over the people. The charges
against Beria and his MVD associates connect the MVD with
opposition to the present liberalized program by which the
new regime is attempting to win popular support in the USSR.
The new MVD minister has been absent from public functions
which that official normally attended in the past. A pro-
fessional army officer has been appointed minister of the MVD
in Georgia, and there has been public criticism of the MVD's
lower levels. There is, however, no evidence that the MVD
is losing the essentials of its power or is being deprived
of any of the police apparatus which it inherited from the MGB.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved Foi elease 2004/06 I AFRDP79-0092W00200050001-6
COMMUNISM IS GAINING INFLUENCE IN CHILEAN LABOR
The Communist Party in Chile, though outlawed since 1948,
is increasing its influence in labor organizations. Coinnunists,
already in control of the unions in two important industries,
are apparently the only "activists" in the Chilean labor move-
ment at presents and virtually the whole labor press is under
their influence.
Communist labor leaders reportedly are in almost unco3-
tested control of the unions in the nitrate fields and the coal
mines with a total membership estimated at 24,000. Althcugh the
major copper workers union with a probable membership of 2:1,000
is non-Communist, the Communists command a considerable minority
following. They are not believed to have much strength, how-
ever, in the communications federations which are said to have
a total of 50,000 members.
Nevertheless, Chilean labor is ideologically susceptible
to Communist influence because of the general low standard of
living under the domestic type of capitalism with its practice
of high markup and low turnover. The Communists have been able
to play on these susceptibilities as a result of their sup;-:ess
in recent years in spreading their influence throughout aiiaost
the entire labor press.
The Communist daily paper in Santiago, El Siglo, is road
by workers of every political orientation. Also, the tabi-sid
newspapers of Chile which appeal largely to the working classes
have labor editors who slant material almost entirely alon:z the
Communist line. Such anti-Communist material as is publi.s--ed
appears mainly in the conservative papers and reaches few .aem-
bers of the working class.
The formation last February of the Chilean Workers C:ritra1.
fulfilled a major. Communist goal. This organization inclonies
all the important labor and white collar unions. The Com-w n..ists,
who had taken the lead in working for a national labor co.
federation, secured only five of the 25 places on the directo-
rate and failed to get a party member elected secretary gel ral,
but a Communist sympathizer was elected president. Moreover,
the Communists achieved acceptance on an equal basis with all
other important elements in Chilean labor in a general co.--
federation. They thus gained a new forum for propaganda, nd
won a base of operations for extending their influence agt.nst
a non-Communist opposition which remains divided.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved Fo ?gelease 2004/06BEC~M-RDP79-0092000200050001-6
A 28-member Chilean delegation attended the congress of
the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Vienna
last October, and one of them described the creation of tie
Chilean Workers Central as an important achievement in "labor's
struggle for unity" in his country. The Central, however, has
not joined any international labor organization. That inter-
national Communism regards the situation as promising is clear
from the speech made by WFTU secretary general Louis Saillant
at the congress. In his comments on the successes achieved in
seeking unity of action among trade unions, Chile and Guatemala
were the only two Latin American countries mentioned.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved Fotelease 2004/0fg$}'RDP79-009200200050001-6
THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATO DEFENSE EFFORT
The NATO ministerial meeting on 14-16 December was
conducted in an unusually harmonious atmosphere mostly be-
cause from the start there was general agreement on the
current status of East-West tension, on the character of
NATO'S military buildup, and on the problems likely to
arise in the near future. The 1953 annual review approved
at the meeting shows that the major problems peculiar to
the period of the rapid creation and equipment of military
units have been solved satisfactorily. At the same time
the report points up new problems resulting from acceptance
of the concept of a "long haul."
The combat effectiveness of the NATO forces is such
that Ismay has called them a discouragement rather than a
deterrent, meaning that the Soviet Union could not mount
ap all-out attack against them without moving additional
forces and thus giving warning. General Gruenther has
made it clear that he still does not have the military
strength to defeat an all-out attack, especially since
he is required to maintain a defense line as far east
as possible. For this, he says, he needs German divisions.
