CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved Fo lease 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-0092ZA000500040001-4
,NNW 111K.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 12
OCI NO. 3785/55
28 April 1955
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
A
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
0 702
AUTH
:
j
~
pAT5f_
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CO FIENTIAL
25X1
25X1
State Department review completed
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
 Approved For Rase 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927,0500040001-4
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
 Approved Firelease 20CQ V A 4000500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
CHOU EN-LAI'S SUGGESTION
FOR TALKS WITH THE US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Chou En-lei's suggestion of 23 April that direct
talks be held between the United States and Communist
China is: (a) part of the effort to split the United
States and its allies; (b) an attempt to recoup the
losses suffered by the Communists at the Bandung con-
ference; and (c) a move to bring the Sino-Soviet bloc's
Far Eastern policy in line with the bloc's world-wide
moves to reduce tensions.
The military situation in the Formosa Straits
continued generally quiet last week.
. Page 2
AUSTRIAN TREATY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Soviet agreement to the Western proposal that.a
five-nation ambassadors' meeting precede the foreign
ministers' conference on the Austrian treaty indicates
that Moscow is willing to satisfy Western requirements
in the interest of prompt action on the Austrian
treaty.
PRACTICE FOR SOVIET
MAY DAY AIR SHOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Sightings of Soviet aircraft rehearsing for the
annual May Day air show suggest that the Soviet heavy
bomber program is substantially
had been previously estimated.
NEW FIGHTING IN SAIGON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The outbreak of fighting between the Vietnamese
army and the Binh Xuyen on 28 April is an outgrowth
of Premier Diem's evident determination to establish
a unified, genuinely nationalist government. His de-
cision to take control of the police force and to
move ahead with plans for national elections brought
the dispute between the government and opposition
elements to a head.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
 ? Approved FoR (ease 200,
ft OjkN692 00500040001-4
28 April 1955
tions operating from Vienna. I I . . . .
Page 1
Pressure Maintained on West Berlin: East Germany con-
tinued its harassment of es Berlin during the
past week. East German officials have made it
clear that the campaign is designed to force West
German recognition of the East German government.
. .
Page 3
Effect of Austrian Treaty on Soviet Security Position:
The USSR can sign an Austrian treaty and withdraw
its occupation troops without substantially reduc-
ing its military strength in Europe, impairing
the security of the Satellites, or reducing the ef-
fectiveness of European Communist-front organiza-
West Berlin Economy Depends on Free Access to West Germany:
The West Berlin legislature's approval on 26 pr
of a second subsidy to cover the recent increase
in East German tolls on Berlin trucking reflects
the legislature's anxiety to preserve the large
economic gains made by Berlin in recent years. In
1954, West Berlin exported goods worth $831,000,000,
mainly to West Germany. . . . . . . . Page 4
East German Conscription Will Probably Be Delayed: Con-
trary to earlier indications, conscription for an
East German army is apparently being postponed.
Communist Party members, however, are being virtu-
ally ordered to "volunteer" for the Garrisoned
People's Police. F7 I . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
trade matters as well.
Japan's Relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc: The
Soviet non has accepted Japan's for diplo-
matic talks in London in early June. Chief Japa-
nese delegate Takasaki's conversations with Chou
En-lai at Bandung dealt mainly with the repatria-
tion problem but may have included political and
. . Page
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005 1727 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-0092 Q00500040001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
Soviet May Day Slogans: Moscow's May Day slogans this
year appear to--gTve somewhat greater emphasis to
the fundamental ideological aims of Communism and
they contain an indication that the Kremlin intends
to proceed with announced countermeasures to West
German rearmament. I I . . . . . . . . .
New Agricultural Measures Announced in USSR: Announce-
ments on 16 and pr by the USSR Ministry of
Agriculture give further evidence that the present
program to increase food output has thus far failed
to gain increased support of the peasantry. They
also suggest a more exacting attitude in demands for
the fulfillment of delivery quotas. .
Laos: Talks between the royal government and the Pathet
Lao, which since January have followed an erratic
and inconclusive course, have again been suspended
indefinitely. The government delegation, thoroughly
disillusioned, has referred the matter to Premier
Kata.y. . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . .
Afro-Asian Conference: The final communique of the Ban-
dung conference was a victory for neither the Commu-
nists nor the neutralists. . . . . .
India Promotes Asian Economic Conference: The six
Asian nations which have accepted India's invita-
tion to an economic conference at Simla on 9 May
have done so apparently more from a fear of not
receiving extra American aid than from a desire
to accede to an invitation from India. Most of
these nations strongly suspect Indian motives.
I I
Afghanistan-Pakistan Tensions Continue: Afghanistan's
e ay In taking ac on towara a settlement with
Pakistan and Pakistan's closing of its consulate
at Jalalabad have prolonged the tension between
the two countries. With the close of the Bandung
conference, however, some progress toward a com-
Page
8
Page
9
Page
10
Page
11
. Page 11
promise appears likely. I I . . . . . . Page 12
Arab Defense Developments: The lack of any Arab announce-
men from Bandung suggests that Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Syria have been unsuccessful in seeking an agree-
ment on Syrian counterproposals to Cairo's proposed
defense pact. There is still an outside chance, how-
ever, that a pact will be signed. If it is, it will
probably have neither military value nor lasting
political significance. i I . . . . . . . Page 14
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/ :3CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
. . . . . . . . . . . .
 Approved Fo I lease 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00922 00500040001-4
SECRET
.CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
Tunisian Agreement Announced: The agreement in princi-
ple announced in Paris on 22 April. between France
and Tunisia, is the first step toward implementing
the Tunisian autonomy declared by Mendes-France
last July. Serious problems and strong opposition
to this agreement remain. I. . .
. Page 14
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. . . . . . . Page 1
The Supreme Soviet session in early February, which
witnessed the resignation of Premier Malenkov, marked
the opening of a new phase of Soviet policy toward Central
and Western Europe. Soviet leaders are developing a
broad program of action based on concessions on the Aus-
trian treaty and the reopening of great-power talks.
This program is designed to prevent or at least impede
the incorporation of a sovereign and rearmed West- ,,EV,,
WEST EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO PROPOSED AUSTRIAN SETTLEMENT . Page 7
Spokesmen for practically all Western European
nations have welcomed the prospect of an early Austrian
settlement, and there is widespread approval for the
idea that Austria should be neutral. There is also gen-
eral agreement that the change in the Soviet attitude is
25X1 the beginning of a new gambit on Germany, but t le
agreement on what move the USSR may make neat
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27IYCIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-009 00500040001-4
SECRET
28 April 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
CHOU EN-LAI'S SUGGESTION
FOR TALKS WITH THE US
Chou En-lai's suggestion
of 23 April that direct talks
be held between the United
States and Communist China is:
(a) part of the effort to split
the United States and its
allies; (b) an attempt to
recoup the losses suffered by
the Communists at the Bandung
conference; and (c) a move to
bring the Sino-Soviet bloc's
Far Eastern policy in line
with the bloc's world-wide
moves to reduce tensions.
Chou's statement came
with unexpected swiftness after
other Asian leaders at Bandung
had made clear their strong
sentiment for a negotiated
settlement.
The Chinese Communist
maneuver is apparently aimed
at forcing the United States
to choose between:
(1) refusing to negotiate,
possibly at considerable cost
to American relations with
other powers in Western Europe
and Asia; or
(2) undertaking negotia-
tions in which Chinese Commu-
nist proposals would be dis-
agreeable to the United States
and Nationalist China but
might be acceptable to many
other governments.
Secretary Dulles' re-
sponse to the Communist over-
ture on 26 April has put Chou
in a position where he could
easily lose the ground he
regained at Bandung. Peiping
would now appear to be at a
political disadvantage in
undertaking major military
operations in the Formosa
Straits at this time or in
setting forth harsh conditions
for negotiations.
