CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000800120001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 31, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL co/[-a
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
Document No. ------"Z --------------------
No Change In Class. ^
^ Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS S it)
COPY NO. 17
OCf NO. 3260/56
31 May 1956
ext Review Date: --J_f ---------
h.: HR 70-3
I I I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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NTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 May 1956
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
TITO'S POSITION
ON THE EVE OF HIS MOSCOW VISIT . . . . . . . . . . . . Page, A
1
On 2 June, just one year after the Khrushchev-
Bulganin visit to Belgrade, President Tito, Vice President
Kardelj and Foreign Minister Popovic are scheduled to
arrive in Moscow for a three-week state visit. Tito will
probably not change his position on world questions during
his visit, but may press his complaints against some of
the Satellites, particularly Albania. 25X1
IMPENDING CONFIDENCE DEBATE
IN FRENCH ASSEMBLY . . , . . , . , . . . , . . , . Page 2
In the confidence debate opening on 31 May.in the
French assembly, Premier Mollet has made all the policies
of his government the issue, thus hoping to split his
potential opponents, most of whom favor some of his
policies but object to others. Mollet's position has
been little affected by the resignation of Vice Premier
Mendes-France on 23 May over Algerian policy.
NOTES AND, COMMENTS
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pagel
The attention of Arab and Israeli diplomats is
focused on the resolution introduced in the United
Nations on 29 May by Britain. The Arabs apparently
contemplated no action if the resolution merely noted
Secretary General Hammarskjold's report, but planned
to oppose any new attempts to bring them together with
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 May 1956
CAIRO SEEKS FURTHER
ARAB RECOGNITION OF PEIPING
Cairo's decision on 16 May to recognize Communist
China has raised Peiping's international prestige at
the expense of the Chinese Nationalists and increased
the likelihood for further Communist diplomatic gains
in the Near East. Cairo is putting diplomatic pressure
on the other Arab states to recognize Peiping. Premier
Nasr and an Egyptian military delegation have accepted
an invitation to visit Communist China, but no date has
been set.
Page
JAPAN MOVES TOWARD CLOSER
RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Japanese moves to exchange unofficial trade repre-
sentatives with Communist China have been spurred by
domestic demands for more trade and the prospects of
restored relations with the Soviet Union. Tokyo is
willing to elevate the trade missions to official
status at a later date but will try to delay granting
diplomatic recognition to Peiping. The Japanese believe
that'expansion of their trade with China is contingent
on their meeting Communist demands for goods now em-
bargoed by CHINCOM regulations.
PEIPING ENLARGES INVESTMENT
IN AGRICULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Following last winter's all-out drive to bring the
Chinese peasantry into collective farms, Communist China
for the first time in its history has earmarked a
significant amount of foreign exchange and investment
funds for agriculture. Peiping, anxious to forestall
resentment of collectivization by providing tangible
evidence of the benefits it will bring, has increased
its imports of chemical fertilizer and has advanced the
schedule for construction of tractor factories. A major
increase in small farm machinery production also is
USSR ESTABLISHING
BOARDING SCHOOLS FOR THE ELITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The USSR is rapidly establishing a large number of
boarding schools, as called for in Khrushchev's speech
at the 20th Party Congress. These schools will probably
be largely restricted to children of high-level govern-
ment and party officials and will offer a higher caliber
of instruction than provided by the general school
system. F777 I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 May 1956
USSR STEPS UP CAMPAIGN
FOR RETURN OF NATIONALS
0 . . 0 . . . . . . . 0 .
In recent weeks, the USSR has intensified its
efforts to induce the return of former Soviet citizens
living abroad. The campaign, which appears to be well
organized and co-ordinated, has been carried into the
western hemisphere, but it is focused on Western Europe.
Measured in numbers, the effort has had limited results,
but the USSR probably regards it as a success in terms
of the psychological effects.
PUBLIC CRITICISM SUBSIDES IN POLAND . . . . . . . . . . Page
Open criticism of the Polish government, which was
vehement in late April, has almost disappeared from
the Polish press and radio in recent weeks. This is
probably a result of First Secretary Ochab's warning
against criticism which undermines party unity or party
policies. While the lull will give the regime time to
institute some of its promised reforms, these probably
will not be extensive enough to satisfy the more liberal
groups.
USSR SLOWING GROWTH
OF LARGE CITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Soviet government is attempting to slow the
growth of large Soviet cities. This program is designed
to ease a tight housing situation and to channel labor
eastward to new areas under development.
Page 9
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President Rhee's statements and appointments since
the 15 May elections indicate that he plans no major
changes in government policy and that he will attempt
to isolate and discredit Chang Myon, the vice-president-
elect from the opposition Democratic Party. Certain
of his appointments, notably that of "Tiger" Kim as
director of the national police point a more ruthless __4 use of police controls. 25X1
VIET MINH MILITARY ACTIVITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
While several recent reports suggested an increase
of Viet Minh military activity near the 17th parallel,
there has been no indication of a major manpower and
logistical build-up in the vicinity of the parallel..
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31 May 1956
SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . Page 11
South Vietnam's political stability will be further
bolstered by the adoption shortly of a constitution.
The virtual elimination of hostile sect units permits
greater flexibility in the deployment of the armed forces
and makes possible concentration on the task of un-
covering Viet Minh clandestine operations. The government
is now turning its attention to economic and social
problems, which,if left unresolved, might afford the
Viet Minh a convenient basis for long-term subversion.
BURMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The Burmese government has moved to hold to a
minimum Communist gains in the elections for the upper
house, the Chamber of Nationalities. These elections
are now in progress and will continue through July.
Despite the government's maneuvering, the Communists are
expected to gain, for the first time, at least token
representation in the Chamber of Nationalities, Burma's
most important forum for the expression of minority
discontent.
PAKISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Near-famine conditions in East Pakistan and the
beginning of a food shortage in West Pakistan present
President Mirza and Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammad
All with complex problems in the eighth week of Pakistan's
political crisis.
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA .
Page 13
. . . Page 14
An agreement permitting Morocco to exchange
diplomatic representatives with other states was signed
in Paris on 28 May. Despite the lack of an equivalent
agreement between France and Tunisia, Tunisian prime
minister Bourghiba has appointed a minister to Saudi
Arabia. In Algeria, France continues its military
pressure while making contacts with Algerian nationalist
leaders.
GREEK POLITICAL SITUATION . . . . . . Page 14
The resignation of Greek foreign minister Theotokis
after the Karamanlis government had won a parliamentary
vote of confidence is evidence of heavy opposition
pressure for a firmer approach on Cyprus. The opposition
is not satisfied with Theotokis' departure, and
Karamanlis may find it necess r to take a firmer stand
in relation to the British.
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31 May 1956
TENSION RISING IN HONDURAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Political tension in Honduras between the de facto
regime of Chief of State Julio Lozano and his opponents
of the right and the left is mounting as maneuvering
begins for control of the constituent assembly, which
is tentatively scheduled to be elected in October.
D
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITIES -- LATIN AMERICA . . . . . . . . Page 1
During 1956, several Latin American countries have
responded favorably to Soviet bloc economic overtures,
and further economic contacts between the bloc and such
countries as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba and Uruguay
are likely. Response to Soviet efforts to establish
diplomatic relations in the area were generally negative.
It is possible that A. I, Mikovan will make a tour of Latin
American countries soon.
SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FUNDS Page 4
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In addition to its political and economic activities
in Asian areas, the Soviet Union has succeeded in using
the United Nations' technical assistance program to
further its aims in such countries as India. The Soviet
financial contribution to the program has been in
nonconvertible rubles. The recipient countries have
therefore been forced to spend the funds in the USSR on
Soviet goods or services. As a result, the Soviet Union
has been able to obtain political and economic influence
in the Asian countries disproportionate.tq its small
financial contribution to the UN program. 25X1
MODERNIZATION OF SOVIET INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . . . . Page
As part of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960),
the USSR has launched a major drive to modernize its
industry and achieve American standards of production
efficiency and labor productivity. The goals for
replacement of obsolete machinery and for eventual
mechanization and autom io re feasible and can
probably be achieved.
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31 May 1956
PEIPING'S VIEWS ON THE TAIWAN PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The Chinese Communists, while building up their
military capabilities for an assault on Taiwan, continue
to assert that they will "liberate" the island by peace-
ful means "if possible." Communist leaders have ex-
pressed confidence privately that the Nationalist govern-
ment will fall through subversion, and there are indi-
cations that Nationalist morale has deteriorated to snma
extent during the past year. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM
31 May 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
TITO'S POSITION
ON THE EVE OF HIS MOSCOW VISIT
On 2 June, one year after
the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to
Belgrade, President Tito and a
delegation including his wife,
Vice President Kardelj and
Foreign Minister Popovic are
scheduled to arrive in Moscow
for a three-week state visit.
Yugoslav leaders have been work-
ing hard to strengthen their
ties with both the Soviet bloc
and the West.
Contacts With West'
Tito has been engaged in
numerous diplomatic visits this
spring. In April he received
the Belgian and Norwegian
foreign ministers and succeeded
in reassuring them about Yugo-
slavia's position. His visit
to Paris early in May impressed
the French favorably. He tried
to convince the French leaders
that Yugoslavia desired firm
political relations regardless
of the French decision on
economic aid.
