CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700160001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
~NFI?E9NTIA
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
COPY NO. 1-9
OCI NO. 1540/56
1 March 1956
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 7
DECLASSIFIED
DOCUMENT NO.
DAT .JREVIEWER:I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
III n
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
TIM
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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 CURRENT INTELLI(ENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
T H E W E E K I N B R IMF
INITIAL
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SEGRET
THE SOVIET PARTY LEADERSHIP .
. The composition of the new central committee of the
Soviet Communist Party and its presidium, secretariat and
bureau for the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic
(RSFSR) reflects the political relationships already
established in the Soviet Union as a result of Khrushchev's
rise to a predominant position. Collective rule at the top
continues with Khrushchev clearly "first among equals."
All of the full members of the presidium were re-elected,
and there is unusual continuity in the secondary levels of
leadership.
MAIN POLICY THEMES
OF THE 20th PARTY CONGRESS . . Page 4
The 20th Party Congress, taking its cue from
Khrushchev's authoritative political report, spelled out
the main themes of Soviet policy---collective leadership,
peaceful coexistence, rapid development of industrial
strength, maintenance of military power at a high level,
and promotion of popular fronts in non-Communist countries.
One of the principal aims of speakers at the Congress was
to strip the Soviet regime of the more repugnant aspects
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ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The possibility that Arab-Israeli border incidents
could expand into major hostilities has been increased
as a result of the concentration of Egyptian, Syrian and
Lebanese troops on Israel's borders. Firing on Israeli
fishing boats on Lake Tiberias and new incidents on the
Gaza front have also contributed to this situation.
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FRENCH NORTH AFRICA . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . .
The crisis in Algeria is deepening as terrorist
operations become bolder, better planned, and on a
larger scale, with an uprising in the city of Al iers
itself reported imminent.
Page 1
Page 8
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n orocco
the rebels have expanded t e r opera ions. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 March 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Yugoslavs Pleased With Soviet Party Developments: Yugoslav
Communist leaders believe t at the Soviet 20th Party
Congress proves the present Soviet leaders are really
trying to set the USSR on a new course. The way
has therefore been made much easier for the resumption
of relations between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist
parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Soviet Spokesmen Reaffirm Sino-Soviet Solidarity: The
tribute accorded Communist China by speakers at the
20th Party Congress climaxes the slow development
over the past several years of Soviet recognition
of the Chinese road to socialism, and marks authori-
tative Soviet acceptance of established Chinese
Communist thought on the subject.
Page 2 25X1
Chinese Communist Party Now World's Largest: The Chinese
Communist Party membership of 9, 0,0 0, as announced
by politburo member Chu Teh in his speech to the
Soviet 20th Party Congress, makes the Chinese party
the largest Communist party in the world. The Soviet
Communist Party has about 7,200,000 members.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Soviet Technical Training for Asian-African Countries:
New Soviet offers to provide technical training for
Asian and African countries and the USSR's sponsor-
ship of technical institutes in Bombay and Rangoon
confirm that Moscow intends to make educational
assistance one of the mainstays of its policy toward
the economically less developed countries. This
program will in the long run increase Soviet in-
fluence among the technical elite and may place the
USSR in a position to compete with the West in the
training of technical students from the underdevel-
oped areas. F- I . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Afghanistan: Of the $100,000,000 Soviet credit to
1A ghanistan, $60,000,000 is reported to have already
been committed to projects in all parts of the
country. Arms from the USSR are apparently arriving
in Kabul, and the long-delayed Afghan military
mission to discuss Czech arms may soon depart for
Prague. The USSR may also be preparing to launch a
campaign designed to give its economic program
maximum political impact. . . . . Page 5 25X1
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Saar Settlement Prospects: French foreign minister
Pineau is apparently ready to make extensive con-
cessions on the Saar in his talks with Foreign
Minister Brentano in Bonn on 3 March. In general,
France seems willing to abandon all objections to
the area's early political and economic reintegra-
tion with West Germany, provided the Germans in turn
satisfy two economic demands aimed at strengthening
France's over-all
om munitvT
Indonesia: The Masjumi-led cabinet, having won parlia-
mentary approval on 28 February for abrogation of
the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, plans to resign
shortly--perhaps before the new parliament is in-
stalled--and assume caretaker status. The first
formal effort to create a new cabinet probably
will be directed toward a coalition of the three
age 8
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major non-Communist parties. 1' 1 . . . . Page 10 25X1
Thai Government Reaffirms Anti-Communist Policies: The
Thai government's crackdown last week on elements
agitating for closer political and trade ties
with Communist China appears to be the result of
a decision not to alter its strongly anti-Communist
policies at this time.
Chinese Communists Occupy Island in South China Sea:
Chinese Communists have recently settled on one of
the islands in the Paracel group, strategically
situated midway between Vietnam and the Philippines.
Ostensibly fishermen, the Communists may be reporting
air-warning information and keeping watch on shipping
Page 11 25X1
Page 11
Inflation Again Threatens Aid Program in South Korea: A
resurgence of inflation since the first of e year
threatens further to dissipate the effectiveness of
the $700,000,000 American aid program in South
Korea, and will probably lead to new disputes with
President Rhee over the level and implementation of
American aid. . . . . . . . . . Page 12
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
scheduled for June will not be rigged.
Instability Continues in Peru: The ending of the Iquitos
retie ion on 25 February leaves the Peruvian regime
of General Odria still threatened by underlying dis-
affection. New disturbances can be expected if Odria
fails to satisfy important elements in the country
that the presidential and congressional elections
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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PRMLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NEW CONSTITUTION NO CURE FOR PAKISTAN'.S POLITICAL
The perennial conflict between East and West Pakistan
will probably continue despite approval of the new
constitution by the Constituent Assembly, and the Pakistani
government's stability is unlikely to be increased.
elections for sometime in May.
Page 13 25X1
Page 1
SOUTH KOREA'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
President Rhee's re-election being virtually certain,
political maneuvering in South Korea is centered on
competition for the-vice-presidential nomination of the
dominant Liberal Party. A party convention to name the
candidates is reported planned for 5-6 March and the
THE DILEMMA OF SOVIET LITERARY POLICY . . . . . . . . Page
Debate in Soviet publications on the problems of
Soviet literature shows that official policy toward the
arts remains unsettled and that the search for a more
tolerable balance in official policy between ideological
conformity and artistic creativeness continues. Differ-
ences of opinion as to the extent to which the party
should regulate creative activity, evident within the
literary fraternity for some time, may be reaching into
the upper levels of the party as well. Khrushchev, in
his speech to the 20th Party Congress, made it clear,
however, that during a period when cultural interchange
with the West has been allowed in the interest of propa-
ganda and diplomatic objectives, the party must guard
against a relaxation of ideological discipline and the in-
filtration of "alien" influence. Literature in the USSR
always has been the servant of the state, and Soviet writers
will be expected to stay within party-defined limits.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
The composition of the new
central committee of the Soviet
Communist Party and its presid-
ium, secretariat and bureau for
the Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic reflects the
political relationships already
established in the Soviet Union
as a result of Khrushchev's rise
to a predominant position. Col-
lective rule at the top contin-
ues with Khrushchev clearly
"first among equals." All of
the full members of the pre-
sidium were re-elected and there
is unusual continuity in the
secondary levels of leadership.
The new central committee
was elected on 24 February at
the 20th Party Congress. On
27 February the 133 voting
(full) members of the 255-man
committee met in plenary ses-
sion to elect the party's pre-
sidium and secretariat. This
presidium, assisted in an ex-
ecutive capacity by the secre-
tariat, constitutes the col-
lective dictatorship of the
Soviet Union. The central com-
mittee is actually chosen by
the top leaders long before the
formal election and includes
their important political friends
and proteges.
Khrushchev's predominant
position was established be-
yond doubt by the election of
a large number of his friends
and proteges to the new central
committee and as candidate mem-
bers of the presidium and mem-
bers of the secretariat. His
power is further illustrated by
his being appointed to head the
central committee's important
new "Bureau for the RSFSR"
(Russian Republic). A liberal
sprinkling in the new central
committee of probable support-
ers of the other top leaders
(Mikoyan, Bulganin, and Kag-
anovich) attests, however, to
the continuation of collective
rule.
