CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000600170001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. -)o
OCI NO. 8855/55
10 November 1955
00CUMENT' No,
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NEXTf1IEW DATE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
~2R~T
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State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Israeli and Arab forces have remained on the alert since
the clash in the El Auja demilitarized zone on 2 November,
but no further incidents of serious proportions occurred during
the week. The border flare-ups coincided with Israel's con-
tention that Western diplomatic action and arms aid are
essential to prevent the outbreak of a new Arab-Israeli war.
FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Foreign Minister Molotov's proposal for the establishment
of an all-German council spells out the Soviet position--already
clear from Soviet and East German statements--that Germany can
be reunified only after establishment of a European security
system and a rapprochement between the two German states. On
the subject of East-West contacts, the USSR is seeking an agree-
ment which would further loosen Western trade controls and endorse
the program of international conferences and exchanges of dele-
gations which Moscow has been promoting.
PART 117
Bolshevik Revolution Anniversary: The 38th anniversary of
the Bolshevik Revolution included the traditional
speech at the Bolshoi Theater and a gay diplomatic recep-
tion, both conforming closely to the Soviet Union's tac-
tics of moderation. The economic portion of the speech
focused on the need for increasing labor productivity,
suggesting that this problem will receive particular em-
phasis in the forthcoming sixth :Five-Yeas Plan. The
ceremonial military parade display weapons and
Zhukov's speech was perfunctory. Page 1
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Faure Continues Fight for December Elections: The French
National Assembly on 10 November refused by a. five-vote
margin to accept the Council of the Republic's amendment
to Premier Faure's bill calling for dissolution of the
assembly on 2 January. Faure has posed a question of
confidence for 12 November on a bill calling for elections
in December, using the 1951 law without the provision
for party alliances. If the motion is passed, elections
may still be held next month. The American embassy in
Paris does not expect the council to oppose the govern-
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French Opinion Increasingly Critical of NATO: 25X1
S e Nor
situation Hirican Has e erio a e , rance as been forced
to withdraw troops committed to the defense of Western
Europe, and certain nationalist leaders are calling for
even more drastic steps in this direction. Former premier
Mendes-France hinted on 3 November that he would campaign
in the approaching national elections for cuts in the
military budget and the conscription term. Page 4 25X1
French North Africa: The imminent return of Mohamed ben Youssef
to Morocco, approved by the French cabinet on 5 November,
opens a new phase in French-Moroccan relations. The
seriousness of the military situation in. Algeria prompted
the French minister of defense to request the United
States to make available 20 to 3D large helicopters
in addition to the seven on hand.
. Page 5 25X1
Afghan-Pakistani Situation: Tension continues high on the
Afghan-Pakistani border as Kabul prepares for a Grand
Assembly of the Tribes (Loe Jirglha.) scheduled for 14
November to discuss national policy on Pushtoonistan.
Prime Minister Daud will probably be able to get at
least a general statement of support for his strong
Pushtoonistan policy from the assembly.
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Further Inflation Anticipated in South Korea: South Korea is
once again ace with in ati nary pressures which could
lead to a serious weakening of the currency. Fed by an
unbalanced budget and large expenditures from the counter-
part fund for support of South Korea's military establish-
ment and industrial development, the currency supply is
expected to expand by 80 percent during the fiscal year
ending 30 June 1956. This could result in a price rise
of as much as 140 percent and a rresumptior of bitter
public attacks against the United States by South Korean
. . . , . . . . . Page 8
Closer Relations Between Ecuador and Soviet Bloc: Closer
relations seem to be eveg oilinbetween Ecuador and the
Soviet bloc. Ecuador's primary Lim is apparently the
acquisition of arms with which to strengthen its
position in the long-standing boundary dispute with
Peru. The Soviet bloc's interest; seems to lie in
increased penetration of Latin America.
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET AIMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow's recent successes in the Middle East have been accom-
panied by increased Sino-Soviet diplomatic and economic activity
in South Asia, where Premier Bulganin and Party First Secretary
Khrushchev are scheduled to visit later this month. The aims of
Soviet policy are to convince the Asian states that the USSR is
the foremost champion of anticolonialism and that the Communist
threat has disappeared, to encourage them to follow neutral
foreign policies, and to promote closer ties with the Orbit.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
AFGHANISTAN'S TIME OF DECISION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The forthcoming visit of Soviet premier Bulganin and party
chief Khrushchev to Kabul in connection with their Indian trip
focuses attention on Afghanistan's position between the Soviet
bloc and the Western powers. Afghanistan has always been suspi-
cious of foreign aid and of both Soviet and Western activity
within its borders. However, in recent years, intensified
conflict with Western-supported Pakistan and domestic political
developments have resulted in increased susceptibility to Soviet
overtures.
EAST-GERMAN CAMPAIGN FOR WESTERN RECOGNITION . . . . . . . Page 7
East Germany's campaign to gain Western recognition as an
independent state has included a continuing trade offensive,
incessant propaganda, economic and political pressures, and
efforts to gain full or provisional status in various inter-
national organizations. Although no non-Communist country has
yet formally recognized the German Democratic Republic, several
have taken steps in that direction. Bonn officials have
indicated privately that they will threaten to break relations
with any power recognizing the GDR.
SIGNS OF TROUBLE FOR THE COLOMBIAN DICTATORSHIP . . . . . . Page 9
The regime of General Rojas Pinilla in Colombia faces an
opposition which is growing in numbers and improving in organi-
zation. Although Rojas has tried to organize mass support for
his government, its backing now comes almost solely from the
armed forces, which are likely to turn against the dictator if
popular dissatisfaction continues to mount.
AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION IN SINO-SOVIET BLOC .
. Page
Drives to collectivize agriculture have been stepped up in
Communist China and renewed in the East European Satellites
during 1955. In the Soviet Union, where collective and state
farms covered about 95 percent of the total cultivated area as
early as 1938, the present emphasis is on expanding output of
crops in a system already socialized. China and especially the
Satellites are apparently avoiding the worst excesses practiced
by the USSR when it introduced collectivization, and are applying
methods which may be more effective in the long run in achieving
the goals of a collective system.
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10 November 1955
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
ARAB-ISRAELI S ITUAT ION
Israeli and Arab forces
have remained on the alert
since the clash. in the E1 Auja
demilitarized zone on 2 Novem
?ber, but no further incidents
of,serious proportions occurred
during. the week. Foreshadowing
possible future trouble, how-
ever,.was a clash between small
Egyptian and Israeli forces in
the vicinity of Eilat, Israel's
port on the Gulf of Aqaba.
The El Auja action was
followed by sporadic incidents
along the Jordanian border,
possibly the result of encour-
agement given the Arab refugees
there by Egypt, and by terror-
.ism attributed to Egyptian or
Syrian-trained Fedayeen bands
operating inside Israel. The
extensive mobilization of Israe-
li forces, which had taken
place just before the attack
of 2 November, was reportedly
relaxed, however, and all the
buses and' 'some trucks requisi-
tioned by the Israeli army were
returned to civilian use.
The clash near Eilat on
8 November, while possibly in-
advertent in itself, recalled
an earlier threat by Egyptian
prime minister Nasr that Egypt
would not counter Israel in
the Gaza strip but would strike
elsewhere, and the vigorous as-
sertions by Israeli prime min-
ister Ben-Gurion that Israel
must break the Egyptian block-
ade of the Gulf of Aqaba, Isra-
el's alternative to the' Suez
Canal route to the East.
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ISRAEL
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.I.hf STRIP
B NOV
Al Agabsh -
SAUDI ARABIA ,.
