CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000300240001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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jF?'E,4T*' OCI NO. 0627
8 October 1954
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY.
AUT
DATE EVIEWER:.1
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DOCUMENT NO.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared prima-
rily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It does not represent a complete coverage of all current
situations. Comments and conclusions represent the im-
mediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
VIET MINH ARMY UNDERGOING EXTENSIVE REORGANIZATION
AND INCREASING ITS FIRE POWER . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The Viet Minh army is undergoing an extensive
reorganization
e reorganization is being
accomplished largely through a reclassification of
personnel already under arms and is made possible
only by the continued heavy flow of illegal arms
shipments from Communist China. The Viet Minh may
hope to use its armed forces to influence the elec-
tions scheduled for 1956, and in any event would be
in a favorable position for a rapid conquest of the
entire country.
NEHRU'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO PEIPING . . . . . . Page 7
Indian prime minister Nehru's visit to Communist
China in mid-October is unlikely to result in any
formal agreement other than a joint communique reit-
erating the desire of the two countries to live peace-
fully side by side.
CURRENT SOVIET ATTENTION TO CHINA . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The Soviet Union has utilized the fifth anni-
versary of the founding of the Chinese People's
Republic to make its most lavish demonstration to
date of friendship and regard for China. The atten-
tion showered on Peiping would seem to indicate
Soviet willingness to grant China the prestige of a
great-power ally. In their public statements, how-
ever, the Soviet leaders give no indication of in-
creased military and economic support.
8 Oct 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY Page 2
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FRENCH PERSONNEL CHANGES TEND TO FAVOR COMMUNISTS
AND HOBBLE PRO-AMERICANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
While the current extensive reshuffling of key
French government personnel appears to be primarily
an effort by the Mendes-France regime to entrench
itself, it has resulted in the transfer of many pro-
American officials to relatively unimportant posts.
There is also evidence that the government has fol-
lowed a soft policy toward Communists. Current
disclosures of Communist infiltration, however, will
probably force Mendes-France to come to grips with
the problem of Communist influence in the government.
EGYPT FACES CRITICAL TEST OF ITS INFLUENCE IN THE
SUDAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
A decline in Egypt's prestige and serious dis-
sension within the governing National Unionist Party
in the Sudan confront the Nasr regime with a critical
test of its influence during the transitional period
before the Sudanese vote on whether to join Egypt
or become independent.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S NEW GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
The choice of the men who will fill the princi-
pal positions in the new Chinese Communist government
discloses significant changes in the relative stand-
ing of the Chinese leaders, although the top four
officials are not affected, Among those whose fortunes
have risen are Peng Teh-huai, new minister of national
defense; Teng Hsaio-ping, new Politburo member; and
Li Fu-chun, new chairman of the State Planning Com-
mission. Those who have apparently fallen from favor
include Kao Kang, Li Li-san, Ja.o Shu-shih, and An
Tzu-wen.
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THE SOVIET WORLD
The Soviet Union's initial comment on the London agree-
ments described them as an "attempt to bring back EDC under
another name," criticized British and French leaders for ig-
noring the wishes of their people on the German rearmament
question, and depreciated the "sensational concessions by
Britain" committing troops and a tactical air force to the
Continent. For the benefit of German listeners, Moscow in-
sisted that the London agreements are incompatible with German
reunification.
As the Western Allies worked out their London agreement
on West German rearmament, the USSR rapidly developed its
campaign to frustrate Western community defense plans. Mos-
cow's immediate aim seems to be to generate French public
and parliamentary pressure to defer ratification of the Lon-
don agreement pending further four-power talks. The Soviet
leaders so far have chosen to offer as bait ostensible modifi-
cations of their earlier terms for world disarmament and an
Austrian treaty.
