CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000200090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 22, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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F-T OCI NO.2636
22 January 1954
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
11
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
CON ENTIA
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared prima-
rily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It does not represent a complete coverage of all current
situations. Comments and conclusions represent the im-
mediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
WESTERN HANDICAPS IN THE BERLIN TALKS . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The three Allied powers approach the Berlin confer-
ence handicapped by the widespread desire for relaxation
of East-West tensions and also by specific political con-
siderations in France, West Germany, and Austria.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DJILAS AFFAIR . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The dispute involving Milovan Djilas appears to
have been purely internal, not bearing on Yugoslavia's
international orientation and foreign policy. Any sub-
sequent purge of some Djilas supporters is unlikely to
weaken the stability of the Tito regime or to involve
other top-level personalities.
FACTIONALISM EXPECTED TO WEAKEN NEW IRANIAN PARLIAMENT. Page 10
The elections now under way in Iran will probably
give Prime Minister Zahedi temporary control, but the
new Majlis is expected to divide quickly into the usual
cliques.
BURMA FACES SERIOUS ARMS SUPPLY PROBLEM . . . . . . . . Page 12
Burma's decision not to renew the defense treaty with
Britain leaves its armed forces with no regular source of
supply and the prospect of a deteriorating ability to meet
the threat of Communists and other insurgents.
PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE NEW PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
President Magsaysay's rapid moves to reorganize the
Philippine government along more efficient lines have
received enthusiastic popular support. His programs,
however, may be undermined by elements within his own
party.
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POST-STALIN SHAKE-UP IN SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY . . . . Page 16
Since Stalin's death a Soviet Foreign Ministry
shake-up affecting almost 70 percent of the top posts
has taken place. The principal aim appears to be revi-
talization of Soviet diplomacy rather than a foreign
service purge.
SPECIAL ARTICLE. A SOVIET SURVEY: I. FOREIGN POLICY . Page 19
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Hints of Soviet strategy at the Berlin conference h;ivp.
emerged
The Russians argued strongly
That e pro em o European security is one which can be
solved by European states through bilateral nonaggression
treaties.
They also suggested that the Kremlin might accept free
elections in Germany at the price of neutralization and the
establishment of a government like that in Austria. Recent
Soviet propaganda, however, indicates continued inflexible
opposition to the Western concept of free elections under
foreign supervision.
Foreign Minister Molotov stressed the need for European
security in an interview on 12 January with French ambassador
Joxe in Moscow. He emphasized that the German problem was
the key to European security but shed no new light on Soviet
security proposals.
Similarly, a note to Austria on 16 January failed to
clarify Soviet plans for an Austrian settlement at Berlin.
While the vaguely worded note supported the principle of a
treaty settlement with Austrian participation, it gave no
specific commitment to take up or settle the issue now.
On Far Eastern issues the Communist world is intensifying
its campaign to overcome the psychological and political
defeat represented by the release of the unrepatriated
prisoners in Korea. The Communists apparently hope to inject
enough confusion and doubt into the repatriation question to
deprive the West of the full impact of its victory on the
nonforcible repatriation principle and to generate strong
pressure for renewed UN debate on the Korean issue.
The attack is being conducted on three main fronts.
The major attention is now being devoted to'an attempt to
prove that the UN decision to release the prisoners on 23
January, allegedly to avoid completion of the explanations,
violates the armistice agreement.
Secondary attention is given to demonstrating a genuine
interest in resuming the preliminary talks at Panmunjom for
arranging the political conference. The Communists contrast
their alleged willingness to resume talks without conditions
with the "arbitrary conditions" raised by the US to block
resumption.
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These first two lines of attack are used to support
demands for the early resumption of UN debate on Korea.
On 14 January, Vyshinsky formally approved reconvening th:,
8th General Assembly to consider the Korean question, but
he argued that "bearing in mind the situation in. Panmunjom,"
the assembly should meet on 22 January rather than on 9
February as suggested by Madame Pandit. Moscow radio warned
on 15 January that the UN must "take into its hands the
peaceful settlement of the Korean question."
Finally, this Communist campaign is also linked with
Soviet objectives at the forthcoming Berlin conference.