The British charge in
Peiping has been directed by
London to ask Chou to clarify
his position. In the mean-
time, Peiping may try to give
an appearance of sincerity to.
its offer by soon releasing
.some of the 56 Americans it
admits holding. The Communists
have apparently been delaying
such releases in order to
extract the maximum propaganda
advantage from them.
Soviet spokesmen are pub-
licly and privately encouraging
the United States to negotiate
with Peiping. Moscow's posture
continues to be that of the
reasonable mediator disclaiming
responsibility for the actions
of its ally.
There is as yet no evidence
that Peiping's position has
changed on any substantive issue
which a Formosa conference might
discuss. The Chinese Communists
have continued to insist, both
publicly and privately, that
they will "liberate" Formosa
and that any type of compromise
is unacceptable.
As recently as 28 April,
Peiping reiterated its long-
standing position that any
Formosa settlement must involve
the withdrawal of American
forces from the area. Peiping
would be expected at least to
begin with this demand in any
talks, arguing that the
SECRET.
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART I OF IMMEDIATE, INTEREST Page 1 of 5
 "Chinese people" themselves
could effect a "peaceful
settlement."
Chinese Communist state-
ments on this subject have
seemed to envisage a non-
violent turnover of Formosa
along the lines of the "libera-
tion" of much of Nationalist-
held China in 1949.
SECRET
Approved For-lease 2005/01/27: CIA-RDP79-00927}00500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The military situation in
the Formosa Straits continued
this week to be generally
quiet. It was broken only by
the first Chinese Communist
shelling of an island in the
Matsu group on 26 April.
Only two rounds
were fired, prob-
ably for register-
ing Communist weap-
ons on the Peiling
Peninsula north of
the Matsus. Both
struck Peikantang
Island, two miles
north of Matsu, and
five Chinese Nation-
alist soldiers were
wounded.
that the Communists
have begun construc-
tion of another new
airfield in Fukien
Province. An area
similar to an air-
field layout is
being cleared near
the village of
Lungtien, about 30
miles south of
Foochow.
Other photos
disclose that run-
way foundations of
the new field north-
east of Swatow have
28 April 1955
EAST CHINA (incl. FORMOSA)
Available Airfield (jet)
Available Airfield (cony.)
Airfield Site
-Selected Road ---} Selected Railroad
---- Proposed Railroori
Naut. 0 30 100 150 Miles
NANCHAN
r.i
SECRET
There are other proposals,
however, which Peiping could
put forward to exploit diver-
gences between the United States
and other powers. One such
notion, even though it has
already been denounced by the
Chinese Communists, is the
Ceylonese plan for a trustee-
ship over Formosa by the Oolombo
powers, all of whom recognize
Peiping. F_ I
been completed more rapidly
than expected.
Construction work is still
in progress at Nantai airfield
near Foochow, and at two sites
near Amoy--Lungchi and Ching-
NAN KIN
GYANGf\
CANTON
j +-
/ f
Swatow N
2f\. AM
7 1 ~
\ L'~JDER F O
STRUCTIgJ a-
$ P ESCA3'ORE
SWATOW YO
1`JHong Kong
I _.
CHINHUA
Eni N0
Luchiao
CHIENOU ,5?
KIANG fii~
E
r'4
h L
- / MATSUS
" ngtien
achiang
UEMOY
aochi
J? AI
0
RTAcHEN
ANHWF.I \
PART I Approved For Releasgi 20R :CIA 27AO005000400Pa01-4
2 of 5
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved FoL (ease 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-0092WA 00500040001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
The Soviet note of 26 April,
agreeing to the Western pro-
posal for a five-nation am-
bassadors' meeting to precede
the foreign ministers' confer-
ence on the Austrian treaty,
is a further sign of Moscow's
interest in signing the treaty
quickly.
Although the note ar-
gued that the Western plan was
not the shortest way to achieve
agreement, it did not repeat
Soviet press charges that the
West is "dodging and maneuver-
ing" in an attempt to delay
the treaty.
A Soviet official has said
that most of the details of a
treaty can be settled in a few
hours. This statement con-
trasts sharply with Western
plans for detailed negotiations
to obtain the best possible
terms and suggests that Moscow
will not be amenable to making
many important substantive
changes in the treaty.
One change the Austrians
are seeking is an increase in
the military forces permitted
by the treaty. Although sev-
eral Austrians gained the im-
pression from the Moscow talks
that the USSR would agree to a
doubling of the presently
authorized force of 58,000
(including 5,000 in the air
force), a responsible Soviet
official in Vienna has twice
expressed doubt that there
could be any increase.
The most important question
to be settled is still the four-
power guarantee of Austrian
territorial inviolability and
integrity, which a Soviet off i-
cial has said must be settled
at the foreign ministers' level.
Western negotiators hope
also to incorporate the recent
Soviet economic concessions in
the treaty itself, rather than
leaving them in the form of a
simple bilateral agreement with
Austria.
PRACTICE FOR SOVIET
MAY DAY AIR SHOW
Sightings of Soviet air-
craft rehearsing for the
annual May Day air show sug-
gest that the USSR will demon-
strate major advances in air-
craft development.
A formation including ten
jet heavy bombers has been
sighted. This is the BISON
(Type 37), only one of which
participated in the show last
year. The availability of
this aircraft in such numbers
means that the Soviet heavy
bomber program is substantially
more advanced than had been
previously estimated.
Rehearsals for Sunday's
air parade have also shown an
entirely new large Soviet air-
craft: a four-engine, turbo-
prop swept-wing aircraft of
heavy-bomber size and config-
uration.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 5
25X1
25X1
 Approved ForrRRelease 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-0092 D00500040001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
NEW F IGHT ING IN SAIGON
A duel between Binh Xuyen
mortars and government artil-
lery began in Saigon on the
afternoon of 28 April, the day on
which Premier Diem had directed
Pa
_ mr President's
Palace Surete
Palk
P ry
vi French
i
ALBA
#30,
become a haven for a number of
important Communist-front or-
ganizations driven out of other
Western countries or which
moved out from under the shadow
of the iron curtain.
These include headquarters
of the World Peace Council
(WPC), the World Federation of
Trade Unions (WFTU), the Inter-
national Federation of Resist-
ance Fighters (FIR), and the
International Organization of
Journalists (IOJ). The first
COMMUNIST
FORCES IN
EASTERN EUROPE
28 April 1955
BULGARIA
f 170P000
+709
two organizations were expelled
from Paris by the French govern-
ment, while the IOJ moved from
Prague and the FIR evolved
from au earlier Warsaw organi-
zation.
The Austrian government
will probably grant visas,
generously to Sino-Soviet bloc
delegations in order to main-
tain a neutral appearance. Ac-
cordingly, Communist-front
operations will probably not be
seriously curtailed.
SECRET
31,0001 _,?...~
*21 - L1.._..1
HUNGARY
1 0,000
4,000
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 15
 Approved For, lease 2005/O1ECRDP79-009200500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
Pressure Maintained
On West Berlin
The East German government
has continued its harassment of
West Berlin during the past
week, and there are no signs of
any abatement in the campaign.
The East Germans have made it
clear that the campaign is de-
signed to force West German
recognition of East Germany.
port. The offer appears to lie
somewhere between the West Ger-
man insistence on talks at a
"technical" level, which would
carry no implication of recog-
nition of East Germany, and the
earlier East German demand that
the talks be held on the minis-
terial level.
On 21 April an unarmed
West Berlin customs boat and
its crew were seized on the
Havel River, allegedly for vio-
lating; the East Germany-West
Berlin border, which in places
runs down the center of the
river. Although the crew was
subsequently released, the
seizure seriously alarmed the
West Berlin public.
Nine West Berlin trucks
loaded with scrap metal for de-
livery to West Cermany were
seized on 23 April at Marien-
born on the Autobahn between
West Berlin and West Germany,
and cargoes from another ten
may have been impounded. The
excuse given was that the car-
goes were incorrectly described
in the applications for transit
permits.