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10 November 1955
The border flare-ups coin-
cided with Israel's contention
that Western d,plomatic action
and arms aid are essential to
prevent the outbreak of a new
Arab-Israeli war. In this at-
mosphere, Israeli foreign minis-
ter Sharett followed up his
talks with the foreign ministers
attending the Geneva conference
with.a trip to the United States.
Sharett's movements evoked the
usual barrage of hostile state-
ments from the Arab capitals.
A press report that the United
States was giving consideration
to Israeli. arms requests suf-
ficed to bring an expression of
FOREIGN ; MINISTERS' CONFERENCE
Germany and European Security
Foreign Minister Molotov's
proposal of 2 November for an
all-German council, which he
strongly defended on 8 November,
was based on a plan offered
by the East German government.
It merely spells out the Soviet
Position--already clear from
East German statements--that
Germany can be unified only af-
ter establishment of Epro- .
pean security system and a rap-
prochement between the two Ger-
man states. Unlike Moscow's
frequently proposed provisional
government, whose primary goal
would have been the holding of
all-German elections, the new
all-German council would con-
centrate on closer relations
between the two German states in
such fields as trade, finance,
and communications.
The USSR has not been as
blunt as East Germany in stat-
ing that the "internal prerequi-
sites" for unity and free elec-
tions necessitate changing West
"serious concern" from the Iraqi
foreign minister.
Egypt's handling of the
incidents in its propaganda,
which claimed that Egyptian
forces had counterattacked in
the El Auja area on 3 November
and driven the Israelis back
with heavy casualties, was in-
terpreted by Israeli officials
and other observers to mean
that Egypt was not ready at this
time to take on Israel,in a
war? The Cairo regime appeared
to be continuing to concentrate
on building up its. armaments.
F__ I
Germany's economic and social,,
pattern to close the gap be-
tween it and East Germany and
driving "militarists".from
power in Bonn. Moscow has shown
its support of this principle,
however, by insisting on rap-
prochement between East and West
Germany as the first step to
reunification. At the 8 Novem-
ber conference session, Molo-
tov stated more clearly than
ever that one reason why all-
German elections are now impos-
sible is that they might result
in the destruction of the East
German economic system.
Having bluntly argued that
the division of Germany will
continue for a long time and
can ultimately be ended only by
the Germans themselves, the USSR
is apparently willing to devote
some effort to building up the.
prestige and stability of the
East German Communist regime.
Molotov repeated old pro-
posals for a prompt withdrawal.
of all but limited contingents
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 November 1955
of troops from Germany and for
an agreement by the two German
states on the strength of their
"armed units." He criticized
the West for withdrawing Eden's
proposal for an inspection of
forces in a zone on either side
of the East-West German line.
He also claimed that the Western
security plan fails to protect
Germany's neighbors and in par-
ticular provides no safeguards
if Germany should dacide at
some time to ignore its treaty
obligations.
East-West Contacts
The USSR has continued to
insist that free East-West
trade must precede any increase
in other contacts. It argues
that Western strategic controls
are the major obstacle to world
trade, and are therefore the
only important topic for discus-
sion by the subcommittee of
experts concentrating on East-
West trade. The USSR's tactics
have indicated that it hopes to
exact an agreement or promise
on loosening trade controls
as part of any general agree-
ment on increasing East-West
exchanges.
The Soviet objective in
the negotiations of a second
subcommittee of experts on
East-West contacts appears to
be an agreement reaffirming in
general terms the programs the
USSR has been encouraging.
These could include internation-
al conferences and exchanges
of delegations in scientific,
technical, industrial, agricul-
tural, cultural, and other
fields, exchanges of publica-
tions, and increased tourism.
On the other hand, the
Soviet delegate has used every
filibustering and evasive de-
vice he could to keep Western
representatives from making
demands which he says would
interfere with Soviet internal
affaLirs. These include the
ending of censorship and jam-
ming procedures, better exchange
rates for tourists, and free-
dom of diplomats to travel
and free sale of publications
within each country. The USSR
appears to be concerned by the
West's success in pointing to
those aspects of the Soviet
system that still, inhibit mean-
ingful East-West contacts.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 November 1955
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bolshevik Revolution Anniversary
The 38th anniversary of
the Bolshevik Revolution was
highlighted by the traditional
speech at the Bolshoi Theater
and the currently fashionable
gay diplomatic reception the
next evening, at which Soviet
leaders undertook to dance po7.-
kas, mazurkas, and gavottes in
demonstration of their human
qualities.
Since 1947, the honor of
delivering the important annual
year-end review has rotated
among members of the party pre-
sidium. This year's spokesman,
L. M. Kaganovich, a first deputy
premier and chairman of the
State Committee for Wages and
Labor, restricted himself to
previously well-defined themes
of the party line. He remained
in character as an Old Bolshevik
on a Bolshevik occasion, com-
bining doctrinaire attitudes
and expressions with the Khru-
shchev-Bulganin coexistence
policy.
His speech, although it
utilized such cliches of the
revolution as "dictatorship of
the proletariate," "class strug-
gle," and "belief in the vic-
tory of Communism in the 20th
Century," nevertheless managed
not to distort the Soviet Union's
current peace line.
Foreign Policy Implications
Kaganovich reaffirmed the
USSR's loyalty to "the struggle
for peace and coexistence" but
reiterated the adamant Soviet
stand on the German issue and
the need for agreeing on a
European security plan. His
brief reference to disarmament
marked time along the lines of
Bulganin's 19 September letter
to President Eisenhower in
stressing the necessity of end-
ing the armaments race and ban-
ning atomic weapons.
Kaganovich devoted partic-
ular attention to the USSR's
good relations with the Bandung
powers and affirmed the signifi-
cance of Bulganin's and Khru-
shchev's coming visits to India,
Burma, and Afghanistan. He de-
clared that the Soviet Union
will always remain on the side
of the peoples of Asia, and
Africa in their struggle for
freedom and independence.
Kaganovich analyzed the
nature of Communist revolution
at some length, in an apparent
attempt to rebut Western. charges
of international Communist con-
spiracy while reaffirming faith
in the inevitable world triumph
of socialism. This was the
first public speech by a top
Soviet leader which rationalized
the relationship of the USSR
and non-Orbit Communist parties
within the framework of "relaxa-
tion of tensions."
Internal Implications
Kaganovich carefully steered
around the troubled question
of the composition of the Soviet
leadership. He did not even
dimly echo any implied criti-
cism of Molotov, and discreetly
observed the "collectivity prin-
ciple" by balancing praise for
Khrushchev's and Bulganin's
speeches before "our central
committee." Achievements of the
Soviet Union were prudently as-
signed to the leadership of
Lenin and the Communist Party.
Reflecting present Soviet
preoccupation with the sixth
Five-Year Plan to be promulgated
at the Twentieth Party Congress
in February 1956, Kaganovich
focused attention on the labor
productivity problem in indus-
try, transport, and agriculture.
He stressed the necessity f-ar
rapid introduction of up-to-date
scientific and technological
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
achievements and rationalization
of labor. This emphasis probably
anticipates the major methods
for expanding industrial output
which will be employed in the
forthcoming plan.
Kaganovich called for
Satellite implementation of
"the Lenin plan for construction
of Socialism." He stressed co-
ordination of bloc economic
plans and, unlike recent dis-
cussions of the same subject,
said nothing about special con-
ditions in each of the Satel-
lites. Such projected co-opera-
tive economic planning may
signify an increased role for
the Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance.
Military Parade
Marshal Zhukov's 10-minute
oration preceding the 7 November
parade was the mildest address
delivered by a military figure
since Stalin's death. There
were no references to encircling
military bases, imperialist
threats, or military groupings,
and only an indirect call for
strengthening the Soviet armed
might, a standard ingredient of
such speeches.
