CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000600160001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 3, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO. 20
OCI NO-8854/55
3 November 1955
CURRENT
INTELLIGEN
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CE
UMENrNQ
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! J7:J%.1\LT!
CONFIDENTIAL
up consultative machinery.
FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The Soviet formula for a European security system, although
it has been modified, is still based on a divided Germany`
and therefore remains different from that suggested by the West.
It embraces most of the features of the full security plan
proposed by the USSR at the summit conference, including pro-
visions for assistance to any nation attacked and for setting
MOSCOW MAY PRESS FOR CONFERENCE
ON NEAR AND FAR EAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Soviet journalists at Geneva are putting forth the argument
that the four powers should address themselves to situations
requiring "immediate attention" such as those in the Near and
Far East. The USSR probably feels that it is in a strong position
at this time for gaining the support of the underdeveloped
ces on Near East and Asian problems.
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Tension is mounting on Israel's borders with Syria and
Egypt, and border violations continue as both sides are rein-
forcing their military units. Ben-Gurion's installation as prime
minister foreshadow a firm and uncompromising Israeli policy.
CONFIDENTIAL
French North Africa: The new Moroccan unity arising from the
support of Berber leader El Glaoui and ex-sultan Mohamed
ben Arafa for the restoration of former sultan Mohamed ben
Youssef has greatly increased the nationalists' strength
and their will to force Paris to yield to their demands.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1955
December Elections'Practically Assured in France: The 330-211
Faure's proposal to advance National Assembly elections
makes it almost certain that the elections will be held on
11 December, even h the bill must still go to the
upper house. . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Saudi Arabia Protests British Occupation of Buraimi: Saudi
Arabia has protested the Britisb occupation of the Buraimi
oasis and adjacent areas in London and has warned. that it may request
UN Security Council action on the dispute.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a e
Laos: Crown Prince Savang of Laos believes that the political
facilitates his exercise of authority.
Rhee Again Threatens Action to Regain Lost Territory: In a
meeting with his chiefs of staff on ``: October, President
Rhee is reported to have demanded that plans be submitted
to him for military action to regain former South Korean
territory below the 38th parallel. Rhee is unlikely to
attempt recovery of the lost territory at this time. His
primary objectives in bringing up the matter now probably
are to draw American attention to Korea during the Geneva
conference, assure the continued presence of American
troops in Korea, and maintain the atmosphere of crisis which
East Germany Improves Position to Interfere With Berlin Access:
East Germany is taking steps w c would mprove its position
for interfering with Western access to West Berlin as part
of its campaign to extort diplomatic recognition from the
West. The regime probably feels itself in a stronger posi-
tion to resume harassing tactics as a result of the emphatic
Soviet endorsement of its sovereignty and the transfer to
East Germany of jurisdiction over its communications and
frontier and checkpoint controls. Page a 25X1
Burmese Premier Advocates Closer Relations With USSR: Since he
arrived on 21 October for a two-week visit n the Soviet
talks between the royal government: and the Pathet Lao may
break down next week and that the Pathet Lao forces may
then step un their military action in the northern provinces.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Union, Burma's Premier U Nu has r'1Idiated-,good 'will.. toward
hosts and has made numerous requests for economic assistance
and cultural exchanges which could provide the Russians
with enlarged opportunity to extend their influence in Burma.
At present, however, there is little likelihood that Nu
would give up Burma's policy of "independent neutralism."
. . Page 7
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New Trans-Mongolian Railroad: Final operating agreements between
t he Soviet nion, the ongolian Peoples Republic, and
Communist China for the opening of the new trans-Mongolian
railroad on 1 January 1956 have been announced by Peiping.
Completion of the new railroad will reduce China's vulner-
ability to blockade and will provide a direct line of
communication between the USSR and China. age 8 25X1
Indonesia: The Masjumi-led Indonesian cabinet appears confident
of winning its first parliamentary test on 11 November when
Prime Minister Harahap's program comes up for approval.
The 12-party coalition cabinet is represented by 139 of
the 231 active members of the provisional parliament, but
support from its small-party allies may not be altogether
firm. If the cabinet does win parliamentary support on
11 November, its prospects would be good for remaining
in office until the new parliament is convened early next
year. Page 9
Philippine Elections: Although some important urban and pro-
vincial issues are to be decided in the Philippine elections
of 8 November, the break between President Magsaysay and
Senator.Claro Recto has focused attention primarily on
Recto's campaign for re-election to the Senate. His violent
attacks on Magsaysay's "incurable habit of subservience to
the United States" have given the issue of Philippine-
American relations more than its usual significance.
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s e a . e e e . . e . . . . . . Page 10
Australian Elections: The Australian government's decision to
call elections for both houses of parliament for 10 December
is intended to capitalize on the curr nt split in the
opposition Labor Party. . . . . . . . Page 11 25X1
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
the rearmament program on schedule.
WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The international political climate has changed considerably
since the original plans were made to build up the West German
forces over a three-year period. The West German public has since
concluded that the threat of war has largely abated, and few West
Germans, including Bundestag members, appear disposed to burden
the economy with large military outlays. Consequently, little prog-
ress has been made on the financial arrangements needed to carry out
SECRET
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3 November 1955
THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The Soviet General Staff probably enjoys greater prestige
now than at any time in its history. One indication of this is
seen in the elevation this year of Chief of Staff Marshal
Sokolovsky from the rank of denutv minister Tense to first
deputy minister of defense. 25X1
JAPAN'S DEFENSE PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . Page 6
The Japanese Defense Agency's, six-year defense plan, the
first year of which is now being implemented, probably reflects
the maximum rearmament effort politically and economically feasible.
While the forces contemplated under the,plan would be inadequate
to defend Japan from external aggression,' they would be capable
of maintaining internal security and conducting a limited defense
of Japanese coastal waters and air space. The Hatoyama government
is trying to obtain popular support for rearmament by promoting
the theme that Japan's rearming-is the only way to secure the
withdrawal of American forces.
SECRET
iv
THE WEEK IN BRIEF'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE
Germany and European Security
The new Soviet formula for
a European security system,
although it has been modified,
is still based on a divided
Germany and therefore remains
fundamentally different from
that suggested by the West.
It embraces most of the fea-
tures of the full security plan
proposed by the USSR at the
summit conference, including
provisions for assistance to
any nation attacked and for
consultative machinery. The
modifications were evidently
designed to make the Soviet
plan appear more reasonable
and in the long run gain sup-
port for it in Europe.
Foreign Minister Molotov
said that the plan is still
aimed at the ultimate abolition
of NATO and the Warsaw pact.
