CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700060001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 22, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY N O. &
OCI NO.9430/55
22 December 1955
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [']
F-3 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH? H
DATE, REVIEWER:4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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T H E W E E K .I N B R I E F
INDONESIAN CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
President Sukarno is apparently determined to bring
about the fall of Prime Minister Haraha.p's Masjumi cabinet.
He is giving strong support to Air Force Chief of Staff
Suryadarma, who engineered a show of arms by air force per-
sonnel on 14 December to prevent the installation of a new
11arahap appointee as deputy chief of staff. Harahap's
position may have been further weakened by the 15 December
constituent assembly elections; early returns show the
Masjumi party running poorly. F_ I
FR ail..F ELECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
In the campaign for the 2 January French election, no
group appears thus far to be showing significant gains in
support. The numerous candidates and alliances for the 2
January election and the similarity of the programs cloud the
issues. State aid to church schools is the only clear is-
sue separating the two non-Communist blocs.
CYPRUS w . . . . . ? ? . Page 3
Terrorism continues on Cyprus as Greece seeks a more
explicit promise of self-determination than that of ~Br.it-
ain''S latest formula for a provisional settlement. Twelve
British soldiers have been, killed recently and three
Americans were injured on 18 December by a bomb tossed into
a Nicosia apartment house dining room.
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . .
? . ? . . . . Page 3
The Syrian-Israeli frontier remains tense. There have
been.minor incidents on the Egyptian-Israeli border. UN
truce chief General Burns appears to have made little progress
in bringing Israel and Egypt to any agreement on truce
proposals for the border regions of Gaza and El Auja. The
Israeli "package" compromise publicized on 19 December as
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an inducement for Egypt and the other Arab states
tiate peace settlements with Israel contained no
to
new
nego-
elements
and is certain to be rejected by the Arabs.
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22 December 1955
JORDAN AND THE BAGHDAD PACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The resignation of Jordan's Majali cabinet on 20 December
is a setback for the British drive to engineer Jordan's ad-
herence to the Baghda-..tct . The caretaker government of
"elder statesman" Hashim, head of the Senate, has promised
to take no action on the pact pending the outcome of the parlia-
mentary elections to be held within four months.
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POSTPONEMENT OF
SUPREME SOVIET SESSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . Page 4
The postponement of the USSR Supreme Soviet session from
23 December to 26 December may indicate that a plenum of the
party central committee is convening during the intervening
period. The calling of the central committee into session at
this time could mean that there are disagreements within. the
party presidium over foreign and domestic policies. The So-
viet budget for 1946 and the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to South
Asia are possible subjects of controversy. 25X1
PARAGUAY . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The military rebellion which broke out in Paraguay on 21
December was precipitated by President Stroessner's order for
the arrest of Epifanic Mendez Fleitas,.Central Bank president and
a controversial leader of the ruling Colorado Party. In back
of the outbreak is a, conflict among the various Colorado
factions and continuing efforts of the party's civilian leaders
to challenge the military's traditional dominance of the govern-
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Berlin Situation: Communist pressure against West Berlin
con inues7Uut the legal steps necessary to incorporate
the Soviet sector of the city into the German Democratic
Republic have not been taken. Such action would termi-
nate the four-power status of the city. East Germany,
despite the aggressive statements of several of its
leaders, still appears intent on maintaining its posi-
tion in Berlin without openly challenging the Western
powers there. E__ I . . . . . . . . . . . Page
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 December 1955
Khrushchev-Buiganin Tour: Three documents issued. at the
conclusion of the Soviet leaders' visit to Afghanistan
provide for further extending political, economic and
cultural ties between Afghanistan and the USSR. Moscow
probably hopes the visit, and the promises of additional
aid, will cause the Afghans to stand up more boldly
against Pakistan and the West. As a result of the visit
Prime Minister Daud's domestic to have
been further strengthened. Page 3
Effects of UN Membership Increase: The admission of 16 new
members into the on 14 ecember has, by promoting
the principle of universal membership, probably improved
Peiping's prospects for admission. While the increase
in Soviet bloc votes is minor, the Arab-Asian bloc may
now be able to muster a two-thirds vote on colonial
issues. . . . . . . . . ... . . . Page 4
The Soviet Shift on UN Membership: By its sudden shift on
the UN membership question, the USSR laid the founda-
tion for its tactics in next year's debate on Chinese UN
representation. Moscow seeks to confront the United
States with a choice between acquiescing in the seating
of the Chinese Communists or continuing to support the
Nationalists at the cost of Japan's exclusion.
. t:.:::~-?: . . . Page 5
Japanese Reaction to Veto on UN Membership: The Japanese
feel that the membership rebuff, along with other
recent setbacks to their diplomacy, emphasizes their
nation's weakness in international affairs and its over-
dependence on the United States. This will strengthen
the position of those within and outside the government
who favor increasingly independent action to strengthen
Japan's international position. The fact that Japan's
accession to the UN depends on Soviet support also will
increase pressures for concessions when the London
treaty negotiations with the USSR are resumed in January.
I. . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Buraimi: Since rejecting the Saudi Arabian proposals for
renewed arbitration of the Buraimi dispute, the British
have further alienated the Saudis by instigating a mil-
itary campaign against a Saudi ally, the imam of Inner
Oman. By taking this firm stand,Britain is attempt-
ing to stop Saudi border encroachments into territory
claimed by the British-controlled Persian Gulf rulers,
and thereby maintain Britain's political and economic
privileges in this area. I . . . . Page 7
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22 December 1955
Saar Election Outcome: The three pro-German parties won
absolute control of the. Saar Landtag in the 18 December
elections but fell short of the 75-percent majority
needed to revise the constitution. Prospects are for
a period of continuing agitation by the ambitious pro- 8
German extremist'leader'Schneider. . Page 25X1
New Soviet Five-Year Plana The draft of the Soviet Union's
Sixth Five-Year an (1956-1960) will probably be made
public a few weeks before it is presented to the 20th
Party Congress next February. The next plan evidently
will be an ambitious program for rapid growth of the
USSR's maturing economy, and will be presented as a
significant step from state socialism toward Communism.
Basic to the fulfillment of the plan will be the success
of the industrial modernization effort in'raising labor
productivity and the achievement of the agricultural and
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Bulganin Defends the Cominform: Marshal Bulganin's defense
of the Cominform in a press conference in New Delhi
on 14 December indicates that the USSR is prepared to
accept the diplomatic embarrassment which the existence
of the Cominform entails to preserve it as a weapon
in the "peaceful open competition of capitalist and
socialist systems" advocated by Moscow.
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Soviet Objectives in the Antarctic: Participation in the
International eophys ca ear (1957-58) provides the
USSR with an opportunity to become entrenched in the.
Antarctic, The scientific gains accruing to the
USSR from a program of continuous work in the Antarctic
would secure it a leading position in polar geophysics,
polar flying, guided-missile development and polar
land, sea and submarine operations. . Page 11 25X1
Soviet Party Membership Increased Significantly: The addi-
tion o a million new members to the Soviet Com-
munist Party since May 1953 indicates a reversal of
the postwar policy of restricting party membership.
This expansion, which brings the membership to 8,000,-
000, appears to reflect the views of Party First
Secretary Khrushchev. It is in line with the campaign
he initiated in the fall of 1953 to bolster party
cadres in agriculture. . . ? ? . Page 1225X1
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22 December 1955
Soviet Military Promotions Since Stalin's Death: The re-
cent promotion o our aovie army genera is brings to
41 the number of known promotions to three-star rank
and above in the Soviet military since Stalin's death.
The contrast between this number in two and a half
years and the 12 such promotions in the eight-year
postwar period under Stalin is indicative of the greater
recognition now accorded military leaders, particularly
operational commanders. ? ? ? ? Page 25X1
Laos: The Laotian election campaign, now in its final
stages, has been generally calm. Present political
leaders are expected to return after the 25 December
voting with a working majority in the assembly and
roughly the same balance of power in the cabinet.
The Patbet Lao has confined its activities to propa-
ganda urging abstention from the polls; only one
Pathet sympathizer is regarded as having a chance of
election. 1 1 . . . . . . . . Page 14
Malaya: Preliminary arrangements have been completed for
a meeting during the last week of December between
Malayan: chief minister Abdul Rahman and Secretary Gen-
eral Chin Peng of the Malayan Communist Party. Rahman
has reiterated that when he meets the Communist leader,
he will do no, more than explain the government's 8
September amnesty and listen to Communist suggestions
regarding the government's offer. . Page 15 25X1
Sudanese Independence: The Sudanese parliament's ""declara-
on:1 o independence on 20 December has been accepted
by Britain and Egypt. Uncertainty remains whether the
move will make unnecessary the convening of the interna-
tional commission which was to supervise the process of
.Sudanese self-determination. . . Page 15 25X1
Constitutional Crisis in Gold Coast: The Gold Coast, Brit-
ain's West African colony w eb is to attain commonwealth
status by early 1957, is faced with internal dissension
over its future constitutional structure and the role
of tribal authorities. . . . Page 16
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Greece: Political maneuvering is intensifying in Greece in
anticipation of a royal proclamation dissolving parlia-
ment and a call for national.elections. Elections, which
would be required within 45 days,may be held as early as
February. Prime Minister Karama.nlis faces a hard pout
ical fight. . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
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'CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Disaffection Growing in Argentina: New large-scale arrests
and a report on the existence of a new "revolutionary
movement".in Argentina suggest that the Aramburu govern-
ment's forceful program to crush all sources of Peron's
former strength may be alienating part of its support
from the military who served under Peron. Though Presi-
dent Aramburu still seems to have control, the arrests
tend to belie the communiques about unity within the
regime which appears to be increasingly strained by
interservice rivalries. . . . . Page 17 25X1
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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THE RIGHT-CENTER COALITION IN THE FRENCH ELECTION . . Page
In the three-cornered French election battle between the
present government coalition, Mendes-France's Republican Front
and the Communists, the conservative Independent-Peasant bloc
which forms the right wing of Faure's coalition will probably
gain the greatest number of seats. This group, basically con-
servative, has shown considerable flexibility, particularly in.
recent months on wage issues as well as in foreign affairs.