The display of military
force, conforming to this pattern,
was of modest proportions. No
new Soviet aircraft were dis-
played in the parade fly-by,
which included one BISON jet
heavy bomber, nine BADGER jet
medium bombers, and fewer than
50 jet fighters. Similarly,
in contrast to previous Soviet
celebrations, the parade re-
vealed no new ground equipment
and was a perfunctory display.
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10 November 1955
Faure Continues Fight
For December ec ions
The French National Assem-
bly on 10 November refused by a
five-vote margin to accept the
Council of the-Republic's amend-
ment to Premier Faure's bill
calling for dissolution of the
assembly on 2 January. Faure
has posed a question of confi-
dence for 12 November on a bill
calling for elections in Decem-
ber using the 1951 law without
the provision for party alli-
ances. If the motion is passed,
elections may still be held
next month. The American em-
bassy in Paris does not expect
the council to oppose the gov-
ernment a second time.
The tight schedule implied
in Faure's 3 November proposal
demanded immediate compliance
with his wishes. Under law, the
Ministry of the Interior must
PART II
have official notification by
20 November to permit a single-
ballot election on 18 December
to allow dissolution of the
assembly on 2 January. The
amendment added by the council,
specifying a different election
procedure than that suggested
by Faure, would have ruined the
premier's schedule because it
would have necessitated new
electoral district boundaries.
Under the new plan report-
edly proposed by Faure on 10
November, elections would be
held under the 1951 law which
permits departmental party lists
in the 90 departments of metro-
politan France. Party alliances,
however, would not be permitted,
and the party winning a majority
would get all the seats in the
department. If no party won a
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10 November 1.955
majority, the seats would be
distributed by proportional rep-
resentation.
The single-candidate sys-
tem suggested by the council
has been championed by Mendes-
France, who won Radical Socialist
support for it over Premier
Faure's opposition during the
party congress of 3-6 November.
Under this system, each party
could present one candidate in
each electoral district of ap-
proximately arrondissement size.
If no candidate won a majority
on the first ballot, a plurality
would suffice in a runoff vote.
Much of Faure's coalition,
particularly Popular Republicans
and Independents, have stated a
preference for the 1951 law with
party alliances. Despite thei:
official opposition to the pre.s-
French Opinion
Increasing y ritical of NATO
There has been a marked
decline in French support for.
NATO during the past year as
the North African situation has
deteriorated. France has been
forced to withdraw troops com-
mitted to the defense of Western
Europe and periain' nationalist
leaders have been calling for
steps which would have an even
more drastic effect on the
Western alliance.
The French government holds
to the position that NATO, the
cornerstone of Western defense,
is not a subject for East-West
discussion; but this firmness
has been attributed more to For-
eign Minister Pinay than to the
more "flexible" Premier Faure.
At Geneva last July, Faure
seemed on the verge of officially
advocating the idea, proposed
by former premier Mendes-France
before the UN General Assembly
ent electoral law, many Social-
ists would also probably favor
it over a single-candidate
system. Moreover, the resolu-
tion reportedly offered by Faure
for the 12 November confidence
vote is the system voted for by
the assembly's Universal Suf-
frage Committee which was based
on a Socialist proposal to re-
move the alliance provision.
The Communists, who voted
with the government on the 3
November dissolution bill, had
been hoping to turn the method
of party affiliation permitted
in the 1951 law to their favor.
by alliances with the Socialists.
While the new Faure proposal
would make this impossible, they
could still hope to gain by the
distribution of seats through
proportional representation.
F__ I
last year, that there might be
agreements between the Warsaw
pact powers and NATO, and, per-
haps even a fusion of the two.
The French public interpreted
the results of the summit talks
as a full-fledged detente. It
is thus receptive to current
Sov.et efforts to picture NATO
as the primary stumbling block
to a German settlement and to
progress toward security and
disarmament.
The American embassy in
Paris on 21 October commented
on the general lack of enthusiasm
for NATO in France
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10 November 1955
Mendes-France's address
to the Radical Socialist Panty's
congress on 3 November was an
apparent move to exploit such
sentiment in the coming national
elections. Urging the party
to adopt a social and economic
reform program to be financed
primarily by savings in the
military budget, he further
proposed that after the North
African problem is solved the
military conscription term be
reduced immediately from 18 to
15 months, and as soon as
possible to 12 months.
A more immediate threat
to NATO stems from the French
government's determination to
reinforce North Africa at the
expense of NATO-committed mili-
tary forces in Europe. Many
troop transfers have been made
during the past year with only
summary notice to SHAPE, and
half of the French army's com-
bat strength is now across the
Mediterranean. The minister of
national defense. indicated to
Ambassador Dillon on 5 November
that there might be additional
transfers of NATO-committed
ground forces from Europe.
Even more drastic moves are
being demanded in other quarte:cs.
French North Africa
Morocco: The imminent re-
turn oho med ben Youssef to
Morocco, approved by the French
cabinet on 5 November, opens a
new phase in French-Moroccan
PART II
Gau7Llist senator Michel Debre,
perhaps the most influential
member of the Council of the
Republic, recently told Dillon
that most Frenchmen now consider
NATO "the wrong kind of alliance
in the wrong place," i.e., a
military alliance in Europe,
where no fighting is taking
place, instead of in North Africa.
Ile proposed that NATO be en-
larged--in area as a basis for
a common Western policy for
North Africa, and in scope by
stressing economic and social
functions along lines already
advocated by Scandinavian mem-
ber countries.
An editorial in the influ-
ential leftist Paris daily Le
Monde suggested in mid-September
that France cut its NATO military
commitments to a few M-day di-
visions and retain'the remainder,
of its forces for purely national
missions, as Britain and the
United States have done. During
the :military budget debates in
the National Assembly in July,
the chairman of the assembly's
defense committee proposed that
France's primary NATO defensive
mission be the Western Mediter-
ranean and Africa.
The government must
soon request assembly approval
of additional military expend-
itures because of the expanded
North African operations.
Renewed recriminations can be
expected against the subordi-
nation of France's national
interests to those of the
Western alliance as a whole.
relations. Ben Youssef has
thus far adopted a conciliatory
attitude toward Paris. Once
installed in Rabat, however,
probably before the 18 November
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`CURRENT INTELLI!G.ENC"I WEEKLY SUMMARY
anniversary of his initial ac-
cession to the throne in 1927,
he is almost certain to resort
to his former obstructionist
tactics in relation to the
French.
Despite Ben Youssef's cor.-
dial conversations with French
government officials, terrorism
in Morocco remains at a record
level. His failure to mention
the continued terrorist activity
in his press releases is caus-
ing uncertainty and cynicism
among French residents in Mor-
occo. The French settler organ-
ization, Presence Francaise,
bowing to the inevitability of
Ben Youssef's reinstatement,
has turned to the defense of
French long-term interests in
Morocco and now demands "numer-
ically equal" representation
for French and Moroccans in all
government councils. The organ-
iza.tion also requests represen-
tation during the negotiation
of reforms and the proposed new
French-Moroccan treaty.
Relations between the sul-
tan and the dominant nationalist
party, Istigla.l, are not yet
clear, although the party has
indicated its willingness to
participate in a. Moroccan gov-
ernment. The less important
Shoura, also known as the Dem-
ocratic Party of Independence,
is intensifying its campaign to
build up its organization at
the expense of the Istiglal
party.
Many rreviously pro-French
Moroccans
are said to have
joined the Shoura in an effort
PART II
to get on the nationalist band-
wagon. French officials who
have in the past played off one
nationalist group against the
other probably will try to cap-
italize on this rivalry among
the nationalists.
Algeria: The seriousness
of the 'military situation in
Algeria prompted the French
minister of defense to request
the United States to make avail-
able 20 to 30 large helicopters
in addition to the seven on hand.