In March,, Yugoslavia reached
settlements with,two of its:.-
principal trading partners,.,
West Germany and Italy, un long-
standing economic issues that
had been politically irritating.
In recent weeks, the
Yugoslavs have indicated they
still desire American military
aid. On 16 May, Yugoslavia
reversed its earlier stand and
agreed to allow additions to
be made immediately to the US
Military Aid Staff. This
reaffirms the agreement worked
out last October by Tito and
Deputy Under Secretary of State
Murphy.
Along with its increasing
reliance on the USSR for econom-
ic assistance, Yugoslavia
continues to express interest
in Western economic aid, partic-
ularlyr American surplus wheat,
and is negotiating for French
and American financing of the
Majdanpek copper development.
Relations With Soviet Bloc
Yugoslavia has expressed
general satisfaction with the
development of its relations
with the Soviet bloc. Belgrade
has scheduled 12 percent of its
total foreign trade this year
with the USSR and about an equal
amount with the Satellites and
Communist China. It has con-
cluded credit agreements with
the USSR totaling $204,000,000,
and arrangements with the
Satellites give it another
$95,000,000. It has also
started to buy wheat from the
USSR and had an observer at the
18-25 May meeting of the Council
for Mutual-Economio Assistance.
The problem of World War II
reparations payments owed by
Hungary appears to be on the
verge of a satisfactory solution..
In the political area,
party contacts with the USSR
are progressing at the gradual
pace Belgrade apparently desires,
At the Moscow meeting, Tito
may press his complaints against
some of the Satellites, partic-
u3'a'r ;T Albania, which have been
reluctant to make any significant
concessions to Yugoslavia.
Tito will probably not
change his position on world
questions during his visit.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 May 1956
On both the German re-unifica-
tion and disarmament questions,
his position is already similar
to that of the USSR. He is
unlikely to abandon his personal
belief in the necessity of NATO,
even in private talks.
The Soviet leaders may not
make,any spectacular proposals
for.improved Yugoslav-Soviet
IMPENDING CONFIDENCE DEBATE
IN FRENCH ASSEMBLY
Premier Mollet faces the
assembly debate on all the
policies of his government--
beginning 31 May--with most
parliamentary groups favoring
one part of his program but
opposing another. Molletrs
position has been little affected
by Vice Premier Mendes-France's
resignation on 23 May over the
Algerian policy.
Mollet evidently chose
the comprehensive issue of
confidence in his policies in
the expectation that attacks
from the left and right would
cancel each other out.
Despite a stepped-up Com-
munist campaign for immediate
peace in Algeria, the Communist
Party supports Mollet's domestic
reform program and may be reluc-
tant at present to impair chances
of closer Communist and Social-
ist co-operation. The Communist
Party has moved up its central
committee meeting to 4 June,
and this is seen as an indica-
tion that the party is planning
to abstain or vote against the
government.
The rightist and center
Popular Republicans, while
states and parties.
relations, probably because
they are satisfied with their
present development. They prob-
ably look on Tito's visit as
valuable in itself and believe
the non-Communist world will
regard the visit as evidence of
still closer relations between
the two countries and of Moscow's
eagerness for increased con-
tacts with other Socialist
increasingly dissatisfied with
the Moroccan convention and the
Tunisian negotiations as too
far-reaching, generally approve
his military measures in Algeria
and are hesitant to make Mollet
a prisoner of Communist votes.
There is considerable re-
luctance in the assembly
generally to precipitate a
cabinet crisis before the
results of Mollet's Algerian
measures are apparent, partic-
ularly , since.:any., newl.'.govern--.
ment would require Socialist
support, if not participation.
Mollet's and Pineau's conduct
in Moscow, moreover, seems to
have been generally satisfactory
to the assembly.
The government may use its
interest in an Indian offer to
mediate the Algerian dispute
in order to appeal to the Com-
munists as well as to the
Socialists and Radicals to
maintain solid support on the
left. It can, moreover, cite
progress in negotiations with
Algerian leaders in Geneva to
appease those who favor nego-
tiations and fear the results
of an all-out military cam-
paign.
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So far Mendes-France is
the only minister to withdraw
from the government, and he has
emphasized the personal nature
of his resignation and has told
his Radical Socialist Party that
the present coalition is the
best obtainable.
While Mollet's coalition
thus appears to have avoided
an immediate crisis, some
prominent Socialists in the
cabinet are sympathetic to
Mendes-France's demands for a
more liberal Algerian policy.
Many Socialists resent Mollet's
willingness to bear the respon-
sibility for an Algerian policy
acceptable to the right, and
they are increasingly prone to
be influenced by Communist agita-
tion against the military meas-
ures in Algeria.
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31 May 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
The attention of Arab and
Israeli diplomats is,focused
on the resolution introduced in
the United Nations on 29 May by
Britain. The Arab attitude to-
ward the resolution was fore-
cast by a Syrian Foreign Minis-
try officials statement.that
the Arabs contemplated no action
if the resolution merely noted
Secretary General Hammarskjold's
report. If, however, the UN
adopted his report or suggested
further moves, the Arab states
could be expected to "clarify"
their position and to oppose
any new attempts to bring the
parties together.
CAIRO SEEKS FURTHER ARAB
RECOGNITION OF PEIPING
Cairo's decision on 16 May
to recognize Communist China
has raised Peiping's interna-
tional prestige at the expense
of the Chinese Nationalists,
stirred up favorable comment in
other Near East countries, and
has increased the likelihood of
further Communist diplomatic
gains in that area. Peiping is
seeking to exploit its success
in Egypt, and may be recognized
by,some additional Arab states
before the fall meeting of the
UN General Assembly in November,
but Chinese Communist efforts
appear unlikely to produce a
general. response at this time,,,
Chinese Communist propa-
gandists have been jubilant over
Peiping's success in Egypt.
Communist broadcasts have cele-
brated Egyptian recognition as a
great victory over "colonialism"
which has "opened the gate" for
This attitude seems con-
sistent with the relative calm
that has settled over the area
since Hammarskjold returned to
New York. The Arabs appear to
be more confident that time is
'on their. side, at least as long
as.-they are reasonably confident
of support from the Soviet bloc.
The Israelis, who have repeat-
edly stated that only arms can
give them real security, appear
to feel less isolated since
some Western arms shipments to
them have been resumed.
similar moves by other Arab
states. Peiping's propaganda,
shrewdly pitched to play on
Middle East nationalism, has
been echoed by the Egyptians.
Cairo is also putting diplomatic
pressure on the other Arab states
to encourage recognition of
Communist China, according to
the Libyan prime minister.
Press reports say diplo-
matic missions exchanged by
Cairo and Peiping are to be on
the ambassadorial level. Ac-
cording to a report broadcast
from Peiping on 31 May, Briga-
dier General Hasan Raghib, now
Egyptian under secretary of
state for war and navy, will be
Cairo's representative in
Peiping. Raghib is generally
given credit for working out
details of the Soviet-Egyptian
arms deal.
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JAPAN MOVES TOWARD CLOSER
RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA
Japanese government ap-
proval on 22 May for the ex-
change of unofficial trade rep-
resentatives with Communist
China is a response to rapidly
rising pressures within Japan
for the normalization of rela-
tions with a prospective major
trading partner. It was proba-
bly accelerated by Agriculture
Minister Kono's agreement with
the USSR on fishing and on the
resumption of diplomatic talks.
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu told
Ambassador Allison on 23 May
that the Japanese government
would do little to reverse the
trend toward relations with
Peiping.
The Japanese decision to
exchange trade representatives
at this time apparently stems
from a strong reaction within
Japan to several. international
developments which the Japanese
feel threaten to isolate them
from the China mainland market:
France's plan to establish a
permanent trade mission in
Peiping; Britain's use of the
CHINCOM "exception" clause to
ship embargoed goods to
still lacking.
The Chinese Communists have
invited Premier Nasr and an
Egyptian military delegation to
visit Peiping. On 24 May, Cairo
announced acceptance of these
invitations. No date has been
set for Nasr's visit, but the
military delegation will re-
portedly leave for China soon.
A Cairo press report says Chou
En-lai has accepted an invita-
tion from Nasr to visit Egypt,
but official confirmation is
Communist China; and Egypt's
recognition of Peiping, which
Japan expects other Middle
Eastern nations to follow.
Perhaps most important of
all, the Japanese inclination
to normalize relations with
Peiping was influenced by the
recent Moscow agreements on
fishing and the prospect of
restored relations with the
USSR. The Japanese see little
reason to differentiate between
the USSR and China in this
matter.
Foreign Minister Shigemit-
su, who is uncertain of retain-
ing his post, appears to have
exercised a positive and lead-
ing role in the decision to ex-
change trade representatives.
Heretofore, he has advocated a
"go-slow" policy concerning re-
lations with the Communist bloc,
and particularly has been op-
posed to concessions to the
USSR unless Japanese territo-
rial demands were met. Amid re-
ports that his policy has been
discredited by Kono's concessions
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 May 1956
to the USSR in return for a
fishing agreement, Shigemitsu
may be trying to.row with
the current.