Vyshinsky's UN disarmament proposal on 30 September was
intended to appear as a substantial concession, with France
as the principal target, Molotov gave a copy to the French
ambassador the day before Vyshinsky's speech, and remarked
that "account must be taken of the German problem,"
Moscow?s motivation in introducing the apparent con-
cessions in its disarmament plan was also revealed by the
French Communist press treatment of the subject. Communist
dailies in Paris developed the theme that it is no longer
essential to remilitarize Germany since with the Soviet dis-
armament concessions general disarmament will now be possible.
The Soviet press carried extensive reports on the French re-
action to Vyshinsky's proposal and attempted to create the
impression that the French non-Communist press believed the
proposal to be a step forward, caking the rearming of West
Germany unnecessary.
Moscow is keeping any new proposals on Germany in re-
serve, although past propaganda hints have suggested that
specious concessions on the principle of free all-German
elections may be forthcoming. The routine character of Mos-
cow's initial comment on the London conference suggests that
the Soviet leaders are still studying the situation created
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by the London agreements and may withhold any major counter-
initiative until the moment of greatest impact on the French
assembly's debate on ratification.
Moscow apparently is counting on strong opposition in
the assembly to forestall early implementation-of the London
decisions. The Soviet press hinted at assembly rejection by
quoting a French Communist paper to the effect that "it is
one thing to draw up plans, but another thing to bring them
to realization and to obtain the approval of public opinion."
During the London conference, the Paris Communist daily
L'Humanitd hopefully predicted that "popular action" would
render any decisions of principle reached at London a "dead,:
letter, as the EDC is a dead better."
Meanwhile, Moscow is strongly hinting through propaganda
and its officials in Austria that it is ready to accept treaty
limitations on the size and locations of its forces to remain
there after the conclusion of a treaty. This small concession
is well calculated to encourage the eagerness of Austrian lead-
ers for a resumption of treaty discussions. The most recent
Soviet propaganda on this new line flatly states, for the first
time, that Austrian participation in the USSR's proposed Euro-
pean security pact would result in the withdrawal of all Soviet
occupation forces.
Soviet efforts to normalize relations with Yugoslavia
moved one small step forward with the conclusion of trade
talks on 1 October 0 Representatives of Soviet foreign trade
organizations and the Yugoslav Chamber of Foreign Trade signed
in Belgrade an "arrangement" providing for about $2,500,000 in
trade each way. Twelve commodities are to be exchanged, the
bulk of them by the end of this year..
A Yugoslav government official subsequently disclosed to
the American embassy that the USSR had proposed further trade
talks on a government rather than a state enterprise level.
He said that the USSR indicated during the recently concluded
trade talks a desire to develop extensive trade with the Yugo-
slavs. It is doubtful, however, that such trade would include
any significant quantities of wheat, which Yugoslavia needs.
Increased domestic and Satellite demands are likely to preclude
the export of Soviet wheat in substantial quantities.
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VIET MINH ARMY UNDERGOING EXTENSIVE REORGANIZATION
AND INCREASING ITS FIRE POWER
The Viet Minh army is undergoing an extensive reorganization
made possible by continuing illegal arms shipments from Communist
China.
Following the Geneva truce agreement of 22 July, the Commu-
nists embarked on an accelerated program of reorganization and
training designed to develop a more modern army, one of greater
fire power and capable of large-scale operations
The reorganization is being accomplished largely through a
reclassification of personnel already under arms. Militia
forces are being converted to regional and regular.status, new
battalions are being formed from regional companies, and inde-
pendent battalions and regiments are regrouping to form new
divisions. Although there has as yet been no significant
numerical increase, some increment of the over-all strength is
to be expected with the incorporation into the armed forces of
Viet Minh war prisoners freed by the French and some Vietnamese
army deserters and prisoners still held in northern. Vietnam.
Without the continued flow of arms shipments from Communist
China--in direct violation of the Geneva agreement, which pro-
hibits the introduction of additional war materiel except on a
replacement basis--a reorganization of this scope would not be
.possible.. Since the cease-fire, this aid has resulted in a
50-percent increase in Viet Minh artillery weapons and has
included enough mortars and recoilless rifles to equip five
infantry Gdivis,ions Ammunition, shipments have also been, heavy.
