CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000900090001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 23, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
wmzrr-~ IN I- I
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.
OCR NO. 4651/56
23 August 1956
DOCUMENT NO. LP-
---No CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
CI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TOE
NEXT REVIEW RATE:
AUTFj, W 70
DATE'
REVIEWER;
.CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA review(s) completed.
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of .Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 August 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
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THE SUEZ CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Despite Nasr's decision not to participate in the
London conference, Egyptian representatives in London
maintained close contact with the participating. delega-
tions. These contacts have increased Egyptian optimism
regarding the chances for an agreement which would re-
affirm Egypt's working control of the canal. Popular
opinion in Cairo now believes that Anglo-French military
intervention is unlikely. The Soviet delegation has
acted as Nasr's chief advocate, at the same time trying
to maintain a working relationship with the Western
powers. Meanwhile, military preparations continue on
both sides.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
A sharp increase in border incidents involving
Israel, Jordan and Egypt has sustained tension in the
area, despite the apparent intention of the Israeli
and Arab governments to prevent the outbreak of
hostilities during the present Suez nal crisis.
SUEZ AND ALGERIAN CRISES
THREATEN FRENCH CABINET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
French premier Mollet fears that an "unsatisfactory"
resolution of the Suez crisis would undermine France's
determination to fight in Algeria and would pose a real
threat to the Fourth Republic. In view of the growing
frustration over France's inability to pacify Algeria,
an unsatisfactory solution of the Suez Problem
might
force Mallet's resignation. 25X1
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 position in negotiations with France.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 August 1956
NORTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Violence continues in Algeria as terrorists,;
counterterrorists and security forces step up their
,activities. In Morocco, the Istigial party is creating
a government "crisis" designed to force the installation
of an all-Istiqlal cabinet, which would adopt a stiffer
the operation and profits of the Panama Canal.
could cite as a precedent in asserting its interest in
PANAMA'S INTEREST
IN SUEZ CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Panama, keenly interested in Egypt's nationalization
of the Suez Canal Company, undoubtedly hopes the Suez
crisis will result in an international agreement which it
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CYPRUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The request by EOKA, the Cypriot nationalist
organization, on 16 August for a truce with the British
apparently surprised both the Greek government and
British authorities on Cyprus. EOKA will undoubtedly
resume operations if the British do not respond favorably.
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POLITICAL SITUATION
IN PAKISTAN . . .
Widespread unrest in Karachi, combined with a
campaign by a strong opposition party coalition to take
over the Pakistani government, has led to another
political crisis which could result in a change in the
premiership or the imposition of executive rule.
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LAOS .
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The outcome of the negotiations of the details
governing the integration of the Pathet Lao troops into
the royal Laotian army, which were scheduled to begin on
22 August, will largely determine whether the recent
agreement in principle can be implemented. Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma, now in Peiping, will probably
be courted for closer political, economic and cultural
relations with China as well as pressed to accede to
any additional demands the Pathet Lao might consider
essential to a settlement of Laotian internal problems.
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23 August 1956
INDONESIAN ARMY DISCONTENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Increasing army resentment toward the Indonesian
government, highlighted on 13 August by the attempted
arrest of the foreign minister on charges of corruption,
is unlikely to result in an attempted coup by dissatis-
fied army elements in the near future. The military is
not believed strong enough politically to force a change
in the government, and there is no support among oliti-
cians, for such a move at this time. 25X1
CHANGES IN THE USSR'S
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Personnel transfers, appointments, and institutional
changes within the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
during the past seven months have furthered the main
lines of development established since Stalin's death.
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HUNGARIAN REGIME SPEEDS
CONCESSIONS TO PARTY MODERATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page ii
During the five weeks since Gero's appointment as
Hungarian party leader, the regime has granted an in-
creasing number of significant concessions--economic,
cultural and political--to elements of the party
favoring an over-all "liberalization" program. These
concessions go beyond the policy line laid down at the
time of Rakosi's ouster in July, and are perhaps best
exemplified by the apparent change in policy toward
former premier Imre Nagy; the regime apparently is now
willing to reinstate Nagy--a symbol of "moderate"
Communism--to_party membership.
SOVIET PLANS FOR INCREASING
COTTON PRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
The USSR has announced that 740,000 acres of virgin
land in the Golodnaya Steppe region of the Uzbek and
Kazakh Republics will be developed and irrigated for
cotton growing. By 1962 the government expects the re-
claimed area to yield "at least 320,000 to 340,000 tons
of cotton annually." This amount is about equal to the
total increase in Soviet cotton production achieved
between 1950 and 1955, but less than 15 percent of the
total increase scheduled durine the Sixth ive-Year
Plan. F T
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23 August 1956
CHINESE COMMUNISTS PLAN FOR
INCREASED PIG IRON AND STEEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Ambitious Chinese Communist plans for pig iron and
steel output which were recently announced will probably
be fulfilled. The new 1956 target of 4,516,000 tons of
steel will supply about four fifths of China's domestic
requirements for steel.
POLITICAL UNREST IN
FOUR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Political unrest and threatened revolutions have
recently accentuated the instability of four widely
separated countries of Latin America: in Honduras and
Ecuador, disgruntled factions threaten internal peace;
in Cuba and Colombia, resistance to dictatorship.
threatens the established regimes.
EFFECT OF WEST GERMANY'S BAN
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ON COMMUNIST PARTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
The outlawing of the West German Communist Party on
17 August by the Constitutional Court may be a factor
in next year's national elections, since recent political
preference polls show that a change of only a small
percentage of the total vote would tip the scales in favor
of the opposition forces. Members of the East German
politburo have urged the workers of West Germany to look
to the opposition Social Democratic Party as the only 25X1
legal workers' party.whieb can safeguard popula rights.
LUXEMBOURG OBJECTIONS TO MOSELLE
PROJECT MAY BLOCK SAAR ACCORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Luxembourg objections that the canalization of the
Moselle River would place its steel industry at a com-
petitive disadvantage have created a major obstacle for
implementation of the French-German Saar accord. The
Luxembourgers are demanding some form of compensation
for anticipated losses. The French assembly is unlikely
to approve the accord unless the Moselle canalization is
undertaken in order to bring France economic compensations
for its loss of benefits in the Saar. 25X1
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23 August 1956
THE KEFLAVIK AIR BASE QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Negotiations over the status of the Keflavik air
base in Iceland have been delayed for at least a month
by the illness of Foreign Minister Gudmundsson. In the
meantime, Icelandic public opinion appears to be
softening, but the government's position has been
strengthened by the prospect of some improvement in the
country's foreign exchange position and indications of
growing sympathy from Danish and Norwegian Social
Democratic leaders for the government's proposals on
the base. F7 I
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SUKARNO'S TRIP TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Indonesia's President Sukarno is scheduled to leave
on 26 August for a seven-week tour of Sino-Soviet bloc
countries. From the viewpoint of Indonesia's foreign
policy, this trip is intended to "balance" his May-June
visit to the United States and Western Europe. Sukarno's
influence is usually reflected in Indonesian foreign and
domestic policies, and he has told his people be will
compare the bloc's progress with that of the Western
world and decide "what is best for Indonesia." He has
publicly described in glowing terms the favorable im-
pressions he received on his visit to the United States.
His trip to Moscow and Peiping will be a highlight in
the accelerated program of cultural and economic ex-
change between Indonesia and the Communist world and will
take place at a time when there are signs of growing
dissatisfaction with the All government, Particularly
among army elements. F_ I
POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE INDIAN ELECTION . Page 3
India is entering its campaign period for national
elections early in 1957 against a background of polit-
ical ferment in South Asia which in the past three years
has forced major changes in government and policy on
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Ceylon. In India, as in
Pakistan and Ceylon, opposition elements have developed
strong provincial political machines, while the ruling
party has been preoccupied with developing national
policy and administrative machinery. This process may
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23 August 1956
have been slower in India because of Prime Minister Nehru?s
stabilizing influence and the inertia of a large and
heterogeneous population. There is a possibility, however,
that Nehru's Congress Party could lose its absolute
parliamentary majority in the election.
PEIPING'S POLICY TOWARD NATIONAL MINORITIES .
Page 6
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Communist China has followed a conciliatory policy
toward its national minorities in granting them nominal
self-government in "autonomous" areas and in respecting
their languages, religions and customs. This policy
has reduced overt opposition to small proportions, and
may have increased Peiping's influence among ethnically
related minorities in neighboring countries. 25X1
THE ANTI-VYSHINSKY CAMPAIGN IN SOVIET JURISPRUDENCE ~. . Page 9
Criticism of Soviet jurisprudence voiced at the
Soviet 20th Party Congress in February has been followed
by a series of attacks on the legal theories of the late
Andrei Vyshinsky, long considered the outstanding Soviet
legal theoretician. In the de-Stalinization process,
demands have been made for strengthened "socialist
legality" and judicial reform, and Vyshinsky has been
condemned for his support of the doctrine of "trial by
confession" and of the theory that all accomplices
a crime are equally guilty.
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23 August 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Egypt
Despite Nasr's decision not
to participate in the London
conference, the Egyptian embassy
staff and Nasr's chief of cab-
inet, All Sabri, maintained
close contact with the partici-
pating delegations, particularly
those of the Soviet Union, Indo-
nesia and India.
Developments at London ap-
pear to have increased Egypt's
optimism for a compromise solu-
tion at a new conference, which
would, however, reaffirm Egypt's
working.control of the canal.
The impasse reached at the con-
ference has increased Cairo's
awareness that it may face pro-
longed tension with the West.
Indian Plan: On 20 August
India's chief legate, Krishna
Mdenon, offered a compromise plan
proposing revision of the Con-
vention of 1888 and establish-
ment of an advisory council of
user nations with which the
Egyptian canal company would be
obliged to consult. The com-
pany's annual report would also
be transmitted to the United
Nations.
The Indian plan was probably
submitted in the belief it had
the support of Egypt and the
USSR. Although the concept of
a consultative council appears
agreeable to Nasr, the council's
somewhat undefined role under
the Indian plan may cause'the
Egyptians some concern. The
growing confidence of the Egyp-
tians in London may have stimu-
lated hope in Cairo that, with
the support: of the USSR, terms
still more favorable than those
proposed by Menon might be ob-
tained. Nasr has given no clear
response to the Indian plan,al-
though it is probably close to
what he is ready to accept.
Defense Preparations: The
Egyptian government, although
apparently interested in nego-
tiating a settlement, is con-
tinuing to prepare to resist in
the event war develops over Suez.
It is preparing for military
action to be followed by pro-
longed popular underground re-
sistance, damage to the canal,
and destruction of oil and other
Western installations in the
area. Efforts to strengthen
defenses of the canal zone and
the delta are continuing, to-
gether with psychological meas-
ures to promote identification
of the masses with the regime.