Sino-Japanese trade is
limited by Communist unwilling-
ness to supply iron ore and
coking coal unless Japan in re-
turn supplies embargoed goods,
such as steel products and wood-
en ships. To test American
reaction and possibly as a step
toward meeting Communist wishes,
Japan plans to exhibit embar-
goed goods in Peiping and Shang-
hai trade fairs this autumn.
Japan reportedly is will-
ing to conclude a payments
agreement with Peiping before
granting official status to
trade representatives. The
Japanese government then proba-
bly would seek to delay diplo-
matic recognition of Communist
China, if only to prevent com-
plications with the United
States and Nationalist China.
Peiping, however, can be ex-
pected. to continue to press
for full diplomatic relations.
(Concurred 25X1
in by ORR)
PEIPING ENLARGES
INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE
Following last winter's
all-out drive to bring Chinese
peasants into collective farms,
Communist China for the first
time in its history has ear-
marked a significant amount of
foreign exchange and investment
funds for agriculture. Peiping,
anxious to forestall widespread
resentment of collectivization
by providing tangible evidence
of the benefits it will bring,
has increased imports of chemi-
cal fertilizer and has advanced
the schedule for construction
of tractor factories. A major
increase in small farm machinery
production also is planned for
1956.
The diversion of investment
funds probably will not appre-
ciably retard the industrial
program at this time because
its principal difficulties ap-
pear to be technical and plan-
ning problems, rather than a
shortage of capital. In any
case, many important elements
of the industrial program are
well ahead of schedule.
Recent contracts signed
with non-Communist countries
have indicated to the American
consul general in Hong Kong
that Peiping's imports of chemi-
cal fertilizer over the next
year may total 2,000,000 tons.
The original schedule for the
entire First Five-Year Plan
period, 1953-1957, called for
the import of only 3,000,000
tons. The import of 2,000,000
tons would cost about $150,000,-
000--one third of the value of
China's imports from the non-
Communist world and 8 percent
of its total imports.
The supply of chemical
fertilizer, including a small
amount from domestic production,
was 130,000 tons in 1936, 500,-
000 tons in 1953, and 1,100,000
in 1955. The 2,500,000 tons
which may be available for the
1957 crops are still far below
China's needs,, which Peiping
has estimated to be 20,000,000
tons annually.
Tractors and Plows
The USSR has helped push
construction of tractor fac-
tories in China more rapidly
than scheduled under the First
Five-Year Plan. Construction
has been accelerated on the one
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factory to have been started
by 1957 under the plan, and two
additional factories are being
built. The largest, at Loyang
in central China, is to produce
15,000 54-hp tractors annually.
Two smaller ones, at Tientsin
and Nanking, are to produce 24-
hp and 37-hp tractors. These
plants should meet a substantial
part of China's agricultura.l?re-
quirements after 1958. Because
of their lightness, the tractors
produced at these plants would
have little use other than for
agriculture.
To meet its tractor needs,,
Peiping continues to import from
bloc countries, while attempting
to secure agricultural tractors
from nonbloc countries. Licenses
for the export to China of a
total of 175 sample tractors
USSR ESTABLISHING
BOARDING SCHOOLS FOR THE ELITE
The USSR is rapidly estab-
lishing a large number of board-
ing schools, as called for in
Khrushchev's speech at the 20th
Party Congress. These schools
will probably be largely re-
stricted to children of high-
level government and party of-
ficials and will offer a higher
caliber of instruction than pro-
vided by the general school
system.
According to Khrushchev, the
schools are to be modeled after
have been granted by Britain and
West Germany and an Austrian firm
has an. order for up to 1,000.
Many small machinery facto-
ries in Shanghai and other cities
were converted in recent months
to the production of agricultur-
al equipment, and a large Soviet-
equipped farm machinery factory
has been established at Peiping.
The 1957 production plan for two-
wheeled, animal-drawn plows, on
which the industry is concentrat-
ing, was doubled in January to
4,000,000. This is eight times
the number produced in 1955.
The value of 4,000,000 plows
alone would represent from 15
to 20 percent of the planned
output for the machine-building
industry in 1956.
(Prepared by ORR)
aristocratic schools of tsarist
times such as those "for the
corps of pages, the cadet corps,
and institutes for daughters of
the gentry." The schools,
Khrushchev pointed out, should
be placed in "the suburbs, in
holiday resorts and in forest
surroundings." Fee for admis-
sion would depend on the ability
of the parents to pay and no ef-
fort or money would be spared in
providing the best facilities
and teachers.
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While Khrushchev gave the
impression that the selection
of students would be on a com-
pletely egalitarian basis, there
is little doubt that, as is now
the case with such exclusive
schools as the Suvorov Military
academy, only those with suf-
ficient influence and money will
ordinarily be able to enter
their children.
The establishment of board-
ing schools may have been prompt-
ed in part by the recent major
changes in the 10-year school
system. With the rapid advance
in the last several years to-
ward attainment of universal
secondary schooling, changes
have been introduced to make
the system more suitable for
mass education. Manual and
practical training is being em-
phasized more in the curriculum,
and tuition fees for the last
three school years--once an ob-
stacle for low-income families--
have been abolished.
The establishment of a spe-
cial school network would enable
children of the Soviet elite to
continue to receive a privileged
education and thereby retain the
same status as their parents.
The problem of growing juvenile
delinquency, apathy, and re-
jection of Soviet mores among
the children of this class may
also have been a factor in the
decision to set up boarding
schools. The aristocratic
schools to which Khrushchev re-
ferred were known for instilling
in their graduates a. feeling of
school pride, duty toward the
regime, and identification with
the established order.
References to the boarding
schools as facilities for the
children of widows and families
where both parents work, ap-
pear calculated primarily to
disguise from the general pub-
lic another special privilege
for the upper party and govern-
ment hierarchy. Even this camou-
flage would appear insufficient
to offset the characteristic
bluntness with which Khrushchev
chose to cite aristocratic tsar-
ist schools as their models.
Plans for implementation
of Khrmshthev's proposal were
drawn up almost immediately
after the party congress. In
early May a meeting, attended
by secretaries of the Communist
Party central committee, in-
cluding Khrushchev, was held
to discuss a, draft statute on
boarding schools.
The meeting was followed
by a RSFSR education conference
which called for the establish-
ment of boarding schools in
every oblast by the next school
year. Enthusiastic support from
the upper strata of Soviet so-
ciety-pay expla.i:n the speed with
which measures to set these
schools up are being taken by
the regime despite the strain
such measures will place on the
already overtaxed school ex-
pansion plan.
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31 May 1956
USSR STEPS UP CAMPAIGN FOR
RETURN OF NATIONALS
In recent weeks, the USSR
has intensified its efforts to
induce the return of former So-
viet citizens living abroad.
The campaign, which appears to
be well organized and co-
ordinated, has been carried into
the western hemisphere, but is
focused on emigres residing in
Western Europe. Measured in'
numbers, the effort had has limit-
ed results, but the USSR prob-
ably regards it as a success in
terms of the psychological
effects.
Propaganda Appeal
Refugees are being flooded
with propaganda urging them to
return to the homeland. The
appeal emphasizes the improve-
ment in the conditions of life
in the postwar'Soviet Union,
and offers good jobs and homes
to a:11 those who elect to re-
turn. The amnesty of September
1955, which removed from crimi-
nal responsiblity those who
were deported or who fled from
the USSR during the war, con-
tinues to provide a further
attraction.
Much of the propaganda di-
rected at emigres is intended
to undermine their morale and
their will to resist Communism.
Individual refugees receive,
through the mail and via broad-
casts, emotional appeals from
relatives and friends inside the
Soviet Union. The Committee for
Return to the Homeland, which
spearheads the campaign from
East Berlin, regularly publishes
articles by "repatriates" de-
scribing their happy existence
in the Soviet motherland. Such
propaganda is designed to in-
fluence especially those refugees
who, 11 years after the war, are
still sustained by charity in the
displaced-person camps of Europe.
Attempts to discredit emigre
political organizations continue.
The leaders of anti-Communist
groups are incessantly portrayed
as agents of Western intelli-
gence services and vilified by
charges of using terrorism and
repression against former Soviet
citizens who wish to be repatriat-
ed. The USSR hopes by such meth-
ods to sow dissension among the
rank-and-file emigres and to dis-
courage their participation in
anti-Communist activities. More
important, it seeks to destroy
the effectiveness of those or-
ganizations whose very existence
is a constant reminder of the
possibility of defection and
resistance.
Results
The blandishments have
yielded few returnees. Diplomat-
ic requests by Moscow for a com-
plete list of former Soviet cit-
izens in Germany, handed to the
Bonn government in March and May
of this year, were refused with
the statement that only 31 ref-
ugees in Germany had expressed
a desire to be repatriated. The
recent arrival in Odessa of a
claimed 800 returnees from South
America-provided the USSR with a
propaganda bonus, but was not fol-
lowed by the wave of.repatria-
tions apparently expected. Pres-
sures on emigres living in North
America have served only to in-
dicate that the USSR-is aware of
the identities of many per-
sons living under assumed names.