TRANSPORTATION AND UTILITIES,IN BERLIN . . . . . . Page
East German harassment again poses a threat to the vul-
nerable road, rail and water communications lines on which West
Berlin depends for its communications to the West. While the
.Communists hope to. force recognition of the East German govern-
ment by asserting control over these routes, West Berlin main-
tains a six-to-nine-month stockpile of basic necessities, which
in an emergency could be supplemented by airlift..
JAPAN DRIVES FOR COMMUNIST MARKETS
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Page 9
The Ha,toyama government, moving cautiously, has put into
effect a. number of policies during the past year to restore
Japan's. trade with the nations of the Sino-Soviet bloc, es-
pecially with Communist China. Exports to the bloc, however,
still comprise only two percent of the total for all countries
and imports little. more than three percent. By enlarging this
trade, Japan hopesto achieve a self-sustaining economy, which
it considers a prerequisite to a more independent role in Asia.
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President Sukarno is ap-
parently determined to bring
about the fall of Prime Min-
ister Harahap's Masjumi-led
cabinet. He is giving strong
support to Air Force Chief of
Staff Suryadarma, who engi-
neered a show of arms by,air
force personnel on 14 December
to prevent the installation of
a Harahap appointee as deputy
chief of staff.
Sukarno has never favored
the present cabinet, which as-
sumed office last July. It
does not include the leftist
National Party, which he pre-
fers,. and it came into being
as tr.e result of army pres-
sure in defiance; )f his wishes.
The lines are thus drawn in
the current dispute as in ear-
lier crises: the Masjumi, the
army and Vice President Hatta
on one side; Sukarno and the
National Party, supported by
the Communists, on the other.
Prime Minister Harahap and
Vice President Hatta maintain
that Suryadarma's open insubor-
dination cannot remain unpun-
ished. Several parties in the
cabinet, however, including the
Nahdlatul Ulama, refuse to
sanction punitive action be-
cause Sukarno is publicly
backing the air chief. Sukarno
and his supporters undoubtedly
hope that if the impasse is
prolonged, the government will
be compeiled to resign.
Another disagreement has
reportedly arisen between
Sukarno and Prime Minister
Har..Lap over the power to ap-
point up to 18 representatives
of racial minority groups to
the new parliament which will
be seated in April. The race
between the Masjumi and the Na-
tional Party in last fall's
parliamentary election was so
close that the racial minority
seats may hold a balance of
power. If a cabinet agreeable
to Sukarno could be installed,
the dispute over the right of
appointment would become academic.
Meanwhile, returns from the
15 December elections for a
constituent assembly are tending
further to weaken Harahap's
position. These show the Na-
tional Party, the Communists,
and the Nahdlatul Ulama polling
better and the Masjumi worse
than at a comparable point in
the counting of last September's
vote. A continuation of this
trend will undermine the support
Harahap will receive from the
small parties in his coalition
when parliament convenes on 10
January. Already, at least
three of them, including the
Nahdlatul Ulama, have refused
to support the government's de-
cision to open the talks with
the Dutch which began on 10
December. One of them broke
openly with the cabinet and asked
that the talks be suspended.
The talks cover virtually
the whole range of Dutch-Indo-
nesian relations, but it was
agreed beforehand. that each
party would maintain its claim
to sovereignty over west New
Guinea, to which both maintain
adamant claims. However, ap-
parently with the hope of winning
a foreign policy victory to help
counter his domestic difficulties,
Harahap asked the American em-
bassy what the United States can
do "with the Dutch or the Indo-
nesians or both" to bring a solu-
tion to the New Guinea issue.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In the campaign for the 2
January French election, no
group so far appears to be show-
ing significant gains in sup-
port.
It is estimated that 3,000
political meetings are being
held daily, and most observers
agree that the 2 January elec-
tions are likely to arouse more
popular interest than :many in
the past. (Also.see Part III, p . l.. )
Depending on the weather,
the massive registrations--
reportedly 1,200,000 higher
than;, in 1951--could. result in a
record-breaking vote. Accord-
ing to a recent poll, 88 per-
cent of those questioned in-
tended to vote. The previous
high was an 84-percent vote in
1936.
The formal platforms of
the two major non-Communist
groups are similar. Both the
Faure and Mendes-France blocs
are asking for parliamentary
reform to permit easier dis-
solution of parliament, although
Mendes-France goes further in
that he is pressing for electoral
reform as well. Both blocs are
also trying to capture young
voters with promises of short-
ened military service.
The only clear issue on
which the blocs differ is the
classic dispute between left
and right on state aid for
church schools. The Mendes-
France vehicle, the Republican
Front, which includes Radicals
and Socialists opposed-to state
aid, have made the Catholic
Popular Republicans a major
target. Mendes-France is at-
tempting to create a foreign
affairs issue by attacking
Pinay for accepting the 19 De-
cember NATO council statement
on Soviet Middle East tactics.
Much of the noise in the
campaign so far has come from
the Poujade antitax groups which
are attacking both the Mendes-
France and Faure blocs and at-
tempting to break up their
meetings by rowdyism. Pinay's
Independent Party has reportedly
canceled all meetings in one
department because of Poujadist
threats, and Mendes-France was
shouted down at a week-end Re-
publican Front rally.
The large number of candi-
dates and alliances continue
to cloud the issues for the
French voter. Numerous small
parties that have no chance of.
getting an. appreciable number
of votes have entered into the
campaign, particularly in the
Paris area. A recent estimate
gives the Pinay-Faure group 300
of the 596 seats at stake. (The
election for 30 Algerian seats
has been postponed.) The Min-
istry of Interior had estimated
earlier, however, that no group
could get a really workable
majority. The Communists are
expected to gain 35-40 seats,
because of the split within the
center and right which would
give them about 135 of the 596
in the assembly.
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Terrorism continues on
Cyprus. Twelve British soldiers
have been killed recently and
three Americans were injured
on 18 December by a bomb tossed
into a Nicosia apartment house
dining room.
Greece wants a more explicit
guaraiitee of self-determination
for Cyprus than that contained
in Britain's latest formula for
a provisional settlement. This,
Britain seems willing to concede.
Greece also desires a rephras-
ing of the formula to exclude
Turkey from a role in determining
The Syrian-Israeli fron-
tier remains tense. There have
been minor incidents on the
Egyptian-Israeli border. UN
truce chief General Burns ap-
pears to have made little prog-
ress in bringing Israel and
Egypt to any agreement on truce
proposals for the border regions
of Gaza and El Auja. The Is-
raeli "package" compromise
publicized on 19 December as
an inducement for Egypt and the
other Arab states to negotiate
peace settlements with Israel
contained no new elements, and
is certain to be rejected by
the Arabs.
There is genuine fear in
Israel that the country faces
either annihilation by Egypt's
growing military strength or a
"Munich type" peace, according
to the American embassy in Tel
Aviv. The embassy believes
the island's ultimate status,
which London will probably re-
fuse.
Curtailment of normal ac-
tivities on Cyprus as a result
of public insecurity is causing
economic distress and is
strengthening the position of
moderate Nationalists. Rumors
that Archbishop Makarios may
ask the terrorists for a Christ-
mas truce suggest he may be
preparing to exert his influ-
ence against continued terror-
ism and toward reopening nego-
tiations with British governor
Harding.
public opinion would generally
approve Israeli preventive mili-
tary action against Egypt "be-
fore it is too late." The em-
bassy also reports that the
government apparently decided
in late October to adopt an
arms procurement program in-
stead of attacking Egyptian
divisions in Sinai. However,
if an arms program were to fail,
preventive war waged against
the Arab states might be linked
with some controversial border
issue in which Israel could
avoid being blamed.
The large-scale reprisal
attack of 11-12 December against
Syria suggests that Israel in-
tends to show the Arab states
and the world that it is still
in a position to negotiate
peace from a position of
strength.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
JORDAN AND THE BAGHDAD PACT
The cabinet of Jordanian
prime minister Majali, who was
appointed only a week ago for
the purpose of linking Jordan
to the Baghdad pact, resigned
on 20 December in the face of
widespread demonstrations
against the pact. The care-
taker government of "elder
statesman" Hashim, head of
the Senate, has promised to
take no action on the pact
pending the outcome of parlia-
mentary elections to be held
within four months.
These developments are a
serious setback to the British
drive to engineer Jordan's ad-
herence to the Baghdad pact.
POSTPONEMENT OF
SUPREME SOVIET SESSION
The postponement of the
USSR Supreme Soviet session
from 23 to 26 December may in-
dicate that a plenum of the
party central committee is con-
vening during the intervening
period. The calling of the
central committee into session
at this time could mean that
there are disagreements within
the party presidium over foreign
and domestic policies. The
Soviet budget for 1956 and the
Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to
South Asia are possible sub-
jects of controversy.
It is also possible that
disagreements have emerged
within the party presidium that
need to be reconciled before
the Supreme Soviet convenes but
which do not necessitate call-
ing the central committee into
session. Resolution of high-
level controversies might
result in important changes
in the party hierarchy.