At an East German "hearing"
on these seizures, a West German
businessman was able to prove
his cargo had been correctly
listed. An East German offi-
cial then admitted that the
confiscation had taken place
for political reasons because
the Paris accords had been
signed and the West Germans
"would make war materiel out of
the scrap." These reasons were
presented as sufficient grounds
for the confiscation, the first
of this type since the spring
of 1953.
On 23 April, the East Ger-
man government proposed that
negotiations on the truck tax
be held between "representatives"
of the two Ministries of Trans-
This proposal suggests that
the East Germans may fear the
effect the West German cuts in
interzonal trade would have on
their shaky economy.
A statement by DeputyPre-
mier Nuschke in an East Berlin
paper the next day clearly re-
vealed that the imposition of
the truck tax was intended to
force West German recognition
of East Germany.
Nuschke stated that "if
Bonn and West Berlin had not
committed the political folly of
declaring us to be nonexistent,
they could have saved themselves
some unpleasantness and they
would be able to save themselves
even greater unpleasantness in
the future."
The West Germans have not
replied to the latest East Ger-
man proposal for negotiations.
The Bonn government continues
to desire Allied representations
to Moscow regarding the truck
tax, a move about which there
is still disagreement between
the Americans, British and French.
Allied officials have not
changed their view that curtail-
ment of interzonal trade by the
West is the best means of forc-
ing East Germany to terms.
Chancellor Adenauer, however,
remains under pressure by West
German commercial interests not
to maintain such a curtailment
too long and not to extend its
coverage to iety of
goods.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
25X1
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 15
 Approved Folelease 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-0092p00500040001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
West Berlin Economy Depends
On Free Access to West Germany
The West Berlin legisla-
ture's approval on 26 April
of a second subsidy to cover
the recent increase in East
German tolls on Berlin truck-
ing reflects the legislature's
anxiety to preserve the eco-
nomic gains made by Berlin in
recent years.
West Berlin is completely
dependent on easy access to
the West, as well as on out-
side financial aid. The
stopping of deliveries to or
from the city, as might have
occurred if the West German
truckers had resisted payment
of the new tolls, would have
had a detrimental impact on
the city's industry and em-
ployment in a fairly short
time.
Two years ago West Berlin
was an extremely depressed
area with a crippled industry
and 25-percent unemployment.
Today it is playing a grow-
ing economic role in Western
Europe and has hope for the
future. Much of this change
was made possible by the in-
creasing confidence of Western
businessmen in Berlin's abil-
ity "to deliver the goods."
In 1954, West Berlin ex-
ported 831,000,000 dollars
worth of electrical equipment,
clothing, food, machine tools,
and other goods, mainly to the
Federal Republic. These ship-
ments were made possible by
imports of food, raw material,
and finished goods worth about
1.05 billion dollars, mostly
from West Germany.
During the year, unemploy-
ment was brought down to 16
percent, industry expanded,
and productivity improved.
The Siemens firm, representa-
tive of Berlin's largest in-
dustry, regained its position
as the world's third largest
manufacturer of electrical
equipment.
American and West German
aid to Berlin, which has
amounted to over 1.57 billion
dollars since 1950, is thus
beginning to bear fruit. With
a backlog of orders, and the
promise of more because of
Bonn's defense program, Berlin's
prospects for another good year
are bright--if major Communist
harassment can be avoided.
ACCESS ROUTES BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND BERLIN
25X1
25X1
SECRET
Selected autobahn
Selected principal railroad
Canal
Kilometers
0 2 40
__ _.. _ tatute ales
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 15
 Approved For-.lease 2005/0SEC. RLAJRDP79-00927A( p0500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
The West Berliners need
no new Communist "needling" to
remind them of the vulnerabil-
ity of their supply lines.
While the East Germans may be
reluctant to tamper with Al-
lied access to the city, this
is not necessarily the case
with German access.
Aside from highway inter-
ference, the East Germans could
in many ways harass the passage
of West German trains over East
German railroads and of West
German barges, which carry most
of Berlin's coal supply, over
East German canals. Moreover,
East German Conscription
Will ro a y Be a aye
Recent evidence suggests
that East Germany will continue
to rely on intensive "voluntary"
recruitment to fill its current
military manpower needs rather
than institute conscription.
Communist propaganda di-
rected against the Paris agree-
ments had suggested that fol-
lowing ratification, East Ger-
many's self-defense would in-
clude conscription and possibly
expansion of the Garrisoned
People's Police (KVP).
There are strong political
reasons for postponing conscrip-
tion.
Communist diplomatic pres-
sure may still prevent West
German rearmament. The intro-
duction of conscription would
further aggravate the recently
increased unrest in East Ger-
many.
West Berlin depends heavily on
East German brown coal, de-
liverie: which have declined
since Bonn retaliated for the
truck tax.
Developments in April
have the Berliners worried,
and they are looking for a
middle course between too
"tough" and too "soft" a re-
sponse to Communist harass-
ments. They are also insist-
ing that the Western powers
are responsible for maintain-
ing free access to the city.
Formal creation of an East Ger-
man army and introduction of
conscription probably would be
justified on the basis of com-
parable steps in West Germany's
rearmament.
In the meantime, the East
German government is giving
increasing emphasis to the re-
cruitment of personnel for the
KVP.
On 3 April, , front-page
editorial in Neues Deutschland,
official voice of the East Ger-
man Communist Par+., (SEDI called
on all its 18- to 22--year-
old members to enter the ranks
of the KVP. The editorial re-
vealed that the term of "volun-
tary" service had been reduced
from three to two years, pre-
sumably as an inducement.
It is reliably reported,
however, that party members
are now virtually ordered to
"volunteer," and that members
of the FDJ have been threatened
with expulsion and denial of
the right to higher education
if they refuse.
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 15
 Approved F rcelease 2005,qEft-RDP79-009000500040001-4
28 April 1955
Recruitment efforts have
been intensified within the
national enterprises and among
the peasants. Apprentices and
students have been offered
special educational advantages
for enlisting.
Extremely urgent recruiting
measures will continue to be
required if the force is to be
maintained even at its present
strength, and it is question-
able whether any significant
expansion can be accomplished
without conscription. Almost
half the present strength of
100,000 men joined the KVP dur-
ing its rapid expansion in 1952
and will have completed their
three-year terms by November.
Some releases were reported in
April and the rest are scheduled
to be released in the fall.
Recent reports of the
transfer of 10,000 to 15,000
special civil police to I.VP
jurisdiction suggest that drafts
from within the police will be
used this year as another means
of obtaining personnel without
general conscription.
Japan's Relations
With the Sino-Soviet Bloc
The Soviet Union has ac-
cepted Japan's bid for diplo-
matic talks in London in early
June. The Japanese Foreign
Ministry announced that it had
received the Soviet reply on
26 April through its UN observ-
er. According to the Japanese
press, the site has also been
approved by the British govern-
ment.
Japanese officials believe
that Chou's affability, his
stated willingness to assist in
the repatriation question, and
his desire for normal relations
will be exploited by various
Japanese groups for propaganda
purposes.
This progress should help
Hatoyama parry expected opposi-
tion attacks in the Diet over
his alleged "inept diplomacy."
At the Afro-Asian confer-
ence, chief Japanese delegate
Takasaki's talk with Chou En-
lai centered mostly around the
repatriation question, accord-
ing to the Japanese press.
Chou was quoted as saying that
he would do his best to return
Japanese "war criminals" and
that in the meantime he would
like to arrange interviews be-
tween the prisoners and their
families.
Meanwhile, in Tokyo, nego-
tiations between private Japa-
nese business groups and a
visiting Chinese Communist trade
mission were still deadlocked
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 6 of 15
25X1
25X1
 Approved. For lease 2005/O j f$ RDP79-009200500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
over Chinese insistence on a
Japanese government guarantee
concerning the execution of the
proposed trade agreement. The
Japanese Foreign Ministry re-
fused to extend the mission's
visas due to expire on 26 April
and made it known that as far
as it was concerned, "they
should get out today."