Soviet government instruc-
tions on the handling of re-
turnees are likely to prove
detrimental to the campaign for
the 4'eturn of nationals as soon as
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31 May 1956
.they are publicized throughout
the emigre community. The
directives clearly indicate
that returnees will receive
those jobs least desirable to
Soviet citizens--work in coal
and iron wines and in lumbering
enterprises.
The campaign, which will
probably be intensified, aims
not only to destroy bases of
opposition abroad by returning
PUBLIC CRITICISM SUBSIDES IN
POLAND
Open criticism of public
affairs in Poland, which was
vehement in late April, has
almost disappeared froti, tile
Polish press and radio in
recent weeks. This is prob-
ably a result of First Secre-
tary Ochab's warning against
criticism which undermines
party unity or party policies.
The lull will give the regime
time to institute some of its
promised. reforms, but these
probably will not be extensive
enough to satisfy the more
liberal groups.
The last outbreak was the
publication in the Warsaw daily
Zycie Warszawy on 6 May of a
Better y Over a dozen Warsaw
architects protesting the re-
moval of the chief architect. of
Warsaw. Tire letter claime
that the party and government
leaders should be blamed, as
well as the chief architect,
for errors in the rebuilding
of Warsaw since they directed
his work. Since then, accord-
ing to the American embassy
in Warsaw, almost all criticism
has disappeared from the news-
papers, except for a few. mild
articles in the youth paper
Poprostu.
system.
as many people as possible to
Communist control, but also to
discredit the West as a haven
for those who have fled or de-
sire to flee froia Coitimunism.
The presence of repatriates in
the Soviet Union will act as a
deterrent to further defection,
and their propaganda descriptions
of the misery of life abroad
will help furtner to convince
the Russian citizens of tie
superiority of the Soviet
Ochab's early warnings,
which were not widely publicized,
had little effect, and the
intensity of the criticism,:
mounted until some groups were
demanding the rei,oval of those
high officials responsible for
Stalinist practices of the past.
His public warnings late in
April that the attempts of
"ideologically unstable" groups
to take advantage of the in-
creased freedom would not be
tolerated apparently have had
more effect. The reported
removal of Roman Werfel, editor
in chief of the party paper
Trybuna Ludu, for failing to
eek the de-Stalinization
campaign within permitted limits,
probably has served to emphasize
the determination of the re-
gime to reassert its control.
the "liberals" in the party,
who have been pressing for
greater freedom, have in the
past retreated under regime
pressure, only to renew their
campaign as soon as the pres-
sure was eased. They probably
again have decided that they
have made all the progress
possible for the present, and
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that it would be wise to await
the outcome of the regime's
promise of reforms.
In the past three weeks,
the government has at least
started a reform program by
announcing changes designed
to eliminate some controls
USSR SLOWING GROWTH
OF LARGE CITIES
The USSR is attempting to
slow the growth of large So-
viet cities. This program is
designed to ease a tight hous-
ing situation and to channel
labor eastward to new areas
under development.
over university faculties.
The draft of a new and more
enlightened penal code rzas been
presented and the regime has
asked for suggestions to im-
prove the code further before
its adoption. The government
has also promised judicial re-
forms.
The Minsk city council
received a recommendation fro+.
the Byelorussian central co..-
mittee on 6 May to forbid the
eiaploylm.ent of new workers, within
the city unless they are.to work
in new factories or are already
USSR
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
1938 AND 1953
(6i percent of total population)
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31 May 1956
registered as residents. A
housing shortage was cited as
the reason for the recommenda-
tion. It also called for a ban
on organized recruiting of vil-
lage labor for work in Minsk
and for strict observance of the
decreed norm of nine square
meters of housing per person in.
registering new residents, as
well as for tightening internal
passport requirements.
Khrushchev played up this
program in his speech at the
20th Party Congress. He stressed
its importance in improving ur-
ban housing, which remained at
its low level in Moscow because
large-scale housing construction
was nullified by population
growth. Khrushchev noted that
there had been 300,000 arrivals
in the city during the past
five years, and said that the
practice of drawing manpower
to the cities from other places
could be stopped easily since
"new industrial construction
in large cities is no longer
done." Besides stopping the
SOUTH KOREA
President Rhee's new cabi-
net appointments, together with
his statements since the 15 May
election, indicate that he does
not intend to change his policies
or methods of control because
of the show of opposition
strength at the polls.
Rhee has been outwardly
cordial to his Democratic vice-
president-elect, Chang Myon,
but has stated that he will
influx from outside, Khrushchev
expressed the desirability of
thinning the population of
large cities by suburban de-
velgpment.
Besides improving urban
housing conditions, restricted
entry to urban, areas helps chan-
nel labor and demobilized per-
sonnel to the areas in which
the government wants them to
work. Since late 1953, 1,300,-
000 workers, including at least
350,000 members of the Komsomol
Communist youth organization,
have been sent into the "new
lands" of Kazakhstan and Siberia.
Now upward of half a million
Komsomol members are to be
recruited and sent to develop
industry in the eastern regions
during 1956 and 1957. According
to Soviet writers, a total of
3,000,000 additional workers
will be needed in the eastern
areas. to carry out the industrial
and agricultural program of the
Sixth Five-Year Plan.
(Prepared by ORR)
brook no interference by Chang
With the affairs of the govern-
ment. In a press conference,
Rhee called attention to the
fact that Chang received a
minority of the total vote vice president.
Rhee's recent cabinet
changes appear to have been
prompted primarily by a desire
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31 May 1956
to meet the objections of Lib-
eral Party Assemblymen. Two
of the new ministers are members
of the assembly, whose leaders
have long called for represen-
tation in the cabinet,, while
two of the officials replaced--
Defense Minister Son Won-il
and Economic Co-ordinator Paek
Tu-chin-'have been. the targets
of assembly crititisn: Rhee's
action may have forestalled a
bipartisan move in the direction
of'parliamentary government for
South Korea. The Democratic
Party has called for such a
change, but will be unable to
press in this direction with-
out considerable support from
Rhee's Liberal Party.
Appointment of the ruth-
less Kim Chong-won ("Tiger"
Kim) as director of the national
police suggests that Rhee con-
templates no change in his meth-
ods of control, and it may even
VIET MINH MILITARY ACTIVITY
While several recent re-
ports suggested an increase of
Viet Minh military activity
near the 17th parallel, there
has been no indication of a '
major manpower and logistical
build-up in the vicinity of the
parallel.
The Viet Minh has decided
to evacuate all children and
older men and women from the
area just north of the 17th par-
allel by the end of June, accord-
ing to an unconfirmed US army
report.
PART II
foreshadow a tightening of po-
lice authority. Kim's appoint-
ment follows his delivery of
a sizable election majority
for Rhee and Yi Ki-pung in an
opposition stronghold South
Cholla Provincel
The American embassy ob-
serves that the promotion of
Kim and other police officials
disregards popular sentiment
and is likely to bring a strong
adverse reaction. Antiadminis-
tration sentiment, which ma-
terialized in the election de-
spite Police-:efforts to "educate"
the , populace,would probably. -increase:should the administra-
tion attempt to restrict .oppo-
'
sition
ctiviti s.
Two regiments of the Viet
Minh 304th Division have re-
portedly moved into the vicinity
of Dong Hoi about 40 miles north
of the 17th parallel. Reports
have also been received of com-
bined infantry-artillery exer-
cises conducted by elements of
the 325th Division near the
parallel, as well as the con-
struction of field fortifications,
roadblocks and antiaircraft em-
placements, and the surveying
of artillery. positions. These
reports of Communist military
activity are lent more credi-
bility by the existence of Viet
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31 May 1956
Minh regulations that
French aircraft fly-
ing for the Interna-
tio.nal Control Com-
mission must fly 16
miles off the Viet
Minh coast when
crossing the 17th` par-
allel.
These Viet Minh
activities may re-
flect defensive prep-
arations.. South
Vietnamese troops
in the vicinity of
the-parallel are be-
lieved to outnumber
the Viet Minh forces
at the present time,
although over-all Viet
Minh military strength
is superior.
The success of
the present Communist
political campaign to
court neutralist
opinion in Southeast
Asia further suggests
a disinclination to
attack the south at
this time. Viet Minh
propaganda, although
acknowledging the pos-
sibility of war, is
stressing appeals for
"peaceful unification."
SOUTH VIETNAM
vIET(lAf
r``'te VIETNAM
I~~I DVISION
The government of South
Vietnam continues to make steady
though, unspectacular progress.
Despite an undercurrent of crit-
icism against President Diem?s
"authoritarianism," the govern-
ment is slowly broadening its
base and has begun to attack its
most pressing economic problems.
As long as the Viet Minh refuses
to accept the indefinite parti-
tioning of the country at the
17th parallel, however, the
threat of Communist subversion
remains.
Two recent developments
have especially contributed
to rising self-confidence. These
are the withdrawal of the French
Expeditionary Corps and the de-
ferment of the scheduled July
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unification elections as a re-
sult of the recent talks in
London between representatives
of the Geneva co-chairmen. On
the latter point, the Diem gov-
ernment has reiterated its view
that reunification is desirable
on the basis of "genuinely free
elections," but that such elec-
tions are impossible as long
as the north is under Communist
control.