Since Bulganin and Khru-
shchev did not return to Mos-
cow until late on 21 December,
it is also possible that more
time is required to prepare a
full report on the foreign aid
program for South Asia to which
they have committed the USSR.
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Postponement of a meeting
of the Supreme Soviet has oc-
curred at least twice since
Stalin's death. In March 1953,
a session was delayed to enable
the central committee to accept
Malenkov's resignation as party
secretary. A meeting scheduled
for 28 July 1953 was postponed
to 5 August, presumably to allow
Malenkov time to secure accept-
ance fnr the "new course" eco-
nomic policy which he presented
at that session. 25X1
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22 December 1955
PARAGUAY
The military rebellion
which broke out in Paraguay on
21 December was. precipitated
by President Stroessner's order
for the arrest of Epifanio
Mendez Fleitas, Central Bank
president and a controversial
leader of the ruling Colorado
Party. In back of the outbreak
is a conflict among the various
Colorado factions and continu-
ing efforts of the.party's
civilian leaders to challenge
the military's traditional domi-
nance of the government.
all members
of the cabinet offered their
resignations on 14 December to
give Stroessner a free hand,
and Stroessner, along with
Romero, has since been holding
conferences with military and
civilian leaders. The meetings
are probably related also to
the Colorado Party's recent
efforts to conciliate its dis-
sident factions.
Pressure for the removal
of officials considered to be
pro-Peron, such as Mendez, re-
portedly is being exerted also
by, the Argentine government as
a prerequisite for the Argentine
co-operation Paraguay urgently.
needs--trade between the two
countries having virtually
ceased since the overthrow of
Peron in September.
As com-
mander in chief of the armed
forces, Stroessner has an ad-
vantage in any military showdown
with Mendez. The latter, however,
has acquired considerable sup-
port among younger army of
ficers and the police.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 December 1955
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Berlin Situation
Communist pressure against
West Berlin continues, but the
legal steps necessary to in-
corporate the Soviet sector of
the city into the German Dem
`ocratic Republic (GDR) hale
not been taken. East Germany,
despite the aggressive state-
ments of several of its lead-
ers, still appears intent on
maintaining its position in
Berlin without openly chal-
lenging the Western powers
there. (Also see Part III, p.4.)
First Secretary Neumann of
the Socialist Unity Party (SED)
organization in Berlin, in an
open threat of direct Communist
action against the Western sec-
tors, said on 17 December that
"in West Berlin, it is now a
question of liquidation of the
occupation statute and setting
aside the power of big business
and militarists so that normal
relations with the government
of the GDR can be created."
Neumann apparently views West
Berlin as a part.of the GDR
capital where East Germany is
unable to enforce its laws.
The East German Foreign
Ministry in early December,
however, was reported to be
preparing a legal opinion which
would define the Soviet sec-
tor of Berlin as the capital
and part of the GDR and which
would imply that the Western
sectors were West German ter-
Neumann also attacked the
proposed law now pending in the
West Berlin Senate which would
allegedly bring West Berlin
under the laws of the Federal
Republic. Continued propaganda
charges by East Germany against
this law may be used to justify
the enactment of similar legis-
lation by the GDR which would
place East Berlin under East
German law. At present, East
German law is applicable in
East Berlin only on re-enactment
by the municipal legislature,
indicating that Communist au-
thorities recognize the existing
legal situation despite their
frequent claims that East Ber-
lin is part of the Democratic
Republic.
The only recent Communist
actions against movement be-
tween East and West Berlin--
the closing of exits to West
Berlin on two elevated stations
on the intersector border on
17 December and the arrest of
20 East German passengers the
next day--apparently were de-
sighed to cut down on Christmas
shopping by East Berliners in
the Western sectors.
Except for the recent con-
fiscation by the East Germans
of 12 trucks loaded with scrap
metal, traffic between West Ger-
many and Berlin continues to
move normally. However, West
German foreign minister Von
Brentano, in his conversation
with Secretary Dulles in Paris
on 17 December, said he ex-
pected the GDR to place in-
creasing obstacles on traffic
and transport to Berlin as part
of its campaign to obtain rec-
ognition..,
West Germany, according
to Von Brentano, can see no
adequate means for countering
such moves except through con-
certed Western action. State
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Secretary Hallstein of the Bonn
Foreign Ministry believes stop-
ping trade with East Germany
would do more harm to the Fed-
eral Republic than to the GDR.
He said that the Federal Re-
public was partially dependent
on East Germany, particularly
as regards brown coal, for which
there is no other source of
supply. Steel exports from
West Germany to the GDR, in
his opinion, were so small that
an embargo on their shipment
could not be used as a means
of pressure.
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Khrushchev-Bulganin Tour
Three documents issued at
the conclusion of the Soviet
leaders' visit in Afghanistan
provide for a further extension
of political, economic and cul-
tural ties between that country
and the USSR. While the Afghan
tour was less spectacular than
the visits to India and Burma,
the Soviet leaders apparently
were successful in giving the
Afghans greater confidence in
Afghanistan's ability to follow
a "neutralist" course, inde-
pendent of its neighbors who
are members of the Baghdad pact.
Prime Minister Daud ap-
parently has not yet committee
himself tc accepting any specif-
ic project.
25X1
Moscow probably hopes the
visit, and the promises of ad-
ditional aid, will cause the
Afghans to stand up more boldly
against Pakistan and the'West.
As a result of the visit, Prime
Minister Daud's domestic'po-
sition seems to have been fur-
ther strengthened.
The most important result
of the visit was the Soviet
offer to Afghanistan of $100,-
000,000 in long-term credits.
Final terms are to be negotiated
at a later date. Apparently So-
viet and Afghan officials will
hold discussions on the number
and type of projects in which
Soviet aid could be used, in-
cluding the development of agri-
culture, construction of hydro-
electric stations, irrigation
projects and the reconstruction
of the Kabul airport.
Prior to the announcement
of the Soviet offer, Communist
credits in Afghanistan amounted
to $11,800,000, of which $5,000,-
OOO.was extended by Czecho-
slovakia, $6,800,000 by Moscow.
While Kabul has committed only
$1,500,000 of the $5,000,000
Czech credit, the entire $6,800,-
000 Soviet credit has been spent
on such projects as grain ware-
houses and roads. Improvement
of the poor trade routes to the
Soviet border will probably be
stepped up, linking the Afghan
economy even more closely with
that of the USSR.
The joint declaration
signed at the end of the visit
emphasized Soviet-Afghan agree-
ment on a number of interna-
tional issues. Joint drafting
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was apparent in the phrasing
of the declaration. It did
not go beyond an implication
of Soviet support for Afghan-
istan on the Pushtoonistan is-
sue, and omitted the condemna-
tion of military blocs included
in the declarations the USSR
had signed with Burma and India.
Effects of UN Membership Increase
The admission of 16 new
members into the UN on 14
December, which focused atten-
tion on the principle of uni-
versal membership, has probably
improved Peiping's prospects
for admission. While the in-
crease in Soviet bloc votes
is minor, the Arab-Asian bloc
may..new be able to muster a
two-thirds vote on colonial
issues embarrassing to the
West.
The endorsement by the
General Assembly of Albania,
Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania
negates the previously held
theory that the UN should
confer membership only on the
basis of individual merit.
The abandonment of this prin-
ciple will enable many coun-
tries to support the admission
of the Peiping regime. In
this connection, the admission.
of Spain,despite a 1946 reso-
lution condemning its conduct,
will probably make it diffi-
cult to cite the 1950 aggres-
sor resolution as a bar to
Peiping's entry.
Although the increase in
the USSR's voting strength to
nine is not expected to reduce
the West's dominant position
in the UN, the growth in
strength of the Arab-Asian
bloc will add to the diffi-
culties of the Western
nations, particularly on
The Soviet and Afghan foreign
ministers also signed a protocol
prolonging for ten years the
Soviet-Afghan treaty of neutral-
ity and nonaggression of 1931,
but apparently added no new
provisions Con-
curred in by ORR)
colonial and economic matters.
The Arab-Asian bloc picked up
six new members, bringing
their total to 23. While in
the past the bloc has not
exhibited much unity or strong
leadership, it is significant
that this year the bloc was
whipped into line on the
touchy Algerian question by
India's Krishna Menon. Should
the bloc develop cohesiveness
under a strong leader, its
anticolonial bias, which the
Latin American bloc shares,
will involve the UN in other
explosive "colonial" issues
and further exacerbate rela
tions between underdeveloped
countries and colonial powers.
The two largest blocs in
the UN, the Arab-Asian and the
Latin American, can claim 43
members, only eight votes
less than two thirds of the
total membership of the
General Assembly. With the
USSR's nine votes, these blocs
could muster two-thirds major-
ity control of the 76-member
assembly. These blocs are
composed primarily of small,
underdeveloped nations, which
usually enthusiastically sup-
port any financing scheme
accruing to their benefit at
the expense of the big powers.
The USSR can be expected to
appeal to this tendency and to
court bloc votes by supporting
large-scale UN financing,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 December 1955
price parity and technical
assistance programs. Britain
and the United States are
currently financing the larger
share of such UN programs now
in operation.
Western Europe increased
its influence and representa=
tion in the UN with six new
members of which Italy, Spain
Soviet Shift on UN Membership.