The new treaty draft sets no
time for this, however, and
merely states that the treaty
would be temporary and "valid
until it is replaced by another
broader treaty on European
security, which will take the
place of existing treaties and
agreements. "
The USSR also has agreed
to the idea--first broached by
Prime Minister Eden at the sum-
mit meeting--of establishing a
zone in central Europe in which
armed forces and armaments
would be limited by agreement
and subject to inspection. The
major disagreement here is again
on the German question. The
Western plan assumes a united
Germany and makes the eastern
border of a united Germany the
center of the zone. The USSR
would make the present border
between East and West Germany
the dividing line.
The USSR probably does not
expect even preliminary agree-
ment on the European security
question at Geneva, but hopes
to make the West appear unrea-
sonable in rejecting the Soviet
terms. It certainly expects a
deadlock on Germany.
East-West Contacts
Molotov made it clear on
31 October that in the Soviet
view, a, program for expanding
East=West contacts should in-
clude the development of East-
West trade if it is to be
successful. He sharply criti-
cized "artificially created
barriers," embargoes, and re-
strictions, and suggested that
the removal of trade discrimina-
tions should be the first item
discussed by a committee of
experts. Although Molotov did
not make this a prerequisite
for expansion of other contacts,
he made it clear this was the
primary Soviet interest.
The unimaginativeness of
other Soviet proposals on East-
West contacts suggests that the
USSR is not particularly inter-
ested in a major reduction of
obstacles to travel and the
free flow of information. There
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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 4
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1955
was brief mention of cultural,
sports, tourist, and scientific
and technical contacts, with a
specific proposal for a confer-
ence on the use of atomic energy
in the field of public health.
The most novel proposal was that
the committee of experts also
MOSCOW MAY PRESS FOR CONFERENCE
ON NEAR AND FAR EAST
Soviet journalists in
Geneva are putting forth the
argument that, since no headway
is possible there on Germany
and European security, East-
West talks should be addressed
to situations requiring "imme-
diate attention" such as those
in the Near and Far East. Ac-
cording to one journalist, the
USSR believes a solution to
Near East questions must be
sought in a conference with all
the powers concerned partici-
pating.
The statements of these
journalists probably reflect
the views of higher Soviet
officials. They undoubtedly
were made on the assumption
they would reach Western offi-
cials and appear to be feelers
to ascertain Western attitudes
toward such conferences. Since
the summit talks, the USSR has
shown interest in obtaining a
voice in Near Eastern affairs
by saying it would join with
the other great powers in
guaranteeing the neutrality of
Near Eastern states.
A I November Moscow com-
mentary on Molotov's discussions
with the Western and Israeli
foreign ministers asked why
Western representatives were
not taking any steps for "nor-
mally examining" complications
study the lifting of restric-
tions on sea communications
and the passage of merchant
ships through canals and straits,
a suggestion probably made with
the Chinese Nationalist "block-
ade" of the Formosa Strait in
mind.
in the Near East. It hinted
that the Near East situation
should be raised in the UN
Security Council.
Soviet Foreign Ministry
press chief Ilyichev also
announced on 27 October at
Geneva that the USSR is consid-
ering a Chinese Communist pro-
posal to hold a big-power
conference on the Far East in
the near future. Moscow has
long favored a conference on
Far Eastern problems with
Communist China--and probably
India--participating on a par
with the present Big Four.
The USSR probably feels
that it is in a strong position
at this time for gaining the
support of the underdeveloped
countries for conferences on
Near East and/or Asian problems.
The Soviet Union has made
special efforts to align itself
with the Afro-Asian states by
supporting the Arabs in UN
votes and by formally endorsing
the objectives of the Bandung
conference in the Nehru-Bulganin
statement--which will probably
be reiterated with Burmese
premier U Nu before he leaves
Moscow. Soviet propaganda re-
cently has launched a new slogan
associating the "spirit of
Geneva" with the "spirit of
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PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pau 2 of d
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1955
Bandung." The forthcoming
visits of Bulganin and Khru-
shchev to Afghanistan, India,
and Burma will afford the So-'
Viet leaders an unparalleled
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
Tension is mounting be-
tween Israel and the Arab
states. The danger of border
incidents is increasing as
military positions on Israel's
borders with Syria and Egypt
are being fortified and rein-
forcements are being moved up.
Meanwhile, Israel is actively
pursuing its efforts to obtain
arms from any source--but
preferably from the West. The
return of Ben-Gurion as prime
minister suggests a firm and
unrelenting policy designed to
maintain Israel's military
superiority over the Arab states,
On the Israeli-Egyptian
frontier the situation has be-
come increasingly serious.
Israel launched a major raid
in the El Auja demilitarized
zone on 2 November in an effort
to wipe out Egyptian entrench-
ments which it claimed were
illegal. Egypt claimed these
checkposts were to keep Israel
from maintaining illegal occu-
pation of the zone. This attack
had been preceded by a series
of major incidents including
a small Egyptian commando raid
deep into Israeli territory on
1 November. Artillery and
antiaitcraft firing has also
been reported in the Gaza area.
American army observers
report that Israel began mobi-
lizing on 28 October and they
opportunity to encourage these
states to adopt policies inde-
pendent of the West and including
closer ties with the Orbit.
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ABORDER VIOLATION
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28 OCT
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SAUDI ARAB7A_'
35
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pasr& .,f d
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t ?
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
believe the mobilization has
reached "a massive stage."
Mobilized equipment is report-
edly moving north toward the
Syrian border and south toward
the Egyptian frontier.
Ben-Gurion's government,
which took office on 2 November,
will probably receive full pop-
ular and parliamentary support
on a tough border policy.
Israel is continuing its
efforts to purchase arms.
Negotiations are in progress
with France and Italy for the
purchase of tanks, planes, 25X1
guns and ammunition.
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PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of A
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The new Moroccan unity
arising from the support of
Berber leader El Glaoui and ex-
sultan Mohamed ben Arafa for
the restoration of former sul-
tan Mohamed ben Youssef, now
in France, has greatly increased
the nationalists' strength and
their will to force Paris to
yield to their demands. Oppo-
nents in both France and Morocco
of Ben Youssef's restoration
can no longer count on any im-
portant Moroccan faction, and
Paris may soon scrap its orig-
inal plan for a Council of the
Throne and a provisional Moroc-
can government.
Foreign Minister Pinay in-
dicated to Secretary Dulles on
31 October that there is now no
reason for not returning Ben
Youssef to the Moroccan throne.
Pinay said he favors a revision
of the protectorate treaty,
which has long been demanded by
Moroccan nationalists, and he
anticipates that such a step
would restore order in Morocco.
_Pinay hopes the recent rein
forccments of French troops can
be withdrawn in time to influ-
ence the forthcoming French
parliamentary elections.
Increased nationalist pres-
sure on the French is being
applied in the form of a week's
work stoppage in Casablanca
which was reported 90-percent
effective in local industries
on the first day, 31 October.