The defense minister said that
in view of the difficult terrain
conditions, the only alternative
to increasing the number of heli-
copters in use by French forces
was to augment French troops in
Algeria to 300,000. Present
military strength is estimated
at 145,000, and any appreciable
increase could be made only at
the further expense of France's
NATO commitments.
Slow progress is being made
to implement Governor General
Soustelle's modest reform pro-
gram. Algerian Moslems now are
contemptuous of such measures
as recognition of Arabic as a
second language and separation
of the Moslem religion from
state control, though they had
agitated for these measures for
more than 10 years.
Soustelle has advocated
that parliamentary elections
not be. held in Algeria simul
tanEeously with those in France
and that revision of the Alger-
ian Statute be postponed until
after Algerian elections are
held. Such delays might cause
more of the moderate Algerian
Moslems to adopt the hardened
position of the extremists.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 November 1955
Afghan-Pakistani Situation
Tension continues high on
the Afghan-Pakistani border as
Kabul prepares for a Grand
Assembly of the Tribes (Loe
Jirgha) scheduled for 14 Novem-
ber to discuss national policy
on Pushtoonistan. Opponents
of Prime Minister Daud may
attempt to use the meeting to
discredit him, but Daud will
probably be able to obtain the
assembly's support for his un-
yielding policy on Pushtooni-
stan and will try to interpret
this as approval of his over-
all foreign policy.
While continuing to deny
any hostile activities, Afghan-
istan is apparently keeping up
pressure on the Pakistani bor-
der. Press stories have re-
ported border incidents and
sabotage within Pakistan, one
of which has been confirmed
by the Pakistani Foreign Minis-
try.
No major disturbance is
likely, however, until the as-
sembly has passed on the Push-
toonistan issue. If Daud is
able to obtain even an equivo-
cal expression of confidence
from the tribesmen, he will have
demonstrated his independence
of other elements of the royal
family, and may then pursue his
anti-Pa.kistani and pro-Soviet
policy more vigorously.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 November 1955
Further Inflation Anticipated
In South Korea
South Korea is once again
faced with inflationary pres-
sures which could lead to a.
serious weakening of the cur-
rency. Fed by an unbalanced
budget and large expenditures
from the counterpart fund for
support of South Korea's mili-
tary establishment and indus-
1 :1
0
trial development, the currency
supply is expected to expand
by 80 percent during the fiscal
year ending 30 June 1956. This
could result in a, price rise
of as much as 140 percent and
a. resumption of bitter public
attacks against the United
States by South Korean authori-
ties.
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 The major factor in the
proposed budget deficit is the
national defense allocation of
$165,000,000, which is just
about equal to the government's
entire anticipated revenue for
fiscal 1956. President Rhee
has directed that none of the
counterpart funds, which are
generated by the sale of im-
ported aid goods, be used to
reduce the military budget
deficit, probably because he
is using the deficit as the
basis for demanding a $100,0(`0,-
000 increase in American aid.
Thus, so long as South Korea
maintains its large military
establishment, the achievement
SOUTH KOREAN BUDGET
EXCLUSIVE OF FOREIGN AID
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
1955 1956
(PROPOSED)
of a balanced budget will be
difficult.
American economic officials
in Seoul estimated in early
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SOUTH KOREAN MONEY SUPPLY
30' 1
I
1953 1954
1955 that an annual increase
of 25 percent in the price
level was the maximum which
could be tolerated without
severe damage to the South
Korean economy and to the ob-
jectives of the American aid
program. However, wholesale
prices in Seoul rose by over
60 percent in the first eight
months of this year, and in
August, the price index was
more than double that of the
previous year.
Following establishment
of the 500-1 hwan-dollar rate
in August, the South Korean
government, in its first real
demonstration of co-operation
on economic issues, adopted
numerous measures in an attempt
to hold the line against further
inflation. It took prompt ac-
tion to price aid goods at the
new, more realistic rate; dis-
posed of some of its own foreign
exchange; reduced governmental
expenditures, partly by post-
poning civil and military pay
increases; cracked down on
black markets; and made plans
for fiscal and credit reform.
This encouraging trend is
now in danger of being reversed
by political considerations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
President Rhee personally
canceled a decision of the
National Assembly to increase
government revenues from the
sale of monopoly goods and serv-
ices. Income taxes were re-
cently reduced, although Ameri-
can officials believe that the
tax burden has not yet reached
a desirable maximum. The deci-
sion to let surplus rice deteri-
orate rather than sell it to
Japan, as well as the general
ban on trade with Japan, has
hurt the economy. Reports also
suggestthat a considerable
portion of imported aid goods
are being diverted from govern-
ment to private channels.
Closer Relations
Between Ecuador and Soviet Bloc
Closer relations seem to
be developing between Ecuador
and the Soviet bloc. Ecuador's
primary aim is apparently the
acquisition of arms, while the
bloc's interest seems to be in
increased penetration of Latin
America.
ere have been several
examples of efforts by
mem ers of the Soviet bloc to
cials.
The exchange rate is fixed
at its present levels until
September 1956 by US-South
Korean agreement. President
Rhee has argued for years that
constant changes in the rate
were responsible for past infla-
tion, and that a fixed rate
would automatically stabilize
prices. Should this theory be
proved false by a significant
rise in prices in the coming
months--as is certain at the
presently jlanned level of
foreign assistance--he is likely
to shift responsibility to the
United States by renewing his
charges of nonco-operation on
the part of American aid offi-
expand relations with Ecuador.
Czechoslovakia, besides attempt-
ing to increase its general
trade with Ecuador, has added
a commercial attache and re-
portedly a military attache to
its legation and has established
a regular courier service.
Poland, whose minister
accredited to Quito is resident
in Mexico City, has been making:
"unbelievably favorable" offers
of merchandise in an effort to
increase its sales in the
Ecuadoran market.
Ecuador's desire to get
arms from Soviet bloc sources
evidently stems from its long-
standing boundary dispute with
Peru and the fears of Peruvian
intentions which caused it to
bring charges of aggression
before the Organization of
American States in early Septem-
ber. Ecuador has not been able
to obtain the arms it wants from
sources in the western hemis-
phere.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Ecuadoran government
does not view Communism as a
clear and present danger either
to the country or to the conti-
nent. President Velasco has
characterized the cold war as
"a struggle between two
materialistic powers" and has
allowed unrestricted freedom
of activity to some 45 Commu-
nist exiles from Guatemala.
members, is rather poorly
organized and has little influ-
ence, but its secretary general
is it member of the Ecuadoran
Senate and has considerable
prestige among Latin American
25X1
The Ecuadoran Communist
Party, which has about 5,000
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECT IVES
SOVIET AIMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Moscow's recent successes
in the Middle East have been
accompanied by increased Sino-
Soviet diplomatic and economic
activity in South Asia, where
Premier Bulganin and Party
First Secretary Khrushchev are
scheduled to visit later this
month. The aims of Soviet
policy are to convince non-
Orbit Asian states that the
Communist threat has disappeared,
to encourage them to follow
"neutralist" foreign policies,
and to promote closer ties
with the Orbit.
Moscow probably believes
it car exploit "the Geneva
spirit" and, together with
Communist China, employ divi-
sive tactics that will exclude
Western influence in the area
in an ever-increasing degree.
It is unlikely the South Asian
states will ignore overtures
from Moscow and Peiping. There
has already been a report that
the Thai premier fears US-
Chinese Communist negotiations
will leave Thailand in the
lurch with its "tough policy"
toward Communist China.
Bulganin and Khrushchev
are scheduled to visit the
three Asian states which thus
far have responded most favora-
bly to Soviet approaches--
Afghanistan, India, and Burma..
They undoubtedly hope their
visit to the area will cause
even the most pro-Western
states of Africa. and Asia to
re-examine the wisdom of their
present policies.
