CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000400170001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 4, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO.
1 `+
OCI NO.1052/55
4 February 1955
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
iii
CURRENT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
i3CC
I DOCUMENTNQ.
25X1 NO CHANGE IN CtASS_ n "-~
cLASS. CHANGED TO:
State Dept. review completed 1 iVEXT REVIEW DATE:
M H '
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40017010
REVIEWER. 25X1
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared prima-
rily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It does not represent a complete coverage of all current
situations. Comments and conclusions represent the im-
mediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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4 February 1955
This publication ceases in its present form with this issue.
Beginning next week it will be incorporated in a new weekly
publication: The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary.
25X1
HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON
Assistant Director,
Current Intelligence
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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... Page 4
Communist strategy on Formosa issue--inflationary
pressures in Eastern Europe.
INDIA SEEKING TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
India, since the Geneva conference in July 1954,
appears to have become increasingly concerned over the
spread of Communism in Southeast Asia and as a result
is attempting to increase its own influence in the
area. Indian advances will appeal in varying degrees
to the Southeast Asian government, but Peiping is
unlikely to acquiesce in the development of a strong
Indian sphere of influence around China's southern
periphery.
THE CURRENT BRITISH ATTITUDE ON MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE . Page 8
Britain apparently still considers Egypt the key
to the defense of the Middle East, and remains con-
vinced there can be no effective area defense arrange-
ment without direct Western participation.
PAKISTAN'S LEADERS FACE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING
POLITICAL STABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Efforts by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and
his small ruling group to establish a constitutional
framework for government in Pakistan are likely--as
in the past--to be interrupted by irresponsible action
on the part of dissident politicians. The oligarchy's
immediate reaction may be to cease serious efforts to
restore constitutional government.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN TURKEY . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Turkey's financial situation, both foreign and
domestic, has steadily deteriorated during recent
months despite good prospects for long-range economic
development. The Menderes government appears deter-
mined to continue an ambitious program of military
and economic development regardless of inflation and
heavy foreign indebtedness.
THE FATE OF STALIN'S LAST HIGH COMMAND . . . . . . . Page 16
The fact that at least half the members of
Stalin's 1952 presidium have lost their position on
the presidium and are no longer a part of the central
administration in Moscow is a reflection of an im-
portant disavowal of the Stalinist heritage and of
considerable political turbulence during the past
two years.
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THE SOVIET CWORLD
While Peiping stepped up the pressure on the offshore
islands last week, Moscow sought to maintain maneuverability.
Through diplomatic channels Moscow moved to obtain UN consid-
eration of Peiping's main charge--American aggression against
China--while together with Peiping it opposed limiting dis-
cussion to the offshore islands. Both governments hinted that
Peiping would eventually attend Security Council discussions.
They may consider that by airing Peiping's charges against the
United States in the UN they can gauge the degree to which the
United States and particularly its major allies are prepared
to compromise.
Ambassador Bohlen believes that the Soviet Union, in its
activities at the UN,, may be trying to provide face-saving
cover for Chinese Communist attendance without retracting the
position that the Formosa question is an internal affair. It
may also hope to provide the Chinese Communists with an inter-
national forum and move them one step closer to UN membership.
Behind the present Communist strategy may well lie some
difference of interest between the USSR and its ally on this
issue. Peiping's desire to seize Formosa has probably brought
it to actions that conflict with Moscow's desire to reduce
international tension while strengthening the bloc for long-
term competition with the West. Moscow has consistently left
the Sino-Soviet alliance unmentioned in relation to Formosa.
The major Sino-Soviet communique of 11 October 1954 enunci-
ating agreement on various areas of Sino-Soviet relations con-
tained no Soviet commitment on Formosa but merely the usual
denunciation of American aggression. Khrushchev, speaking in
Peiping at that time, carefully avoided anything resembling a
commitment of support for China's aim of liberating Formosa,
promising only the support of the Soviet "people," not the
government. Since then Moscow has given no evidence of a
change in its position on Formosa.
Whether or not the Chinese Communist offshore islands
campaign was more the result of Peiping's impetuosity than a
joint strategy, the importance of the Sino-Soviet alliance to
both powers probably now has resulted in a co-ordinated strategy
to gain maximum advantage by a combination of diplomatic and
military action. The USSR'can be expected to deter Communist
China from action involving a substantial risk of general or
major war in the Far East. Peiping, it seems, will pursue a
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relatively cautious military policy for the time being--one
designed to avoid involvement with American forces--regardless
of its attitude toward UN action on a cease-fire.