Since the election of the
previous central committee in
1952, the top party hierarchy
has changed considerably as a
result of Stalin's death, Beria's
execution, Malenkov's demotion
and Molotov's humiliation. The
secondary leadership, however,
has remained remarkably stable.
Almost 60 percent of the new
central committee served on the
old one. This percentage is
larger than at any time since
the 17th Party Congress in 1934,
the last congress before the
great purges.
The relative position in
the central committee of the
government administrator and
the party official has not changed,
but among the government
representatives there has been
a shift from the police and the
military to other functionaries.
The cut in police representation
from nine to three is in line
with the reduced political role
of the police in the post-Stalin
period. The effect of the cut
in total military representation
from 26 to 18 is somewhat offset
by the military's net gain of
one among the full members of
the central committee and the
election of Zhukov, a profes-
sional soldier, as a candidate
member of the party presidium,
where he may be able to exercise
some personal influence on policy.
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 The new central committee
contains six more ambassadors
than the one elected in 1952,
but nearly all of these are
former party careerists turned
diplomat since Stalin's death
and assigned to posts within
the Sino-Soviet bloc.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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USSR
PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
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BU LGANIN-
VOROSHILOV-
-f
FIRST DEPUTY
CHAIRMEN
KAGANOVICH
Kaganovich
MIKOYAN - -
- Mikoyan
MOLOTOV--
- Molotov
PERVUKHIN-
- Pervukhin
SABURO
V--
- Saburov
KHRUSH
-
CHEV
Khrushchev - -
KIRICHENKO -
DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
MALENKOV-
SECRETARIES
- -Malenkov
SUSLOV--
I -Suslov
Kosygin
Malyshev
Tevosyan
Khrunichev
Kucherenko
Lobanov
Zavenyagin
Shvernik
Zhukov
Mukhitdinov
Brezhnev - --
- Brezhn
Shepilov---.
-Shepilo
52 Other ministers.
F arts eva- --
30ther officials of
ministerial rank
Aristov
.
Belyay
Pospel
-New appointvanta
Party theorists and purvey-
ors of the ideological line ap-
pear to have been downgraded by
the congress. A. A. Fadeyev,
a secretary of the Union of So-
viet Writers, was demoted to
candidate member of the central
committee, and K. M. Simonov,
another secretary of the writers'
CHAIRMAN-CEREMONIAL
HEAD OF STATE
(The Chairmen of the
Supreme Soviet Pre-
sidiums in the it
Republics.)
SECRETARY
Pegov
MEMBERS
- Khrushchev
- Kirichenko
- Shvernik
Ponomarenko
(In addition there
are si other mem-
bers of lesser
importance.)
Soviet of the Union Soviet of Nationalities
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 March 1956
guild, was removed from the
committee. The Ukrainian play-
wright Aleksandr Korneichuk
is the only writer to retain
full membership on the com-
mittee. Neither the director
nor deputy director of the
Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin In-
stitute, the party's t.op.ide-
ological research institution,
was elected to the committee
although both posts were rep-
resented on the last central
committee.
The only appreciable
change in geographical repre-
sentation on the central com-
mittee was an increase in
Ukrainian representation from
8 to 19. Nine other members
of the committee had only re-
cently transferred from the
Ukraine to jobs elsewhere in
the union. This increase is
probably due to Khrushchev's
influence, since he spent many
years as party secretary in the
Ukraine, and the persons gain-
ing thereby. can probably be
counted his supporters.
Presidium and Secretariat
The eleven full members
of the party presidium were
re-elected at the central com-
mittee plenum. following the
.,
J
Usti 001: M
BY MAJOR" OCCUPATIONAL , jt~TEEGO I S ..<
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
MILITARY
it
FOREIGN OFFICE
}ETHER
~~2 -~-- T956
108. 46% 11 45%
114. 48 124 49
26 11 18 7
9 4 3 1
6 .3 12 5
73 30 91 36
1 MARCH 1956
TOTAL, ~, 286 1000
1
25,
6
T00%
congress. Ambassador to Poland
P. K. Ponomarenko, dropped as
candidate member, was the only
casualty. Ponomarenko may have
fallen out of favor because of
his association with Malenkov,
or more likely because of the
way in which he carried out
Khrushchev's agricultural policy
in Kazakhstan, where he was
party secretary in 1954-55.
Five candidate members
were added to the presidium.
They are Minister of Defense
G. K. Zhukov, Kazakh party boss
L. I.. Brezhnev, Uzbek party
boss N. A. Mukhitdinov, Pravda
editor in chief D. T. Shepilov,
and Moscow City party boss E.
A. Furtseva. Trade Unions head
N. M. Shvernik was re-elected
a candidate.
ELECTIONS OF,CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEES
(MEMBERS RE-ELECTED SINCE 1927 AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEES)
1930 1934
171
NEW MEMBERS
SECRET
1956
60229-2
The six members
of the old secretariat
were re-elected and
Brezhnev and Furtseva
added. Since the posi-
tion of all-Union
party secretary may
be incompatible with
their Kazakh and Mos-
cow City jobs, both
Brezhnev and Furtseva
may be replaced in
those posts.
Furtseva is the
first woman to achieve
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a position on either the pre-
sidium or the secretariat. Her
promotion is probably due to
the influence of Khrushchev,
who had helped her become Mos-
cow party secretary and who
singled her out for honors at
public fetes and receptions
during the past year.
With five of the eight
secretaries also on the pre-
sidium (two as full members and
three as candidate members),
closer co-ordination between
policy-making and the party's
:gay-to-day administration should
result. Khrushchev's hand in
top party councils will also
probably be strengthened.
Bureau for the RSFSR
The central committee's
"Bureau for the RSFSR," called
for by Khrushchev in his speech
to the congress, was presumably
organized by the central com-
mittee plenum on 27 February.
Khrushchev was named chairman,
and party secretary N. I. Bel-
yayev, deputy chairman. The
MAIN POLICY THEMES
OF THE 20th PARTY CONGRESS
The Soviet Party Congress
has clearly spelled out main
trends in Soviet policy, trends
that had their origin in the
period following Stalin's death
and which became more clearly
defined with the purge of Beria
and the rise of Khrushchev.
Khrushchev dominated the
congress. His eight-hour, 50,-
000-word political report was
a demonstration of authority.
His report as well as the other
speeches at the congress, notably
Mikoyan's, add up to the fact
SECRET
SUMMARY
10-man bureau also includes
RSFSR premier M. A. Yasnov,
Moscow Oblast party boss I.
V. Kapitonov, Leningrad Oblast
party boss F. R. Kozlov, and
A. P. Kirilenko, a Ukrainian
recently transferred to head
the Sverdlovsk (RSFSR) Oblast
party organization.
The RSFSR bureau will prob-
ably act as a junior presidium,
making republic-level policy de-
cisions for the Soviet Union's
largest republic. The creation
of a special body to perform this
function, formerly a responsi-
bility of the all-Union presidium,
followed apparently successful
experimentation with departments
in the all-Union party apparatus
especially created to deal with
RSFSR matters. While the new
bureau is probably designed to
relieve the presidium as a
whole of administrative detail,
the political importance of
RSFSR affairs is so great
that Khrushchev has chosen
to keep them under his
Personal jurisdiction.
that the present leadership has
revised Soviet policy in order
to strip the regime of the more
repugnant aspects of Stalinism.
These aspects were:
An absolute dictatorship
based on naked police power.
rather than on party authority.
A primary reliance on force
and the threat of military
power to achieve Communist
ends, coupled with the grim
thesis of the inevitability
of war.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A belief in the necessity
of violent revolution in
every nation.
These ideas have been
formally repudiated, and have
been replaced by:
Collective leadership. The
veterans of Stalin's tyranny
have now at least outwardly
committed themselves to "col-
lective leadership," with
Khrushchev the dominant per-
sonality. This is not likely
to work indefinitely, but
while it does, it will prob-
ably give a flexibility to
Soviet policy that will make
it more dangerous to the non-
Communist world than the
"hardened arteries" period
of Stalin's last years.