In encouraging closer
relations between the Sino-
Soviet bloc and the more "neu-
tralist" members of the Arab
League and South Asian states,
the USSR aims to "encircle"
the Baghdad powers and isolate
the Asian members of the Manila
pact--Thailand and Pakistan
in particular--as a first step
toward weakening their ties
with the West. The Soviet
leaders will probably try to
convince their Asian hosts
that both the Baghdad and
Manila, pacts must be dissolved.
Aid Policy
Moscow's current policies
toward the Bandung nations--
all the major states of the
Middle East and South Asia--
have been carefully designed
to take advantage of popular
attitudes and the aspirations
of individual states or groups
of states, regardless of the
fact that many are pursuing
firmly anti-Communist internal
policies. Moscow's military
assistance to Egypt and its
formal support, along with
that of. Nehru and U Nu, to the
"five principles" and the
objectives of Bandung are cases
in point.
The USSR's prompt response
to requests by "neutralist"
Arab League states for mili-
tary assistance will serve
as a cogent example to the
South Asian states of the
advantages of reaching long-
range commercial agreements
with the Soviet bloc, ostensi-
bly free from the threat of
Communist subversion and on a,
basis profitable to both sides.
Kaga.novich said in his October
Revolution address on 6 Novem-
ber that the USSR ha.d no
designs for exporting revolu-
tion.
Moscow will probably con-
tinue to present its offers
to the South Asian states with-
out strings attached, in a
form most likely to be accepted
by the sensitive Asian national-
ists. The Soviet Union prob-
ably will emphasize the favor-
able prospects for expanded
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Soviet economic and technical
assistance to the South Asian
states, rather than the mili-
tary aid which it found more
appropriate for the "neutral-
ist" Arab states.
Participation in Conferences
The USSR probably will
press for full participation
in Middle Eastern affairs at
an early date. Soviet spokes-
men have already indicated that
Moscow would be willing to
sign a treaty in conjunction
with other powers guaranteeing
the neutrality of the area.
There have been several indica-
tions that the USSR might press
for a separate conference on
Middle East problems following
the foreign ministers' meeting
in Geneva.
Izvestia declared on 3
Novem er however, that the
USSR would not adhere to the
1950 tripartite declaration by
the US, UK and France on the
Middle East and thereby become
a party to the "colonizing"
approach of the Western powers
toward the Arab states, es-
pecially Egypt.
In the absence of talks
with the Western powers on
Middle East problems, Moscow
will. attempt to accomplish its
aims by unilateral efforts to
increase its influence with
the Bandung powers.
A Soviet correspondent
in Geneva believes the USSR
will be invited to participate
in a. second Asian-African con-
ference, which he understands
will be held in Cairo in the
spring of 1956 25X1
ru-
shchev and Bulganin reportedly
will visit Cairo to discuss
"Northern Tier"
Arab League
Manila pact
member
Soviet visit
this matter with Egyptian
premier Nasr. Prime Minister
U Nu has already expressed his
personal willingness to accept
the Soviet Union as a partici-
pant. Moscow would have a
unique opportunity at such a
conference to press for its
objectives.
Baghdad and Manila Pacts
There are already signs
that Moscow and Peiping are
making overtures designed to
"dissolve" the Baghdad and
Manila pact alignments. Moscow
protested to Tehran when Iran
adhered to the Baghdad pact on
12 October and remained offi-
cially cool toward Iranian
officials for several weeks.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 November 1955
Subsequently Moscow eased
its pressure on Iran. Soviet
propagandists nevertheless con-
tinue to point out to the Irani-
an s , Iraqis, Turks and Pakistan-
is the disadvantages of their
alignment with the West; in-
sisting that it can only perpf:t-
u ate :4mperialism, drain their
national treasuries and bring
harm to the people.
The USSR recently expressed
its pleasure with Thailand's con-
duct in international affairs
and commended Foreign Minister
Prince Wan. In addition, Com-
munist China has reportedly
offered to sign a treaty of non-
aggression with the Philippines
which would include a Chinese
promise not to use a Communist-
controlled Taiwan as a base for
an attack on the Philippines.
There are also indications that
Moscow may soon ask for a re-
sumption of relations with Aus-
tralia.
Both Moscow and Peiping
have for some time advocated
establi'.hment of an Asian s e-
curity pact in which all the
AFGHANISTAN'S TIME OF DECISION
The forthcoming visit of
Soviet premier Bulganin and
party chief Khrushchev to Kabul
in connection with their Indian
trip focuses attention on Af-
ghanistan's position between
the Soviet bloc and the Western
powers. Afghanistan has always
been suspicious of the politi-
cal implications of both So-
viet and Western activity with-
in its borders. However, in
recent years, intensified con-
flict with Western-supported
Pakistan and domestic politi-
nations of the Pacific, includ
ing the United States, would
participate. In Moscow's view,
this would replace such align-
ments as the Manila pact.
Sino-Soviet Co-ordination
The USSR and Communist
China appear to be in accord
with regard to over-all Commu-
nist policies toward the Arab
and South Asian powers and there
are, in fact, some signs of
close co-ordination between Mos-
cow and Peiping. Both have de-
fined their policies toward the
Bandung powers as being based
on the "five principles" and
the Objectives of the Afro-Asian
conference. They also have p r o-
moted India as the leader of
the area and as a candidate for
"sixth great power" status in
international affairs. A suc-
cessful Sino-Soviet effort to
promote a"neutralist" bloc of
Asian states with India and
Egypt as keystones would accom..
plish the immediate aims of
both the USSR and Communist
China.
cal developments have resulted
in increased susceptibility to
Soviet overtures. The Soviet
Union has taken advantage of
these developments to cultivate
a closer relationship with Af-
ghanistan.
Bulganin and Khrushchev
probably will try to take ad-
vantage of these circumstances
to attempt to ::ie Afghanistan
in.more closely with current
Soviet strategy in the Middle
East.
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6URRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 November 1955
Traditional Afghan Orientation
For almost 150 years Af-
ghan policy has aimed almost
exclusively at maintaining in-
dependence in the face of pres-
surefrom Russia on the north
and Britain on the south and
profiting from competition be-
tween the great-powers. At
some times, Russian influence
has been predominant.; at others,
British. Afghanistan has al-
ways managed to shake off both.
Even though the British
withdrew from India in 1947,
the Afghans have assumed that
the competition continues,,par-
tially as a result of the Ameri-
can interest in the area. Their
traditional policy remains un-
altered. King Zahir Shah in
opening the Afghan National As-
semlily on 2 July 1955 expressed
it simply: "The pursuit and
preservation of neutrality has
35
K AS HM iR
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,--~- Selected railroad
All-weather road
formed, and still forms, the
axis of our government's
policy." Prime Minister Daud
in an independence day address
on Z'91 August used almost identi-
cal words.
Although the Afghan-Soviet
treaLties of.1921 and 1931 pro-
vided for establishment of
close ties, Soviet contact with
Afghanistan prior to 1954 was
limited to routine matters--
boundary and quarantine ques-
tions, a moderate amount of
trade under a barter agreement
signed in 1950, and an exten-I
siori of credit in 1953 for
construction of four gasoline
storage facilities in northern
Afghanistan.
During this period, the
Afghans seemed to prefer West
ern economic contacts . Begin-`
ning in 1951:, $8,200,000 in
direct technical assistance
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10 November 1955
was received from the United
States. Export-Import Bank
loans totaling $39,200,000 fi-
nanced development of the Eel-
mand Valley by the American
construction firm of Morrison-
Knudsen. Afghan;.c+ 's trade
with nonbloc countries was
three to five times greater than
with the USSR.
