CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000200200001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 9, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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C? FIVE TPA' OCI NO.4858
9 Apri.1 1954
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
DOCUMENT ~+O. _42.0
AUTJ F
N:_XT REViEYV DATE. __.
NO CHANGE !N CLA.`,:;.
C~ L'L4S if=1ED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
ET
25X1
25X1
State Dept. review completed
CONFIDENT M7
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared prima-
rily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It does not represent a complete coverage of all current
situations. Comments and conclusions represent the im-
mediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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9 Apr 54
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
EUROPEAN SECURITY THEME BECOMES MAJOR INSTRUMENT OF
SOVIET STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The USSR's note of 31 March to the three Western
powers again underlines the importance in Kremlin
strategy of a Soviet-sponsored system of security as
an alternative to EDC and as an instrument to sever
the ties that bind the West.
INDOCHINA ISSUES AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE . . . . . . . Page 8
Moscow and Peiping apparently hope to accomplish
at least two purposes in relation to Indochina at the
Geneva conference: (1) to heighten the prestige of
the Viet Minh; and (2) to compromise the French in the
eyes of the Vietnamese.
01
DANGER OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES INCREASING . . . . . Page 10
Conditions on the Arab-Israeli borders, generally
tense since the Qibya attack last October, threaten to
erupt in large-scale hostilities.
CHILEAN INSTABILITY INCREASING DESPITE AMERICAN AID
ON COPPER SURPLUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Chile's economic crisis will be eased but not solved
by the American purchase of 100,000 tons of its copper
surplus. President Ibanez will be helped by the move,
but the ineffectiveness of his domestic policies leaves
him in a steadily weakening position.
INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS REAFFIRM POLICY OF SUPPORTING
GOVERNMENT . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The recent congress of the Indonesian Communist
Party approved the policy of supporting the government
so long as this proves expedient. Most government
leaders still welcome Communist support, but a few
are becoming aware of its dangerous implications.
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DETERIORATING TRANSPORT FACILITIES WEAKEN IRAN . . . . Page 17
Progressive deterioration of Iran's railway and
road transport system seriously hampers the effective-
ness of the security forces, the build-up and mechaniza-
tion of the army, and the distribution of essential
commodities.
SPECIAL ARTICLE. USSR SUPREME SOVIET ELECTION FOLLOWS
STALIN PATTERN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
The results of the first post-Stalin election reflect
slight changes in the present regime's approach to intern'
problems. The composition of the new Supreme Soviet indi-
cates that the new leadership has not yet basically modi-
fied Stalin's government policies.
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Moscow's preoccupation with promoting China's claim to
great power status was again demonstrated when the Soviet Foreign
Ministry challenged Secretary Dulles' statement of 29 March
that Molotov had agreed at Berlin the Geneva conference would
not be a "Big Five" meeting. The Foreign Ministry argued that
the fact that only the five powers "will participate in the
examination of both the Korean and Indochina questions" proves
China will participate "on an equal basis with the other great
powers,"
The Soviet note of 5 April on administrative arrangements
advanced this same thesis and added a proposal that Chinese
should be an official language, along with English, French.,
and Russian, "during the whole conference." It stressed that
Korean would be an official language only during the considera-
tion. of the Korean question.
This line of argument may presage a Soviet demand at Geneva
that China be included in negotiations on the composition and
scope of the Indochina phase of the conference.
Moscow was also prompt to reject Ambassador Lodge's inter-
pretation that the Geneva conference and the Korean political
conference are virtually identical. Pravda denounced this as
an attempt to transform Geneva into a " wo-sided" conference
with North Korea, China and the USSR appearing as defendants
while the United States and its allies play the role of prose-
cutors. Chinese and North Korean media also attacked the United
States for seeking to discount Geneva "as a mere substitute for
the Korean political conference."
Endorsement by an international Communist organ of a cease-
fire in Indochina prior to Geneva supports other indications that
Communist tactics are aimed at forcing France to open truce talks
with the Viet Minh and thereby, in effect, extend de facto recog-
nition to the Ho regime. Pravda and Izvestia both reported a
resolution passed by the recent Vienna session of the Bureau of
the World Peace Council that an immediate truce would make it
possible to start negotiations between France and the Viet Minh.
Moscow has so far given slight attention to Secretary Dulles'
call for "united action" to prevent Communist conquest of Indo-
china, A New Times article interpreted this as foreshadowing
Chinese Na iona is participation in the war, inasmuch as the
United States is "least of all disposed" to commit its own forces.
