CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000800070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO.
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
;EEKLY
SUMMARY
OCI NO. 1779/56
26 April 1956
Document No. ------ ------------ --------------
[} Declas
Cla S. Ch ed
Nex Re
Auth. A 70-3
Date:
By: ----------
Document No. ----------1_-
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No Change In Class. 0
^ Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS S
f'ext Review Date: --------
t HR 70-3
tz: Z.v j 9 By:I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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tOflDENT1AL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
THE WEEK' IN BRIEF
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Arab-Israeli border tension has been reduced following
the 18 April cease-fire agreement between Egypt and Israel.
Israel considers the UN-sponsored arrangement only a
"postponement of war" and has not demobilized first-line
military units or reduced civilian control measures. The
Egyptian government is continuing its activities among
the Arab states and has issued a statement that arms shi -
ments from the Soviet bloc will proceed.. 25X1
THE BRITISH POSITION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Britain sees its position throughout the Middle East
threatened by Egypt's increasingly energetic anti-British
activity, but is encouraged by developments at the recent
Baghdad pact council meeting. Britain particularly
welcomes the American announcement of association with
the pact's economic committee.
BULGANIN-KHR.USHCHEV VISIT
TO BRITAIN . . . . . .
Bulganin and Khrushchev appear to be surprised and
frustrated by the cool reception they have been receiving,
both in their public appearances in Britain and in
private conferences with British leaders. Khrushchev has
shown his irritation by intemperate. and even threatening
remarks. His speech at a Labor Party dinner, which
antagonized Labor leaders,'e4ded in a fiasco, and may
have undermined the Soviet campaign to promote ties with
Western European Socialists;
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
NEW SOVIET OVERTURES
TO TURKEY AND IRAN . .
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The USSR apparently hopes that its recent diplomatic
and economic overtures to Turkey and Iran will undermine
Turkey's role in NATO and weaken the allegiance of both
Turkey and Iran to the Baghdad pact. Moscow probably
believes it can convince Turkey that its commitments to
Western defense planning have been outdated by the-
Bulganin-Khrushchev foreign policies and are a useless
drain on its economic resources. The two-week visit of
the Shah to the Soviet Union in June will provide the
Russians with an opportunity to shake the present Iranian
g
overnment's determination to stick with the West.
r- I
Page 1
NEW ARAB ALLIANCE
DIRECTED AGAINST BRITAIN Page
. . . . . . . . . . . .
The recent accession of Yemen to the Egyptian-Saudi-
Syrian military alliance contributes'little to the Arab
military potential against Israel. It does, however,
portend increasing Arab harassment of the British position
on the littoral from Aden to the head of the Persian Gulf.
WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS
IN JERUSALEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The "emergency" session of the 24th World Zionist
Congress, which opened in,Jerusalem on 24 April, devoted
the first part of its discussions to Israel's security
position as affected by the Soviet bloc arms deal with
Egypt. The assembling of 500 delegates from some 50
countries gives Israel an opportunity to mobilize Zionist
support and to make use of this world-wide influence and
GREEK GOVERNMENT CRISIS . . . . Page 5
The crisis facing Greek prime minister Karamanlis
as a result of Cypriot charges that Foreign Minister
Theotokis was lax in pressing for Cypriot self-deter-
mination will probably end the government's moderation on
the Cyprus issue. Karamanlis will probably be forced to
take stronger action on Cyprus or risk losing control of
the government to extremists.
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26 April 1956
DISARMAMENT, AND GERMANY'S NATO TIES . . . . . . . Page 6
In recent weeks there have been new expressions of
sentiment in both West Germany and France in favor of a
neutralized, unified Germany. The West German Free
Democrats appear to be drifting toward the Social
Democratic position that West Germany would be better
off outside NATO, and important elements in France are
pressing for new overtures to Moscow and a reassessment
of the German situation.
POLICIES OF
THE NEW CEYLONESE GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
'Prime Minister Bandaranaike intends to permit his
coalition government to move gradually to the'left, both
in domestic matters and in foreign relations. While he
may move to exchange diplomatic missions with the USSR
and Communist China, he has indicated that he will wait
until after the Commonwealth conference in June before
committing himself', on the questions of British bases and
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SINGAPORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Negotiations on self-government for Singapore,
which opened in London on 23 April, probably will fail
if Chief Minister Marshall perbists in pressing last-
minute demands, including one for local control of in-
ternal security. The British fear that the local
elected ministers would be unable to preserve order and
the island might fall under Communist control. Should
the negotiations fail, Communist-inspired disorders in
the colony are likely, and these could lead to reimposition
of direct rule by the British.
AFGHANISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . Page 9
Afghan prime minister Maud apparently intends to
encourage the United States and the Soviet bloc to
compete in offering aid to Afghanistan in the belief
that expanded ties with both sides will ensure
Afghanistan's independence as well as its economic
development, However, Kabul's heavy commitments to the
bloc and Daud's objective of building strength against
Pakistan may make,it increasingly difficult for
Afghanistan to maintain freedom of action..
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26 April 1956
SOVIET-JAPANESE FISHING TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
By issuing a decree putting teeth into the North
Pacific fishing restrictions to be enforced on 15 May,
the Soviet Union has indicated that it will follow a
tough policy in the Moscow fishing talks with Japan.
Moscow is probably trying to put pressure on Japan to
resume diplomatic relations with the USSR.
ANTI-STALINISM DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Developments in the USSR in the past two weeks
suggest that the Soviet leaders are trying to work out
a middle course between the "liberalism" engendered by
the anti-Stalin campaign and the need to preserve party
discipline and maintain the position of the present
leadership. A speech by Pravda editor Shepilov noted
the importance of "the row-the chiefs and leaders,"
and articles in Pravda and _Party Life condemned "anti-
party statements b Soviet o-fiici . At the same
time, administrative measures were undertaken to control
the work of Soviet state security organs to prevent a
repetition of the abuses of the Stalin era.
ANTI-STALINISM CAMPAIGN
IN POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
The Polish regime, apparently to demonstrate that
a new era of legality and freedom of expression has
opened, has dismissed seven high officials associated
closely in the public mind with responsibility for the
injustices of the Stalin era. Similar removals rently
are beginning in Czechoslovakia.
EAST GERMANY
MAY TIGHTEN BORDER CONTROLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Additional border controls may be imposed by the
East German regime before the May Day holiday in an
effort to reduce the increasing flow of refugees. The
confusion and movement in connection with the holiday
would provide opportunities for flight to the West
unless tighter border controls were effected. The May
Day celebration probably will emphasize civilian rather
than military aspects of East German life. C
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GOOD-WILL VISITS
OF SOVIET NAVY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The USSR is scheduled to conduct exchange naval
visits with the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway
in July and August. The purpose of these visits is not
only to impress the small nations with Soviet good will
but also with Soviet naval strength in European waters.
LABOR UNREST IN SPAIN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The strike wave in northern Spain is the latest
manifestation of the workers' discontent over the rising
cost of living. The discontent has been increasingly
vocal since the fall of 1955, and further unrest is
likely unless the government carries out its promise to
keep prices down.
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POLITICAL TENSION IN PARAGUAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
dissatisfaction with the government and economic conditions.
The outlawed Communist Party in Paraguay is reported
planning a general strike on 1 May to exploit rising
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE CHANGING ROLE OF NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic
Council on 4-6 May will take place amid widespread
criticism of NATO as inadequate for countering Soviet
expansion under the changed military and political
conditions of 1956. Most of the criticism focuses on
NATO's lack of political unity and direction. The
council meeting, which will be attended by foreign
ministers only, will concern itself with political and
economic rather than military matters in a search for
more effective methods of achieving political co-
CURRENT.INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
CURRENT SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The rapid growth of Soviet industry will continue
and the USSR will probably meet the industrial goals of
the Sixth Five-Year Plan. Further forced expansion of
the Soviet economy from what is already a large indus-
trial base will require intensified development of raw
material and energy sources, involving high capital out-
lays in these fields.
OUTER MONGOLIA . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet leader Mikoyan's visit to Ulan Bator in
early April and the conclusion of an aid agreement
between the USSR and Outer Mongolia underscore Moscow's
continuing predominance in the development ox Outer
Mongolia. Of special interest to the USSR are the oil
and mineral resources in the country, now being in-
creasingly exploited as a result of the completion of
the Trans-Mongolian Railroad. Despite Chinese Communist
interest in Outer Mongolia, traditionally Chinese
territory, Peiping shows no present inclination to press
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
The 18 April cease-fire
agreement between Egypt and
Israel negotiated by UN secre-
tary general Hammarskjold has
resulted in a noticeable decline
of tension between Israel and
the Arab states. Only a few
incidents of shooting across
the Israeli-Egyptian borders
have been reported in recent
days, although a serious vio-
lation occurred on tiie Israeli-
Jordanian border on 23 April.
Israeli officials feel a
crisis with Egypt has been
averted temporarily but contend
that. the UN cease-fire is only
a "postponement of war," since
the basic issues in the Arab-
Israeli dispute have not been
resolved and the arms imbalance
remains. Israel continues to
maintain all first-line military
and support groups on extended
active duty and to keep in ef-
fect civilian control measures
aimed at war mobilizaiion.
staff of the Arab Legion, is
scheduled to arrive in Cairo
this week. Lebanon is under
pressure from Saudi Arabia and
Egypt to finalize a Lebanese-
Syrian military alliance, which
has been under discussion for
the past several months.