This surprisingly firm
attitude suggests that Japan
has no intention of being
wheedled into de facto rela-
tions with Peiping at this
time. The Japanese show of
impatience over Communist
maneuvers may have resulted
from dissatisfaction with the
private Sino-Japanese fisher-
ies agreement recently con-
cluded in Peiping.
The Japanese fisheries
delegation itself was unhappy
over its inability to recover
100 Japanese fishing vessels
seized by Peiping. When queried
about the matter, the Chinese
reportedly answered that they
had no authority to discuss
it, and moreover, since the
boats were being used, their
return would be difficult.
25X1
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 15
 Approved Fow&lease 2005/( 1 T-RDP79-009200500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
25X1
Soviet May Day Slogans
The few changes in Mos-
cow's May Day slogans,. as com-
pared with last year's, have
the purpose of bringing them
in line with current Soviet
tactics in domestic and for-
eign policy.
There are three new slo-
gans devoted to international
topics. One reflects the im-
portance the Kremlin attaches
to the Communist bloc security
countermeasures against the
Paris accords.. The other two
point up Communist hopes for
continuing propaganda advan-
tages from the talks on Aus-
tria and from developments at
the Afro-Asian conference.
For the first time since
1945, the traditional. slogan
of the Communist movement,
"Proletarians of the world,
unite!", proclaimed in the
Communist Manifesto of 1848,
was added to the May Day slo-
gan of greetings to the work-
ing class of the world.
The use of this slogan as-
sociated with the "heroic" pe-
riod of international Communism
suggests greater emphasis on the
fundamental ideological aims of
Marxism. Perhaps it is designed
to reassure hard-core Communists
in countries outside the Sino-
Soviet bloc that a more mili-
tant nhase of action will in-
evitably follow the present soft
tactics appropriate for the pe-
riod of "peaceful coexistence."
The only other important
variation from last year's slo-
gans was the omission of the
exhortation against the settin?
up of military blocs. This
omission is most unusual since
there has been no other letup
in Communist propaganda attacks
on Western defense groupings.
It appears to be another indi-
cation that Moscow intends to
proceed with setting up the
unified Eastern European com-
mand announced as a counter-
measure to West German rearma-
SECIET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 15
 Approved Release 2005S1E11-RDP79-009000500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
New Agricultural Measures
Announced in USSR
Announcements on 16 and
19 April by the USSR Ministry
of Agriculture give further
evidence that the present pro-
gram to increase food output
has thus far failed to gain
increased support of the
peasantry. At the same time
they suggest a more exacting
attitude in demands for the
fulfillment of.delivery quotas.
The agricultural ministers
of the various republics were
ordered on 16 April to visit
machine tractor stations and
collective farms which had
failed to fulfill goals for
compulsory deliveries and.tar-
gets for state purchases of
meat and milk products, and to
"take meat on the spot."
They were also ordered to
eliminate causes of failure to
fulfill state delivery plans
and to impose severe punish-
ment on inefficient directors
of machine tractor stations.
On 19 April, the USSR
Ministry of Agriculture ordered
a decrease in the-supply of
Chemical fertilizer during the
second and third quarters of
1955 to those regions which
had not utilized fertilizer
properly during the first
quarter, and an increase in
deliveries to regions which
had distributed fertilizer
according to plan.
Many of the criticisms
concerning agriculture in the
Soviet central press during
the past few weeks are standard
and have been repeated each
spring for many years. The
present heavy emphasis, how-
ever, seems to indicate more
than normal urgency, thus
pointing up the critical agri-
cultural situation in the USSR.
Since mid-March,,Com-
munist Party first secretary
Khrushchev has made four major
speeches on agricultural prob-
lems at farm conferences in
the western Soviet Union which
are probably intended to drama-
tize his personal interest in
and responsibility for success
of the present agricultural
program.
The peasants' attitude
toward the collective farm and
toward government control in
the present crop year will be
an important gauge of the effect
"new course" price concessions
and other incentive measures
have had, since it was only at
the close of the 1954 crop year
that the peasantry could have
had any tangible measure of an
increase in income.
It is possible, however,
that recent Khrushchev innova-
tions, such as his order to
replace one third of all present
collective farm chairmen with
urban administrators, are
strengthening peasant skepti-
cism, thus negating any earlier
favorable reactions among the
peasantry. (Pre-
pared jointly by OCI and ORR)
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES MID COMMENTS Page 9 of 15
 Approved Fo.$elease 2005/gWnl'RDP79-0092U000500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
Talks between the royal
government and the Pathet Lao,
which since January have
followed an erratic and incon-
clusive course, have again been
suspended indefinitely. The
government delegation, thor-
oughly disillusioned, has re-
ferred the matter to Premier
Katay.
The latest negotiating
session, which began on 19 April
after the arrival in Vientiane
of some 30 Pa.thet Lao repre-
sentatives on 12 April,., was
marked by Communist demands--
unacceptable to the..govern-
ment--to intervene in the
political affairs of the kingdom.
After rejecting what Chief
Government Negotiator Nhouy
Abhay described as his "reason-
able proposal" for reintegrat-
ing certain Pathet Lao elements
into the royal government, the
Communists countered with pro-
posals which would have given
them a voice in the revision of
electoral laws and the deter-
mination of the postelectoral
government.
The Pathet Lao wanted, in
Nhouy's words, to be the
"arbiters of everything.".
Nhouy has now informed
Premier Katay that further
negotiations are useless and
has recommended that the Pathet
Lao problem be referred to "in-
ternational bodies"--presumably
the International Control Com-
mission and subsequently the
Geneva powers. With the refer-
ral of this problem, Nhouy be-
lieves, the Communist negotia-
tors should be asked to return
to their northern provinces.
Katay's propensity for
postponing a final showdown
with the Pathet Lao may have
been played on by Communist and
,neutralist delegates at Bandung.
Katay issued a joint statement
there with Pham Van Dong, Viet
Minh vice premier and foreign
affairs minister, to the effect
that the latter recognized the
Pathet Lao question as purely
an internal matter, and that
the Viet Minh and Laotian gov-
ernments should strive for
harmonious relations within the
framework of the "five princi-
ples."
These actions suggest that
Katay has again been lulled in-
to the hope that a "hands-off"
policy can be negotiated with
powerful Communist neighbors
which will ultimately result
in a withering of the Pathet
Lao organization and the
resolvement of this internal
dispute. Katay, although he
has had his share of disullu-
sioning experiences with the
Pathet Lao, still harbors the
belief that very few Pathet Lao
are genuine Communists, and
that without external direction
the majority would return to
the government fold in quick
rejection of their past mis-
guided deeds.
Katay may be unwilling to
bring the Pathet Lao problem
to a head, preferring to be-
lieve that as long as the gov-
ernment holds out the prospect
of negotiations there is still
a chance that the Pathet Lao
will ultimately prove tract-
able.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10 of 15
25X1
25X1
 Approved Foelease 2005/RDP79-0092000500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
Afro-Asian Conference
The Bandung conference
has concluded on a harmonious
note with the unanimous ap-
proval of a lengthy communique
covering a wide range of po-
litical, cultural and economic
topics.
The highlight of the clos-
ing days was Chou En-lai's
offer to settle the Formosa
problem by direct negotiations
with the United States.
This offer, coming shortly
after Sir John Kotelawala of
Ceylon had delivered the strong-
est anti-Communist speech of
the conference, was perfectly
timed to have maximum effect
on the conferees. It was al-
most universally well received
and gained for Chou the initia-
tive that previously had been
exercised by the anti-Communists.