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Peiping, however, commented on the whole speech, which it
characterized as an attempt to forestall any positive results
at Geneva and to coerce America's allies into a policy which
would increase international tension. The answer as to where
"united action" might lead, said Peiping, "has already been
given in the Korean war."
This may have been intended as a veiled warning that any
greater American assistance to the Franco-Vietnamese forces or
any "internationalization" of the war, might be countered by
increased Chinese aid to the Viet Minh. Such a warning presumably
would be designed to make the French more susceptible to Communist
proposals at Geneva or to a pre-Geneva cease-fire offer.
The resolution of the World Peace Council Bureau also suggests
the possibility that the Communists at Geneva may introduce an
Asian security proposal along the lines of Molotov's "all-
European collective security system" at Berlin. In commenting
on this resolution, Izvestia said on 6 April that the five great
powers, meeting for the first time at Geneva, together wits other
interested states, "must reach an agreement on general security
in the Far East."
Soviet propaganda continues to exploit the Kremlin's disar-
mament proposal and Molotov's European security plan as evidence
of honest aspirations for peace, in contrast to an alleged Ameri-
can "policy of strength" and military build-up. In this respect,
the USSR will probably choose the recent statements of American
policy on Indochina war as a peg on which to renew attacks on
"massive retaliation" and to expand discussions at Geneva to in-
clude propaganda on the need for disarmament and the abandonment
of "military groupings" in favor of wider forms of security,
At the scheduled meeting of the Disarmament Commission on
9 April, Soviet UN delegate Vyshinsky may argue that China's role
at Geneva later this month justifies the sending of an invitation
to Peiping to participate in the subcommittee. It is unlikely
that such a move would command the necessary seven votes, but it
might at least temporarily stall the functioning of the sub-
committee.
However, the first meetings of the Disarmament Commission
must be spent on procedural matters concerning the creation of
the subcommittee, and it is therefore unlikely that substantive
matters could be discussed before the Geneva conference, Such
a delay would afford Molotov an opportunity at Geneva to reopen
his Berlin proposal for a world disarmament conference of all
states for the purpose of signing a Geneva convention-type pledge
not to "use" atomic, hydrogen or other weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Molotov might repeat the argument he advanced at Berlin
that disarmament is too important to be handled in the "restricted"
confines of a. United Nations body.
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EUROPEAN SECURITY THEME BECOMES MAJOR INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGY
The USSR's note of 31 March to the three Western powers
again underlines the importance in Kremlin strategy of a
Soviet-sponsored system of security as an alternative to the
European Defense Community and as an instrument to sever the
ties that bind the West. Moscow probably believes that, in
conjunction with its propaganda campaign to play down the threat
of Soviet aggression, the concept of an all-European system of
collective security will exert a growing influence on Western
European opinion.
The Soviet concept of all-European collective security as
first officially enunciated at the Berlin conference evolved
.gradually. When Prime Minister Churchill launched the European
security question in May 1953, the Soviet press asserted that
"no formal guarantees can give confidence to the neighbors of
the German state."
Apparently beginning to see exploitable potential in some
form of security guarantee as an alternative to EDC, the USSR
then began to recall publicly the virtues of the French-Soviet
and British-Soviet treaties of mutual assistance and referred
to them as a possible framework for a wider European pact. The
Soviet note of 26 November maintained that security must be
based on the "concerted efforts" of all European states and that
these efforts should rest on the previously assumed obligations
of the powers concerned. Propaganda following this note gave
the impression that the Soviet security plan would follow the
principle of the British and French treaties. At that time, the
plan seemed merely a new package in which to wrap the familiar
denunciations of EDC, American bases, and German militarism,
rather than a new set of proposals.
As outlined at Berlin on 10 February, the Soviet plan for
security called for the participation of "32 European states"--
although these were not specified---in..a mutual assistance pact
which would exclude the possibility of its members joining any
other "contradictory" coalitions. The United States and China
would be allowed to send observers to whatever committees or
consultative bodies were established. Molotov would not commit
himself on the. question of whether the North Atlantic Treaty
was compatible with his concept of security for Europe. In
response to the negative reception of a plan that would exclude
the United States from Europe, Malenkov and Molotov in subs?quent
speeches emphasized that the security plan was flexible and open
to amendment.
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The newest Soviet maneuver officially rectifies Molotov's
miscalculation of the effects of proposing a plan which would
exclude the United States from Europe, and also addresses itself
to the other problem of NATO's compatibility with a cont:inent-
wide security plan. The Kremlin must hope to gain more serious
consideration for its proposals by admitting the legitimacy of
American interests in Europe.