Reaction to Soviet Statement
The Soviet statement of 17
April has been met with cautious
encouragement in Israel, and
with dismay and uncertainty in
the Arab states.
Israeli officials felt the
statement "marked a certain
change" but doubted that it
represented a permanent shift.
Foreign Minister Sharett warned
parliament on 23 April that it
might foster rather than pre-
vent war if it resulted in an
arms freeze before the gap be-?
tween Israeli and Arab strength
was closed.
Hammarskjold, after discus-
sions in Syria, is now in Jordan
in an attempt to obtain addi-
tional cease-fire arrangements.
An agreement between Israel and
Syria has become more difficult
to achieve because both states
have injected into the border
discussions the problem of the
Jordan River diversionary canal.
Israel has announced its inten-
tion of resuming work this sea-
son on the canal within the
demilitarized zone at Banat
Yacov, and Syria is making a
cease-fire agreement conditional
on the guarantee that Israel
will be prohibited from further
work on the proposed canal.
A military delegation from
Jordan, led by the chief of
In the Arab states, offi-
cial reaction was limited and
somewhat cautious but reflected
the sharply adverse press re-
action in which even some of
the pro-Soviet, anti-Western
press attacked the statement.
Some papers found in it a pos-
sible indication that their
recently found champion was
plotting with the West to the
detriment of the Arab cause,
and that the Arabs would be
forced to settle with Israel.
Some saw it as a Russian move
to gain a voice in the Middle
East and an end to unilateral
action by the West. Most of
the Arab press emphasized that
the Arabs now could not depend
on either East or West.
S Yjkl Eli.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
Izvestia.att.empted on 21
April to_clarify the statement
and.perhaps to mollify the Arabs
by explaining that the USSR had
intended to ensure calm on the
demarcation line, not: to recog-
nize.it as a permanent boundary.
Moscow. thus .put- itself , on record
as standing for peace in the.
area and, simultaneously, left
the way clear for supporting
Arab territorial demands against
the Israelis in any forthcoming
negotiations in the United Na-
tions. Two days later, in an
apparent attempt to soften Arab
disappointment, the Egyptian
and Syrian governments informed
the press that the USSR had as-
sured them that the declaration
did not indicate a change in its
policy toward the Arabs and
that it would continue to arm
them as before.
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THE BRITISH POSITION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Though somewhat encouraged
by developments at the recent
Baghdad pact council meeting,
Britain sees its position
throughout the Middle East
threatened by increasingly en-
ergetic anti-British activity
by Egypt.
Views on Baghdad Pact
The British feel the coun-
cil meeting on 16-19 April
made some progress in strength-
ening the Baghdad pact. They
were particularly encouraged
by the American announcement
of association with the pact's
Economic Committee. A Foreign
Office official remarked that
he thought there was now no
question of the pact
breaking up "in the
near future." Earli-
er statements show,
however, that the
British believe that
over the long term,
London and Washington
will have to rely
heavily on economic
assistance to con-
vince the Arabs of
the advantages of co-
operating with the
West.
Specifically, the British
seem to have in mind regional
economic plans, such as the
technical assistance board
suggested by London on 31
March but not further pursued
at the council meeting.
Britain is especially anx-
ious to provide tangible bene-
fits to Iraq, the sole Arab
member of the pact and the
locus of major British oil in-
terests. London is preparing
a sizable arms shipment to
Iraq, apparently including ar-
mored cars or tanks, and pre-
sumably will make additional
arms available on the occasion
of King Faisal's visit to Lon-
don in July.
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Relations With Egypt
Britain's relations with
Egypt have steadily deteriorated.
Cairo's virulent anti-Western
propaganda on Cyprus, East
Africa, and Bahrein, combined
with other hostile Egyptian
actions since Foreign Secretary
Lloyd talked with Premier Nasr
in early March, have apparently
convinced the British that
Nasr will not now co-operate
with them.
On 25 March the Foreign
Office took the unusual step
of publicly criticizing Nasr
for having broken a promise
to Lloyd to restrain propaganda
hostile to Britain and its
Baghdad pact allies. Although
Cairo radio broadcasts have
since been less anti-British in
tone, the British attitude
regarding Nasr has not changed
significantly.
abandoned for the present any
attempt to influence Nasr di-
rectly on the Israeli question.
BULGANIN-KHRUSHCHEV VISIT
TO BRITAIN
Bulganin and Khrushchev
appear to be surprised and
frustrated by the cool reception
they have been receiving, both
in their public appearances in
Jordan and Saudi Arabia
Toward Jordan, Britain
is evidently taking a cautious
approach, announcing on 18
April that 27 or 28 British
officers will continue to be
assigned to the Arab Legion.
Britain is also trying to en-
courage closer relations between
Amman and Baghdad.
At the moment, however,
London is concerned that its
position in the talks in Riyadh
on the Buraimi question.. now
scheduled to begin on 27 April
will appear to have been seri-
ously weakened by the Egypt-
Yemen-Saudi Arabia defense
alliance and Saudi-backed,
Yemini pressure on the British
Britain and in private con-
ferences with British' leaders.
Official British fears that
the visit would appear like
a triumphant tour have proved
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
to be groundless, as for the
most part crowds have greeted
the Soviet leaders in silence
or with more jeers than cheers.
Khrushchev has shown his
irritation by intemperate and
even threatening remarks which
appear to have been spontaneous
rather than deliberate and
which have in turn increased
the coolness of the British
reception. These remarks are
in contrast with the care-
fully prepared statements read
by Khrushchev and Bulganin.
Labor Party Reaction
The dinner with top Labor
Party leaders on 23 April was
a fiasco from the Soviet point
of view which may undermine
the Soviet program to estab-
lish ties with West European
Socialists and to promote the
popular front concept. Khru-
shchev antagonized the Labor
leaders by repeating the
charges he made in India that
Britain and France had urged
Hitler to attack the USSR,
and by defending the Stalin-
Hitler pact. He further
angered them by warning that
if the West persisted in re-
arming West Germany, the USSR
would have no alternative but
to seek an alliance with those
forces in West Germany who
desire an alliance. He added
the threat that the USSR had
"plenty of space to experiment
with the hydrogen bomb."
The British Labor leaders
replied with a plea for the
release of Social Democrats
and trade unionists in the
USSR and the Satellites, which
Khrushchev angrily rejected.
Khrushchev was overheard to
say that he found it "much
easier to talk to the Con-
servatives than to the British
Labor Party." His surprise
and anger at the Laborites'
attitude was matched by their
disgust at his performancp,
and one described him privately
as a "simple-minded" man who
would be capable of holding
only a secondary position in a
British trade union.
Disarmament
In the private discussions
of the disarmament problem,
the Soviet leaders have so
far made no new proposals for
the resolution of differences
between the Soviet and Western
approaches in the UN Disarma-
ment Subcommittee in London.
The British representative on
the subcommittee, Anthony
Nutting, told his Western
colleagues on 23 April that
the Russians appear to be
"fed up" with the subcommittee
and are very suspicious of the
Western position. Khrushchev
took the lead in attacking the
American aerial inspection
proposal, charging that it was
designed solely to take photo-
graphs of the USSR for target
and espionage purposes.
The Soviet leaders re-
peated Gromyko's explanation
to the subcommittee that nu-
clear disarmament provisions
had been omitted from the USSR's
27 March proposals because
previous negotiations had
proved it was impossible to
solve nuclear and conventional
problems simultaneously. They
showed no interest in any
Western ideas for a partial
approach to disarmament and
insisted that the Western
powers had made any agreement
more difficult by retreating
from their earlier positions.
Soviet Propaganda Treatment
Soviet propaganda organs
have viewed the visit through
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
rose-colored glasses, report-
ing thousands of cheering
Britains welcoming Bulganin
and Khrushchev in their public
appearances. The voluminous
propaganda coverage has ad-
mitted that they have been
greeted with "occasional
hostile shouts" and some anti-
Soviet posters carried by
"hooligans," and has attributed
this hostility to "certain
press organs." Nothing has
been reported in Moscow about
the Labor Party dinner. Al-
though Khrushchev's Birmingham
speech has received heavy play
in Soviet organs, his reference 25X1
to a missile with a hydrogen
warhead has been deleted from
the Soviet version.
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26 April 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
NEW SOVIET OVERTURES
TO TURKEY AND IRAN
The USSR apparently hopes
that its recent diplomatic and
economic overtures to Turkey
and Iran will undermine Tur-
key's role in NATO and weaken
the allegiance of both Turkey
and Iran to the Baghdad pact.
Moscow probably believes it can
convince Turkey that its com-
mitments to Western defense
planning have been outdated
by the Bulganin-Khrushchev
foreign policies and are a
useless drain on its economic
resources. The two-week visit
of the Shah to the Soviet Union
in June will provide the USSR
with an opportunity to shake
the present Iranian government's
determination to stick with
the West.
Turkey
Moscow has increased its
diplomatic attention to the
Turks, especially since the
first of the year, and has re-
peatedly offered economic as-
sistance aimed primarily at ex-
ploiting Turkey's economic cri-
sis. Mikoya.n reportedly told
Turkey's Prime Minister Menderes
in Karachi during the Pakistani
Republic Day ceremonies that
Turkish membership in NATO and
the Baghdad pact was no obstacle.
to improving Soviet-Turkish re-
lations.