The rate of absenteeism at the
nearby American air base at
Nouaseur was high in comparison
with the usual ineffectual re-
sponse.
The nationalists are re-
ported considering extending
the strike until France agrees
to return Ben Youssef to Morocco.
The widespread belief that Ben
Youssef's return is imminent
may result in extensive terror-
ism if his return appears to be
unreasonably delayed, Respon-
s.ibie Istiq;lal leaders have' in-
dicated that independence re-
mains the paramount goal and
Ben Youssef's re-enthronement
is secondary.
In Algeria, the situation
is not improving despite the
tremendous French military
strength there. Algerians in
the disturbed northeastern area
are Losing faith in the govern-
ment's ability to suppress the
terrorism. Firebrands among
the European settlers appar-
ently are urging them to take
the :Law into their own hands
in self-defense,
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NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 12
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1955
December Elections Practically
A`ss`u-r-e-cT in France
The 330-211 vote of confi-
dence on 3 November approving
French premier Faure's proposal
to advance National Assembly
elections probably assures vot-
ing on 11 December, even though
the bill must still go to the
upper house.
The vote occurred after the
midnight deadline which would
have forced the Council of the
Republic to act within a. week.
Normal procedure now applies,
under which the council can de-
lay its decision two months,
with an additional 100 days to
reach a compromise with the
assembly. Since the council is
preponderantly conservative,
however and in the main sympa-
thetic to the views of the In-
dependent deputies who sparked
the drive for early elections,
approval will probably still be
forthcoming within the over-all
three week period allowed under
the urgency-procedure for final
ratification by both houses.
Premier Faure had called
for a vote of confidence when
assembly discussion of electoral
reform appeared to be hopelessly
bogged down. Most deputies
professed to prefer a new elec~
tion.procedure over the present
single-ballot law, but'no major-
ity could be found for any of
the 12 procedures considered in
the three-day debate.
The decision of the Com-
munists to vote for the govern-
ment's proposal seems to have
been a decisive factor. The
Communists hope to benefit from
the lack of unity among the non-
Communist left and the center
parties which formed electoral
alliances against them in 1951.
In all but the largest elec-
tion districts, where pure pro-
portional representation pre-
vails, the present law permits
one party or an alliance of
parties to take all the seats
if they get a majority of the
votes. This system was devised
to prevent the Communists and
the Gaullists from getting their
full share of the seats in the
195:L elections.
There is real danger now,
however, that the Communists will
succeed in aligning with some'
Socialist federations on the.
local level. The Communists
stand to gain, moreover, even
without such alliances, because
the center parties are more di-
vided than in 1951, and will
probably have more difficulty
in uniting.
The center and rightist
parties hope to benefit from
the disintegration of the Gaul-
list Rally, but their major
aim in pressing for early elec-
tions was.to hamper Mendes-
France's attempt to form a.;left-
center majority. Mendes-France
will probably seek to win delay
in the Council of the Republic,
starting his maneuvers in this
direction at the Radical So-
cialist Party congress now in
session.
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''ART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 1.~
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Saudi Arabia Protests
British Occupation of Buraimi
Saudi Arabia
sent a note of pro-
test to London on 27
October requesting a
withdrawal of British-
led forces from the
Buraimi oasis and
areas to the west.
On 29 October Saudi
Arabia informed the
UN Security Council
that it reserved the
right to request a
meeting of the Secu-
rity Council to deal
with the British
"armed aggression."
This move,
probably will not be
followed by an actual
appeal to the UN be-
cause Saudi Arabia's
violations of its
arbitration agreement
with Britain have
weakened its case.
The Saudis have
also begun radio
propaganda attacks
and reportedly have
requested Arab League
consideration of the
British action.
Saudi Arabia may also break
relations with Britain.
O SI-
? muscat
tJ British controlled
territory.
US companies have
oil concession.
Qao
Both the Saudis and the
British are concerned over the
Buraimi issue because it in-
volves their prestige in the
Persian Gulf area and in the
entire Arab world, as well as
prospective oil revenues.
UK-SAUDI DISPUTE
British controlled territory
Iraq Petroleum Co.(IPC)
US oil concessions
Arabian-American Oil Co.
(ARAMCO)
Cities Service-Richfield
25X6
25X6
Saudi bitterness over the
British action is also being
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17. L F O F 0 11 t.\'
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Ahu Dha
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PART 11 NOTES AND COMMENTS pa ap q Mf 19
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1955
directed against the United
States. One of Saud's advisers
hinted to the US charge in Jidda
on 28 October that Saudi Arabia
might no longer co-operate in
fighting communism. The
Arabian American Oil Company,
implicated by the British as
"a party in interest," is sup-
porting the Saudis but also
fears reprisals.
Rhee Again Threatens Action to
Regain Lost Territory
The chairman of the South
Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff
has told American officials
that President Rhee, in a meet-
ing on 25 October, restated
his desire to initiate military
action to recover Communist-
held areas south of the 38th
parallel. When advised by
Unless the Saudis can re-
store their prestige in the
Arab world, there is danger
that they will accept the So-
viet offer of arms assistance
and diplomatic relations and
refuse to renew the Dhahran air
base agreement with the United
States under any conditi s.
his service chiefs that such
action was impracticable, Rhee
reportedly declared "nothing
is impossible" and directed
that plans be submitted to him
within a few days.
In early August the three
South. Korean service chiefs
told United States officials
that they had rejected a sim-
ilar proposal by Rhee. Contin-
ued refusal by South Korean
military leaders to support
the use of force may induce
Rhee to fabricate incidents in
order to provoke hostilities
and he may feel it necessary
to replace key military person-
nel.
In view of the reported
opposition of the key military
leaders and the absence of in-
dications of other preparations
to involve military units in
action, it is unlikely that
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PART I I u v e e i n nnUU%1 Tm o
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Rhee intends to attempt recovery
of former South Korean territory
with his regular forces at pres-
ent. The disposition of the
American 24th and 7th Divisions
and the British Commonwealth
Division on the approaches to
the Kaesong corridor would re-
quire South Korean units to
move through other UN troops
if a direct land assault were
to be attempted. South Korean
capability for any but a small-
scale amphibious operation
against the Communist-held
Ong, in-Ka,esong area is' limited
by American restraints on
employment of the few amphib-
ious vessels available.
At present the South Kore-
an logistic capabilities to
conduct offensive operations
Crown Prince Savang of
Laos believes that the polit-
idal talks between the royal
government and the Pathet Lao
may break down next week. The
negotiations in Vientiane have
reached an apparent stalemate,
with government officials
describing the latest Pathet
proposals as "unacceptable."