The maneuver is a part, also, of recently intensified
propaganda contrasting alleged Soviet initiative in fostering
security with a continued American military build-up. Under-
scoring Soviet "reasonableness" by a substantive proposal1 at
this time may be another device to weaken Western unity prior
to its crucial test at Geneva.
Western government spokesmen expressed public skept'.cism
about the Soviet proposals. Some believe, however, that they
deserve serious study and may have a lasting effect on Western
public opinion despite the transparent absurdity of the offer
to join NATO. French and British officials were upset by the
quick unilateral American rejection of the Soviet proposals.
Soviet propaganda has already described this as an attempt by
the United States to impose its views on others,
Other British observers noted that the Communists are
enjoying some success in forming broad fronts based on "anti-
Fascism" and "collective security," They also noted the excellent
timing of the proposal during a period of serious public concern
with the H-bomb.
Regardless of the plan's immediate impact, however, the
Kremlin must hope that the concept of an all-European system of
security will exert a growing influence in Western Europ#. There
is some indication that a Satellite-sponsored conference will be
called to keep the Soviet plan before Western opinion as a
reasonable substitute for EDC. Moscow probably sees its security
plan as a source of lasting dissension among the Western powers,
even if EDC is ratified.
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INDOCHINA ISSUES AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
Moscow and Peiping have indicated that they will be more
interested in dealing with Indochina than with Korean questions
at the Geneva conference. They apparently hope to accomplish
at least two purposes in relatioi; to Indochina at the Geneva
conference: (1) to heighten the prestige of the Viet Minh;
and (2) to compromise the French in the eyes of the Vietnamese.
Possible solutions of the Indochina problem mentioned
either by the French or by Communist officials include partition,
elections supervised by neutrals, or formation of a coalition
government. There is very little indication, however, that
an agreement along any of these lines can be reached.
Orbit comment implies that an early cease-fire would en-
hance prospects for successful talks at Geneva. This comment
has been in the form of quotations from third person sources,
rather than of statements by responsible Communist spokesmen.
This suggests that it is designed to encourage war-weariness
among the French rather than actually to lead to a cease-fire.
Premier Laniel, in an address to the assembly in February,
laid down certain minimum conditions for a cease-fire which
were known to be unacceptable to the Viet Minh. His purpose
was to preclude the possibility of a truce.prior to the Geneva
conference. The physical problems of a cease-fire inherent
in the largely guerrilla nature of the fighting, as well as
the strong opposition of the Vietnamese government, remain
formidable obstacles to an agreement at Geneva.
The French hope of obtaining a cessation of hostilities
by inducing the Chinese Communists to discontinue aid to the
Viet Minh appears doomed in view of France's inability to offer
any tempting concessions to the Communists in return. Mc,re-
over, Peiping has regarded recognition and a place in inter-
national councils as its right, not as something to be pirchased
by real concessions. The logical Communist counter to a
demand for cessation of Chinese aid to the Viet Minh would
appear to be a demand for cessation of American aid to tie
French.
If, however, Peiping could win diplomatic recognition
from France and from certain Commonwealth states in exch.nge
for a paper promise to cease aid to the Viet Minh, it might
consider such a promise--coupled with a truce--a profitable
gesture. Under truce conditions, Peiping could reduce its
aid while the Viet Minh lived off its stockpile pending
developments on the political front.
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The fact that the Communists in the past have always
insisted on French withdrawal from Indochina as the only
basis for a settlement suggests that this will be their
starting position at Geneva. The French and Vietnamese
governments are fully aware, however, that an early French
withdrawal would mean the surrender of the country to the
Viet Minh and the subsequent spread of Communism in Southeast
Asia.
There have been several references by French or Orbit
officials to forms which an Indochina political settlement
might take, assuming the feasibility of a cease-fire. Soviet
diplomats in London have hinted that Moscow might be amicable
to the partition of Indochina along the 16th parallel, "if
the United States and France object to amalgamation of the
Vietnam and Viet Minh administrations." The Viet Minh, how-
ever, steadfastly claims sovereignty over all Vietnam, and
the French, for their part, recognize that loss of the Tonkin
delta would leave the remainder of Vietnam highly vulnerable.
French officials have predicted a Soviet proposal at
Geneva that all-Vietnam elections be held following a cease-
fire. They believe that Ho Chi Minh would win such elections,
but that a protracted truce would somewhat improve the non-
Communists' electoral prospects.