He suggested an exchange
of visits and repeated Soviet
offers of unconditional finan-
cial and economic assistance.
Mikoyan referred to Khrushchev's
acknowledgment of Soviet re-
sponsibility for the rupture
in Soviet-Turkish relations,
elaborated on by Pravda and
Izvestia editoria s, as proof
ofthe USSR's good intentions.
Turkish foreign minister
Koprulu told the American em-
bassy in Ankara on 11 April
that the Soviet commercial at-
tache had said the USSR is
willing to be more generous
with economic and technical aid
for Turkey than for India,.
Burma or Afghanistan.
Koprulu also confirmed
that the Soviet attache had
approached the president of the
Turkish Chamber of Commerce--
who is also head-of the Is
Bankasi, which finances much
of Turkey's business--with an
offer to "put Turkish business
back on its feet" by credits
and outright gifts. The Soviet
attache then invited the Turk-
ish businessman and his friends
to come to the USSR and see
for themselves what the Soviet
Union could do.
These approaches to the
Turks have made it clear that
the USSR has abandoned its
territorial claims against Tur-
key and that for the present
at least the system for control-
ling the Turkish straits is sat-
isfactory to Moscow. The Soviet
ambassador in Karachi told the
Turkish ambassador there on 9
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
April that the USSR claimed
nothing from Turkey except free
passage through the Dardanelles,
"which already exists." He add-
ed that the USSR, like Ataturk,
was following a policy of keep-
ing within its own boundaries.
There appears to be a grow-
ing belief in Moscow that the
Soviet campaign is bearing fruit.
Pravda on 3 April declared
"There is already a large meas-
ure of recognition in Turkey of
the importance of establishing
good-neighborly relations and,
particularly, economic contacts
with the USSR, and it is the'
historic principles, approved by
the Bandung conference, which
Turkey attended among others,
that can and should be taken as
a guide for such relations."
Some top-level Turkish officials
have termed the Communist prop-
aganda campaign aimed at Turkey
as "brilliant."
Moscow apparently is pre-
paring--as the Shah suspects--
to present a case for closer
political and economic relations
with Iran, and may make offers
which the Shah will find diffi-
cult to reject when he visits
the USSR in June. The Shah
told ambassador Chapin on 9
April that Mikoyan had admitted
to past errors and expressed
interest in the Shah's visit.
Moscow has also invited
officials of the Iranian national
bank to visit the Soviet Union..
The visit ostensibly is for an
inspection of Soviet banking
establishments, but Moscow may
make offers of financial and
economic assistance to Iran.
The Soviet leaders may believe
reports of these offers would
reach the Iranian public and
weaken the Shah's determination
to avoid closer ties with Moscow.
NEW ARAB ALLIANCE
DIRECTED AGAINST BRITAIN
The recent accession of
Yemen to the Egyptian-Saudi-
Syrian military alliance con-
tributes little to the Arab
military potential against
Israel. It does, however, por-
tend increasing Arab harassment
of the British position on the
littoral from Aden to the head
of the Persian Gulf.
Saudi Arabia and Yemen are
currently involved in serious
disputes of sovereignty with
Britain over the Buraimi Oasis
and boundaries of the western
Aden Protectorate. The Arabs
have been encouraged by the
receipt of large quantities of
modern Soviet arms, together
with promises of diplomatic
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26 April 1956
support, and by indications of
Britain's deteriorating power
position.
Yemen
Yemeni intrigues against
British influence have recently
increased in the territory of
the Aden Protectorate where the
tribal leaders have received
British subsidy and protection
for over 100 years.
In mid-April, following
a Yemeni attack on an outpost
in the western Aden Protectorate,
British authorities sent the
usual warning of retaliation if
Yemeni forces were not withdrawn
from the protectorate by 23
April. Shortly before the dead-
line, however, the British gover-
nor of Aden is reported to have
canceled the warning and agreed
to discussions with Yemen.
Saudi Arabia
The British proposal to
hold talks with Yemen is com-.
elementary to British plans to
open discussions with Saudi.
Arabia in Jidda on about 26
April. These will be concerned
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26 April 1956
with sovereignty over the Buraimi
Oasis in southeast Arabia, which
was occupied last fall by Brit-
ish-led forces of the sultan of
Muscat.
WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS
IN JERUSALEM
The "emergency" session
of the 24th World Zionist Con-
gress, which opened in Jeru-
salem on 24 April, devoted the
first part of its discussions
to Israel's security position
as affected by the Soviet bloc
arms deal with Egypt. The as-
sembling of 500 delegates from
some 50 countries gives Israel
an opportunity to mobilize Zion-
ist support and to make use of
this world-wide influence and
political strength.
This source of strength
plus a demonstration of support
for Israel by the congress may
exert.a restraining influence
on Israel. At the same time,
the Israeli government will
maintain that it, and not the
congress, is the final authority
on the country's domestic and
foreign policies.
The World Zionist Organi-
zation, founded in Basle in
1897, is an international body
of Zionist federations in near-
ly all countries of the world
with Jewish populations. Its
original mission was to help
"establish for the Jewish people
a public and legally assured
home in Palestine." In 1954,
its functions and status in re-
lation to Israel were redefined:
the Near East.
Under these circumstances,
prospects for a negotiated
solution of the disputes do
not appear favorable. The
British seem to be exercising
restraint in the awareness
that any direct military in-
tervention to support the sub-
sidized tribes could be detri-
mental to their larger polit-
ical and economic interests in
the organization was to be con-
cerned with immigration, reset-
tlement, material and cultural
development, and the raising
and administration of funds, in
accordance with Israeli laws.
The controlling body, the con-
gress, meets every few years.
There will be no representation
from the Soviet bloc at the
current session.
Agenda
The congress is to devote
about two days to discussing
the present emergency confront-
ing Israel. Seven days or so
will be spent on Zionist work
in general and on the structural
reform of the world organization
and its relations to other Jew-
ish organizations working for
the welfare of Israel. The main
aims will be to find ways of
increasing financial and polit-
ical support of world Jewish
Communities for Israel, and of
accelerating immigration from
among the nearly 500,000 Jews
in North Africa, whose future
is considered insecure.
Congress-Israel Relations
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion
has taken the position in the
past that Zionists outside
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26 April 1956
Israel should have no' voice
in shaping the, state's domestic
or foreign policies and that
the'World Zionist Organization
should not interfere in Israel's
internal affairs. At the same
time, however, Ben-Gurion is
said to feel that the.convoca-
tion of the congress is a spir-
itual and organizational weapon
of such magnitude that he would
be "loath to take action against
the Egyptians without first
having availed himself of this
major source of strength."
The World Zionists are
not under the same emotional
pressures and physical dangers
as the Israelis, and are likely
to be an element of cautious
restraint on the Ben-Gurion
government, which, nevertheless,
will maintain its full control
over Israel's domestic and
foreign policies.
GREEK GOVERNMENT CRISIS
The crisis facing the
Greek government as a result of
charges by the Cyprus ethnarchy
against Foreign Minister Theo-
tokis probably will end the
government's moderation on the
Cyprus issue. The charges that
Theotokis had not pressed suf-
ficiently hard for Cypriot self-
determination appeared editori-
ally in the ethnarchy's press
organ last week and have been
reinforced in Athens by reports
that Archbishop Makarios had
opposed Theotokis' appointment.
The Greek cabinet announced
on 24 April, that it had unani-
mously decided to refuse Theo-'
tokis' resignation and could
not admit outside intervention
in its affairs. Theotokis has
now agreed to stay in office,
although he probably continues
to believe that his retention
will weaken the government's
prestige and eventually result
in forcing it out of office.
Prime Minister Karamanlis'
support of his foreign minister
may enable the government to
weather the present crisis,
but as a result of the Cypriot
press attacks, it will be
forced to adopt a more active
Cyprus policy to forestall now
political attacks.
25X1
Since Theotokis' modera-
tion has not elicited any Brit-
ish move to reopen negotiations
on the Cyprus dispute, pres-
sures for increased moral and
material support to the Cypriot
insurgents will probably be-
come irresistible. Athens
may also be pushed into mak-
ing a dramatic gesture such as
breaking relations with Brit-
ain or again suspending partic-
ipation in NATO. 25X1
Karamanlis is not likely
to countenance any weakening
of Greek ties with the United
States or a. withdrawal from
NATO. If political pressures
force his resignation, however,
the next government would prob-
ably be susceptible to neu-
tralist and anti-Western influ-
ences.
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26 April 1956
DISARMAMENT AND GERMANY'S
NATO TIES
In recent weeks there have
been new expressions of senti-
ment in both West Germany and
France for a neutralized, uni-
fied Germany. The West German
Free Democrats appear to be
drifting toward the Social Demo-
cratic position that West Ger-
many would be better off out-
side NATO, and important ele-
ments in France are pressing
for new overtures to Moscow
and a reassessment of the Ger-
man situation.
Attitude of German-Patties
The "alliance-free" German
Socialists seem likely to get
new support from the Free Demo-
crats (FDP), who, since being
ousted from the Bonn coalition
in February, have embarked on
a vigorous "unification" cam-
paign and are searching for the
Soviet "price." FDP chairman
Dehier, who was re-elected to
his position at the party con-
vention on 20 and 21 April, has
endorsed a unification plan
which begins with Bonn's with-
drawal from NATO.
The FDP convention was
built around the theme of uni-
fication, and Saar leader Hein-
rich Schneider made a demagogic
appeal for direct negotiations
with Moscow and East Germany.