Chou's offer climaxed a
series of moves to improve
Peiping's status in inter-
national society. Among other
things, Chou signed a treaty
with Indonesia resolving the
status of Overseas Chinese
citizenship and backed Indo-
nesia's claim to West New
Guinea, supported the Arabs
against both Israel and France,
and talked trade with the Japa-
nese. He even invited such
staunch anti-Communists as Carlos
Romulo, Prince Wan and Mohammad
All to visit Communist China.
There can be no doubt that
Chou gave a good account of him-
self. Neutralist quarters hailed'
his "brilliant diplomacy" and
praised his "forbearance." Anti
Communists thought he was "frank,"
""sincere" and "reasonable . T"
Mohammad All went so far as to
say that while he continued to
abhor Communism, he had changed
his opinion of Chou on the basis
of his experience at Bandung.
Although Chou played his
part astutely, he had to pay a
price for any good will he may
have generated. He committed
his regime to the support of
the conference's communique
which was molded largely by anti-
Communist representatives.
The main theme that runs
throughout this declaration is
respect for the principles of
the United Nations and any con-
spicuous deviation on the part
of Peiping could quickly dis-
sipate the gains that Chou may
have registered at the con-
ference.
India Promotes .
Asian Economic Conference
The six Asian nations
which have accepted India's
invitation to an economic con-
ference at Simla on 9 May
have done so apparently more
from a fear of not receiving
extra American aid than from
a desire to accede to an in-
vitation from India. Most of
these nations strongly suspect
Indian motives and feel that,
in issuing the inviation, India
is attempting to assume economic
leadership of the area.
Judging from past confer-
ences among these nations, the
conference in unlikely to de-
velop a well co-ordinated plan.
Regardless of India's promotion-
al efforts, some of the impor-
tant invitees will probably not
attend.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 15
25X1
 Approved Fo elease 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-0092W00500040001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
Following the visit of
FOA Director Stassen to India
in March, New Delhi invited 11
Asian countries--Burma, Cam-
bodia, Ceylon, Indonesia,
Japan, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan,
the Philippines, South Vietnam,
and Thailand, as well as Malaya
and Singapore--to send repre-
sentatives to a high-level
meeting in Simla about 9 May
to consider American economic
aid.
The invitation stated
tFat Stassen had indicated the
American government would like
these countries themselves to
take the initiative in devel-
oping the pattern for utili-
zation of American aid,
I As a result of Ceylon's
refusal to attend on the ground
that American aid should be re-
ceived on a bilateral basis,
New Delhi cabled the original
invitees that it regretted any
misunderstanding of its inten-
tions and urged their attend-
ance. The cable stated that
aid on a bilateral basis is
contemplated by India, too,
but there are other problems
to be discussed.
The agenda for the meet-
ing was sent to the Asian
nations on 21 April. In con-
tains the following main points:
1. Pattern of utiliza-
tion of American aic',
Afghanistan-Pakistan
Tensions Continue
Afghanistan's delay in
taking action toward a settle-
ment with Pakistan and Paki-
stan's closing of its consulate
at Jalalabad have prolonged
the tension between the two
countries. There are rumors
that diplomatic relations may
2. Practical problems
which have arisen in connec-
tion with utilization, such as
complicated procurement, price
and loan regulations.
3. Special allocation for
development of intraregional
trade.
4. Machinery to provide
credit.
5. Representation of
European countries which may
desire to assist.
6. Setting up of a perma-
nent secretariat for the Colombo
plan consultative committee.
So far, Cambodia,, Indonesia,
Japan, Nepal, Thailand; and
Vietnam have accepted the in-
vitation. Pakistan and the
Philippines have not replied,
but Pakistan has indicated it
will accept. Burma and Ceylon
have refused. The Indian gov-
ernment believes that Malaya
and Singapore, whose invita-
tion is being handled through
the British government, will
accept.
The Indian government has
requested American assistance
in persuading Asian nations to
attend the meeting, particularly
Pakistan and the Philippines.
be broken. With the close of
the Bandung conference, however,
some progress toward a compro-
mise appears likely.
Recent reports indicate
that King Zahir Shah of Afghani-
stan has decided to remove his
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 15
25X1
 Approved Folease 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-0092W00500040001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
cousin Prince Daud
from the premiership.
There are conflicting
statements that form-
er prime minister
Shah Mahmud, Deputy
Prime Minister Ali
Mohammad, or Defense
Minister Arif will
be selected as Daud's
successor.
Zahir reportedly
delayed action until
after the Afro-
Asian conference,.
both to avoid compro-
mising the position
of the Afghan dele-
gation and to await
Foreign Minister
Prince Naim's return
from the conference.
Members of the
Afghan delegation at
Bandung stated pri-
vately that no dif-
ferences existed be-
tween Zahir and his
cousins, Daud and
Naim. One official
also claimed that Af-
ghanistan is consid-
ering negotiating
61 Smeraan
- 12
U. S. S.
R.
CHINA
r, t
~
M.ry
r".J
~NM1 roH.
-.. Nell Terma
Fa cnah
~~1
- +SnlbarHnan M
eza, iSM1erlf
38
~
` Maiman.
Pul "-KM1U Ui S N
`??? S ,
.-^
f KuaM1ka
v
Qala Neu N t
H
/ AKA MTA
_,G
Herat
~
KA UL JA ALA AD
?' / T ~.=
:,o
AFGHANISTAN
-
b
F-h
32
h
/
K
.
_ J 32
'
Qal..i-NyrH S
I
a
le
k
l
P
n
a
a
D H A
A
uella
/
Mull n
//llr~i
~JI
/INDIA
l%
P A K I S
T A N
28
81KANER -28
1
+'~
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN
IRAN
~ ''
28 APRIL 1955
.T.1b.t
KARACH
HYeERABAe
All-weather road
Railroad (selected)
ARABIAN S E A
29
K. 6
with the USSR for "uninterrupted
access" to international commu-
nications channels to avoid
alleged Pakistani restrictions.
.These statements seem de-
signed to blame Karachi for the
present tension and to win in-
ternational support.
Afghanistan's delay in
taking positive action toward
a settlement and Afghan propa-
ganda, such as the statements
made at Bandung, apparently have
prompted Karachi to continue
pressing Kabul to make restitu-
tion for an attack on the Paki-
stani embassy on 30 March.
Karachi has sought to main-
tain pressure on the Afghan gov-
ernment by announcing on 25 .
April that it has decided to
close its consulate in Jalala-.
bad. The consulate had, how-
ever, not been functioning since
a demonstration on 31 March.
Furthermore, Minister of
Interior Mirza has stated he is
drafting a note for Prime Minis-
ter Mohammad All to present to
Kabul which would threaten to
break off diplomatic relations
unless Kabul made adequate
restitution within a reason-
able time for the attacks on
Pakistan's diplomatic posts in
Afghanistan. Mirza also claimed
that the Pushtoon tribes along
the Afghan-Pakistani border are
restless, implying that Karachi
will have to "placate" the
tribes. by withdrawing its dip-
lomats if Kabul makes no
concessions.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 15
25X1
 Approved ? Foelease 2005/0,qEr:RDP79-009200500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
25 1
Arab Defense Developments
The lack of any Arab an-
nouncement from Bandung sug-
gests that Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Syria have been unsuccess-
ful in seeking an agreement on
Syrian'counterproposals to
Cairo's proposed defense pact.
There is still an outside
chance, however, that a pact
will be signed. If it is, it
will probably have neither
military value nor lasting po-
litical significance.
The Syrian proposals,
which were partly aimed at pla-
cating Turkish and Iraqi as
well as domestic Syrian oppo-
sition to Egypt's plan, would
have eliminated the anti-Iraqi
aspects of the original propo-
sition.