As in the case of cease-fire proposals, however, the French
would find it difficult to obtain the necessary consent of the
Bao Dai government to nationwide elections. The only pressure
the French could exert would be the threat to withdraw their
forces. Bao Dai has stated, however, that he is not seriously
concerned by the alleged disposition of the present Paris
government, or even a successor government, to follow Mendes-
France's policy and come to terms with the Viet Minh.
The problems of a political settlement are complicated
by the anomalous position of Laos and Cambodia. Each of these
countries is deeply affected by the war, yet each is disposed
to take a neutralist view of the fighting in Vietnam. Their
only interest in any Indochina settlement would be to secure
the elimination of Viet Minh-inspired dissident groups within
their own borders. Recent Viet Minh propaganda has built up
the "free" governments of these states, suggesting that the
Communists may introduce the question of their status at.
Geneva. Although Peiping and Moscow have not recognized
these regimes, they may demand that their spokesmen participate
in the Geneva conference.
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9 Apr 54
DANGER OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES INCREASING
Conditions on the Arab-Israeli borders, generally tense
since the Qibya attack of last October, threaten to erupt in
large-scale hostilities as a result of the bus incident at
Scorpion Pass in the Negev desert on 17 March and the Israeli
attack on the Jordanian village of Nahhalin on the night of
28 March. Israeli, Syrian and Jordanian troops concentrated
near the frontiers make this danger all the more acute (see
map, p. 12).
The danger that the Israeli government may adopt a
tougher policy offers a major threat. Prime Minister Sharett
favors a moderate course of action, but he has been subject to
considerable popular pressure to adopt a stronger line. In-
fluential advocates of a strong-arm border retaliation program
are Defense Minister Lavon, Army Chief of Staff Dayan, and.
ex-premier Ben-Gurion.
Israel's belligerent attitude is largely the result of
its frustration over continuing Arab hostility and unwilling-
ness to negotiate, and over UK inability to break the deadlock.
Its irritation has been increased by two recent Soviet vetoes
of UN resolutions on the Palestine dispute.
The Israelis are also growing hostile toward the UN Truce
Supervision Organization. Both American charge Russell in
Tel Aviv and Consul General Tyler in Jerusalem report a growing
campaign by Israeli officials, and especially by the press., to
discredit the neutrality of the UN observers headed by General
Bennike.
The Arab states have been pressing their diplomatic cam-
paign in Western capitals against Israel with new vigor. Jor-
dan and Syria now have large numbers of troops near the Israeli
border. Some 11,700 Arab Legionnaires are stationed in West
Jordan to provide quick support to the frontier national guard,
and it is estimated that approximately 12,000 Syrian troops, one
third of the army, are near the Israeli-Syrian border.
Egypt is preoccupied with its own internal problems, but
it may assume a more belligerent attitude as a result of Israel's
border raids on 2 April, which resulted in the death of three
Egyptian soldiers and the capture of another. These incidents,
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which resulted in the UN armistice commission's making twc de-
cisions condemning Israel, are regarded as "very serious" by
the Egyptians, who maintain that this is the "first time Israel
has dared attack and kill Egyptian soldiers."
Neither the Israeli nor the Arab governments desire full-
scale hostilities. The Sharett cabinet is aware of its depend-
ence on international, particularly American, good will. The
Arab governments, on the other hand, privately recognize the
military superiority of the Israelis. Moreover, the well-
disciplined Arab Legion troops in Jordan are under the restrain-
ing influence of British officers, and the present Damascus
government is a weak caretaker regime which has given no indi-
cation of wishing to provoke a war with Israel.
Major military moves by Israel or the Arab states are there-
fore improbable, but provocative incidents which could involve
the participation of larger forces are still likely. The Israeli
military leaders directly responsible for border security con-
tinue_to advocate a tougher policy against the Arabs.
Syria has long opposed Israel's diversionary canal project
on the upper Jordan River. The Damascus government is particu-
larly angered because the armistice commission, after several
border incidents had occurred in the Lake Tiberias region,
rendered a decision prohibiting even the traditional access by
Syrian civilians to the lake. This ruling may cause the Syrian-
Israeli armistice machinery to break down, as did the Jordanian-
Israeli commission.
A breakdown of the truce is most likely along the Jordanian-
Israeli armistice line. According to Consul General Tyler, the
British, who are generally well informed, are sufficiently con-
cerned over the border situation to be registering their sub=jects. Tyler points out that Israel's belligerency and its tend-
ency to retaliate have increased dangerously since 1952. With
the Arab Legion on the alert in the border regions, a confused
incident might lead to large-scale hostilities.
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000 1 Troop dispositions near
~. / Arab-Israeli border
Armistice Line 1 January 1950
International boundary
-~--~- Railroad (selected)
The Armistice Line encin es the present sooere,gn stale o:.