Molotov will probably attempt to use the widespread concern
over the failure to reach a Korean settlement as support
for his demands for a five-power conference to discuss re-
duction of international tensions. Moscow radio has warned
that it will be impossible to solve the Korean problem without
Communist Chinese and North Korean participation, and Chou
En-lai has endorsed Moscow's proposal for a five-power con-
ference.
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WESTERN HANDICAPS IN THE BERLIN TALKS
The three Allied powers approach the Berlin conference
handicapped by the strength of the widespread desire for a
relaxation of East-West tensions and also by specific polit-
ical considerations in several Western European countries.
Britain seems fully determined to pay no excessive price for
such a detente, but in France, West Germany, and Austria
special national objectives make the governments vulnerable
in varying degrees to possible Soviet overtures and pose po-
tentially serious difficulties for the three Allied foreign
ministers.
For France the most sensitive issue is the Indochina war.
Communist diplomatic hints and propaganda approaches to France
have for some months capitalized on the growing desire to shed
this burden; and Vice Premier Reynaud reiterated in the last
fortnight that France must seek a suitable five-power confer-
ence with this end in view. Other members of the cabinet have
called for ending the war on any terms short of outright with-
drawal, and no French government can at present refuse to give
serious attention to any Soviet proposals on Indochina.
On European security questions, France's present indeci-
sion springs mainly from unwillingness to make room for a
resurgent Germany in the European and Atlantic communities.
Most Frenchmen have lost their fear of Soviet aggression in
the near future, but do fear that a unified and rearmed Ger-
many would relegate France to a secondary role and eventually
lead the West into war to regain Germany's lost eastern Prov-
inces. Consequently, they are likely to look with sympathy
on any Soviet proposals for a disarmed or neutralized Germany.
French representatives might well be susceptible to a
Soviet "package deal" accepting a major Western demand such
as free all-German elections, but coupling such acceptance
with limitations on Germany's future armaments and alliarces.
In particular, the French would be attracted by a Continent-
wide security guarantee implying restrictions on Germany's
freedom of action.
In West Germany, where progress toward unification re-
mains the primary demand on the Berlin negotiators, theiE, is
still agreement among all political parties that free elec-
tions are a prerequisite for unification. The belief is grow-
ing both in parliament and the press, however, that the USSR
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has legitimate grounds for assuring its own military security
before relinquishing East Germany and withdrawing its occiipa-
tion forces. It is likely, therefore, that many West Germans
would consider it entirely reasonable for Moscow to insist on
some kind of agreement on the status of a united Germany be-
fore agreeing to free elections, and many also would still ac-
cept neutrality as the price of free elections.
Sharp resentment would probably be aroused in West Ger-
many if the Allies tried to terminate the conference at an
early date because of Soviet refusal to agree on specific ar-
rangements for free elections after Moscow had previously ac-
cepted the principle. Chancellor Adenauer's government,
however, can be counted on to oppose any Soviet efforts to
protract the conference, provided that initial Soviet conces-
sions cause no great surge of unification sentiment.
'West German opinion also is vulnerable to any possible
conciliatory Soviet gestures early in the conference on sec-
ondary issues such as the status of Berlin or East-West trade.
Interest is increasing in the Federal Republic in expanding
trade relations with the Orbit as a hedge against threatened
economic recession; and any Communist gestures on this or sim-
ilar matters would be taken by many West Germans as evidence
that concessions on more important issues were possible.
Austria's growing insistence on obtaining a state treaty
at almost any cost constitutes still another potential handi-
cap for the Allied negotiators. The Austrian government in-
dicated to the American ambassador on 14 January that, if
permitted to state its case at Berlin, it would adhere to the
agreed Western position. It would be prepared, however, to
abjure all military alliances and even assume the burden of
reparations specified in the present version of the treaty's
Article 35.
Allied failure to let Vienna accept Soviet terms it con-
sidered bearable would have serious repercussions in Austria.
Austrian acceptance of such terms, on the other hand, might
cause West German opinion to blame its own failure to achieve
a treaty on "obstructionism" by Adenauer and the occupying
powers.