New Constitution
South Vietnam's viability
will be further bolstered by
the adoption of a constitution
some time before the end of June.
The constitution will undoubt-
edly reflect the government's
close study of the American and
Philippine models and will pro-
vide for a separation of powers
and a guarantee of individual
rights. Effective control will
remain with the presidency, how-
ever, and certain limitations
will be placed on the people
as a result of Diem's conviction
that full democracy must be
withheld until the danger of
Viet Minh subversion subsides
and an enlightened electorate
develops.
DissidentActivity
In the military field, the
capture on 13 April of the boa
The Burmese government,
shaken by the Communist-led
National United Front's (NUF)
good showing in the lower house
elections on 27 April, has moved
to hold to a minimum Communist
gains in the elections for the
upper house, the Chamber of Na-
tionalities.
The Chamber of Nationali-
ties has 125 seats, as compared
to 250 in the lower house. Half
of these seats are allocated to
Hao rebel leader, Ba Cut, sig-
nified the virtual elimination
of effective armed opposition
to Saigon's authority by dissi-
dent sect forces. The marked
improvement in South Vietnam's
internal security will give its
armed forces greater flexibil-
ity and permit full concentra-
tion on the elimination of
clandestine Viet Minh forces.
South Vietnam's preoccupa-
tion with political and secu-
Pity ;ratters has heretofore
permitted little progress in
solving serious econowic and
social problems. Diem is ex-
tremely conscious of the danger
of Viet Minh exploitation of
economic and social discontent,
and has recently initiated cor-
rective action in these fields.
A start has been made in
implementing long-planned
agrarian reforms. The govern-
ment's program for permanently
integrating more than 600,000
northern refugees into South
Vietnam's economy is beginning
to move smoothly, with impres-
sive results apparent at the
huge Cai San resettlement camp
in the western region. Finally,
in an effort to increase and
broaden the country's produc-
tion, the government is taking
steps ddsigned to attract a
significant influx of foreign
investment.
the Burman majority; the other
half to Burma's major ethnic
minority groups. Although
much less important than the
Chamber of Deputies, the upper
house can initiate legislation
other than money bills and can
amend lower house bills subject
to approval by a majority of
both houses. Its most signifi-
cant function, however, is to
serve as a forum for the airing
of complaints by the minorities.
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31 May 1956
After the lower house elec-
tions, the government for a
time considered postponing the
upper house elections indefi-
nitely, citing alleged "insur-
gent intimidation." It finally
decided to permit the polling
for 45--presumably safe--seats
to go off as scheduled on 22
May. In 11 other districts,
government candidates were unop-
posed,, and the 28 members repre-
senting the Shan and Kayah States
are appointed by their local
chieftains and will automatically
support the government.
In densely populated areas
where the Communists are expect-
ed to make their best showing,
the government has postponed the
elections--until 31 May in the
Rangoon constituencies and un-
til 22 July in the others. The
NUF has vigorously protested
these postponements, charging
the government with conniving
to delay elections until the
Near-famine conditions in
East Pakistan and the beginning
of a food shortage in West Paki-
stan present President Mirza..
and Prime Minister Chaudhri Mo-
hammad All with complex problems
in the eighth week of Pakistan's
political crisis.
The Karachi government has
attempted to meet the food prob-
lem, as it-has in the past, by
increased requests for emergency
assistance from the United States.
On 23 May it also "gratefully
accepted" a free gift of 40,000
tons of grain from the USSR.
A political free-for-
all is now centered in East
Pakistan, whicn has been under
monsoon rains are of sufficient
force to keep down an expected
protest vote.
In another move to help its
own candidates, the government
has taken advantage of its con-
trol over the electoral machin-
ery to relax sanctions against
the stuffing of ballot boxes.
Despite these maneuvers,
observers anticipate that
enough voters will seize this
chance to protest the contin-
ued insurrections and an in-
creasingly serious inflationary
situation to return some Commu-
nist candidates to the Chamber
of Nationalities. Unrepresent-
ed in the outgoing membership,
the Communists would thus be
provided not only with a new
forum in which to attack the
government, but also with an
excellent opportunity to pro-
fess their sympathy for minority
group aspirations.
"direct rule" of the national
government since 26 May. The
various political factions in
the province are trying to
organize a majority in order to
claim control of the government
when direct rule ends. Some
weeks of confusion appear cer-
tain, during which Karachi's
efforts to solve the food prob-
lem will probably be hampered
by the competing politicians'
attempts to make political capi-
tal out of it. Meanwhile, Prime
Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali's
trip to Communist China sched-
uled for 2 June has been post-
poned indefinitely--apparently
as the result of a real rather
than "di lomatic" illness.
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Morocco
The tension which has pre-
vailed in Rabat may diminish)
following the signing of an
agreement in Paris on 28 May
permitting Morocco to exchange
diplomatic missions with other
states. Actual exchanges will
probably not take place, how-
ever, until after the conclu-
sion of the debate in the
French National Assembly, now
expected to end about 5 June.
The agreement paves the
way for a direct Moroccan ap-
proach to the United States on
American air bases in Morocco.
Many Moroccan leaders hope for
an agreement providing annual
payments large enough':to enable
Morocco to be less dependent"on
its French subsidy. Esti-
mates of probable Moroccan de-
mands for compensation range
,from $88,000,000 to $430,000,-
000 annually.
Tunisia
Despite the lack of an
agreement with France specifi-
cally permitting Tunisia to ex-
change diplomatic representa-
tives, Prime Minister Bourghiba
has obtained agreement from
Saudi Arabia to the appointment
of Neo-Destour leader Taieb
Annabi as minister to Jidda.
This appointment was considered
urgent because of the imminence
of the season for pilgrimages
to Mecca. Exchanges of ambas-
sadors with other states,
including France, probably will
follow the negotiation of a
diplomatic convention with
France after the National As-
sembly debate. Tunisia has
maintained a high commissioner
in France since 23 April..
Algeria
While France continues its
military pressure in Algeria,
it is also. making contacts with
nationalist.. ' leaders,. reportedly
both in Cairo and Geneva. Pre-
mier Mollet is preparing to
make a somewhat optimistic. prog-
ress report to the National
Assembly on 31 May. The mili-
tary situation, however, has
not changed and the mayor of
Algiers and other liberal French
leaders in Algeria have indi-
cated.their pessimism about the
situation.
25X1
resent efforts
By ra League states to obtain
United Nations action on Al-
geria or to impose an economic
boycott on France are not 1 k
tb be effective. 25X1
25X1
GREEK POLITICAL SITUATION
Greek prime minister Kar-
amanlis on 24 May won a vote
of confidence on the Cyprus is-
sue along straight party lines,
In spite of this victory,
Karamanlis, as had been gener-
ally predicted, accepted the
resignation of foreign Minister
Theotokis, who had for several
months been a special target
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31 May 1956
of opposition charges of not
being firm in his approach on
the Cyprus issue. The new for-
eign minister,Evangelos Averoff,
will be immediately subjected
to heavy opposition pressure
to take a stronger line on
Cyprus.
The Greek government has
reiterated its terms for a set-
tlement of the Cyprus dispute,
which include the return of
the exiled Archbishop Makarios,
and a fixed date for the ap-
plication of self-determination.
Political tension in Hon-
duras between the de facto
regime of Chief of State Julio
Lozano and his opponents of
both the right and the left is
mounting, as maneuvering begins
for control of the constituent
assembly which is tentatively
scheduled to be elected in
October. The assembly will
probably be empowered to choose
a constitutional chief execu-
tive and convert itself into
the nation's legislature, thus
restoring constitutional govern-
ment, which has been in abeyance
since December 1954.
The 71-year-old Lozano be-
lieves the only way to elimi-
nate the violent political par-
tisanship of the past and create
the conditions necessary for
orderly, democratic government
is to establish a "national
union" government with the sup-
port and participation of the
three major political parties.
He apparently is convinced he
is the man to head such an ad-
ministration.
His "National Union Move-
ment" began with the Reformist
Party, the smallest of the
three, and has since gained the
Under present conditions it will
not be in a position to moderate
its line. Karamanlis will prob-
ably step up his attempts to
win UN consideration of the
dispute and renew his efforts
to win world support.
The opposition will make
another attempt to uqseat the
government when the opportunity
arises, and Karamanlis may find
it necessary to take a less
moderate stand in relation to
the British.
adherence of a significant por-
tion of the Nationalist Party
and a few important members of
the Liberal Party. Lozano,
however, probably lacks wide
popular support.
Lozanoas Opposition
Lozano is meeting increas-
ingly bitter opposition from
hard-core Nationalists still
loyal to ex-dictator Carias
and from the radical, Communist-
influenced faction of the Lib-
eral Party, led by Ramon Villeda
Morales. There are persistent
rumors of an alliance between
Cariistas and Villedistas.
Though such an alliance between
traditional enemies would not
be stable or lasting, its crea-
tion might be a,serious chal-
lenge to Lozano's plans.