Savang believes that if the
talks do break down, Pathet
Lao forces are "very likely"
to step up their military ac-
are limited to a 45-day supply
of ammunition, including a 5-
day supply with front-line
units, and a 2- to 10-day supply
of POI, F_
Rhee has the capability
of provoking incidents with
small unconventional units.
In calling for the use of force,
however, his primary objectives
are probably to attract United
States attention to Korea dur-
ing the Big Four foreign min-
isters' conference in Geneva,
assure the continued presence
of American troops, and main-
tain the atmosphere of crisis
which facilit
of authority.
ticin in the northern provinces.
The Pathet Lao is well
prepared for initiating an of-
fensive in the north. Its
forces have been built up over
the past year and military
shipments have been received
from the Viet Minh.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 19.55
East Germany Improves Position
To n erlere Vith V_ in Access
East Germany is taking
steps which would improve its
position for interfering with
Western access to West Berlin
as part )f its campaign to ex-
tort diplomatic recognition
from the West. The East Ger-
mans probably feel themselves
in a stronger position to re-
sume harassing tactics as a
result of the emphatic Soviet
endorsement of East German sov-
ereignty at Moscow in September
and the transfer to East Germany
HAN VER.
Helmstedt
Soviet ehcpom, ? ; Magdeburg
of ;jurisdiction over its com-
munications and frontier and
checkpoint controls.
East Germany is unlikely,
however, to take any drastic
measures to assert its "sov-
ereignty" during the current
Geneva conference.
Soviet border guards now
have been withdrawn from all
highway checkpoints on the East-
West: German frontier except
ZAT_ ( rected)
et e d)
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Helmstedt and their
functions transferred
to East German fron-
tier police. This act
confronts Allied of-
ficials with a choice
of submitting to East
German controls or
restricting official
travel to the Helm-
stedt Autobahn. Pre-
sutnnably only the per-
sonnel of Allied mili-
tary missions ac-
credited to the Soviet
forces in East Germany
will not be subject to
the controls admin-
istered by the East
German authorities.
East Germany has
made clear its inten-
tion to use every pos-
sible opportunity to
force Bonn into nego-
tiations on the highest
possible level as a
means of securing
recognition. The ac-
quisition of control
over barge traffic
'between West Germany
and West Berlin has
given the East Germans
a new means of apply-
ing pressure.
Soviet authorities
returned some 60
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
invalidated to the British, who
in turn transferred the per-
mits to the West German naviga-
tion authority in Hamburg for
presentation to its East German
counterpart. The East German
agency has indicated it believes
the correct way for Bonn to in-
augurate the new arrangements
would be for the West German
transport minister to write to
his East German counterpart.
This would automatically raise
the matter of barge permits
from the technical to the gov-
ernment-to-government level.
Threats against West Berlin
"spy centers" were also revived
in mid-October, following a
period of relative quiet. An
article in the East Berlin Na-
tional Zeitung on 22 October
warned that unless the activi-
ties of "agent centers" were
curtailed, severe countermeas-
ures would be taken which
would affect everyone who
visited East Germany or traveled
to West Germany, and which would
be particularly stringent in
regard to traffic between West
Berlin and West Germany. This
threat was in line with party
first secretary Ulbricht's re-
cent public attack against West.
German-supported organizations
functioning in West Berlin.
Work is apparently being
rushed for completion in 1956
of the Berlin Outer Frei.p.ht
Ring.
Meanwhile, East German
authorities reportedly have re-
cently imposed more rigid con-
trols on East German travel to
West Berlin, apparently aiming
at curtailing the refugee flow
to the West prior to the long-
expected formal establishment
of East German armed forces
after the Geneva conference.
a blockade zone was se up
within a radius of about 50
miles from Berlin on 23-24
October, and special permits
are now required to secure rail
tickets to the city.
Icon- .
firm yy the recent sharp drop
in the number of refugees esca.p-
ing to West Berlin.
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Burmese Premier Advocates
Closer Relations With R
Since he arrived on 21
October for a two-week visit in
the Soviet Union, Burma's Pre-
mier Nu has radiated good will
toward his hosts and has made
numerous requests for economic
assistance and cultural ex-
changes which could provide
the Russians an enlarged op-
portunity to extend their in-
fluence in Burma. At present,
however, there is little likeli-
hood that Nu would give up
Burma's "independent neutralism."
The American embassy in
Moscow reports that while the
USSR has been anxious to make
a good impression on Nu, the
efforts it has made on Nu's be-
half' have been considerably less
than those for Nehru.
From the moment of his ar-
rival in Moscow, Nu has been
unsparing in his eulogy of the
Soviet Union. He has praised
the USSR for its building "a
brave new world," for its
sincere desire for peace, and
for its beneficence iri "saving"
Burma from a difficult situa-
tion through its timely pur-
chase of rice. He even went so
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pagel'7 of 12
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
far as to propose that the USSR
be invited to participate in
the next Afro-Asian conference.
He also has stated that
Burma's trade relations with
the USSR have included the ex-
tension of industrial assist-
which was not colored by
political conditions. He went
on to say that Burma is pre-
pared to purchase Soviet equip-
ment and services on a, scale
commensurate with the Soviet pur-
chases of Burmese rice, and to
develop closer cultural rela-
tions with the Soviet Union.
In this connection, a Burmese
purchasing mission arrived in
Moscow on 31 October? for the
purpose of obtaining Soviet
goods.
Whether the USSR is will-
ing or able to exploit this op-
portunity to enhance its pres-
tige in Burma remains to be
New Trans-Mongolian Railroad
Final operating agreements
between the Soviet Union, the
Mongolian Peoples Republic, and
Communist China. for the opening
of the new trans-Mongolian rail-
road on 1 January 1956 have
been announced by Peiping. Com-
pletion of the new railroad will
reduce China's blockade vulner-
ability and will provide the
Soviet bloc with a direct line
of communication with China
proper.
seen. At his reception for Nu,
Bulganin made a routine state-
ment in favor of trade develop-
ment and cultural. exchanges,
but made no commitments, Per-
haps Bulganin will be more spe-
cific in a communique when Nu
leaves the USSR or during his
proposed visit to Burma before
the end of this year.
U Nu has always maintained
that Burma would accept assist-
ance from any quarter if there
were no strings attached. To
Americans he has indicated
doubt as to the USSR's ability
to live up to its boasts, and
has stated that when he asks
for aid from the Russians, he
is, in fact, calling their
bluff. His fulsome praise of
the USSR, reminiscent of the
line he took in Peiping last
year, may be due in part to his
desire to please his hosts.