Maximum publicity is being given
in Egypt to the "national mobil-
ization"--reflected in the re-
cent decision to establish 20
"battalions," of 1,000 armed
men each, among the Egyptian
bedouin tribes.
Egyptian forces in the
canal zone are now believed to
include units equal to possibly
one and a half infantry divisions,
plus a tank battalion, large
paramilitary reserve forces and
permanent coastal defenses. The
emphasis thus far appears to
have been on improvising the
defense of the canal zone and
the delta with the military re-
sources already there, plus
mobilization of a paramilitary
reserve. A significant redeploy-
ment from the Israeli front is
not believed to have occurred.
Financial Squeeze: Business
circles and the government in
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23 August 1956
Cairo are beginning to experience
economic problems as a result of
the British and French freezing
of Egyptian assets and the threat
of war. The cash position of
most Egyptian banks has been
weakened by continuous with-
drawals since the end of July,
particularly from French and
British accounts. Merchants
are reducing their extension of
credit and retailers are attempt-
ing to convert their cash into
goods.
Canal Operations: Pressure
is also being felt as a con-
sequence of British and French
measures against the new Egyp~
tiara canal authority. Selwyn
Lloyd has estimated that the
transit tolls now being collect-
ed by Egypt are only one third
of those normally received and
are insufficient to meet oper-
ating expenses of the canal.
Egypt's more efficient use of
canal pilots has reduced the
backlog of vessels awaiting
passage and relieved the strain
on the inadequate pilot force.
Since the nationalization, 23
additional Egyptian pilots have
been added, and Egypt appears.
to have begun to get.rid of
replaceable French staff members.
Serious difficulty in oper-
ating the canal will occur if
French and British canal em-
ployees and pilots are ordered
by the European company not to.
work for the new Egyptian au-
thority. Of 210 pilots, only
55 are Egyptian and most of the
remainder would probably leave
if the European company so
directed.
Soviet Roles at Conference
Dimitri Shepilov assumed
three roles in his first inter-
national conference as Soviet
foreign minister. First, as
mediator, Shepilov attempted to
lessen the tension between Egypt
and the West by negotiation and
an exchange of views. Although
Shepilov joined India on 22
August in strongly objecting to
the West's intention to present
Egypt with only the majority
proposals, he generally avoided
obstructionist tactics, such as
introducing the status of other
waterways, apparently in an at-
tempt to maintain the working
relationship that developed
with the Western powers, es-
pecially the United States. He
proposed that a preparatory
commission be instituted to give
"thorough study" to further steps
to bring the two sides together.
Second, as the conference's
chief advocate for Nasr, Shepi-
lov hammered away on the thesis
that Egypt had the right to
nationalize the canal and, to-
gether with Moscow propaganda
media, sought to create an iden-
tity of interests between the
USSR and Arab nationalism.
Third, as spokesman for
the Soviet government, he warned
in a statement on 17 August that
any attempt by Britain and France
to use force against Egypt "can
grow into a major conflict" which
could, "possibly go outside" the
Middle East.
Shepilov on 21 August an-
nounced acceptance of the pro-
posal advanced by India the day
before, at least as the basis
for negotiations. He also re-
cited the proposals the USSR
had planned to recommend, which
included the provision that the
composition of the consultative
committee be determined by an
agreement, and that it include
Egypt.
His statements to the con-
ference suggested that Moscow,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 August 1956
like Cairo, believes that time
is on the side of Egypt. His
suggestion that a preparatory
committee hold meetings on a
number of problems prior to
convening another conference
indicates that Soviet tactics
will be aimed at prolonging
negotiation. Moscow probably
assumes that Egyptian operation
of the canal on its own terms
would become increasingly accept-
a:ble to the majority of the
users and that Nasr's demands
would ultimately prevail.
British and French Moves
Meanwhile, both Britain
and France have continued "pre-
cautionary" military measures
under a nearly complete security
blanket. Although British forces
continued to arrive in the Medi-
terranean by sea and air during
the week, the build-up appears
to be leveling off and may have
temporarily stabilized after
the arrival of from 6,000 to
8,000 troops since 26 July, when
ground strength in the entire
area was estimated at 38,400.
Units shipped include an esti-
mated six infantry battalions,
two medium artillery regiments..
(US battalions), three anti-
aircraft artillery regiments..
(US battalions), plus support
elements and materiel.
tierman press also reports:Brit-
ish military equipment has been
seen leaving. An infantry bat-
talion scheduled to leave Korea
for Malaya is reported being
sent to Aden. This underlines
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the belief that the British are
rediverting certain forces from
the Far East and Southeast Asia
for utilization in the Middle
East.
French activit : The French
services so involved in
continuing military activity
resulting from the Suez crisis,
Some units of the Mediterranean
Fleet on the alert at Toulon
are scheduled to undergo several
days of "maneuvers" this week,
according to a press report.
The American air attachc? in
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23 August 1956
Paris has reported that most
French air force operational
units in France are in a state
of general alert.
As early as 14 August, the
French representative to the
North Atlantic Council announced
that French troops under the
command of SACEUR--primarily
forces in Algeria, but also
some in France and Germany--
may be affected by the crisis 2-1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 August 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
A sharp increase in seri-
ous incidents involving
Israel, Egypt, and Jordan has
renewed tension along Israel's
frontiers.
Two incidents resulting
in casualties in Israel's Negev
Desert on 16 August were fol-
lowed by Israeli jabs into
Jordan and the Egyptian-
occupied Gaza strip. The Gaza
outbreak received wide press
coverage in Egypt, second only
to the Suez crisis, while Cairo
radio broadcasts in Hebrew
charged that "foreign elements"
were trying to create new
trouble between Israel and the
Arabs--hinting that Britain
might be involved.
Despite a renewed clamor
in Israel for strong action,
Tel-Aviv appears to want to
hold retaliation to a minimum
in order not to jeopardize its
interests in the Suez issue.
Fedayeen
The Negev incidents sug-
gest that Egyptian-directed
terrorists are again operating
in Israel from both Egypt and
Jordan.
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The new fedayeen activity
was possibly given impetus
by the assassination in mid-
July of the Egyptian fedayeen
commander in the Gaza strip
and the Egyptian military
attache in Jordan--acts which
have been attributed by the
Arabs to Israel. Therefore,
while Egypt has publicly taken
a relatively moderate atti-
tude toward Israel during the
Suez crisis, Egypt may in-
tend to resume full-scale
terrorist operations against
Israel when the Suez crisis
is settled, at which time 25X1
its capabilities for such
actions will have been improved.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 August 1956
SUEZ AND ALGERIAN CRISES
THREATEN FRENCH CABINET
French premier Mollet
reportedly fears that an "un-
satisfactory" resolution of
the Suez crisis would undermine
France's determination to fight
in Algeria and would pose a
real threat to the Fourth Repub-
lic. In view of the growing
frustration over France's in-
ability to pacify Algeria, an
unsatisfactory solution of the
Suez problem might force Mol-
let's resignation.
France's initial reaction
to the Suez crisis was unusually
strong and united, largely out
of fear that another boost to
Nasr's prestige would hearten
Algerian resistance. French
dissatisfaction over the
Algerian campaign was already
strong and it will increase
sharply if an end to the
fighting is not in sight by
fall. A prolonged deadlock
over Suez would encourage de-
featism in France; and many
left-center deputies might be
swayed to accept an early end
to what they consider a hope-
less war in Algeria.
Leaders of the Popular
Republican and Radical Parties
told Foreign Minister Pineau
on 20 August that the National
Assembly should be recalled if
the results of the London con-
ference are unsatisfactory to
France.
Mollet has reportedly
indicated that if French as-
pirations are not satisfied
on the Suez issue, he would
resign, presumably to avoid
the onus for whatever might
result at home or in Algeria.
He might also, however, try
to take advantage of the grow-
ing malaise over Algeria to
move for early negotiations
with the Algerian rebels in
the hope of having enough non-
Communist support to avoid re-
liance on the Communists when
the National Assembly reconvenes
on 2 October. Even if unsuc-
cessful, such a move would at
least ensure his position with
his own party. It would, how-
ever, arouse those deputies
from various parties who have
supported Mollet only because
they see no other government
capable of solving the Algerian
problem. They can be"expected
to hold Mollet accountable xor
France's stalemated Algerian
campaign.
With the disintegration of
the broad non-Communist support
the present coalition has enjoyed,
the extremes in the assembly will
again be in a position to make
their influence felt. Mollet
is reported to fear that a double
setback on Suez and Algeria would
bring about a real constitutional
crisis for the Fourth Republic.
This pessimism is reportedly
shared by other French Volitica
leaders.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY,SUMMARY
23 August 1956
Algeria
Violence and bloodshed
continue in Algeria, where ter-
rorists, counterterrorists and
French security forces have all
reportedly stepped up their
activities since early August.
The nationalists are con-
centrating their principal ef-
fort on the Department of
Algiers and particularly Algiers
city,. which has taken on the
appearance of an armed camp,
with patrols stationed at all
major intersections. Assassina-
tion efforts have been increas-
ingly directed against Europeans,
causing a rise in tension and
strengthening the hand of
European extremist groups in-
volved in counterterrorism.
Elsewhere in Algeria, the
pattern is one of sporadic at-
PART II
tacks on individuals in urban
areas and of continued economic
sabotage, arson raids, military
ambushes and occasional direct
clashes between rebel bands
and security troops in the
countryside. The French have
stepped up their large-scale
clean-up operations, but have
been unable to prevent inci-
dents in several areas not
previously affected. They have
fallen into a number of serious
ambushes, including one south of
Algiers in which over 20 French
soldiers were reported killed.
Although. the recent increase
in rebel activity is not con-
sidered directly linked to the
Suez crisis, the latter has
had a stiffening effect on both
sides. Any optimism which ex-
isted over the prospects for
early. negotiations between the
French and the nationalists has
now been dispelled. A statement
put out by the rebels from
Algiers last week ruled out
local cease-fire agreements
and insisted with renewed vigor
that a settlement was contingent
on France's prior recognition
of Algerian independence.
The French, for their part,
feel that the "position of
strength" from which they hoped
to arrange a cease-fire by
October, followed by negotia-
tions with representative
Algerians, has been jeopardized.
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23 August 1956
Now Premier Mollet is said to
feel that everything depends
on the outcome of the Suez
crisis.
The "crisis" which the
Istiglal party is promoting is
designed to force the installa-
tion of an all-Istiglal regime
in order to strengthen the
Moroccan government, which would
then adopt a stiffer position
in the final stages of negotia-
tions with France. A secondary
purpose is to force the far less
important Shoura party (Demo-
cratic Party of Independence)
out of the government, and per-
haps out of-existence. The
Shoura party, with a very small
following, holds -a dispropor-
tionately large number of
ministries--six out of a total
of 21. On the other hand,
Istigial, with a widespread
following, holds only 10 posts.