The'American army attache in Saigon has pointed to the
possibility that the Viet Minh hopes, through a significant
strengthening of its armed forces' capabilities, to influence
the vote in'the.elections scheduled for July 1956 in all of
Vietnam. However, if the elections are canceled, or if the
Communists lose them, the Viet Minh would still be in a
f avorable,,position for a rapid military conquest of the
entire country.
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NEHRU'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO PEIPING
Indian prime minister Nehru's visit to Communist China in
mid-October is unlikely to result in any formal agreement other
than a joint communique reiterating the desire of the two coun- 25X1
tries to live peacefully side by side.
The publicity given by Nehru and Chou to the five princi-
ples of nonintervention and coexistence in the preamble of the
Sino-Indian treaty on Tibet strongly suggests that Nehru con-
siders this an adequate declaration of the peaceful intentions
of both countries. His coolness toward another Colombo powers
meeting and a conference of African and Asian powers supports the
belief that he feels the principles have been; sufficiently dis-
cussed. His apparent difficulty in evolving satisfactory work-
ing details for carrying out the principles is possibly one of
the strongest factors militating against the idea that a new
pact may come out of Peiping. An opening of diplomatic rela-
tions between China and Nepal., which may be announced after
Nehru's return, could not be considered a result of the visit
since India reportedly has already expressed itself in favor.
In addition, Nehru may feel that another bilateral or
multilateral nonaggression or Locarno-type treaty with China
could be interpreted as a leftward shift in India's orienta-
tion--an interpretation'he would take pains to avoid. India
now has no political commitments to Western nations other than
those in the Commonwealth, and a pact with China would unbal-
ance this situation. Nehru's sensitiveness on the question of
neutrality was illustrated as recently as late September by
his unwillingness to have China invited to the conference of
African and Asian nations proposed by Indonesia
Nehru's uneasiness over China's real intentions in Asia
is illustrated by the fact that in June both he and the Bur-
mese prime minister indicated to Chou their fears of Chinese
aggression. 4;hou is said to have reassured them. In addi-
tion, Chou supposedly promised to look into the question of
dual nationality of Chinese residents in Burma and Indonesia.
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China has not acted as yet, however, and Chinese activi-
ties and propaganda aimed at Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thai-
land have not been calculated to eliminate fear. In early Sep-
tember, Nehru expressed perturbation over the Chinese Communist
shelling of Quemoy Island. Nehru is unlikely to enter into an
agreement with China until he can satisfy himself as to China's
intentions, especially if he is beginning to fear China's mili-
tary might, since this. might preclude his later seeking assist-
ance from the West.
While Nehru publicly deplores the Manila pact, there is
no sign he willLmake it a major issue either domestically or
internationally or that he'will seek a treaty with China to
counteract it. Indonesian piemier Ali Sastroamidjojo's fail-
ure when he was in New Delhi from 22 to 25 September to gene-
rate enthusiasm for a Locarno-type pact or even for a confer-
ence of Colombo or Afro-Asian powers is indicative of Nehru's
unwillingness to be pushed at this time.
Nehru, probably better than All, recognizes the lack of
support in Asia for a new nonaggression treaty. Pakistan is
already committed to the Manila agreement. The Ceylonese gov-
ernment is sympathetic toward it. Even in Indonesia, there are
strong objections to a nonaggression pact. The prospect for
any firm agreement evolving from Nehru's visit to Peiping there=
fore appears to be dim.
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CURRENT SOVIET ATTENTION TO CHINA
The Soviet Union utilized the fifth anniversary of the
founding of the Chinese People's Republic to make its most
lavish demonstration to date of friendship and regard for
China. The Soviet delegation to Peiping, headed by Khrushchev,
and including his fellow Presidium members Bulganin and Mikoyan,
the editor of Pravda and the minister of culture, was the high-
est level delegation to leave the USSR since Malenkov and
Zhdanov went to the opening of the Cominform in 1947. This
is the first time Soviet leaders of such stature have made a
public visit to China. In Moscow the remaining six Presidium
members, including Malenkov and Molotov, attended the Chinese
ambassador's reception.