Further discussions of the
pact may take place after the
Tunisian Agreement Announced
The agreement in principle
between France and the protec-
torate of Tunisia, announced in
Paris on 22 April, is the first
step toward implementing the
Tunisian autonomy declared by
former French premier Mendes-
France last July.' Serious
problems and strong opposition
to this agreement remain.
return of the Egyptian, Saudi
and Syrian leaders from the
Bandung conference. None of
the parties, however, now seems
genuinely interested in devel-
oping a new defense arrange-
ment, and any progress would
probably depend on a desire to
save face.
government.
The original Egyptian
proposal has"been so watered
down that Turkey, the pact's
strongest foe, seems agreeable
to seeing some version of it
signed.
In the meantime, the
Syrian government, which has
seemed on the verge of being
overthrown as a result of the
controversy, was given a. new
jolt by the assassination on
22 April of Colonel Adnan Malki,
a high army supporter of the
Neither French nor Tuni-
sian extremists are satisfied.
Further hurdles are expected,
both when the series of conven-
tions defining the extent of
autonomy is drafted and when
the series is submitted to the
French National Assembly for
approval, probably in July.
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 14 of 15
 Approved Folease 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-0092000500040001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
A group of French settlers
in Tunisia, led by French sena-
tor Gabriel Puaux, has announced
that it will fight autonomy in
every way possible.
Salah ben Youssef, the
secretary general of the fore-
most nationalist party, the
Neo-Destour, has also denounced
the agreement. Inasmuch as the
agreement was announced only
after Premier Faure had reached
a personal understanding with
the party's chief, Habib Bour-
ghiba, Ben Youssef's opposition
may cause a split in the Neo-
Destour and a resumption of dis-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
25X1
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 15 of 15
 Approved F Release 2005/01/27: CIA-RDP79-009 A000500040001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
PART I I I
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
Since the Western powers
reached their agreements at the
Paris conference last October,,
the Soviet.Union has been-de-
veloping a broad program of
action, designed to prevent or
at least impede the carrying
out of the agreements, and,
simultaneously, to enhance the
strength and prestige of the
Sino-Soviet bloc..
Moscow's initial response
to the decisions of the Paris
conference was to look. to the
security of the Soviet base.
Satellite leaders were assem-
bled in Moscow, along with a
Chinese "observer," to. announce
a series of.countermeasuresto
be taken if the Paris agree?.-.
ments were ratified.
Moscow then launched an
intensive campaign of threats
and promises aimed at blocking
ratification of the Paris agree-
ments.
(b) Bulganin's speech on
9 February giving greater
Soviet support to Peiping on
the Formosa issue; and
(c) the attempt of the
.top Soviet leaders to under-
score the strength of the "So-
cialist camp" in comparison
with the.'United States.
One of the most striking
aspects of Molotov's foreign
policy, speech of 8 February
was his reiterations--five times
the claim' that''.the .1"corre-
lation of forces" between the
two rival social systems "has
definitely changed to the ad-
vantage of Socialism." He re-
called the fate'of the German
attack on the USSR, warned that
any future aggressor should
not forget "the. immeasurably
increased might of the Soviet
Union," and for the first time
claimed that the USSR had nu-
clear superiority.
By the time the Supreme
Soviet convened on 3 February,
the Soviet government appar-
ently had concluded that there
was little chance of averting
ratification of the Paris ac-
cords and that'the time had
come 'to launch a new line of
action calculated to disrupt
their implementation.
Emphasis on-Strength,
The main features of the
effort to enhance the strength
and prestige of the Sino-Soviet
bloc as a whole were:
(a) Molotov's declaration
on 8 February that China occu-
pies a position of equality
with the USSR at the head of
the Socialist camp;
Bulganin in his investi-
ture speech on 9 February like-
wise emphasized the theme of
invincible Soviet power. He
assured the Supreme Soviet that
one of the "main cares" of the
party and government would be
the strengthening of the defen-
sive might of the state and
the maintenance of the fight-
ing preparedness of the armed
forces "at the level dictated
by the interests of our mother-
land and the international sit-
uations" He also noted that
the production of Soviet heavy
industry "at present is almost
three and one half times greater
than in prewar 1940."
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART. ' I I I PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 9
25X1
 Approved Fo lease 2005/Q,9 RDP79-0092%WO0500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
'28 April 1955
At the same time, however,
Soviet leaders provided a coun-
terbalance.to the more militant
tone by stressing "peaceful
coexistence`"
In their interviews with
the Hearst delegation, for ex-
ample, they tried to give the
impression that'they'wanted to
improve relations with the
United States and to dispel
any fears of Soviet aggressive-
ness. While supporting the
Chinese Communist position on
Formosa, both Khrushchev and
Zhukov voiced the hope that
hostilities would not break
out again in the Far East
The bellicose and chau-
vinistic tone of the Supreme
Soviet speeches may, in addi-
tion, have been intended to
prepare the people of the bloc
for unpalatable decisions in
domestic economic policy and
to reassure them of the Com-
munist world's ability to deal
with any threats growing from
the agreements to rearm West
Germany.
The USSR also began putting
into effect some of the measures
against West German rearmament
outlined at the conference of
Sino-Soviet bloc leaders in
Moscow in December and in dip-
lomatic notes during that month.
Molotov stated in his 8 Febru-
ary speech that consultations
on the Soviet bloc eight-power
treaty of friendship, collabo-
ration and mutual aid were be-
ing carried out, and on 21
March the USSR announced that
the eight powers had reached
agreement on the principles
of this treaty and on the or-
ganization of a unified bloc
command.
On 9 April, the Soviet
government followed through on
its threat to annul the Soviet
wartime treaties with the United
Kingdom and France by request-
ing the Presidium of the Su-
preme Soviet to abrogate them.
The Austrian Negotiations
The first Soviet move to
regain the initiative was the
reopening of the long deadlocked
Austrian question. Molotov
probably anticipated that the
conspicuous attention he de-
voted to Austria in his speech
on 8 February would carry a
special meaning for the Western
governments because the Austrian
question has for several years
been designated in the West
as a_ "test of Soviet good
faith."
- In the Moscow talks of
12-15 April with the Austrian
delegation, the Soviet leaders
displayed unprecedented flexi-
bility and willingness to com-
promise. They informed the
Austrians that they were pre-
pared to sign and ratify a
treaty without delay.
Bulganin explained that
the Austrian question could
not have been settled earlier
because the USSR had considered
that the Austrian and German
questions should be settled
together. But now that the
German question had been set-
tled in another way, he said,
the USSR was prepared to con-
clude an Austrian treaty as
long as none of the big powers
gained an advantage therefrom.
Molotov and his colleagues
obtained from the Austrian del-
egation assurances that Austria
"will not join any military al-
liances nor allow military
bases on its territory."
Austria also publicly agreed
to pledge to follow "in relation
to all states a policy of inde-
pendence." Privately, it prom-
ised to issue a declaration
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 9
 Approved F Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00WA000500040001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
after the conclusion of the
treaty, pledging Austria to be-
have "in a neutral manner com-
parable to Switzerland."
The only major question
left to be resolved was the
nature of the four-power guar-
antees of Austria's neutrality.
The communiqud on the talks
made no reference to this ques-
tion and the Soviet negotiators
did not put forward any pro-
posed text. They went no fur-
ther than to declare the USSR's
willingness to participate in
a guarantee and suggested that
Austria request it from the
f our powers.
There remains a possibil-
ity that Moscow will seek to
include in a guarantee,provi-
sions that would offer the USSR
a pretext for future interven-
tion or imply a semiprotector-
ate status for Austria.
The Effect on the
German Problem
Moscow apparently re-
garded the Austrian talks to
a large extent as a device
for stimulating public pres-
sure in Western Germany and
Western Europe against German
rearmament, for renewed nego-
tiations with the USSR on Ger-
many, and for engaging the
Western powers in a foreign
ministers' conference. On 19
April, the Soviet Union deliv-
ered notes to the three Western
powers calling for a four-power
foreign ministers' conference
in Vienna "in the nearest fu-
ture" to conclude the Austrian
treaty.