The Istigial maneuver, ap-
parently spearheaded by the rad-
ical wing led by Allal el-Fassi,
occurred on 20 August when its
national council asked the ten
Istiglal cabinet members to re-
sign, and thereby cause the
collapse of the provisional
regime. The sultan allegedly
has informed these ministers
that he would not accept their
resignation. Party moderates,
notably Foreign Minister
Balafrej, probably will counsel
against rash action, however.
Pressure on Sultan Mohamed ben
Youssef to replace Shoura
ministers and to take steps
leading toward a constitution
and elections will probably be
stepped up.
Although the sultan recog-
nizes that the present government
is strife-ridden and unwieldy,
he has been reluctant to in-
stall an all-Istiqlal cabinet,
and has not succeeded in having
other moderate parties formed.
There are indications he fears
the Istiglal.may ultimately
be dominated by the El-Fassi
wing, which allegedly has strong
republican tendencies. He also
hesitates to form a constitu-
tional monarchy on the British
pattern, a goal of the Istiqlal
moderates which he has publicly
endorsed but which would sub-
stantially curb his present
authority.
PANAMA'S INTEREST
TN SUEZ CRISIS
Panama, keenly interested
in Egypt's nationalization of
the Suez Canal Company, un-
doubtedly hopes the Suez crisis
will result in an international
agreement which it could use
as a precedent in asserting its
"rights" to participate in the
operation and share in the
profits of the Panama Canal.
Panama's efforts began over
20 years ago and have gained
momentum in the past four years.
Persistent attempts have been
made to weaken the United
States' treaty rights by ex-
ploiting legal technicalities
to press for concessions not
envisaged in the original
agreements. President Arias
made the "off the cuff" sug-
gestion to an American official
on 17 August that Panama have
a representative in the Canal
Zone to advise American authori-
ties before decisions are made
which affect Panamanian in-
terests. The Panamanian govern-
ment and press were genuinely
piqued that Panama was not
invited to the London con-
ference. On 4 August,
Arias declared his government
felt it should have received
an invitation because ~f the
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.CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 August 1956
large number of ships registered
under the Panamanian flag and
because the Panama Canal "has
analogies of various kinds"
with the Suez Canal. He de-
clared that Panama, as a non-
participant, would not be bound
by the decisions reached at the
London conference. On 15 August
a formal note to the same effect
was delivered to the British
government.
On 7 August, the Panamanian
foreign minister announced that
the Panamanian ambassador to
Italy, who is also minister to
Egypt, had been sent to Cairo.
After his arrival, he met with
the Egyptian foreign minister
and reportedly planned to see
President Nasr. The Panamanian
minister told the press in Cairo
on 19 August that his government
views Egypt's right to national-
ize the Suez Canal with the
greatest sympathy and that the
dispute may "greatly affect"
CYPRUS
The request by EOKA, the
Cypriot nationalist organiza-
tion, on 16 August for a truce
with the British apparently sur-
prised both the Greek government
and British authorities on Cy-
prus. EOKA will undoubtedly re-
sume operations if the British
do not respond favorably.
EOKA may have asked for a
truce because the security
PART II
Panama's future policy toward
the Panama Canal. He repeated
Panama's position that the
canal is under its sovereignty
despite contractual arrangements
for administrative control by
the United States, adding that
Panama "will never accept inter-
national control over the canal."
Although Panama is exploit-
ing the Suez situation to press
the United States for more con-
cessions regarding its partici-
pation, Panamanian tactics are
unlikely to change significantly.
Ambassador Vallarino in Washing-
ton, noting that the treaty on
the canal with the United States
"does not entirely fulfill the
wishes and aspirations of the
people and government of
Panama," expressed the hope
that the Suez affair "may lead
in the future to better under-
standing and more liberal con-
sideration toward Panama"
forces have been making progress
in their antiterrorist campaign
and because many Cypriots are
beginning to be disillusioned
with EOKA's policy of violence.
The organization may also have
considered that the influence
of the nationalist spokesman,
Archbishop Makarios, who has
been in exile for six months,
was diminishing and a truce
would give an excuse for bringing
him back into the picture.
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23 August 1956
Greek foreign minister
Averoff has expressed the in-
tention of resuming talks with
the British and of sending the
Greek ambassador back to Lon-
don. He hopes thus to clear
the way for the return of
Makarios from the Seychelles
to London and the opening of
substantive talks. Averoff
plans to offer a simple agree-
ment reaffirming the principle
of self-determination, with
the application to be worked
out over an indefinite period
between the Cypriots and the
British government. He also
envisages that police powers
on the island would be retained
by'London for two years, after
which consideration could be
given to turning these powers
over to the local government.
Britain would retain respon-
sibility for defense and foreign
affairs indefinitely.
Averoff also would suggest
a lower house of parliament
with proportional Greek and
Turkish representation and an
upper house with equal repre-
sentation.
Governor Harding said on
20 August that he would try to
increase the division between
EOKA and the people, especially
by removing all restrictions
not required in continuing
antiterrorist activity. Hard-
ing told the American consul
in Nicosia that he believed
Makarios' return might be help-
ful if he would clearly condemn
PART II
violence and co-operate in
establishing self-government.
Harding said, however, he had
"no intention of proposing that
the archbishop re-enter the
picture to negotiate terms on
which he would co-operate and,
particularly, with the threat
of terrorism still a weapon."
Harding has given the na-
tionalists three weeks to lay
down their arms and make a choice
between going to Greece or
staying in Cyprus. Those who
choose to go to Greece will not
be charged with any crimes but
will lose any British citizen-
ship and are prohibited from
re-entering Cyprus. Whoever
chooses to remain on the island
will be tried if there is evi-
dence "that he has committed a
specific offense against the
person." The governor has also
promised amnesty for certain
offenses after he is convinced
that order has been restored.
Greek and Cypriot national-
ist reaction to Harding's of-
fer has been unfavorable. The
mayor of Nicosia declared that
EOKA had not been defeated and
therefore probably would not
surrender.
Both EOKA and Athens con-
sider Makarios the key to fur-
ther negotiations with Britain
and will probably consider that
only the archbishop's return
from exile will prove British
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23 August 1956
Widespread unrest in Kara-
chi, combined with a campaign
by a strong opposition party
coalition to take over the
Pakistani government, has led
to another political crisis
which could result in a change
in the premiership or the
imposition of executive rule.
The arrest of 55 Moslem
League and Awami League agita-
tors in Karachi followed a
government order on 16 August
banning public meetings. The
government's action was in re-
sponse to large demonstrations
against Prime Minister Chaudhri
Mohammed All during Pakistan's
Independence Day celebration
on 14 August.
President Mirza and Prime
Minister Chaudhri have been
meeting in Karachi with the
governors and chief ministers
of both provinces and with
Suhrawardy in an attempt to
resolve the problem created by
the East Pakistani governor's
adjournment of the provincial
assembly on 13 August. A tenta-
tive decision has reportedly
been reached to impose direct
rule on the province in order
to certify the budget for the
month of September. Mirza has
also reportedly promised Suhra-
wardy that the assembly will be
called back into session to
determine whether the present
United Front government still
commands a majority.
The demonstrations were
originally directed against
Pakistan's foreign policy and
may have been partially inspired
by the Egyptian embassy. How-
ever, they soon turned to local
issues and were paralleled by
increased political agitation
in the provinces.
H. S. Suhrawardy, national
head of the Awami League who
has long wanted to be prime
minister, and Mian Daultana,
West Pakistani Moslem League
leader, are also using the
situation to further their
efforts to organize firm majori-
ties in the assemblies of both
the central government and East
Pakistan. This coalition now
reportedly controls 45 to 48
seats in the 76-man central
assembly.
During the brief meeting
of the East Pakistan assembly
before it was adjourned, Suhra-
wardy's Awami League opposition
appeared to have a slight majori-
ty by which it would be able to
bring down the United Front
government when the assembly
reconvenes. If the Awami League-
Moslem League coalition also has
a majority in the central legis-
lature, which is expected to
convene in September, Mirza
may find himself facing the
choice of replacing Chaudhri,
who has been the target of most
of the agitation, with Suhra-
wardy, or declaring a state of
emergency. throughout Pakistan
and ruling by executive decree.
Mirza's decision will prob-
ably be influenced by the extent
to which Suhrawardy is able to
control the extreme left wing
of his party
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23 August 1956
LAOS
The-outcome of the nego-
tiations of the details govern-
ing the integration of the Pa-
thet Lao troops into the royal
Laotian army, which were sched-
uled to begin on 22 August, will
largely determine whether the
recent agreement in principle
can be implemented. Meanwhile,
a government delegation, headed
by Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma, arrived in Peiping on
20 August for a seven-day cour-
tesy visit, to be followed by
a 24-hour stopover in Hanoi on
the way back to Vientiane. As
part of its over-all effort to
promote neutralism and expand
Communist influence in South-
east Asia, Peiping will probably
urge the premier to accept
closer relations with the Com-
munist bloc and seek to influ-
ence the negotiations in Vien-
tiane in favor of the Pathet Lao.
The Pathets, however, are
likely to present terms de-
signed to achieve a settlement
that leaves them in de facto
control of their troops and
territory--at least until
they have consolidated their
political position.
The visit of the Laotian
premier to Peiping before the
details of a settlement have
been negotiated may directly
affect the form of the final
agreement, since the Chinese
Communists will have an oppor-
tunity to pressure him on ad-
ditional Pathet demands or
guarantees. While not compro-
mising Souvanna by offering to
establish diplomatic relations
with Laos immediately, the
Chinese Communists will probably
urge him to agree to the even-
tual conclusion of an aid and
trade agreement, and to promote
cultural and economic relations.
Although Souvanna has
said he will not engage in sub-
stantive discussions in Peiping,
he is nevertheless vulnerable
to Communist blandishments.
He has privately and publicly
indicated a belief that Laos
is too small and too isolated
to afford the risk of becoming
a "second Korea" by following
policies which might antagonize
its Communist neighbors.
The delegation is scheduled
to stop over in Hanoi on 28
August where it will probably
receive the "red-carpet" treat-
ment and assurances of noninter-
vention in Laotian affairs, as
well as a "plea" for closer
relations, which Souvanna is
likely to find difficult to
reject.
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23 August 1956
Increasing Indonesian army
resentment toward the government,
highlighted on 13 August by the
attempted arrest of Foreign
Minister Abdulgani on charges of
corruption,.is unlikely to re-
suit in an attempted coup by
dissatisfied army elements in
the near future.
Most top military leaders,
unlike younger army-elements,
want to leave the administration
in civil hands and have become
involved in political matters
only when they considered it
necessary to safeguard the
state or keep military affairs
free from politics. Younger
army groups, however, increas-
ingly regard a military coup as
the only solution to Indonesia's
domestic problems.