This unprecedented attention climaxes a growing Soviet
acknowledgment over the past 18 months of the role of China
in the Communist world. With the end of the Korean war,
Moscow stepped up its promotion Of China's stature as a world
power whose recognition is essential for world peace and used
the Geneva conference to reinforce this thesis. Since the
death" of Stalin, Moscow has also begun to recognize Mao as
a Marxist theoretician, and this year accorded him the un-
usual honor of including him in the official philosophical
dictionary, the only living Communist leader-so listed.
This trend has been accompanied by Soviet economic aid
to China which, although it has included key industrial and
military equipment, has been modest in scale. There has been
little emphasis by the USSR of its military commitment to
Peiping under the Sino-Soviet treaty. Moscow has stressed
instead, particularly since the Korean settlement, that China
is the "stabilizing factor" for peace in the Far East.
Peiping has always been far more eager to make explicit the
joint obligations of the Sino-Soviet treaty than has Moscow,
China's recent moves against Formosa and the offshore
islands have evoked little official response from the USSR.
Soviet media have been cautious in reporting Chinese claims,
initiating little independent comment and relying largely
on quoting Chinese statements. Any mention of Soviet commit-
ment under the Sino-Soviet treaty has been scrupulously
avoided.
This general Sovi,et;pattern was followed by Khrushchev
in his address~,n? Peiping on 2 October. The Soviet party
leader paid great tribute to China's accomplishments in
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preparing for Socialism, reaffirmed the inviolability of Sino-
Soviet friendship,and'reiterated the current Soveit stress on
peaceful coexistence. He commended Chou--En-lei's call for con-
sultations among Asian powers based on his five principles of
nonaggression.
Although Khrushchev gave the first general pledge of
support by a top-ranking Soviet leader to Peiping's desire
to "liberate" Formosa, he avoided the question of the kind,
degree and timing of Soviet support. He made no mention of
the Sino-Soviet treaty in connection with Formosa.
Ambassador Bohlen,in commenting on these points, noted
that the Khrushchev speech seemed to put the USSR behind the
Chinese position on Formosa, but that he found it difficult
to believe Moscow was prepared to run a serious risk of in-
volvement in a major war on this issue. He further reported
that in Moscow,Malenkov, Molotov, and Voroshilov rather point-
edly ignored any reference to the liberation of Formosa in
their replies to the Chinese ambassador's toast to China's
determination to achieve this goal.
Bohlen found further evidence of the USSR's desire to
soft-pedal the degree of its commitment to the Formosa cam-
paign in an unusual procedure employed by the Soviet censor in
dealing with the Moscow AP correspondent's story on the
Khrushchev speech. The censor pointed out that the journalist
had incorrectly quoted Khrushchev as stating that the "Soviet
Union supported China's determination'.' on the Formosa issue,
whereas Khrushchev had merely said that the "Soviet people"
supported this.
In his speech, Khrushchev failed to repeat the long-
standing Soviet,boast of:'having played the major role in
defeating Japan in World War II. He acknowledged for the
first time that the Soviet army came "to aid" the Chinese
people after the USSR had defeated Hitler. He also went
beyond any previous Soviet spokesman by explicitly crediting
the Chinese Communist Party'with having evolved the "brilliant
strategy and tactics" of the Chinese revolution. He stated
that the "Chinese people are advancing along the correct
road of their own." Prior to Stalin's death, Soviet theore-
ticians had shown great reluctance to acknowledge the success
of Mao's early tactics, which were at times in direct contrast
to those proclaimed by the Comintern under Stalin.
Khrushchev spoke of future Soviet economic aid mainly
in the form of assistance to the 141 projects announced in
1953 as the Soviet contribution to China's first Five-Year
Plan. But the Chinese were assured "that the Soviet people
will continue to be their trustworthy, true friends9! and will
support future Chinese development.