Peaceful coexistence and de-
nial of the "fatal inevita-
bility of war." These are
policy-propaganda themes
likely to last a good many
years, because the Soviet
leaders recognize that Stalin
was making things easier for
the West by frightening
small nations into co-oper-
ation with the United States
from a dread of general war
or direct Soviet military
aggression.
Possibility of peaceful
transition to socialism in
some countries. The admis-
sion that the "transition to
socialism" may be achieved
in some countries by peace-
ful parliamentary means is
a signal for full speed a-
head with the "popular front"
in unstable political arenas
such as France, Italy, and
Indonesia. It reflects a
belief on the part of the
Soviet leaders that, with-
out war, they can push A-
merican influence off the
Eurasian continent and per-
haps all the way back home
by political, economic and
subversive pressures alone.
It is unlikely that the
Soviet leaders would have under-
taken the delicate and potential-
ly dangerous task of revising
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Communist dogma if they were
contemplating only some short-
term, narrow tactical shift in
line.
Authoritative pronouncement
of this new policy line will
have many reverberations in
Communist circles throughout
the world. (See article on
Yugoslav reactions, Part II,
p. 1 ) While some local Com-
munist leaders have probably
been shaken by Soviet repudia-
tion of Stalinism, they now
have a chance to revitalize
their parties and win back re-
spectable Lntellectual and work-
ing-class support, previously
dwindling because of the unfail-
ing subordination of local in-
terests to Soviet policy.
The congress also reaffirmed
that the regime is dedicating it-
self to maintaining a rapid pace
of development of industrial
strength. The economic goals
cited permit the USSR simulta-
neously to keep the home base
solid and secure in both econom--
c.and military contexts, even
though at some cost in improve-
ment of living standards; to
export capital to the places
where it will do the most
political good--especially to
the former colonial countries
anxious to industrialize rapidly;
and to distribute arms to coun-
tries abroad, wherever such ac-
tion will cause the most trouble.
Mikoyan and Zhukov asserted
that the USSR's military strength
will be maintained at a high lev-
el, although they stated that
Soviet military power would be
employed defensively or as a
deterrent to Western initiation
of hostilities.
Soviet policy is also
calculated to enhance Soviet
prestige in Asia and Africa.
Khrushchev included "peace-
loving" neutral states in
both Asia and Europe, along
with the Sino-Soviet bloc,
in a vast "zone of peace"
which now, and especially in
the future, Soviet leaders
expect to play a decisive role
in world affairs. Soviet policy
is designed to slow down the
growth of Western strength
and exploit weaknesses in the
Western coalition. At the
same time, it is intended to
increase Soviet influence on
the world's uncommitted and
neutralist nations and to
manipulate them in support of
Communist foreign policy. The
final congress resolution
carefully grouped the main
nations of the world in ways
that reflected these policy aims.
All the speeches of the
Soviet leaders make it clear
that the capture of power,
establishment of "dictator-
ships of the proletariat," and
the revolutionary transformation
of society will remain the
ultimate aims of Communist
parties. Khrushchev's re-
visions of Communist dogma
constitute mainly an admission
that long-term Communist ob-
jectives can be reached by
means hitherto considered un-
realistic and for that reason
wrong.
Finally, all the speakers
at the congress sounded a note
of deep confidence in the
strength of the Communist world
and in the inevitability of
its ultimate triumph over
capitalism. In Khrushchev's
words: "The Soviet State is
growing and gathering strength.
It towers like a powerful
lighthouse showing all hu-
manity the road to a new
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world .... Our cause is invin-
cible .... The future is ours."
Or, as Mikoyan put it:
"Not a single major interna
tional question can now be
solved by the will of the West-
ern powers alone without re-
gard for the views of the Soviet
Union, China, and all the coun-
tries of socialism. In the minds
of humanity, socialism is now in-
comparably stronger than capital-
ism. That is why it is not for
us to fear a struggle between
the ideas of socialism and capi-
talism."
The possibility that Arab-
Israeli border incidents could
expand into major hostilities
has been increased as a result
of the concentration of Egyptian,,
Syrian, and Lebanese troops on
Israel's borders. Firing on
Israeli fishing boats
on Lake Tiberias and
new incidents on the
Gaza front have also
contributed to this
situation.
Almost all major
Syrian army units
are now stationed at
or near the Israeli
frontier, and Egypt
has 42,500 men, over
half its army and a-
bout 80 percent of
its actual combat
strength, in the
Sinai Peninsula near
Israel's southwest-
ern border. The Leba-
nese also have moved
infantry and artil-
lery closer to the
border.
Syrian officers
admit that the dis-
position of their
forces makes them
vulnerable to an
Israeli breakthrough
in the event of hos-
tilities, but they
claim the recent move of their
units is demanded by public
opinion. Both the Syrian and
the Egyptian reinforcements of
frontier areas appear to stem
from fear that Israel will
take some action inside the
NEAR EASTERN GROUND FORCES
Jll~_~~~~
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
demilitarized zone in the im-
mediate future to divert the
Jordan River.. Fear of a. crisis
and possible'domestic repercus-
sions also appear to be. behind
Syrian president Quwatli's in-
tention to take a "rest" in up-
per Egypt.
Despite the fact that. UN
truce supervisor General Burns
has encountered an almost com-
pletely negative Israeli.at-
titude toward proposals for
easing tension along the bor-
der with Egypt, Israeli state-
ments continue to imply that
Israel is willing to wait at
least a, couple of months for
some solution to the Jordan
water problem.
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
Algeria.
The crisis in Algeria is
deepening as terrorist opera-
tions there become bolder,
better planned and concerted,
and larger in scale
French officials.in. Paris
expect major , rebel activity in
March, and.the cabinet has re-
quested the Na.tiona.l.Assembly
to approve emergency powers-
.Former premier Mendes-France
told Ambassador.. Dillon on 27
February that the Algerian
situation had deteriorated con-
siderably during the past month
and was beginning to show.re-
sembla.nces to the Indochina
war.
The Israeli radio has
publicized assertions by Syrian
authorities that they would
put a stop to the sporadic
rifle fire directed against
Israeli fishermen on Lake Ti-
berias. Moreover, Tel Aviv kept
silent the fact that Egypt had
held up a Greek ship carrying
construction material for the
Israeli port of Eila.t at the
head of the Gulf of Aqaba. un-
til after Egypt had allowed
the ship to proceed.
These actions suggest
that Israel does not want
to provoke a crisis at this
time.
The mayor of Algiers
claims to have evidence that
the na.tionalists plan to surround
the city of Algiers and stage a.
simultaneous uprising within the
city, possibly within the next
two weeks. He does not believe
the local police force is a.de-
quate to handle such a situation.
Algerian Moslem extremists
are preparing for a showdown,
while, the "Group of the 61,"
hitherto attempting to exert a,
moderatlug.influence, appears
to be inactive. The extremists
for several months have isolated
the port of Collo in eastern
Algeria, and in addition have
now surrounded the important
port of Nemours in western Al-
geria. Land communications are
so disrupted that only air travel
is reasonably safe.
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Fearful that France may
be forced to abandon them, the
European settlers in Algeria
are organizing to take measures
for their own defense, if neces-
sary in defiance of French law.
There is increasing advocacy of
a coup to establish a European-
supremacy regime patterned on
the one in South Africa.
The French army in Algeria,
variously estimated at between
166,000 and 220,000, is con-
tinuing to lose ground to the
rebels, and the French Minis-
try of Defense is proposing a
major reorganization and train-
ing program to combat their hit-
and-run operations.
Morocco
Moroccan rebels, who re-
cently have substantially enlarged
their field of operations, on 26
February attacked a French mili-
tary outpost in southwestern
Morocco. Meanwhile, Moroccan
dissatisfaction with the slow
pace of the French-Moroccan
negotiations in Paris is be-
comin a parent.
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Yugoslavs Pleased
With Soviet Party Developments
Yugoslav Communists be-
lieve that the Soviet 20th
Party Congress proves the pres-
ent Soviet leaders are really
trying to set the USSR on a new
course.
The Belgrade newspaper
Politika, in an editorial typi-
cal o he Yugoslav press re-
action, says that the speeches
and resolutions at the con-
gress, and particularly the
condemnation of the "cult of
personality," point to "a new
page in Soviet history, a
technical and modern, progres-
sive and elastic, and also more
humane stage than the previous
one." The only point with
which the Yugoslav press has
expressed disagreement was the
continued Soviet insistence
that the world is divided into
two camps, a position the Yugo-
slavs have consistently opposed
as only sharpening tensions.
Ambassador Riddleberger
reports that Yugoslav officials
have concluded that the Soviet
"threat" is no longer imminent,
if in fact it exists at all.
They based this conclusion
mainly on Soviet references to
peaceful intent and the state-
ments that a socialist state
can be achieved from capitalism
through parliamentary procedures.
Prior to the Soviet party
congress, the most important
areas of ideological difference
between Belgrade and Moscow
were in concepts of how so-
cialism can come to power, and
how socialism can develop once
in power. On the former ques-
tion, the Yugoslavs claim that
all countries will inevitably
achieve socialism in their own
way, and that already some
countries in Western Europe
are developing socialism in an
evolutionary fashion through
legislation rather than rev-
olutionary seizure of power.
Mikoyan's statement at the
party congress clearly con-
tinued the historic Bolshevik
objection to an evolutionary
course, calling it mere re-
visionism or reformism, and
"fruitless jibbing." Mikoyan
and Khrushchev did, however,
accept the idea of a. "revolu-
tionary" takeover by the
"workers" (i.e.,Communists)
without actual resort to vio-
lence. In other words, they
said,.it is possible "to reach
socialism by peaceful means...
using existing parliamentary
institutions." Mikoyan cited
the Czechoslovak coup of 1948
as an example of successful
parliamentary transition to
socialism, and it was in this
sense that Soviet leaders
accepted the possibility of
"peaceful revolution."
On the second point, the
Soviet leaders made into of-
ficial party doctrine what they
had accepted on their Belgrade
visit--that is, that there are
many roads of socialist develop-
ment once the "workers" are in
power. This makes the Yugoslav
and other possible "roads of
socialist development" as
respectable as the USSR's own
road.
The ideological gap has
thus been narrowed between
Moscow and Belgrade, and the
way made much easier for the
establishment of new party-to-
party relations. The Yugoslavs
deny that any have been estab-
lished yet.
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The message of greetings
to the Soviet "comrades" sent
by Tito on behalf of the Yugo-
slav party and Socialist Front
in one sense constitutes a
party contact. It may be
a forerunner of more direct
contacts, first at a. relatively
high level. Some move may be
made in this direction during
Tito's trip to Moscow this
summer. The Yugoslavs have
insisted that they are willing
Soviet Spokesmen
Rea. irm Sino-Soviet Solidarity
The tribute accorded Commu-
nist China by speakers at the
20th Soviet Party Congress
climaxes the slow development
over the past several years of
Soviet recognition of the Chi-
nese road to socialism, and
marks authoritative Soviet
acceptance of established Chi-
nese Communist thought on the
subject. The Soviet leaders
confirmed that the USSR and
China. are continuing to co-
operate harmoniously.
The speakers discussed
China separately from the
other "people's democracies"
and indicated its order of
priority within the Sino-Soviet
bloc by consistently placing it
immediately after the USSR.
References to Communist
China's world position strongly
emphasized peaceful Chinese
initiative. Communist China's
claim to Taiwan was given
secondary emphasis, although
it figured prominently in
speeches by Molotov and Zhukov.
Khrushchev ignored the Taiwan
issue and placed Chinese exter-
nal policy entirely within the
context of the bloc's general
peace initiative.
He.credited China with
contributing to the termination
to have relations with all
"socialist" groups, provided a
satisfactory basis can be es-
tablished. They probably now
believe this is possible with
the USSR in light of statements
at the congress. They will
probably remain adamant against
contacts with the Cominform,
which Belgrade strongly criti-
cizes as being dominated ideo-
logically by one form of
socialism.
of the wars in Indochina and
Korea and proposing a. collective
peace pact for Asia--a pro-
posal for which Molotov again
declared Soviet support. Both
Khrushchev and Molotov endorsed
the "five principles," ori-
ginally co-authored by China
and India, as the best formula
for peaceful coexistence in
the world.
Within the general frame-
work of increasingly broad
acceptance of past and future
methods of arriving at social-
ism, the party congress speakers
gave the fullest recognition
thus far extended to the ideo-
logical correctness of the Chi-
nese road to socialism. Sev-
eral speakers, including
Khrushchev, endorsed China's
program of "peaceful" trans-
formation from capitalist to
socialist ownership.
D. T. Shepilov, one of the
foremost of the Soviet ideol-
ogists, applauded the Chinese
Communists for their "masterful
application" of Marxist dia-
lectics to local conditions in
what constituted the most gen-
erous tribute to the special
features of the Chinese transi-
tion yet made by a. high. Soviet
official. Shepilov, probably
echoing past dissension within
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the Soviet party on the problem
of China's transition, criti-
cized the "bookmen of Marxism"
who regard the Chinese approach
as "almost tantamount to tram-
pling finder foot the principles
of Marxism-Leninism."
Shepilov did not go so
far, however, as to cite
Chinese Communist Party
Now World's Largest
The Chinese Communist
Party's membership of 9,000,-
000, as announced by politburo
member Chu Teh in his speech
to the Soviet 20th Party Con-
gress, makes the Chinese party
the largest Communist Party in
the world. The Soviet party
has an official membership of
7,215,505.
The last official Chinese
enrollment figure announced
was 6,500,000 as of the end of
1953. An increase of 2,500,-
000 in two years, though large,
is not unprecedented. The
Chinese Communist Party claimed
to have enrolled 2,700,000 new
members in 1949 and 1950.
Since 1953, the party has
conducted an intensive drive
for membership among the peas-
ants, who make up the bulk of
Soviet Technical Training
For Asian-American Countries
New Soviet offers to pro-
vide technical training for
Asian and Far Eastern countries
and the USSR's sponsorship of
technical institutes in Bombay
and Rangoon confirm that Moscow
intends to make educational
PART Ir
Chinese Communist claims for
Mao Tse-tung as a, formulator
of doctrine. Without men-
tioning Mao, he attributed to
the "Chinese Communist Party"
the conclusion that "peaceful"
methods would prevail in
China's transition to social-
ism.
the new members. More recently,
emphasis has been placed on re-
cruiting workers from industrial
and commercial enterprises con-
verted to joint state-private
ownership.
Chinese Communist Party
membership is likely to continue
to grow. Party leaders in one
Chinese province have announced
a membership goal of about 3 per-
cent of the population. This
is about the present Soviet
ratio, and if extended to
China as a whole, would mean a
membership of about 18,000,000.
An official announcement
of Chinese Communist Party en-
rollment can be expected at
the 8th congress of the Chinese
party, which is scheduled for
the latter half of 1956.
assistance, especially in tech-
nical fields, one of the main-
stays of its policy toward the
less developed countries. This
program will in the long run
afford the USSR an opportunity
to promote Soviet technical
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1 March 1956
practices and influence a large
segment of the technical elite
in Asia and the Far East. The
USSR may soon be in the posi-
tion of training as many Indian
and Burmese students as the
West.
The USSR's technical train-
ing program may well fall under
the jurisdiction of the new
Chief Directorate for Economic
Relations (GUES) .,which also
controls Soviet foreign econom-
ic aid and enjoys a priority
place directly under the Council
of Ministers.
.P. A. Ma.letin, a deputy
chief of GUES, who headed the
Soviet delegation to the con-
ference of the Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far
East (ECAFE), which recently
met in India, has said that the
USSR is ready to receive spe-
cia.lists from the ECAFE coun-
tries and to share Soviet tech-
nical and economic experience
with them. He also said the
USSR would send experts to
those countries either as a
part of the Soviet contributions
to the United Nations Expanded
Technical Assistance Program
(UNETAP) or under bilateral
agreements.
A Soviet spokesman report-
edly told the conference that
the Soviet government was ready
to grant 200 scholarships to
students from the ECAFE coun-
tries for study in Soviet in-
stitutions.
The USSR, through UNESCO,
will provide technical assist-
ance and equipment to the value
of six million rubles ($1,500,-
000 at the official rate) for
the proposed Western Technologi-
cal Institute at Bombay, which
will be opened in mid-1957, ac-
cording to the official Indian
information service. The USSR
PART II
also will provide the institute
with 15 Soviet professors for
five-year terms, translators to
prepare English versions of So-
viet technical literature, and
training facilities for 20
Indian teachers in the USSR.
The institute appears to
have been worked out between
India and the USSR early last
year. The amount allocated for
it is almost double the expendi-
ture originally anticipated
when the project was approved
last November within the frame-
work of the UNETAP for 1956.
The deputy director general of
UNESCO has stated, however,
that if UNESCO is to be associ-
atedwith the Bombay institute,
the USSR will be informed that
the project must be worked out
on a multilateral basis.
The Soviet Union also
plans to furnish similar
facilities and, apparently,
personnel for a technological
institute it is to construct
in Rangoon. The Burmese in-
stitute was promised by Bul-
ga.nin and Khrushchev during
their visit to Burma, in December
and has been planned outside
United Nations channels. The
institute,like the one the USSR
is to construct for India., will
accommodate about 1,000 students.
The Soviet Union probably
will endeavor to make these in-
stitutes the most advanced in
South and Southeast Asia. With
the expanded educational ex-
change program, they will be
effective means of promoting
Soviet technical methods and
Soviet-type planning for coun-
tries which desire speedy in-
dustrializa.tion. Communist
influence is already in ascend-
ancy among Burmese university
students, and a by-product of
the institutions probably will
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
be that some of the trainees
will become Communist or pro-
Soviet in their political con-
victions.
One of the most spectacular
offers in the field of educa-
tional assistance has been the
USSR's willingness to train
personnel in the peaceful uses
of atomic energy. On 10 Febru-
ary the USSR agreed to help
Egypt set up and equip a nuclear
physics laboratory in Cairo.
Soviet scientists will be sent
to Cairo,, and Egyptian scientists
and specialists will.be trained
in Soviet research institutes.
The agreement was signed by a
deputy chief of GUES.
Afghanistan
Of the $100,000,000 Soviet
credit to Afghanistan, $60,000,-
000 has reportedly already been
committed to projects in all
parts of the country. Arms
from the USSR are apparently
arriving in Kabul, and the long-
delayed Afghan military mission
to discuss Czech arms may soon
depart for Prague. The USSR
may also be preparing to launch
a, campaign designed to give its
economic program maximum politi-
cal impact.
The USSR and Afghanistan
have agreed to more than a
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mitting $60,000,000
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I I Most signifi-
cant of the reported projects
from the standpoint of poten-
tial Soviet subversion of
Afghanistan are motor vehicle
repair shops at Kabul, Puli-
kumri, and Kandahar, and con-
struction of a military airfield
A Soviet offer to help
India. develop its nuclear re-
search was made last July.
Premier Bulganin, in his reply
to a. Pakistani editor on 6
February, expressed a willing-
ness to share the USSR's atomic
knowledge of the peaceful a.p=.
plication of atomic energy with
Pakistan.
As a concomitant of the
USSR's increased activity
in the Afro-Asian countries,
Soviet educational institu-
tions have stepped up the
teaching of the languages
of the area. 25X1
(Concurred in by URH and
OSI)
30 miles north of Kabul.
Visits by Soviet missions
to the Ja.lalabad area, which
reportedly resulted in agreement
for construction of a dam at
Barika.d 30 miles from the Khyber
Pass, and to the Kandahar area,
opposite Quetta in Pakistan,
suggest that the USSR is eager
to extend its influence into
areas close to the Pakistani
border. The Russians also in-
spected the Kandahar Interna.-
tional'Airport and the Kha.jakai
dam in the Helmand River devel-
opment project, both of which
are being constructed by the
American Morrison-Knudsen com-
pany.
The American embassy in
Kabul reports that the Russians
are to undertake construction
of short-wave radio and long-
distance telephone facilities
for which the West Germans had
already been given a contract.
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The second phase of the Sarobi
hydroelectric project on which
the Germans have been working
is also reportedly to be taken
over by the USSR under the cred-
it agreement. If this happens,
it would be the first occasion
when Western interests were
squeezed out by increased So-
viet activity.
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Arrival in VEh?7I
two
convoys of to 50 t
from the Soviet hnrdc
con ain rifles,
light automatic weapons, and
ammunition--indicates that the
USSR is also supplying the
Afghans with arms, which Kabul
has long sought to obtain from
any source. The second convoy,
according to information ob-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 March 1956
tamed by the American army
attache in Kabul, may have
carried equipment for a hospi-
tal, donation of which was an-
-pounced by Bulganin and Khru-
shchev during their visit to
Kabul last December. uncon-
firmed reports of new Soviet
Afghan arms deals continue to
circulate in Kabul.
The Afghan government is
about to send a military mission
to Czechoslovakia to purchase
more arms. The decision to
send the mission, which was
publicized several months ago
but never implemented, was re-
portedly made following prodding
from Prague.
Although a demonstration
against new Afghan-Soviet ties
is supposed to have taken place
Chahar
Burjak
MairlTana
Bala Murghab
Mazari
Sharif
Reported military aiff-iefd'site
KAB
PAKISTAN
Sarrdeman
-r Broad gauge railroad
y-r-~ Narrow gauge railroad
All weather road
tso
MILES
MARCH 1956
Aral
Sea
Arabian
See
JAKL)bl _
Jalalabed ~argal i K ASH M I R
JS}12NIa,r, ~? (Status in dispu}g)_
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among Hazara tribesmen in cen-
tral Afghanistan early in Janu-
ary, prompt implementation of
Soviet offers has apparently
inspired a certain amount of
public enthusiasm in Kabul.
Recent informal protests by the
Afghan Foreign Ministry to the
American embassy against "en-
croachment upon Afghan sover-
eignty" by American balloons
and USIS propaganda against a
country "with whom Afghanistan
has friendly relations" may
also reflect Kabul's more fa-
vorable attitude toward the USSR.
On the other hand, unusual
publicity has been given to the
signing of a $2,500,000 techni-
cal assistance agreement with
the United States, and top Af-
ghan officials have stressed
their desire for more American
assistance. This suggests Ka-
bul is eager to keep its rela-
tions with the US and the USSR
in some kind of balance.
Radio Kabul has announced
the beginning of Russian lan-
guage lessons in Kabul. There
is also a report that Soviet
cultural magazines in Russian
and Persian are to be printed
in Kabul and that Soviet agri-
cultural magazines in Persian
are to be. distributed in the
schools. This suggests that
the Afghan government is not
resisting Soviet efforts at
cultural penetration as vigor-
ously as it has in the past.
Two editors of Afghan
government newspapers recently
visited the USSR. Another
press official is reportedly
to go to Moscow and Stalingrad
for two years' experience while
a Russian press adviser is to
come to Kabul in six months.
In addition, Moscow is planning
to construct a one-acre pavil-
ion for the Afghan national
festival scheduled for August.
(Concurr :d in 25X1
by ORR)
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1 March 1956
Saar Settlement Prospects
French foreign minister
Pineau is apparently ready to
make extensive concessions on
the Saar in his talks with
Foreign Minister Brentano in
Bonn on 3 March. In general,
France seems willing to abandon
all objections to the area's
early political and economic
reintegration with West Germany,
provided the Germans in turn
satisfy two specific demands for
economic advantages which would
strengthen France's over-all
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1?hENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
position in the Coal-
Steel Community.
At the begin-
ning of the current
negotiations in Feb-
ruary, France demanded
that political rein-
tegration of the Saar
with Germany be slowed
to keep pace with
economic integration
which France had
wanted to extend over
a decade. There are
indications, however,
that the French may
now be prepared to
come close to a Ger-
man counterproposal
for a two-year political inte-
gration period, possibly with
some arrangement permitting Saar
participation in the 1957 Bun-
destag elections,
Remarks made by Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
Maurice Faure to American of-
ficials on 24 February suggest
that Paris is now prepared to
write off the whole territory
as a French economic asset.
Faure pointed to the "magnitude
of France's sacrifice" of the
Saar, its second most important
foreign customer, and hitherto
a key factor in the maintenance
of the franc zone's favorable
trade balance with West Germany.