Army officers are now re-
sentful of high-level army
transfers ordered by the chief
of staff.and cabinet, the cor-
ruption among high government
officials, and the government's
delay in implementing economic,
political and military adminis-
trative reforms. They dis
trust the National Party, which
heads the cabinet, and many re-
gard the military as one of the
few dependable guardians of the
state.
Although resentment toward
the government undoubtedly is.
again on the inc.rease,.the mili-
tary is not believed to be suf-
ficiently united to force a .
change in-the government, and
there is no support for such an
effort from within the coalition
cabinet or from the opposition
at this time.
commanders have either been
transferred or are scheduled for
reassignment by mid-September.
These transfers would appear to
strengthen army headquarters
and the government.
The army's attempted ar-
rest of Abdulgani on 13 August
focused national attention on
the problem of corruption, but
little more than token remedies
are expected. Following a
parliamentary resolution de-
manding an explanation from the
cabinet, Prime Minister All
stated on 15 August that the
government would combat cor-
ruption "on the basis of law"
and "regardless of person."
This statement was almost im-
mediately negated by the justice
minister, who announced that
Abdulgani would not be inter-
rogated--as demanded by the
army--when he returns from the
London conference.
In an apparent face-saving
gesture for the military, it
was announced on 20 August that
President Sukarno and the govern-
ment favor-the army's suggestion
of holding regular meetings with
military leaders and that an
anti-corruption bill would be
forthcoming in the near future.
Should top military leaders
or the army's young hotheads
improve their position, the
government might be induced to
make genuine concessions. The
army forced the fall of the
cabinet in July 1955 and, given
an issue which would unite the
military..and splinter the coa-
lition cabinet, might again
force such action. Corruption,
however, does not appear to be
such an issue, and the scatter-
ing of the army's strongest
leaders would appear temporarily
to weaken the military's poten-
tial for action.
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23 August 1956
CHANGES IN THE USSR'S
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY
Personnel transfers, ap-
pointments, and institutional
changes within the Soviet Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs during
the past seven months have fur-
thered the main lines of de-
velopment established since
25X1 Stalin's death-
25X1
Molotov's replacement by
Shepilov on 1 June was the
culmination of a long period
in which it was apparent that
Molotov's prestige and influ-
ence were being undermined, and
in which his policies and
methods of carrying out diplo-
matic maneuvers no longer ac-
corded with the aims of the
new Soviet leadership.
It is possible many of
the changes effected within
the ministry during that peri-
od were made by the "collective
leadership" even over Molotov's
express opposition, and, there-
fore, that Shepilov's assump-
tion of the diplomatic mantle
will not result in any major
shake-up in the diplomatic
corps. Shepilov has, however,
recently recalled V. A. Zorin
from the Bonn embassy and
brought N. S. Patolichev and
A. V. Zakharov into the min-
istry from party and government
work. All three were made dep-
uty ministers and added to the
collegium, Shepilov's top ad-
visory body within the minis-
try.
With the addition of Pato-
lichev and Zakharov, six of
the 13 top positions within the
ministry are now held by men
brought into the foreign serv-
ice since Stalin's death. As
these men master their new
duties, some of the career dip-
lomats in top positions may be
retired or transferred to other
positions. In 13 of the Soviet
Union's foreign missions,too,
the chiefs are now men new to
the foreign service since Sta-
lin's death.
The enhanced role of the
Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry
in the post-Stalin period is
clearly revealed by the fact
that in October 1952, only six
diplomats were on the central
committee and but two on the
party's central auditing commis-
sion, whereas 14 now sit on the
USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT CHANGES)
4 January 1956
K. D. Levychkin replaced V. F. Nikolayev as acting
head of the 5th European Desk (Balkans)
25 January 1956
P.1, Yershov promoted from minister to ambassador
to Switzerland
'23 March 1956
L. F. Teplov appointed ambassador to the Sudan
29 March 1956
A. A. Smirnov replaced I. I. Ilyichev as ambassador
to Austria
25 April 1956
M. G. Gribanov replaced G. P. Arkadyev as ambassador
to Norway
4 April 1956
I. L Ilyiehev replaced M. G. Gribanov as head of the
Scandinavian Desk
15 May 1956
1. A. Melnik replaced V. I. Avilov as minister to
Luxemburg
I June 1956
D. T. Shepilov replaced V. M. Molotov as USSR minister
of foreign affairs
22 June 1956
B. 1. Karavayev promoted from minister to ambassador
to Ethiopia
;Q, June 1956
L N. Yakushin promoted from minister to ambassador
to Thailand
i6 July 1956
N. S. Patolichev, A. V. Zakharov, and V. A. Zorin
appointed USSR deputy ministers of foreign affairs
V. A.Zorin removed as ambassador to West Germany
4 August 1956
Y.D. Kiselev, ambassador to Egypt, also appointed
minister to Yemen
15 August 1956
S. P. Kiktev promoted from minister to ambassador
to Lebanon
18 August 1956
N. M. Pegov replaced A. I. Lavrentyev as ambassador
to Iran
23 AUGUST 1956
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23 August 1956
USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Minister
1st Deputy Minister
Collegium Mel
Deputy Minister Deputy Minister
V. S. Semyonov
Collegium Member
4t7Aftirkarb-diew __
Collegium Member Collegium Member Collegium Member
S. P. Kozyrev S. K. Tsarapkin LM. A. Kostylev
Protocol
F. F. Molochkov
Treaty & Legal
G. I. Tunkin
Press
_41M.-ibla
Consular
A. P. Vlasov
Economic
Administrative
(S.P. Kozyrev?)
r-'
~Personn-el
American
Countries
A. A. Soldatov
2nd European
V.Y. Yerofeyev
4th European
P.G. Krekoten*
Sbandinavian
Countries
I.I. Ilyichev
Southeast Asia
B. M. Volkov
Far Eastern
L F. Kurdyukov
central committee and five on
the auditing commission.
FO IIGH * I ON$
United Nations
n Brought into Ministry
since Stalin's death
---Presumed to exist
-Acting Read
The Soviet campaign to in-
crease the number and prestige
of its diplomatic missions has
borne fruit. During the past
seven months, diplomatic rela-
HUNGARIAN REGIME SPEEDS
CONCESSIONS TO PARTY MODERATES
During the five weeks since
Gero's appointment as Hungarian
party leader, the regime has
granted an increasing number of
significant concessions--eco-
nomic, cultural and political--
to elements of the party who
favor an over-all "liberaliza-
tion" program. This modifica-
tion of policy, a reflection of
the strength of, the moderate
tions have been es-
tablished with the
Sudan,' Cambodia, Ne-
pal and Yemen, and the
missions to Switzer-
land, Ethiopia, Thai-
land and Lebanon
raised from legation
to embassy status.
Overtures for the es-
tablishment of dip-
lomatic relations
have been made to
Liberia, Laos, Tuni-
sia and Morocco, and
talks with Japan,
though suspended, may
lead to an exchange
of ambassadors after
the London conference
on the Suez Canal is-
sue.
The transforma-
tion of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
from a Stalinist in-
strument in the cold
war to an effective
weapon in the diplo-
macy of cultural
and economic penetra-
tration appears to have been
completed in its main outlines.
Barring a shake-up in the So-
viet Union's political high
command, no radical changes are
likely to occur within the
ministry in the near future_
group, represents an effort to
re-establish party unity through
compromise and the abandonment
of rigid doctrinal, positions.
Attitude Toward Nagy
The most dramatic and po-
tentially explosive aspect of
this program has been the re-
vision in the leadership's
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1st European
A. A. Arutyunyan
3rd European
S. G. Lapin
5th European
K.D. Levychkin*
Near & Middle
East Countries
G. T. Zaitsev'
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23 August 1956
attitude concerning the future
status of former premier Imre
Nagy, who was ousted from the
party by Rakosi last year on
grounds of "right-wing.devia-
tionism." Despite the fact that
Nagy was personally condemned in
the July 1956 central committee
resolution, Gero has stated
that the party door is open to
Nagy if he accepts present par-
Even if the rehabilitation
of Nagy were accompanied by
some form of limited self-
criticism--Nagy has in the past
refused to do this--it would be
.a bitter pill for hard-line
party doctrinaires such as Gero
to swallow. It would not only
be viewed by the party moderates
as favorable to their efforts
to speed liberalization but
might be welcomed by the public,
which looks back on the Nagy
era--July 1953 to April 1955--
as the most "liberal" of the
country's Communist regimes,par-
ticularly with respect to eco-
nomic policies.
Cultural Policy
The party has evidently
already retreated from its
position on cultural policy an-
nounced last month. A party
ideological journal recently
warned its readers that party.
functionaries who persist in
deprecation of the role of the
intelligentsia are violating
party policy. Szabad Nep edi-
tor Horvath, admitt ng tEiat in-
tellectuals have not been satis-
fied by. party policies, has
implied that the limits of free
expression have been extended.
beyond the point established in
July. In addition, Horvath sug-
gested that two writers who had
been expelled from the party
for bitter attacks against the
regime last June might now be
readmitted.
Gyula Ka l la i , who was im-
prisoned in 1951 and is a mem-
ber of the Debrecen group of
nativist-Communists, has re-
portedly been named to head the
central committee cultural
section, replacing a woman known
for her hard doctrinal views.
Kallai's appointment would
represent a significant conces-
sion to the group of intellec-
tuals who have led the fight for
greater party democratization
and general policy moderation.
Political Policies
The politburo changes in
July have taken on added signif-
icance in the light of the in-
creasingly important public role
Janos Kadar, alleged leader of the
moderate force, is playing in
the implementation of party
policy. On 12 August, Radar,
who was appointed to the party
politburo and secretariat and
now appears to be one of the
top six figures in the party,
departed from the recent party
line by charging that the right-
ist deviation of Nagy in 1953
stemmed from errors committed
between 1949 and 1953, presum-
ably by Rakosi and Gero.
Outlook for Party Moderates
The moderates appear will-
ing to work for party unity
while consolidating and strength-
ening their political position
and pressing for a step=by-step
liberalization of the regime's
policies. In this fashion,
they hope to come to power with-
out.weakening the over-all au-
thority of the party and without
risking direct Soviet repressive
action.
IL. appears likely that
after consolidating their posi-
tion, the moderates will carry
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23 August 1956
their .attack against Gero,
whose resignation was demanded
by the intellectuals even
before the ouster of Rakosi.
25X1
SOVIET PLANS FOR INCREASING
COTTON PRODUCTION
The USSR has announced
that 740,000 acres of virgin
land in the Golodnaya Steppe
region of the Uzbek and Kazakh
Republics will be developed
and irrigated for cotton
growing. By 1962 the
ment expects the re-
claimed area to yield
"at least 320,000
to 340,000 tons of
cotton annually."