In Eastern Europe; the general failure of the Satellite
economies to meet production targets for consumers' goods
since the inauguration of the new course has resulted in
increased inflationary pressure. Although consumers' goods
have become available in greater quantities during the past
18 months, wage increases, price reductions, and lower taxes
have caused a disproportionately rapid advance in purchasing
power. Rumors of an impending currency reform have been noted
in varying intensity in Poland, Rumania, Hungary and East Germany.
Only in East Germany, however, do they appear plausible and even
there the regime will have to move cautiously in order to avoid
a crushing blow to worker and peasant morale,
In Poland, a recent statement by the first secretary of
the United Workers' Party, Boleslaw Bierut, before the third
plenum of the party's central committee on 25 January reveals
that during 1955 Poland will continue to implement its new
course policies and de-emphasize the rapid development of
heavy industry. Hungary, on the other hand, while continuing
the new course, plans a significant increase in the rate of
industrial growth for this year.
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INDIA SEEKING TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
India, since the Geneva conference in July 1954, appears
to have become increasingly concerned over the spread of Commu-
nism in Southeast Asia and as a result is attempting to increase
its own influence in the area. Indian advances will appeal in
varying degrees to the Southeast Asian governments, but Peiping
is not likely to acquiesce in the development of a strong
Indian sphere of influence around China's southern periphery.
India, which has long tended to assume that Southeast Asia
lies within its orbit, had its complacency shaken by the Commu-
nist gains at Geneva, Prime Minister Nehru warned Ho Chi Minh
last October that the Communists would "run into trouble" if
they sought to extend their holdings beyond Vietnam. Nehru's
attitude further hardened following his visit to Communist
China, during which he was apparently impressed by Chinese unity
and strength. An additional factor may have been British
influence. London, while encouraging Nehru's ambitions in
Southeast Asia, has long sought to induce him to take a more
realistic view of Peiping.
Apparently believing that South Vietnam will eventually
fall under Chinese domination, New Delhi has reaffirmed the
position that Cambodia and Laos are within its sphere of
influence by recognizing Cambodia on 13 December and by posting
a consul general to Vientiane in Laos on 8 January.
Meanwhile, Indian members of the International Control
Commission in both Laos and Cambodia have injected themselves
into local politics. In Laos, where the cease-fire agreement
calls for a political settlement between the royal government
and the Communist-controlled Pathet Lao, the Indians have
sought to "bring the two sides together." They are convinced
that the Pathet Lao are not really Communists but good nation-
alists who can be weaned from the Viet Minh. In Cambodia there
has been Indian support for Son Ngoc Thanh, a former dissident
leader, in his effort to make a political comeback at the
expense of the king.
India may see the Afro-Asian conference as an opportunity
to promote its leadership among Southeast Asian countries.
The American embassy in New Delhi believes that Nehru can be
counted on to combat any Chinese Communist effort to dominate
the conference, and that he might take the initiative himself.
He may press for wide acceptance of the so-called five principles
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of coexistence in the hope that by further committing Peiping
to the principle of nonaggression, a powerful moral force will
develop which the Chinese will find difficult to ignore.
Responsiveness to Indian leadership varies. Burma and
Indonesia are the most favorably inclined. The Cambodian king
occasionally displays neutralist tendencies, and the Laotian
premier holds views similar to._those of the Indian truce offi-
cials regarding the Pathet Lao. Both countries, however, as
well as South Vietnam, have increasingly turned toward the
United States. Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines are the
least susceptible to Indian blandishments, although there are
elements in each which favor Indian views.
In its effort to cultivate New Delhi, Peiping has been
tolerant of India's ambitions since India has not attempted to
include military commitments in its program.
China's policy is probably only a temporary expedient, however..
Chou En-lai has often indicated that the Communists aim to win
control of all Vietnam, to neutralize Laos and Cambodia and to
frustrate any Western-supported Southeast Asian alliance.
The Viet Minh, in violation of the Geneva agreement, is
continuing to improve its military capabilities with Chinese
assistance, is aiding the Pathet Lao to consolidate its control
of northern Laos, and is maintaining an active underground in
South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. There are, moreover,
numerous indications that Peiping. is attempting to expand its
influence elsewhere in Southeast Asia, both by diplomacy and
subversion, and it may eventually come into conflict with
Indian efforts.