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FRENCH PERSONNEL CHANGES TEND TO FAVOR COMMUNISTS
AND HOBBLE PRO-AMERICANS
While the current. extensive reshuffling of key French
government personnel appears to be primarily an effort by
the Mendes-France regime to entrench itself, it has resulted
in the transfer of many pro-American officials to relatively
unimportant posts. There is also evidence that the government
has followed a "soft policy" toward Communists. The replace-
ment of pro-American officials apparently springs from a
desire for "more independent" policies; current disclo-
sures of Communist infiltration, however, will probably force
Mendes-France to come to grips with the problem of Communist
influence in the government.
Personnel shifts in the Foreign Ministry have already
removed from several key spots officials who were close to
former foreign minister Bidault. While numerous transfers
could be expected during what amounts to the first drastic
administrative shake-up under the Fourth Republic, even the
French press is speculating that the premier is deliberately
shifting pro-American officials to relatively remote or in-
active spots.
Among the most important changes has been the replace-
ment of outspokenly pro-EDC Herve Alphand, permanent delegate
to NATO, by Maurice Couve de Murville, former ambassador to
Egypt, who in the past has not hesitated to undercut Bidault's
pro-American policies. Pro-American Guy de la Tournelle,
since 1950 director of political affairs and third-ranking
official in the Foreign Ministry, has been appointed ambas-
sador to Spain.
Pierre de Leusse, who resigned last year. as head of the
Foreign Ministry's press section in protest against Bidault's
pro-EDC policy, has just been appointed ambassador to Warsaw.
The significance of this move may become clear if Pierre
Charpentier, who is scheduled for a post abroad when his
present office is set up as a new Ministry of Foreign Trade,
is also assigned to an Orbit country, Charpentier is known
to favor expanded East-West trade, has worked for a reduction
in strategic trade controls, and claims to have Mendes-France's
support for continued trade with north Vietnam.
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Considerable concern has been expressed in the press and
among the opposition over the government's move to tighten
control over channels of information. The recent appointment
of a new direotor of the semiofficial Agence France Presse
has been explained publicly by a government spokesman as a
move to give the agency "a greater independence in its in-
formationo" The new director is a close associate of Interior
Minister Mitterrand, who has been regarded as lenient toward
Communists. The appointment of a new director of the nation-
alized radio is also planned.
Mendes-France has already shown his willingness to
manipulate the press. Just prior to the assembly vote on EDC,
the government ordered AFP to withhold news of Britain's
clarification of its stand on the defense community.
Even in the early weeks of the Mendes-France regime,
when the premier was occupied at Geneva, there were indica-
tions the new government would follow a 14soft policy" toward.
Communists. The reappointment of an avowed Communist to the
National Center of Scientific Research in early July was
noted by the American embassy in Paris as reversing the trend
of previous governments toward removing Communists from
sensitive positions.
Most recently, political adversaries of the premier
have seized on the dismissal of police inspector Jean Dides,
head of an anti-Communist section, as another indication of
Mendes-France's bad faith and pro-Communist leanings. The
subsequent revelation of information leaks by key defense
officials to Communists has, however, removed the finger of
suspicion from Mendes-France in this matter, although the
extent of Mitterrand's involvement is still not clear.
The leaks of secret defense information, described in
the press as "France's biggest postwar scandal," have already
led to the questioning of top Communist leaders. An aroused
public opinion will. probably compel Mendes-France to give
attention to the problem of his own relationship with the
Communist Party. This may result in friction between the
premier and some of his closest advisers.
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EGYPT FACES CRITICAL TEST OF ITS INFLUENCE IN THE SUDAN
Egyptian prestige in the Sudan has been impaired by re-
cent developments in Cairo and by serious dissensions within
the governing National Unionist Party in the Sudan. Popular
support for the pro-Egyptian Unionist Party is threatened by
growing coolness toward the Nasr regime among leaders of the
important Moslem Khatmia sect. As the majority of the Union-
ist Party deputies belong to this sect, Prime Minister Azhari's
prounionist policies may face new difficulties when the Suda-
nese parliament reconvenes in November.