This amount is about
equal to the total
increase in Soviet
cotton production
achieved between
1950 and 1955, but
less than 15 percent
of the total increase
scheduled during the
Sixth Five-Year Plan
(1956-1960).-
The Soviet
Union, already the
world's second larg-
est producer of cot-
ton, plans to produce
about 6,000,000
metric tons in 1960,
an increase of 56
percent over 1955.
This ambitious goal
is to be achieved
by increased yields
and an expanded area
under cultivation,
but the elaborate
PART II
Andras Hegedus, present premier
and a protege of Rakosi, prob-
ably is also a candidate for
removal.
plans for the expansion of
cotton production in each of
the principal cotton growing
republics--Uzbek, Tadzhik,
Turkmen, and Azerbaidzhan--
have not been proceeding on
schedule. In Uzbek, which
PLANNED DEVELOPMENT
GOLODNAYA STEPPE
O Land under irrigation
O Land suitable for reclamation
A Principal hydroelectric station
~r~ 7Unde ~lUnder C. onstruct _ nstruchon
Leninab,pd
Fa~rkha _.~ -
yube
Q
Existing canal --- Planned canal
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23 August 1956
US-USSR PRODUCTION
RAW COTTON
COTTON TEXTILES
BILLION LINEAR METERS
1950
23 AUGUST 1956
1960
60820 3B
new reclamation project. Almost
25,000 skilled workers will be
sent to the region to carry
out the necessary construction
work. Since the area to be
reclaimed is almost totally
unoccupied, the farming of
virtually the entire area will
be conducted by 34 new state
farms.
The project illustrated
the more logical approach to
agricultural taken in the USSR
since the death of Stalin.
Instead of attempting, as
they did under Stalin, to grow
cotton in regions which do not
require irrigation'but which
are climatically unsuitable for
cotton, present plans are di-
rected at increasing the pro-
duction in regions where the
climate is favorable. In
addition, grandiose projects
such as the Main Turkmen
Canal, which could have been
completed only at a tremendous
cost, are being replaced by
smaller, less costly projects, 25X1
from which a return can be
expected in a relatively
short time.
annually produces 60 to 65
percent of Soviet cotton, it
has not been possible to raise
yields consistently above
those attained in
1950. Total cotton
production for the
USSR in 1955 was be-
low that of 1954
following adverse
weather in major
growing regions.
Approximately
1.5 billion rubles
are to be spent by
1960 on the recon-
struction of the
existing irrigation
system and the con-
struction of new ca-
nals and irrigation
.facilities for the
25X1
USSR RAW COTTON PRODUCTION
ACRES
8000
7000
~~
00
6000
50
00
4000
30
00
20
00
10
00
0
8
~ SOWN AR
EA
7
PRODUCTION
6
0
4
_
0
OF :~00
.3
0
0
0
0
1940
1945
1940 -1960
1950 '54 '55
METRIC TONS
0
00
000
000
00
000
00
00
00
1960
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23 August 1956
CHINESE COMMUNISTS PLAN FOR
INCREASED PIG IRON AND STEEL
Ambitious Chinese Commu-
nist plans for pig iron and
steel output in 1956 which
were recently announced will
probably be fulfilled. Accord-
ing to announcements at the
National People's Congress in
June, the output of pig iron is
now scheduled to increase 25
percent this year over the 1955
level, and steel production is
to rise by 58 percent. The new
plan calls for almost 10 per-
cent more steel to be produced
this year than had been sched-
uled under the original five-
year plan for pro-
duction in 1957.
Although large
by China's stand-
ards, the 1956 target
of 4,516,000 tons of
steel output is small
compared for example
to the estimated pro-
duction in the Soviet
Union this year of
49,200,000 tons.
Also, by China's own
admission, it will
meet only 82 percent
of the country's
steel requirements.
orate tempo of work, and several
new projects have been completed
ahead of schedule. In the five-
year plan, China also underesti-
mated the increase in output
realizable from existing facil-
ities through relatively minor
renovations and more effective
control.
Of the total 900,000-ton in-
crease in pig iron production
planned for this year over 1955,
up to 400,000 tons will come from
the Anshan metallurgical complex
in Manchuria, where a fifth
COMMUNIST CHINA
PIG IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION
(MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS)
1956
TARGET
1956
TARGET
PIG IRON
Achievement of
these revised targets is prob-
ably feasible, since construc-
tion in the iron and steel in-
dustry is proceeding ahead of
schedule and additional in-
creases of production are being
obtained by the adoption, under
Soviet supervision, of modern
technological practices. When
the original five-year plan was
announced in 1954, Chinese
planners apparently underesti-
mated the rapidity with which
output could be expanded. Con-
struction schedules under the
original plan for iron and steel
plants called for a fairly mod-
PART II
STEEL
`(FROM FIVE-YEAR PLAN)
large blast furnace was completed
in July. The restoration of two
furnaces at Penchi, begun in April
1955, should also be completed
this year and provide another
300,000 to 400,000 tons. The re-
mainder required to meet the
goal will probably be obtained
from increased efficiency at oth-
er plants. In steel production,
1,100,000 to 1,300,000 tons of
the 1,670,000-ton increase sched-
uled this year will come from
Anshan, where the seven new
open-hearth furnaces have recent-
ly begun operation, and more
are scheduled for completion
this year.
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23 August 1956
POLITICAL UNREST IN
FOUR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Political unrest and threat-
ened revolutions have recently
accentuated the instability of
four widely separated countries
of Latin America: in Honduras
and Ecuador, disgruntled factions
threaten internal peace; in
Cuba and Colombia, resistance
to dictatorship threatens the
established regimes.
Honduras
The de facto regime of
Honduran chief of state Julio
Lozano--despite the abortive
revolt on 1 August, Lozano's
sudden illness, and persistent
rumors that the army is pre-
paring to take over. the govern-
ment--is apparently going ahead
with plans for the election on
7 October of a constituent as-
sembly, which is expected to
form a new government.
The Liberal. Party, which
won a plurality in the nulli-
fied national elections of 1954
and is believed still to retain
wide popular support, is split
into a pro-Lozano faction and
a, group in open opposition to
Lozano led by the party's former
presidential candidate, the
demagogic Ramon Villeda Morales.
Villeda and three of his chief
lieutenants were exiled in mid-
July, and Villedistas are be-
lieved responsible for the at-
tempted revolt in the capital
on 1 August. Some rebels es-
caped with up to 3,000 rifles
and the Liberals are reportedly
planning another revolt,
The army is in an excellent
position to assume control of
the government should Lozano be-
come incapacitated.
Ecuador
opposition parties to accept the
narrow victory of Conservative
candidate Ponce Enriquez.
The election crisis of the
past three months has been punc-
tuated by political plotting,
coup rumors, an attempt of
junior military officers to kid-
nap outgoing President Velasco
Ibarra, an abortive military
revolt, and a boycott of congress
by opposition deputies which
blocked the legal confirmation
of the president-elect until 16
August--almost a week beyond
the scheduled date. 25X1
Following his inauguration,
set for 1'September, Ponce will
face political and economic
problems which will tend to per-
petuate the instability which
has prevailed since the election.
The opposition factions, largely
dominated by Liberal elements,
may be expected to obstruct his
program and administration both
in and out of congress. The
loyalty of the military is also
questionable, with some high-
ranking army officers having
indicated pronounced Liberal
1 sympathies.
Cuban president Batista,
whose regime put down a civilian
attack on a military garrison
in April, is still faced with
plotting by exiles and, re-
i portedly, by civilian and mili-
tary elements within the country.
However, he still elontrols the
majority of the army, a key factor
in the situation, despite some
disaffection.
Political instability in The administration is not
Ecuador centers around the con- widely popular and dissatisfac-
tested June presidential election tion has increased during the
and the reluctance of the defeated past year. In an effort to
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23 August 1956
mollify the opposition, the
government, which is opposed to
general elections before 1958,
has scheduled partial elections
for November 1957, and at least
some opposition elements may
participate.
The government's allega-
tion of.11 August linking Domini-
can dictator Trujillo, ex-presi-
dent Prio Socarras and Cuban
revolutionary Fidel Castro in a
conspiracy to overthrow Batista
may have been calculated to
justify closer control of sub-
versive elements. The American
embassy in Havana has stated
that Castro, who has declared
1956 to be the "year of deci-
sion,"may have available a con-
siderable quantity of arms and
ammunition in Cuba and may be
able to count on a sizable num-
ber of followers there.
The progressive erosion of
support for Colombian president
Rojas Pinilla has reached near-
critical proportions. Authori-
tarian measures taken by the
government have forced it to re-
ly almost exclusively on the
army for continuance in power.
however, widespread rumors that
a military junta is to be estab-
lished with or without Rojas
Pinilla's participation may in-
dicate he can no longer count on
the unqualified and indispensa-
ble backing of the army. In
EFFECT OF WEST GERMANY'S BAN
ON COMMUNIST PARTY
The outlawing of the West
German Communist Party (KPD)
on 17 August by the Constitu-
tional Court may be a factor in
next year's national elections,
since recent political preference
polls show that a change in only
July the church, a key prop of
the government, condemned the
'"Third Force"--the latest of
several of Rojas' attempts to
win support from the masses.
The cardinal primate's un-
equivocal denunciation of the
Third Force prevented endorse-
ment by the largest of Colombia's
labor federations, which is
church-sponsored.
Public and party opposi-
tion to Rojas Pinilla has
gradually increased in recent
weeks and guerrilla activi-
ties continue. Apparently the
government has also alienated
various elements which former-
ly offered it a measure of co-
operation, or at least tacit
approval. The recent alliance
of the antagonistic Liberal
and Conservative factions has
tended to crystallize opposi-
tion plans for a restoration
of constitutional government.
The business class, victim of
corrupt practices of the ex-
ecutive.and the military, is
disgruntled over the insta-
bility of the currency and
official manipulation of exchange
controls.
Strict censorship-of the
press, which has undermined Co-
lombian prestige in the hemisphere,
arbitrary arrests, and extensive
graft attributed to members of the
president's family have all
served to alienate the general
populace.
a small percentage of the total
vote would tip the scales in fa-
vor of the opposition forces.
In .1957 the KPD vote--2.2 percent
of the total in 1953--will pos-
sibly go to the Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPD), Chancellor
Adenauer's chief opposition.
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29 August 1956
Some of the Communist vote.
may be channeled to splinter
parties which are neutralist
and generally sympathetic to
Moscow. The SPD may enter elec-
toral alliances, however, with
some of these parties. Mem-
bers of the East German polit-
buro have urged the workers of
West Germany to look to the SPD
as the only legal workers' party
which can safeguard popular
rights.
SPD deputy chairman Mel-
lies and some trade unionists
have expressed concern that
covert Communist operations are
more to be feared than overt
activities. The independent
German press has been skeptical
of the political wisdom of ban-
ning the party at this time,
and sees the move reacting
against the Adenauer regime.
Police who set out to imple-
ment the decision to confis-.
cate party funds and property
found the Communists had left
them little of value to con-
fiscate.
LUXEMBOURG OBJECTIONS TO MOSELLE
PROJECT MAY BLOCK SAAR ACC.QRD
Luxembourg objections to
the canalization of the Moselle
River, placing its steel in-
dustry at a competitive disad-
vantage, have created a major ob-
stacle for implementation of the
Saar accord between France and
Germany. Luxembourg's position
is of critical importance, since
it is unlikely the French par-
liament would be willing to
No transfer of headquarters
will be necessary, since KPD
first secretary RE_imann and
some of his major unctionaries
have been operating in East
Berlin for several gears. The
Communists will pr^^ably try
to operate through politically
acceptable organizations, such
as labor unions, since many front
organizations have already been
banned.
ment on 17 August.
The West'German minister
of interior stated that while no
mass action would be taken against
the 70,000 Communists in West
Germany, proceedings against
principal party leaders'were
essential to halt illegal activi-
ties. Several leading party
officials who were found guilty
of treason by the Federal Court
last spring are now in jail.
Other major party functionaries
are believed to have fled to
East Germany since the announce-
approve the Saar accord without
the canalization of the Moselle--
which would bring economic com-
pensations to France to offset
some of those benefits being
relinquished in the Saar.
The Luxembourg attitude had
been expected to be co-operative.
Luxembourg prime minister Bech
informed Chancellor Adenauer at
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23 August 1956
the time of the second French-
German agreement on the Saar in
June that Luxembourg would ap-
prove the Moselle canalization
without much difficulty. Bech
evidently miscalculated the
extent of the dormant economic
and political nationalism the
Moselle project would arouse.
Luxembourg opinion seems unani-
mous in fearing that its steel
industry, which accounts for 95
percent of the country's ex-
ports, will. be placed at a con-
siderable disadvantage with
respect to Lorraine steel pro-
ducers. The Luxembourgers
demand some method of compen-
sation for their anticipated
losses.
Portion of the Moselle River
to be made navigable
MILES
23 AUGUST 1956
The French, on
the other hand, insist
they will not make
payments to Luxembourg
for alleged "damages"
as such. Their posi-
tion has been that al-
though Luxembourg
steel producers would
gain less than those
of Lorraine by the
Moselle project, the
over-all position of
the Luxembourg producers
would improve. The
French have been in-
clined to feel they
can reconcile the
Luxembourgers to their
point of view, but the
American ambassador to
Luxembourg has warned
that the French under-
estimate the extent of
feeling on the Moselle
project.
In the negotia-
tions which have thus
far taken place, the
Germans have refrained
from putting pressure
on Luxembourg in this
matter, and Belgium
and the Netherlands
are playing a cautious
role in deference to
their close associa-
tion with Luxembourg. The
Netherlands, in contrast to
Belgium, sees considerable ad-
vantage deriving from the canal
project. Belgium feels the
port of Antwerp will suffer
from the rerouting of commercial
traffic, but is reluctant to
stand in the way of a French-
German agreement on the Saar.
It fears French reprisals, and
wishes the project could be
"Europeanized."
Although the Luxembourgers
insist on compensation, the
French feel reasonably certain
of ultimately winning their
point through arbitration.
Some early settlement is
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23 August 1956
25X1
necessary to allow
for
parlia-
many in
time
to permit orderly
mentary approval of
the
Saar
transfer
of
the Saar
to German
.accord in France
and
Ger-
control
by 1
January
1957,
THE KEFLAVIK AIR BASE QUESTION
With the Keflavik negotia-
tions delayed for at least
a month by the illness of Ice-
landic foreign minister Gud-
mundsson, several factors are
at work which may influence
the firmness with which the
government pushes for a with-
drawal of American troops,
The economic and psychological
impact of the gradual work
stoppage at the base, and the
publicizing of the North At-
lantic Council's affirmative
reply on the continued neces-
sity for American troops, are
apparently having a moderating
influence on Icelandic public
opinion.
Factors tending to stiffen
the government's position in-
clude the prospect of some im-
provement in the country's for-
eign exchange position and indi-
cations of growing sympathy from
Danish and Norwegian Social
Democratic leaders for the
government's proposals on the
base.
The gradual completion of
construction activity at Ke-
flavik and the.decision not
to undertake any new projects
for the present are reducing
appreciably the employment of
Icelanders at the base. These
jobs, which are generally de-
sired by Icelanders, at present
number 1,850 but by the end of
the year are expected to number
700 at most. In addition,
there are some signs of popular
concern over the presence of
Communists in the new government.
On the other hand, Iceland's
precarious economic situation,
which is one of the factors
weakening the government's posi-
tion in base negotiations, has
assumed a slightly more favorable
aspect with the herring catch on
the north coast reported to be
nearly triple that-for the com-
parable period last year. The
USSR recently agreed to take an
additional 50,000 barrels of
salted herring. The $25,000,000
credit offered by West Germany
before the 24 June elections for
financing Iceland's ambitious
program of economic expansion
has not yet been withdrawn.
25X1
However long the begin-
ning of negotiations is de- 25X1
layed, the six-month peri-
od during which Iceland and
the United States are to reach
an understanding began on 1
August. At the end of this
period, either party may,
under Articles VII of the
Defense Agreement of '951,
give notice of its intention
to terminate the agreement, ef-
fective 12 months from the date
of such notice.
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23 August 1956
PATTERNS SN4_PERSP9cT_1YE5
SUKARNO'S TRIP TO SINO-SOVIET BLOC
President Sukarno is sched-
uled to leave on 26 August for
a seven-week tour of Sino-Soviet
bloc countries, which, in line
with Indonesia's "independent"
foreign policy, will balance
his May-June trip to the United
States and Western Europe.
Sukarno's influence is usually
reflected in Indonesian foreign
and domestic policies, and he
has told his. people he will
compare the bloc's progress
with that of the Western world
and decide "what is best for
Indonesia." He has already
indicated he was favorably im-
pressed while in. the United
States.
His trip to Moscow and
Peiping will be a highlight in
the accelerated cultural and
economic exchange between Indo
nesia and the Communist world
and will take place at a time
when there are signs of growing
dissatisfaction with the Ali
government, particularly among
army elements. (See Part II
for a discussion of current
internal politics in Indonesia)
The Orbit tour comes on the
heels of new Indonesian expres-
sions of nationalism and anti-
colonialism seen in the repudia-
tion of Indonesian debts to the
Netherlands and support of Egypt
in its decision to nationalize
the Suez Canal.
East and West
In a speech on 29 July to
a convention of the National
Party, Indonesia's largest
party and the leader of the
government coalition, Sukarno
announced he, would not go to
the Soviet Union and Communist
China to determine a "state of
mind" as he had done in the
United States. He said the
Marxist "state of mind" was
already well known, but he did
intend to observe whether this
state of mind had been materi-
ally implemented.
He said he.had discovered
during his American tour that
the most important thing to
Americans, and the thing they
practice to the utmost, is
freedom of expression. He said
that with this freedom of ex-
pression they have achieved
freedom from want. Sukarno
stated that, in contrast, the
"Soviet countries" are "working
from the other side" in that
they are making efforts to
achieve freedom from want, and
"freedom of expression will come
later."
Sukarno went on to say
that he believes the best sys-
tem for Indonesia is somewhere
between the two. He promised
that when he returns from his
trip he will be able to state
"in the affirmative what would
be best for Indonesia."
Actually Indonesian eco-
nomic and political policy is
already "somewhere between the
two." Sukarno's influence is
such, however, that the views
he derives from his tours are
likely to contribute to a clearer
definition of policy and to the
accelerated formulation of gov-
ernment programs.
Sukarno plans to spend two
weeks in the Soviet Union. He
is scheduled to address a mass
meeting. in Moscow, to make sev-
eral speeches at universities,
and to tour industrial projects,
including some in the Ural Moun-
tains and the Ukraine. He will
spend approximately five days
each in Czechoslovakia, Yugo-
slavia and Austria, and, follow-
ing several days of rest, will
go to Communist China for two
weeks, where he will participate
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 August 1950
Indonesia's "Neutrality"
Sukarno's impressions of
the West and the Sino-Soviet
bloc are not expected to de-
flect Indonesta.from its "in-
dependent" or "actively neutral"
foreign. policy. If. anything,,
his pronouncements have in-
creased Indonesia's determina-
tion to adhere to such a policy,
although perhaps with greater
flexibility.
Sukarno has emphasized that
Indonesian foreign policy will
continue'to be guided primarily
.by nationalism and anticolonial-
ism. Indonesia will probably
become more assertive in its
foreign relations, partly as a
result of increased confidence
resulting from Sukarno's trips,
and also from the belief that
the prestige of the Asian-
African nations is increasing.
Indonesian neutralism, as
defined by Sukarno and other
national leaders, is designed
to advance the development of
Indonesia'and enhance its pros-
pects of survival as an in-
dependent nation. The Indo-
nesians will maintain relations
with both blocs to the extent
that they feel such relations
benefit the country.
Repudiation of Debts
The Orbit tour comes on
the heels of new Indonesian
expressions of nationalism and
anticolonialism. The Indone-
sian Foreign Ministry announced
on 4 August that it had repudi-
ated debts to the Netherlands
which it had assumed in 1949
when it achieved independence.
The Indonesians justified the
repudiation on the basis of
their unilateral abrogation
last April of the 1949 agree-
ments.
The government possibly
believed that some nationalistic
action was needed following one
SECRET
in China's 1 October anniver-
sary celebration of, the estab-
lishment of the Communist re-
gime. He will return to Indo-
nesia on 12 October.
Sukarno will be.accompanied
by approximately the same in-
dividuals he. took with him to
the United States in May. He
has said he wants them to have
a "complete picture." In addi-
tion, it is understood that
both the Soviets and the Chi-
nese have invited a selected
group of journalists 'who, 'al-
though not traveling with Su-
karno's official party, will
be in the USSR and China at
the same-time.
Sukarno's trip to the Com-
munist world will climax an
accelerated Sino-Soviet drive,
under way since last April,
directed toward the develop-
ment of closer relations with
Indonesia. The Communist of-
fensive has included an in-
crease in the number and size
of individual Orbit diplomatic
missions in Djakarta, numerous
cultural exchanges, and offers
of trade and, aid. Principal
among the last is the Soviet
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technical aid made last
April and now being nego-
tiated in Djakarta.
The amount of aid
is still unspecified,
but the Soviets have of-
fered 12-year industrial
credits at 2.5 percent
interest. The agree-
ment apparently will
not be signed before Su-
karno leaves on 26 August and
may be delayed until his re-
turn in October.
Madame Sun Yat-sen is now
touring Indonesia, and Indone-
sia's Prime Minister Ali will
visit the USSR later in the
year.