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The fall from power of Milovan Djilas, one of the four
top Yugoslav party leaders, represents the first serious
rupture within the top echelon of the Yugoslav party since
1948. The dispute appears to have been purely internal, and
there is no evidence that Yugoslavia's international orienta-
tion and foreign policy are involved. Although a purge of
some Djilas supporters can be expected to follow, it is
unlikely to weaken the stability of the Tito regime or to in-
volve other top-level personalities.
The solidarity which has hitherto characterized the
tightly knit Tito clique, the suddenness with which the pres-
ent crisis developed, and the special attention given
Djilas' attack on the corruptive influences of bureaucratic
authority suggest that personal differences as well as d--s-
agreements on the form and timing of party policy were r4=---
sponsible for sparking the Djilas dispute. The personal
factor remains an "unknown," however, and no further light
was thrown on the subject during the central committee d_s-
cussions on 16 and 17 January.
According to charges by the Yugoslav central commit--ee,
the views expressed by Djilas in a recent series of articles
were "basically contrary to the spirit" of the decisions
reached by the Sixth Party Congress in November 1952. These
decisions stipulated that the party's position of leadership,
.its Communist identity, and the organizational principle of
"democratic centralism" were to remain unimpaired, but that
Communists were no longer to be considered "an exclusive part
of the working class" or to claim for themselves a monopoly
in the creation of socialism.
The obscurity and lack of definition of this new line
immediately gave rise to considerable confusion within the
party, and contributed to a highly flexible interpretation
of party policies on. the part of Yugoslav leaders. While it
is true that Djilas has been more specific than other Yugo-
slav leaders in his criticism of "bureaucracy," corruption,
and "outmoded forms," he has heretofore been a faithful ex-
ponent of the party line, and it was not until late in
December that any ideological deviation became apparent
his articles.
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It became clear during the discussions of the central
committee on 16 and 17 January, however, that Djilas had
violated party discipline by publicly airing his persona._
interpretation of the party platform, and that he had in-
curred the wrath of other party leaders by interpreting that
platform too broadly. Particularly objectionable were
Djilas' advocacy of a smaller party organization, his sug-
gestion that the party's basic organizations be abandoned,
his proposal that some state organs be "emancipated from
every influence of the party," and his attack on "the qu:__te
real monstrosity" and "fancied superior morals" of the
"closed circle" of party bureaucracy.
Although he clearly noted that "the struggle for de-
mocracy must still be headed by the experienced Communis
cadres," Djilas' articles were understandably interpreted in
Belgrade as a threat to the authority and prestige of the
party leadership. The resulting attack on him may involve
a return to a purer communist doctrine and lead to further
attacks on "bourgeois liberalist forms" and the "formalistic,
Western type of democracy," but there is no indication.thiat
it will result in a weakening of Yugoslavia's political,
economic and military ties with the West. Tito has emphasized
that the matter is a purely internal one, and that "it cannot
influence the course of our foreign policy."
There are indications, however, that Djilas' censure re-
flects a certain "tightening-up" in Yugoslav domestic po:_icies
and party discipline. In any case, a review and clarifica-
tion of the Sixth Congress line is long overdue, and the
Djilas case is already being used as the basis for a strong
reassertion of the mission and solidarity of the party.
Although it has been announced that a new plenary ses-
sion of the central committee will meet in six weeks to
reassess the decisions of the Sixth Congress, there has as
yet been no indication that Yugoslav policies will be basi-
cally changed. On 17 January Tito warned that the Communist
Party should not make "new mistakes" by "going to the other
extreme" as a result of the Djilas affair, but should continue
to follow in its present path with greater vigilance and care
"to avoid saying later that we have again been blind."
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FACTIONALISM EXPECTED TO WEAKEN NEW IRANIAN PARLIAMENT
The elections now under way in Iran will probably give Prime
Minister Zahedi temporary control of the new Majlis, which, how-
ever, is expected to split quickly into the usual cliques based
on special and personal interests. These groups may often oppose
Zahedi's policies and their votes on his program will be unpre-
dictable. Any reappearance of pro-British deputies will also
increase parliamentary disputes.