By its sudden shift on
the UN membership question,
the USSR laid the foundation
for its tactics in next year's
debate on Chinese representa-
tion. The proposal made on
14 December apparently re-
versed Moscow's earlier maneu-
ver to bring about the collapse
of the entire membership
effort by forcing the Chinese
Nationalists to veto Outer
Mongolia. The Soviet leaders
had earlier appeared confident
that they could throw the
blame for the failure of the
prolonged negotiations on the
Chinese Nationalists and the
United States and that this
failure would spark immediate
efforts to expel the National-
ists from the UN.
Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov had strongly endorsed
the Canadian 18-nation plan
on 17 November, insisting that
"18 or none" must be admitted,
after the American delegate
had declared that Outer Mon-
golia "cannot make the grade."
Soviet diplomats throughout
the world made strenuous
efforts to ensure that Outer
Mongolia would receive the re-
quired number of votes in both
the Security Council and the
assembly so that the Chinese
Nationalists would have no
choice but to veto Outer
Mongolia.
Soviet delegate Sobolev's
statements at the 13 December
and Portugal are strong sup-
porters of the West who will
probably aid the colonial
powers in restraining the
anticolonial groups. Austria
and Finland, motivated by a
desire not to offend the
Soviet bloc, most likely will
attempt to maintain a neutral
position in the UN.
Security Council session which
defeated the 18-nation plan
gave no indication of the next
day's about-face. He accused
the United States of wrecking
the Canadian plan by insti-
gating the Chinese Nationalist
veto after earlier pressures
on other delegations to induce
them to withhold the necessary
votes for Outer Mongolia had
failed. Sobolev urged the
council to ponder the situation
when "one person, who repre-
sents only himself," could
obstruct the will of the
United Nations, and to con-
sider what could be done about
it.
Peiping's premature com-
ment on the failure of this
plan seems to indicate that
the Chinese Communists were
not given advance warning of
the new Soviet plan excluding
Japan. The American consul
general in Hong Kong has sug-
gested that it may have come
as a surprise and even a shock
to Peiping, which has been
courting Japan with more
emphasis on the carrot than
on the stick.
Moscow may have decided
that the overwhelming support
of the great majority of UN
members for some solution of
the membership deadlock at this
session made its original tac-
tics too risky. It therefore
devised the 16-nation "compro-
mise" plan which would have
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22 December 1955
the twin advantages of enabling
the USSR to claim credit for
resolving the deadlock and, at
the same time, continuing to
use Outer Mongolia's candidacy
as a lever to force the expul-
sion of the Chinese National-
ists and the seating of the
Chinese Communists--the main
objective of its entire member-
ship maneuver.
While the USSR may origi-
nally have hoped that the defeat
of the membership effort by the
collapse of the 18-nation plan
would lead to the immediate ex-
pulsion of the nationalists, its
new plan has prepared the ground
for a showdown battle on the
Japanese Reaction
To Veto on UN Membership
The Japanese feel that the
UN membership rebuff, along with
other recent setbacks to their
diplomacy, emphasizes their
nation's weakness in inter-
national affairs and its over-
dependence on the Unites States.
This reaction will strength-
en the position of those, both
within and outside the govern-
ment, who favor increasingly in-
dependent action to bolster
Japan's international position.
In seeking to improve its
position, Tokyo probably will
direct a primary effort toward
developing closer ties with
the Asian-African bloc. The
belief that a self-sustaining
economy is a prerequisite for
an independent position also
will prompt the Japanese to
continue their drive to expand
trade with the Soviet bloc. A
concomitant development proba-
bly will be a, decrease of the
question of Chinese representa-
tion next year. The USSR, in
making Japan's admission con-
tingent upon the simultaneous
entry of Outer Mongolia, has
in effect served notice on the
UN and on the Japanese that
Japan's admission is possible
only if the United States agrees
to admit Peiping and unseat
the Nationalists, because the
latter will never accept Outer
Mongolia. Moscow's reversal is
thus designed to confront the
United States with a choice
between acquiescing in the seat-
ing of the Chinese Communists
or continuing to support the
Nationalists at the cost of
Jaan's continued exclusion.
government's resistance to
leftist pressures for norma.li-?
zation of relations with the
Communist nations.
Although the Soviet
Union's second and third vetoes
last week directed Japanese
resentment toward the USSR as
the primary obstacle to Jap-
anese membership in the UN,
press and official criticism
was less than might have been
expected, considering the extent
of the Soviet actions. In fact,
these actions have incited some
grudging respect for Moscow's
tough position and astute tac-
tics.
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The Japanese appear to
believe that a direct deal with
the USSR in the peace treaty
talks offers the best means for
securing Soviet support for
Japan's accession to the UN.
Pressures for making concessions
at the London talks are likely
to grow and strengthen Prime Min-
ister Hatoyamats inclination to
concede on the territorial issue.
Since the rejec-
tion on 21 November
of the Saudi Arabian
proposals for renewed
arbitration of the
Buraimi dispute, the
British have further
alienated the Saudis
by instigating a mil-
itary campaign against
a Saudi ally, the imam
of Inner Oman. By tak-
ing this firm stand,
the British are at-
tempting to stop the
Saudi border encroach-
ments into territory
claimed by the British-
controlled Persian Gulf
rulers, and thereby
maintain their politi-
cal and economic priv-
ileges in this oil
rich area.
On 12 December
the sultan of Muscat
and Oman initiated,
with British support,
a campaign to subdue
his nominal subordi-
nate, the imam of
Inner Oman. The imp+
materially assistee
by the Saudis.;
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The Japanese are convinced,
however, that the USSR intends
to make their entry to the UN
contingent on representation
for Communist China and that
no concessions, however expen-
sive, will make Moscow drop its
scheme. This conviction and
natural Japanese reluctance to
make concessions probably will
enable the Foreign Ministry to
maintain its present position
temporarily when the suspended
talks reopen. 25X1
British controlled
territory.
US companies have
oil concession.
UK-SAUDI DISPUTE
British controlled territory
Iraq Petroleum Co.(IPC)
2 US oil concessions
Arabian-American Oil Co.
(ARAMCO)
Cities Service.. Richfield
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22 December 1955
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has been asserting his inde-
pendence for some time. The
Saar Election Outcome
The three pro-German
parties won absolute control
of the Saar Landtag in the 18
December elections but fell
short of the 75-percent mandate
needed to revise the constitu-
tion. This may facilitate
French agreement to a defini-
tive settlement of the Saar
problem in French-German ne-
gotiations scheduled to begin
in January.
The outcome of the vote
has eliminated the danger that
an overwhelming pro-German
victory might make the Saar a
major issue in the French e-
lections and thus tie Paris'
hands in forthcoming negotia-
tions. There is still the pos-
sibility, however, that the
ultranationalist Saar leader
Schneider and his sympathizers
in West Germany can sour the
current French disposition to
rely Bonn's good faith in fur-
ther negotiations.
At the moment, Paris seems
prepared to relinquish all its
claims to political authority
in the Saar and to loosen its
formal economic ties, provided
basic French economic "rights
and interests" are protected.
French foreign minister Pinay
and West German foreign minis-
ter Von Brentano worked out such
an agreement just before the
Saar election, but the de-
tails are being kept secret
until after the French elec-
tions. Paris will in any case
insist on maintenance of the
present economic union pend-
ing a definitive solution.
According to the agreement,
Paris recognizes that the final
stage of a definitive Saar set-
tlement will not involve main-
tenance of the French-Saar cus-
toms and monetary union. one
Quaff d'Orsay official now frank-
ly envisages the prospect of
the re-incorporation of the
Saar into West Germany. Pend-
ing a definitive solution, how-
ever, France will insist that
the present economic union re-
main unchanged.
The formation of a new Saar
government will be delayed at
least until 5 January, and the
current "nonpolitical" caretaker
government under Heinrich Welsch
is expected to continue its
duties until then.
Meanwhile, an effort is be-
ing made with the encourage-
ment of Chancellor Adenauer
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22 December 1955
and the neighboring West Ger-
man bishops to form one strong
predominantly Catholic bloc
by a merger of the dominant
pro-German Christian Demo-
cratic Union party with the
Christian People'-s^Party? cif
former premier Hoffmann, which
held a surprisingly strong
third place despite being at-
tacked as pro French. Both
are comparatively moderate
groups;combined, they would
control a slight majority of
Landtag seats and could bar-
gain to shunt Schneider into
a subsidiary cabinet post.
The draft of the-Soviet
Union's sixth Five-Year Plan,
for the years 1956-1960 will
probably be made public a few
weeks before it is presented
to the 20th Party Congress
next February. As the first
Five-Year plan to bear the
imprimatur of the "collective
leadership," it can be ex
petted to reflect its view
of the Soviet ec.onomy'.'s poten-
tials and problems. Its main
outline is clearly indicated
in recent policy speeches of
Premier Bulganin and Party
First Secretary Khrushchev..
Soviet industry will prob-
ably in general follow the
broad program laid downt)y
Premier Bulganin in his speech
to the Industrial Conference
last May and his report on
industry to the central com-
mittee in July. The impq.rtance
of heavy industry as the only
"correct" base for continuing
the development of the Soviet
economy will be reaffirmed.
The planned rate of,growth of
industrial output over the
next five years is unlikely
to exceed that of the original
fifth Five-Year Plant which
has been substantially over-
fulfilled.
Schneider, however, is
reported to be ambitious to
figure on the West German
political scene. Having called
the nationalistic tune in the
pre-election campaign, he also
retains a powerful lever over
the other pro-German groups,
which still maintain their
ties with each other. He is
refusing to participate in
forming a new Saar government
except on his own terms. Pros-
pect;e are for a period of con-
tinuing agitation which will
tend to foment trouble between
According to current es-
timates, production of all
five basic commodities of
Soviet industry--steel, pig
iron, coal, electric power
and petroleum--could within
the next five years reach
or surpass the long-range
goals for the early 1960's an-
nounced in 1946 by Stalin.