Differences between Nagib and Nasr, further dissension
within the Revolutionary Command Council, and the Cairo re-
gime's policy toward the Moslem Brotherhood have lessened Su-
danese desire for political union with Egypt. Many of the
Khatmia initially supported the Egyptian-dominated Unionist
Party solely as a means of ending British administration of
the country. This element now resents Egypt's efforts to ex-
tend its influence and to manipulate Sudanese politics.
The Unionist Party won its victory in the November 1953
elections for the first Sudanese self-governing parliament,
thanks largely to the popular support of the Khatmia. Prime
Minister Azhari has accordingly sought to maintain a balance
inthe cabinet between Khatmia and prounionist politicians.
All Mirghani, head of the Khatmia, is considered the most
influential figure on the Sudanese political scene. The grow-
ing friction between Mirghani and the Nasr regime constitutes
a serious threat to Azhari's prounionist government. It also
lessens the prospect that the Sudanese will choose political
union with Egypt rather than independence when they vote on
their future status at some date before January 1957.
Major Salah Salim's sudden and unexpected visit to Khar-
toum on 30 September to confer with Unionist Party officials
suggests that the Nasr regime is concerned over the split with-
in the party and Egypt's declining influence among tae Khatmia.
If Major Salim is unable to effect a reconciliation between the
two factions, Egypt may expect a further loss of influence in
the Sudan and increasing opposition to union of the two coun-
tries.
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S NEW GOVERNMENT
The choice of the men who will fill the principal positions
in the new Chinese Communist government discloses significant
changes in the relative standing of Chinese leaders, although
the top four officials are not affected (see chart, p. 16). The
election conducted in the Chinese National People's Congress in
September supports indications of the past several years that
the big four, in order, are Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou
En-lai and Chu Teh.
Mao, who is to be chairman of the Republic for four more
years, will almost certainly remain in over-all control, although
his activity may be reduced by ill-health. Liu, as chairman of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, will be
in a position to exercise power second only to Mao's and, appar-
ently, to assume primary authority on Mao's death or incapacita-
tion. Chou En-lai will continue as premier and foreign minister
in the number three job. Chu Teh, as the only vice chairman of
the Republic, will be the formal successor to Mao's office,
although not to his authority.
Administration of government affairs is in the hands of the
State Council, consisting of 35 ministers and commission chair-
men and presided over by Chou En-lai. In nearly all cases,
ministers who were replaced were named vice chairmen or members
of the Standing `Committee . of,. 1tus. tcong'es ",;:,where they will be
under the supervision of Liu Shao-chi and will not have a direct
hand in the daily administration of the government.
Peng Teh-huai, until recently commander of Chinese Communist
forces in Korea, has apparently assumed direct control of the
armed forces in place of former commander in chief Chu Teh.
Peng was named as the new minister.. of national defense, a
position he is expected to fill aggressively and well.
Both Peng and Chu are among the15,vice chairmen of the
new National Defense Council, as are all field army commanders.
Since there is no direct command channel: between this body and
the new Ministry of National Defense, the council will probably
function largely as an advisory body to Peng and to Mao Tse-
tung, who heads the council.
The rapid rise of Teng Hsiao-ping in recent years was
confirmed during the congress, as Peiping identified him for
the first time as a member of the Chinese Communist Party
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politburo. Teng retained his position as a vice premier and
was also appointed a vice chairman of the National Defense
Council.
A similar rise in the stature of J.i Fu-chun was confirmed
by the congress, which named him to replace Kao Kang as chairman}
of the important State Planning Commission, one of the two-or
three top jobs in the Chinese Communist economy. Li, who may
like Teng be a new member of the politburo, was formerly second
in importance to Kao Kang in Manchuria.
The congress appeared to confirm the fall from favor of
Kao Kang, long the party's boss in Manchuria and until this
year one of Communist China's big five. Kao, who has been out
of the news since January of this year, was not mentioned in
any way during the congress session and has apparently been
disciplined sharply for challenging the party leadership.