Itrael except the Gaza Strip, the Neuhal Zone, and the
YI~miIterized Zones
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9Apr 54
CHILEAN INSTABILITY INCREASING DESPITE AMERICAN AID ON
COPPER SURPLUS
Chile's severe economic crisis will be eased but not
solved by the proposed American purchase, announced on 25 March,
of 100,000 of the 180,000 tons of copper Chile has accumt_lated.
Although President Ibanez, who has consistently opposed copper
sales to the Orbit, will be helped by the new American move,
the :ineffectiveness of his domestic policies leaves him in a
steadily weakening position.
Chile's great dependence on copper sales, a government
monopoly, has made it reluctant to adjust to the worsenir_g world
metals market. For the current year, Chile counts on copper to
supply one fifth of government revenue and about one third of
its total foreign exchange earnings. Although the world price
for copper has been about 30 cents per pound since June 1953,
Chile continued to demand 35.5 cents until last December. This
policy was mainly responsible for the large accumulation of
stocks. Chile subsequently adjusted its price to the inter-
national market, but until mid-March insisted on payment in
dollars.
Even the sale of all Chile's copper production at current
prices would not solve either the domestic or foreign exchange
budget problems. The American-owned companies, which produce
about 95 percent of the copper, now plan to cut production one
third. Total estimated production this year is expected to be
about 250,000 tons, as compared to 422,000 tons in 1952 and
365,000 tons last year.
The foreign exchange losses are'already having serious ef-
fects. Payments for petroleum imports are past due, and Chile
may not be able to make the semiannual payments on Export-
Import Bank loans due in June and July. Meanwhile, inflation
continues unchecked. Since January 1953, living costs have
risen about 4.5 percent per month, and the peso has dropped
from about 125 to 285 to the dollar.
During the seven months of negotiations with the United
States, sales of copper to the Orbit were repeatedly advocated
by Chilean Communists and even by some Chilean officials. Do-
mestic political considerations prompted the repeal last.
September of decrees prohibiting trade with the Orbit and,
according to Finance Minister del Pedregal, were behind the
17 March cabinet statement implying an intention to sell copper
behind the iron curtain.
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Although the government has since formally assured Wash-
ington that it will confine its copper sales to Western markets,
some influential Chileans will probably continue to see Orbit
markets as a solution for the country's economic problems.
Consequently, official statements implying consideration of
Soviet offers will continue to seem good domestic politics as
well as an effective means of maintaining pressure on the
United States for economic aid.
Along with other Latin American countries, Chile has re-
peatedly held that the United States should provide some form
of preferential treatment for countries producing strategic
materials which they are barred from selling to the USSR. It
raised this point at Caracas, and will probably bring it up at
the special inter-American economic conference next fall.
Chilean demands along these lines will probably increase fol-
lowing the expected general relaxation of East-West trade re-
strictions.
Ibanez' ability to cope with Chile's continuing economic
and political problems is somewhat in doubt. The 76-year-old
president lacks majority support in either house of the legis-
lature, and the only political party with substantial repre-
sentation in the cabinet opposes his policy of not selling cop-
per to the Orbit. His domestic policies have involved inef-
fective compromises between various pressure groups, and the
American embassy reports that he is now "going through the
motions of being president, but that the motions are feeble
and have less and less meaning."
The prospects for improvement held out by any of the cur-
rently rumored political solutions are also poor. One s'ig-
gestion calls for the appointment of a cabinet of "competent
technicians" without regard to party affiliation, but the
necessary cooperation of the moderate parties is not in sight.
The Radical Party, Chile's third largest in terms of legis-
lative representation, is rumored to be flirting with the
leftist parties, including the Communists, in an effort to re-
establish the old Popular Front. Finally, some of Ibanez' ex-
treme rightist supporters are reported seeking an authoritarian
regime, but it is doubtful whether Ibanez still retains either
the prestige or the physical vigor for such a move.
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9 Apr 54
INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS REAFFIRM POLICY
OF SUPPORTING GOVERNMENT
The recently concluded fifth congress of the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) placed the party's fortunes in the hands
of aggressive young leaders and approved the policy of supporting
the government so long as this proves expedient. Government
leaders generally still welcome Communist support, although a
few are apparently becoming aware of its dangerous implications.
The proceedings of the congress, which was held in Djakarta
between 15 and 22 March, indicated that the PKI regards Moscow
as its primary source of inspiration, although Peiping's in-
fluence was discernible in some aspects of the party's program.