The party also went on record
as opposed to German conscrip-
tion "at the present time."
Chancellor Adenauer's
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
remains a strong supporter of
West Germany's existing ties
with the West.
Like other German parties,
however, the CDU has been fear-
_ful lately that the conclusion
of an international agreement
on disarmament might leave Ger-
many still divided. The CDU
is also anxious to appear no
less vigilant than other parties
in defending Germany's national
interests. Foreign Minister
Brentano, therefore, recently an-
nounced to the press his govern-
nent's intention to present its
views on unification, disarma-
ment and security to Moscow
"very soon." Von Brentano dis-
avowed, however, any intention
of making new proposals or
entering into bilateral negotia-
tions.
French Policy
The Socialist chiefs of the
present French government have
on various recent occasions im-
plied publicly that they are in
basic disagreement with Western
policy on the European security
problem. Ambassador Dillon has
reported his view that they are
prepared to accept a reunified,
neutralized Germany which would
not have exclusive ties with
the West. He believes that
France would link such a status
for Germany to a general dis-
armament agreement with the So-
viet Union.
PremA-er Mollet now says
that the French government's
disarmament policy is based on
the views of Jules Moch, French
delegate to the UN Disarmament
Subcommittee. Fanatically op-
posed to German rearmament, Mach
has long accented disarmament
as the major problem which
must be solved before others,
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26 April 1956
particularly the reunification
of Germany, are attacked.
POLICIES OF
THE NEW CEYLONESE GOVERNMENT
Ceylon's new prime minister,
S. W. R. D. Bandara.naike, has
indicated his intention to main-
tain firm control over his co-
alition government but to per-
mit it to move gradually to the
left both in domestic matters
and in foreign relations.
Composition of Government
Apparently confident of
the strength of his united
front's absolute majority in
the lower house of parliament,
Bandaranaike has made no effort
to seek the support of outside
parties by giving their rep-
resentatives cabinet posts.
With the exception of Commerce
Minister R. G. Senanayake, a.
hotheaded dissident who ran
for election as an independent
after being expelled from Sir
John Kotelawala's United Na-
tional Party, Bandaranaike's
cabinet consists entirely of
united front members. Senana-
y ke, who had been commerce
r._;~ter in Kotelawala's ca.bi-
ne ?; , was returned to that post,
,esurria.bly because of his knowl-
edge of trade arrangements
with Communist China..
Bandaranaike's own Sri
Lanka Freedom Party members
hold all but three of the cabi-
net posts, including the stra-
tegic portfolios of defense,
foreign affairs, home affairs,
finance, posts and broadcasting,
and local government and culture.
Bandarana.ike has given the dif-
ficult posts of industry and
agriculture to Trotskyite mem-
bers of the coalition, who will
have to take the blame for any
failure to make speedy progress
in improving economic conditions.
Aside from Bandaranaike,
only two members of the ca.bine-
are experienced politicians.
These are Agriculture Minister
Gunewardena., a Trotskyite and
former member of the Communist
Party, and Commerce Minister
Senanayake. Several other
cabinet members have records
of sympathy for Communism, mem-
bership in Communist-front organ-
izations, association with the
pro-Communist newspaper Trine,
political support from Commu-
nists, or convictions for cor-
ruption and political mal-
practices.
Early Developments
As evidence of its desire
to satisfy the aspirations of
its followers, Banda.ra.naike's
,government has already decided
to suspend capital punishment
for three years as an experi-
,mental measure and to make May
Day a holiday with full pay for
Ceylonese workers.
The government has also
decided to investigate Voice
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26 April 1956
of America activities in Ceylon,
following a demand by Communist
parliamentary deputy Pieter
Keuneman that the Voice's
broadcasting station be closed
and the activities of the Amer-
ican-sponsored Asia Foundation
ended. Bandaranaike may move
fairly rapidly to exchange dip-
lomatic missions with the USSR
and Communist China and to open
Ceylon to trade and cultural
delegations from the Sino-Soviet
bloc.
On the other hand, the
prime minister has indicated
that he will wait until after
the Commonwealth conference in
London in June before commit-
ting himself on the more im-
portant questions of the with-
drawal of British bases and
Ceylon's status in the Common-
wealth. He already has to deal
in parliament on 2 May with an
official plea from a Tamil
member not to end Britain's base
rights in northern Ceylon with-
out the consent of the Tamil
population of that area. Ban-
daranaike has also said that
nationalization of industry and
plantations must be a gradual
process.
It is not yet certain that
Bandaranaike can resist pressure
from his cabinet for immediate
sweeping changes, especially if
these men themselves are under
pressure from position-seeking 25X1
far leftists, who constitute a- 25X1
bout a quarter of the membershi
of parliament.
Negotiations on self- ov-
ernment for Singapore, which
oji'ened in London on 23 Apri',
probably will fail if Chief
Minister Marshall persists in
pressing last-minute demands--
including one for local control
of internal security. Marshall
has threatened to resign if his
demands are not *et. Should
the talks collapse, Communist-
inspired disorders in the colony
are likely and these could lead
to reimposition of direct rule
by the British.
by April 1957. An anti-Com-
munist, Marshall apparently
Marshall.'s total demands
amount, in effect, to full in-
dependence within the Climnonwealth'
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26 April 1956
hoped that his terms would
undercut the position and the
appeal of the Communist-manipu-
lated People's Action Party
(PAP), which is represented on
Singapore's all-party delega-
tion to London. The PAP draws
its strength from Peiping-ori-
ented Chinese in Singapore's
predominantly Chinese popula-
tion.
The British probably would
compromise on Marshall's de-
mands but would refuse to grant
full responsibility for secu-
rity to elected ministers.
Even if Marshall won the con-
cessions he has asked for, he
would probably soon be forced
from office by left-wing ele-
ments and that it would only
be a matter of time before ef-
fective power would pass into
the hands of the Communists.
Large-scale Communist-in-
fluenced demonstrations have
been planned for May Day and
are expected also on 14 May,
the anniversary of student ar-
rests in 1954 and labor-stu-
dent riots in 1955. Should
the demonstrations be used by
the Communists as occasions to
foment serious disorder, the
AFGHANISTAN
Afghan prime minister Daud
apparently intends to encourage
the United States and the So-
viet bloc to compete in offering
aid to Afghanistan in the be-
lief that expanded ties with
both sides will ensure Afghan-
istan's independence as well
as its economic development.
However, Kabul's heavy
commitments to the bloc and
Daud's objective of building
strength against Pakistan make
it likely that Soviet influence
British are prepared to suspend
the Singapore constitution and
reimpose direct rule.
British Plan
Britain believes the only
solution to the problem of
Singapore self-government is
some form of association of
Singapore with the Federation
of Malaya, where the govern-
ment has strong popular sup-
port and the problem of Commu-
nist subversion has not reached
the dangerous proportions it
has in Singapore. Malaya,
however, refuses to consider
dealing with Singapore's serious
racial and Communist problems
before it achieves independ-
ence itself, probably in August
1957. The British policy: ap-
parently is to maintain suffi
cient control in Singapore.in the
interim to prevent the seizure
of power by increasingly strong
Communist elements.
The British can main-
tain their hold by force,
but this would necessarily
be only a short-range solution
inviting violence.
25X1
will continue to predominate,
and may make it increasingly dif-
ficult for Afghanistan to main-
tain freedom of action.
Daud told the American
charge in Kabul on 17 April that
he would personally see to im-
plementation of the United
States' offer to develop Afghan-
istan's aviation, apparently
assuming that the United States
would be prepared to co-oper-
ate with the Soviet Union. He
suggested that the US government
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26 April 1956
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might supply communications
equipment for the Kabul air-
port and perhaps build the
administration building while
Moscow took care of the run-
ways and taxi-strips.
The charge comments that
Daud apparently sees no politi-
cal danger in the $100,000,000
credit Afghanistan recently ac-
cepted from the USSR.
SOVIET JAPANESE FISHING TALKS
The USSR has given a
clear warning that it intends
to follow a tough policy in
the talks o' fishing rights
with the Japanese delegation
which is now en route to Mos-
cow. Izvestia published on
21 Aprl a -government decree
which puts teeth into the reg-
ulation of 20 March restricting
salmon fishing in the North
Pacific. Moscow is probably
trying to put pressure on Japan
to resume diplomatic relations.
New economic deals are also
being made with the bloc. The
USSR is reportedly pressing Kabul
to admit an East German diplo-
matic mission in order to ensure
implementation of a $5,000,000
credit recently offered by the
East Germans. In addition, the
Afghans are reported to have ;
signed an agreement with Czecho-
slovakia on 14 February for the
purchase of more than $10,000,000
worth of telephone equipment.
Several shipments of small
arms have apparently reached
Afghanistan from the USSR in
the past six months, but no
formal arms agreement has yet
been announced.
It was to offset the ef-
fects of this regulation, which
becomes operative on 15 May,
that Japan proposed the fisher-
ies talks. In accepting the
proposal, Moscow agreed to dis-
cuss "piscatorial conservation
and aid to ships in distress,"
and has not elaborated on its
intentions.
Terms of Soviet Decree
The 21 April decree sets
up weight limits for catches,
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26 April 1956
establishes penalties for vio-
lations, including fines and
confiscation, and states that
Soviet patrol boats will enforce
the restrictions. Promulgation
of the decree at this time sug-
gests that the USSR will present
the Japanese delegation with
disadvantageous terms on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis.
