CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000900140001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 21, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
ro IQ 9",
%.0 IN L- I
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
cldlz~j-l
COPY NO. .y
OCR NO_ 3263/56
21 June 1956
DOCUMENT NO.
NQ CHANGE IN CLAS$. 0
E3 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TQI AT
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR O'
: RVIEWER:
LATE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The declaration on relations between the Soviet
and Yugoslav Communist Parties issued on 20 June at
the conclusion of Marshal Tito's visit to the USSR
reveals agreement to expand party contacts, but within
.a framework which conforms closely to the precon
ditions of equality and independence on which the
Yugoslavs had insisted. Khrushchev's speech on 19
June suggested that Yugoslavia had now taken its
place "within the camp of Socialism." Tito's speech
on the same 9ccasion stressed the wide area of agree-
ment reached on international issues.
WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST LEADERS
CRITICIZE MOSCOW . . . . . . . .
Criticisms of Moscow's anti-Stalin campaign
voiced last week b --the Italian and French Communist
leaders do not pear to be a "revolt" against Soviet
Communist aut ority. Instead, they seem to be a co-
ordinated effort to prove that foreign Communist
parties are independent. This line, laid down au
'thoritatively by Moscow at the 20th Party Congress,
is aimed at demonstrating the "new" Soviet spirit
and obtaining the parliamentary collaboration of.West
European Social Democrats in popular fronts. The
fore-ign :Communist leaders, who are under attack within
their own parties, are under great pressure to clarify
the local line and re-establish party discipline in'
;order to maintain their own positions.
SOVIET AIR SHOW . . . . . . . . . .
Preparations for the Soviet Aviation Day air
-show, scheduled for 24 June at Tushino Airfield in
Moscow, indicate the USSR plans an impressive dis
-play,of aircraft. For the first time, the show will
be attended by senior air officials from leading
Western'powers and other nations outside the Sino-
Soviet bloc. In addition to an aerial parade, the
tentative schedule includes a display of aircraft on
the ground and visits to an aviati ool and an
aircraft factory.
CONFIDENTIAL
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,CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC'PLANS . . . . . . . Page 4
Statements by Chinese Communist leaders at the
National People's Congress show that Communist China
is pressing ahead along the general lines charted by
the USSR in the 1930's, with forced draft industri-
alization and collectivization of agriculture. The
$12.5 billion Chinese budget for 1956 is designed to
achieve 1957 industrial and agricultural production
goals this year. Capital construction also has been
speeded up. Budgeted defense expenditures will be
5.5 percent less this year, but the Chinese economy
will bear a greater burden than last year, when the
USSR provided a large special credit for defense out-
lays.
Page 6
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SHAH PEARS REPERCUSSIONS
FROM SOVIET AID OFFERS . .
. Page
Moscow has made elaborate preparations to receive
,the Shah of Iran on his visit beginning on 25 June.
Upon his return, the Shah will probably press for in-
creased American military and economic aid to justify
to th Ir nian public his continued alignment with the
West.
YEMENI CROWN PRINCE IN MOSCOW . Page 1
Moscow has accorded Crown Prince Badr of Yemen
and his entourage of political and economic advisers
an especially warm we come for r natives of
such a small country.
I T"\ r, AL
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LJIA JL1L.L,L vfti~
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SINO-SOVIET LEADERS
STRESS PERSONAL DIPLOMACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
The unprecedented number of invitations to non-
Communists to visit the USSR and China in the last
year and the many trips abroad by top Soviet leaders
indicate the importance he Communist ow attach to
personal diplomacy.
PEIPING PRESSES
FOR A DULLES-CHOU MEETING . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The release of two American priests last week
marks the first time in 1956 Peiping has freed
imprisoned Americans. Peiping apparently still hopes
that the hostage value of the remaining 11 prisoners
will serve to extract American concessions in the
Geneva talks, in particular, agreement to convene a
foreign ministers' conference between the United
States and Communist China.
Page 4
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The replacement of Israeli foreign minister
Sharett by Mrs. Golda Myorson, an undeviating
supporter of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, indicates
a shift of emphasis rather than a radical departure
in Israel's foreign policies. Ben-Gurion probably
will now be free to place more emphasis on what he
thinks is Israel's immediate security need. Sharett
had sought to give greater weight to Isr ' over-all
international position.
FRANCE'S ALGERIAN POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
French premier Guy Mollet appears to be trying
to meet leftist pressure for immediate reforms in
Algeria and an end to hostilities by preparing for
a piecemeal development of political autonomy. The
government thus far has refused to consider the good
offices of intermediaries, but has not entirely
closed the door aff-giniq ual recourse to such
means.
CYPRUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Great Britain has prepared a new plan for a
Cyprus settlement at a time when the Greek govern-
ment has indicated an interest in seeking a new
approach to the problem. Neither country has yet
made direct overtures to the other, but their latest
positions indicate Lions,might be re-
sumed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
Page 8
COMMUNISTS EXPLOITING
URUGUAY'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The deteriorating economic situation in Uruguay,
which has resulted in increased sentiment in favor
of trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc, has also led to
Communist gains in the labor field. The five-week-
old packing-house strike, in particular, has enabled
the Communists, who remain politically weak, to in-
crease their influence over non-Communist unions
through "solidarity" activities. Communist-backed
cost-of-living strikes also threate in other im-
portant fields.
ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN
PROCEEDS CAUTIOUSLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Since April, the campaign against Stalin has
proceeded slowly and carefully. The Soviet press
has remained silent on publication in the West of
Khrushchev's party congress attack, and the Soviet
public has so far been informed indirectly of only
a small part of its contents. Some observers have
noted cynicism and a loss of confidence in the
present leadership, especially among the intelli-
gentsia, as a product of the anti-Stalin campaign.
ENCYCLOPEDIA REFLECTS
CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY
. . . . . . Page 11
The USSR's Great Soviet Encyclopedia (second
edition), issued a volume at a time since Volume 2
appeared in 1949, reflects changes in the official
line as they occur. Thus, for example,. references
to~the^Korean dwar in Volume 39, issued last March,
in Volume 22, published in 1953.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
SOVIET REDUCTION OF FORCES . . . . .. . . . . .
The withdrawal of several Soviet units'from
Germany on 20 and 21 June is the second public
demonstration in East Germany that the USSR is
implementing its plan announced on 14 May to reduce
its forces by 1,200,000 men. There are indications
that preparations are under way for further de-
mobilizations.
. Page 12
SOVIET WARSHIPS
IN FOREIGN WATERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet warships have made or are scheduled soon
to make a number of cruises in the Mediterranean,
the Atlantic and the Pacific. This activity is de-
signed not only to demonstrate "friendship" with
countries visited but also to impress the world with
the growth of Soviet military power.
Page 13
THE CZECH PARTY CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
At the Czech party conference of 11-15 June, the
Communist leaders indicated their awareness of wide-
spread confusion and discontent both within the party
ranks and among the population generally, but made
clear they intended to halt further public expression
.of disaffection. Some limited concessions were
announced, however, including extensive administrative
reforms emphasizing decentralization.
BANDARANAIKE'S PERSONAL ROLE IN CEYLON . . . . . . .
The future stability of the new Ceylonese govern-
ment depends almost entirely on the personal strength
and character of.Prime Minister Bandaranaike, among
whose suppoarters there are few with political ex-
perience. He has stood fast on the national lan-
guage issue in the face of considerable violence, and
be apparently intends to retain Ceylon's Common-
wealth membership and an over-all defense treaty
with Britain,even though he will probably proclaim
Ceylon a republic and request the elimination of
British control over military bases.
Page 15
ASIAN-AFRICAN STUDENTS'4CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . Page 17
The Communist drive for absolute domination of
the Asian-African Students' Conference held in
Bandung was substantially curbed in the final sessions
of the conference, which closed on 7 June. This was
achieved principally by the Indian and Pakistani
delegates, supported, by some seven delegations of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE ALGERIAN MILITARY SITUATION--PART I : THE : REBELS , .
The Algerian rebels' National Liberation Army--
which may number between 20,000 and 40,000 men--has
progressively disrupted the security and economy of
much of northern Algeria by guerrilla operations.
The rebels obtain a large part of their equipment
locally, but there are indications that their efforts
to obtain arms now extend throughout the Near East
and Europe to the western bemisDhere an bly to
Soviet bloc countries.