ANNOUNCED GOALS FOR 1960-85 ESTIMATED 1960
1955 SET BY STALIN PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION IN 1948 CAPABILITY
F
metric tone or 1 on owa ttt hours]
Steel 45 80 61-84
Iron 33 50 50
Coal 391 500 600
Electric Power 168 260 275-300
011 70 60 125-135
The basic need for rapid-
ly increasing the productivity
of labor to compensate for a
diminishing rate of growth of
the industrial labor force has
finally forced the Soviet Union
to face the problem of obsoles-
cence. Emphasis will be placed
on ,automation and other techno-
logical innovations. For the
first time, large-scale mod-
ernization of aging indus-
trial installations will be
included in the plan. In ad-
dition, the first major ad-
justment of wage rates and
production norms since World
War II can be expected as a
result of work done by the
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State Committee on Problems of
Labor and Wages, headed by Kag-
anovich.
Other industrial programs
to be stressed are: speeding
up the industrialization of
Siberia; increasing industrial
specialization, wherein indi-
vidual plants will concentrate
on the production of fewer items;
and increased authority for
economic administrt,tors at
lower levels.
The 1960 goals for agri-
culture have been laid down by
Khrushchev in his speeches on
the "new lands" and livestock
programs, the latter calling
for an eightfold increase in
acreage of fodder corn. These
twin schemes are at the core
of plans to increase, grain
production.by 50 perce"c or
more, to double
state output
of meat and other
livestock
products,
and
to
increase
wool
production
by
80
percent.
De-
spite some early disappointments,
Khrushchev has claimed that
these goals can be met well be-
fore 1960. The plan will
Bulganin Defends the Cominform
Marshal Bulganin authorita-
tively reasserted Soviet support
of the Cominform in the course
of his New Delhi press confer-
ence on 14 December. His some-
what rhetorical defense was in
effect a direct rejection of
Western and Indian suggestions
that the Cominform should be
abolished as a concession to
coexistence..
Bulganin argued that the
Cominform has a right to exist
as an international, nongovern-
mental organization comparable
to the Socialist International
or "capitalist international
monopoly associations," implying
that each of the three types of
organizations was a legitimate
international spokesman for a
particular economic class. He
probably devote substantial re-
sources to agriculture,. but it
is expected that the targets
will be missed by wide margins.
The rate of growth in the
production of manufactured con-
sumer goods will be high, with
those industries not dependent
on agricultural raw materials
showing the greatest gains.
Textile production, for-ex-
ample, is to increase only
about 50 percent, according
to the Soviet press, but much
higher targets will be set for
durable consumer goods.
Recent Soviet statements
indicate that the Sixth Five-
year Plan will be an ambitious
program for rapid growth of
the USSR's maturing economy,
and will be presented as a
significant step from state
socialism toward Communism.
Basic to the fulfillment of
the plan will be the success
of the industrial moderniza-
tion effort in raising labor
productivity and the achieve-
ment of the agricultural and
(Prepared by ORR5
livestock goals.
restated the Soviet claim that
the Cominform exists for ex-
change of information and ex-
perience between Communist
parties, the spokesmen for the
working classes.
Bulganin's statement was
especially significant because
it runs counter to Prime Min-
ister Nehru's publicly ex-
pressed opinion that the activ-
ities of the Cominform are
inconsistent with the Chou-
Nehru "five principles" which
India and the USSR have re-
affirmed during the Bulganin-
Khrushchev visit. It is also
the most specific public de-
fense of the Cominform made
by a top Soviet official in
recent years. The statement
indicates that the USSR is pre-
pared to accept the diplomatic
embarrassment which the
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existence of the Cominform en-
tails to preserve it as a'weap-
on in the "peaceful open com-
petition of capitalist and so-
cialist systems" advocated by
Moscow.
Bulganin's justification
of the Cominform does not elim-
inate the possibility that the
USSR is considering new organi-
zational forms embracing more
Communist parties and perhaps
some Socialist parties as well.
Soviet spokesmen discreetly
proposed to representatives of
the Norwegian and Austrian So-
cialist parties in.late Novem-
ber that direct relationships
be established between each of
Soviet Objectives in the Antarctic
Participation in the In-
ternational Geophysical Year
(IGY) (1957-58) provides the
them and the Soviet Communist
Party.
Khrushchev, in accepting
a Norwegian Socialist counter-
offer of an exchange of journal-
ists, expressed the hope for
party relations "when the neces-
sary conditions mature." Since
the Yugoslavia, visit by Soviet
leaders last May, Soviet and
Satellite parties have also
gone on record in favor of re-
establishing relationships with
the Yugoslav Communists.
The possibility of expand-
ing the Cominform to include
non-European Communist parties
is suggested by increased empha-
sis in the Cominform journal
on Asia., Africa, and Latin
America.
25X1
USSR with
the opportunity
to
become entrenched in the
Ant-
arctic.
PLANNED SOVIET ANTARCTIC STATIONS
1956 -1959
? Sites proposed-Sept. 1955
? Sites proposed-Dec. 1455
Polar
Station
SECRET
Judging by the
number of scientific
workers scheduled for
participation, the
variety of scientific
activities planned,
the air-hop method of
operation, and the
advance start on the
work, the Soviet pro-
gram of IGY observa-
tions and non-IGY ex-
ploration and mapping
appears to be more
comprehensive than
that planned by any
other participating
country. More than
70 specialists will
arrive in the Antarc-
tic in late January
on the specially out-
fitted vessel Ob. A
second ship, the Lena,
has also left the USSR
for the Antarctic. With
the arrival of these
ships, work will begin
on establishment of the
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"first Soviet observatory in
the Antarctic" and the main
Soviet coastal station, Mirnyy.
As soon as possible in
1956, this expedition will be-
gin exploration to determine
the sites for two inland sta-
tions, Vostok and Sovetskaya,.
and will begin limited geo-
physical observations, All
stations are to be completed
and a full observation program
under way by January 1957, six
months prior to the official
beginning of the IGY.
The USSR hopes to estab-
lish an intercontinental air
route between Antarctica and
the USSR via Australia, India
and Indonesia. It has already
made a formal request to Aus-
tralia for airport. and mari-
time facilities. If the Aus-
tralians grant these rights,
the movement of scientific per-
sonnel, equipment and supplies
will be expedited.
The USSR has never.. offi-
cially claimed any part of the
Antarctic, but continued occu-
pation of Soviet whaling or sci-
entific bases following the IGY
could lead to "effective occu-
pation." Recent Soviet state-
ments on the importance of the
Antarctic for long-range. weather
forecasting and the announcement
of plans "to study the question
of supply bases" for whaling
suggest the arguments the USSR
will use to maintain this foot-
hold.
If challenged, the USSR
would be likely to defend its
rights on the basis of its a-
chievements in the exploration,
and its surveying and mapping
of previously unexplored areas.
It may further claim that as a
leader in polar research, it
would make major scientific con-
tributions of value to the whole
world if it continued its effort
after 195.8. It may also attempt
to emphasize the weak foundation
for the claims of the various
countries and to disclaim them as
opportunistic and of no benefit
to mankind as a whole. Such a
position might be difficult to
dispute since so much of the Ant-
arctic, particularly the area of
Soviet activity, is still un-
explored.
The scientific gains which
would accrue to the USSR from a
program of continuous work in the
Antarctic could secure it a lead-
ing position in polar geophysics,
since it has been the leader in
Arctic scientific work for many
years. This research and experi-
ence could have significant mili-
tary implications in polar flying,
guided--missile development, and
polar land, sea and submarine oper-
ations. Prepared jointly
by ORR n";;~=
25X1
Soviet Party Membership
Increased Sig nificamy
According to a recent speech
by N. D. Khrushdhev to the. Indian
Parliament, the Soviet Communist
Party now has 8,000,000 members,
1,000,000 more than it May 1953.
This is a significantly more rap-
id rate of increase than prevailed.
in preceding postwar years and:Ap-
parently marks a reversal of the
postwar policy of restricting
party membership reaffirmed by
Malenkov at the 19th Part! Con-
gress in October 1952. The main
emphasis under that policy had
been on improving the quality of
the party. From 1947 to 1952 the
net increase in membership was
only about 582,000.
The present expansion of
the party membership appears to
reflect the views of First Sec-
retary Khrushchev and may he re-
lated to the campaign he initiated
in the fall. of 1953 to bolster col-
lective and state farms with party
cadres. 25X1
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22 De.cemle"r 1955
Soviet MilitaryPromotions
Since Stalin s Dead
The promotion of four.So-
viet army generals revealed in
press accounts of the October
Revolution celebration. brings
to 41 the number of known'pro
motions to three-star rank and
above in the Soviet military
since Stalin's death. The con=trast between this number in
two and a half year:s.and the
12 comparable promotions in the,
eight-year postwar pericVd coder
Stalin reveals the greater rec-
ognition now accorded milit.Ty'..
leaders, particularly
operational commanders.
Stalin's dis-
trust of professional
military officers
was probably a pri-
mary factor in his
slighting of mil-
itary leaders. The
more numerous pro-
motions since Sta-
lin's death prob-
ably includemany
long-overdue advance-
ments and reflect a
desire of tfie `p"re?erit
re?;ime to improve
morale and efficiency
within the higher
ranks of the pro-
fessional officer
corps.