Approximately 750 miles
shorter than the present Mos-
cow-Peiping rail link through
Manchuria, the railroad will
become a major artery for trade
between the USSR and Communist
China. Its estimated initial
annual capacity of 2,700,000
tons each way will increase the
present capacity of Sino-Soviet
rail connections more than 50
percent. Shipments of Chinese
agricultural products will be
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PART TT NCITF.S ANTI C`(IMMvNTTS Paora A of 1
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SECRET %Wf
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
facilitated and
freight costs greatly
reduced by the use of
diesel locomotives as
well as by the shorter
rail distance.
The new rail-
road will provide
the USSR better trans--
port links to im-
portant Mongolian
mineral deposits, and
will enable Communist
China to exploit
large Mongolian tim-
ber reserves and to
use the rich oil de-
posits at Sain Shanda.
Moreover, the rapid
extension of the
road nets in both
Inner and Outer Mon-
golia in association
with railroad con-
struction will great-
ly facilitate the
livestock-breeding
and iron and steel
development programs
recently initiated
in that region.
M 0 N'\g0LIA
!~L
SAYN SHANDA "r??.J
PEIPING
YELLO
SEA
140 200 300 IT 500
Nautical Miles0
0 "l00 240 300 40 500
Statute Miles
Full-scale operation of
the trans-Mongolian line was
earlier planned to start sev-
eral months earlier than now
scheduled. Delays were caused
by adverse weather last winter
and by difficulties in install-
The Masjumi-led Indonesian
cabinet appears confident of
winning its first parliamentary
test on 11 November when Prime
Minister Harahap's program comes
up for approval. The 12-party
coalition cabinet is supported
by 139 of the 231 active mem-
bers of the provisional parlia-
ment. If the cabinet does win
ing an advanced automatic signal-
ing system.. The Soviet broad-
gauge rail system has been ex-
tended 215 miles into Chinese
territory to the transloading
station of Chinina. 315 miles
from Peiping..
(Prepared by ORR)
parliamentary support, its
prospects would be good for re-
maining in office until after
the 15 December elections for a
constituent assembly.
There is a possibility,
however, that members of small
parties which are represented
in the government and which
SECRET
VLADIVOSTOK V
S E A O F I A P A N
oz
KO EA
DART T T ATnVI'ta c A HTn nnlmwe?t+ T.Tnn a r_ ... _ n -.0 -1 n
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
polled poorly in the 29 Sep-
tember parliamentary elections
will either abstain on 11 No-
vember or vote according*to
personal preference rather than
along party lines. In such a
case, the well-disciplined op-
position composed of the Na-
tional and Communist Parties
and several leftist and pro-
Communist groups might defeat
the government program and
cause the cabinet to fall.
Should the Harahap govern-
ment go down, the National
Party probably would form a
new cabinet prior to the 15
December elections. It would
attempt to reverse personnel
changes in government minis-
tries and in the election ma-
chinery made by the 11arahap
government which might aid the
Mas j umi .
The Harahap cabinet, how-
ever, appears to be proceeding
on the assumption that it will
remain in office for at least
several months. It has Dressed
an anticorruption campaign
which has fallen heavily on
me- sabers of the National Party,
but which has been hampered by
President Sukarno's refusal to
sign an emergency anticorrup-
tion bill until it has been
passed by parliament.
The cabinet's appointment
of Colonel A. H. Nasution as
army chief of staff on 28
October is a further victory
for the army and anti-Communist
Philippine Elections
Although some important
urban and provincial contests
are to be decided in the Phil-
ippine election of 8 November,
the break between President
Magsaysay and Senator Claro
Recto has focused attention
primarily on Recto's campaign
political elements over those
groups which favored a "people's
army".rather than a small,well-
trQLined military organization.
Nasution, who is pro-West and
held the post of chief of
staff from 1949 until late
December 1952, was a primary
Communist target during that
period. His retirement from
active service in late 1952
as a result of an army dispute
with parliament over military
policy was viewed by the Com-
mur-ists as a considerable
achievement. Nasution's re-
sumption of the post has been
presented by the cabinet as
part of its program to-'restore
the army's confidence in the
government."
Meanwhile, votes from
staggered parliamentary elec-
tions in areas bypassed on 29
September are being counted.
Late unofficial returns have
slightly increased the National
Party's lead, giving it 26.5
percent of the total vote, the
Mas j umi 25.5, the Nahdlatul
Ulama 21.2, and. the Communist
Party 19.7 percent.
Should the Harahap cabinet
win the 11 November parliamentary
vote, the National Party prob-
ably will make no move to un-
seat the government until after
the 15 December elections. Then
it may make a determined effort
to have the newly elected par-
liament seated as soon as pos-
sible, thus necessitating the
formation of a new cabinet.
(CONFIDENTIAL.)
for re-election to the Senate.
The senator's violent attacks
on Magsaysay's "incurable habit
of subservience to the United
States" have given the issue
of :relations with the United
States more than its usual
significance in Philippine
election campaigns.
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page,-10 of 12
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Nacionalista Party leaders
fear that Recto, running on the
opposition Liberal ticket, may
receive the largest vote of
any of the nine senatorial can-
didates to be elected. His
popularity extends to.the pro-
Magsaysay masses, and he is
receiving vigorous support
even from several Nacionalista
Party stalwarts.
Recto's charges of virtual
treason niay force Magsaysay to
be increasingly cautious in
dealing with the United States.
That the issue of Philippine
sovereignty is becoming more
delicate is illustrated by re-
cent press indignation over
the US navy's insistence on
continued administration of
the town of Olongapo, located
on the Subic Bay naval base.
The charge of Philippine
subservience to the United
States is'a favorite one of
the ,'uks and they undoubtedly
hope to benefit by the promi-
nence the campaign is giving it.
Ai their present weakened con-
dition they are not an im-
portant factor in the campaign,
however, although they are be-
lieved to be supporting certain
candidates for local posts.
Australian Elections
The Australian govern-
ment's decision to call elec-
tions for both houses of par-
liament on 10 December is in-
tended to capitalize on:the
current division within the
opposition Labor Party. Labor
Party leader Evatt's announce-
ment of his correspondence with
Soviet foreign minister Molotov
over the Petrov affair provides
the government with a likely
issue with which to exploit
Labor's split.
Their propaganda describing
the ideal candidate could well
be a description of Recto.
The Nacionalista leaders
hope at best to win five of
the nine Senate seats at stake
on 8 November, but, barring
defections among Nacionalista
senators not up for re-election
this year, their control of the
upper house is not in jeopardy.
While Recto's re-election,
which is generally conceded,
would inevitably be regarded
as a setback to Magsaysay, the
president has attempted to
cover himself by emphasizing
his demand for Recto's exclu-
sion from the Nacionalista
ticket--which was accomplished
--rather than for his defeat:,
both Recto and Magsaysay
appear to regard this year's
election as a warm-up for the
presidential elections two
years hence. At present, the
president's mass popularity
remains almost undiminished,
and lie has greatly strengthened
his position as party leader.