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tour and on the eve of another
simply as an expression of
Indonesian independence. The
repudiation of the debts also
served the purpose of indicat-
ing that the cabinet was grap-
pling with Indonesia's economic
problems.
Support of Egypt
Sukarno dramatically de-
fended the cause of nationalism
in other areas when he stated
in a major address on 17 August,
Indonesia's Independence Day,
that the nations of Asia and
Africa should issue a warning
to the world, "Hands off Egypt;"
Sukarno announced that In-
donesia's presence at the London
conference is in "defense of
Egypt's sovereign rights and in
defense of peace." Indonesia
has taken the position that Nasr
may be depended on to guarantee
free passage of the Suez Canal,
and Foreign Minister Abdulgani
has stated that any control
over Suez, including that of the
United Nations, should be con-
sidered an infringement on .
Egypt's sovereignty.
POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH ASIA
India is entering its cam-
paign period for national elec-
tions in early 1957 against a
background of political ferment
in South Asia which in the past
three years has forced major
changes in government and policy
on Afhganistan, Pakistan, and
Ceylon. In India, as in Paki-
stan and Ceylon, opposition ele-
ments have developed strong
provincial political machines,
while the ruling party has been
preoccupied with developing na-
tional policy and administra-
tive machinery. This. process
may have moved more slowly in
India because of Prime Minister
Nehru's stabilizing influence
and the inertia of such a large
and heterogeneous population.
It is possible, however,that
Nehru's Congress Party will lose
its absolute parliamentary
majority in the elections.
Postwar Governments
The governments of India,
Pakistan, and Ceylon, which
took over from the British
shortly after World War II,
were shaped in the British tra-
dition. They had highly edu-
cated leaders of strong character
who established effective gov-
ernments and who enjoyed wide-
spread popular. support. These
men were backed by monolithic
political parties, the opposi-
tion to which was negligible.
In Afghanistan, too,the post-
war government was controlled
by elder statesmen who held
traditional, conservative views.
By 1953, however, because
of the magnitude of the political
and economic problems in India,
Pakistan, and Ceylon, almost
every capable leader of the
dominant political party had
undertaken administrative gov-
ernment duties while few men
of stature remained in provin-
cial party posts. This situa-
tion seriously weakened the party
machinery and diminished con-
tact between the government and
the people. Firm control of
the government led to compla-
cency on the part of the ruling
group, whose large majority in
parliament enabled its dominant
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personalities to act.much as
they pleased.
At the lower levels, party
organization deteriorated, fac-
tionalization became rife, and
corruption grew common. In
addition, death and retirement
thinned the ranks of those who
had been mainly responsible for
the creation of the new states.
By 1953, it also, became
apparent that the people of
India, Pakistan, and Ceylon were
increasingly dissatisfied with
the failure of their political
leaders to produce the con-
siderable improvement in the
standard of living which they
had been led to'believe would
come with independence. The
slogans of the independence
movement had worn thin, momen-
tum had diminished, and even
the speeches of such men as
Nehru merely repeated long-
familiar words.
Changes in Leadership
Prince Daud's assumption
of the premiership in Afghani-
stan in 1953 was the first ma-
jor change in the old order of
entrenched leadership in South
Asia. This was followed in
early 1954 by the East Paki
stani provincial elections, in
which the ruling Moslem League
was completely repudiated by
the people. In April 1956, the
people of Ceylon overwhelmingly
defeated the government which
had held power since independ-
ence. By 1956, therefore, it
had become clear that the com-
mon people of Asia, having
developed some experience with
democratic techniques, were
becoming increasingly aware of
their power to elect their own
governments and to have a ,say
in directing their own destinies.
In each of these cases,
the ruling political group had
lost contact with the situation
and underestimated the strength
of the opposition, which in the
case of Afghanistan consisted
of a single individual without
apparent popular support and in
the others included a variety of
numerically small, ideologically
diverse groups without unity.
Relying on its historical
record, the supposed prestige
of its leaders, and its control
of the government. machinery and
of the mass media of propaganda,
the ruling group had made no
serious effort to ensure its
continuance in power. In the
elections in East Pakistan and
Ceylon, the programs of the
ruling Moslem League and United
National Party were based on
timeworn generalities, candi-
dates made no great effort to
campaign, and both the govern-
ment and the party were ignorant
of developments outside the ur-
ban areas. Meanwhile, opposition
parties were campaigning'inten-
sively.in the countryside on
specific local issues of direct
interest to the voters.
Situation in India
At the moment, the same
situation seems to prevail in
India that existed in East Paki-
stan and Ceylon prior to the
elections in those areas..
The Congress Party is not
in close contact with the people.
Its provincial organization ap-
parently has not improved materi-
ally in the past two years and
is badly split by factionalism.
The much-touted efforts to re-
juvenate the party during these
two years have consisted almost
exclusively of introducing
bright young men into the gov-
ernment structure rather than
the party organization. The
party is still using such gen-
eral slogans as the welfare
state, the five-year plan and
neutrality. There are few signs
that Congress leaders, busy with
the Second Five-Year Plan and
the administrative problems
attendant on the reorganization
of state boundaries, have begun
to think seriously of contest-
ing the elections.
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The opposition, on the
other hand, has already begun
to publicize platforms almost
exclusively concerned with local
provincial issues and tailored
to appeal to a majority of the
special interest groups in each
region. Strong efforts are
already being-made by many op-
position parties to achieve
unity in opposing the Congress
Party.
Most Congress leaders do
not seem to be aware of the
demanding nature of the popular
movements which overthrew the
governments of East Pakistan
and Ceylon. These leaders show
no particular concern over the
possibility of a similar occur-
rence in India. They have not
yet indicated their intent to
prevent such an event by con-
ducting intensive campaigns in
the village areas where the
great majority of Indian voters
reside, and apparently do not
yet recognize that the relative
success of the Congress Party
and the opposition in reaching
the voter at the village level
will probably be the key to
the election outcome.
Future Trends
On the basis of present
information, it seems unlikely
that Congress leaders will
leave the urban areas for ex-
tensive tours of the agrarian
regions or that the low-quality
Congress functionaries in the
provinces will appeal greatly
to the people.
The Congress Party, which
faces a hard election fight in
the areas of West Bengal,
Travancore-Cochin, Andhra, and
Bombay, will probably put its
maximum effort into campaigns
in those areas. It will also
make a strong effort in the
important states of the Punjab,
Uttar Pradesh, and Madras. This
may mean that the party will
neglect the larger number of
less important states. If,
as in the case of East Pakistan
and Ceylon, an opposition move-
ment gains. unexpected momentum.
in the "neglected" areas in the
month immediately preceding
elections, the Congress Party
may find itself without the
machinery or the personnel to
combat this danger effectively.
The Congress Party, which
won only 45 percent of the
popular vote in 1952, may not
be able to lose many more votes
and retain its absolute majority
in parliament. The vote for
independent candidates may be
even larger in 1957 than in
1952, when the bloc of inde-
pendent votes was second only
to that of the Congress Party
in size.
Dissatisfaction with Congress
policies may lead to the candi-
dacy of a greater number of
independents of provincial
stature than before. Their
success will depend to a large
extent on the feelings of the
voters on specific issues, such
as nationalization of industry,
trade controls, reorganization
of state boundaries, unemploy-
ment, corruption in government,
and regional benefits from five-
year plan development projects.
The uncommitted voter who
dislikes the Congress Party and
who obtained little benefit from
having voted Socialist or Com-
munist in 1952 may therefore
swing toward these independent
candidates, who may become im-
7 nt as a balance of
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23 August 1956
PEIPING'S POLICY TOWARD NATIONAL MINORITIES
Communist China has fol-
lowed a conciliatory policy to-
ward its 35,000,000 people in
ethnic minority groups, grant-
ing them nominal self-govern-
ment in "autonomous" areas and
respecting their languages,
religious and customs.. However,
behind the facade of autonomy,
Communist control over minori-
ties remains firm.
During the 1930's and
early 1940's, the Chinese Commu-
nists promised minorities the
right of self-determination in
order to gain their support in
the struggle for control of
China. With the establishment
of the Peiping regime in 1949,
the Chinese Communists discarded
this pledge of self-determina-
tion and adopted the principle
of "autonomy" with no right of
secession. In the constitution
of 1954, autonomous areas were
described as "inalienable parts"
of China, whereas in the Soviet
Union minority republics nomi-
nally have the right of se-
cession.
Autonomous areas vary
greatly in size.. Two very
large ones have been established
--the Inner Mongolian Autono-
mous Region in 1947 and the
Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Re-
gion in 1955. Tibet is being
readied for the status of an
autonomous region.
Autonomous areas are not
established until Peiping feels
its control is firm, and no
doubt is.left.that ultimate
power lies with the central
government. Although the
governments of autonomous areas
may draw up special regulations
for their areas, these must be
submitted for approval to
higher administrative levels.
Like other administrative units
of China, the autonomous areas
are freely reorganized and
amalgamated on the initiative
of the central government.
Chinese Leadership
Peiping maintains the fic-
tion of autonomy by working
through local leaders who are
amenable to central government
control. The Mongolian leader,
Ulanfu, a member of the cen-
tral committee of the Chinese
Communist Party and chairman
of Peiping's Nationalities
Affairs Commission, serves as
party boss and governor of the
Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Region. In Tibet, orders are
issued through the Dalai and
Panchen Lamas, non-Communists
whose powers have been effec-
tively circumscribed by the
Chinese. Peiping's doubt as
to the Dalai Lama's true at-
titude was evident in its re-
fusal to allow him to attend
Buddhist festivals in India
this year.
As in China proper, work-
ing cadres in the autonomous
areas are major instruments for
reducing opposition to the cen-
tral government. Seven nation-
alities institutes--a central
school in Peiping and six re-
gional schools--have been set
up to train youths from minori-
ties areas for work as cadres.
Peiping has worked through
minority cadres to the fullest
possible extent, both because
of their usefulness in knowing
local languages and customs and
as a means of disguising cen-
tral control.
Chinese cadres are always
in the background to provide
proper guidance, and the Com-
munists are frank in saying
that autonomous status cannot
be achieved without Chinese
leadership and assistance. They
explain that the Chinese, be-
ing the most advanced group in
the country, must necessarily
lead other groups in the program
of national development.
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Conciliatory Features
Although Peiping envisions
the transformation of autono-
mous areas into socialist so-
cieties along with the rest of
China, it is advancing toward
this goal at a studied pace
and with an outwardly careful
regard for local customs and
desires. For example, the
Communists are proceeding cau-
tiously in bringing tradition-
ally independent herdsmen in
23 AUGUST 1956
24281
LOCATION AND NUMBERS OF CHINA'S jI
NATIONAL MINORITY PEOPLES
AMMU AND
ASH MIR
(s A- lrv o,seuT e)
MINORITY GROUP 1953 POPULATION
Korean 1,120,000
Puyi 1,248,000
Mongol 4j. 1,463,000
Manchu 1 ' - l 2,419,000
Miao 2,511,000
Tibetan
Yi
Hui
Uighur
Chuang
"The M-h- o o dsmhooed ooe,
Northeast Chrna and do nor hone
oo deanto a,gion.