The first order of business was to confirm the authority of
three youthful leaders, referred to as of the "Lenin, Stalin
type," two of whom recently made prolonged visits to Moscow and
Peiping. A program was adopted emphasizing the need for better
party discipline and the development of a strong peasant follow-
ing. Pending achievement of these goals, the Communists would
continue to support the government.
The Masjumi and Socialist parties, the government's principal
opposition, were vehemently denounced as tools of Western
imperialism. Their leaders and moderate Vice President Hatta
were branded as virtual traitors.
President Sukarno and Prime Minister All both sent warm
greetings to the congress, and the opening reception was attended
by three cabinet ministers, two of whom delivered speeches thank-
ing the Communists for their support and asking that it continue.
These views were echoed publicly by the chairman of the National
Party (PNI), which controls the government. The mutual benefits
which derive from government-Communist cooperation appear to
preclude any early break.
The Communists did, however, speak at their congress of the
inevitability of an eventual break with the "national bourgoisie,"
i.e.,the National Party. In anticipation of this, they are
apparently attempting not only to strengthen their organization
and enlarge their following but also to bolster their claim of
being the true nationalists of Indonesia.
Along this line, the American embassy in Djakarta reports
that Chinese are apparently being removed from the local Communist
Party, and that a Chinese member of the PKI politburo was dropped
15
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by party action last October. A number of left-wing Chinese
groups have been merged under the leadership of a former editor
of a local Communist newspaper, and the group is evidently to
stay clear of any overt link with the Communists.
The surrender since the turn of the year of large numbers
of the Communist-oriented "Bamboo Spears" guerrilla organization
may have been inspired by the PKI. By this action, the Communists
could claim to be doing their patriotic duty in promoting stabilit
and at the same time feel freerto make new demands for stiffer XX
government action against Moslem insurgents. Actually, the
Communists stand to lose no military notentin.l
There are a few indications, however, that the Communists
may be overreaching themselves. The American embassy reports that
certain elements in the National Party are concerned about Communist
infiltration tactics and fear that their own claim to leadership
in the nationalist movement in Indonesia is being usurped. A
prominent party spokesman warned in a recent speech against ideo-
logical subversion, and there have been some indications that the
foreign minister is becoming concerned over the Communists increas-
ing influence.
A Foreign Ministry official told the American ambassador on
20 March that the prime minister and others were trying to engineer
a "turn" in Indonesian foreign policy, presumably toward the West,
but the significance of this assertion is obscured by the fact that
he was at the time asking that the United States not oppose
Indonesia's demand for Netherlands New Guinea.
Of perhaps greater ultimate significance for any future
increase in the Communists' influence is the fact that their
attacks on Islam apparently are arousing serious Moslem resentment.
Illustrative of this sentiment was the mobbing on 29 March of the
Communist secretary general, who had made anti-Islam remarks in
a speech in east Java. The real strength of the Masjumi, still
Indonesia's largest party, consists of its association with the
country's predominant religion.
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0lr 54
Progressive deterioration of Iran's railway and road trans-
port system seriously hampers the effectiveness of the security
forces, the build-up and mechanization of the army and the dis-
tribution of essential commodities (see map, p. 19). The govern-
ment is 'trying to prevent a total breakdown of transportation
facilities, but its rehabilitation program will probably fall
short of even minimum needs.
The single-track Trans-Iranian Railway, connecting the
Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea via Tehran, has suffered from
high operating costs and inefficiency since it was opened in 1939.
The railway functioned at peak capacity only when it was operated
by American engineers during World War II. Under the wartime
strain of increased loads, the roadbed and equipment deteriorated
and, when American personnel withdrew, regular maintenance was
discontinued. Large sections of rail now urgently need replace-
ment, and seepages are reported in tunnels, none of which ;ias
ever been repaired.
Between March 1952 and March 1953 the entire railway system
carried only 1,400,000 metric tons of freight, whereas the main
trunk line alone carried a wartime annual high of more than
2,500,000 tons. Nonmilitary tonnage hauled during the pear war
year was twice that of the prewar annual average. Iran's present
minimum rail transportation needs are between 3,000,000 and
4,000,000 tons annually.
The system is now incapable of handling an emergency. In
late 1953, when the railroad was allowed to haul only oil products
because of the extreme fuel shortage in the north, gasoline stocks
for Tehran's security forces dwindled to a 24-hour supply. The
railway was also unable to handle sugar received under the Ameri-
can emergency aid program; consequently, much of it had to be sold
at dockside, and the Iranian government earned much less from sugar
sales than anticipated. In January of this year, the railroad still
was refusing all shipments except petroleum and sugar.