The USSR has reportedly
promised a newly organizeL. Jap-
anese fishing combine, with un-
known backing,, favorable consider-
ation of its application to fish
within the restricted area on
Soviet terms. The combine has
announced its intention to send
a fleet separate from that al-
ready approved by the government
for the 1956 fishing season.
The government, however, has in-
dicated it will not permit the
combine to operate because the
Soviet licensing action consti-
tutes interference in Japanese
internal affairs.
The USSR probably feels
that this unexpected competition
for the restricted fish quotas
available to the Japanese will
ANTI-STALINISM DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE USSR
Developments in the USSR
in the past two weeks suggest
that the Soviet leaders are try-
ing to work out a middle course
between the "liberalism" en-
gendered by the anti-Stalin
campaign and the need to preserve
party discipline and maintain
the position of the present lead-
ership. A speech by Pravda edi-
tor Shepilov noted the importance
of "the role of the chiefs and
leaders," and articles in Pravda
and Party Life condemned "anti-
party statements by Soviet of-
ficials. At the same time, ad-
ministrative measures were taken
to control the work of Soviet
state security organs to prevent
add to the exasperation of Jap-
anese fishery interests, al-
ready anxious for a definite
settlement of the fishing is-
sue.
Minister of Agriculture
and Fisheries Kono, the head of
the Japanese delegation, plans
to be in Moscow for at least
ten or fifteen days. He has
indicated that he will try
to meet with Bulganin, Khrushchev
and other top Soviet leaders...
Although the government has
confined Kono's powers to the
fishing issue, Kono told Am-
bassador Allison prior to his
departure for Moscow that he
would explore for himself and
the Japanese cabinet actual
Soviet terms for a peace set-
tlement with Japan. Such in-
formal talks will afford the
USSR an opportunity, in the
context of a situation adverse
to the Japanese negotiating
position, to propose once again
that relations between the
two countries be normalized.
a repetition of the abuses of
the Stalin era..
Shepilov, chosen to deliver
the main address at the Lenin
anniversary celebration on 22 April,
produced an abbreviated' Soviet
progress report patterned closely
after Khrushchev's principal
speech to the party congress in
February. In one of the few
noteworthy parts of his speech,
Shepilov called for "complete
liquidation of all the conse-
quences of the cult of Stalin,"
but reminded his audience that
collective leadership does not
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26 April 1956
mean "administration by pro-
duction meetings, schools, army,
and so forth." He went on to
say that Marxism-Leninism fights
both against the idealist view
that heroes are the main crea-
tive agents of history, and a-
gainst anarchism which denies
the rightful authority of leaders.
i Prior to Shepilov's speech,
articles in Pravda. and Party
Life had clear y indica. etc that
some elements in the party had
exceeded the bounds permitted
for Criticizing the cult of
personality.
Pravda admitted that "under
the guise of condemning the cult
of the individual, some rotten
elements are trying to question
the correctness of the party's
policy." It warned that "the
party cannot permit the freedom
to discuss problems to be inter-
preted as the freedom to prop-
agate views alien to the spirit
of Marxism-Leninism,because this
contradicts the provisions of
the party rules and the party
principles."
Party Life also took up the
attack by scoring "certain meet-
ings where demagogic speeches
were made in which criticism of
the cult of personality in part
amounted to a negation of any
kind of authority whatsoever
and to undermining management,
discipline and sense of organ-
ization."
Anti-Stalin Drive Continues
Administrative measures to
combat Stalinism were also under-
taken, however. The official
journal of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet announced
on 23 April the creation of a
special group empowered to super,,
vise the work of Soviet state
security organs. As a, special
division in the office of the
USSR prosecutor general, the
group will carry out the pro-
visions of a Supreme Soviet
decree of 20 June 1955 which
specifically assigned to the
prosecutor general's office
the responsibility for inspec-
tion of Soviet investigation
agencies, criminal and civil
courts, and prisons.
Creation of the new group,
which serves to tighten adminis-
trative control of the formerly
autonomous state security organs,
is evidently a part of a broader
reorganization of the prose-
cutor general's office and may
be the first step in a. general
overhaul of the Soviet judicial
system as demanded by Khrush-
chev at the 20th Party Congress.
Announcement of the
creation of the new group
followed closely a denuncia-
tion in Soviet State and Law
of the "trial by confess
tactics employed by the
late Andrei Vyshinsky, So-
viet prosecutor general dur-
ing the purge trials of
the late 1930's. In as-
serting that the con-
demnation of persons on the
sole basis of confession
was a. glaring violation of
Soviet law, the journal
implied that state security
organs had been responsible
for extorting confessions
from accused persons with-
out due regard for the
validity of charges lodged
against them.
Other signs of the times
have been noted in the de-
cision to change the name
of the party's top school of
ideology from the Marx-
Engels-J.nnin-Stalin Institute
to the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism, and in the re-
cent appearance in Pravda
of the name of Alexei Rykov,
a former Soviet premier
who was executed in 1938.
No mention was made of the
role of "traitor" assigned
to Rykov by Stalin. I _J 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 8:
26 April 1956
ANTI-STALINISM CAMPAIGN
IN POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The Polish regime, ap-
parently to demonstrate that
a new era of legality and free-
dom of expression has opened,
has dismissed five high offi-
cials and arrested two others
associated closely in the pub-
lic mind with responsibility
for the injustices of the Sta-
lin era. The officials concerned
had-:.,been responsible for
the administration of justice
and internal security. Prague
on 25 April announced the dis-
missal of Czech Defense Minis-
terand First Vice Premier Ce-
picka from these posts and fran the
politburo. According to earli-
er reports, removals similar
to those in Poland were to oc-
cur soon in the Czech govern-
ment.
The Polish minister of
culture has also been removed,
probably because he was unable
to keep the new freedom of ex-
pression within the limits de-
sired. The government had
hoped that the increased free-
dom would be used in a manner,
it considered "constructive,"
but the criticism that followed
was so extensive, a warning
had to be issued that the use
of attacks on the cult of the
individual to disguise attacks
on the party would not be per-
mitted. The new minister of
culture will have the task of
enforcing limits on the new
freedom and yet persuading the
people that within these limits
they have more freedom than be-
fore.
On 20 April, the Polish
regime announced the dismis-
sal of former minister of pub-
lic security Stanislaw Radkie-
wicz from his post as minister
of state farms. He was minister
of public security from 1944
to 1954, and it was probably
his role in the purge trials
of that period that has now
brought about his departure
from the government.
Dismissed with Radkiewicz
were the prosecutor general
and the military prosecutor
general. The following day
the minister of justice was
relieved of his post. On 24
April two more Polish security
officials were arrested, the
former deputy minister of the
Ministry of Public Security
and the onetime, chief of De-
partment X of that ministry.
All these men were responsible
during the Stalin era for the
persecution of many officials
who are now being released be-
cause their imprisonment now
is deemed to have been unjusti-
fied.
Czech defense minister
and first vice premier Cepicka
was removed from these posts
and the politburo on 25 April,
acording to a Prague announce-
ment. Cepicka is the son-in-
law of the late premier, Gott-
wald, who was criticized re-
cently for practicing the cult
of personality. According to
an earlier report from the
French ambassador in Prague,
who informed the American em-
bassy, Communist sources have
stated that Vice Premier Ko-
pecky, Slovak party first secre-
tary Bacilek, and Minister of
Culture Stoll are also to be
dismissed soon.
Kopecky and Bacilek are
also members of the Czech polit-
buro. As former heads of the
ministries of culture and se-
curity respectively, they, a-
long with Stoll, are vulnerable
as was Cepicka, because of the
roles they played after the
war in stifling all criticism
and allowing the organs of jus-
tice to be used in an arbitrary
manner during the Stalin era.
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26 April 1956
There probably will be
further dismissals of Satel-
lite officials who have been
connected with cultural affairs
and with the administration
EAST GERMANY
MAY TIGHTEN BORDER CONTROLS
The East German regime
may impose more stringent bor-
der control measures prior
to the May Day celebration in
an effort to reduce the flow
of refugees, particularly tech-
nicians and men of military
age. These measures would in-
clude more thorough control of
all traffic to Berlin, closer
checks on the intersector bor-
ders within Berlin, and tighter
controls on the border between
East and West Germany.
The confusion and movement
in connection with the holiday
would provide opportunities for
flight to the West unless bor-
der controls were tightened.
The East German regime is
seriously concerned about the
loss of military and technically
skilled manpower. Since 1 Jan-
uary 1955, 42,080 East Germans
of conscription age have es-
caped to West Berlin
alone and about as
many have fled di-
rectly across the
West German border,
Approximately three
fourths of these mil-
itary age refugees
are males.
During the week
of 6 to 12 April,
972 out of a total
of 3,882 refugees
registering in West
Berlin were between
the ages of 17 and
24. This is the
of justice in an effort to con-
vince the people that a clean 25X1
break is being made with the
Stalinist practices.
F_ 1
25X1
largest number of refugees in
this age group in any week
since the beginning of Novem-
ber 1955.
Although elaborate prep-
arations are being made for
the May Day celebration, no
serious trouble is expected in
Berlin. Armed demonstrations
in West Berlin or the provoca-
tion of incidents on a large
scale would be inconsistent
with the current Communist
line of relaxing tensions be-
tween the Communist and non-
Communist blocs.