3,254,000
j ll[~' 7.~`l it l II~J 1'11I' III 3,559,000
3,640,000
Sinkiang into co-operatives,
and there has thus fax, been no
insistence on the completion
of land reform in Tibet. At
the recent session of the Na-
tional People's Congress, Ulan-
fu repeated the dictum of the
party that reforms in minority
areas must come only as the
people demand them.
PART III
Minorities are ostensibly
granted a larger share in the
central government than their
numbers would warrant. While
minorities comprise only 6 per-
cent of the population of China,
their delegates make up nearly
17 percent of the membership
of the rubber-stamp National
People's Congress. However,
in the centers of real power,
minority representation is
slight. Only one member of a
minority race, the reliable
a N2RTH
VI TNAM
KOPEH `
SHANSII I m _Low
HEILUNGKIANG
Harbin
irkrhg ~,
nghai
LAST
ngpo
CH
A
IN
!?CHEIIANGs
SEA
Ulanfu, is a member of the cen-
tral committee of the Chinese
Communist Party or of the State
Council, which directs govern-
ment operations.
Deference to minority sen-
sibilities is evinced in the
encouragement of the use of
local languages. Chinese cadres
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have assisted in devising writ-
ten languages for those minor-
ities without one. At the re-
cent session of the National
People's Congress, Ulanfu told
of plans to continue this pro-
gram,. which promotes the regime's
campaign to wipe out illiteracy
in minority areas in seven to
twelve years, and which inci-
dentally makes the minorities
more susceptible to Communist
propaganda.
Moslems - Buddhists
The minority peoples are
predominantly Moslems and Bud-
dhists, and Peiping has placed
particular stress on respecting
both groups. In its dealings
with the adherents of these two
religions, Peiping has worked
through two government-sponsored
organizations, the China Islamic
Association and the Chinese
Buddhist Association. These
organizations have aided in the
restoration of mosques and mon-
asteries and have assisted Mos-
lems and Buddhists in maintain-
ing contact with their coreli-
gionists in foreign countries.
The Chinese Buddhist Association
recently arranged for the loan
of an important Buddhist relic
to Burma, and the China Islamic
Association recently sponsored
the pilgrimage of a group of
Moslems to Mecca.
Minority Attitudes
Peiping's policy toward
national minorities has evi-
dently been successful'in that
overt opposition has been re-
duced to small proportions.
Since 1953, the only serious
uprising has been the recently
admitted resistance in areas
of western Szechwan Province
populated by Tibetans and other
minorities. The uprising, which
began in late February, was
described as "mainly settled,"
with the leaders receiving-le-
nient treatment. Most evidence
to date suggests that the rebel-
lion, while still continuing,
does not extend to Tibet proper,
where calm apparently prevailed
during the recent visit of a
high-level Peiping government
delegation.
Foreign Policy Effects
The conciliatory tone of
Peiping's treatment of national
minorities, and in particular
its apparent deference toward
local religions, has earned it
dividends in foreign affairs.
The propaganda value of per-
mitting religious freedom was
exploited by Chou En-lai at the
Bandung conference in 1955.
Chou took the line that the
Chinese Communists, while them-
selves atheists, respect the
religious beliefs of groups in
China.
Delegations from Moslem
countries such as Indonesia,
Pakistan and Egypt have ex-
pressed the belief that their
coreligionists in China enjoy
religious freedom and equal
rights. A belief that Moslems
in China are accorded freedom
of religion may have played
some part in Egypt's and Syria's
recognition of the Peiping gov-
ernment this year. The decision
of the Chinese Buddhist Associ-
ation to sponsor ceremonies to
mark the 2,500th anniversary of
the death of Buddha this year
may elicit favorable response
among Buddhist countries of
southern Asia and shows Commu-
nists' awareness of the propaganda
value of their policy toward re-
ligion.
Peiping's propitiatory
treatment of minorities could
result in increasing Chinese
influence among ethnically re-
lated peoples in neighboring
countries.
In western Sinkiang, the
Communists have made an effort
to secure the allegiance of
minority peoples who have tra-
ditionally come-under a degree
of Russian influence, although
Peiping apparently has not tried
to influence the ethnically
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similar peoples living in the
Soviet Union. Similarly, Pei-
ping has established a "Thai
autonomous area" in southern
Yunnan Province. Bangkok is
apprehensive that the area
may be used as a base for in-
citing dissidence among the
population of northern Thai-
land.
The "show window" tech-
nique has been used along the
Tibet-India border, where the
Communists reportedly have
encouraged border peoples in
India to visit Tibet and ob-
serve Chinese accomplishments.
In the disputed Sino-Burmese.
border area, Peiping has simi-
larly endeavored to win the
sympathies of the tribal popu-
lation. Village chiefs in
northern Burma have been in-
vited to visit related groups
in neighboring Yunnan to ob-
serve conditions under Chinese
rule.
THE ANTI-VYSHINSKY CAMPAIGN
Criticism of Soviet juris-
prudence voiced at the Soviet
20th Party Congress in February
has been followed by a series.
of attacks on the legal theories
of the late Andrei Vyshinsky.
In the de-Stalinization process,
demands have been made for
strengthened "socialist legality"
and judicial reform,and Vyshin-
sky has been condemned for his
support of'the doctrine of
"trial by confession" and of
the theory that all accomplices
in a crime are equally guilty.
Vyshinsky was long con-
sidered the outstanding Soviet
legal theoretician. He earned
his reputation as a specialist
in criminal court precedure
while serving as chief public
prosecutor during the purges
of the late 1930's. The author
of more than 200 works on law,
he was director of the Institute!
of Law of the USSR Academy of
Sciences from 1937 to 1941, and
was editor of the theoretical
journal Soviet State and Law
from 1937 0 .
Attacks on Vyshinsky's
theories for their incompati-
bility with socialist legal
IN SOVIET JURISPRUDENCE
concepts charge that the "wide-
spread prevalence of the cult
of the individual" may have
hampered work in the juridical
field.
The campaign against Vyshin-
sky thus far has been confined
to the realm of theoretical
law, which apparently suffered
from exaggerated respect for
his works. The "blind worship
of his pronouncements" to the
extent that some of them were
"made into infallible dogma"
is said to have had a stulti-
fying effect on the work of
juridical scientists.
Theory of Evidence
Vyshinsky has been most
severely criticized for his
concept of the role of evidence
in the courts. The first attack
on his theories appeared in
April, when his method of "trial
by confession" was denounced
as a "glaring violation of
socialist legality." Utilized
by Vyshinsky to destroy Stalin's
enemies during the purge trials
of the 1930's, it admitted the
confessions of the accused as
the sole .evidence before the
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court. Since the validity of
the confessions was assumed,
the defendants were automati-
cally condemned.
After the initial attack,
academic articles struck at the
so-called "evaluative concept
of evidence," the basis of the
trial-by-confessions method.
Under this concept, guilt is
established on the basis of the
mere probability that the facts
presented court--e.g.,
in the confessions of the ac-
cused--are true. Vyshinsky
wrote in 1937 and reaffirmed
in 1950 that it was neither
necessary nor practical for a
Soviet court to arrive at the
"absolute truth" in all cases.
The present legal line states
that this is incorrect and
that the establishment of
absolute truth in every case
is a fundamental principle of
Soviet justice.
Problem of Complicity
The most recent criticism
of Vyshinsky appeared in the
August issue of the party
journal Kommunist, which lashed
out at his views that all ac-
complices of a criminal are
equally guilty, even though
some may not have had anything
directly to do with his crime.
The treatment of complic-
ity cases in the Soviet Union
has not been consistent. In
prosecuting cases of complicity,
Vyshinsky evidently applied the
doctrine of analogy. Under this
doctrine, a crime not specifi-
cally defined in the criminal
code is punished under that
article of the code which
covers the crime most closely
analogous to the one committed.
Thus a criminal's accomplice
could be tried for the same
crime as the criminal himself
and receive the same punishment.
On several occasions,the ques-
tion of retaining the doctrine
of analogy has been debated,
inconclusively, in Soviet legal
circles.
Attack on Poskrebyshev
In addition to its attack
on Vyshinsky, the Kommunist
article criticized A. N.
Poskrebyshev, Stalin's former
private secretary. In one of
the rare references to
Poskrebyshev since Stalin's
death, Kommunist asserted that
he had "indiscriminately and
without proof condemned theo-
retical discussions of legal
questions as mere scholastics"
at the 19th party congress in
1952. Poskrebyshev had in fact
ridiculed Soviet lawyers for
their debates on theoretical
problems such. as analogy and
the definition of guilt. He
advocated a study of the more
practical aspects of law in
order to strengthen state dis-
cipline.
Purposes of the Campaign
The anti-Vyshinsky campaign
evidently serves a dual purpose.
By striking at the theoretical
bases of Stalinist jurispru-
dence, it will help convince
the Russian masses that the ar-
bitrary justice and purges of
former years can never be re-
peated.
Second, and perhaps more
important, it may Jolt Soviet
legal scholars out of the leth-
argy into which they lapsed
under Stalin and Vyshinsky.
Almost all the attacks on
Vyshinsky have been accompanied
by demands that the theory of
evidence be profoundly studied
and that the most pressing ques-
tions of "socialist legality"
be answered.
Lawyers are accused of
having accomplished little to
advance Soviet law and of having
been content to "mouth truisms"
because they were afraid to put
forward new juridical theories.
The lack of productivity in
the past is now blamed on
Stalin's reign of terror. How-
ever, it is quite probable that
a real fear of Vyshinsky
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existed, since he was able tc
rebuff any attempts to gain
legal .stature rivaling his own.
The attack on Poskrebyshev im-
plies that a discussion of theo-
retical questions of law will
be safe from attack by high
party functionaries.
There is apparently a
genuine dearth of fundamental
legal works in the Soviet Union.
In January, for example, it was
stated that,Vyshinsky's book on
evidence was the only leading
work on the subject in the USSR.
In addition to scrutinizing
the question of absolute truth
and the theory of evidence,
lawyers have been called on to
perform serious research in
such fields as bourgeois law,
court work, and methodology in
criminal law.
Despite the increasing
frequency of attacks on
Vyshinsky's theories, he has
not been condemned as an in-
dividual. The Institute of
Law of the Academy of Sciences
still bears his name, and his
role in the purge of Stalin's
victims has not been mentioned.
(See Weekly, Part III, Legal
and Judicial Reform in the
US R, 17 May
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