Thirty-five percent of the 248 oil-burning steam locomotives
are inoperative or under repair, and about two thirds of these
will probably have to be scrapped. Even including the 40 new
oil-burning locomotives from England, which were put into opera-
tion during 1953, the total in operating condition is only 175.
More locomotives and several hundred additional freight cars are
required before cargo capacity can support present needs; and
much equipment will be needed to permit expansion of the economy.
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Tehran has taken positive steps looking toward rehabili-
tation including: (a) a purchase agreement of 16 February
providing for delivery within six months of the 24 English
locomotives still to be delivered under a 1939 order; and
(b) a request last month by the Transportation Ministry for
bids on a comprehensive list of locomotive spare parts to be
paid for with American aid funds.
The proposed railways budget for the year starting '21 March
1954 is $14,200,000, while former prime minister Mossadeq's
budget for 1953 called for only $113,000. But most of this
great increase is destined, as in the past, for expansion rather
than rehabilitation. Three economically unimportant extensions
of the railroad, under construction since 1939, are presently
being pushed because of their supposed political value. At
present the railroad is a liability from a military standpoint,
and large numbers of troops are required to protect it from
Tudeh sabotage.
As for road transport, the 6,000 miles of paved and gravel-
surfaced roads are in poor condition, and the private trucking
industry also suffers from shortages of spare parts and mainten-
ance technicians. Trucking through the area served by the rail-
way declined rapidly after 1939 as a result of government
discrimination, and the trucking industry is now incapable of
supplementing rail transport to the degree required.
The transportation crisis is growing in Persian Gulf ports,
and Point IV industrial machinery is piling up. In Azerbaijan,
the transport situation is even more tangled.
Railroad rehabilitation is recognized by Tehran as the key
to improving the standard of living. Large-scale American assist-
ance and continuous supervision will, however, be necessary to
carry out a sound program.
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 Max. Elev. 7,245 ft.
Vert. Exag. 53:1
Bushirs o
AL MANAMAH
BAHREIN
TRANSPORT FACILITIES
ABADAN
loo 200 360 4o S 0 6
Aho n
shah(
8. Shahpo,
qt'
ARABIA
Ad D.mma
`.. \
?'~??~IJEUT A\, .I KUWAIT SHIRAZ
'\ ZONE _ .e.,.nWArr*
..Y
~..~ International boundary
? National capital
Principal road (selected)
Th. ine.,nationl bowdoi.. ahm.n on ehi, my do ooe ``
:..ilr -pond in ell aaus no eh. bomd.- no -
ogna.d by eh. U. S. Go.a,nm.oe.
kodabad :
Other road or trail (selected) 0 100 200 300 400 MIS..
0cam--r
0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
-r-,- Railroad (seleCrd?
Intermittent stre m
-- -- Intermittent lake
Salt waste
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9 Apr 54
The results of the first post-Stalin election reflect
slight changes in the present regime's approach to internal
problems. The composition of the new Supreme Soviet also in-
dicates that the new leadership has not yet basically modified
Stalin's governmental policies (see charts, p. 23),
The transition from Stalin to the new "collective leader-
ship" was marked by a few purges and numerous shifts of person-
nel, but there were no widespread changes among the people on
whom the top leadership depends for active support. This con-
tinuity in personnel is clearly evident in the new Supreme
Soviet, which includes 43.2 percent of the delegates of its
predecessor as compared with 41.6 percent re-elected in 1950
(see chart 1, p. 23). A much smaller degree of continuity was
present in the 1946 body.
The traditional "honorary" nominations of members o: : the
all-Union party presidium and secretariat clearly indicated the
growing prestige and influence of Khrushchev0 According to
the central and republic press, Khrushchev, though number three
in official presidium listings, was nominated in a much greater
number of electoral districts than Molotov, the number-two man.
All other presidium and secretariat members received nom_fi_nations
consonant with their positions in the official listings; Malenkov,
for example, received 25 percent more nominations than Khrushchev
(see chart 2, p. 23).
While an analysis of the composition of the Supreme Soviet
reveals nothing about the true attitude.of the Soviet people, it
does reflect various aspects of the regime's current program.
The new regime's continuing preoccupation with the prob?.em of
consolidating its control, for example, has resulted in a some-
what higher level representation of party and government offi-
cials than in 1950 at the expense of the lower echelons. This
year all USSR ministers were elected to the Supreme. Soviet. In
1950 only one minister who was not also a deputy chairman of
,the Council of. Ministers.was.elected In.1950 there were 16
.chairmen. of rural soviets, the lowest-level official in the
hierar.cby.of soviets.,. while in 1954 only.five.were elected.