He has not, however, effected 25X1
many of the reforms he promised
two years ago.
The government parties are
faced with several state elec-
tions and would in any case
have had to hold elections for
one half of the Senate before
July 1956.
Should Prime Minister
Menzies' coalition, whose
majority in the House of Rep-
resentatives was reduced in
elections two years ago, renew
its mandate for the next three
years, it would be in a better
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
3 November 1955
position to undertake stringent
measures in the economic field.
Australia's exchange re-
serves have fallen off heavily
with the drop of export earn-
ings from a period of high em-
ployment and import demand.
The government imposed new im-
port restrictions on 10 October
but has not acted to check
credit expansion beyond urging
voluntary curbs.
The government is expected
to make substantial gains in
the lower house, despite the
fact that the right- and left-
wing factions of the Labor Party
are now attempting to submerge
their differences. Labor's
cleavage came into the open
with Evatt's accusations during
the 1954 campaign that the de-
fection of the Soviet diplomat
Petrov and his wife was arranged
by the Menzies government to
smear the Labor opposition.
Many members of Evatt's
party were shocked by his de-
fense of two subordinates im-
plicated in the Petrov testimony.
His subsequent attacks against
Labor's conservative industrial
groups and their domination by
Catholic Action have identified
him more closely with the party's
extreme left and pro-Communist
elements.
Evatt's seat in parliament
is threatened as well as his
role as party leader. He rep-
resents a conservative constitu-
ency in which recent redistrict-
ing is believed to have worked
against him. Moreover, his use
of Molotov's denial of Soviet
espionage to impugn both the
Menzies government and the find-
ings of the royal investigating
commission almost preclude his
backing by conservative and
Catholic elements in his party.
A Labor victory, however,
would vindicate Evatt and bring
about changes in Australian
foreign policy. In this connec-
tion, a Labor Party meeting on
3 November reportedly adopted
a stand calling for withdrawal
of Australian troops from Malaya
and recognition of Communist
China. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SECRET
P"IRT 1.
NOTES AND CO1 PAT S
12 Pace 12
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Financial Problem
Financial planning for re-
armament is running far behind
organizational planning. The
budgetary effort Finance Min-
ister Schaeffer seems willing
to permit is completely in-
adequate for a build-up in three
years, and the special problem
of support costs for the Allied
forces looms in the background.
The United States promised
substantial aid--contingent on
receiving Bonn's estimate of
the cost of the build-up and
the adequacy of the contribu-
tion it was willing to make.
Bonn submitted an estimate
of costs on 28 September. It
calculated total costs for the
first three years at $12.26
billion. Of this amount, the
Finance Ministry announced its
ability to contribute only $2.14
billion annually, in addition
to a $1.19 billion carry-over
from the current fiscal year,
or a total of $7.61 billion in
three years. The government
apparently expected the differ-
ence of $4.65 billion to be
made up largely through Ameri-
can assistance.
In its Annual Review sub-
mission to NATO on 19 October,
however, Bonn presented a
scaled-down estimate showing
$10.83 billion for the total
cost of the build-up, of which
$3.22 billion was expected to
be financed from outside Ger-
many.
In the current 1955-56
fiscal year, Germany is spend-
ing only 6.5 percent of its
gross national product for de-
fense as compared with France's
8.2 percent and Britain's 9.8
percent.
As all aspects of rearma-
ment are brought together in
the Federal Defense Council,
either Schaeffer will have to
give in on financing, or
Adenauer will be persuaded to
lengthen the period of build-up.
Schaeffer will be a hard man to
deal. with.
Public opinion and the in-
terests of industry would seem
to be on Schaeffer's side. Fears
that creation of a 500,000-man
force will dry up the labor mar-
ket, and a lack of interest in
arms contracts, cause industrial-
ists to want recruitment retarded,
even though they have access to
an extensive Italian labor mar-
ket. The German labor unions on
the other hand oppose the impor-
tation of Italian labor.
Another controversial finan-
cial issue is that of support
costs. Bonn has been paying
about $760, 000, 000 annually for
the .stationing of Allied troops
in Germany. When the agreement
of this expires on 5 May 1956,
Bonn says that support costs
will no longer be paid. London
and Paris are nevertheless de-
termined to continue receiving
these payments, and there is a
possibility the British espe-
cially will withdraw some troops
if support costs are not paid.
Whatever the chances of a
rapid build-up, Bonn intends to
inaugurate rearmament in Decem-
ber. At that time about 100
officers and noncommissioned
officers will be called up to
prepare barracks, receive equip-
ment, and develop training fa-
cilities. On 2 January a token
group of about 1,100 is sched-
uled to be recruited consisting
of a band, a service company,
four infantry companies, and an
MP company. In the third month
of training, the combat troops
will start specialized training
in artillery, armor and antitank
and antiaircraft warfare.
Large-scale recruitment
planned for the spring of 1956
will permit expansion of these
special units into battalions.
Conscription will probably not
be instituted until after the
next national election in 1957.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY .
THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF
The Soviet General Staff,
which over the years has assumed
numerous administrative respons-
ibilities beyond its primary
function as the planning body
of the Soviet armed forces,
probably enjoys greater prestige
now than at any time in its
history. One indication of
this is seen in the elevation
this year of Chief of Staff
Marshal Sokolovsky from the
rank of deputy minister of de-
fense to first deputy minister
of defense.
Prior to World War II and
during the early war years, the
General Staff had little pres-
tige in the Soviet.Union as a
whole or within the armed
forces, The Red Army's suc-
cesses in the latter half of the
war built up the General Staff's
reputation, and the trend to-
ward more power and influence
for that body within the armed
forces has apparently continued
in .the , postwar years.
The General Staff is not
believed to exert strong polit-
ical influence, however, and
the civil leadership has re-
tained the dominant voice in
the making of national mili-
tary strategy.
It is known that from 1918
to 1945 a committee existed in
the Soviet Union, on which
civilians and military advisers
sat together, for the formula-
tion of national military strat-
egy. Such a committee may still
exist, and its military members
may have greater independence
in applying national military
strategy than ever before.
Organization
The General Staff, headed
by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky,
has three principal war-plan-
ninl; organs, and is believed
to have three basic doctrine-
formulating organs, and per-
haps as many as thirteen direc-
torates which perform adminis-
trative and support duties.