Faure considers German willing-
ness to try to "maintain" French-
Saar economic relations as
mostly "theoretical."
Paris' two minimum demands
in return are German acquiescence
in canalization of the Moselle
River and confirmation of the
existing French-Saar agreement
on exploitation of the rich
Warndt coal field. The German
negotiators' current position
on Moselle canalization is con-
fined to objections on purely
economic grounds: that the
French can attain their objective
of making the Lorraine steel
industry more competitive by
electrifying the Moselle rail
lines or even sooner by inter-
national agreement to lower
existing rail rates.
The German negotiators,
however, admit the "symbolic
value" of the Mo
for the French
I
The Benelux countries--
particularly Luxembourg--may,
however, raise strenuous ob-
jections.
Continuation of the exist-
ing agreement on the Warndt
coal field is seen by the French
as essential for the future
of the Lorraine metallurgical
industry, but is strenuously
objected to by the Saarlanders.
Most of this coal field under-
lies Saar territory, but it is
mined from pitheads in France.
The Saarlanders accuse the
French of mining only the veins
closest to the surface, leav-
ing the less profitable deep-
lying deposits for exploitation
after the existing agreement
has expired, 27 years hence.
Bonn is unlikely to allow
the protests of the local
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
extremists to deter it from mak-
ing a reasonable deal with the
French, since it recognizes
that such elements will probably
object to almost any attainable
The Masjumi-led cabinet,
having won parliamentary ap-
proval of the bill to abrogate
the Netherlands-Indonesian
Union, plans to resign shortly
and assume caretaker status.
It may resign before the elected
parliament is installed between
10 and 20 March.
The three major non-Commu-
nist parties are engaged in
informal discussions. The Na-
tional Party (PNI), which heads
the opposition, the Masjumi,
and the Nahdiatul Ulama (NU)
reportedly have agreed in prin-
ciple to form a coalition gov-
ernment but they have not yet
agreed on a program.
The Masjumi, which had
been isolated from other non-
Communist parties through the
tactics of President Sukarno
and the PNI, now appears to
have increased its prestige by
bringing about an end to the
Netherlands-Indonesian Union.
This achievement, combined with
the Masjumi's reported endorse-
ment of the more nationalistic
policies of the party's Vice
Chairman Sukiman as opposed to
those of Chairman Natsir, may
have reduced difficulties be-
tween the Masjumi and the other
two parties.
Sukiman is a more skillful
politician than Natsir and is
more acceptable to President
Sukarno, the PNI and the NU.
French-German settlement. Bonn,
moreover, has presumably noted
the reports of the waning in-
fluence of Heinrich Schneider,
most vocal of the Saar ultra
The first formal effort to
create a new cabinet, therefore,
will probably be directed to-
ward a PNI-Masjumi-itU coalition.
The large area of disagreement
among the three parties, how-
ever, particularly in regard
to personalities and the issues
of foreign investment, foreign
policy, and tolerance of Com-
munist activity, foreshadows
difficulties. Should this
effort fail, the alternative of
a PNI-NU-small party coalition
probably will be accepted.
This would be a return to the
so-called "Ali formula" of
1953-55 whereby the government
depended on Communist parlia-
mentary support.
Meanwhile, Vice President
Hatta--probably the best in-
formed and most moderate
individual in the Indonesian
government and a strong anti-
Communist--has definitely
decided to resign. He hopes
to combat Communism through
the medium of the co-operative
movement, which, under his
guidance, is developing fairly
rapidly among the villages.
His departure will remove the
most important restraining in-
fluence on President Sukarno,
who appears to believe that
he can use the Communists for
his political advantage and
eventually discard them.
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1 March 1956.
Thai Government Reaffirms
Anti-Communist Policies
The Thai government's
crackdown last week on ele-
ments agitating for closer po-
litical and trade ties with
Communist China appears to be
a result of a decision not to
alter its strongly anti-Commu-
nist policies at this time.
On 21 February, the police
arrested parliamentary member
Thep Chotinuchit and members
of his party at the.Bangkok
airport on their return from
a month's tour of Communist
China. This action is in
marked contrast to the govern-
ment's equivocation prior to
Thep's departure. Thep has
warned that he will use public
hearings on his case to compare
favorably conditions in Commu-
nist China with those in Thai-
land.
The government, which re-
portedly intends to try Thep
for "treason," can if it so
chooses, however, prevent the
press from publicizing Thep's
statements. The police also
arrested leaders of.the weekly
gatherings at Bangkok's "Hyde
Park," which these elements
have used as a forum for.attacks
against the government and
noisy pleas for a Sino-Thai
rapprochement. The government
has since lifted its temporary
Chinese Communists Occupy
island in Sou na Sea
The Chinese Communists in
the past six months have occu-
pied at least one island in the
Paracel group in the South
China Sea, midway between Viet-
nam and the Philippines. The
Paracels, claimed by several
countries, are made up of a
ban on further such meetings.
Bangkok newspapers were warned
that writers commenting favor-
ably on China would be subject
to prosecution under Thailand's
stiff anti-Communist law.
These actions follow a
six-month period in which there
were strong indications that
the government was re-examin-
ing its anti-Communist policies,
possibly feeling its way to-
ward a normalization of rela-
tions with Peiping. The rea-
sons for the sudden about-face
are obscure. Thai leaders may
have concluded that the public
agitation for a Sino-Thai rap-
prochement, which some of them
seemed to have stimulated, was
unduly embarrassing Thailand
in its relations with the
United States, especially in
view of the approaching SEATO
meeting at Karachi.
The arrest of Thep and
related moves will be highly
unpopular with many Thai in-
tellectuals, whose neutralist
and pro-Communist tendencies
became apparent after the gov-
ernment relaxed its authori-
tarian controls last summer.
The ruling clique's position
is considered too strong, how-.
ever, to be seriously threat-
number of small uninhabited
coral atolls. Their value
lies in their strategic loca-
tion astride the main shipping
lanes through the South China
Sea. The islands' new occu-
piers, ostensibly' fishermen,
may be reporting air-warning
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information and keeping watch
on ship movements. The islands
are too small for airfields,
but could be used as small
naval bases.
I
o'
PATTLE
ISLA ND; i'..
FPONG
KONG
Pal~acel Islands
cial claims of sovereignty
over the islands have been made
by both the Nationalist and Com-
munist Chinese, and by both North
and South Vietnam.
Inflation Again Threatens
Aid Program in South Korea
A resurgence of inflation
since the first of the year
threatens further to dissipate
the effectiveness of the Ameri-
can aid program in South Korea
(amounting to $700,000,000 in
the current fiscal year), and
will probably lead to new dis-
putes with President Rhee over
the level and implementation
of American aid.
Rhee has taken cognizance
of the latest inflationary surge
by publicly blaming the official
exchange rate of 500 hwan to the
dollar, which he says the US
imposed on South Korea. The
black-market exchange rate,
which has been rising steadily
since the first of the year,
reached a level of 975 hwan
to the dollar by early February.
Last August the United
States agreed to maintain a
fixed exchange rate for a year,
Rhee having insisted that
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inflation was caused by fluctua-
tions in the rate. The South
Koreans initially created an
illusion of partial success
in combating inflation by the
expedient of deferring govern-
ment expenditures. However,
following the receipt in January
of an additional $25,000,000
in American aid to encourage
anti-inflation efforts, Korean
counterinflation measures ap-
pear to have weakened consider-
ably.
Certain recent develop-
ments--such as the action by
the Bank of Korea. raising the
ceiling on commercial loans,
the delay in the sale of govern-
ment dollars to businessmen,
and the failure to raise
fertilizer and monopolized com-
modity prices--promise to weaken
the currency further.
The chronic inflation re-
suits largely from South
Korea's attempts to live be-
yond its means. It maintains
a 720,000-ma.n military estab-
lishment and has an unrea.listi-
cally ambitious investment
program. The current year's
budget is expected to show a,
deficit of about $140,000,000..
Among the effects of this in-
flation is the fact that it
has discouraged the accumula-
tion of capital essential to
any private investment in
Korean development and has
priced Korean goods out of
world markets.