Li Li-san, onetime leader of the Chinese Communist Party
and rival of Mao Tse-tung, was also dealt a blow by the con-
gress, in that he was not retained as minister of labor or
named to any other post. Li had been made the scapegoat in
1931 for the failure of the Comintern line in China in previous
years., and was ordered to Moscow for, reindoctrination. He
returned to China in 1945, reportedly as a Kremlin-supported
check on Mao, and was re-elected at that time to the party's
central committee, but he never regained anything approaching
his former power.
Two other major figures seem to be in trouble, judging
from the proceedings of the congress. Jao Shu-shih, who had
been director of the party's highly important organization
department and the regime's top official in East China, was
completely ignored by the congress. An Tzu-wen, a theorist
who had been Jao's deputy in the organization department,
lost his job as minister of personnel for the government when
that post was eliminated by the congress, and he was not given
any other job.
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imp
GOVERNMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China Chu Teh, Vice Chairman of the Republic
STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
STATE COUNCIL
Chairman
Chairman
Premier
Mao Tse-tung
Liu Shao-chi
Chou En-lai
Vice Chairmen
Vice Chairmen
Vice Premiers
Chu Teh. Hsu Hsiang-chien
Peng Teh-huai Nieh Jung-chen
Lin Piao Yeh Chien-ying
Liu Po-cheng Cheng Chien
Ho Lung Chang Chih-chung
.Chen Yu -Fu Tso-yi
Teng Hsiao-ping Lung Yun
Lo Jung-huan
81 Members
Soong Ching-ling Huang Yen-pei
Lin Po-chu Peng Chen
Li Chi-shen Li Wei-han
Chang Lan Chen Shu-tung
Lo Jung-huan Dalai Lama
Shen Chun-ju Saifudin.
Kuo Mo-jo
65 Members
Minister of Internal Affairs: Hsieh Chueh-tsai
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Chou En-lai
Minister of Defense: Peng Teh-huai
Minister of Public Security: Lo Jui-chung
Minister of Justice: Shih Luang
Minister of Supervision; Chien Yung
State Planning Commission; Li Fu-chun
National Constr. Commission: Po I=po
Minister of Finance: Li Hsien-nien
Minister of Food: Chang Nai-chi
Minister of Commerce: Tseng Shan
Minister of Foreign Trade: Yeh Chi-chuang
Minister of Heavy Industry: Wang Ho-shou
1st Mine of Machine Building: Huang Ching
2nd Min. of Machine Building: Chao Erh-lu
Minister of Fuel Industries: Chen Yu
Minister of Geology: Li Ssu-kuang
Minister of Building: Liu Hsiu-feng
Chen Yon Ho Lung
Lin Piao Chen Yi
Peng Teh-huai Ulanfu
Teng Esiao-ping Li Fu-chun
Teng Tzu-hui Li Hsien-nien
Minister of the Textile Industry:
Minister of Light Industry:
Minister of Local Industry:
Minister of Railways:
Minister of Communications:
Min. of Posts & Telecommunications:
Minister of Agriculture:
Minister of Forestry:
Minister of Water Conservancy:
Minister of Labor:
Minister of Culture:
Minister of Higher Education:
Minister of Education:
Minister of Public Health:
Physical Culture and Sports Comm.:
Nationalities Affairs Comm.;
Overseas Chinese Affairs Comm.:
Secretary General of State Council:
Chiang Kuang-nai y
Chia To-fu
Sha Chien-li
Teng Tai-yuan
Chang Po-chun
Chu Hsieh-fan
Liao Lu-yen
Liang Hsi
Fu Tso-yi
Ma Wen-jui
Shen Yen-ping
Yang Hsiu-feng
Chang Hsi-jo
Li Teh-chuan
Ho Lung
Ulanfu
Ho Hsiang-nung
Hsi Chung-hsun
People's Supreme Court President: Tung Pi-wu
Procurator General: Chang Ting-cheng
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