The promotion of A. S. .
zfadov to army .;general suggests
the influence of Marshal Konev,
under whom he served for several
SOVJLT MILITARY PROMOTIONS
iJNDER? STALIN
and A. V. Gorbatov, commander
.of the Baltic MD adjacent to
the Baltic Sea. All served
under- Defense Minister Zhukov
duri.ng the storming of Berlin,
an'd'd two of them--Gorbatov and
Fedyuninski--remained in Ger-
many with him after the end of
hostilities.
L SOVIET UNION
POST-STALIN
1953 -1955
lillif
fffffffffff
iliftlll
No military district or
fleet commander was promoted
under Stalin. Of the four of
ficers whose promotions to the
rank of army general were re-
vealed on 7 November, however.,
three are military district
commander-s whose---new- -r4n-k-.is_._.---:;
commensurate with their respon-
sibilities in exposed peripheral
areas of the USSR,. These of-
ficers are: A. A. Luchinski,,
commander of the Turkestan MD
which touches on the Iran-Afghan-
istan border; 1, 1, Fedyuni.nsk,i,
commander of the Transcaucasus
MD bordering on Turkey and Iran;
years during and after World
War II.
25X1
The 41 promotions to three-
star rank or above include those
of four individuals who have
been promoted twice since Stalin's
----d.ea.th,.: bu.t-. do.. -not include that
of KGB chairman Serov to army
general.
Of the 41 officer's pro-
moted, 22, including 1,1 military
district commanders and four
fleet commanders, were in oper-
ational commands at the time of
promotion. The other 19, of
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which four are air force officers,
were in Moscow in administrative
or staff capacities. Of those
officers advanced under Stalin,
only four were in operational
commands, while eight were in
Moscow.
None of the men promoted
since Stalin's death are po-
litical officers. One--Fleet
Laos
The campaign for the 25
December national assembly e-
lections has been relatively
calm. The Pathet Lao, which
is not participating in the e-
lection because of failure to
reach a political settlement
with the royal government, has
confined its activities to prop-
aganda urging voters to stay
away from the polls.
The two leading parties--
Premier Katay's Progressives
and Foreign Minister Phoui's
independents--have formed a
loose alliance aimed at block-
ing the election of any Pathet-
supported candidates. These
parties now have 28 of the pres-
ent' 34 deputies and are each
expected to win about one third
of the assembly seats. Four
Pathet sympathizers have been
recognized among the 228 candi-
dates for the assembly's 39
seats. With one possible ex-
ception, their prospects for
election are poor.
Ngon Sananikone, commerce
minister and brother of Phoui,
anticipates that the balance of
Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov--is a
full member of the party central
committee and seven are candi-
date members of the committee.
TWO of the officers elevated
under Stalin--Marshal Bulganin
and Admiral S. E. Zakharov--
were political officers and both
were full members of the central
committee.
power in the cabinet will re-
main substantially the same,
with Phoui agreeing to leave
the-premiership to Katay. The
apparent victory of Katay over
Defense Minister Souvanna Phouma
for control of the Progressive
Party and the reported willing-
ness of Phoui to continue to
co-operate with Katay indicates
that rivalries among the three
leaders will not precipitate
a postelection repetition of
last October's cabinet crisis.
The government is pre-
paring for voting to take place
in the areas it controls in
the disputed northern prov-
inces. The government will
probably declare that the
elections constitute the po-
litical settlement envisaged
in the Geneva agreements and
call on Pathet Lao troops
to accept reintegration into
the national community. If, as
anticipated, the Pathets re-
fuse to comply, the govern-
ment may step up military
and political pressure to
break Pathet control of the two
northern provinces.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Malaya
Preliminary arrangements
have been completed for a meet-
ing during the last week of
December between Malayan chief
minister Abdul ,ahman and Sec-
retary General Chin Peng of the
Malayan Communist Party. Rah-
man, who lately appears to have
taken a more determined stand
against the Communists, is re-
ported to be losing interest
in seeing Chin Peng but has
said he is willing to do so in
a "final effort to knock sense
into him."
Rahman has reiterated that
in any meeting with the Com-
munist leader, he is willing
only to explain the government's
8 September amnesty and to lis-
ten to Communist suggestions
on the government's offer. A
Malayan official informed the
American consulate general in
Kuala Lumpur that Rahman plans
to seek official approval from
his own party--the Alliance
which holds 51 of 52 elected
seats in the Legislative Coun-
cil--for the resumption of all-
out war against the Communists
if Chin Peng officially refuses
to accept the amnesty. This
resumption was ordered on 1
December by the Malayan gov-
ernment without reference to
Sudanese Independence,
The Sudanese parliament's
"declaration" of independence
on 19 December has been accepted
by Britain and Egypt in whose
name the country has been gov-
erned since 1899. Uncertainty
remains, however, whether the
move will make unnecessary the
convening of the international
commission which was to super-
vise the process of Sudanese
self-determination.
the party after a heavy Com-
munist. attack in central Malaya.
A Communist press release
of 17 November demanded a re-
drafted agenda for the Rahman-
Chin Peng talks and rejected
the amnesty as set forth,. Rah-
man, however, apparently has
chosen to ignore this move in
favor of a more official re-
fusal.
The Communists' efforts
to arrange the talks despite a
clear conflict with the govern-
ment on the purpose of the meet-
ing indicate their continued
desire to achieve some sort of
recognition and thereby acquire
greater scope for political
activity and subversion. Re-
gardless of the outcome of
present arrangements, Communist
efforts in this direction may
be expected to continue.
Rahman leaves for London
on 2 January for talks on self-
government. The British high
commissioner in Malaya an-
nounced on 30 November that
progress toward self-govern-
ment need not be retarded by
Communist maneuvers.
The declaration--a resolu-
tion requesting Britain and
Egypt to recognize the inde-
pendence of the Sudan--was
passed unanimously after Prime
Minister Azhari proposed to
introduce it as a device to
add prestige to his weakening
cabinet. Opposition parties,
however, are expected to con-
tinue to press for Azhari's
removal in favor of a "national"
coalition government.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S.UMEARY
Constitutional Crisis
In Gold Coast
On the threshold of inde-
pendence, the Gold Coast,
Britain's West African colony,
is faced with internal dissen-
sion over its future constitu-
tional structure and the role
of tribal authorities. Recent
legislation has intensified de-
mand's of the opposition coali-
tion for a decentralized fed-
eral, system and has also ap-
parently stalled the efforts
of a. British adviser to work
out a, compromise.
Tension has been mounting
since September 1954, when the
National Liberation Movement
(NLM) was launched to press
for a. federal system of govern-
ment. The native council of
the important Ashanti region,
the principal source of NLM
support, threatened violence
in November when the
Legislative Assembly
voted to bring sub-
ordinate chiefs more
directly under the
control of the cen-
tral government con-
trolled by Prime
Minister Nkrumah's
Convention. People's
Party (CPP). Explo-
sions occurred at
the residence of the
prime-minister in
Accra, and excitement
ran high throughout
Ashanti. The wide-
spread disorders
and an Ashanti se-
cession attempt feared
by the_.Amerioan_..
consul general did
not materialize, how-
ever, and by the end
of the month the
situation was report-
ed somewhat eased.
Nevertheless, press
sources indicate
that sporadic vio-
lence is continuing
in Ashanti at a higher than
normal rate. Meanwhile, an
important Northern Territories
tribal council has declared it
would oppose self-government
for the Gold Coast and might
even secede if the peoples of
the Northern Territories are
not given special arrangements
to manage their own affairs.
The fundamental issue be-
hind the bitterness over fed-
eralism is the character, organi-
zation and direction of the new
Gold Coast state. The most in-
fluential and articulate of the
diverse opposition elements are
traditional tribal authorities
and conservative African middle-
class leaders who, with inde-
pendence now in sight, are in-
creasingly concerned over their
future status in a unitary state
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22 December 1955
25X1
dominated by the CPP. They
dislike CPP leaders, whom
they consider "upstarts," and
fear the impact of the CPP's
Western-inspired concepts of
political and social organiza-
tion on traditional values and
institutions.
The attempts of the British
constitutional expert invited
by the Gold Coast government
to facilitate discussions on
the expansion of regionalism
have so far failed. Since the
passage of the controversial
November legislation, the NLM
and the Ashanti council have
completely boycotted these
consultations.
London, which has had high
hopes for the Gold Coast's
Greece
Political maneuvering is
intensifying in Greece in an-
ticipation of a royal proclama-
tion dissolving parliament and
a call for national elections.
Elections, which would be re-
quired within 45 days, may be
held as early as February.
Prime Minister Karamanlis faces
a hard election fight.
Karamanlis, without a popu-
lar mandate, has been unable
to exploit the almost universal
approval his appo*ntmAnt -
ceived in October.
Disaffection Growing in Argentina
New large-scale arrests
and a report on the existence
of a new "revolutionary move-
ment" in Argentina suggest that
the Aramburu government's force-
ful program to crush all sources
early accession to Commonwealth
membership, is concerned over
the present situation. How-
ever, Britain considers itself
no longer in a position to in-
terfere in Gold Coast internal
affairs and thus is unlikely
to intervene unless there is a
complete collapse of the author-
ity of the central government.
If some reconciliation of
basic issues is not made soon
and the government persists in
acts which inflame the opposi-
tion, the position of the seri-
ously weakened CPP regime is
likely to deteriorate further.
Such a development could en-
danger the transfer of full
sovereignty, which is widely
anticipated by the beginning;
of 1957.