Recent reports state that
East German army units will
parade on May Day, Major em-
phasis of the celebration will
probably be placed on "workers'
accomplishments" in the German
Democratic Republic, however,
rather than on the newly estab-
lished army. 25X1
REFUGEES ENTERING WEST BERLIN
2ND WEEK 3RD WEEK 4TH WEEK
MARCH
1ST WEEK 2ND WEEK
APRIL
60424 2
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
GOOD-MILL VISITS OF SOVIET NAVY
Soviet naval power will be
on display during July and
August this year, when the USSR
is scheduled to exchange good-
will naval visits with the
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden
and Norway. In each case a
Soviet cruiser and two destroy-
ers will be involved. This
unusually heavy schedule is
undoubtedly intended to im-
press these small nations not
only with Soviet good will but
also with Soviet naval strength
in European waters. Moscow
has been making particular ef-
forts lately to encourage Scan-
dinavian neutralism and develop
a variety of exchanges between
the USSR and Scandinavia.
The first postwar Soviet
naval visit to a Western port
occurred in 1953, when a new
Sverdlov-class cruiser partici-
pated in the naval review at
Spithead in connection with
the British coronation. Since
then Soviet naval units have
twice returned to England and
have paid visits to Sweden and
LABOR UNREST IN SPAIN
The strike wave in north-
ern Spain is the latest mani-
festation of the worker' dis-
content over the rising cost
of living. The discontent has
been increasingly vocal since
the fall of 1955, and further
unrest is likely unless the
government carries out its
promise to keep prices down.
The walkout of thousands
of Spanish textile, metallur-
gical and other workers began
on 9 April in the province of
Navarre and spread to Barcelona
and various cities in the Bas-
que provinces. It was essen-
tially a protest against the
Finland. Communist Party
leader Khrushchev and Premier
Bulganin arrived for their cur'-
rent visit to Great Britain on
the Ordzhonikidze, a Sverdlov-
class cruiser of postwar design
which probably was extensively
overhauled at Kronstadt last
December.
inadequacy of the government's
20-percent wage boost on 1
April and the sharp increase
in prices which they claimed
followed it.
In several cases the
workers reportedly won very
substantial wage increases
through negotiations with
management. State officials
later annulled these conces-
sions, however. They closed
many plants, announced that
workers on strike would lose
their seniority rights, and
arrested a considerable
number of strikers despite the
orderly nature of the walkouts.
5X1
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25X1
While the strikes pose
no immediate threat to the
stability of the Franco regime,
the fact that they were carried
out in the face"of legal pro-
hibitions and followed the of-
ficial wage boost has caused
the government concern. Cen-
sorship remains in force in
the affected regions, suggest-
ing that the situation is
still tense and that the author-
ities fear the strike may
spread to other parts of the
country. Two cabinet ministers
have blamed the strikes on
"subversive elements across
the border"--a favorite govern-
ment tactic to avoid public
blame for an unsavory situation
These developments show
that there is a limit to the
workers' tolerance of adverse
living conditions. Continued
delay on the part of the Franco
government in correcting the
situation may cause more
serious demonstrations and
further diminish popular sup -
port for the regime. 25X1
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
25X1
POLITICAL TENSION IN PARAGUAY
Political tension is
mounting in Paraguay as a
result of recent student clashes
with the police and increasing
agitation by opposition groups.
The Communists are reported
planning a general strike on 1
May to exploit rising dissatis-
faction with the government and
economic'conditions. Moreover,
the government is gravely con-
cerned over the efforts of the
former president of the Central
Bank, Mendez Fleitas, to re-
turn from exile.
Student Clashes
The opposition-dominated
student federation in mid-April
called meetings in Asuncion in
which it sharply criticized
dictatorial government and
government control of the na-
tional university. This criti-
cism was echoed by delegations
of Argentine and Uruguayan
students invited .u the meet-
ings, and resulted in clashes
with progovernment students:
and later the police. Members
of the Argentine delegation
were temporarily arrested,along
with Paraguayan students, and
Argentina has called its am-
ba.ssadoi home to report. on the
situation.
The student federation
probably timed this incident
to offset the improvements in
Argentine-Paraguayan relations
resulting from the Argentine
army minister's visit to Para-
guay in late March. The severe-
ly repressed Liberal Party,.which
dominates the federation, has
had high hopes of obtaining
Argentine aid--official or un-
official--in its stepped-up
plotting and propaganda activi-
ties, and such a development
would be prejudiced by improved
relations between the two coun-
tries. Relations had been
strained since Peron's ouster,
as Argentina considers a number
of Paraguayan officials to be 25X1
pro-Peron.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
The ministerial meeting
of the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) on 4-6 May will take
place amid widespread criticism
of NATO as inadequate for coun-
tering Soviet expansion under
the changed military and polit-
ic a:._1 conditions of 1956. Most
of the criticism focuses on
NATO's lack of political unity
and direction. The council
meeting, which will be attended
by foreign ministers only, will
concern itself with political
rather than military matters
in a search for more effective
methods of achieving political
co-operation.
tendency of the larger powers
to bypass or ignore NATO on
important questions--as, for
example, France's troubles in
North Africa that gave rise to
the dispatch there of NATO-com-
mitted troops.
Much of the criticism
boils down to the view that NATO,
which was established primarily
to provide an umbrella of mili-
tary security, has not developed
machinery to deal with the multi-
tudinous problems of competitive
coexistence. It has joint mili-
tary planning, but no joint po-
litical planning.
THE NATO POWERS
26 APRIL 1956
24145
Criticism of NATO, in-
creasingly evident in most West-
ern European countries, stems
from a number of situations.
There is continuing doubt over
the usefulness of large ground
forces in an H-bomb era.
A new and more widespread
concern is that NATO lacks the
flexibility to counter the cur-
rent Soviet threat of nonmili-
tary expansion in the under-
developed regions of the world.
Furthermore, NATO has come under
attack for failing to resolve
the disputes among its own mem-
bers, such as the Cyprus issue,
and also for what is seen as a
U.K. \ .DENMARK
l 1
PORTUGAL J ~..T"
/ ITALY
L'
Those insisting that the
"nonmilitary aspects" of NATO
must now receive greater em-
phasis turn for authority to
Article II of the North Atlantic
Treaty. At last December's
ministerial meeting, the council
was instructed to examine and
implement measures conduci', e to
greater co-operation under is
article. Article II states:
"The Parties will contrib-
ute toward the further de-
velopment of peaceful and
friendly international re-
lations by strengthening
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
their free institutions,
by bringing about a better
understanding of the prin-
ciples upon which these in-
stitutions are founded, and
by promoting conditions of
stability and well-being.
They will seek to eliminate
conflict in their interna-
tional economic policies
and will encourage economic
collaboration between any or
all of them."
The difficulty in finding
adequate terms of reference for
joint political planning stems
both from the vagueness of this
statement and from national at-
titudes. Joint military plan-
ning evolved undex the threat
of a danger which appeared al-
most identical to every member
of the alliance; political plan-
ning, to become a joint enter-
prise, must take account of 15
views of what constitutes the
danger and how to deal with it.
The desire to expand polit-
ical consultation within NATO
is most often expressed by the
lesser powers.
Turkish prime minister
Vtenderes complained to British
foreign secretary Lloyd recently
that France, Italy and even Brit-
ain are approached by the USSR
and respond bilaterally, with-
out co-ordination. German NATO
representative Blankenhorn has
said there is scarcely a prob-
lem on which NATO is genuinely
-united, and maintains that each
country is overly preoccupied
with its own difficulties.
The Belgian NATO repre-
sentative recently observed that
since the December resolution
,on implementing Article II, there
had been a good deal of diplo-
matic activity on which there
had been no discussion in NATO.
He referred to the sometimes con-
flicting statements by the Big
Three foreign ministers involving
Western policies and added that
disagreements among the Big
Three were very disquieting to
smaller countries.
The German representative
suggested that one hindrance to
consultation is the "immobility
of bureaucracy of foreign of-
fices," which need to be edu-
cated in the usefulness of NATO
as a political forum.
There is no doubt that dur-
ing the last several years NATO
representatives have made in-
creasingly fruitful use of the
weekly council meetings, es-
pecially the private ones where
no records are kept, for a frank
exchange of views. There has
grown up a rapport within this
group despite hindrances from
their respective foreign minis-
tries, which often impose re-
strictive instructions on their
representatives. Both the Brit-
ish and the Germans have re-
marked that these restrictions
are largely responsible for the
current sense of frustration
plaguing NATO.
There has been considerable
discussion of the proper role
of NATO in the economic field.
It is now generally accepted by
member nations that NATO's in-
terests are not confined to its
own geographic framework, but
are world-wide. The Middle East
is of particular concern at the
moment as an area where Soviet
economic penetration must be
countered.
Although no firm conclu-
sions have yet been reached, i';
is becoming clear that the per-
manent representatives no longer
favor the creation of NATO mecha-
nisms for actual programing or
operation of economic aid pro-
grams. Nor is it considered
desirable that NATO duplicate
existing international machinery
in the field of trade, balance
of payments, tariffs and aid.
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26 April 1956
The central idea of most
countries now seems to be that
there is a place in NATO for
discussion, and, if possible,
agreement,-on broad principles
of economic policy which might
then be put into effect through
other organizations. This would
not demand block voting by NATO
members in the other organiza-
tions, but would contribute,
they believe, to a gradual a
lignment of member countries'
economic principles and policies.