Instability Continues in Peru
The ending of the Iquitos
rebellion on 25 February leaves
the Peruvian regime of General
Odria still threatened by under-
lying disaffection. New dis-
turbances can be expected if
Odria fails to satisfy important
elements in the country that
the presidential and congres-
sional elections scheduled for
.June will not be rigged.
The Iquitos uprising, like
the strikes and student demon
stra.tions at Arequipa last
December, reflected the growing
popular concern that Odria. in-
tends to rig the elections in
order to perpetuate himself in
power, despite the constitu-
tional ban on a. president suc-
ceeding himself. Most top
military leaders apparently
desire free elections
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1 March 1956
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
NEW CONSTITUTION NO CURE FOR PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS
Pakistan's long-awaited
constitution seems to be on the
verge of approval by the Constit-
uent Assembly. The perennial
conflict between East and West
Pakistan will probably continue,
however, even after approval of
the document. The struggle for
personal power among individual
politicians in both parts of
the country will also continue.
The result is bound to be a
politically fragmented govern-
ment whose policies will re-
flect its weakness and division.1
Prime Minister
Chaudhri Mohammad All
constitution. Governor General
Iskander Mirza defeated this
move by threatening to declare
martial law in East Pakistan,
home province of Fazlul Huq,
leader of the United Front.
Price of Success
However, Chaudhri Mohammad
All and Mirza have had to ac-
cept dangerous modifications in
the original draft to effect
passage of the constitution.
The executive power on
which the government has in
the past relied to deal with
parliamentary and provincial
obstructionism has been greatly
weakened. The wealthy West
Pakistani landowners and indus-
trialists on whom the ruling
Moslem League must rely for
support have succeeded in lim-
iting the government's right
of eminent domain. No deter-
mination has been made of the
crucial issue as to whether
Moslem and non-Moslems should
vote in the same or separate
electorates.
Constitutional Progress
Prime Minister Chaudhri
Mohammad Ali's unrelenting
pressure on the Constituent
Assembly has resulted in ap-
proval of all but a few clauses
of the draft constitution.
The most serious challenge
of the constitution was the
United Front's threat to with-
draw from the government coa-
lition and to join the opposi-
tion Awami League to form a
united East Pakistani resist-
ance to the passage of the
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Interdir Minister r United Front Leader
Fazinl hurl
Designation of Pakistan
as an "Islamic Republic" and
denial of the presidency to
anyone except a Moslem are im-
portant and potentially dan-
gerous concessions to extremist
religious groups. Mirza has
steadfastly opposed these pro-
visions and has managed to de-
lay the crucial second read-
ing of them in the assembly,
but Chaudhri Mohammad All and
other West Pakistani politica.ns
who have been using the ortho-
dox elements to increase their
power have been afraid to in-
sist on a secular constitution.
Inclusion of the Moslem
provisions will continue to
isolate the large Hindu minor-
ity in East Pakistan and has
already resulted in the three
Hindu minority parties instruct-
ing their ministers to resign
from the central and East Pak-
istani governments.
Opposition in East Pakistan
This Hindu withdrawal, to-
gether with the defection of
some key Moslem leaders of the
United Front, leaves less than
half of the East Pakistani mem-
bers of the assembly in favor
of the constitution and lends
support to the charge that the
document is being imposed on
East Pakistan. The opposition
is carefully recording this fact
by demanding roll-call votes
on all important issues. Polit-
ical posters to this effect are
reportedly already appearing
in East Pakistan. The intensity
of this opposition makes the
fall of the United Front pro-
vincial government in East Pak-
istan likely if the provincial
assembly convenes as scheduled
in mid-March.
The fall of the East Pak-
istani government may be pre-
vented by the appointment of
Fazlul Huq as governor and by
dissolution of the provincial
assembly, with the present min-
istry continuing as a caretaker
government. This presumably
would be less inflammatory than
direct rule by the central gov-
ernment, which could also be
undertaken. Nevertheless, the
struggle between the eastern
and western parts of the country
will probably be renewed almost
immediately after passage of
the constitution on the issues
of joint Hindu-Moslem.or sepa-
rate electorates and the selec-
tion of a provisional president
of Pakistan.
Most West Pakistani lead-
ers favor some kind of Moslem
Awami League Chief
Hussein Shahid Suhrawardy
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state and separate electorates.
East Pakistan is eager for a
joint electorate to erase Hindu-
Moslem divisions and to enable
formation of a united East Pak-
istani bloc.
Political Struggle
The challenge of discon-
tent in East Pakistan will
have to be met in the first
national election under the
constitution. This election,
which is supposed to take place
within a year after approval
of the constitution, appears
to be the opportunity that op-
position leader Suhrawardy now
hopes to seize to effect his
Moslem League President
Abdur Rab Nishtar
return to national prominence.
He alone has support in both
parts of the country, and he
alone has championed East Pak-
istan in the debate on the con-
stitution.
The present leaders of the
Karachi government have little
reason to look forward to an
election. Mirza has no polit-
ical following, and although
his selection as first provi-
sional president is likely, he
is apparently already being by-
passed by politicians maneuver-
ing for power in West Pakistan.
Chaudhri Mohammad Ali also
has little popular support. Al-
though he now seems to be in
alliance with newly elected
Moslem League president Nishtar
and seasoned Punjabi leader'Daul-
tana, he may find himself dis-
carded if the outcome of the
election raises the possibility
of his replacement as prime
minister.
Prospects
Consequently, it seems un-
likely that the Pakistani gov-
ernment's stability will be in-
creased by adoption of a con-
stitution. Development of the
economy will still have to be
West Pakistan Finance Minister
Mian Mumtaz Daultana
designed to meet the demands
of various political groups
rather than the needs of the
nation, and neutralist senti-
ment is apt to. increase in the
absence of a broadly based gov-
ernment capable of committing
the country to a strong and
definite foreign policy. While
Pakistan is unlikely to abrogate
its already established ties
with the West, it appears that
the high point of political
and military co-operation
with the United States may
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SOUTH KOREA'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Pre-election political
maneuvering in South Korea is
centered on competition for
the vice-presidential nomination
of the dominant Liberal Party.
A party convention to name the
candidates is reportedly planned
for 5-6 March and the election
for some time in May.
Rhee's Role
The assumption that 80-
year-old President Rhee will
be re-elected but will not
live out his four-year term
has made the vice presidency
the immediate goal of South
Korean politicians.
Split-ticket voting being
permitted, it would theoret-
ically be possible for Presi-
dent Rhee to be re-elected
with a member of the opposition
as vice president. However,
although, Liberal Party officials
have reportedly expressed con-
cern over popular gains by the
opposition, the fact that the
Liberal Party controls patron-
age and the instruments of co-
ercion make its retention of
both posts likely.
Any Liberal vice-presi-
dential nominee will benefit
from identification with Rhee,
who, although the target of
increasing criticism since the
armistice, is still regarded
as the embodiment of Korea's
national aspirations. None-
theless, should Rhee pass over
party chairman Yi Ki-pung, re-
garded as the leading contender
for the vice presidency, disap-
pointment among Yi's followers
could disrupt the party organi-
zation. In 1948 and 1952 Rhee
chose weak running mates rather
than risk any challenge to his
authority.
Liberal Party Tactics
In 1952 Rhee received 75
percent of the popular vote in
an election in which the free
ballot was considerably neutral-
ized by the intimidation of
antiadministration groups.
Such tactics may be kept to a
minimum this year in view of
the increased efficiency of
the Liberal Party organization
and the country's greater in-
ternal stability.
Opposition Groups
The main opposition to
the Liberal Party comes from
the Democratic Party--whose
considerable popular support
is somewhat offset by rivalries
--and from the incipient Republi-
can Party, which may endorse
Rhee but compete for the vice
presidency. The Liberals are
portraying Rhee as the person
most qualified to deal with
American officials; and Am-
bassador Yang in Washington
has stated that American aid
to South Korea would end if
Rhee were not re-elected.
Meanwhile, the possibility
that the recent assassination
of South Korea's counterintelli-
gence chief was politically
motivated has brought into the
open a power struggle between
two factions: a moderate, pro-
American group centering about
Yi Ki-pung, Defense Minister
Son and Army Chief of Staff
Chong; and a group which includes
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Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman
Yi Hyong-kun and Republican
Party leader Yi Pom-sok. The
time remaining before the Lib-
eral Party convention is likely
to see various opposition and
Liberal Party factions in
eleventh-hour attempts to block
the vice-presidential aspira-
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tions of Yi Ki-pung.