In an effort to reduce the
effectiveness of opposition
propaganda, which has been de-
manding immediate elections,
Lozano announced on 21 May that
elections for the constituent
assembly will be held on.7 Octo-
ber "or earlier," unless public
disturbances force a postpone-
ment. He has promised that the
elections will be free. The
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timing and procedures of the
elections, however, will be de-
termined solely by him, and his
control of the electoral machin-
ery permits him to influence the
results. ,
Rumors of a Villedista-
Cariista coup have been frequent
during the past week. Though
a spontaneous outbreak is al-
ways possible, an organized
effort to seize the government
is unlikely at this time.
Lozano enjoys the loyalty of
the army and has ordered strict
security precautions during
the Villedista convention of
25 to 28 May. If, however,
the opposition becomes con-
vinced Lozano has no intention
of permitting free elections,
it may decide its only hope lies
in the use of force.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 May 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
During 1956 the Soviet
bloc has intensified its eco-
nomic overtures to Latin Ameri-
ca and has sought to establish
diplomatic relations with an
increasing number of Latin Ameri-
can countries. Several coun-
tries--including Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Cuba and Uru-
guay--have responded favorably
to the commercial overtures,
and further bloc success along
these lines seems likely. How-
ever, the response in the dip-
lomatic field has been generally
negative.
Bloc Policy
The Communist countries
began to step up their campaign
for closer relations with Latin
America in 1952 by expanding
the staffs of diplo-
matic missions and
increasing their trade
and cultural offen-
sive.
Since Premier
Bulganin's announce-
ment this January of
the USSR's desire to
establish diplomatic
and economic relations
and to extend techni-
cal assistance to any
Latin American coun-
try, the Soviet bloc
has apparently at-
tached a high prior-
ity to the area, and
approaches are being
made at high diplo-
matic levels. Al-
though accent has been
placed on offers for
diplomatic exchanges,
the bloc has had more
success with trade
approaches calculated
to play on serious
economic difficulties.
Soviet propaganda
directed to the area
4RltAAL
continues to inveigh against
the "injustices" of US monopo-
lies which are said to build
"economic dependence" and empha-
sizes the "obvious advantages"
of trade with the Soviet bloc.
In addition Moscow points out
that its own "trade, not aid"
program does not carry with it
all the military and political
obligations which it claims
accompany economic dealings with
the United States.
Czechoslovakia and East
Germany appear to be particularly
active. Czechoslovakia is in
an advantageous position because
it has diplomatic representatives
in seven countries, and a record
of commercial activity in the
area from before-.the war.
Guadalajara
Mexico City
LATIN AMERICAN
REPUBLICS
L. Paz I
BOLIVIA
A
Tucuman
V.
^ SOVIET BLOC TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND ARRANGEMENTS
SOVIET BLOC CULTURAL SOCIETIES
Pre
Cordob[aZSOnFe
ROSLfIa
idente Roque
Soenz Pena
Men 1@.ue Ai vBudu
dons L. Ai Platlataa. Montevideo
A Tandil'
wA
G 0 c_c
91 MAY 19
60118-5
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The bloc appears to be
exploring Latin American recep-
tivity in preparation for laumh-
ing a more concentrated overt
program. Persistent rumors
have stated that A. I. Mikoyan,
a first deputy premier and re-
sponsible for Russia's foreign
trade, will make a tour of La-
tin American countries soon.
It seems likely that these ru-
mors have been encouraged by
the USSR as a means of testing
Latin American receptivity to
such a visit.
A majority of the Latin
American nations view bloc trade
simply as a matter of economic
expediency, and a number are
actively exploring the oppor-
tunities for its expansion.
Some, notably Argentina, Brazil
and Uruguay, are faced with the
disposition of surplus agricul-
tural commodities and accompany-
ing balance-of-payments prob-
lems and dollar shortages. At
the same time, they are seeking
heavy industrial equipment and
--in the case of Argentina and
Ecuador--arms and aircraft not
available to them in the free
world on terms which they de-
sire.
In various trade proposals,
bloc countries have agreed to
import Latin American agricul-
tural products and to export
manufactured goods on generous
cause world prices for Latin
American raw materials to rise.
Argentina
Argentina has had active
trade with most bloc nations
for several years and the re-
placement of Peron by Aramburu
apparently has made no signifi-
cant difference in those rela-
tions. Czechoslovakia's sale
of Aero-45's to Argentina in
February was the first sale
of aircraft by a Communist coun-
try in Latin America.
A Soviet bid in April to
sell Argentina substantial quan-
tities of oil equipment on long-
term, low-interest credit ap-
parently was in response to
Argentina's announcement on 7.
March that its state oil monop-
oly would call for bids on $250,-
000,000 worth of petroleum equip-
ment on "both sides of the iron
curtain." The USSR has also
offered generous conditions for
the sale of other items, re-
portedly including the barter
of MIG's for wheat or other
agricultural commodities.
Brazil, whose total trade
with the Soviet bloc almost
doubled in 1955, has had trade
agreements with Poland, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia, and is
willing to increase trade with
the bloc provided advantageous
credit terms and, in some cases, payments agreements can be con-
at lower prices than those of cluded. Last year Brazil's ex-
American and British competitors.j ports to the USSR amounted to
Many Latin Americans see
trade with the bloc as one way
to broaden and diversify foreign
trade--a long-time objective--
and to gain bargaining leverage
with the United States. Some,
such as Costa. Rican president
Figueres, who favors limited
exports to the USSR, probably
hope Soviet bloc purchases will
about $697,000. The Brazilian
government, eager to sell sur-
plus coffee and cotton and to
obtain nondollar machinery, is
negotiating with a newly ar-
rived trade delegation from
East Germany.
The excess of world pro-
duction of coffee, Colombia's
principal source of revenue,
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31 May 1956
has caused the latter to seek
new markets in Eastern Europe
and the USSR.
Czechoslovakia has been
attempting to expand its Colom-
bian market for some time and
has offered to buy Colombian
coffee in exchange for indus-
trial equipment.
A Czech trade mission re-
portedly was expected in Bogota
in May to~sell aircraft, trucks,
and automobiles and to negoti-
ate a $20,000,000 arms deal
initiated by a private Colom-
bian firm. The Colombian for=
eign minister has stated that
no government-to-government ne-
gotiations are contemplated.
Cuba
Cuba, which sold $32,000,-
000 worth of sugar to the USSR
in 1955, is the object of an
intensified sales effort by sev-
eral Eastern European nations.
Uruguay
Since the large Soviet pur-
chases in Uruguay in 1954, this
country has looked to the bloc
as a market for agricultural
surpluses. This is largely
responsible for the naming of
an "ambassador" to head its mis-
sion in Moscow and the renego-.
tiation of commercial agree-
ments with Czechoslovakia and
the USSR. Uruguay is the only
Latin American country which
has appointed a commercial agent
to Communist China.
Bolivia and Chile have both
been approached with economic
offers. While Bolivia's re-
sponse is unknown, Chilean pres-
ident Ibanez apparently favors
increased trade ties with East-
ern Europe, although he is a-
gainst formal relations with
the USSR.
Paraguay is now question-
ing the value of existing
agreements with Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland, although
a Czech flour mill is to be
installed soon. Mexico, which
has trade and dipomatic rela-
tions with the bloc, has re-
fused to take any official
steps to further trade con-
tacts.
Most of the remaining
countries, not yet principal
targets in the campaign, do-
not have the problem of dispos-
ing of surplus products and
thus would not be so suscepti-
ble to bloc offers. Their com=ments on the Bulganin state-
ment generally have been nega-
tive.
Diplomatic Overtures
The reaction of the Latin
American countries to bloc bids
to establish diplomatic rela-
tions has been negative for
the most part. While many La-
tin American officials probably
consider the Soviet threat over-
played, they are reluctant to
expand relations with the bloc
for fear of disapproval by the
United States and, in some cases,
are apprehensive about the ac-
tivities of resident bloc mis-
sions.
The USSR, which has diplo-
matic relations with Mexico,
Uruguay and Argentina, is known
to have made since January ad-
vances for diplomatic relations
to the Dominican Republic, Bo-
livia., Brazil and Peru. The
Dominicans, despite the So-.
viet assurance of goods "at
bottom prices," have flatly
refused the Soviet offer.
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31 May 1956
The others have made no formal
response. Peru has responded.
by taking steps to discourage
the travel of Soviet officials.
Venezuela has delayed in its
reply to the offer of a treaty
of friendship and commerce.
Of the Satellites, Czecho-
slovakia has strengthened its
already well-established diplo-
matic position in Latin America
by exchanging consuls with Co-
lombia and sending a new repre-
eentative to Peru. "Bolivia
reportedly has named a minister
to Prague. Czechoslovakia has
been turned down in its diplo-
matic overtures to Honduras,
Haiti and Paraguay.
Formal diplomatic relations
between Latin American coun-
tries and the bloc probably will
not be greatly expanded in the
near future, but growing com-
mercial relations will increase
Soviet influence in the area.
(Concurred in
by ORR)
SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FUNDS
The Soviet Union,capitaliz-
ing on the widespread prefer-
ence of recipient countries for
aid under international, rather
than national sponsorship, has
succeeded in using the United
Nations technical assistance
program to strengthen its po--
litical and economic position in
India and other Asian areas.
Its success has been out of pro-
portion to its contribution of
funds to the program.