Page 1
Page 5
NEW SATELLITE FIVE-YEAR PLANS .. . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Eastern European Satellites' Second Five-
Year Plans (1956-60) provide for increasing the in-
vestment in agriculture and consumer goods in-
dustries. Heavy industry, however, will continue
to hold first priority.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ETHIOPIA, A MAJOR TARGET OF THE COMMUNISTS'AFRICAN
CAMPAIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . Page 10
Ethiopia has become a major target in the
Communists' attempt to penetrate tropical Africa. The
latest overtures by the Soviet bloc and Communist
China have taken advantage of Ethiopia's dissatis-
faction with the amount of Western aid it has been
receiving.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS
The declaration on rela-
tions between the Soviet and
Yugoslav Communist Parties is-
sued on 20 June at the conclu-
sion of President Tito's visit
to the USSR reveals agreement
to expand party contacts, but
within a framework which con-
forms closely to the precondi-
tions of equality and independ-
ence on which the Yugoslavs had
insisted. Khrushchev's speech
at Dynamo Stadium on 19 June
suggested that Yugoslavia had
now taken its place "within the
camp of Socialism." Tito's
speech on the same occasion
stressed the wide area of agree-
ment reached on international
issues as set forth in the gov-
ernment communique, issued along
with the party declaration.
Different Roads to Socialism
The party declaration ac-
knowledges that "the roads and
conditions of'Socialist develop-
ment are different in different
countries." Party co-operation
"should be based on complete
freedom and will and equality,
on friendly criticism, and on
the comradely character of ex-
change of views on disputes be-
tween our parties," The decla-
ration states that these con-
tacts are but a part of the de-
veloping broader relations among
progressive movements in the
world--a point presumably in-
sisted on by the Yugoslavs to
offset Western suspicions that
Yugoslavia is establishing ex-
clusive party ties with the So-
viet bloc,
Khrushchev in his speech
at Dynamo Stadium endeavored,
however, to create the impression
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
that Yugoslavia had returned
to the "Socialist camp," and
he hailed the "monolithic unity"
of the Socialist countries.
Khrushchev emphasized that the
Socialist countries were de-
veloping as independent, sover-
eign states, where each Commu-
nist party was applying the
principles of Marxism and Lenin-
ism in accord with the partic-
ular nature of the country.
As if to temper somewhat
the remarks of Khrushchev, Tito
maintained that his visit to
the USSR was a logical continua-
tion of his policy of improving
relations with all nations on
the basis of equality. He then
reiterated-his intention to fol-
low his own brand of Communism
and not that of the USSR by de-
claring that "our way is differ-
ent from yours," adding that the
differences must not be an ob-
stacle to the closest possible
co-operation between countries
building Socialism.
Yugoslavia's Role
Khrushchev said that the
USSR wants friendship and under-
standing with the working-class
parties of all countries, de-
spite differences with them.
The party declaration stated
there was a pressing need for
"co-operation of all progres-
sive and peaceful forces." This
may indicate that the Yugoslavs
will assume an active role in
seeking the development of pop-
ular fronts and increased inter-
national contacts between Com-
munist and Socialist parties.
This may be one of the major
results Moscow hopes to achieve
by having welcomed so lavishly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
the former "renegade" on his
return to the USSR and by pro-
claiming its faith in the doc-
trine. of various roads to tSo-
cialism.
The government communiqud
issued along with the party dec-
laration does little more than
document the issues on which the
Yugoslavs had previously indi-
cated agreement with the USSR.
In his farewell address
Tito reaffirmed a broad identity
of views when he declared that
his visit,to the USSR had con-
vinced him that the USSR has
"the same desires as well and
that a "common language" had
been found in his talks with
the Soviet leaders.
WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST LEADERS
CRITICIZE MOSCOW
Major statements by the
leaders of the Italian and
'F'rench Communist Parties last
week on the anti-Stalin campaign
in the USSR, like the communique
issued on 20 June at the conclu-
sion of Tito's visit to Moscow,
represent the active implementa-
tion ,of the new line, enunciated
at 'the Soviet 20th Party Congress
in February: the roads to So-
?cialism vary with different con-
ditions in different countries.
Independence From ,foscow
. The central theme of these
pronouncements was the independ-
ence of foreign Communist par-
ties from Moscow. The key slo-
gans. stressed autonomy, freedom
of will and equality, friendly
criticism, couft dely exchange
of;'views on disputes between the
Soviet and foreign parties, and,
in general,, a "frank and criti-
cal relationship among Marxists."
This communiqud repeated
Soviet and Yugoslav support
for Communist China's admis-
sion to the UN, endorsed the
cut in Soviet forces as a step
toward partial disarmament,
urged talks between East Ger-
many and West Germany to bring
about reunification, supported.
the removal of obstacles to
free trade, and called for
aid to underdeveloped countries.
through the UN. It proposed
no new measures in bilateral
relations between the Yugo-
slav and Soviet governments,
but merely endorsed a con-
tinued expansion of trade,
scientific, and cultural re-
The theme was concisely
stated by Palmiro Togliatti,
secretary general of the Italian
party, in his press interview,
published on 16 June. Stress-
ing that the "Soviet model can-
not and should not continue to
be obligatory.," Togliatti said
the international structure of
the world Communist movement is
changing today. It is becoming
"many-centered" and therefore
one cannot speak of a "unique
guide within the Communist move-
ment but rather of progress ac-
complished by following dif-
ferent roads." The. French Com-
munist statement-followed a
similar line.
Co-ordinated Action
The reactions of the lead-
ers of the two great Western
European Communist parties do
not appear to constitute a re-
volt against Moscow or a repudiation
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of their loyalty to the inter-
national Communist movement.
On the contrary, they provide
strong evidence of a planned
and co-ordinated maneuver.
The foreign Communist leaders,
who are under attack within
their parties, are under great
pressure to clarify the local
line and re-establish party
discipline in order to maintain
their own positions.
The Italian and French
statements, along with those
by the British and American Corn-
munist..press,are cast in simi-
lar language and follow the same
pattern. They all balance a
defense of the Soviet leaders'
attacks on Stalin and profes-
sions of the unity and solidarity
of the Communist world, with
criticisms of the handling of
the anti-Stalin campaign and de-
mands for further "elucidation"
of how Stalin was able to per-
vert the Soviet system.
The rather strong language
used by Togliatti and the French
Communists in criticizing the
Soviet leaders for having toler-
ated Stalinism so long is merely
an index of the new latitude
the foreign Communist parties
SOVIET AIR SHOW
Preparations for the Soviet
Aviation Day air show, scheduled
for 24 June at Tushino Airfield
in Moscow, indicate the USSR
plans an impressive display of
aircraft. For the first time,
the show will be attended by
senior air officials from lead-
ing Western powers and other
nations outside the Sino-
Soviet bloc. A tentative sched-
ule
are being allowed in developing
local policies within the frame-
work of the general line laid
down in Moscow.
Thus, there is evidence of
a top-level decision on a program
to carry out the "different roads
to Socialism" in such a way as
to emphasize foreign Communist
independence from Soviet
control.
"Popular-Front" Tactics
As part of its effort to
present a "liberal" front to
the non-Communist world, Mos-
cow is seeking to create the
impression abroad that ties be-
Lween the Soviet Union and
foreign parties are being loos-
ened. Thelocal Communist parties
are now pictured as genuine
national parties which are no
longer being manipulated pri-
marily to advance Soviet
foreign policy objectives.
This line is clearly intended
to set the stage for parlia-
mentary collaboration with
Social Democrats and others
who may be amenable to Commu-
nist overtures aimed at reviving
the popular fronts of the mid-
1930's..
includes the aerial
pare e, a display of aircraft
on the ground and visits to an
aviation school and an aircraft
factory.
More than 20 delegations,
including those from the Satel-
lite nations, are expected to
attend. To date, the following
non-Orbit nations have accepted
Soviet invitations: the United
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States, Britain, France, Norway,
Sweden, Finland, Switzerland,
Yugoslavia, Syria, Egypt and
India.
New aircraft seen in prac-
tice fly-bys which will probably
appear in the show are a swept-
wing jet light bomber, two dif-
ferent versions of delta-wing
fighters, and an improved ver-
sion of the twin-engine FLASH-
LIGHT all-weather interceptor.
Rehearsal flights by four air-
craft resembling the FARMER
transsonic day-fighter indi-
cate that a modified version
of this aircraft has also been
developed.
Other Aircraft Developments
Other aircraft believed
to be under development in the
USSR may appear in the air
show. A four-engine jet trans-
port has been heralded by So-
viet officials for the past two
years which reputedly will carry
180 passengers. A four-engine
turbo-prop transport of com-
parable size is also probably
under development but is less
likely to be completed in time
for the show. A new twin-
engine turbo-prop transport
mentioned by Tupolev for the
first time this year may also
appear in the show.
In addition to new air-
craft, the USSR may give a
demonstration of aerial refuel-
ing techniques
BISON heavy bombers
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ment of a probe-and-drogue aerial
refueling system.