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THE CURRENT BRITISH ATTITUDE ON MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE
Britain apparently still considers Egypt the key to
the defense of the Middle East, and remains convinced there
can be no effective area defense arrangement without direct
Western participation. Although London has welcomed the re-
cently announced plans of Turkey and Iraq to conclude a pact,
it does not expect this agreement to contribute much toward
regional defense and is now attempting to prevent any adverse
Egyptian action.
The British believe the participation of Egypt in any
Middle East defense system is essential, partly because of
its location and manpower, but especially because of the Suez
base with its workshops and storage depots. Under the Suez
agreement concluded with Egypt last summer, Britain retains
for seven years the right to reoccupy the base in the event
of an external attack on Turkey or any signatory of the Arab
League Collective Security Pact. Having achieved this right
after three years of difficult negotiations, Britain does
not want to jeopardize it by alienating Egypt.
British officials' assessment of the requirements for
a regional defense agreement has made them unenthusiastic
toward the "northern tier" approach, the first step in which
was the Turkish-Pakistani pact concluded in April 1954. Lon-
don believes that no organization for this area can be ef-
fective without direct Western participation. Foreign Secre-
tary Eden has stated, however, that he is equally anxious to
encourage "indigenous initiative" in developing regional de-
fense.
Consequently, Iraqi premier Nuri Said's proposal last
fall for a modification of the Arab League Collective Security
Pact aroused considerable Foreign Office interest because it
contemplated the eventual adherence of Britain and the United
States.
Britain's existing treaties with Iraq and Jordan also
influence its attitude toward a regional defense arrangement.
Of particular concern is the treaty with Iraq, which expires
in 1957. Britain recognizes that the present treaty cannot
simply be renewed, but is anxious to retain the use of the
Shaiba and Habbaniya air bases. London had hoped that its
minimum requirements in Iraq could be ensured through a multi-
lateral regional agreement. It now appears that bilateral
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discussions will be necessary, since Nuri Said has promised
the Iraqi parliament he will submit his proposals for re-
vision to it by March. Revision has apparently not been
discussed in detail, but Britain has already informed Nuri
that his suggestion of an arrangement similar to the Suez
agreement is unsatisfactory, partly because of Iraq's proxim-
ity to the Soviet border.
The Anglo-Jordan treaty does not expire until 1968, but
sentiment is developing in Jordan favoring revision. There
has been increasing criticism of the prime minister for not
having secured modification of the treaty during his talks
in London last December.
Shortly after Iraq and Turkey announced their agreement
on 13 January to conclude a treaty, Foreign Secretary Eden
informed the premiers of the two countries that Britain was
"most encouraged" by this development. Actually, however,
London expects little from the proposed pact because of the
lack of roads between the countries, Turkey's NATO commit-
ments and the deficiencies of the Iraqi army. Eden has men-
tioned to Nuri Said the need for a prompt follow-up to the
communique announcing the intended agreement and has inquired
about Iraq's plans for consulting with the United States and
Britain,
Meanwhile Britain has been attempting to dissuade Egypt
from any action adverse to the proposed treaty. Stressing
the need for serious thought about Middle East defense, the
British ambassador in Cairo has expressed Britain's hope that
Egypt will press for an early adjournment of the current meet-
ing of Arab prime ministers until more information on the pact
is available. Acting on the instructions from London, he has
pointed out that Britain realizes there can be no real Middle
East defense without Egypt, and that Eden looks forward to
discussing defense questions during his mid-February visit
to Cairo.
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PAKISTAN'S LEADERS FACE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING
POLITICAL STABILITY
Efforts by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and his small
ruling group to establish a constitutional framework for gov-
ernment in ''akistan are likely--as in the past--to be inter-
rupted by irresponsible action on the part of dissident poli-
ticians. The oligarchy may react by ceasing serious efforts
to restore constitutional government;
The governor general's first effort to improve Pakistan's
government structure took place in April 1953, when factional-
ism within the dominant Moslem League party had led to politi-
cal disorganization and religious rioting in West Pakistan.
At that time, Ghulam Mohammad used his essentially viceregal
powers to dismiss Prime Minister Nazimuddin and to replace him
with the present prime minister, Mohammad Ali.
The governor general was supported by Finance Minister
Chaudhuri Mohammad All, Defense Secretary Iskander Mirza and
General Ayub, commander in chief of the army, all of whom
hau been seriously concerned over the political and economic
deterioration and over the Moslem League's failure to provide
the leadership expected of it since 1947, when Pakistan became
independent.