Editorials in Pravda and
Izvestia following Tie Austrian
talks openly stressed the re-
lationship of a four-power
agreement on Austria to the
German problem. They noted
that the establishment of a
"new situation" in Austria can-
not help but interest the Ger-
man people and echoed Molotov's
remark by stressing that the
talks indicate that "the most
complicated contemporary ques-
tions," including the German
question, "can be resolved by
negotiations."
This treatment of the
Austrian-Soviet talks strongly
suggests that it is Moscow's
intention to grant Austria a
generous settlement that would
immediately become a compelling
symbol and example to the West
Germans.
This line of action, was
foreshadowed by West German
Communist leader Max Reimann
in statements on 17 April.
Reimann said that the success-
ful negotiations between the
USSR and Austria show the
German people what possibili-
ties there are if the orders
of the American and German
monopolists are ignored and
the "national interests of our
people--the peaceful reunifi-
cation of our fatherland--are
the sole targets."
The Soviet Position on Germany
Until early April, Moscow
carefully maintained a distinc-
tion between a four-power con-
ference on German reunifica-
tion--which it would be will-
ing to attend only if the Paris
agreements were renounced--and
a conference of four or more
powers on other questions such
as Austria, international ten-
sions, European security, dis-
armament and Asian issues.
After 1 April, the USSR
softened this line and is now
suggesting that, as long as
the Paris treaties have not
been implemented, a German set-
tlement can still be the sub-
ject of great-power talks.
Soviet and East German propa-
gandists are assuring German
listeners that the possibil-
ities for such negotiations
"have not been exhausted."
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 9
 Approved Foelease 2005/01/27: CIA-RDP79-00921000500040001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
It is still clearly implied,
however, that a renunciation
of the Paris accords would be
prerequisite to any agreement
on a German settlement.
This insistence on renun-
ciation of the accords as the
price for reunification is prob-
ably not intended as merely a
temporary tactic aimed at de-
feating ratification. The So-
viet leaders appear to regard
this position, together with
their concessions on Austria,
as their most potent weapon in
their long-term strategy to
undermine Adenauer's authority,
destroy his coalition, and
bring about a major reorienta-
tion in West German foreign
policy.
The Soviet leaders probably
expect that the restoration of
West German sovereignty will
lead to the emergence of a more
independent foreign policy and
an increasing preoccupation
with the problems of reunifica-
tion.
Future Policy on Germany
Soviet tactics toward West
Germany for the foreseeable fu-
ture will probably be designed
to maintain constant pressure
on Bonn to withdraw its commit-
ments under the Paris agree-
ments, Pressure and warnings
are likely to be balanced by
continuing offers to establish
diplomatic and trade relations
and possibly by attractive pro-
posals on reunification and
neutralization.
In early March, after the
Bundestag had approved the Paris
accords, G. M. Pushkin, Soviet
ambassador to East German
spoke enthusiastically
~nu prospects resuming diplo-
matic relations between Moscow
and Bonn. He even named candi-
dates for the ambassadorial ap-
pointment on both sides.
Despite Moscow's apparent
plan to point to an Austrian
settlement based on reunifica-
tion and neutralization as an
example for the West Germans,
the Soviet leaders are probably
not interested in negotiating
a similar settlement for Ger-
many.
As Mikoyan remarked to a
member of the Austrian delega-
tion in Moscow, the settlement
of a problem involving seven
million people could not form
a precedent for a settlement
of a problem involving seventy
million. The USSR has a stake
in East Germany infinitely
greater than it had in Austria,
and the strategic importance
of Germany and German resources
are crucial in the balance of
East-West power in central
Europe.
The Soviet aim is to inject
a dramatic new element into the
German equation that will dis-
rupt Western plans and enable
the USSR to play for time which
it believes will bring changes
in Western Germany favorable to
Soviet interests, particularly
after Dr. Adenauer's departure
from the political scene.
Policy Toward Bloc Neighbors
Molotov in his foreign
policy review made a special
effort to prevent any misunder-
standing that his emphasis on
the two-camp conflict meant a
more extreme policy toward
countries bordering on the Sino-
Soviet bloc.
He gave strong praise to
India, proclaimed Soviet sup-
port for the Afro-Asian con-
ference, and cited improvements
in Soviet relations with Fin-
land, Iran, Afghanistan, Japan,
and to some extent with Yugo-
slavia.
A significant development
in Soviet policy toward Scandi-
navia.came with Deputy Foreign
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 9
 Approved ,eRelease 2005e-C,[-A-RDP79-0091A000500040001-4
28 April 1955
Minister Gromyko's visit to
Sweden from 24 to 26. March o This
underlined the USSR's continu-
ing interest in preventing any
move by Sweden toward military
co-operation with the West.
Moscow's moderate response
to Tito after he had criticized
the way Yugoslavia was treated
in Molotov's speech of 8 Febru-
ary and the Soviet ambassador's
interview on 28 March with Tito
provide further evidence that
the Soviet government intends
to continue efforts to improve
relations with Belgrade.
Soviet policy toward the
Middle East has been almost
wholly preoccupied with efforts
to prevent the extension and
strengthening of Western-spon-,
sored defense arrangements.
Moscow is seeking to discourage
Iran from joining the Turkish-
Pakistani alliance and thus
completing the "northern tier,"
and on exploiting historical
and dynastic rivalries in the
Arab world inflamed by the con-
clusion of the Turkish-Iraqi
treaty,
Soviet propaganda to Iran
by mid-March had reached its
highest volume since last Octo-
ber and contained pointed
references to the 1927 Soviet-
Iranian treaty, which provides
that each party will not take
part in political alliances
directed against the other.
Moscow was quick to ex-
ploit the cleavage in the Arab
League produced by the Turkish-
Iraqi pact. There have been
frequent allusions to-Turkish
ambitions to revive the Otto-
man Empire, and the USSR has
singled out Syria for special
diplomatic and propaganda
attention.
On 16 April, the Soviet
government also threatened to
raise the question of Western
interference in the Near East
before the United Nations,
apparently timing this state-
ment to provide ammunition
for Communist delegates at the
Afro-Asian conference.
Soviet bloc efforts to
forestall any move by Afghan-
istan toward association with
regional defense arrangements
continued with Rumanian offers
of a trade agreement and
assistance in an oil explora-
tion project in March, and a
Hungarian trade, offer, includ-
ing long-term industrial
credits, in February. The USSR
has attempted to exploit
Afghanistan's disputes.with
Pakistan in order to prevent
a settlement which might open
the way for Afghanistan's
entry into a Middle East de-
fense alliance or might enable
Pakistan to participate more
effectively in such a defense
arrangement.
Moscow's long-established
policy of encouraging India in
its independent foreign policy
and in its aspirations to play
a mediatory role between the
two power blocs was evident in
statements by Molotov and
Voroshilov. The Soviet Foreign
Ministry announced on/,28 March
that Nehru will visit the USSR
in early June,, and Izvestia
reported on 9 April that an
Indian parliamentary delegation
had accepted an invitation to
come to the Soviet Union.
Soviet Policy in the Far East
The most significant
developments in the Bulganin
government's policy toward
Communist China centered on
what appeared to be the first
cautious steps toward firmer
support of Peiping's foreign
policy objectives.
a en ov had not been suf-
ficiently "strong" on his
foreign policy. Khrushchev
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pag:
 Approved Fcelease 2005S7EIIr-RDP79-009000500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
took great pains to stress the
USSR's solidarity with China
in all fields. He declared
that the Soviet Union would
honor its 1950 treaty if China
were attacked, though he did
not specify exactly what he
meant by "attack.
Bulganin, in his Supreme
Soviet speech, likewise implied
a greater measure of support,
stating. that..the "Chinese
people may rely upon the aid
of their faithful. frier4d.the
great. Soviet. people'-11 .'.in their
struggle for the honor and
independence of. their mother
land.