(Prepared jointly with O I
CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC PLANS
On 18 June, Li Fu-chun, vice
premier and chairman of the State
Planning Commission, told the
National People's Congress, now
assembled in Peiping, that Com-
munist China would fulfill the
First, Five-Year Plan (1953-
1957) ahead of schedule, and
that the Second Five-Year Plan
is already being formulated. In
1956 a planned increase of 62
percent in capital construction
over 1955 will result in the
completion of seven eighths of
the entire Five-Year Plan for
fixed investments. The level
of production for both agricul-
ture and industry scheduled
originally for 1957 is now to
be reached this year, Communist
China is thus pressing ahead
along the general lines charted
by the USSR in the 1930's, with
forced draft industrialization
and collectivization of agricul-
ture.
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 Other
Administration
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUTARY
CHINESE COMMUNIST BUDGET EXPENDITURES
(Billions of Dollars)
Social, Cultural
& Educational
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$12.2
II.Y
7%
9.5%
12%
g
$10
1
x:,
.
_3%
$%
20%
24%
22%*
24%
%
l
lx
%
.
.
i1%
Other 1
%
14
o
I1
%
14.5%
2 0%
%
18%
14%
%
24
14%
%
15
%
52%
14
%
'4$%
9%
% 14
47
SV 11
tt
Heavy 47%
36.5%
40%
%
39
10%
--------
- 5
- %'
------- 4
-- ---%
L'
1954 1955
ACTUAL PLAN
includes $550,000,000 In Soviet military credit
These predictions by Li
Fu-chun were preceded on 15
June by a final review of the
1955 budget and the adoption
of a $12.5 billion state budget
for 1956.
Agriculture
In agriculture, which is
the key to attainment of the
Five-Year Plan goals, 1955 was
described as a year of "rapid
socialist transformation." An
excellent food crop harvest of
184,000,000 tons was claimed
for 1955, although for the
first time since the Communists
assumed power, state income
from agriculture was less than
planned as.a result of agricul-
tural losses caused by the
floods in 1954. With a 50-
percent increase in investment
in this field, the Chinese
hope to attain a 1956 food
crop of nearly 200,000,000 tons,
barring bad weather. This would
1955
ACTUAL
$12.5
1956
PLAN
Commerce &
Foreign Trade
Communications
& Transportation
Agriculture
exceed the plan for 1957 by
6,500,000 tons.
Industry
The original total of
694 industrial plants scheduled
for construction under the First
Five-Year Plan has been revised
upward to about 800. Priority
development of heavy industry
will be sustained by the assign-
ment of 89 percent of industrial
investment funds to this field.
The remainder for light industry
is, nevertheless, an 86-percent
increase over 1955. The planned
1957 level of industrial pro-
duction is now scheduled for
attainment this year with no
major underfulfillments ex-
pected.
The $2.5 billion allocated
to military expenditures, while
down 5,5 percent from 1955, is
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUN MY
21 June 1956
nevertheless 20 percent of total
expenditures, and will permit
continuing progress in China's
military modernization program.
At least $550,000,000 of
1955 expenditures consisted of
Soviet equipment and installa-
tions in China transferred
under a Soviet credit. Since
this transaction has been com-
pleted and no Soviet military
credits are included in the
budget this year, spending by
China itself has actually gone
up 19 percent. The assumption
by China of the entire burden
of defense costs may in part
explain recently imposed econo-
mies in military construction
and last year's failure to
spend $284,000,000 of the
funds allocated.
Transportation
Although the original First
Five-Year Plan investment allo-
cations for transportation had
already largely been spent in
the first three years, the 1956
budget for transportation is
51 percent over the 1955 figure
and will permit impressive
overfulfillment of original
plan goals.
Last
year
757
miles of new
lines
were
added
to the rail
system
and
5,000
miles of new roads--largely in
the western hinterland--to the
highway network. In 1956, 1,230
miles of new rail lines are to
be added to the 17,000-mile
system.
Budget Surplus
A budgetary deficit for
1956 of about $400,000,000 will
be covered by a surplus carried
over from 1955. As planned, the
1956 budget will have no sur-
plus to carry forward into 1957.
Because of its effect on bank
credit operations, this lack of
a surplus will contribute to
inflationary pressures unless
it is offset by increased taxa-
tion or -greater forced savings.
Prepared by ORR) 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SHAH FEARS. REPERCUSSIONS
FROM SOVIET AID OFFERS
The Shah of Iran expects,
probably correctly, that'the
Soviet Union is planning an
"extraordinarily cordial and
impressive" welcome for him when
he arrives for a state visit on
25 June. He will stay in the
Kremlin, where an apartment
reportedly is being. decorated
and modernized for him.
The American ambassador in
Tehran believes the Shah, is not
likely to be taken in by Soviet
offers. He does not want any
political conversations. and has
said he intends to acct only as
a constitutional monarch. He
apparently has decided not to
take along any officials who
would be competent to carry on
political discussions.
In view of the wide play
which Soviet offers would
YEMENI CROWN PRINCE IN MOSCOW
Moscow has accorded Crown
Prince Badr of Yemen and his
entourage of political and eco-
nomic advisers an especially
warm welcome for representatives
probably get in Iran, the Shah
islikely to counter them or
even to anticipate them by
pressing for a step-up in
military and economic aid from
the United States. He feels
that Iran has been unaccountably
neglected since he took the
"unprecedented step" of joining
the Baghdad pact.
The Shah was greatly im-
pressed during his recent trip
to Turkey by its great progress,
particularly in the:military
field, and he compared unfavor-
ably the several hundred jet
planes the Turks had been given
by the United States with the
two that Iran has received.
of such a small country. He
arrived in Moscow on 11 June
following a visit to Egypt
where he had talks with Premier
Nasr and other leading. Egyptian
officials.
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at JUNK loss
visited Yemen and a trade agree-
ment with the USSR was signed.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Kamaran
Island. .
415
. Arabia
Yemeni contacts with the
Soviet bloc have been encouraged
by Cairo for the purpose of
undermining the British posi-
tion in the Aden Protectorate.
The Soviet-Yemeni treaty of
friendship, first signed in
1928, was renewed in October
1955. In March 1956, Soviet
and Czech economic missions
SINO-SOVIET LEADERS
STRESS PERSONAL DIPLOMACY
The unprecedented number
of invitations to visit the
USSR and China extended to non-
Communist leaders in the last
year and the trips by top So-
viet leaders to Yugoslavia, South
Asia, the Near East and the Unit-
ed Kingdom indicate the impor-
tance the Communists now attach
to personal diplomacy.
The Moscow talks appear
to be partially aimed at ex-
panding commercial ties between
the two countries. The dele-
gation accompanying Badr in-
cludes many "representatives of
business circles."
While the USSR is genu-
inely interested in establish-
ing close ties with Yemen be-
cause of its identification
with the. Egyptian-led Arab
states, Moscow is also seizing
on this opportunity to exacer-
bate further the position of
the British in the Middle
East. Khrushchev told Foreign
Minister Lloyd during the So-
viet visit to Britain in April
that the USSR would supply
arms to countries such as
Yemen as long as the British
supported the Baghdad pact.
Concurred in by ORR)
The confidence of the So-
viet leaders in the effective-
ness of personal contacts in
creating a new image of the
bloc in the eyes of the non-
Communist world has often been
expressed in their public state-
ments since the summit confer-
ence in Geneva last year.
Stressing the "great signifi-
cance" of the establishment of
personal contacts among the
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CURRENT'INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
heads of government of the four
great powers at Geneva, Premier
Bulganin told the Supreme Soviet
last August that the conference
marked a turning point in their
relations. In his report to
the party congress in February,
Khrushchev listed personal
contacts between Soviet states-
men and those of other countries
as one of the "most important
directions in which the Soviet
Union's initiative has de-
veloped."