The governor general and his immediate entourage hoped to
remain in the background and to use the prime minister to re-
store the Moslem League to political leadership. The political
bankruptcy of the league continued, however, and its disastrous
defeat in the East Pakistani provincial elections of March 1954
led to its virtual demise.
The subsequent revolt of dissident Moslem League leaders
at the time of the "constitutional coup" on 21 September final-
ly convinced the governor general of the uselessness of trying
to work through the league. This group took open control of
the government, Mirza and General Ayub accepting cabinet posi-
tions, and maintained only a veneer of constitutionality by
keeping Prime Minister Mohammad Ali.
Despite this second disappointment, the group's strong
British civil service tradition and its lack of dictatorial
aspirations have led it to undertake still another attempt to
establish a more or less democratic government.
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This time the oligarchy is making no use of the Constit-
ue.nt Assembly dismissed last October. It is writing a new
national constitution. It is revising the provincial struc-
ture of West Pakistan, uniting four provinces into one, pre-
sumably to eliminate opportunities for potential dissidents
to establish themselves in local centers of power.
The governor general's group has also formed a "nonparty"
cabinet, including opposition leaders H. S. Suhrawardy o.i the
Awami League and A. H. Sarkar of the Krishak Sramik party.
Both of these organizations belonged to the United Front which
won the elections in East Pakistan in 1954.
The ruling group is faced with a major difficulty, however,
in finding reliable individuals to help rebuild the structure
of representative government. Since it has apparently abandoned
the national Moslem League organization as such, it can count
in West Pakistan only on more or less loyal individual league
leaders who took no part in the September "coup," Having no
support from the Moslem League leaders in East Pakistan, most
of whom participated in the September revolt, the ruling group
seems to be trying to utilize the opposition United Front or-
ganization as the means through which representative govern-
ment can be restored there. Ghulam Mohammad presumably hoped
by appointing two of its leaders to the cabinet to gain United
Front support for his program.
The unscrupulous nature and personal ambitions of many
of the individuals with whom the oligarchy is forced to deal
in both East and West Pakistan are likely to create diffi-
culties, however. Suhrawardy, the most unstable element in
the present government, is already denouncing the policies of
the government. He may be seeking to build up enough support
to force the governor general to buy him off by making him
prime minister.
It seems almost certain that because of increasing res-
tiveness on the part of Suhrawardy and men of his ilk) the
ruling group will sooner or later be faced with the problem
of disciplining dissident members of the government. Ghulam
Mohammad might again try to counter dissidence with political
maneuvers, but it seems more likely that his fund of good
will would be exhausted. Mirza, who would succeed the gov-
ernor general as leader of the ruling group if Ghulam Moham-
mad's precarious health should fail, *is a career civil ser-
vant and has little patience with politicians.
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With the concurrence also of Defense Minister Ayub and
senior military and civil service officials, therefore, either
Ghulapi Mohammad or Mirza would probably adopt blunter tactics
than heretofore to keep Pakistan politically and economically
alive. This presumably would entail abandonment of present
constitutional plans in favor of more frankly authoritarian
government, indefinite postponement of the restoration of.
popular government, and more open reliance on the army as the
ultimate political arbiter if necessary.
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THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN TURKEY
Turkey's financial situation, both foreign and domestic,
has steadily deteriorated during recent months despite good
prospects for long-range economic development. The Menderes
government appears determined to continue an ambitious pro-
gram of military and economic development regardless of infla-
tion and heavy foreign indebtedness.
Despite growing industrialization, an extensive public
works program, and increases in agricultural production, the
purchasing power generated by the government's investment and
defense programs has outrun the supply of consumers' goods,
causing price rises and continuing inflationary pressure (see
chart A, p.15). Some factories have been forced to close down
because of exhausted inventories and others are operating at
25 percent of capacity.
Mounting foreign trade deficits and a critical shortage
of foreign exchange also are seriously injuring Turkey's abil-
ity to purchase from abroad essential-industrial equipment,
raw materials and consumers' goods (see charts B, D, and E, p.
15). The economic stabilization program which was announced
last May failed primarily because the government followed an
inflationary policy. The value of the Turkish pound has fallen
sharply in the free market.(see chart C, p.15),
In spite of these trends, the budget the Menderes govern-
ment has submitted to the Grand National Assembly for the fis-
cal year beginning in March 1955 provides for a 30-percent in-
crease in over-all expenditures and:a 44-percent increase in
government investment. Much of this. increase will have been
absorbed by the rise in prices.
The apparent determination to accelerate the pace of eco-
nomic development is in contradiction to Ankara's assertion
that investments would be studiously limited in view of con-
tinuing domestic inflationary pressures and the critical for-
eigb payments position. It is significant that 30 percent of
the investment expenditures would depend on foreign exchange
despite the critical shortage.
Foreign commercial debts are estimated to total approxi-
mately $150,000,000. West European countries have concluded
bilateral trade and credit arrangements with Turkey in an at-
tempt to assure the eventual payment of these debts. Medium-
term credit estimated to total over $300,000,000 has been
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promised to Turkey if the commercial debt problem can be
solved. Ankara's ability to pay off these debts, and at the
same time purchase additional essential imports, is doubtful,
however. Menderes unsuccessfully sought a half-billion-dollar
loan from the United States government during his visit to
Washington last summer and is again making approaches for a
substantial American loan.
In the effort to overcome difficulties in obtaining large
foreign credits, Ankara is turning to barter agreements with
the countries of the Soviet bloc. Exports to the Orbit during
the the first nine months of 1954 were 62 percent greater than
Turkey's total exports to the Orbit in 1953, and they repre-
sent 20.5-percent of its total export trade. By mid-December
Turkey had accumulated a $2,500,000 credit balance in trade
with the USSR and favorable balances ranging from $a1},O00,000 to
$3,000,000 with Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. There are also
indications of increased trade with Bulgaria and East Germany.
Rumors persist that the USSR has offered credits or loans to
Ankara. Despite this commercial trend, however, the political
orientation of Turkey toward the West will almost certainly
not be affected.
A recent survey of the Turkish financial situation by
American officials concluded that a 44-percent devaluation
would "assist the government in restoring stability at home
and solvency abroad." Menderes apparently regards such a
measure as politically unwise; he reasserted in December be-
fore a committee of the Grand National Assembly that devalu-
ation "would never be possible." The continuing belief, how-
ever, that the currency will eventually be devalued is an-im-
portant factor in the black market and has become a matter of
increasing concern to the Turkish business community.
American officials, mindful of Turkey's strategic loca-
tion, defense contribution, and the importance of its contin-
ued leadership in the Middle East, believe that Turkey's eco-
nomic problems can and must be coped with. As the government's
investment program pays off gradually in terms of finished
goods, inflationary pressure,!shouid be relieved and some meas-
ure of economic stability restored. While acknowledging the
inherent dangers and probable ultimate expense for the United
States, these officials tend to regard the long-term prospects
of'the Turkish economy with restrained optimism.
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ECONOMIC SITUATION IN TURKEY
PRICE INDEX
1950 = 100
I I
RETAIL
L
J
1953
~ 1! /,//! 11
A S 0 N D J F W A M
1954
MONTHLY AVERAGE FOREIGN TRADE
(Value in Millions o U. S. Dollars)
r
DEFICIT POSITION OF TURKEY
WITHIN EUROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION
(CUMULATIVE)
(in millions of U. S. Dollars*)
*EPU Units expressed in terms of U.S. Dollar
H ~i i 111
ff IC IAL RAik
360 O
r
1553 A S O N D IF F M A M J J A S
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S
1353 1954
4,1
I
'
ww.
l~~=
+,~~pnnR~~~~ccnnccp~~~
`l tk!'4^Ei
IMPORT
/
y I~ I
RTT
I
- --
-
~
0
1946 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54
0
TOTAL TURKI E FOREIGN TRADE
January - September
$3$40W,000
PIESE
NT RI
ACK
a eix
i
EX
CHAN
GE R
ATE
J
A N
U A
R Y
?
:
ft
t
T
DEFICIT
$107,000,000
DEFICIT
$140,000,000
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THE FATE OF STALIN'S LAST HIGH COMMAND
At least half of the 25 full members and 11 candidate
members of the party presidium created by Stalin to replace
the politburo at the time of the 19th Party'Congress have lost
their `position'.oii the . presidium and. are no. longer a part of.the
central administration in Moscow (see chart, p.20). Those who
did not die of natural causes were purged, demoted, or trans-
ferred to full-time jobs in the provinces. This pattern rep-
resents an. important disavowal of the Stalinist heritage and
reflects the political turbulence of the past two years. It
may also indicate that what was once widely interpreted as a
Malenkov clique within this group has been dispersed in def-
erence to collective leadership.