The Formosa problem
appears to confront the Soviet
leaders with a dilemma. Their.
desire to satisfy Chinese
needs and requests and to
maintain a strong united front
with Peiping toward the West
conflicts with their interest
in avoiding involvement in a
large-scale war in the Far
East.
The Bulganin government
appears to have decided that
the Formosa situation requires
a stronger line on the part of
the Soviet Union and is willing
to accept the risks such a line
may carry. The USSR made no
official commitment of mili-
tary support, however, and
probably would seek to restrain
its Chinese ally from forcing
events to the point of large-
scale military hostilities.
The USSR's primary objec-
tive both in propaganda and in
private exchanges on the For-
mosa issue has been to estab-
lish itself in the eyes of the
world as the champion of a ne-
gotiated settlement and place
the United States in the posi-
tion of refusing to settle
international issues and relax
tension. Thus, Molotov pro-
posed a ten-power conference
to the British ambassador on
4 February.
This plan was published by the
Soviet press on 12 February
despite the fact that Moscow
.had learned in private talks
that the proposal was unac-
ceptable to the United States
and Britain because it cir-
cumvented the United Nations
and excluded the Chinese Nation-
alists.
.Aside from backing up
Communist China on the Formosa
.issue, the USSR has made Japan
a major diplomatic target
in recent months. Japan's
belief that its only hope of
achieving economic independence
lies in mainland markets has
been assiduously fostered by
the Communist powers as a
lever for generating new con-
flicts with the United States
and.for inducing a reorienta-
tion in Japan's general foreign
policy. ,
This Sino-Soviet line of
action was also evident in
Moscow's prompt gestures to
the new Hatoyama government
after the pro-American Yoshida
cabinet had resigned last
December. The USSR sought
to capitalize on Hatoyama's
election promises regarding
trade and normalization of
relations with.the USSR.
Soviet leaders have adopted
a generally more conciliatory
position but have shown no haste
to proceed with negotiations.
The Soviet tactics seem
to be based on the assumption
that the passage of time and
mounting domestic pressures
will force the Japanese govern-
ment into negotiations on Soviet
terms.
Major trends in recent
Soviet foreign policy in-
clude:
(1) the continuation of
a long-term policy of con-
ciliation toward the Sino-Soviet
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 9
 Approved
elease 2005/01/27: CIA-RDP79-0094000500040001-4
SECRET
28 April 1955
bloc's neighbors which was
initiated soon after Stalin's
death;
(2) the carrying for-
ward of a series of measures
designed to offset the Western
diplomatic success at the
Paris conference last October;
and
(3) the beginning of a
new course of action--based
on concessions on the Austrian
treaty and the reopening of
great-power talks--designed
to place the USSR in an advan-
tageous position to influence
the course of events in West
Germany and Western Europe
in the postratification period.
Soviet leaders have con-
tinued to show a high degree
of flexibility in the conduct
of foreign policy, characteris-
tic of the entire post-Stalin
period.
Both the Malenkov and Bul-
ganin governments have appar-
ently felt that the need to
prevent the further develop-
ment of the power and cohesion
of the Western alliances is
sufficiently pressing as to
warrant well-timed and limited
concessions.
Immediate military gains
in Indochina were sacrificed
in order to achieve broader
political gains which included
defeating EDC. The Soviet
Union now appears ready to
withdraw from Austria in order
to arrest a trend toward West
German alignment with the West.
These concessions, how-
ever, have never involved
positions where the Sino-
Soviet bloc's prestige and
security are deeply engaged
and have never implied any
modification of the supreme
objectives of disrupting the,
Western coalition, isolating
the United States from its
allies, and bringing about
the withdrawal of American
military power from advanced
bases in Europe and Asia.
Spokesmen for practically
all Western European nations
have welcomed the prospect of
an early Austrian settlement,
and there is widespread approv-
al for the idea that Austria
should be neutral.
There is also general agree-
ment that the change in the
Soviet attitude is the begin-
rning of a new gambit on Germany,
but there is little agreement on
what move the USSR may make
next.
The British believe the
West has no option but to move
as quickly as possible to sign
an Austrian state treaty. The
Foreign Office has recommended
that the cabinet not foreclose
the possibility of offering a
guarantee of Austrian territor-
ial integrity should one be re-
quired to complete a settlement.
On the broader questions of
Germany and European security,
the British representative to
the tripartite study group in
London believes that the new
British government will not be
able to formulate its views be-
fore mid-July, which he envis-
ages as the earliest date for
East-West talks. He says the
British have nothing new to pro-
pose on the subject of European
security, but that the West
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 9
25X1
 Approved F elease 2005SE, 67, ET CIA-009 A000500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
ought to be prepared to meet a
Soviet initiative.
This spokesman argues
against taking specific posi-
tions now on the grounds that
they might leak to the Soviet
Union. He thinks that the West
Germans, too, might want to
wait some weeks to evaluate the
effects of the Paris accords
coming into force.
the French have been anx-
ious to move rapidly toward an
Austrian settlement, but seem
particularly concerned over
Vienna's willingness to accept
an ill-defined status of neu-
trality. They believe thata
guaranteed neutrality, if Aus-
tria were unable to defend it-
self, would present a "serious
problem."
The French profess a desire
to keep the Austrian and German
problems separate, but their
attitude is actually somewhat
equivocal. The Foreign Minis-
try professes "concern" that
the Germans may wish to follow
the Austrian example. At the
same time, the French view the
Soviet attitude toward Austria
as a possible omen of "reason-
ableness" on Germany, a develop-
ment which might obviate the
necessity of implementing the
Paris accords.
French Foreign Ministry
spokesmen, partly in an effort
to hasten efforts to establish
a study group for East-West
talks, have referred to an up-
surge in neutralist sentiment
in the National Assembly, par-
ticularly among Gaullists, as
a result of the prospective
Austrian settlement.
The American embassy in
Rome on 15 April reported local
apprehension over the effect of
Austrian neutrality on the de-
fenses of Italy's northern
frontier.
In West Germany, Bundestag
leaders expect a rise in neu-
tralist sentiment, but feel the
public recognizes the vast
differences between a settlement
for Austria and one for Germany.
Bonn is taking the line that the
Austrian situation may reveal
Soviet willingness to negotiate
the question of German reunifi-
cation on the basis of free
elections and freedom in foreign
relations.
The West German opposition
is emphasizing the example of
Austrian neutrality as a pos-
sible device for restoring Ger-
man unity. Some German news-
papers, which are generally hope-
ful and cautious, hint that Ger-
many may be forced to consider
neutrality in order to gain free
elections.
Austrian treaty, developments
cannot be considered to have had
any effect on the 26 April state
elections in Lower Saxony. In
general, the Lower Saxony elec-
tions followed the pattern of
other West German state elec-
tions in the past year, the
issues and personalities being
essentially local.
In Sweden and Finland, the
proposed settlement-of the Aus-
trian problem has been welcomed
for its own sake, but most com-
mentators believed that the
Soviet "concessions" were aimed
primarily at encouraging German
neutrality and nullification of
the Paris agreements.
The general suspicion in
Western Europe that the Soviet
Union may next make a move
directly aimed at Germany ap-
pears to be somewhat weaker than
the hope that this most recent
sign of Soviet "reasonableness"
may be.the prelude of a general
easing of East-West tensions.
Only London, by emphasizing
that NATO must be the Western
basis of any European security
arrangements, appears to real-
ize that'a spread.of the con-
cept of alliance-free nations
could have a disastrous effect
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000500040001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 9
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved F Release 2005 -RDP79-0094000500040001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 April 1955
on the political and military
solidarity of the Western
alliance. The British have
long regarded the withdrawal
of the United States from West-
ern Europe as a primary ob-
jective of Soviet.foreign policy.
O
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : C- 7 00050004000
PART III PATTERNS AND ge 9 of 9