The Coming Meeting
Preliminary activity in-
dicates extraordinary interest
in the may meeting. At British
insistence, for example, the
usual agenda topic "Trends and
implications of Soviet policy"
was expanded by the, phrase ""in-
cluding political and economic
penetration of underdeveloped
countries." Four papers on this
subject (British, German, French,
Italian), already circulated to
the council, will be considered
during the meeting. Discussion
of this topic will probably be
opened by British foreign secre-
tary Lloyd, who will report on
the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit
to Britain.
The staff paper on the
Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan
concludes that during the next
five years the USSR is likely
to maintain a rate of industrial
expansion considerably above
that of NATO countries at the
same time it strengthens its
defense effort. It: notes that
a similar projection of economic
trends in NATO and the Soviet
countries submitted to the coun-
cil in December 1955 may have
underestimated the Soviet rate
of growth. A separate item con-
cerns political and economic
questions arising from current
Soviet tactics.
After consideration of the
implications of current Soviet
policy, the ministers will take
up other questions of common con-
cern in the international situa-
tion., including North Africa, the
Middle East, the Far East, Ger-
many and disarmament. Indica-
tions are that the French will
open discussions.on North Africa,
the Turks on the Middle East.
"Germany" was put on the
list at Canada's suggestion
so.the council could, if it
desired, include a statement in
its communique which would con-
tinue to make its position on
reunification clear to public
opinion. Both Britain and Bel-
gium have indicated they might
raise the question of support
costs in relation to Germany's
NATO contribution. Information
on the status of the London dis-
armament talks has been requested
by West Germany, Italy, Norway
and Belgium, the last stressing
its need to know the Western
position, including any existing
disarmaments.
Commenting on the lack
of adequate political consul-
tation as contributing to the
current frustration in the
council, the British NATO rep-
resentative remarkedlast
month that even the ministerial
meetings consisted to a large
extent of statements by re-
spective ministers rather
than-a give-and-take exchange
of views. Present indica-
tions are that the forthcom-
ing meeting will be charac-
terized more than before by
iwe-and-take discussions.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE -WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
CURRENT SOVIET ECONOMTC DEVELOPMENTS
The economic strength of
the USSR today is impressive.
With an economy slightly more
than one third that of the
United States, the USSR is sup-
porting a military program in
which outlays for military pur-
poses are nearly equal to those
of the United States. At the
same time, it is forcing the
growth of its economy by direct-
ing a higher share of its re-
sources to investment than is
the United States.
Investment
The present policy is
based on the doctrine that the
production of producer goods
must increase at a rate faster
than the production of consumer
goods. During 1953 and 1954
this relationship was changed
temporarily.
USSR PRODUCTION INCREASES (Percent)
3 PRODUCER GOODS Icy CONSUMER GOODS
1951-1955
25X1
While the great bulk of
capital investment will be chan-
neled toward producer goods
industries, consumer goods in-
dustries will receive 74 per-
cent more investment funds dur-
ing the Sixth Five-Year Plan
than in the Fifth, apparently
concentrated in the latter half
of the period.
Capital investment in heavy
industry is planned to increase
70 percent during. the same pe-
riod. Soviet statements make
it clear that the production
of consumer goods will not in-
crease at as high a rate as the
production of producer goods
at any time during the Sixth
Five-Year Plan, but the rising
share of investment allocations
for the former will tend to re-
duce the present gap.
Industrial Base
Rapid expansion of the So-
viet.economy from what is al-
ready a large industrial base
will require intensified ex-
pansion of raw material and
energy sources in future years.
Expansion in these fields will
require a larger share of total
capital investment and will com-
pel some slowing of growth in
the machinery and metal-fabri-
cating sectors.
The cost of the new expan-
sion effort can be seen from
Soviet data..'To expand annual
production of electric power by
one ruble requires four times,
the average capital outlay nec-
essary to increase by one ruble
the production of Soviet in-
dustry as a whole. In the fuel
extractive industries, threetbnes
the average outlay is required,
and in metallurgy--twice. Thus
under the Sixth Five-Year Plar
a greater expenditure in in-
vestment will be required per
unit of increased production
than under previous plans.
Much of this new investment
will be concentrated in Asia,
particularly in Kazakhstan and
Siberia. Concentration of cor-
struction efforts in the east
will require industry in the
European USSR to rely on an ex-
tensive program of capital re-
placement and introduction of
improved technology in existing
plants to achieve increased out-
put goals.
Military Program
The shifts in military a :-
p.enditures have been obscured
by a highly publicized reduction
in the budget for the Ministry
of Defense from 112.1 billion
rubles in 1955 to 102.5 billion
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
1956.
OVER
1951
il~COPPER
.Be1khosh
LAKE
HAIKA LI
COAL
kkutsk
~7J new industrial area
mining center
Anew hydroelectric station
Industrial Development In The Kazakh-Siberian Area
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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND CAPITAL INVESTM9NNT
656
INCREASE IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
TOTAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT
1951
OVER
1946
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207
1951-
1955
military procurement
by 1960, while main-
taining the planned
investment program
in industry.
1961
OVER
1956
The high level
of expenditure for
the military program
and for investment has
retarded the rise in
the living standard,
although there has
been a steady improve-
ment. During the '-
Sixth Five-Year Plan,
in 1956. Demobilization of
640,000 men, if it has been
carried out as announced, has
reduced personnel costs by some
5 billion rubles. In addition,
when allowance is made for price
reductions which may have cut
procurement costs by as much as
10 percent, the 1956 appropria-
tion appears equivalent to a-
bout 110 billion rubles at 1955
prices. Under these conditions,
procurement of military equip-
ment may increase in 1956 by
3 billion rubles. If the USSR
desires, it can achieve consid-
erable further increases in
there will be more adequate sup-
plies of clothing, livestock
products, consumer durables,
and housing.
Agriculture
A key to a higher stand-
ard of living and thus to strong-
er incentives for the Soviet
worker is agricultural produc-
tion? As a result, agriculture
continues to be a major benefi-
ciary o:of the post-Stalin revi-
sions in economic policy. Its
share of total state capital in-
vestment will rise from 10.8
25X1
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06 April 1956
percent realized during the ;
Fifth Five-Year Plan to 12.1'
percent of the much larger to-
tal in the Sixth.
In addition, Soviet lead-
ers apparently intend to keep
the agricultural labor force
at its present level, at least
until its productivity, tradi-
tionally very low, rises sharp-
ly. Until 1953 it was common
practice to divert labor from
agriculture to- industry to
achieve industrial production
targets. A higher priority for
capital and labor, should bring
sharp increases in Soviet agri-
cultural production, although
probably not enough to meet the
very ambitious targets for 1960.
Efforts to restrict the
importance of the private plots
of collective farmers may com-
plicate the immediate agricul-
tural program, but may yield
long-run economic advantages.
The level of agricultural pro-
ductivity is to be raised by
reducing time spent on the pr i-
vate plot. Soviet leaders con-
sider this to be a marginal
effort, particularly in the case
of private livestobk production.
Immediate effects on agricul-
tural production may be adverse,
however, if coercion creates
resentment among collective
farmers.
Labor Force and
Pro uctivity
Another serious
problem facing Soviet
planners during, the next
five years is maintain-
ing a rapid rise in the
productivity of 14bor.
In the past, the planned
level of industrial pro-
duction was reached, de-
spite failures to achieve
scheduled levels of work-
er productivity, by the
expedient of transfer
ring to industry greater
numbers of workers than
had been planned. This
procedure is difficult
to apply at this time, when
effects of the low wartime birth
rate are being felt in lower'
additions to the labor force,
The Soviet economy received
9,300,000 new workers in 1951-
55, but will only get 7,800,000
in 1956-60. Of these totals,
the numbers going to the in-
dustrial sector are to fall
from 3,900,000 achieved under
the Fifth plan to 1,800,000
scheduled under the Sixth. To
achieve the 65-percent increase
in industrial production called,
for by the new plan in the face
of this handicap requires a 50-
percent increase in output per
worker by 1960.
This ambitious requirement
will in effect be raised even
higher by the scheduled reduction
of the workweek from 48 to 41
hours. Shorter hours may induce
some improvement in efficiency,
but even a 42-hour week by
3.960 would require a 70-percent
increase in productivity, a level
which the Soviet worker is un-
likely to reach.
The new Five-Year Plan, how-
ever, apparently has made al-
lowance for this eventuality.
The 4,300,000 new workers al-
lotted to "other" sectors--
neither agricultural nor indus-
trial--is larger than expected
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMM RY
26 April 1956
USSR
PERCENT ANNUAL INCREASES.
(1951-1955)
Five-year plan goal
average annual
increase)
1954 1955
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1951 1952 953 1954 1955 1951 1952 1953
LABOR FORCE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION LABOR PR ODia PRODUCTIVITY
and may include a considerable
reserve of unallocated labor.
Thus by holding to the minimum
-the flow of new labor into ag-
riculture, government, and serv-
ices; the allocation to indus-
try might be pushed from 1,800,-
000 as high as :`3;800,000. With
this much leeway, a 5- to 10-
percent underfulfillment of the
productivity goals could be
absorbed without loss to indus-
trial production.
Should the productivity
program run into more serious
trouble, two further courses
of action will still be open to
Soviet planners. They could
renege on their promise to re-
duce the workweek`,, and freeze
it at a level above 41 hours.