Contrary to an earlier official announcement that the elec-
tions would be completed within 24 hours, it now appears that
the balloting will be spread over several weeks. This increases
the government's chances for success in manipulating the voting.
Zahedi and the shah are making strong efforts to influence the
elections despite Zahedi's illness, which has kept him inactive
for the past week. Although they reportedly disagree over cer-
tain candidates, they are supporting a joint list.
Zahedi recently said that he expected 40 of the 136 candi-
dates backed by the government to support him fully, while 40
more would be friendly to the government but could not be depended
on in times of stress. The prime minister believes the remainder
would in general support the government, except for perhaps a half
dozen troublesome demagogues.
The caliber of the candidates offers little hope that the
new Majlis will be an improvement over earlier ones. Many of
those backed by the government were chosen more for their friend-
ship for the shah or Zahedi than for ability and honesty. Sev-
eral are obviously being rewarded for past political suppcrt of
the regime, although' their reputations are poor. Men such as
Zahedi's former deputy prime ministers Amidi-Nuri and DowJatabadi
are considered thoroughly corrupt opportunists.
There will probably be the traditionally large majority of
deputies representing the entrenched landowning and tribal inter-
ests, with a scattering of representatives from the professions,
lawyers, journalists, clerics, and the military. Some opposition
deputies may be elected, although there seems to be little coor-
dination between the various opposition groups. Mozaffar Baghai,
chief non-Communist opponent of Zahedi, apparently is trying to
win election from Kerman, a district which twice before sent him
to Tehran. The shah and Zahedi in turn reportedly have decided
to delay the Kerman elections in an attempt to block Baghai.
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The first test of Zahedi's control will come immediately
after the Majlis is formed, when it is customary to give the
prime minister a vote of confidence after hearing his program.
He probably will win this initial vote but is likely to run into
difficulties soon afterward. Iran needs, and nearly every govern-
ment including the present one has promised, financial, social
and economic reforms. The attempted reforms always meet opposi-
tion from those groups in the Majlis whose special interests
might be prejudiced by the action.
The government will therefore probably have very unpredict-
able backing. Zahedi might receive a vote of no-confidence on
any one of a dozen issues ranging from his handling of the oil
negotiations with Britain to much-needed tax reforms. His sup-
port will almost certainly fade away if he is unsuccessful in
his internal economic program and in his negotiations with Britain.
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Burma's decision not to renew the defense treaty with
Britain which expired on 4 January leaves its armed forces
with no regular source of supply. The Burmese reached this
decision largely because they felt that the agreement was
incompatible with national sovereignty, and that Britain
had exploited its position and interfered in domestic affairs.
As a result, Burma's capability to meet the threat of Commu-
nists and other insurgents in all likelihood will deteriorate.
British arms will continue to be sold to Burma, but there
are indications that unless a new relationship can be work=ed out,
London will accord future Burmese requests a lower priority than
heretofore. While negotiations for a new agreement are continuing,
the American army attache in Rangoon reports that an early settle-
ment is unlikely and that the British mission is planning to phase
out its activities as rapidly as possible.
Burma's need for military equipment, meanwhile, is becoming
acute. Little of the materiel which the British turned over to
the armed forces in 1948, when the country became independent, is
still usable, and subsequent deliveries have satisfied only imme-
diate operational requirements. Thus even a slowdown in the trans-
mission of arms will handicap military efforts to suppress the Com-
munists and other insurgent groups, and to put pressure on the
Chinese Nationalist forces in northeast Burma.
To avoid dependence on Britain, the Burmese have long sought
to buy arms in continental Europe, Asia, and the United States, and
odd lots of small arms are known to have been purchased from France
and Italy. Such purchases, however, besides failing to sa-isfy
Burma's needs, cause serious maintenance problems due to lack of
standardization and an irregular flow of spare parts.
According to the American embassy in Rangoon, Burmese offi-
cials are irritated by their failure, to date, to obtain arms
from the United States. The Burmese commander in chief in Decem-
ber told the American army attache, with whom he has been -friendly,
that he did not trust Washington and indicated that he was resigned
to getting along without American arms. The embassy fears that the
Burmese may turn to the Soviet bloc for assistance if they continue
to be frustrated in their procurement efforts, and has recommended
that they be given $10,000,000 worth of selected military items or
that such equipment be made available at extremely liberal prices.
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There is no evidence that the Burmese are now seeking arms
in the Communist world. However, should the current trade nego-
tiations with the Communists concerning the disposal of large
surplus rice stocks prove satisfactory, it is quite possible the
Burmese will seek to solve their arms problem in a similar manner.
Although the Orbit is capable of exporting a wide raz-ge of
military equipment, to do so would constitute a sharp departure
from past policy.
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PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE NEW PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
Since his inauguration on 30 December, President Ramon
Magsaysay has moved rapidly toward reorganizing the Philippine
government along more efficient lines and his announced policies
have met with enthusiastic popular response. The chief obstacle
to his success appears to lie in the possible undermining of his
program by conservative elements within his own Nacionalista
Party.
In his inaugural address, Magsaysay called for a re-
examination of the feudal land tenure system, for a wider dis-
tribution of the benefits of economic development, and for
administrative and judicial reforms. Since then he has insti-
tuted a major reorganization of several government economic
agencies and corporations. He has also ordered the armed forces
to help in conducting a census of land ownership and in a large
road construction project which is probably beyond Philippine
financial and technical capabilities.
These moves are in keeping with Magsaysay's election cam-
paign, which for the first time gave the Philippine masses a
feeling of personal contact with the government. After the
inauguration they overwhelmed the president's office in response
to an invitation to send in by collect telegram any complaints
they had about the government. There is little doubt that they
confidently expect a thorough overhauling of the Philippine
social and economic structure.
The entrenched Nacionalista politicians, however, who
represent the conservative, land-owning elite which has dot_iu-
nated every preceding administration, will resist any real
challenge to the existing power structure. They control the
congress. and have maneuvered to influence key administrative
appointments.
Magsaysay's new cabinet members were nearly all selec-ed
from a list of recommendations submitted by the party. He
withdrew his original choice for labor secretary, and appointed
to a key post in the Department of Foreign Affairs a protege of
Nacionalista stalwart Senator Claro Recto, who has often been
critical of American policy. A woman appointed as social wel-
fare administrator appears to have as her chief.qualificat-ion
that she is the daughter of a wealthy campaign contributor.
SECRET
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The new secretary of commerce is a representative of the sugar
interests. The latter financed Carlos Romulo's Democratic
Party, which supported Magsaysay. Other appointees, however,
appear to be well qualified and to have views similar to
Magsaysay's.
The progressive groups which helped to organize Magsaysay's
landslide victory have heretofore never been close to the inner
circles of government. They include progressive Catholic groups
and civic-minded business and professional organizations. Their
members, some of whom are Magsaysay's closest advisers, are
mostly young men of a different generation from that which domi-
nated Philippine political life from Quezon to Quirino. In his
short time in office, Magsaysay has apparently attempted to get
along'with his party and at the same time not to dim the hopes
of these groups to which he must look for support of his program.
So far he has been successful.
The Philippine Congress meets in regular session on 25
January. Philippine presidents have broad and powerful pre-
rogatives which when skillfully used have enabled them to
exercise virtually complete control over the legislative arm.
Magsaysay, however, has none of the political experience oL' the
Nacionalista leaders in Congress. He must move cautiously to
avoid open conflict with them, but if he moves too cautiously
he risks the considerable popular disillusionment which would
follow a failure to live up to the high hopes he has raised.
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POST-STALIN SHAKE-UP IN SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY
The extensive reorganization and personnel shake-up
within the Soviet Foreign Ministry over the past ten months
apparently is aimed at revitalizing Soviet diplomacy rather
than purging political undesirables (see chart, p.18). The
present regime is clearly interested in developing the Foreign
Ministry as a more effective instrument of foreign policy than
it appeared to be in Stalin's last years.
Almost 70 percent of the top Foreign Ministry positions
have figured in personnel changes since Stalin died and V. M.
Molotov resumed direct administrative control of the foreign
affairs apparatus. This is the most extensive shake-up in
the ministry since 1939, when Molotov became foreign minister
the first time. In contrast to 1939, however, the present
changes consist largely of personnel shifts within the min-
istry.,
The relatively few individuals who have been brought
in from other fields and assigned to leading positions art.
mostly high party men. These,added to the number of Foreign
Ministry careerists already on top party bodies, place an un-
precedented number of foreign service personnel high in the
ranks of the party. Since the party has always maintained
close control over the Foreign Ministry, the increased number
of ministry personnel also on top party bodies lends suppc'rt
to the thesis that the party is now more actively interested
in exploiting the traditional instrument of diplomacy as a.
means of effecting its foreign policy objectives.
The fact that most of the former party careerists in
the foreign service are being utilized in Satellite affairs
may indicate an attempt at closer control over the Orbit;
but a more probable reason is that their experience will he
most useful where similar ideological and organizational
problems may be encountered and where ordinary diplomacy
is less a problem.
In addition to the personnel shifts, the Foreign Min-
istry's central apparatus has been streamlined. Evidence
indicates that the number of territorial divisions has been
reduced from twelve to nine. A new American Division has been
formed through the merger of the former Latin American and
USA divisions. The Fifth European Division has been abolished
and its territorial responsibility transferred to the Third
European. There is a strong possibility, also, that the Balkan
Countries Division has been abolished and its responsibilities
assumed by the Fourth European.
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Soviet diplomatic relations with several foreign states
have been regularized within the past ten months through the
accrediting of ambassadors to Canada, Greece and Yugoslavia,
where the Soviet embassies had been headed by charges foi
several years. In addition, embassies were established and
ambassadors accredited in Austria and the German Democratic
Republic, and diplomatic relations with Israel were resumed.
The latest move of this nature was the announcement on 22
December of the intention to establish an embassy in Indcnesia,
which the.USSR recognized in 1950.
Taken all together, the large number of personnel shifts,
the influx of top party people, the streamlining of the cen-
tral apparatus, and the regularization of relations with
foreign states add up to an attempt to increase the ministry's
effectiveness in the conduct of Soviet foreign relations.
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PROBABLE SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY'S
TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS
(only countries with which the USSR has diplomatic relations are incluced)
BEFORE STALIN'S DEATH
Latin America
Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay)
1st European
( enneelux countries, France,
Switzerland and Italy)
2nd European
(Great ri ain, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand)
3rd European
(Austria, ermany)
4th European
Czechoslovakia, Poland)
5th European
can inavian Countries and
Finland)
Balkan Countries
Hungary an alkan Countries)
Near & Middle East
Ethiopia, Egypt, Israel, Syria,
Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and
Afghanistan)
Southeast Asia
(Pakistan-, dia, Burma, Thailand,
Vietnam, Indonesia)
1st Far Eastern
(Mongolia, China, Korea)
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1954
United Nations
American countries
(USA, Mexico, Argentina,
and Uruguay)
1st European
unc nged)
2nd European
(unchanged)
3rd European
(Austria, Germany,
Scandinavian countries
and Finland)
4th European (except GDR)
-(European Satellites, Greece
and Yugoslavia)
Merged in 3rd European
Merged in 4th Europe-in
Near & Middle East
(unchanged)
Southeast Asia
unchanged
Far Eastern
ongo ia, hina, Korea)
25X1
25X1
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
A SOVIET SURVEY: I. FOREIGN POLICY*
Jan 54
The outstanding characteristic of Soviet foreign policy
from the summer of 1953 to the eve of the Berlin meeting has
been a clear effort to temporize on every major East-West dif-
ference, steadfastly refusing to settle any of these differ-
ences at the cost of major concessions. The Soviet leaders
thus have avoided unnecessary commitments which might reduce
their future freedom of action.
This stand probably derives from two basic considerations.
The first is Moscow's determination to maintain intact the
present frontiers of the Orbit which compels it to reject all
Western proposals for settlements requiring a possible with-
drawal from such advanced positions as East Germany, Austria,
and North Korea. The Soviet leaders are aware that this un-
yielding stand places them at a propaganda disadvantage in nego-
tiating with the West, In order to offset this disadvantage,
the Soviet representative at the forthcoming Berlin conference
may attempt to avoid openly opposing those Western proposals
which will command wide popular support, such as free elections
in Germany, by means of injecting demands for a five-power con-
ference and consideration of such issues as American foreign
bases, international tensions, atomic weapons prohibition, and
European security.