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The dominant position of the party is strikingly revealed
in the representation drawn from the two highest levels of the
party hierarchy. Of the 1,347 deputies elected, 177 are members
or candidates of the central committee and central auditing
commission of the all-Union party, while 263 are from their
equivalents at the republic level. At least another 144 axe
members of krai and oblast party bureaus in the Russian Repub-
lic, which has no republic organization and where the krai and
oblast bureaus play somewhat the same role as the republic
party central committees in the other 15 republics. Thus, elim-
inating. duplications, nearly half the deputies are members or
candidates of high-level party bodies. In addition, another
35 percent are members of lower-level party bureaus, or simply
party members.
All but 27 of the full members of the 1952 all-Union
central committee were elected to the Supreme Soviet. Most of
the 27 can be accounted for as dead, purged or removed from
office in apparent disfavor, or as holding positions not normally
represented in the Supreme Soviet. The omission of Yuri Zhdanov,
however, is the first indication that he has lost the prestige
or position which earned him a place on the 1952 central com-
mittee.
One of the long-term objectives of the party in the Soviet
Union has been to increase the role of women in public life.
Progress has been much slower than the early leaders seemed to
believe possible, but in recent years there have been signs of
solid gains in this regard. That the present regime is con-
tinuing this policy, and even accelerating it, is shown by the
increased representation of women in the new Supreme Soviet,
Women account for 25,3 percent of the deputies as compared with
21.3 percent in 1950 and 16.5 percent in 1937 (see chart 3,
po 23).
The slight increase from 61 to 69 in the military repre-
sentation over 1950 reflects the stable position of the armed
forces, but no increase in prestige. This is emphasized by the
fact that the 1937 and 1946 Supreme Soviets contained a much
higher number of military than those of 1950 or 1954 (see chart
4, p, 23).
The representation of security personnel, on the other hand,
suffered a nearly 50-percent decrease. Two factors help account
for this reduction. In the first place, the two separate security
ministries of 1950 (MVD and MGB) were united following Sta.l.in?s
death, reducing by half the number of ministers and administra-
tion heads. Secondly and more significantly, Beria's downfall
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marked a successful attempt to prevent the security apparatus
from becoming an independent power base. Curtailment of The
number of prestige positions for security personnel appears to
be part of a continuing effort to keep the security forces
subordinated to the party.
There was an eight-percent drop in the number of parry and
government officials which was for the most part taken up by
an increase in the number of intermediate and lower-level
economic personnel. The industry portion of these lower -t.evel
workers shows a remarkable stability in the relative proportions
of enterprise directors, technical experts, and foremen and bench
workers. The agriculture portion, however, shows a marke{3 shift
to the lower-level workers. This is in keeping with the regime's
"new look" agricultural policy with its emphasis on production
and workers closest to production. The continued high repre-
sentation of industrial workers, however, reflects an enduring
emphasis on industrial production.
The election was carried out under the 1950 rules, abed no
innovations in its conduct were noted. As before, the nomina-
tions were so arranged that when those nominated in more than
one electoral district had selected the district in which to
run, only one candidate was left in each district to be regis-
tered and hence to appear on the ballot. However, in five
cases--three in Azerbaijan and two in Kazakhstan--political or
other developments after the nominations forced the replacement
of the original nominee, emphasizing the last-minute nature of
the leadership shake-ups which recently wracked these republics.
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ELECTIONS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
CHART 2 HONORARY NOMINATIONS
Order of PRESIDIUM AND SECRETARIAT MEMBERS
Official Number of electoral districts in which nominated as reported
Listing in Pravda, Izvestia and the Republic Press
MALENKOV
MOLOTOV 240
KHRUSHCHEV
VOROSHILOV 158
BULGANIN 101
KAGANOVICH 102 CHART I
MIKOYAN IF67
SABUROV CONTINUITY
OF
PERVUKHIN REPRESENTATION
SBVERNIK ~41
PONOMARENk..(NN43
r,.,oN
POSPE LUV
SHATALIN
PERCENTAGE
OF
WOMEN
CHART 4
MILITARY
PERSONNEL
50
SECURITY
PERSONNEL
3rd Convocation
Re-elected to 3rd Re-elected to 4th
PARTY
OFFICIALS
SELECTED
OCCUPATIONAL COMPARISONS
OF DEPUTIES
LOWER LEVEL
AGRICULTURE
LOWER LEVEL
INDUSTRY AND
TRANSPORT t
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