THE DILEMMA OF SOVIET LITERARY POLICY
Continuing debate in Soviet
publications on the problems of
Soviet literature shows that
official policy toward the arts
remains unsettled. Differences
of opinion as to the extent to
which the party should regulate
creative activity, evident with-
in the literary fraternity for
some time, may be reaching into
the upper levels of the party
as well.
Propaganda Instruments
The regime has always rec-
ognized literature as a vital
instrument of propaganda, and
Soviet writers, whom Stalin
called "engineers of the human
soul,t" are considered employees
of the state just as much as
factory managers. In recent
years, however, the popular ap-
peal, and therefore the effec-
tiveness, of the officially
subsidized product has notice-
ably declined. Frequent signs
of impatience among creative
artists with the deadening re-
straints imposed by the party
and of consumer resistance to
a. dull product have presented
the regime with a dilemma--how
to maintain ideological con-
formity without choking off all
creative inventiveness.
The violent postwar liter-
ary purge directed by the late
politburo member, Andrei Zhdanov,
which attempted to place Soviet
literature in a rigid party
strait jacket, had run its
course before 1952. Deliver-
ing the central committee re-
ports to the 19th Party Con-
gress, in October 1952, Georgi
Malenkov scored the prevalence
of hack writing and called on
Soviet writers to give their
work more variety and interest.
He suggested a revival of
satire as a means of exposing
the "negative" in Soviet life.
While moving away from the ex-
tremes of the "Zha.ndovshchina,"
however, he emphasized that
the basic standard of Soviet
literature was "party-minded-
ness."
Appeals for Relaxation
Following Stalin's death,
there were signs of a changed
atmosphere. During the period
of the so-called "thaw" in late
1953 and early 1954, there were
several rather bold appeals for
a relaxation of political con-
trols over the arts. In the
spring and summer of 1954 the
regime answered with an emphatic
"no." Total repression was not
revived, however, and the
Second Congress of the Union
of Soviet Writers, which met
in December 1954, heard a
relatively uninhibited expres-
sion of divergent views.
Discussion at the congress
steered clear of the basic
issue of political control,
but frequently called for
greater aesthetic latitude and
a more imaginative approach
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1 March 1956
within the orthodox political
framework. The defenders of
the status quo counterattacked,
but in the absence of an au-
thoritative pronouncement from
the party, the congress ended
on an inconclusive note.
During 1955, the debate
between the "conformists" and
the "reformists" continued at
literary conferences and in the
Soviet press. The argument
ostensibly centered around
questions of aesthetics, that
is, how much latitude of style
and method a writer may exer-
cise in his portrayal of "so-
cialist reality." However,
behind the narrower issue of
style, argued out in the tech-
nical jargon of Marxist liter-
ary criticism, a faction of
Soviet writers who are chafing
at the bit of party control
may be raising the question of
substance.
Literary Gazette Editorial
A clear statement of the
conformist position can be
found in an editorial which
appeared in Literary Gazette
in April 1955. Socialist
realism permits originality
of form and style, the editori-
al contended, and no one seeks
to impose a single, inflexible
standard. "But," it continued,
"diversity is not omnivorous-
ness, diffuseness.....It is
necessary that the diversity
of means of which art disposes
should serve one purpose--the
affirmation of socialist life,
of socialist ideology."
Author: "Tell me, when are you going to publish my novel?"
Publisher: "Soon ...We are already writing up the last chapters..."
(From Krokodil)
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Articles published in
Pravda and Literary Gazette in
November 19i , on the M th an-
niversary of the publication of
Lenin's work on Bolshevik lit-
erature, likewise strongly re-
affirmed the propagandistic
function of Soviet literature.
They referred to the militant
Zhdanov decrees on culture,
asserting that they would re-
main the basis of party policy
for a long time to come.
Kommunist Editorial
Ignoring these strictures,
however, an editorial in the
December issue of the party's
theoretical journal, Kommunist,
carried the claims for aesthet-
ic flexibility further than any-
thing that had appeared in the
party press since the end of
World War II. Without mention-
ing Malenkov, the editorial dis-
cussed and took issue with many
of the views expressed by him
at the 19th Party Congress.
While not denying its
political function, the article
argued that literature is a
unique.-form of expression and
is not''bound by the rules of
exposition applied in the social
science's. The creative writer
should, in other words, have
some freedom to decide how his
message is to be presented. A
strictly literal interpretation
of official literary precepts
can lead to schematization and
oversimplification which, the
author implied, are among the
major defects of Soviet litera-
ture
It is the writer's duty to
portray what is typical in So-
viet life, the article conceded,
out it is not tree, as Malenkov
asserted in his party congress
speech, that only that which
corresponds to "the essence of
a given social force" is typi-
cal. Literature should, in-
stead, reflect actuality in a
"concretely sensuous form, em-
bodying the general in what is
individual." Stripped of its
Marxian terminology, this a-
mounted to a 'ball for humanized
characters living in a recog-
nizable world instead of stere-
otyped party paragons acting
out abstract Communist formulas,
Equally narrow and harmful
is the approach which equates
"typical" and "party-minded,"
Kommunist continued, again tak-
ing issue with Malenkov. It is
not true, the article argued,
that the merit of a creative
work depends at all times and
all places on the extent to
which it applies a conventional
party analysis to every politi-
cal, social and economic prob-
lem. Some of the works of pre-
revolutionary writers and of
contemporary foreign writers,
for example, can be called
"progressive" even though they
do not have a strictly Marxian
point of view.
The argument was carried
no further than this. It is
not clear whether the author
was suggesting indirectly that
Soviet literature should be
judged by the same standards.
On this point nevertheless he
had at least skirted a basic
issue, for it is insistence
on "party-mindedness" which
lies at the core of party con-
trol of the arts.
Issue Remains Unsettled
Expression of these views
in Kommunist, and subsequently
in the regional press where
the editorial was republished,
suggest that they have some
support within the party. The
rejection of views expressed
by Malenkov may be an attempt
to saddle him with responsi-
bility for the woes of Soviet
literature. It seems more
likely, however, that the at-
tack was directed against the
literary position represented
by Stalin and Zhdanov, and may
have been intended as a state-
ment that the present leadership
dissociates itself from the re-
strictive policies of the past.
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The issue has-not been
settled in favor of a relaxa-
tion and liberalization of
literary policy. The keynote
speeches at the recent regional
party congresses, for example,
gave no hints of a softer line.
A. I. Kirichenko, a member of
the all-Union party presidium
and first secretary of the
Ukrainian party, speaking to
the Ukrainian congress, on the
contrary, asked the party to
increase its influence on
literature. He noted a slack-
ening in "implementation of the
historical decisions of the
CPSU concerning literature and
the arts--decisions which have
formulated principles of party
policy in ideological work," a
reference to the Zhdanov de-
crees.
The Soviet press only
recently attacked a prominent
writer who, following the
party's demand for exposure of
"negative outlook" and "bour-
geois survivals," had written
a novel on life in the new ag-
ricultural lands which over-
emphasized the "negative."
Past experience should have
taught Soviet writers to move
carefully until a clear, un-
ambigious line has been laid
down by the party.
State Continues Control
The regime, recognizing the
value of literature as a medium
of persuasion among a people
which still has memories of a
splendid literary tradition,
may be tempted to make limited
concessions in order to lift
Soviet literature from its
present depressed state and to
prevent erosion of the alle-
giance of its intelligentsia.
Literature in the USSR, however,
always has been the servant of
the state and Soviet writers
will be expected to stay within
party-defined limits.
Khrushchev, in his speech
to the party congress, made it
clear that, during a period
when a limited extension of
cultural interchange with the
West has been allowed in the
interest of propaganda and dip-
lomatic objectives, the party
must guard against a relaxation
of ideological discipline and
the infiltration of "alien" in-
fluiices. The search for a
more tolerable balance between
ideological conformity and
artistic creativity remains,
therefore, a troublesome
problem for the regime.
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