The battle-planning or-
gans--the Operations Directorate,
SOVIET G NERA1 STAFF T J 1~1 RUCTURE
(DOCTRINE)
CHIEF
OPERATIONS
DIRECTORATE
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS
DIRECTORATE
CENTRAL DIRECTORATE FOR
MILITARY TRANSPORT
L------..,...J
REGULATIONS
DIRECTORATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT
OTHER DIRECTORATES
PRESUMED TO EXIST
DIRECTORATE
FOR STUDY OF
WAR EXPERIENCE
MILITARY TOPOGRAPHIC
DIRECTORATE
SECRET
MILITARY
HISTORY
DIRECTORATE
ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMIC
DEPARTMENT
-, - - - -1
DIRECTORATE FOR
SERVICE TROOPS
L ---
PART TTT PATTRRWR ARTn DVP DVf"rT17pQ n..,.... ., _r ,.
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:rAtCC1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the Organization
and Mobilization Di-
rectorate, and the
Intelligence Direc-
torate--have under-
gone little change
in function since
their creation in
1918. Their intern-
al structures, how-
ever, have been re-
vised from time to
time.
The doctrine-
formulating organs
believed to exist at
present are the Reg-
ulations Directorate,
the Military History
Department, and the
Directorate for the
Exploitation of
War Experience.
SUBORDINATION OF SOVIET GENERAL STAFF
1 PRESIDIUM
C P S U
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
C P S U
DEPUTY MINISTERS
OF DEFENSE
The organization of these three
has varied considerably in the
history of the General Staff;
in 1928, for example, they
were apparently temporarily
combined in a single directo-
rate.
The precise number of ad-
ministrative directorates is
not known. Included are the
Military Topographical Direc-
torate, the Cipher Directorate,
the Signal Communications Di-
rectorate, the Administrative
Economic Department, and prob-
ably several others which deal
with personnel. It is not
clear whether the Central Di-
rectorate for Military Trans-
port is a part of the General
Staff or subordinate to the
principal logistical organ,
the Rear of the Armed Forces.
Functions
The primary function of
the General Staff is to receive
general strategic directives
from the civil leadership
through the minister of defense
and to translate them into spe-
cific orders which are issued
in the field. The General
Staff thus acts as the policy-
SECRET
making and war-planning organ
for the ground, naval, and air
forces, and logistical organi-
zations. Liaison between the
General Staff and the head-
quarters administrations of the
individual service branches is
probably maintained through of?-
fices of deputy chiefs of staff
representing each service at-
tached to the General Staff.
Prior to 1930, the General
Staff's responsibilities were
generally limited to its pri-
mary function. Under Minister
of Warr Frunze in 1925, for ex-
ample, it exervised no adminis-
tratf.ve powers, for it was
Frunze's theory that a General
Staff should confine itself to
technical planning problems. A
staff' with wider powers, he
felt, would not only become too
large for efficiency but might
turn into a political threat to
the state.
In the 1930's, however,
the General Staff gained a num-
ber of administrative duties,
notably responsibility for map-
making, cipher-control and per-
sonnel administration. The
trend, since 1930 has been for
the General Staff to encroach
steadily on the prerogatives of
the various service branches.
SECRET
:?TNATIONAL STRATEGY
COMMITTEE
:::WXISTENCE NOT CONFIRMED)
PRESIDIUM
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OFFICIAL CONTROL
UNDER SOVIET LAW
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
(MARSHAL ZHUKOV)
CHIEF GENERAL STAFF
SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY
(V. D. SOKOLOVSKY)
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 9
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1955
Rise in Prestige
Prior to World War II the
prestige of the General Staff
within the armed forces was not
great. Probably chiefly be-
cause he saw a potential polit-
ical threat, Stalin had been
unwilling to grant the Staff as
a whole, or the chief of staff
as an individual, the authority
both needed for proficient
staff operations.
The Soviet military set-
backs against Finland in the
winter of 1939-1940 led to
some reform measures, but when
the German armies struck in
June 1941, General Zhukov, then
chief of staff, found. he lacked
the authority to undertake emer-
gency redeployment of combat
units in order to prevent a Ger-
man breakthrough.. It was not
until Stalin had looked dis-
aster in the face that he
ordered a complete reorganiza-
tion of the command system and
sought to enforce the authority
of the General Staff.
For this purpose Stalin
relied on a former Imperial
General Staff colonel, ' Marshal
Boris Shaposhnikov, who crew
upon his Tsarist experience to
create a.command system similar
to the one employed by Tsar
Nicholas II in World War I.
Shaposhnikov's reforms
came in three steps. First he
combed the entire body of staff
officers from the General Staff
proper down to corps level,
weeding out numerous political
appointees and replacing dead-
wood with capable men. Second,
in late 1941 he set up a head-
quarters directly under Stalin,
the Stavka, which assumed di-
rect control over the strategic
direction of the war effort.
Third, he established a Group
of General Staff Officers under'
the control of the Operations
Directorate of the General Staff
whose mission it was to go out
into the field and supervise
the conduct of operations
planned by the Stavka and the
General Staff. The result was
a highly centralized and suc-
cessful command system.
Within a year after the
end of the war, Stalin dis-
mantled the command system es-
tablished by Shaposhnikov. The
Stavka was abolished, and the
Group of General Staff officers
was probably also abolished.
Stalin removed himself from per-
sonal leadership and returned to
his prewar method of operating
from behind the scenes. He re-
tained the title of generalis-
simo, however, and Soviet
writers until his death hailed
him as*the "creator" of Soviet
military science and the "or-
ganizer" of victory in the war.
The work of such Stakva members
as Shaposhnikov, Vassilevski,
and Zhukov tended to be ignored.
Within the armed forces
the situation was somewhat dif-
ferent. The Red Army victories
in the latter half of the war
had :resulted in a rapid growth
in the prestige and influence
of the General Staff as an organ
and of the staff officer as an
individual, and this prestige
and influence did not diminish
with the end of hostilities.
No formal corps of staff offi-
cers emerged from the conflict,
but officers assigned to staff
work usually remain in staff
work and frequently carry the
same rank as their commanding
officers. At present the So-
viet staff officer at all levels
enjoys a rank about one grade
higher than his opposite num-
ber in the British and American
services.
Under the Collective Leadership
It is reasonable to pre-
sume that with the death of
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTTVF.S
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1955
Stalin in 1953, there was a rise
in the prestige of the military
within the structure of the
state, and possibly in the in-
fluence of the chief of staff
in the making of national se-
curity decisions. Prior to
Stalin's death it is probable
that the committee designed to
produce national strategy en-
joyed considerably less inde-
pendent authority than any such
committee now enjoys. The fact
that a collegium of civil
leaders must reach agreement
before a basic directive can be
thrashed out probably gives
JAPAN'S DEFENSE PROGRAM
The Japanese Defense
Agency's six-year defense plan,
the first year of which is now
being implemented, probably
DEFENSE AGENCY
DIRECTOR GENERAL
VICE DIRECTOR GENERAL
JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
r NATIONAL l
-{ DEFENSE
t_ COUNCIL J
PARLIAMENTARY
VICE MINISTER
FINANCE
BUREAU
DEFENSE
STAFF COLLEGE
TECHNICAL
RESEARCH
INSTITUTE
GROUND
STAFF OFFICE
C/S
PERSONNEL
BUREAU
professional military leaders
a better chance to influence
final decisons.