Finally, as a last resort, they
could again transfer labor from
agriculture to industry.
Planning Problems
The probable consequences
of these measures illustrate
the complexity of the equations
which the Soviet government has
to solve. The effect on worker
morale of a failure to reduce
the workweek aright reduce pro-
ductivity enough to cancel out
the gain in working time. A
reduction in agricultural labor
might slow the growth of agricul-
tural production, and thus of
food supplies and consumer
goods, again.to the detriment
of worker morale. These in-
tangible factors, like the effect
on pr"oduotivity "of shorter: hourrn,
are:.?.extremely. difficult for the
Soviet government to evaluate.
Similar equations govern
the distribution of investment
capital. Funds allotted to
agriculture may improve in-
dustrial worker morale and pro-
ductivity. Funds allotted to
plant modernization yield the
same result more directly. The
need to increase industrial pro-
duction must be balanced against
the need to strengthen the raw
material and. energy base. Over.-
all industrial investment must
be balanced against military
needs in an era when the cost
of modern armaments is steadily
rising.
.The USSR has set its sights
high in the solutions it has
proposed for.these problems,
but in the main not too high for
success. After 1960--when growth
iu the' latrort?.forc.e:; e:lt~Ixz sll
to normal, the new industrial
development of Siberia and.
Kazakhstan begins to pay divi-
dends, and the present economic
policies in agriculture are re-
flected in increased yields--
even higher goals can be set.
Prepared by ORR)
25X1
25X1
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
The announcement on 8
April, during Soviet leader
Mikoyan's visit to Ulan Bator,
of the conclusion of an aid
agreement between the USSR and
Outer Mongolia underscores Mos-
cow's continuing predominance
in the development of Outer
Mongolia.
Soviet exploitation of oil
and mineral resources in the
country is being stepped up as
a result of the completion of
the Trans-Mongolian Railroad.
In international affairs, Outer
Mongolia is completely subser-
vient to the USSR, which may
again try to use the country's
.candidacy for membership in the
United Nations as a means of
attempting to embarrass the
United States in its relations
with the Chinese Nationalists
and Japan. Despite increasing
Chinese Communist interest-in
Outer Mongolia, traditionally
Chinese territory, Peiping shows
no inclination to press its
claims at this time.
Foreign Relations
Ever since the "Mongolian
People's Republic"--population
about 1,000, 000-was : founded
and Mongol Communist leaders
received Soviet assistance in
liquidating nationalists and
pan-Mongolists in 1924, the
foreign policy of Outer Mongolia
has been directed from Moscow.
At present the regime has embas-
sies only at Moscow, Peiping,
and Pyongyang and a legation at
Hanoi. The ambassador in Peiping
is also accredited to New Delhi.
Dasiyu Adilbish,. the ambassador
to the USSR--who was concurrently
accredited to all Eastern Euro-
pean Satellite governments--was
appointed Ulan Bator's new minis-
ter of foreign affairs on 17
April.
Although the USSR continues
to direct Outer Mongolia's for-
eign policy, it has recently per-
mitted Ulan Bator to assume a
more independent posture. The
visit to India in January of
Ulan Bator's newly appointed
ambassador to New Delhi--resi-.
dent in Peiping--marked the first
time since 1925 .that the So-
viet Union had allowed an
Outer Mongolian official to en-
gage in bilateral diplomatic
contact with any nation out-
side the Communist bloc. In-
dia's action last January to
formalize relations with Outer,
Mongolia will strengthen the
USSR's position supporting the
Mongolian regime's candidacy
for UN membership.
UN Membership
The question of Outer
Mongolia's admission may arise
again if the Japanese renew
their application for United
Nations membership this fall.
The Russians may again offer to
vote for Japan if Outer Mongolia
is also admitted, hoping there-
by to confront the United States
with a choice between agreeing
to seat Outer Mongolia or con-
tinuing to support the Nation-
alists at the cost of Japan's
continued exclusion,
International recognition
of the Mongolian regime and its
dmission to the United Nations
is complicated by the question
of Outer Mongolia's "independ-
ence," Nationalist China ana
the Soviet Union exchanged notes
in August 1945 agreeing to a
plebiscite to decide Outer Mon-
golia's independence. The
plebiscite, carried out two
months later, resulted in a
"unanimous" vote for indeperd-
"n cee 4.nd legally ended Nation-
alist China's theoretical sover-
eignty over Outer Mongolia.
In 1946 and 1947, the USSR
sponsored Mongolia's application
for membership in the United
Nations. Nationalist China,
which had recognized Outer Mon-
golia's independence in January
1946, voted in favor of the
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26 April 1956
regime's admission at the same
Security Council session in
August 1946 at which the United
States voted against it. The
Chinese Nationalists changed
their vote in 1947; their veto
last December was accompanied
by the renewed claim that Outer
Mongolia is "Chinese territory."
Domestic Affairs
The Soviet Union also ef-
fectively controls Outer Mon-
golia's domestic political and
economic affairs. The farcical
plebiscite of 1945 demonstrated
that Soviet-controlled political
police were in the country.
Each voter was obliged to sign
his ballot or, if illiterate,
to "indicate his identity by
the fingerprint of his right
thumb." The 28,000-member Mon-
Outer Mongolia
YO5Buleg
Road .elected ~~~
- 0--u- Railroad, 5' gauge _ , \ Baalal Haan Anna
T-*- Railroad, 4'8' ' gauge r
- Railroad, narrow gauge \ \ _
it has faithfully followed Mos?-
cow's re-evaluation of Stalin.
The two ranking leaders of the
Mongolian regime appear to be
Prime Minister Yumzha Tsedenbal
and Dashin Damba, first secre-
tary of the central committee.
Economic Development
The general population is
reluctant to depart from its
nomadic pursuits--90 percent
of the population gains its
livelihood from animal hus-
bandry--and it is not surpris-
ing that mineral and transport
development have hinged on
Soviet initiative. While Soviet-
sponsored joint enterprises have
been largely abolished in Far
Eastern and European Communist
countries, in Outer Mongolia
they still continue to be the
S x_y
)An,V f
Naushk g~, Ak
International boundary
-.~. International boundary,
- indefinite ~? -,-,
golian People's Revolutionary
Party (MPRP)--i.e., the Mon-
golian Communist Party--is the
only authorized political party
and is the USSR's instrument
of control. Since the death
of Stalin the central committee
of the MPRP has been obliged
to "collectivize" party leader-
ship, in accordance with changes
in its Soviet counterpart and,
following the 20th Party Congress,
Pulingnuaa --
Isinln
f??1,-
yeah JSag
Yji?l 1956
24141
basic organizations directing
Mongolia's few modern economic
activities.. Foreign trade is
almost exclusively with the
USSR.
The continuing predomi-
nance of Soviet economic con-
trols was assured on 8 April
when Mikoyan concluded a long-
term aid agreement in Ulan
Bator. Chief significance of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 April 1956
the agreement was the impli-
cation of future improvement
and development of Mongolia's
few narrow-gauge rail lines.
These may be converted to the
Soviet broad gauge and eventu-
ally linked with the new Trans--
Mongolian trunk line.
The most significant re-
cent economic undertaking has
been the joint Sino-Soviet con-
struction of the Frans-Mon-
golian Railroad which began
full service on 1 January.
Some 715 miles shorter than the
present Moscow-Peiping rail
link through Manchuria, this
line is becoming a major artery
for trade between the USSR and
Communist China. Its estimated
capacity of at least 2,700,000
tons each way annually will add
more than 50 percent to the
present capacity of Sino-Soviet
rail connections. The line
extends the Soviet broad-gauge
system into China proper for
the first time, to the change-
of-gauge transloading station
of Chining--some 200 miles
northwest of Peiping.
A mining enterprise might
be associated with the con-
struction of a new city of
possibly 30,000 population
somewhere in the mountainous,
sparsely populated northwest
region. Soviet newsreels show
that the town stretches across
a wide valley and may be the
third largest city in the
country. Other evidence of
economic activity in the north--
west is the establishment in
1955 of new truck transport
bases in this region.
In addition to its politi-
cal and economic value to the
USSR, Outer Mongolia is a
buffer strategically important
for the security of the Lake
Baikal industrial complex and
the Trans-Siberian Railroad,
both of which are close to its
border. To the Chinese Com-
munists, the region provides
an important axis of communica-
tion with the USSR, facilitat-
ing the movement of essential,
commodities between the two
countries.
Outer Mongolia signed an
"economic and cultural co-
operation" pact in 1952 with
Communist China--its first
known agreement with a country
other than the Soviet Union--
and the Chinese have an in-
creasing interest in Outer
Mongolia's economic potential.
However, the predominance of
Soviet control over all activ-
ity in Outer Mongolia will
probably continue for a long
time.
Although the leaders of
the Peiping regime apparently
do not now have aspirations
for regaining portions of
this traditionally Chinese
territory, they may wish to
press claims at some future
time. Peiping has kept open
the door to such claims. Thus
the latest Chinese Communist
maps, unlike those of the USSR,
show the Sino-Mongolian border
as "undemarcated," with terri-
torial advantages varying from
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26 April 1.956
40 to 100 miles on the side of
China. The USSR and Communist
China apparently have avoided
a showdown on the matter of
over-all border delimitation 25X1
or, at least, any public sug-
gestion' that it is a problem
of immediate concern,
(Prepared jointly wit
25X1
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