Recent Developments
In 1954, the USSR extended
the equivalent of $6,200,000
and Czechoslovakia $5,000,000
for development projects, such
as grain and gasoline storage
facilities, road-building equin-
ment, and small industrial
plants. These are to be repaid
in goods over an extended: pe-
riod.
The Pakistani blockade
of normal Afghan trade routes
in the summer of 1955 apparently
resulted in.a stepping up of
deliveries under the barter
agreement with the USSR, al-
though these were inadequate
to meet all the shortages caused
by the blockade. After the
blockade was lifted, Afghanistan
continued to attempt to develop
transportation channels inde-
pendent of Pakistan, including
those through the USSR which
were provided for in a transit
a reement signed last -Tune.
Afghan export.-import trade with
West Germany is already reported
moving over this route. Afghan-
istan is attempting to improve
its road connections with the
Soviet border.
Negotiations for arms from
Czechoslovakia are under con-
sideration and deliveries under
a $3,000,000 cash deal are
apparently already being made.
An Afghan military mission is
about to depart for Prague
and two Czech arms experts are
reportedly in Kabul. Neti:So-
viet offers to provide without
charge teachers and equipment
for Kabul University and a
500-bed hospital for the capital
have recently been reported.
All Soviet-Afghan deals in the
past, however, have been on a
cash or credit basis, and many
previous offers of gifts were
not carried out.
Radio Moscow has with
increasing frequency in the past
few months linked Afghanistan
with Egypt, Syria, .nc' others
which have rejected the "northern
tier" defense arrangement, tail-
ing them the "neutral, peace-
lOving nations of the Middle
East." This propaganda may be
preparatory to modification by
the USSR of its past individual,
cautious approach to Afghanistan
in favor of an attempt to in-
clude Afghanistan in the Soviet
Middle Eastern strategy.
Afghanistan's Present Attitude
Afghanistan has recently
indicated increase:?. dissatis-
faction with the long-termas-
pects of the Helmand Valley
program and suggested several
changes. At least two of these
may cause a: rouble when a pending
Import-Export Bank mission,
which has to approve the changes,
reaches Kabul. They are a pro-
posal to abandon a project to
develop roads connecting Afghan-
istan with Pakistan and to begin
development of the Helmand del-
ta area on the Iranian border.
The latter proposal raises the
danger.of intensifying a long
smouldering dispute with Iran.
A possibility of increased
American economic aid under the
President's Fund for Asian Re-
gional Development, which is
tied into co-operation with Pak-
istan, has received a cool ini-
tial reception.
Afghanistan's new national
airline, Aryana, which is managed
by an American, has also proved
unsatisfactory to the Afghans
and probably added to their dis-
content with Western assistance.
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10 November 1955
Afghanistan has recently
"been vigorously attempting to
determine what it can expect
from both power blocs. It has
made clear that its main de-
sire is political support for
itc, unrealistic demands for in-
dependence for the Pushtoon
tribal ;areas of Pakistan. It
has received no encouragement
on this from the West and lit-
tle from the Soviet Union.
Soviet economic activities,
however, such as the recent de-
livery of Kabul's first modern
buses and taxicabs, have attracted favorable attention and have
served immediate needs. The
$5,000,000 Czech credit extend-
ed in 1954 is to be repaid in
goods at 3 percent interest..
This probably compares favorably
in Afghan minds with the Export-
Import Bank loan, which requires
repayment in dollars at 3.5 and
4.5. percent .
Afghanistan's long-standing
attempt to obtain arms from
nonbloc.sources has had little
success, in part due to the
fact that the material would
probably be forbidden transit
by Pakistan, through which it
would have to come. Afghani-
stan's interest in the recent
,Soviet bloc arms deal with Egypt
and its dealings with Czecho-
slovakia for arms are there-
,fore not surprising.
Future Trends
The Afghans evidently be-
lieve. they are not getting what
they want from the United States.
They may believe they can get
it from-the Soviet bloc. The
fact that several years of
American activity has resulted
in no political pentration may
lead them to feel that similar
ties with the USSR can be safely
undertaken. Consequently, they
may, especially in view of the
crisis with rakistan, be in a.
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mood to accept Soviet aid with-
out the restrictions they have
imposed'in the past. These
restrictions apparently have
limited Soviet activities,,to the
northern part of the country
and prevented the permanent
stationing of. technicians in
Afghanistan..
Perhaps the most important
factor in the Afghan decision
is Prime Minister Daud, who
has always been less suspicious
of the Soviet Union than other
Afghan leaders. Daud.has been
unable to obtain Western sup-
port for his extreme policies
against Pakistan and for rapid
modernization of his country..
He reportedly told the Afghan
parliament on 17 October that
he now proposes to see what
he can get from the USSR.
The calling of a rare Grand
Assembly of the Tribes by King
Zahir Shah for 14 November in-
dicates a major policy deci-
sion is pending. Unlike the
"rubber-stamp" parliament, the
tribal assembly cannot easily
be controlled by Daud and may
upset his plans. Presumably,
however, he will attempt to
limit discussions to the Push-
toonistan issue with Pakistan,.
and if he obtains support for
this, will try to use it to
justify the over-all policy of
his government.
Although influential ele-
ments in the Afghan government
probably remain opposed to in-
creasing dependence on the USSR,.
Daudi is stubborn and impetuous
and unlikely to retreat from
a policy to which he is already
deeply committed. Consequently,
if he stays in control, he may
be receptive to new Soviet offers
when Bulganin and Khrushchev
visit Kabul, reportedly for a
stay of three or four days.
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 November 1955
EAST GERMAN CAMPAIGN FOR WESTERN RECOGNITION
East Germany's campaign to
gain Western recognition as an
independent state has included
a continuing trade offensive,
incessant propaganda., economic
and political pressures, and
efforts to gain full or pro-
visional status in various in-
ternational organizations.
Western recognition of
the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) is an important goal of
Soviet policy. The Moscow
treaty of 20 September by which
the USSR ostensibly granted
East Germany full independence,
was clearly designed to raise
the GDR. to equality with the
Federal Republic and to enhance
its capabilities for obtaining
recognition.
No non-Communist country
has formally recognized East
Germany but several have taken
steps in that direction, and
some will be susceptible to
new overtures.
While East Germany will
probably concentrate its pres-
sure on the West Germans, it
is unlikely to gain recogni-
tion from Bonn as long as
Adenauer remains in power. In
fact, Bonn officially has pri-
vately threatened to break re-
lations with any power recog-
nizing the GDR. Bonn must, how-
ever, deal with East Germany
on a. variety of subjects and
will probably be willing to
meet it on a, governmental level
on such essential matters as
trade and transport.
travelers except officials of
Western occupying powers.
Sovereignty over its air
space, granted by the Soviet-
East German protocol of 25
March 1954 and emphasized in
the September 1955 treaty, pre-
sumably includes the right to
impose some controls on the
existing French, British and
American commercial air services
into West Berlin, and to demand
government-level negotiations
on their continuation.
Government-level air agree-
ments' will probably -result from
the opening of East Germany to
commercial service. The Soandi-
nav:ian Airways System recently
inaicated that it may apply
to East Germany for overflight
rights to Berlin.
The GDR will probably ex-
ploit its control over the
means of communication between
the Federal Republic and West
Berlin to the fullest in an
attempt to force West Germany
and other countries to deal
with it on a government level
and thus gain some measure of
recognition. One possible move
in this direction would be to
require Western countries, in-
cluding the United States, Brit-
a i ri and France, to obtain East
German permission for any means
of nonmilitary transport to
West Berlin. Sweden and Den-
mark have railroad connections
into East Germany, and pressure
may be brought on them in an
attempt to get them into govern-
ment-level negotiations.
Air and Land Communications
East Germany now possesses
enough of the rights and func-
tions of an independent state
to be able to force Western
countries to deal with it on
certain problems. Among these
are sovereignty over its own
air space, control over com-
munications between the Federal
Republic and West Berlin, and
the power to issue visas to all
The GDR has also obtained
from the USSR the right to visa
passports of all travelers en-
tering its territory, with the
exception of American, French,
and British occupation offi-
cials, who are given Soviet
documentation. Personnel of
other Western military missions
stationed in Berlin, however,
are required to obtain East
German visas.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The East Germans launched
a trade offensive in the spring
of 1954, and have since had per-
manent official trade missions
accepted by six countries--Fin-
land, Egypt, Burma, Lebanon,
Austria and India. With the ex-
ception of Austria, each of
these countries has signed a
government-level trade agree-
ment.
In addition, barter agree-
ments have been concluded be-
tween the East German state-
owned foreign trade agency and
semiofficial trading corpora-
tions in many non-Communist
countries. East German trade
delegations have visited many
countries in all quarters of the
globe in efforts to find new
markets, especially in under-
developed areas.
East Germany has shown a
willingness to exploit its trade
with West Germany in the cam-
paign to force recognition, even
at some cost to its own economy.
This willingness has been dem-
onstrated by East Germany's
maintenance of the toll on truck
traffic to Berlin in the face
of the Federal Republic's retal-
iatory ;mbargo on some iron and
steel products.
Potentially, one of East
Germany's most effective means
of gaining international stature
may be through participating in
international organizations,
although Western countries gen-
erally have opposed its admis-
sion, especially in cases where
the West Germans have protested.
Nevertheless, the GDR has al-
ready taken the first steps in
SECRET
this direction, and can be ex-
pected to persist in its efforts.
Free World Stand on Recognition
Three countries--Egypt,
Finland, and Yugoslavia--are
'Tn.own to be considering recog-
nition. Finland has already
exchanged quasi-diplomatic rep-
resentatives, the East German
emissary in Helsinki having the 25X1
authority to issue visas.
Austrian officials feel
their government should take
a "neutral" approach to the
separate Germanies by postponing
establishment of formal relations
with Bonn and recognition of the
GDR. They also say, however,
that an East German offer to
return Austrian property to Aus-
tria would necessitate a "more
tangible" response to current
informal East German requests
for closer relations.
On the other hand, 37 non-
Communist countries said they
are not willing to recognize
the East German regime. The
East Germans are probably real-
istic enough, therefore, not to
aspire to general recognition by
the West in the foreseeable fu-
ture, but they may hope to a-
chieve a more or less official
status by the establishment of
connections with as many coun-
tries as possible. 25X1
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SIGNS OF TROUBLE FOR THE COLOMBIAN DICTATORSHIP
The regime of General Rojas
Pinilla in Colombia faces an
opposition which is growing in
numbers and improving in organ-
ization. Although Rojas has,
tried to organize mass support
for his government, its backing
comes almost solely from the
armed forces, which are likely
to turn against him if popular
dissatisfaction continues to
mount.
When he overthrew Laureano
Gomez in the June 1953 coup,
Rojas was generally acclaimed
by all but the Gomez faction
of his own Conservative Party;
and also by the other tradi-
tional party, the Liberals.
He was expected to bring a re-
turn to constitutional govern-
ment, probably through a Con-
servative-Liberal coalition,
and end the political violence
that had plagued Colombia since
the Bogota riots in 1948.
Neither expectation has
been realized. Rojas, who
styled his administration "The
Government of the Armed Forces
Constituent Assembly "elected"
him president for four years
and voted to continue itself in
office for the same period, thus
postponing general elections.
Plenary sessions of the assembly
have now been postponed indef-
initely. Rojas has made no move
'-.o draw Conservative and Liberal
Party leaders into the govern-
ment .
To silence political crit-
icism, Rojas decreed a sweeping
calumny law in October 1954 and
later banned opposition radio
commentaries while insisting on
free radio time and sole tele-
vision rights for government
propaganda. Shortly afterwards,
the government formed a national
publications board to control
the import of newsprint and
publish an official daily news-
paper. Finally on 3 August,
the government closed the in-
fluential Liberal daily El Tiempo,
one of Latin America's best-
known newspapers. Although the
original. censorship decree has
been "lifted," a new "code of
ethics" appears to have --t, net
effect of greater stringency.
after a few months began to move
toward authoritarianism rather
than the constitutional govern-
ment which had prevailed for
45 years.
The traditional political
parties, particularly the Lib-
erals, became increasingly
critical. Rojas, meanwhile,
attempted to build up an or-
ga,nized mass following of his
own. His attempts to end guer-
rilla activity by political and
economic malcontents, which has
upset the eastern and central
parts of the country, have met
with such little success that
the majority of the armed forces
is now engaged in efforts to
maintain public order.
Moves Toward Dictatorship
Rojas has refused to lift
the six-year-old state of siege.
In August 1954 his hand-picked
In the sphere of economic
policy, the government has a-
roused considerable opposition
by its high expenditures on the
armed forces and propaganda and
intelligence services, and on
costly projects such as the pro-
posed new capital buildings.
Although Colombia is presently
enjoying relative prosperity,
mainly because of good coffee
exports, merchants are concerned
over the regime's erratic im-
port control policy, with its
favors for the military estab-
lishment and other official
bodies. There is also widespread
criticism of the government's
failure to implement promised
social welfare measures.
Search for Political Support
Rojas now has little polit-
ical support from either the
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CURRENT INTELLTGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 November 1955
labor. The govern-
ment also tried to
consolidate various
labor and political
groups--the CNT, the
Socialist Party and
others--into a Na-
tional Action Move-
ment.
BOGOTA
p1~
Liberals or the Conservatives.
Since the closing of El Tiempo,
the Liberals have shown new
party unity and shifted from
"loyal" to complete opposition.
The right-wing Gomez faction of
the Conservative Party continues
in opposition, and is now being
joined by the more moderate Con-
servatives under former president
Ospina Perez.
The president's attempt to
build up a mass organization
first took a fnrm reminiscent
of Peron's build-up of the trade
unions. Early this year Rojas
extended official recognition
to a new labor group, the N,,.-
tional Confederation of Workers
(CNT), and tried to activate a
government-sponsored national
trade union council in a move
to increase.state control over
This attempt,
however, would have
subtracted strength
from the Conservative
Pasty and the dominant
Union of Colombian
Workers, both under
strong clerical influ-
ence, and so antag-
onized the politically
powerful Roman Catho-
lic hierarchy. Since,
that time the church
felt further affronted
by government moves in
the field of secondary
education undertaken
without sufficient con-
sultation of the hier-
archy. As a result,
a steady crystallization
of church opposition
to the government has
taken place during the
past year.
These efforts to
create public support having
failed, the president and his
followers attempted to inflate
the president's son-in-law,
Moreno Diaz, to a leading po-
sition in the Conservative Par-
ty. Moreno's unpopularity is
such, however, that success of
this effort would further an-
tagonize Conservative Party
elements. Rojas has already
failed to elicit Conservative
Party support for his closing
of the.Liberal journal.
Dependence on Armed Forces
Although Rojas seems gen-
erally unaware of the extent
of popular dissatisfaction, he
has come to depend more and
more on the armed forces. The
army general staff reportedly
is.increasingly assuming a
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10 November 1955
governmental policy role, with
the cabinet steadily being rel-
e g ated o a rubber-stamp po-
sitiuu. Military officers are
being placed in increasing num-
bers throughout the administra-
tion, and all ranks now receive
various special benefits. Of
the 1956 national budget,26 per-
cent has been allocated to de-
fense expenditures.
the o om
army, unlike certain other Latin
American armies, has no tradi-
tion of governing the country
in opposition to widespread pub-
lic opinion. Important Liberal
and pro-Gomez Conservative el-
ements are known to exist in
the armed forces, and a shift
of allegiance on their part to
opposition forces is possible.
25X1
2SX1
armed forces too would eventuall
become dissatisfied. 25X1
Most
a om ians in the traditionally
influential groups are' already
disaffected. Should dissatis-
faction continue. to mount, ttie
AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION IN SINO-SOVIET BLOC
Drives to collectivize
agriculture have been stepped
up in Communist China and re-
newed in the East European Sat-
ellites during 1955. The present
campaign in China appears to be
the direct result of a top-level
party decision ner.sonally pre-
sented by Mao Tse-tung, while the
drive in Eastern Europe has prob-
ab l y .?esulted from a Soviet
ruling that the relaxation of
collectivization efforts per-
mitted during the "new course"
years of 1953 and 1954 is no
longer to be tolerated.
In both areas, the programs
now under way are utilizing
propaganda and intimidation to
induce peasants to co-operate,
but are avoiding the force and
physical violence characteristic
of Soviet collectivization in
the 1930's.
Communist China
An increased emphasis on
collectivization has been evident
in Communist China since the sum-
mer of 1955. According to cur-
rent Communist estimates, the
proportion of peasants in ag-
ricultural producers' co-op-
eratives--the form of collec-
tive used in China. and North
k.orea---will rise from 15 to about
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10 November 1955
50 percent between the summer
of 1955 and the spring of 1957,
a full year ahead of earlier
plans. Peasant opposition and
the a,dversp effects of collectiv-
ization on agricultural pro-
ductiou appear to have wor-A ea
many Communist planners, but
the go-slow advocates in Pei-
pin; have been overruled by
Mao Tse-tung.
TRENDS IN COLLECTIVIZATION
PERCENT OF CULTIVATED LAND IN COLLECTIVES
EUROPEAN SATELLITES
scale collectiviza-
tion in other Commu-
nist countries, by
reducing farming in-
centives, have tended
BULGARIA to depress agricul-
HUNGARY
.--I EAST GERMANY
- RUMANIA
--.. POLAND
ink; agriculture is to secure
more direct control over agricul-
tural production in order to
support the industrialization
program.
Collectivization by itself
will not, as alleged in Commu-
nist propaganda, increase farm
output. On the contrary, the
compulsory aspects of large-
Mao, in one of his rare
public pronouncements, called
on 31 July for a, speed-up of
rural socialization and an end
to "conservative and indecisive
attitudes" among party members.
Mao asked that the co-operative,
movement include half of China's
500,000,000 farm population by
early 1958. Subsequent changes
in regional plans,attributed to
Mao's urging, advanced this goal
a year.
Intense political and
economic discrimination against
individual farmers in recent
months makes them afraid not
to join co-operatives. In
particular, the campaign against
counterrevolutionaries has
intimidated all peasants and
terrorized the rich and upper
middle-class peasants, who will
be treated by Peiping as bit-
ter opponents of collectiviza-
tion.
Peiping's immediate eco-
Iomic objective in collectiviz-
aural production.
The higher-than-av-
erage yields claimed
.or existing co-opera-
tives can. be accounted
for by their prefer-
ential treatment in
allocation of loans,
fertilizer, seed and
implements.
In view of the
disruptive economic
effects of rapid
collectivization and Peiping's
refusal to allocate investment
funds to support plans for sub-
stantially expanding agricul-
tural production in the next
few years, there is little
likelihood that the 1957 food
target of an 8-percent increase
over the favorable 1955 crop
will be ach:iuved. However,
unless Output falls considerably
below the planned level, the
Peiping regime probably will
control an increasing pro-
portion of total. agricultural
TRENDS IN COLLECTIVIZATION
PERCENT OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS
IN PRODUCERS CO-OPERATIVES
COMMUNIST CHINA .
Based on official
ommunist apnounc ments. ? -/
-- .- planned
0
1954
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1956 1957
511074
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 November 1955
output as new co-operatives
are formed.
North-Korea. and North Vietnam
In North Korea, 44 percent
of.tfie peasants are already
members of producer co-opera.-
tives. There is little current
emphasis on expanding the so-
cialized sector of agriculture,
however, and no. North Korean .
schedule for complete collectiv-
ization, has been announced.
Collectiviza..tiox in North. Viet-
nam is still several years off
as distribution-of landlord.-
holdings among peasants. is
just being completed. .
East European Satellites
The European Satellites
renewed their efforts to'6o:
lectivize agriculture early
this year following an 18-month
period during which they had
either played down this pro-
gram, or, in the case of HU`n4
gary and Jze'choslovakia, a.ctuialtp
retreated from it. The simhl-
taneous revival of the 0o1.l0o-
tiviza.tion drive in all t
Satellites suggests central.
direction from Moscow.
In December 1954) B~s'
German deputy premier Walter
Ulbricht declared that the col-
lectivized acreage would be
increased by about 50 percent
during 1955.
In June and July 1955,.
several Satellite regimes
sharply stepped up propaganda
urging agricultural socializa-
tion. Hungarian premier Hegedus
and Czech party first secretary
Novotny implied that harsh
measures would be instituted
to make the collectivized sec-
tor predominant by 1960. The
Polish and Bulgarian regimes
also delineated policies of
expanding collectivization,
albeit on a more modest scale.
. Following the Czech re-
gime's announcement of 29 June
that the percentage of arable
SECRET
land controlled by the collec-
tivized sector had dropped
from 35 to 33 percent since
January, the government empha-
sized the right of local
authorities to sell to co-opera-
tives private farm land not
being effectively cultivated,
and it continued to publicize
the trials of "kulaks" in an
effort to intimidate private
farmers to join the co-opera-
tive movement "voluntarily."
Hungary and'Bulgaria.
apparently are successful in
quiietly. forcing peasants intc*
collectives through discreet
pressures applied by local.
oci,als.
The decision to press
' lectiviza.tion was made
several months before the
outcome of the current harvest
661ld be known by the Satellite
regimes. It was undoubtedly
a political decision motivated
by the need to re-emphasize
the regimes' socialist goals
in reaction to the stress of
the "new course" on current
production at the expense of.
co]Llectiviza.tion. The relative
satisfaction of the Satellites
with the 1955 bread grain, root
and vegetable harvests will
contribute to their willingness
to continue to push the pro-
gram during the next year..
Current indications are,
however, that collectivization
will proceed without the harsh
measures implied in the June
pronouncements of the Hungarian
and Czech leaders. Since early
August, the Czechoslovak regime
has refrained from repeating
its threats to appropriate
land for collectives despite
its apparent failure to expand
the socialized sector signifi-
cantly. The Hungarian party
press recently warned the
local cadres against excessive
zeal in collectivizing.
The Satellites--particu-
larly the Hungarian regime--
do not want to revive peasant
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 November 1955
resistance which resulted iron
the extreme collectivization
pressure applied in 1952 and
led to a retrogression in
socialization during the fol-
lowing two years of the "new
course.. "
In the USSR, where col
lective and state farms covered
about 95 percent of the total
cultivated area. as early as
1938,the present emphasis is
on expanding output.of crops
within a system..a.lready so-
cialized. In general, all
recent cha.nges.in the system
have been marginal in nature,
and aimed at increasing state
control or improving manage-
ment, peasant incentives, and
efficiency. Among other meas-
ures, the number of collective
farms has been reduced from
254,000 to about 89,000 by
amalgamation into larger units
during the past five years..
Although collectivization
was nearly completed over 15
years ago in the Soviet Union,
the harsh measures used to
reach and maintain this status
discouraged the peasants and
are one reason why lagging agri-
cultural output is still the
USSR's m
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