The second basic consideration is Moscow's probable belief
that the present world stalemate can be maintained without
serious disadvantage to Orbit interests and with growing pros-
pects for an eventual split in the non-Communist world.
There have been no decisive changes in the Orbit
which would impel Moscow to consider negotiating either a
general settlement with the West or definitive agreements on
specific questions. The concession on the POW issue which
opened the way to the Korean armistice has been the only notable
one which Orbit leaders have made.
* This is the first of two articles. The second will deal
with internal problems.
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The policy of postponement may be partly motivated in cer-
tain areas by a desire to gain time for correcting the adverse
effects of past policies, such as the pressing need to repair
the damage to Soviet prestige inflicted by the June riots in
East Germany. The new leadership may also have regarded the
series of moves initiated after Stalin's death as the necessary
forerunners of the internal economic and political readjust-
ments they wished to introduce.
However, the over-all pattern of Soviet moves and propa-
ganda in the international sphere suggests that this policy of
postponement has been devised in the light of the Kremlin's
present strategic estimate of its position vis-a-vis the
non-Communist world. It appears, moreover, at least since the
concessions on Korea and with the exception of certain temporary
tactical retreats, that Soviet foreign policy is free from any
basically defensive motivation springing either from internal
weakness or from fear of Western intentions and military pressure.
The USSR is taking advantage of the period of stalemate to
strengthen its position in areas which the Soviet leaders may
believe are now vulnerable to Western pressure. In particular,
Moscow moved quickly and vigorously both to restore the authority
and prestige of the East German regime following the June riots,
and to speed the reconstruction of North Korea's industry and
communications and the reorganization of its armed forces.
The new regime has shown an awareness of the delicate prob-
lems presented by Mao Tse-tung's unique stature in the Communist
world and Peiping's special and recently enhanced position in
the Soviet Orbit. It has also taken steps to deal with these
problems and maintain the solidarity of the Sino-Soviet alliance.
In recent months Moscow has played up Communist China as a "new
great power," has accorded China greater stature as an Asian
model and leader, has given Mao unusual praise, has promised
long-range assistance to Peiping's construction efforts, and has
most rebently acquiesced to increased Chinese influence in North
Korea.
The present policy appears to rest basically on Moscow's
belief that with the end of the Korean war, increasing pressure
will be brought against the United States by its allies for a
relaxation of trade controls, great power negotiations, and
delays in rearmament and in European integration. The USSR ap-
parently hopes that such pressures and frictions will progress-
ively reduce the West's capability for united action.
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This strategy was clearly defined by Malenkov on 8 August
1953 when he said, "If today, in conditions of tension in inter-
national relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent by internal
strife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may
lead to its disintegration."
There was nothing in this speech which would indicate any
impending changes in the present pattern of Soviet foreign
policy. Malenkov served notice that the present Soviet power
position and the frontiers of the Orbit will be defended. He
devoted special attention to countering any tendency in the
West to interpret the "peace-through-negotiations" line as a
manifestation of weakness. This was apparent in his hydrogen
bomb claim and his references to the Beria purge and the current
unrest in the Satellites.
The "campaign for negotiations" was the predominant feature
of Soviet official statements and propaganda for the first six
months of the new regime. It differed from previous propa-
ganda offensives, such as the 1950 Stockholm appeal for a ban
on atomic weapons and the 1951-52 appeal for a five-power peace
pact, in that it was supported by concrete diplomatic moves.
Malenkov's statement on 15 March 1953, repeated in his 8 August
speech, that "there is not a single controversial or unsettled
question which could not be solved by peaceful means on the
basis of mutual agreement of the interested countries" was the
pivotal slogan of the campaign.
Moscow made most of its conciliatory gestures and conces-
sions during the first four months after Stalin's death. More
recently, the USSR has been calling on foreign governments to
meet it halfway, and Soviet propaganda is making much les3 use
of the theme of negotiated settlement of international issues.