The promotion this spring
of Chief of Staff Sokolovsky
from deputy minister of defense
to first deputy minister of
defense--the first time a chief
of staff had been so honored--
probably reflected increased
influence for Sokolovsky within
the top hierarchy of civil and
military leaders. It also may
ref]'.ect increased influence
for the General Staff itself.
(SECRET)
reflects the maximum rearma-
ment effort which is political-
ly and economically feasible.
While the forces contemplated
JOINT STAFF
iL COUNCIL
DEFENSE
ACADEMY
SEA
FORCE
SECRET
AIR
STAFF OFFICE
C/S
AIR
FORCE
DEFENSE
BUREAU
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPVrT TV1 S
PROCUREMENT
OPERATIONS
OFFICE
TRAINING
BUREAU
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VESSELS
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November :1955
SECRET NOFORN
JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE PLAN
SEA
1954 56 57 58 6
1954 55 5
57 5 5
AIR
9
II
O
332
56 W 58 5 60._ 6T, ,~ 6 C? BAT PLANES
195 57 58 ,
under the plan would be inade-
quate to defend Japan from ex-
ternal aggression, they would
be capable of maintaining in-
ternal security and conducting
a limited defense of Japanese
coastal waters and air space.
The program envisages a
small army designed for
internal defense, a convoy-type
navy with a limited
antisubmarine war-
fare capability, and
a defensive air force.
The plan pro-
vides for the expan-
sion of Japan's mil-
itary forces to a
180,000-man, six-
division ground force
by 1959; a 34,000-man,
124,000-ton navy by
1961; and a 43,000-
man, 33-squadron
(1,300-plane) air
force by 1961. These
contemplated forces
are below the maximum
that Japan's manpower
and industrial poten-
tial and technologi-
cal ability could be
expected to provide.
The Ground Self-
Defense Forces at
present consist of a
corps of two divi-
sions and four sep-
arate infantry divi-
sions, each with
organic support troops
including artillery,
tank and engineer
units. Except for
the concentration of
approximately one
third of the ground
forces on Japan's
northernmost island
of Hokkaido, the units
are fairly evenly de-
ployed throughout the
country. The pres-
ent strength of the
ground forces is under
the 150,000 men au-
thorized, but that level is ex-
pected to be reached by the end
of the fiscal year,'31 March
1956.
The potential effective-
ness of the forces was in-
creased by a recent reorganiza-
tion which created a balanced
six-division force, with
limited logistical capabilities.
SECRET
SECRET
jul ,
AIRCRAFT
on 11
.PERSONNEL
34 000
BY 1961
IN
THOUSANDS
7 13 ~
~ ? IPERSONNE LTHOJSANDS
. ~~ ~~
954 55 56 5 58 59 61
3E ,
I
IN IW IN
in lug
Tonnage
167 x179-i
PART TTT DAP'r1 PNs AATf DW0Qnt'rmTtrWQ r_..._ - _M ^
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE W:EEKLY SUMMARY
The reorganization, however,
caused a temporary reduction
in combat effectiveness. In
mid-1954 the ground forces
were believed to have a combat
effectiveness equivalent to a
regimental combat team, while
their effectiveness now is
that of a battalion combat
team.
Following the completion
of battalion training early
this month, training entered
the combined-maneuver phase
involving regimental or higher
units. Combined maneuvers
with 16,000 troops were held
on Hokkaido from 10 to 14
October and all units are ex-
pected to complete this type
of training by the end of
November.
Sea Forces
The Maritime Self-Defense
Forces (Navy) personnel
strength was approximately
16,000 officers and men by the
end of July, and the authorized
strength of 19,400 is expected
to be reached by March 1956.
In addition to the Maritime
Staff Office, the naval organi-
zation includes one fleet--com-
posed of two escort squadrons
and one patrol squadron, and
one minesweeping squadron--
five regional districts and a
naval air arm.
The naval force has 184
vessels including two destroy-
ers, 20 escort ships, one sub-
marine and a number of patrol,
minesweeping and auxiliary
vessels; most of the major ves-
sels are on loan from the United
States. Two destroyers and
three destroyer escorts plus
other auxiliary vessels are
under construction in Japanese
yards. The present ships are
capable of limited antisubma-
rine warfare, minesweeping and
harbor defense.
Japan's relative emphasis
on air power derives primarily
from its insular position and
its vulnerability to air at-
tack. The Air Self-Defense
Force established in July 1954
is still in the formative stage,
with primary emphasis on an
intensive technical- and pilot-
training program under Ameri-
can auspices.
The air force has an
authorized personnel strength
of 10,346 for the current
fiscal year; 6,915 men were on
active duty; on 20 September,
154 officers had completed and
143 were undergoing American-
supervised training. In mid-
September the air force had
223 planes,,of which 46 were
jet-- and 156 were piston-type
trainers. The force has no
combat capability, but some air
units are expected to be ready
to aid in Japan's defense by
1959.
Staff Organization
Moves are now under way to
complete the establishment of
a national defense organization,
utilizing the concept of civil-
ian control at the top, and
patterned after the American
defense structure. A bill
creating a National Defense
Council to replace a similar
body set up by the cabinet will
be resubmitted to the next reg-
ular Diet session in December.
Moves are under way within the
Defense Agency to have it ele-
vatel:d to a Defense Ministry.
Changes in terminology
and rank designations to more
appropriate military ones are
also planned. These changes
will strengthen the government's
bid to revise the antiwar
clause of the constitution and
thereby legalize the status of
the armed forces.
Present legislation gives
the prime minister authority
over the defense establishment
similar to the command rela-
tionship of the President of
the United States to the Ameri-
can armed forces. The prime
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pace 8 of 9
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v y r ^
3 November 1955
minister's authority is not
expected to be altered by
future legislation..
The Hatoyama government
is appealing to growing nation-
alistic sentiment in building
popular support for rearma-
ment. Instead of basing its
appeal on the Communist threat,
the government is promoting
the theme that Japan's rearm-
ing is the only way to secure
the withdrawal of American
forces and a revision of the
Security Treaty and Adminis-
trative Agreement with the
United States. The public is
especially sensitive to the
presence of American ground
troops, which are regarded as
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CONFIDENTIAL.
symbols of continued occupa-
Foreign Minister
gemitsu has requested Wash-
ington to promise to redeploy
all American ground
the end of 1958.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
PART TTT F.)ATTVT71QC Awn TfLn CrfLnm rtrrcr
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