Operation
Technical assistance activ-
ities have been part of the
regular work of the United Na-
tions,.arid its specialized agen-
cies since 1946. In 1949, the
General Assembly expanded and
combined the technical assist-
ance activities of the UN and
the specialized agencies, and
the resulting Expanded Program
of Technical Assistance for
Economic Development of Under-
developed Areas (UNETAP) began
operations in.1950. This pro-
gram is directed by the Techni-
cal Assistance Board (TAB),
but actual operations are car-
ried out by seven of the UN
specialized agencies--in such
fields as health, agriculture
and education--plus the UN
Technical Assistance Adminis-
tration (UNTAA), a catch-all
organization covering such ad-
ditional fields as transport,
mining, and community develop-
ment.
The program is financed from
a special account to which
governments contribute volun-
tarily on a yearly basis. For
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ITED NATIONS'-EXPANDED PROGRAM
TECHNICAL' ASSISTANCE
(UN1aAP)
r'r ETvI E'Ft Gi~V NIvIE2 Tea
O THI UNI I ED NATIONS)
TCONOMIC
:< - ECOSOC) rs)
(,SAME MEMBERS AS COUNCIL)
-(TAC)
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BOARD (TAB)
(AGENCIES & EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN)
INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION
(ICAO)
INTERNATIONAL
LABOR
ORGANIZATION
(ILO)
UNITED NATIONS
EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC &
CULTURAL ORG.
(UNESCO)
WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION
(WHO)
-------------
UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL I ..
TECHNICAL BANK FOR I
ASSISTANCE RECONSTRUCTIONI
ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPEMENTI
(UNTAA) IBRD
INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS UNION
(ITU)
INTERNATIONAL I_ , _z!
MONETARY FUND L~
(IMF)
WORLD
METEOROLOGICAL
ORGANIZATION
THE BANK & FUND PARTICIPATE
IN THE TAB AS OBSERVERS.
THEY DO NOT RECEIVE FUNDS
FROM THE EXPANDED PROGRAM.
(WMO)
FOOD AND
AGRICU LTURE
ORGANIZATION
(FAO)
UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS
NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES
Like the con-
tributions of some
of the smaller free
world countries, such
as Argentina, Turkey
and Denmark, the
Soviet bloc contribu-
tions are nonconvert-
ible. Hence, there
are only three pur-
poses to which the
contributions can be
devoted: (1) the
salaries of Soviet
bloc experts; (2)
training grants for
UN fellowships with-
in the Soviet bloc;
and (3) Soviet bloc
supplies and equip-
ment for use in UN
technical assistance
projects. All three
permit Soviet infil-
tration and propa-
ganda activities.
The UN encoun-
tered.some difficulty
utilizing the Soviet
bloc contributions
because of their in-
convertibility, but
about $1,300,000 was
expended in 1955,
most of it for the
purchase of equipment.
Projects utilizing
$3,253,500 of the
Soviet bloc cur-
the 1956 expanded technical as-
sistance program, 72 countries
have pledged the equivalent of
$28,940,563. Over half of this
comes from the United States.
Soviet Contribution
For four successive years,
beginning in the summer of 1953,
the USSR has pledged or- con-
tributed 4,000,000 rubles (ap-
proximately $1,000,000) per -
year. Lesser amounts have been
pledged or contributed by the
Satellites. Including pledges
for 1956, Soviet and Satellite
sources have made available to
the program. the equivalent of
$5,033,332.
rencies contributed since 1953
have been approved by TAB for
implementation in 1956. The
greatest share will be chan-
neled through UNESCO, with
smaller amounts being allotted
to FAO, WMO- and WHO (see chart)
projects.
Over $2,000,000 in Soviet
bloc contributions has been
allotted to the 1956 UNETAP
program for Arab, African and
Asian areas, with $1,445,500
going to India alone. Four
Latin American countries are
scheduled to receive some $340,-
000 in aid, mostly in equipment,
with Chile the largest recip-
ient..
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This increased allocation
of bloc funds is primarily the
result of the USSR's protests
to the UN against its failure
to use past bloc contributions.
The USSR has also approached a
number of underdeveloped coun-
tries, particularly in Asia, to
encourage them to request such
assistance as is available
through the ruble account,
accompanying such overtures
with explicit criticism of the
motives of the United States
in offering aid to these coun-
tries.
TAB officials, while aware
of the necessity of maintaining
the multilateral nature of the
UN program, have sanctioned
discussions among donor and
recipient countries and the
particular UN organization
concerned.
Bombay Technological Institute
One of the most ambitious
projects involving the use of
Soviet UN technical assistance
funds is the UNESCO-sponsored
Bombay Technological Institute
scheduled to be completed in
mid-1957. This project was
worked out in Moscow in Septem-
ber 1955 by a group consisting
of representatives of the
Indian government, members of
the UNESCO secretariat and
Soviet officials. Cost of
the project was set at six
million rubles ($1,500,000 at
official rates).
The USSR will provide 15
professors or lecturers and
three translators to prepare
English versions of Soviet
technical literature, supply
equipment for use at the insti-
tute's laboratories, and award
20 fellowships to Indian teach-
ers for study in the USSR. The
first group of Indian fellows
is scheduled to arrive in the
USSR in September 1957.
At a meeting on the subject
last November, a member of the
UNESCO secretariat indicated
that, although it was hoped that
not more than one third of the
experts to be provided would
be Soviet citizens, there was
no financial provision anywhere
in the 1956 program for pro-
viding experts from any other
country. The American repre-
sentative at this meeting came
to the conclusion that the
Bombay project was'in fact
developed bilaterally, "with
UNESCO playing a more or less
incidental and not clearly
defined role."
1956 PLEDGED CONTRIBUTIONS
TO UNETAP
(72 Contributing Nations)
US
UK
Canada
France
USSR
Netherlands
Sweden
Denmark
India
Belgium
Norway
Brazil
Australia
W. Germany
Switzerland
Turkey
New Zealand
Pakistan
Colombia
Ukraine
Uruguay
Italy
Chile
Yugoslavia
Egypt
Argentina
Other
TOTAL
$ 15,500,000
2,240,000
1,800,000
1,448,571
1,000,000
760,000
695,921
579,123
450,000
437,500
380,792
324,324
312,520
238,095
233,645
201,495
168,020
166,213
140,000
125,000
120,000
112,000
110,000
110,000
100,517
100,000
1,086,827
$ 28,940,563
It was revealed in April,
moreover, that Moscow had agreed
with the Indian government to
provide a further 10,000,000
rubles for the Bombay Technologi-
cal Institute. TAB refused to
act as a channel for this bi-
lateral move. A UNESCO mission
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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is now in Bombay to survey the
institute. The director gener-
al of UNESCO has assured Ameri-
can representatives that the
mission will attempt to bring
the Bombay project more in line
with normal UN technical assist-
ance procedures. However,
Soviet deputy minister of higher
education Rumja.nzov is included
among the Soviet members of the
mission as a "UNESCO expert,"
a tenuous designation.
UN officials are now con-
sidering a Soviet offer to pro-
vide India with 120 fellowships,
valued at nearly $1,000,000,
in connection with the steel
plant in Bhila.i, being built
by the USSR on a strictly
bilateral basis.. Such use of
Soviet UN contributions entire-
ly in aid of a Soviet bilateral
project would be a major devi-
ation from normal UN technical
assistance procedures.
Various Soviet officials
have intimated recently that
the USSR's contributions to the
UN technical assistance program
might be increased in future
years--a development which
would compound the present
problems.
As things stand now, the
USSR has succeeded both in
getting maximum propaganda
credit for its relatively small
contribution to the UN technical
assistance program and in using
bilateral negotiations to set
up projects which should be
negotiated between the UN and
the recipient country.
The lack of centralized
control over the UN projects
permits the various partici-
pating UN organizations to
set up projects not fully in
accord with previous UN prac-
tices. TAB, in some cases,
has been reduced to a mere
role of rubber-stamping proj-
ects set up bilaterally.
Unless UN administrative pro-
cedures are tightened, increased
Soviet contributions would
lead to a further breakdown of
the multilateral nature of the
UN program.
(Concurred in by ORR)
The Sixth Five-Year Plan
(1956-1960) calls for the pro-
duction of more and better
machinery as a means to 'in-
crease Soviet labor productiv-
ity and maintain the USSR as
the world's fastest growing
country, economically speaking.
Since the possibility of in-
creasing output in the Sixth
Five-Year Plan by adding to
the labor force is limited
(see Weekly of 26 April, Part
III), the problem of labor
productivity--the ratio be-
tween total goods and services
produced and the time worked
in producing them--has assumed
new importance.
On 4 July 1955, in a
speech before the party central
committee which kicked off the
present labor productivity
drive, Premier Bulganin com-
pared Soviet and American tech-
nology as well as the wide dis-
crepancies in efficiency among
various Soviet plants producing
similar products. He pointed
out that during the First and
Second Five-Year Plans, Soviet
factories had "what was then
the most perfect equipment,"
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but that over 20,, years, had
since passed. ,During the war,
the equipping of. new. industrial
plants was.carr'ied out only to
an insignificant:extent. Al-
though the economy received
large amounts cif .new Machine
tools and egUipment,In the post-
war years of reconstruction,
and expansion, Bulganin empha-
sized that much antiquated
machinery still remained. in
use.