Victory in the elections
for Karamanlis' new party is
still probable, but its ma-
jority may be narrow. Develop-
ments on the Cyprus issue and
the unresolved Greek-Turkish
wrangle may seriously affect
the prime minister's prospects.
of Peron's former strength may
be alienating part of its sup-
port from the military who
served under Peron. Though
President Aramburu still seems
to have control, the arrests
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25X1
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tend to belie the communiques
about unity within the regime
which appears to be increasing-
ly strained by interservice
rivalries.
5X1
able popular support.
Although Ara.hiburu still
appears in control, disunity
within the regime could be
exploited to force new changes
among top government officials.
;vioreover, the government may
be losing the psychological
battle for popular support in
view of the many rumors of
possible antigovernment action
by pro-Peronista.s as well as
by elements favoring Lona,rdi,
who apparently retains consider-
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22 December 1955
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE RIGHT-CENTER COALITION IN THE FRENCH ELECTION
In the three-cornered
French election battle between
the present government coalition,
Mendes-France's Republican Front,
and the Communists, the conserv-
ative Independent-Peasant bloc
which forms the right wing of
Faure's coalition will prob-
ably gain the greatest number
of seats. This group, basically
conservative, has shown consid-
erable flexibility, particularly
in recent months, on wage issues
as well as in foreign affairs.
The conservative elements,
which were in almost complete
disrepute following the Liber-
ation, had regained their old
parliamentary pre-eminence by
the end of the 1951-55 assembly.
In 1946 and early 1947, France
had been ruled by an uneasy
Leftist alliance of Communists,
Socialists and Popular Republi-
cans. In mid-1947, when the
Communists moved into open op-
position and the Gaullist Rally
branched off to the right, the
Socialists and the Popular
Republicans had to rely on the
Radical Socialists to continue
governing.
From then on the dominant
parties of the prewar era slowly
regained influence. As Radical
prestige reasserted itself,
the Socialists slid gradually
into the opposition, and the
Popular Republicans, despite
their social and economic af-
finity for the Socialists, found
themselves increasingly pris-
oners of the conservatives.
The 1951 election resulted
in a big cut in Communist repre-
sentation, but the non-Communist
left was also weakened. The
conservative forces held a major-
ity, and it was only a matter
of time until the Gaullis.ts ac-
cepted cabinet responsibility.
The government was then clearly
dominated by the right.
Pinay's Conservative Bloc
In Faure's coalition, the
conservative bloc, now headed
by Foreign Minister Pinay and
including his own Independent
Party as well as the Peasants,
Independent Peasants and the
Gaullist Social Action Republi-
cans, has consistently increased
in strength and prestige,in the
outgoing assembly. The group,
including a considerable number
of the strongly conservative
elements, such as rightist
Peasant Antier and ex-Gaullist
Barrachin, has been sufficiently
flexible on major issues to ad-
just to coalitions shading
slightly to the right or slightly
to the left. Mendes-France's
attempts in the present cam-
paign to make a clear division
between non-Communist left and
right have had the effect of
further strengthening the bloc.
Pinay's economic policies,
which have tended to lead his
party and the whole bloc away
from outright standpattism,
have been called the right cen-
ter's answer to Mendes-France.
While Pinay's approach differs
in method and is more conserva-
tive in tempo than that of Men-
des-France, it is also directed
at the eventual realization of
a dynamic free-enterprise system.
Pinay is trying to com-
pete with Mendes-France's ap-
peal to youth. He has advo-
cated a cut in military con-
scription, and suggested the
possibility of granting young
married couples state loans
which could be partially amortized
through special allowances for
the birth of children. In for-
eign affairs, he backs the At-
lantic Community and the Euro-
pean integration concept.
The right wing of the
Independents, as well as the
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22 December 1955
more deeply conservative groups
with whom they have allied,
balk at some of Pinay's views.
The Extreme Right
The extreme right of the
Faure coalition is made up of
the ex-Gaullist Social Action
Republicans. Pinay induced
the latter to break with De
Gaulle's Rally in 1952, and
they have since participated
in all the right-center govern-
ments.
The other of the two ex-
Gaullist groups, the Social
Republicans, leans much farther
to the left in economic policy,
but still clings to Gaullist
concepts in its opposition to
European integration and its
strong nationalism. Although
it is at odds, therefore, with
the Faure-Pinay.foreign policy,
three fourths of it is now al--
lied with the government co-
alition for the election.
The outlook is not bright;
for either Gaullist party in
this campaign: Although many
dISTS
PROGRESSIVES
REPUBLICANS -c I n
Gaullist deputies have personal
followings, they depended to a
large extent in 1951 on De
Gaulle's prestige, and much of
their support is expected to
be spread over all the non-
Communist groups, the bulk of
it going to the Independents.
All elements of the con-
servative bloc, but particularly
the right wing, will probably
lose votes to the many electoral
lists being run by the Poujade
antitax movement and by extreme
nationalists. These groups are
expected to be strong enough in
15'or 20 districts to block a
Pinay-Faure majority, thereby
making proportional representa-
tion mandatory and assuring the
Communists some seats they would
otherwise have lost. This ex-
treme right, however, will prob-
ably win no more than 12 or 15
seats itself and will probably
not prevent substantial gains.
by the Pinay forces.
The right-wing Radicals,
who under Premier Faure are
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0.A
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OF THE RESISTANCE
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22 December 1955
aligned with the conservatives,
are generally in accord with
the Pinay program for economic
reform. Faure, himself an ad-
vocate of a program similar to
that of Mendes-France, moreover
is closely identified with the
country's present wave of pros-
perity. He has already played
on this as a promise of a better
living standard in an effort to
win support for parliamentary
reform permitting easier dis-
solution of the assembly to
ensure government stability.
Faure's strong position on the
Atlantic Alliance places him
very close to Pinay on foreign
affairs, and the premier seems
to have won Pinay over to the
government's present North Af-
rica policy.
The position of the Rad-
icals in the right-center co-
alition has been weakened,
however, by the split between
Faure and Mendes-France. The
party has long used to advan-
tage its lack of cohesiveness
and its consequent ability to
represent standpattism in some
areas and enlightened reform
in others. The split, however,
formalizes the left-right dif-
ferences within the party and,
for this election at least,
has resulted in two separate
parties.
The Radical strength in
the next assembly will depend
on whether the split is patched
up, but Mendes-France's bitter
attacks on right-center foreign
policy and the business inter-
ests supporting the conserva-
tives may have permanently
alienated his own right wing.
Personal antagonisms resulting
from his expulsion of Faure,
Rene Mayer and other prominent
Radicals will make future party
solidarity more difficult.
Popular Republicans
From a -postwar position
of strength comparable to that
of the Communists, the Popular
Republicans have lost ground
consistently,;especially?to
the Gaullists. They have had
the continuing problem of try-
ing to "face toward the left"
and participate at the same
time in right-center coalitions
On economic issues they
mesh more easily with the So-
cialists, but they line up with
the right and the Gaullists in
support of state subsidies to
church schools. Moreover, their
continued participation in right-
ist-dominated governments leaves
them open to the charge of slid-
ing to the right.
To counter these charges,
the Popular Republicans in their
congress last May directed their
efforts toward conciliating the
Socialists. The church-school
issue was soft-pedaled and a
secretary general known to fa-
vor a rapprochement with the
Socialists was elected. Al-
though they have been unable
to make any alliances with the
Socialists in this campaign,
The Popular Republicans have
refrained from aligning a-
gainst them in some areas in
the hope of avoiding a com-
plete break with the left.
The party's platform calls
for political and economic re-
form aimed at "reconstruction
of parliamentary prestige" and
expansion of the economy with
state aid. In foreign affairs
"independence within inter-
dependence" for North Africa
is the slogan, along with a re-
vival of European integration
and the preservation of the
East-West detente through diplo-
matic negotiation.
George Bidault, the Popu-
lar Republican' leader most
directly identified with the
party's domination over for-
eign policy in the present
assembly, appears to be in
near eclipse as a prominent
party figure. Robert Schuman,
its other former foreign min-
ister, seems to have regained
considerable prestige after a
temporary eclipse, but the
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party's chief spokesman now
appears to be Pierre Pflimlin,
finance minister in the Faure
cabinet.
General Prospects
The inconsistencies in
policy aims and programs that
appear within the right-center
coalition will probably prevent
it from realizing a workable
majority in the elections. Its
inability to form broad al-
liances is causing Pinay con-
siderable concern, and is ex-
pected to contribute to an in-
crease in Communist strength.
It appears, in any event,
that the coalition will move
more clearly into a moderate
rightist position in the new
assembly since its strength
will rest on the gains made by
the conservative bloc, par-
ticularly Pinay's Independ-
ent . Party. It will still, how-
ever, be unable to govern
without some support from the
non-Communist left, the sit-
uation which was responsible
for the instability of the
outgoing assembly.
TRANSPORTATION AND UTILITIES IN BERLIN
West Berlin, situated
110 miles inside the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) and
thus subject to complete or
partial Communist interdiction
of its vulnerable supply lines
from the West, is again being
subjected to intermittent
harassment by the East Ger-
mans. While the USSR has
notified Western powers that
in practice the USSR will
continue to assume responsi-
bility for free access to
West Berlin of Allied garri-
sons and their supplies, GDR
spokesmen assert control over
all other. movement by road,
rail, and waterway between
Western Germany and Berlin.
Their immediate objective
appears to be initiation
of East-West German talks at
cabinet-minister level as a
form of de facto recognition.
percent (2,604,000 metric
tons) of all goods taken in-
to West Berlin and 54 per-
cent (528,000 metric tons) of
that coming out was carried
on the highways.
There are four roads des-
ignated for interzonal high-
way traffic within East Ger-
many between West Berlin and
the Federal Republic. All are
in good condition, with the
exception of one bridge over
the Elbe at Dessau, which is
under repair. The main high-
way connection is the Helm-
stedt Autobahn, which extends
from West Berlin past Potsdam
to Brunswick and Hanover in
the German-Federal Republic.,
Other routes used are Highway
No. 5 to Hamburg, and the Hof
and Wartha-Herleshausen Auto-
bahns.
Buses and trucks are the
most important of the various
means of transport between
West Germany and Berlin. In
1954, when access was rela-
tively free of harassment, 41
Of these four routes., only
the Helmstedt Autobahn is
clearly mentioned in an Allied-
Soviet agreement as available.
for Western use. The other
three are avai~able for the
West only by sufferance of
the Communists. The four
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__ ECRET...
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUBARY
WEST
GERMANY
Hannover 46isfel _.e
ECT ID---GERMAN
PORT ION ROUTES
Rothensee
ship lift
Brandenburg P0
BERLIN
instruction
interzonal highways are under
control of the East German
police. The border check
points of the Helmstedt Auto-
bahn, however, are under
Soviet control. .
In 1954, 941,644 West Ger-
man vehicles used the four
highways--of which 312,091 were
trucks, 41,652 buses, 433,314
passenger cars and 154,587
motorcycles--with 57 percent
of them traveling the Helmstedt
Autobahn. East Germany taxes
all these vehicles and exer-
cises a direct control over the
flow of traffic by its border
checks.
The second most important
transport medium, the railroads,
1 a
MILES
accounted for 35
percent (2,256,000
metric tons) of the
tonnage brought in-
to Berlin and 24
percent (236,000
metric tons) of that
taken out in 1954.
German passen-
ger trains to West
Berlin move over
four specified rail
routes. Allied
trains and all
freight trains are
restricted to the
Helmstedt-Marienborn
line, and empty cars
are returned to.the
Federal Republic via
Oebisfelde.
Locomotives are
in short supply in
East Germany and are
mostly of ancient
vintage. This lack
of adequate equip-
ment affects Western
traffic since all
trains from the
Federal Republic,
including Allied
passenger and
freight trains, are
moved by East German
locomotives while in.
the GDR. Rails in
East Germany are worn and un-
even, and wooden ties in the
roadbed have been burned and
weakened in many places by the
inferior type of brown coal
which slips through locomotive
fire grates.
There are 13 freight trains
from'the Federal Republic to
Berlin daily, authorized by a
1945 agreement between the
Western Allies and the USSR.
These 13 trains include all
Allied military freight traf-
fic. There are also 10 German,
two American and one British
passenger trains a day and two
French military trains per
week. The 13 inbound freight
trains have a maximum carrying
capacity per train of 800 tons.
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SET'
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Since 1948, East Germany
has been building an outer
freight ring avoiding West
Berlin, to permit its trains
to go around instead of through
the Western sectors. At the
present time the ring is prob-
ably adequate for most of the
freight traffic to East Berlin
that would normally have used
the West Berlin yards, even
though the ring has not been
completed and one detour must
still be used. In addition to
the rail lines themselves, ex-
tensive shunting facilities
are being developed to replace
the Western sector freight
yards normally used by the East
German railroads in Berlin.
Water transportation in
1954 accounted for 23 percent
(1,425,000 metric tons) of the
tonnage brought into West Ber-
lin and 19 percent (181,000
metric tons) of that taken out.
Greater Berlin
Water transportation is used
primarily for bulk goods such
as fuels; building materials,
iron and grain. The average
transit time from the Ruhr to
Berlin via the Mittelland sys-
tem is about six days for self-
propelled craft and 12 days for
barges under tow.
The volume of barge traf-
fic is subject to wide seasonal
fluctuations because of freez-
ing of waterways, high water in
spring and low water from Sep-
tember to December. In 1954,
10,647 barges moved between
West Berlin and the Federal Re-
public. During the same year,
13,327 East German barges car-
ried 2,843,270 tons of goods
through West Berlin.
The principal canals con-
necting the Elbe and Oder
Rivers pass through the Western
sectors of Berlin, thus provid-
ing through access to many
points of East and West Germany,
Autobahn
Highway
Railroad
--Elevated railroad
Subway
Canal
25X1
TRF ELa SPanda;q~
Shin Cana(
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the North and Baltic Seas, Po-
land and Czechoslovakia. The
principal routes are the Havel
and Elbe Rivers, and the Mittel-
land Canal system. Eastern
water connections are made
either through the Havel River
and the Hohenzollern Canal or
via the Spree River and the
Oder-Spree Canal to the Oder
River, which forms part of the
border of Poland.
The East German authorities
built the Paretz-Niederneuen-
dorf Canal in 1951-52 to bypass
Berlin to the West. However,
barges used by East Germany
range from 500 to 1,500 tons
in size, and this canal can
accommodate only those displac-
ing 600 tons or less. The
larger barges must use water-
ways within Berlin, including
the Upper and Lower Havel and
the Spree Rivers, the Teltow
and Landwehr Canals, and the
Spandau and Neukoelln ship
canals.
The most important lock
on the East German waterways
is the Rothensee Shiplift,
which has been the site of
serious interruptions in water
transport. It has been closed
from time to time (once for
nearly a year) on the pretext
of needing repairs, effectively
disrupting barge traffic on
the Weser-Elbe portion of the
Mittelland system.
The East German canal sys-
tem is under the control and
supervision of the GDR Inland
Waterways Directorate, which
charges anchorage fees for all
vessels in these waterways.
East-West German barge move-
ments have been subject to con-
trol procedures agreed to be-
tween Great Britain and the
Soviet Union in 1951, the
basic waterways agreement being
renewed each year until December
1954 when the USSR turned the
matter over to the East Ger-
mans. At present, 1,600 West
German barges are licensed for
interzonal transport.
Air transport is used for
3 percent (33,000 metric tons)
of the goods moved from West
Berlin to the Federal Republic.
The city's air connections with
the West are of particular sig-
nificance because they are the
only means of transport not
susceptible to East German con-
trol.
All flights between West
Berlin and the Federal Republic
must use three air corridors
established by agreement of the
four powers in 1945. All West-
ern commercial lines presently
use Tempelhof, which is located
in the American sector of Ber-
lin and is the largest of the
Berlin airports. Other fields
are Gatow, used by the British,
Tegel, a French airfield, and
Schoenefeld, located outside
of East Berlin.
The use of the corridors
and the Berlin circle--the
area around Berlin in which
aircraft maneuver for landing--
is restricted to planes of. the
Allied powers and is subject to
procedures and rules estab-
lished by the quadripartite
Air Safety Center, the only
four-power body still function-
ing in the city. The supervi-
sion of operations in East
German air space outside the
three corridors is legally in
the hands of GDR authorities,
and nonmilitary , carriers such
as the Czech, Polish, Bulgarian
and Soviet airlines are licensed
to operate and land at Schoene-
feld. For all practical pur-
poses, however, the Soviet
authorities control the air
space.
In addition to military
air traffic of the three West-
ern powers, three airlines
(American, British and French)
provide service between Berlin
and the Federal Republic, cur-
rently operating a total of
230 passenger flights a week
out of Tempelhof.
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nmENTIAL
Transportation
In Berlin
After the po-
litical split of
Berlin in the fall
of 1948, the city
transport company
(BVG) was divided
into Eastern and
-RDP79Qpi7A000700060001-0
WATERWAYS
23%
tions on 1 July 1949.
East-West bus trans-
portation was dis-
continued at that
time, and in January
1953, streetcar
service between the
two parts of the city
was stopped, leaving
only the subway and
elevated trains on-
erating between the
sectors.
ROADS
41%
1954
millions of tons
2
F1
The elevated system is in-
dependent of the BVG, being
under the East German railway
directorate. It extends out-
side the city into East Ger-
many, and serves 125 stations
within Berlin, 74 of which are
in the West sector. East Ger-
man Transport Police claim con-
trol over these 74 stations
and have from time to time ex-
ercised their authority.
.When the BVG was split in
1949, about 60 percent of the
subway trains and streetcars
and 75 percent of the buses.
were kept by the BVG in West
Berlin. In 1954, the $VG West
served 566,600,000 passengers,
of which 50 percent traveled
by streetcar, 23 percent by
subway and 27 percent by bus.
Surface transportation
includes 40 separate street-
car lines with a total of 270
miles of track in the Western
sectors. The BVG West has 405
double-decker and 50 smaller
buses, serving 44 lines in West
Berlin which total 305 miles
in length.
The only BVG service which
operates between East and West
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Berlin is the subway, and the
control and operation of the
track and service is divided
between the two administra-
tions, depending on the loca-
tion of the line. The subway
system is constructed roughly
in the shape of a square and
comprises five lines which
total 47 miles in length, of
which about 68 percent is in
the Western sectors. The sub-
way car pool totals about 800
units, of which approximately
714 are.in use.
Motor traffic within the
city of Berlin has become in-
creasingly heavy during the
past years, and in 1954, 100,-
599 vehicles were registered
in the West sectors. These
motor vehicles move between
East and West Berlin with rela-
tive freedom, being subject to
control and search by both West
Berlin and Communist customs
authorities and border police.
Other Utilities
in Berlin
The gas, water, electric
power and telephone lines
operate independently in East
and West Berlin. The East and
West sectors use a common sewer
system. Other matters, such
as police controls and fire
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