Three from the original list--J,V, Stalin, A.Y. Vyshinsky
and M.F. Shkiryatov--apparently died from natural causes.
Three others have been purged or probably purged: L.P. Beria?
V.M. Andrianov, who was mysteriously removed as first secre-
tary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee in November 1953;
and the prominent theoretician D.I. Chesnokov, who has not
been identified in a position since early 1953.
Two other members have taken significant demotions.,
S.D. Ignatiev, onetime minister of the MGB and'member of
the central committee secretariat, is apparently still so
closely associated with the ill-fated doctors' plot as to
necessitate his remaining, at least temporarily, in the prov-
inces He is currently the first secretary of the Bashkir
party committee. L.G. Melnikov, who also appears to have
suffered in the Beria affair, was removed as party boss of
the Ukraine in June 1953, and at the same time probably lost
his membership on the presidium. He is now ambassador to
Rumania.
Still others may have been demoted. D.S. Korotchenko
has moved from the top government post in the Ukraine to the
largely ceremonial position of chairman of the Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet presidium. V.V. Kuznetsov, formerly chairman
of the all-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, now is a dep-
uty minister of foreign affairs. Five men brought into the
presidium as members or candidates in 1952 and added to the
central committee secretariat have been removed from both the
presidium and secretariat and sent away from Moscow to less
desirable jobs,
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A special case is that of P.K. Ponomarenko. He has given
up his post on the'secretariat and been sent to work away from
the capital, but his retention as a candidate member of the
presidium and party chief of Kazakhstan suggests that his de-
motion, if any, has been slight.
The list ends with a group of three--those removed from
the party presidium, but kept in their old job or transferred
to a position considered equivalent to that which they held
.before October 1952. They are O.V. Kuusinen, chairman of the
presidium of the Karelo-Finnish Supreme Soviet; N.S. Patolichev,
first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party; and P.F.
Yudin, a party functionary with considerable foreign affairs
experience, now serving as Soviet ambassador to China.
Only Deputy Premiers Kosygin, Malyshev and Tevosyan,
Party Secretary Suslov, Finance Minister Zverev and Foreign
Trade. Minister Kabanov were able to retain important positions
in Moscow after being removed from the presidium following
Stalin's death. Presidium candidate member Shvernik, formerly
a full member, also seems not to have suffered, his present
job paralleling his place on the old politburo.
The remaining nine members of Stalin's presidium are full
members of the present body. All but two of these were mem-
bers of the politburo. The two new men, M.Z. Saburov and
M.G. Pervukhin, are in the select category of having been
promoted despite the drastic concentration of power following
Stalin's death. The only other original presidium member to
be promoted after leaving the presidium is A.M. Puzanov, who
is now chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.
If, indeed, a Malenkov clique once existed among some of
the younger members of the 1952 presidium, it has probably
now been so dispersed as to have lost most of its effective-
ness. Alleged cronies of Malenkov--Andrianov, Ignatiev, and
Ponomarenko--are a case in point. Thus-developments since
Stalin's death would suggest that either the clique was never
an important force, or that it was an element in Malenkov's
strength which he no longer needs or has been deprived of.
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TEE FATE OF THE 1952 PARTY PRESIDIUM
ROVED FROM RETAINED AT ONI"ER
CENTRAL ADMIN-
ISTRATION
J,z V. Stalin L. P. Beria S. D. Ignatiev
A. Y. Vyshinsky V. N. Andriancv L. G. Neluikov
N. F. Shk.ryatcv D. I. Ghesnokov D. S. Korotchenkc
V. V. Kuznetsov
A. B. Aristov
L. I. Brezhnev
N. G. Ignatov
N. A. khailov
N. M. Pegov
P. K. Ponomarenko* N. A. Bulganin*
C. V. Kuusinen L. M. Kaganovich*
N. S. Pat~lichev N. S. Khrushchev*
P. F. Ywd-in G. M. Malenkov*
A. I. Nikoyam*
V. M. +o1otov*
N. G. Pervukhin*
N. Z. Saburov*
K. E. Voreshilov*
N. N. Shvernik*
A. N. Kosygin
V. A. Nalyshev
I, F. Tevosyan
N. A. Suslov
L. G. Zverev
I. G. Kabanov
A. N. Puzanov
* Me,uber of present presidium
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