Although there has been good progress over the past
three years in the construction of airfields, airpower i
NATO's most critical deficiency. The number of fighter
aircraft is short of present goals, and the planned rate
of buildup will leave appreciable deficiencies even by
1956. There is also a shortage of effective aircrews,
and the present air warning systems are considered incap-
able of preventing a surprise attack. Gruenther's state--
ment that the shortage of tactical airpower may be more
serious than the shortage of ground forces led the council
to recommend some increases in the rate of buildup for
19 54 .
Ground force units are not all up to combat standards
of readiness. They lack adequate supporting units; re-
serves are insufficiently trained; ammunition and equip-
ment shortages persist. For example, few NATO countries
approach the minimum level of ammunition reserves, and
Norway has only four days' reserve of .50 caliber ammu-
nition. Political difficulties still prevent most member
15
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved FO elease 2004/06`d1 .RDP79-0092W00200050001-6
countries from instituting the recommended two-year term
of national service and from requiring satisfactory
refresher courses for reserves. Minesweepers, escort
vessels, and maritime patrol aircraft continue to be the
principal naval inadequacies.
. On the credit side, equipment and armament have beer
generally improved; the command structure is now well
integrated; and notable progress in standardization and
training procedures has resulted from last year?.S di-
rective to concentrate on qualitative improvement.
The harmony of the recent meeting contrasts sharply
with the pessimistic atmosphere of the December 1952 and
the April 1953 meetings.
There is now official acceptance of the idea that non-
fulfillment of the ambitious goals set at Lisbon in Febru-
ary 1952 does not mean the failure of NATO. Moreover, sub-
sequent examination of the Soviet "new look" has produced
general agreement that, while the threat of military ag-
gression is not immediate, it has not disappeared, and
that the dismemberment of the North Atlantic alliance
continues as one of the USSR's basic aims.
A widespread hope that the introduction of new weapons
would reduce the requirements for conventional forces ha.
contributed to a slackening in the NATO effort. General
Gruenther told the ministerial meeting that SHAPE is giving
first priority to a study of forces to be available four
years hence and of the added impact of new weapons. He
pointed to the 400-mile-long central European front and
said that it would be premature to conclude that even
with a German defense contribution, new weapons could close
that gap successfully.
The year 1954 will mark the end of appreciable expansion
in ground and naval forces. During 1953, defense spendir.g
for the 14 member countries increased by two billion dollars
to a total of 65 billion dollars. The increase in 1952
over 1951 had been nine billion dollars. Leveling off may
entail some reductions during 1954 in the defense budgets
of the larger NATO members where' the". initial biiildup,.was
large and rapid; but increases will still be called for
in countries such as Denmark, Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands where the rearmament program has been more
gradual.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6
 Approved FoRelease 2004/0
FCW-RDP79-0092F_
,,.y M i, 11% T MT
In offering guidance for the 1954 annual review, the
North Atlantic Cpuncil noted that fulfillment of current
programs is indispensable. It has also asked the military
authorities to reassess the pattern of effective militar,
power over the next few years, taking into account develL;P-
ments in military technology, Soviet capabilities, and the
general strategic situation.
In the meantime, there is general agreement that
the current status of East-West tension prevents NATO
members politically and economically from supporting de-
fense spending at a level higher than the present. Whil(
NATO's own new look" is being further defined, ways mus
be found to prevent the annual recurring costs of maintain-
ing existing forces from eating up all defense appropria-
tions, which are required to complete the air buildup;
to correct the most critical deficiencies; and to replace
obsolete materiel,
General Gruenther has noted that NATO was created
at a. time when fear of the Soviet Union submerged long-
standing rivalries and resulted in a peacetime alliance cf
unprecedented scope and duration. Its very success under
these conditions thus poses difficulties for the future,
since a. defense program cannot be turned on and off with
every fluctuation in East-West tension. He predicts that
NATO's next three years will be more difficult than the
first three.
C
17
SE ET
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000200050001-6