In the course of the last six months, constant Western
diplomatic pressure aimed at forcing Moscow to abandon its
vague and generalized statements and to agree to serious nego-
tiations on concrete issues greatly reduced the Kremlin's free-
dom of maneuver. This situation was registered in the note of
3 November 1953 which made clear the Soviet leaders' strong
desire to avoid meeting with the three Western powers and their
unwillingness to settle any major East-West issue at the cost
of concessions involving the present frontiers of the Orbt.
This negative and inflexible stand produced a prompt and
unfavorable Western reaction. Molotov's unusual press confer-
ence on 1.3 November apparently was an attempt to counteract such
unfavorable comment, but he reiterated the note's unacceptable
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conditions. This was followed by the 26 November note which
proposed a four-power foreign ministers' conference in Berlin
and the 26 December note suggesting the 25 January 1954 date.
This tactical change probably represented an effort to repair
the damage to Moscow's propaganda position without, however,
modifying any basic substantive positions.
The four Soviet notes which preceded that of 26 November
clearly indicated that the USSR does not desire serious negotia-
tions for a German settlement, except on its own terms, and
then only in conjunction with five-power talks on "urgent inter-
national problems having great significance for the lessening
of international tension."
The USSR refused to attend a meeting of foreign ministers'
deputies on the Austrian state treaty and appeared reluctant
to include this question on the agenda of a foreign ministers'
conference. Soviet statements have suggested that the conclu-
sion of an Austrian treaty is linked with the settlement of the
German question,
With respect to a Korean settlement, so long as the Orbit
leaders see no real danger of a resumption of hostilities;, they
probably calculate that little will be lost by maintaining
the present deadlock and the division of Korea.
Indochina provides another example of the attempt to under-
mine non-Communist resistance to Communist pressure by ex-
ploiting hope of settling disputes through negotiation. Ho Chi
Minh's 29 November statement that he is "prepared to discuss"
a proposal from France for a settlement was probably aimed at
generating doubt and suspicion in the minds of non-Communist
Vietnamese, and at exploiting war-weariness in France. 1o's
move probably was intended to complement Soviet efforts to
induce France to pursue an "independent" foreign policy.
There is no convincing evidence that the Viet Minh urgently
desires the prompt conclusion of a negotiated settlement it
is likely that Orbit policy will continue in the immediate
future to be based on the belief that war of attrition in Indo-
china offers greater advantages than either peace or an expanded
Communist war effort.
Moscow's policy of stalling for time and avoiding commitments
has also emerged in its reaction to high-level suggestions from
the West that the Soviet fear of attack might be relieved by
some type of nonaggression pact. The USSR has strongly implied
that no European security negotiations could take place unless
Soviet terms on Germany are met,
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r
There have been several indications that the Soviet Union
will develop the security theme at the Berlin conference, but
the propaganda emphasis is likely to be placed on the dangers
emanating from American foreign bases and "aggressive" alliances.
Any proposals offered as an alternative to Western security ar-
rangements are not likely to go beyond 'a Soviet-sponsored system
of bilateral or multilateral security pacts which would be
intended to supersede the EDC.
In another field, Moscow's affirmative response to Presi-
dent Eisenhower's widely acclaimed invitation to "governments
principally concerned" to discuss his proposal for an inter-
national atomic energy pool reflected an awareness that out-
right refusal or delay would seriously damage its propaganda
position. Soviet propaganda has since attempted to utilize the
President's proposal to intensify the campaign for "an unccondi-
tional pledge by governments not to use atomic weapons."
The present Soviet foreign policy may be no more than a
device for stalling in the belief that the bloc's over-all posi-
tion will grow stronger and its freedom of maneuver greater with
the passage of time. As such, it would be part of the campaign
to isolate the United States by persuading the rest of the
world that only American intransigence and aggressive ambitions
thwart the establishment of secure peace. Moscow may hope that
this campaign will open the way to bilateral negotiations aimed
at detaching certain countries from the American-led coalition,
The recent overture to France offering an alternative to the NATO
alignment as a means of preventing the renascence of German mili-
tary power is a case in point.
1-rTIAL
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