- Trips made by Nori Orbit leaders
?. y ud- omel leaders
1954-55
79557
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE . WEEKLY SUMMARY
VISITS OF NON-ORBIT LEADERS
VISITS OF ORBIT LEADERS
To Moscow
To Peiping
From Moscow
1955
1954
1954
CHANCELLOR RA'AB
AUSTRIA
PRIME MINISTER NEHRU
INDIA
DEPUTY PREMIER MIKOYAN
HELSINKI
PRIME MINISTER NEHRU
INDIA
PREMIER U NO
BURMA
1955
CHANCELLOR ADENAUER
PRESIDENT PAASIKIVI
WEST GERMANY
FINLAND
1955
PREMIER BULGANIN, PARTY
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER H
LYO
E
E
PREMIER ALI
SECRETARY KHRUSHCHEV
BELGRADE RANGOON
O
AK
PREMIER U NU
N
W ZEALAND
BURMA
19,56
GENEVA KABUL
PRIME MINISTER GERHARDBEN
NORWAY
PRINCE SIHANOUK
DEPUTY PREMIER KYA
W NYEIN
CAMBODIA
BURMA
DEPUTY PREMIER
MIKOYAN
NEW DELHI
BELGRADE
1956
PRIME MINISTER ALI
PAKISTAN
1956
PRIME MINISTER HANSEN
DENMARK,
PRESIDENT SUKARNO
INDONESIA
DEPUTY PREMIER
MIKOYAN
KABUL NEW DELHI
PH ME MINISTER ENLANDER
SWEDEN
PREMIER NASR
EGYPT
KARACHI RANGOON
PREMIER MOLLET
FRANCE
PREMIER ALI
INDONESIA
PREMIER BULGAN
PARTY
IN
PRESIDENT TITO
YUGOSLAVIA
PRIME MINISTER PRA
SAD
NEPAL
SECRETARY K
,
HRUSHCHEV
LONDON
CROWN PRINCE BADR
YEMEN
PREMIER SOUVANNA
LAOS
PRESIDENT VORO
SHILOV
HELSINKI
VICE PRESIDENT RADHAKRISHNAN
PRINCE SIHANOUK
INDIA
CAMBODIA
1957
1967
SHAH
IRAN
PRIME MINISTER BAND
ARANAIKE
CEYLON
PREMIER BULGAN
IN PARTY
DEPUTY PREMIER KYAW NYEIN
BURMA
SECRETARYK
HRUSHCHEV
NORWAY DENMARK
PRIME MINISTER GERRARDSEN
NORWAY
SWEDEN FRANCE
PRESIDENT SUKARNO
INDONESIA
PREMIER NASR-
EGYPT
From Peiping
PREMIER ALI
INDONESIA
1954
PREMIER CHOU
NEW DELHI
PRIME MINISTER DAUD
PRIME MINISTER VAN ACKER
AFGHANISTAN
BELGI UN
RANGOON
1957
GENEVA
PRIME MINISTER BANDARANAIKE
CEYLON
1955
PRIME MINISTER EDEN
UK
PREMIER CROU
1956
PREMIER CHOI]
CAIRO AND
NEAR EAST"
60619-4
The Chinese Communists
have kept pace with their So-
viet partners in inviting
leaders of non-Orbit countries
to visit Peiping. In contrast
PEIPING PRESSES
FOR A DULLES-CHOU MEETING
The release of two Ameri-
can priests last week marks
the first time this year Pei-
ping has freed imprisoned Ameri-
cans. The Chinese Communists
have made the point that these
two Americans have been freed
only because their sentences
have been served. Peiping ap-
parently still hopes that the
hostage value of the remaining
11 prisoners will help to ex-
tract concessions in the Geneva
talks. The "key question" in
these talks, according to-Pei-
ping broadcasts, is a foreign
ministers' conference between
the United States and Communist
China.
Peiping's plea for a
Dulles-Chou meeting was first
made shortly after the ambas-
sadorial talks at Geneva. be-
gan in mid-1955. In January,
with Moscow's world-wide ap-
proach, however, the Chinese
have concentrated their efforts
among neighboring Asian nations,
the Middle East.
and, since early this year, in
the Chinese Communist Foreign
Ministry declared that "only
through a Sino-American con-
ference of foreign ministers"
would it be possible to resolve
the Taiwan question. Peiping
tried to introduce a further
note of urgency in May 1956
with the request, subsequently
rejected in Washington, that
the conferees at Geneva set
themselves a two-month dead-
line for completing arrange-
ments to convene a meeting of
foreign ministers.
It is doubtful that Com-
munist China actually believes
such a meeting would resolve
the disputed points at issue,
but it would serve Peiping's
objective of enhancing its
international prestige and ad-
vancing its claims for diplo-
matic recognition and UN
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUN
21 June 1956
membership. Chou En-lai in
a recent press interview ob-
served that."it is ridiculous
that two countries should be
holding conversations without
mutual recognition." This
argument is particularly
likely to carry weight with
countries like Japan, France
and the Arab nations, where
sentiment in favor of recogniz-
ing Communist China is already
strong.
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
The replacement of Is-
raeli foreign minister Sharett
by Mrs. Golda Myerson, an
undeviating supporter of
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, ap-
pears to indicate a shift of
emphasis rather than a radical
departure in Israel's foreign
policies. Ben-Gurion probably
will now be free to place more
emphasis on what he thinks
is Israel's immediate security
need. Sharett had sought to
give greater weight to Is-
rael's over-all international
position.
The construction of pill-
boxes near Banat Yacov, and.
military installations re-
cently.observed in the El Auja
demilitarized zone along the
Israeli-Egyptian border may
be symptoms of the tougher
policy expected to result from
Sharett's resignation.
This does not mean that
the Israeli leaders will launch
a full-scale campaign against
the Arabs since they probably
Of the 11 Americans still
in prison, the sentences of
eight are known. None of tiese
sentences will have been com-
pleted before 1957. However,
treatment of the prisoners has
improved over the,last six
months--a reflection possibly
of Communist'readiness to free
the prisoners as soon as Pei-
ping decides that its position
at Geneva makes their release
desirable.
feel Israel would be robbed of
the fruits of victory in any
case. It does mean that. the
policy of retaliation, never
abandoned, will probably resume
something like its full force,
and that Tel Aviv's attitude
will be that it is up to the
UN--the Western powers and the
Soviet bloc--to make the Arabs
keep the peace if retaliation
seems to be leading toward war.
A reshuffle of the Israeli For-
eign Ministry and of several
diplomatic posts to bring the
lower-level outlook in line with
such attitudes is ,a strong possibility.
The effect on the Arabs of
such a shift of emphasis in
Israeli policy is likely to be
increased acceptance of the
leadership of Egypt, the only
Arab state even remotely able
to stand up against Israel.
There may also be a tendency to
draw still closer to the Soviet
bloc in order to ensure that
peace moves in the UN or among
the great powers reflect sensi-
tivity to Arab views.
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;CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
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FRANCE'S ALGERIAN POLICY
French premier Guy Mollet
appears to be trying to meet
leftist pressure for immediate
reforms in Algeria and an end
to hostilities by preparing for
a piecemeal developments of po-
litical autonomy. The government
thus far has refused to consider
the good offices of intermedi-
aries but has not entirely closed
the door against eventual re-
course to such means.
Shift From Military
Both Mollet and Robert La-
_coste, minister residing in
Algeria, contend that as a re-
sult of recent French military
offensives French efforts can
now shift away from purely mil-
itary operations.
Mollet publicly maintains
that his government is ready
to authorize contact with the
.rebels for a cease-fire pro-
vided these contacts are "of-
ficial.and direct .'' This has
been interpreted to mean con-
tact only with rebels in Algeria
and to, rule out negotiations
with the Algerian nationalist
leaders in. Cairo
Ithe government
nas reacted cautiously to two
public cease-fire proposals.
Indian premier Nehru proposed
on 22 May a five-point plan as
a basis for anegotiated settle-
ment. Though the French gave
Krishna Menon no encouragement
on his visit to Paris in early
June, and in effect told him
France wanted no intermediaries,
he has since hinted he found
France's attitude "now less
rigid." The Paris press noted
that the Indian. proposal was
couched in a manner to avoid
embarrassment to'France since
it omitted the use of the word
"independence.."
Cease-fire Feeler
On 13 June an Algerian
nationalist proposal for a
cease-fire was publicized by
the same Swedish newspaper
which obtained the Indochina
peace feeler sent out by Ho Chi
Minh in late 1953. In this
new proposal, an effort was re-
portedly made to avoid a refer-
ence to "independence." Un-
officially Paris has character-
ized it as. unacceptable, but
Mollet has refrained from of-
ficially turning down either
of. these offers.
.Although the French govern-
ment is,reported considering a
federal tie for Algeria which
would permit internal autonomy,
Mollet has so far offered no
clear answer on?Algeria's
future status. While he still
insists this must be worked
out in a framework of "indis-
soluble ties," he appears to
have given up the concept of
Algeria as. an integral part of
France. As yet, however, po-
litical pressure. from the
right still appears too strong
for Mollet to commit himself
to cease-fire talks with the
nationalist spokesmen in Cairo,
and any indication that France's
military repression is success-
ful may encourage the right to
press for a continued tough
policy.
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Great Britain has prepared
a new plan for a Cyprus settle-
ment at a time when the Greek
government has indicated an in-
terest in seeking a new approach
to the problem. Neither country
has yet made direct overtures
to the other, but their latest
positions indicate that negoti-
ations might be resumed..
British Position
London is reported prepared
to announce its willingness to
grant Cyprus a constitution and
after a "suitable period"--
perhaps-ten years--to ask NATO
whether transfer of Britain's
sovereignty over Cyprus would
be strategically feasible.
Greek Position
Greek foreign minister
Averoff has told Ambassador
Cannon that Athens insists on
recognition of self-determination
for Cyprus in "positive and
straightforward terms." During
earlier negotiations, Greece
maintained that the British
statement on self-determination
was "weasel-worded." Averoff
also stipulated a "genuinely
democratic constitution" pro-
viding for self-government for
three years. After the three
years, an international organ-
ization, to be agreed on by
negotiation, would determine a
date for Cypriot self-deter-
mination "not to be later than
eight years." Athens also in-
sists on the liberation of
Archbishop Makarios before an
agreement is reached.
Averoff told the Turkish
ambassador in Athens that Greece
would be satisfied with station-
ing a symbolic contingent of
troops on Cyprus if the island
joined Greece, would establish
free ports for Turkish commerce
on the island and give the Turk-
ish minority the right to appeal
to either NATO or the United
Nations.
Turkish Position
Ankara believes Britain has
already promished the Greeks too
much and will continue to oppose
any scheme which might lead to
the eventual union of Cyprus with
Greece. The Turks adhere to
their view that the strategic
location of Cyprus--only 40 miles
from Turkey--and the island's
large Turkish minority make
Greek hegemony unacceptable.
London is aware of Turkey's
attitude toward any eventual
change in sovereignty over the
island. and, according to For-
eign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, is
determined to take no steps to
mollify the Greeks which would
seriously prejudice Turkey's
strategic position in area
defense. According to press re-
ports, Turkey has told Britain
that, if necessary, it will send
troops to the island to keep it
out of Greek hands.
Cypriot Nationalists
Although nationalist ter-
rorism, which has already caused
nearly 150 deaths, including
that of an American vice consul,
continues at a high level, there
are some indications that EOKA--
the nationalist organization--
.may be taking a somewhat more
conciliatory attitude. EOKA
announced a week ago it was con-
demning seven Cypriots to "social
death" for collaborating with
the British. This ostracism con-
trasts with the previous pattern
of punishment by assassination.
The Cyprus ethnarchy has also
announced that it will receive
any proposals and pass them on
to Archbishop Makarios, a shift
from its previous position that
the British had to deal directly
with Makarios.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COMMUNISTS EXPLOITING
URUGUAY'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
Communist labor leaders
in Uruguay are adding to their
influence over non-Communist
unions through "solidarity"
activities in support of the
workers in the five-week-old
packing-house strike. The Com-
munists hope their efforts will
contribute to cause further
deterioration in Uruguay's in-
creasingly strained economy.
The rising cost of living
and the government's apparent
inability to improve the situa-
tion have been important factors
in the Communist labor gains
during the past six months.
Strained Economy
Uruguay traditionally has
a high standard of living and,
from the end of the war until
the early 1950's, enjoyed a
relatively stable economy. In
the past two years, however,
there has been a continued rise
in the international trade and
payments debt, an increasing
imbalance in the federal budget,
a steady decline in the value
of the peso and a necessity to
decrease imports from the United
States.
Many of Uruguay's financial
difficulties stem from the inflexi-
bility of its economic structure.
Nearly 70 percent of its in-
adequate foreign exchange re-
ceipts are derived from live-
stock products such as meat,
hides and wool. Dwindling cattle
herds, along with increasing
domestic consumption of meat,
is reducing the number available
for export, while extensive
government controls over the
economy and high labor costs are
additional obstacles to ex-
panding production and exports.
This situation and irrita-
tion with American foreign trade
policies have made Uruguay one
of the chief Latin American
countries.seeking trade outlets
with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Luis
Batlle Berres, who stepped down
in February from his one-year
turn at the presidency, has
stated that "as a result of
American policy, we will sell
anything but our souls to Russia,
China, or anyone else."
The high cost of public
administration and a generous-
social welfare system have
further intensified Uruguay's
financial problems. Over 40 per-
cent of the employed labor force
is on the federal payroll, either
in the civil service or in
government-owned industries.
The Packing-House Strike
The five-week-old packing-
house strike affects the entire
meat industry at the peak of the
slaughtering season and has
affected not only the foreign-
owned export houses but also
the government. The strike
apparently was timed to create
the maximum pressure for wage
increases to cover the long
periods of unemployment caused
by the sporadic operation of
the packing houses.
Of the major packers, only
the government-owned Nacional,
which monopolizes the local
market, has been able.to command
an adequate, regular and reason-
ably priced supply of cattle for
slaughter in the last five years.
Although favoring the national
packing house, the government
has considered the foreign packers
essential to the economy and has
footed the bill for the bulk of
packer losses.
Communist Gains
The packing-house strike
has also provided the Communists
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
with the most dramatic successes
they have scored in the labor
field. Their sympathy strike
on 1 June, backing the non-
Communist packing-house workers,
marked the first time the Com-
munist labor federation has
been able to lead an organized
joint action, including both
the anarcho-syndicalists and
the dominant anti-Communist
Sindical Confederation of Uru-
guay. A second general sym-
pathy strike was scheduled for
21 June.
The Communists, who are
weak politically, hope that
such "solidarity" activities
will prove conclusively to union
leaders the value of the inter-
federation "co-ordinating com-
mittees" which have recently
begun to appear at a lower
level in other fields. These
committees, which the Communists
have been using to gain influ-
ence over non-Communist unions,
have been skillfully organized.
Their activities have been free
from Communist cliches and have
been presented as disinterested
attempts to protect the immedi-
ate financial interests of the
workers.
Communist-backed cost-of-
living strikes now threaten in
the civil service, the construc-
tion industry, the railway sys-
tem and the banks. The govern-
ment has not commented on any
of these Communist activities
and appears to consider the
economic consequences of the 25X1
meat strike more serious than
the danger of any possible gains
by the Communists.
ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN
PROCEEDS CAUTIOUSLY
Since April, the campaign
against Stalin has proceeded
slowly and carefully. The
overt process of de-Staliniza-
tion,.carried out earlier in
such ways as the removal of
pictures and busts, has come
to a virtual standstill. The
Soviet press has remained si-
lent on publication in the West
of Khrushchev's party congress
attack, and the Soviet public
has so far been informed in-
directly of only a small part
of. its contents.
Delay in publication of
Volume 40 of the Great Soviet
Encyclopedia, which will con-
tain an article on Stalin, sug-
gests that the regime is tak-
ing stock of its position. it
has apparently introduced a
note of caution into its cam-
paign.with an eye to maintain-
ing discipline and restraint.
There have been reports that,
in the first flush of surprise
and release at the revelations
about Stalin, unhealthy criti-
cism, directed against the
party and its leaders themselves,
had arisen in some party circles.
In the face of this reaction,
according to information re-
ceived by the American embassy
in Moscow, the party central
committee has ordered that dis-
cussion of the de-Stalinization
question be ended in party
meetings.
Some observers have noted
cynicism and a loss of confi-
dence in the present leadership,
especially among the intelligentsia,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY B Jl
21 June 1956
as a product of the anti-Stalin
campaign. There is no indica-
tion, however, that the matter
has become a serious political
problem. Revision of Stalinist
history is being carried on
quietly but persistently in
scholarly and ideological jour
nals, and this process will
probably continue.
It is unlikely that the
indictment against Stalin will
be broadened to include charges
of sexual excesses and wife-
murder, as recently reported
in a French newspaper. These
accusations were said to have
been made by Khrushchev before
a small gathering of party lead-
ers as a follow-up to his denun-
ciation of Stalin at the 20th
Party Congress.
The source of the reports
of this second, more damning
ENCYCLOPEDIA REFLECTS
CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY
The USSR's Great Soviet
Encyclopedia (second e iition),
issued a volume at a time since
Volume 1 appeared in 1949, re-
flects changes in the official
line as they occur. Thus, for
example, references to the
Korean war in Volume 39, issued
last March, are less critical of
the United States than those in
Volume 22, published in 1953.
This piecemeal issuance of
the encyclopedia has on more than
one occasion caught its publish-
ers in an embarrassing situation.
The biography of Beria in Volume
6, published in 1950, had to be
completely eliminated in 1953
when Beria was arrested and exe-
cuted for "antiparty and state
crimes." This was accomplished
by supplying purchasers of the
encyclopedia with an insert to
be pasted into the book in place
of the pages on Beria.
Similarly, the biography of
the Chinese revolutionary leader
assault on Stalin's character
by Khrushchev is Michel Gordey,
Soviet expert of the French
newspaper France-Soir who ac-
companied the Mollet-Pineau
party to Moscow. Although his
information was described in
Fr.?nce-Soir as unquestionably
authentic, Gordey left the im-
pression with Ambassador Bohlen,
with whom he discussed the sub-
ject in Moscow, that it was
based entirely on rumors circu-
lating among Soviet Communists.
Even if Khrushchev, whose
penchant for intemperate state-
ment is well established, did
in fact make such accusations,
it is unlikely they will be
publicly aired at a time when
the subject of Stalin is being
treated very gingerly in the
Kao Kang, who committed suicide
in 1955 when he was accused
of anti-party crimes by the
Chinese Communist Party leader-
ship, was excised from the nages
of the encyclopedia.
The publishers have recent-
ly decided to. hold up Volume 40
"for an indefinite period" and
proceed with the publication
of Volume 41. Since Volume 40
will contain the article on
Stalin, they are obviously seek-
ing to avoid further embarrass-
ment by delaying publication un-
til the new line on Stalin can
be definitively stated.
The encyclopedia clearly
reflects changes in the Soviet
line. For example, in Volume
22 published in September 1953,
the United States was accused
of beginning an aggressive war
in Korea and charged with try-
ing to "enslave the Korean
people," and with building up
Korea as a staging area for an
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
attack on Communist China. The
UN resolution on Korea was de-
scribed as an "illegal and
shameful act," and outcome of
"American-English bloc" plots.
By March 1956, when Vol-
ume 39, containing the article
on the United States, was pub-
lished, the USSR's new "peace-
ful coexistence" policy was
The withdrawal of several
Soviet units from Germany on
20 and 21 June is the second
public demonstration in East
Germany that the
USSR is implementing
its plan announced
on 14 May to reduce
its forces by 1,200,-
000 men. There are
indications that
preparations are un-
der way for further
demobilizations.
The withdrawals
this week consisted
of an air division
from Brandenburg,
one of the three
scheduled to leave,
and small armored
and artillery units
from Magdeburg and
Weimar. At least
one regiment of the
air (ground attack)
division which was
located at Branden-
burg was withdrawn
in May and was her-
alded by the East
German radio as evi-
dence of Soviet good
faith. Magdeburg is
headquarters for the
Third Shock Army,
Weimer, for the 13th
AAA Division of the
Eighth Guards Army.
EAST GERMANY
GMA GUARDS MECHANIZED ARMY
GA GUARDS ARMY
fftSA SHOCK ARMY
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTY DIVISION
AIR DIVI$rON
25 5Q
NAUTICAL MILES<
2ND GMA
r?
P36SA
SECRET
apparent in a much-toned-down
discussion of American partici-
pation in the Korean war. En-
cyclopedia authors dropped
the inflammatory verbiage of
the earlier volume. The United
States, no longer "imperialist,"
is now merely accused of hav-
ing "interfered in the civil
war in Korea."
On 14 June Marshal Grechko,
.commander of Soviet forces in
East Germany, invited Western
representatives to observe the
~--~ BERLIN
. BRANDENBURG'
~CZEC110
3RD GMA
? Juterbog
7
59830 B
60619 5
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
withdrawals. He stated that
33,500 would return to the USSR
in the coming months. He also
said that 20,000 Soviet troops
in Germany had been sent home
in the past year. There are
indications that about 20,000
more troops did in fact leave
the Soviet zone last fall than
were estimated to be eligible
for discharge. Grechko may be
including Soviet border guard
troops which withdrew last Oc-
tober.
Soviet plans for a reduction
of forces may involve demobiliza-
tion of certain categories of
SOVIET WARSHIPS
IN FOREIGN WATERS
Soviet warships have made
or are scheduled soon to make
a number of cruises in the
Mediterranean, the Atlantic and
the Pacific. This activity is
designed not only to demonstrate
friendship with countries visited
but also to impress the world
with the growth of Soviet mili-
tary power.
The arrival in Shanghai on
20 June of a Sverdlov-class
cruiser and two postwar destroy-
ers marked the first official
visit of Soviet warships to an
Asian country. Since World
War II, only Western navies
have been seen in the southern
Sea of Japan and the Tsushima
Straits. The trip may be in-
tended to provide Asians with
tangible evidence of Sino-Soviet
solidarity, as well as the
growth of Soviet power, partic-
ularly naval power, in the
Pacific. The cruiser is one
of two Sverdlov-class ships
which came from European'Russia
via the Northern Sea Route last
troops in all areas. Any
significant Soviet withdrawals
from Eastern Europe are
likely to be highly publicized
for Soviet foreign policy
purposes.
A Soviet announcement on
26 May that special commissions
had been established at the
local administrative level in
the USSR to help place former
servicemen in civilian jobs
suggests that preparations are
being made to facilitate the
absorption in the civilian
economy of large numbers of
discharged troops.
summer to join the Pacific
Fleet, whose effectiveness has
been increased markedly since
1953.
In the next two months,,,
Soviet warships of the Baltic
Fleet will visit Denmark and
the Netherlands, and Northern
Fleet ships will visit Sweden
and Norway. The commanders of
both fleets will accompany their
ships. This will be the first
appearance of Northern Fleet
units in foreign ports. The
selection of Arctic-based units
for the visits to Norway and
Sweden probably is intended to
impress these countries with
the growth of Soviet naval
strength on their northern
flank.
In addition,since 1 June
four "W"-class long-range sub-
marines have passed through the
Skagerrak on the surface. This
was the first time since 1948
that Soviet submarines are
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
known to have passed through
the Danish Straits and the
first display of boats of this
class in non-Soviet waters.
In early June, Soviet war-
ships under the command of
Admiral Kasatonov, visited
Yugoslavia for the first time,
in keeping with the Soviet
rapprochement with Tito.
THE CZECH PARTY CONFERENCE
At the Czech party con-
ference of 11-15 June, the Com-
munist leaders indicated their
awareness of widespread confu-
sion and discontent both within
the party ranks and among ele-
ments of the population, and
made clear their intention to
halt further public expression
of disaffection. Although
claiming they would not revert
to terroristic practices, the
party leaders gave clear warn-
ings that continued transgres-
sions against the party line
would not be tolerated and
that the regime has acted to
ensure that any further proc-
ess of de-Stalinization will
proceed along the "correct"
course.
No Further Removals
By once again using Slansky
as the scapegoat for past er-
rors and by the general tenor
of their speeches, the ruling
hierarchy indicated that no
additional removals of top
party leaders are now planned.
The speeches of party
first secretary Antonin Novotny
and Premier Viliam Siroky made
it unmistakably clear that the
political and economic lines
established at the tenth party
congress in 1954 were correct
and that no basic revisions
were necessary. Novotny added
that contrary to the sentiments
of some members who had demanded
a party congress, the central
committee is capable of solving
the present problems, which he
admitted were grave.
"Internal Ferment"
Other speakers revealed
that the confusion within the
party and the unexpectedly
strong open dissidence on the
part of writers and university
students which arose after the
Soviet 20th Party Congress had
frightened the regime. Vice
Premier Kopecky, for example,
informed the conference that
"great internal ferment" had
made a "tumultuous appearance"
as a result of the Soviet
congress.
Despite party promises
that the campaign to remove
the worst police excesses would
continue, Minister of the In-
terior Barak reasserted the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
"legitimate" and necessary role
of Czechoslovakia's security
organizations. The American
embassy noted that Barak's
concern with "enemies of
socialism" was as evident as
in Stalin's time.
Concessions and Reforms
Although the major empha-
sis of the conference was
placed on party control, some
limited concessions were an-
nounced. A government reorgani-
zation, involving several min-
isterial shifts, and the out-
right dismissal of Prosecutor
General Ales, Minister of Cul-
ture Stoll, and Minister of
Light Industry Malek were re-
vealed,and certain reforms in
the so-called "mass organiza-
tions," such as the youth
groups and trade unions, were
declared imminent.
BANDARANAIKE'S PERSONAL ROLE
IN CEYLON
The future stability of the
new Ceylonese government de-
pends almost entirely on the
personal strength of Prime Min-
ister Bandaranaike, among whose
supporters there are few with
political experience.
A program of extensive
administrative reforms was
detailed with major emphasis
on widespread decentralization,
greater responsibility for
lower party and government or-
gans and a substantial reduc-
tion of the administrative
structure. Three agricultural
ministries have been merged into
one, and the Food Industry and
Agricultural Procurement Minis-
tries combined. The minis-
terial level henceforth will
deal only with basic problems
of planning, investment and
technical policy. On the other
hand, factory managers will have
increased authority, including
the right to alter the enter-
prise production and financial
plans and organizational struc-
ture, within the framework of
general instructions from the
minister.
(Concurred in by ORR)
Party Support
Information available on
30 of the 37 candidates elected
to the lower house of parlia-
ment from Bandaranaike's own
Sri Lanka Freedom Party indicates
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
that 20 are under 45
years
of
age and that 13 are
under
40.
Of the 30, 12 had never run
for parliament before and only
13 had run under the Freedom
Party banner in 1952.
A considerable proportion
of the group had participated
in government only on the local
.level, e.g., as mayors, members
of municipal councils, and vil-
lage committeemen. Roughly
half of the group are landed
proprietors, seven are teachers,
and three are lawyers. At
least nine are ultranational-
istic Buddhists. The group,
which is more representative
of the people than the old-line
politicians it ousted, is drawn
primarily from agricultural
rather than industrial constit-
uencies. Seats in industrial
areas in many cases went to
leftists.
Bandaranaike's Position
Bandaranaike, who now
apparently recognizes the
magnitude of the individual
burden he bears to initiate
policy and to withstand the
pressure of the opposition,
has become in-
creasingly cau-
tious in his
statements of
intent on major
policy matters.
At the same
time, he is dis
playing some
firmness, as
demonstrated by
his willingness
to call out
army forces on
13 June to
prevent disturbances while
parliament considered the
national language bill.
Popular respect for his
firmness was indicated by the
fact that passage on 15 June
of the bill to make Sinhalese
the sole national language was
not followed by rioting such as
had occurred in Colombo and
elsewhere earlier. Passage of
the bill by 66 affirmative
votes, very nearly a two-thirds
majority of the 101-man parlia-
ment, also indicates considerable
continued overt support for the
prime minister,
Future Program
Bandaranaike's ability to
withstand continued pressure
from opposition groups and
extremists within his own
united front is not yet firmly
established. At the moment,
however, it seems likely that
he will be able to push through
his program on the next big
issues to be faced--those of
Ceylon's relationships with
Britain. Bandaranaike's press
conference on 13 June indicated
his intention to placate leftists
and nationalists by declaring
Ceylon a republic and by
reaching a "friendly arrangement"
for the elimination of British
control over military bases in
Ceylon.
At the same time, he
apparently wishes, like India
and Pakistan, to retain Common-
wealth membership. In view of
Ceylon's virtual defenselessness,
he also apparently intends to
try to keep Ceylon's over-all
defense treaty with Britain.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
ASIAN-AFRICAN
STUDENTS' CONFERENCE
The Communist drive to
completely dominate the Asian-
African Students' Conference
held in Bandung, Indonesia,
was substantially curbed in the
final sessions of the conference,
which closed on 7 June. Although
the Communists failed to achieve
their major objectives, they
are praising the conference and
attempting to capitalize on
their show of "reasonableness"
and on the theme of Asian-Afri-
can student unity against "re-
actionary forces."
The non-Communist dele-
gates, despite the lack of prep-
aration on the part of many of
them and their weak representa-
tion on the key conference com-
mittees, were able to maintain
sufficient cohesion to force
adoption of the unanimity rule
in the plenary sessions. As
a result, they blocked approval
of the most blatant Communist
proposals, including what is
believed to be their major goal
of creating permanent Asian-
African student organs. Al-
though political resolutions
in accord with the Communist
propaganda line were passed,
they were on themes to which
few Asians and Africans could
fail,to subscribe, and were
framed in such a manner as to
apply to the Communists as well
as to the West.
SECRET
While successful in be-
ginning the conference approxi-
mately on schedule and'in seat-
ing many delegations.whose
credentials were questionable,
the Communists appear to have
overplayed their hand, particu-
larly in relying on an aggres-
sive, non-student Egyptian dele-
gate to initiate some of their
principal proposals. Communist
control of the conference was
blocked principally by the
Indian,Philippine and Pakistani
delegates, supported by some
eight delegations of smaller
countries.
Despite a setback to their
major objectives, Communist
leaders at the meeting report-
edly agreed with the chief
Egyptian delegate on the desira-
bility of holding a second con-
ference in Cairo in mid-1957.
Their principal gain from the
Bundung conference will stem
from their opportunity to in-
crease contacts among student
groups. They also hope to capi-
talize on their attempt to con-
vey an impression of good will
and co-operative coexistence.
They are more effectively organ-
ized than the non-Communists to
exploit the political resolu-
tions for their own purposes,
and to play up the theme of
Asian-African student solidarity
"in the camp of peace."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE ALGERIAN MILITARY SITUATION
PART I'-- THE REBELS
The Algerian rebels' Na-
tional Liberation Army--which
may number between 20,000 and
40,000 men--has progressively
disrupted the security and
economy of much of northern Al-
geria by guerrilla operations.
The rebels obtain a large part
of their equipment locally, but
there are indications their ef-
forts to obtain arms now extend
throughout the. Near. East-and,
Europe t? "..'the western :hemisphere
and probably to Soviet bloc
countries.
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NW-0 IWO
Strength and Disposition
Estimates of the total
strength of the National Lib-
eration Army vary between the
15,000 men the French officially
acknowledge and the claim of a
rebel leader last fall that the
army would number 100,000 in a
few months. It is unlikely that
this figure has been attained
for full-time fighters, but.the
French appear to have consist-
ently underestimated the num-
bers involved. An estimate of
20,000 to 40,000 does not seem
unreasonable. Additional thou-
sands of part-time participants,
many of them recruited involun-
tarily for specific operations,
provide considerable supplemen-
tary strength.
The progressive growth of
the rebel forces is reflected
in the steady expansion of their'
areas of activity and control
since 1 November 1954. From
small beginnings in the Aures
Mountains, the nationalists now
control wide areas and have dis-
rupted the security of four large
sectors of northern Algeria.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
0
Area of rebel control
Principal area of rebel activity
] Aures-Nementcha sector
II Northeastern Constantine-Bone sector
III Kabylie sector
0
Area of relative insecurity
IV Western Oran sector
In pursuit of their ob-
jectives, the rebels have car-
ried on guerrilla operations
over a constantly expanding
area. Emerging from their in-
accessible mountain strongholds,
they have generally avoided
pitched battles with the better-
equipped French forces and con-
centrated their efforts ora dev-
astating the Algerian country-
side. Principal targets of
their attacks have been trans-
port and communications lines,
hydroelectric installations,
schools, farms, vineyards, or-
chards, livestock, and forests,
and also Moslem villages which
have withheld support or ex-
hibited "loyalist" tendencies.
In urban areas the National
Liberation Army, apparently
operating through small cells,
carries on a sporadic terrorist
campaign characterized by bombings
and assassinations. In such
activities, it has competed
and occasionally clashed with
the adherents of the Algerian
National Movement, a less ef-
fective and apparently declin-
ing rival nationalist organiza-
tion.
Equipment
The principal factor lim-
iting the rebels' capabilities
is apparently a shortage of
weapons, ammunition and other
equipment. Their materiel sit-
uation has greatly improved since
November 1954, but it remains
highly unfavorable in comparison
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with that of their well-stocked
French adversaries.
Nationalist guerrillas
are still often equipped only
with ordinary hunting rifles
and knives, but increasingly
they have been using automatic
weapons. They appear to have
sizable quantities of grenades,
some mortars, and-,a limited
amount of radio. communications
equipme.pt.' They have to rely
on animal rather. than motor
transport and lack any heavy
artillery or aircraft. Per-
haps 50 percent of rebel mili-
tary personnel are outfitted
in khaki uniforms.
Sources of,Materiel
The materiel now used by
the rebels appears to be mostly
of French, British, German or.
American manufacture. Some are
stocks abandoned by the Afrika
Korps or the Allies during
World War II. Many of the, more
modern items were captured in
raids since 1954 on French out-
posts and arms depots. Several
thousand Moslem and some Eu-
ropean'deserters from the trench
army have also brought algng
arms.
External sources of supply
have generally been regarded as
of lesser importance, quantity-
wise, than internal, but now ap-
parently are becoming more signif
icant.., The involvement of the
Arab states may increase.
Egypt has played a.promi-
nent role by providing important
services--a refuge where na-
tionalist leaders can operate
freely, training centers for
officer personnel, and signifi-
cant quantities of small arms
and ammunition, in addition to
undertaking the world propa-
ganda leadership for the na-
tionalist cause.
Nationalist leaders have
publicly announced their re-
ceptivity to arms originating
in the Soviet bloc and some may
have already been received from
this source.
the French
have claimed for some time that
Czech arms are actually being
sent through Trieste. In any
event, known arms shipments to
certain Arab states from the
Soviet bloc have increased the
capacity of those countries to
send their older Western equip-
ment to Algeria.
The nationalists may even
be tapping sources in the west-
ern hemisphere.
Most arms reaching Al-
geria from external sources
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
are brought in by camel cara-
vans following overland routes
passing through Libya and south-
ern Tunisia. Previously.limited
by the necessity for clandes-
tine arrangements in Libya,
this traffic is expected to
increase now that Libyan pre-
mier Ben Halim has confessed
his inability and unwillingness
to control it. Another, less
significant, overland route is
thought t p.beg n ii Tangier or
at points along the coast of
the former Spanish zone of Mo=
rocco and proceed thence to Al-
geria via its western frontier.
A lesser part of this con-
traband may be carried directly
to Algeria by sea and landed
along the nationalist-controlled
coastal regions of Constantine
and Bone. Small craft engaged
in this operation reportedly
set out from Egypt, and it is
possible that similar vessels
depart from northern Morocco,
Gibraltar, Malta and southern
Europe.
Moroccan-Tunisian Involvement.
Since the March cease-fire
in Morocco, the Algerian rebels
have been receiving considerable
logistical support and prob-
ably several thousand additional
fighters as well from the ir-
regular Moroccan "Army of Lib-
eration," which proclaimed
a united front with the Al-
gerian guerrillas last October.
Some aid may also be coming
from extremist Salah ben Yous-
sef's Tunisian "Liberation
Army," but this is probably more
limited because of Ben Youssef's
.open warfare against the national-
ist Tunisian government of Ha-
bib Bourghiba.'
On the official level, cir-
cumstances have dictated re-
straint, although Bourghiba's
,,.complicity.' in;;:the transit of,
arms through Tunisian territory
has been suggested. Inevitably,
however, Moroccan and Tunisian
leaders will be under increas-
ing pressure--from their own
people, from the Algerian lead-
ers and from Cairo--to demon-
strate in more effective ways
their avowed dedication to
North African nationalist soli-
darity.
The nationalists' depreda-
tions have dealt a heavy blow
to the Algerian economy: agri-
culture is languishing, important
mineral exports have been cur-
tailed, and safe travel and com-
munication are virtually restrict-
ed to air facilities. In part
of the Kabylie region, signs of
developing famine conditions
have been reported.
Some 4,000 primarily Mos-
lem civilian casualties have
been acknowledged, and this
total should probably.be expand-
ed to include a large number of
the 15,000 rebel casualties
claimed by the French. Losses
in all categories sustained by
the security forces are offi-
cially set at about 4,000, al-
ment.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 June 1956
NEW SATELLITE FIVE-MR PLANS
'52 '53 '54 '55 '56-'60
POLAND
'52 '53 '54 '55 '56260
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
shortages Will continue indef-
initely in the other Satellites:
Scheduled increases in
agricultural production range
from 22 percent in East Germany
to 30 percent in Czechoslovakia
on the basis of increased mech-
anization and larger supplies
of fertilizer. However, an
accelerated collectivization
campaign may slow agricultural
growth; Hungary, Czechoslovakia
and Rumania] with less than 40
percent of their arable land
now under state control, plan
to socialize more than half
the remaining land by the end
of 1957. The collectivization
campaigns can hardly be under-
taken without resort to coercion
and further alienation of the
peasantry.
Role of CEMA
The newly revitalized
Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance, in an effort to
integrate the new five-year
plans more fully than had been
done in the past, is seeking
to reduce overlapping of produc-
tion and competition in foreign
trade. It has called on East
Germany to concentrate on coke,
lignite, precision equipment
and chemicals; Bulgaria on ag-
riculture; Poland on hard coal
and heavy machinery; Hungary on
'52 '53 '54 '55 '56=60
HUNGARY
SECRET
The Eastern European
Satellites' Second Five-Year
Plans (1956-60) provide for in-
creasing the investment in ag-
riculture and consumer goods
industries. Heavy industry,
however, will continue to hold
first priority.
Industrial Production Goals
Industrial output is
scheduled to grow at a fairly
high rate during the next five
years but more slowly than in
the past. In most Satellites,
heavy industry is scheduled to
increase production by about
60-70 percent. Capital goods
industries will have first
priority, but fuel and power
production, disproportionately
lagging in the past, will be
boosted considerably.
The planned increases of
about 40 to 50 percent in con-
sumer goods output should sub-
stantially raise the standard
of living. Real income of the
population is scheduled to rise
25 to 30 percent.
rationing is still in effect in $ aluminum; Rumania on oil; and Czech-
Albania and East Germany and food oslovakia on general engineering.
Agricultural Goals
Food shortages, however,
more than shortages of manufac-
tured consumer goods have ac-
counted for the general dissatis
faction of the populace. Food
NOUNCED RATES OF SATELLITE INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
'52 '53 '54 '55 '56-'60 RUMANIA
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Foreign Trade
The Satellite foreign trade
policy during the next five
years will stress an increased
exchange with.Middle Eastern and
Asian countries.
Aside from political ad-
vantages, the opening of these
markets to'bloc products and
the acquisition of new sources
of raw material will consider-
ably benefit countries like
Hungary which have critical
foreign exchange problems.
Czechoslovakia has already under-
taken industrial construction
in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Af-
ghanistan and India, and will
probably continue to lead the
Satellites in this kind of
activity.
ETHIOPIA, A MAJOR TARGET OF THE COMMUNISTS' AFRICAN CAMPAIGN
Ethiopia has become a major
target in the Communists' attempt
to penetrate tropical Africa.
The latest overtures by the
Soviet bloc and Communist China
have taken advantage of Ethio-
pia's dissatisfaction with the
amount of Western aid it has
been receiving..
The Soviet legation in
Addis Ababa was raised to an
embassy on 2 June. Its hospital
and permanent cultural exhibit
have been considered centers
of Communist activity, and many
observers believe they direct
all Communist activities in
Africa. Since March the ac-
tivities of the mission have
increased, the caliber of per-
sonnel improved, and an assist-
ant military attachd has been
added to the staff. A Czech
legation was established in
Addis Ababa last year.
Czech Economic Approaches
Economic activity--spear-
headed by the Czechs--has been
the main tactic used in pene-
trating Ethiopia. A six-member
Czech trade delegation arrived
in Addis Ababa in February 1955,
traveled extensively throughout
the country, and offered key
individuals deals involving
sugar factory machinery and
equipment for a cotton spinning
plant. Both reportedly were
rejected. In December, however,
the delegation negotiated an
agreement for the shipment of
Soviet petroleum to Ethiopia in
Rumanian ships for the equiva-
lent of about $3,000,000. No
shipments are known to have been
SECRET
Labor Productivity
The success of the five-
year-plans depends on a major
increase in labor productivity.
This factor is to account for 66
percent of the planned increase
in industrial output for Hungary,
90 percent for Czechoslovakia and
75 percent for Rumania.
pared by ORR)
Since reliance can no longer
be placed on large transfers of
labor from agriculture to indus-
try, the lion's share of invest-
ment will be directed to mechani-
zation and modernization of
existing plants rather than new
construction. Training of workers
is also to play an important role
in increasing output. Special
attention will be given to the
electronics industry because of
its importance for mechanization
and automation. (Pre- 25X1
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SECRET
Now
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
made. An Ethiopian-Czech agree-
ment concluded last April pro-
vides for the exchange of com-
mercial products.
Czechoslovakia's economic
interest was also demonstrated
by its large exhibit at the
Silver Jubilee fair in Addis
Ababa in November 1955, which
was described
as out of all propor-
tion to its possible commercial
Soviet Deals
The Soviet Union entered
the economic field in early
1956 with small-scale contracts
with Ethiopian importers of
cement and coal. In March it
reportedly offered $150,000,000
to Ethiopia for large-scale
hydroelectric and irrigation
projects. This offer has not
been accepted and Ethiopia is
unlikely to accept such aid.
This latest Soviet ges-
ture coincided with a period
of sharp Ethiopian dissatis-
faction with Egypt's apparent
success in securing offers of
international financial aid for
the Aswan High Dam. Ethiopia
was embittered because it.had
not been consulted about the
use of the Nile River water and
felt that Egypt's neutralism
had been rewarded while its
own stanch pro-Western stand
had gone unrewarded. Addis
Ababa considers Cairo its chief
rival because of conflicting
Nile River interests and be-
cause of Egypt's activity among
the Moslems of Eritrea and the
Somalilands.
Cultural Offensive
A Communist cultural of-
fensive was launched in April
when a75-member Communist Chi-
nese theatrical troupe gave
several performances in Addis
Ababa before some 12,000 per-
sons including most high-rank-
ing government officials. The
program was well suited to local
tastes and was considered by
American officials to have been
the most popular cultural event
in Addis Ababa in several years.
Ethiopians of pro-American
sentiment reported that the per-
formances generated a feeling
of friendship for the Chinese
Communists which had been lack-
ing since the Korean war.
A Czech string quartet
also gave several concerts in
the capital and a Soviet ballet
troupe was expected later. On
6 June, the Ethiopian soccer
team left for a month's visit
to the USSR. On the same day
press sources reported that
Moscow had invited Ethiopian
government journalists to tour
the USSR as guests.
Subversive Activity
The Communists' subversive
activity has been limited largely
to the distribution of propaganda
material, particularly to the
Greek and Armenian communities.
The present political and social
situation, with Emperor Haile
Selassie in tight control of
the illiterate and politically
SECRET
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
apathetic population, affords
Moscow little opportunity to
create dissidence.
The situation is likely
to change greatly, however, on
his death. Then, the expected
rivalry of royal factions, the
clash between reactionary Coptic
Church leaders and the few lib-
eral administrators, the hatred.
between Christian rulers and
Moslem-pagan conquered peoples,
and the loose control of the
central government over outlying
provinces will furnish the Com-
munists an opportunity to.use
cliques, rebellions and reli-
gious hatreds to expand their
influence.
SECRET
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