,To assist-the, 'drive.toward
industrial mOdernization`and
raising productivity, the.
Stalinist postwar prohibition
against praise And open.copying
of Western technology and the
Marxist doctrine..of obsoles-
cence were abandoned at this
central committee meeting.
In his doctrine of obso-
lescence?Marx asserted that.
"wasteful" abandonment of pro-
duction equipment was.unneces-
sary under socialism, observing
that machinery becomes obsoles-
cent in capitalist economies,
because an owner must replace
machinery which is still pro-
ductive to meet the prices of
a competitor with a newer fac-
tory. This dogma was accept-
able so long as total indus
trial production in the USSR
was low and labor to operate
both old and new machinery was
plentiful. As a result, the
same product was often turned
out in plants which varied 20
or more years in technology,
and production machinery, obso-
lete by Western standards,-re-
mained in production.
Modernization
In the past, most Soviet
funds for industrial invest-
ment have been devoted to the
construction and equipping of
new plants. Under the Sixth
Five-Year Plan, however, only
about half of the total invest-
ment funds will be used for
this purpose--primarily for the
new industrial expansion in the
eastern USSR.and the Urals,re-
gion..
The'remaining investment
funds scheduled for the next
five years will. be spent for
modernization, of. existing plants
in the. older. established areas.
These expenditures should be
-a; major step toward overcoming
the technical backwardness of
many Soviet plants, particular-
ly older goes in the European
USSSR..` Labor productivity at
the, , relatively. new blast fur-
nace of the Magnitogorsk steel
plant, for example, is 3.5
times as great as the average
at all Soviet blast furnaces.
Similarly, the open-hearth
steelmaking furnaces at Mag-
nitogorsk are as efficient as
the best American steel fur-
naces, but the general level
of,labor productivity in Soviet
steelmaking,-, is only about one
half of that of Magnitogorsk.
A selective modernization
program has been announced for
individual plants in a wide
range of industries and is de-
signed to raise industry to
the level of its most efficient
plants. Because the average
age of Soviet capital equipment
is low--less than that of equip-
ment in the United States, and
despite the 'fact that much of
it is of prewar design, a good
part of the modernization pro-
gram will probably consist of
minor changes--such as the ad-'
dition of materials handling
equipment--involving neither
large-scale scrapping nor major
additions to existing produc-
tion lines.
The Soviet Union should
have no trouble supplying the
equipment necessary for this
phase of the modernization pro-
gram. Temporary difficulties
may arise, however, from faulty
administration and opposition
to change on the part of in-
dividual ministries or plant
managements long trained to
resist any measure which re-
duces output even temporarily.
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Especially extensive re-
equipment programs have been
announced for a few industries,
including producers of metal-
working and foundry equipment,
railroad rolling stock, tractor
and agricultural equipment,
and textile and food processing
machinery. These industries
appear to have been selected
either because of an abnormally
large lag in their technology,
because extensive design changes
are planned for their products,
or because their 1960 production
goals have been set so high as
to require large-scale moderni-
zation.
Mechanization and Automation
Publicity accorded the
present Five-Year Plan's moder-
nization program has stressed
"further complex mechanization
and automation." As in the
West, these terms are without
exact meaning in the Soviet
Union and a neat line cannot
be drawn between them. Mechani-
zation,, however, refers to re-
placing human labor with mechan-
ical or electrl-c-al-devices, and
automation, to replacing human
control with mechanical or
electrical devices.
Qualified Western observ-
ers uniformly report that Soviet
plants use far more labor than
similar plants in the West,
especially in materials handling.
Consequently, "complex mechani-
zation" alone can still make
major contributions to raising
Soviet industry's technical
level. In the Sixth Five-Year
Plan, most new equipment will
probably fall in this category.
Between now and 1960, true
"automatic production processes,"
some of which have already been
used in the USSR for 20 years,
will probably account for only
a small portion of total indus-
trial output: In the chemical
and petroleum industries, more
sophisticated systems are
scheduled for installation.
Furthermore, automatic systems
are to be introduced widely
in the USSR's communications
network, in electric power
production and transmission,
and in the paper-making indus-
try. In addition, from 200
to 250 automatic and semi-
automatic pilot production
lines will be installed in in-
dustrial plants of Moscow
Oblast by 1960.
The USSR has the ability
to design systems more complex
than those now scheduled for
installation. Analysis of
Soviet theoretical literature
on communications, physics,
electronics and mathematics
shows that the USSR's research
on automation is on a par with
that in the West. As for ap-
plication, members of a highly
qualified American industrial
delegation to the USSR reported
in December 1955 that they had
seen automatic systems as good
as any in the West.
One factor which may retard
the design and production of
automated systems for industry
may be the competition of modern
weapons systems for the same
type of personnel and basic
component materiel. Among the
most advanced and intricate
systems of automation in use
today are those in some missile
weapons systems.
Implementation of the Program.
On 28 May 1955, a State
Committee for New Technology
was formed to formulate and
co-ordinate the execution of
plans for the modernization of
Soviet industry. The importance
of the c'o*nmittee is indicated
by the rank of its chairman, V.
A. Malyshev, who was the general
supervisor of all Soviet machine
building in the immediate post-
Stalin period and the initial
successor to Beria as controller
of Soviet nuclear development.
In July 1955, Malyshev.or-
dered each economic ministry
to name a deputy minister for
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31 May 1956
new technology, to serve as a
link with the committee and to
supervise the technical plans
of the ministry.
Despite a trend to allow
managerial personnel more
uthority in the conduct of
plant operations, the committee
may tend to limit a manager's
authority to decide how and
when to install new equipment.
At the same time, he will be
under increasing pressure to
see that his plant meets its
schedule for technical improve-
ment. In July 1955, Bulganin
stated that managers who fail
to fulfill plans for raising
the technical level of industry
ould be punished, just as are
managers who fail to fulfill
output plans.
This long-neglected
principle was applied to an
important person for the first
time in recent years on 22
January 1956, when the minister
of Machine and Instrument
Building was fired for failure
to meet his ministry's plan
for technological improvement.
On the same date, this ministry
was split up, and a new Ministry
of Instruments and Means of
Automation was established.
Present Soviet plans for
increasing the quantity and
quality of machinery and other
capital equipment by 1960 ap-
pear feasible and should be
fulfilled. By 1960, the
amount of modern machinery
per industrial worker in the
USSR will approach the present
level in advanced Western coun-
tries, and will no longer be as
significant a factor as in the
past, hindering the Soviet
-Union in its efforts to catch
up with American industrial
labor productivity.
(Prepared by ORR) (Concurred
in by OSI)
PEIPING'S VIEWS ON THE TAIWAN PROBLEM
The Chinese Communists,
while building up their mili-
tary capabilities for an as-
sault on Taiwan, continue to
ssert that. they will "liberate"
the island by peaceful means
"if possible." Communist
leaders have expressed confi-
dence privately that the
Nationalist government will
fall through subversion, and
there are indications that
Nationalist morale has deteri-
orated to some extent over the
past year.
"Peaceful Liberation" Theme
The Chinese Communists have
never altered their position
that Taiwan is rightfully
Communist territory and that
its "liberation" is an "internal
matter" in which they will brook
no interference. For more than
a year, however, Peiping has
been following a "peaceful" line
toward the Nationalists. Short-
ly before the Bandung conference
in April 1955, Chinese Commu-
nist propaganda muted its bellig-
erent references to preparations
for a conquest of Taiwan. At
the conference itself, Chou
En-lai struck a conciliatory
pose, offering to negotiate with
the United States on the ques-
tion of Far Eastern tensions and
asserting that Taiwan would be
"liberated" by peaceful means
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31 May 1956
"so far as possible." Since
then the Communists have made
no effort to seize Nationalist-
held territory by force.
Several times in the past,
year, Chou En-lai and spokesmen
for Chou have expressed confi-
dence privately that Taiwan
would fall to Peiping through
an internal collapse. In a
major policy statement last Janu-
ary, Chou claimed Communist ef-
forts had already brought Chinese
Nationalist political and.mili-
tary officials to a "state of
panic and hopeless pessimism."
.: Subver(A1gn, 0Ampaign
Chinese Communist propa-
ganda is now beamed to Taiwan
for about 11"hours a day
has sought to erode Nationalist
morale by a "soft" approach.
Previous offers of amnesty and
good treatment for all defectors
have been underscored.
Peiping has appealed to
Chinese nationalism by relating
Communist achievements in build-
ing a "new China." Americans
on Taiwan are villified as
""col?nialists," destroying Chi-
nese culture and "oppressing"
the Chinese people. At the
same time, the Nationalist-
situgtion on Taiwan is depicted
as-hopeless, Chiang Kai-shek's
forces are described as too
feeble to defend Taiwan, let
alone attack the mainland.
Peiping's propaganda fea-
tures personal appeals to promirr-?
rent Nationalists by former col-
leagues now working for the
Communists.
The visit to Peiping early
this year of the Canadian ad-
entu r? Morris "Two-Gun Co-
hen, a former confidant of Sun
Yat-sen and ondti;: