CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9
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February 4, 2005
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May 23, 1957
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SUMMARY
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Approved For Lease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-009271200100001-9 CONFIDENTIAL ~Ea~Rfi (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY g UMEN1 NO, _.:.---- NO CHANGE IN CL ASS, f~ C3 L1ECLASSIFtED Ga.As's? GHANGEO TO: AtiTTt W 7a' 23 May 1957 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 25X1 COPY NO. 17 OCI NO.2689/57 State Department review completed Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 Approved Foelease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00901200100001-9 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 Approved Forlease 2005/0JN"Ft?rz4u"VP79-00927,1200100001-9 CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 T H E W E E K I N B R I E F OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST THE FRENCH CABINET CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 The urgency of the financial question over which Premier Mollet fell on 21 May places the French assembly under con- siderable pressure to approve a new cabinet quickly. Never- theless, the complete absence of any clear alternative to Mollet's 16-month-old minority government ma result in a prolonged cabinet crisis. NOTES AND COMMENTS INDONESIA . Page 1 Tension remains high in the non-Javanese provinces of Indonesia, while central government officials in Djakarta are sharpI nd my divided on how to end provincial di ection. Prime Minister Djuanda has ad- vocated a more conciliatory policy than Sukarno's and, as a result, has been publicly opposed by his own deputy prime minister and in one instance overruled by the army chief of staff. THE SUEZ ISSUE . . s . Page 2 The UN Security Council debate on Suez ended on 21 May without any action, but the council remains seized of the question. Israel may soon test canal passage, and could do so with little or no advance notice. THE SYRIAN SITUATION . . . . . 0 . . , a . . . , , . . Page 03 Two weeks after the rightist defeat in the parlia- mentary by-elections, political events in Syria show further encroachment by leftists in the government and army. The country remains in a state of limited martial law, and open criticism of the government may soon be silenced. Foreign and domestic policy follow extreme leftist lines, and attacks on the United'States are in- creasing in frequency and bitterness. CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 25X1 25X1 i Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 THE WEEK IN BRIEF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 25X1 ADENAUER'S WASHINGTON VISIT . . . . . .., . . . . . . . . Page 4 Chancellor Adenauer is scheduled to begin his Washing- ton talks on 27 May at a time when West Germany is in the midst of a lively debate over disarmament and European security arrangements. The approaching Bundestag elec- tions will make Adenauer unusually eager to demonstrate an identity of views with American leaders, since the opposition Social Democratic Party would exploit any SOVIET THREATS AGAINST ATOMIC ARMS FOR. WEST GERMANY . . . Page a The USSR's diplomatic warnings to Bonn that grave consequences are inherent in arming West German forces with nuclear weapons apparently are being supplemented by, planted reports that Moscow will not tolerate such a move and is prepared to take military action to prevent it. These warnings, taking advantage of the nuclear arms controversy in West Germany, have been accompanied by hints that the USSR would make concessions on reuni- fication if Bonn would withdraw from NATO. The Soviet Union made similar threats of military action in late 1954,, when it was trying to block ratification of the Paris agreements bringing West Germany into NATO. GOMULKA GAINS SUPPORT AT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING . . . . Page 6 The Polish Communist central committee closed its ninth session on 18 May with a resolution reaffirming Gomulka's "October" program and the principles of Polish independence within the Soviet bloc enunciated in Gomulka's 15 May keynote speech. Although deep factional cleavages within the party have not been healed, Gomulka's firm policy statement, after six months of uncertainties and lack of control at the lower party levels, will probably win substantial support from the broad mass of hitherto uncommitted party functionaries. Approved For ease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927Af1200100001-9 SECRET SOVIET-MONGOLIAN ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . Page 8 The Soviet-Mongolian communique issued in Moscow on 14 May itemizing new Soviet aid to Outer Mongolia marks another step in Moscow's policy of maintaining a major voice in Mongolian affairs while avoiding the appearance of direct control typical of the Stalin era. Moscow has agreed to turn over control of the petroleum industry and mineral ex- ploitation and to provide financial assistance for Mongolia's three-year plan, which begins next year. Peiping apparently is not contesting the continued dependence of Outer Mengolia on Soviet economic assistance and has hailed the agreements as indicating the existence of a "new equality and mutual " assistance between a large and small country. SECRET ii Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 THE WEEK IN BRIM' 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Raeease 2005/0 J4C.CCIAA-RDP79-00927 1200100001-9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 25X1 25X1 25X1 NORTH VIETNAM'S LAND REFORM POLICY MISCARRIES . . . . . . Page 9 The North Vietnam government's vacillating land re- form policy is creating dissatisfaction and confusion among the peasantry. The regime is welshing on its promises to restore to small independent peasants land taken away from them during.the land reform campaign of 1954-56. Some members of the party district and village committees have resigned in protest over this zigzag policy. Catholics, a large minority in North Vietnam, are among the most vocal critics. LAOS . . . . . . . . . -a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10 Premier Souvanna Phouma probably will remain in office and will be given a fresh opportunity to settle the Pathet Lao problem. Souvanna is planning to make the Pathets a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer of a coalition government in return for promises of submission to the royal govern- ment's authority. The Pathets are unlikely to give these 25X1 guarantees, but will probably seek to prolong ne in order-to further their subversive activities. 25X1 THE SITUATION IN HAITI . . , . . Page 10 A military government seized power in Haiti on 21 May but may have difficulty maintaining control, particularly if there is a general strike. Despite an early announce- ment that the army unanimously supports the chief of staff, who engineered the bloodless coup, a serious rift may exist ARGENTINA CONCERNED OVER PERON'S ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . Page 11 Argentina's provisional government believes that Peron, now in Venezuela, is a threat to its stability as long as he remains in the hemisphere, but efforts to have him ousted have failed. Peronista exiles, especially in the five coun- tries neighboring Argentina, are engaged in propaganda beamed at Ar entina eanw e, a new upsurge in army dissen- sion as resu a in the arrest of the arm commander in chief and 20 officers. SECRET iii Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For I ase 20058E RE DP79-00927AQ1200100001-9 23 May 1957 BURMESE GOVERNMENT MAY NEGOTIATE WITH INSURGENT COMMUNISTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 Despite continued official insistence on uncon- ditional surrender of the insurgent Burma Communist Party, the Burmese government is reported divided on the question of a settlement. It seems only a question of time before some kind of negotations are begun. The campaign of the insurgent Communists to achieve legal status is being supported by other Communist groups and pro-Communist mem- bers of the Burmese parliament. 25X1 FOOD SHORTAGE POSES THREAT TO EAST PAK[STAN GOVERNMENT . . Page 14 Rapidly rising food prices in East Pakistan in recent weeks have endangered the provincial government, which is led by the eastern branch of Prime Minister Subrawardy's Awami League. A similar food crisis in 1956 was an impor- tant factor in the downfall of the previous East Pakistan government, and a repetition could threaten Suhrawardy's central government coalition. The central government is unlikely to secure the rice it needs from Southeast Asia, and may make an urgent request for additional American assistance. F-- I CYPRUS 00006 . . . 000*** Page 14 Greece continues to seek American intervention to break the deadlock over Cyprus and hopes continued quiet on the island will induce the British to reopen negotiations with Archbishop Makarios. Britain hopes discussions on the inter- national status of Cyprus will be initiated within the NATO framework before it begins negotiations with the Cypriots on self-government. NATO's Secretary General Spaak has already begun informal consultations with the permanent represent- atives of Britain, Greece, and Turkey. NEW ITALIAN CABINET . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 The Christian Democratic minority government of Adone Zoli may depend on the "benevolent abstention" of some of the small parties when it seeks parliamentary confirmation on 29 May, but its chances are at present rated fairly good. Zoli reportedly is working out a program that might give his government more than "caretaker" status. JAPANESE CONSERVATIVES PLAN CRACKDOWN ON LEFTIST LABOR UNION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16 The ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, under the guidance of Prime Minister Kishi's cabinet, is planning a new labor pro- gram which would curb the political power of the leftist Japan General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo), but would also "include " progressive" features designed to have wide popular appeal. h T e government has strong popular support,for its program. SGT iv 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Fffease 2005/0`&I1 P79-00927200100001-9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 SOUTH KOREAN ARMED FORCES COMMAND CHANGES . . . . . . . . Page 17 The sweeping command changes in the South Korean armed forces recently announced by President Rhee were probably initiated to reduce factionalism, to improve morale and efficiency, and to assure delivery.of the mili- taryvote to the Liberal Party in the 1958 assembly elec- tions. The changes are not likely to affect the combat capability of the armed forces and do not foreshadow preparations for a "march north." PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE USSR . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 The Soviet leaders, moving away from the arbitrariness of the Stalin era, are attempting, by encouraging public discussion, to enlist popular support for the solution of complex and pressing domestic problems. Since 1953, when a public examination of "contradictions" in Soviet society was officially sanctioned, these discussions have been marked by increasing boldness and candlor, culminating this year in a frank airing of domestic problems and short- comings in the Soviet Communist Party press. In order to keep these discussions under control, the regime finds it necessary continually o redefine the limits of criticism. 25X1 25X6 SECRET v Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 THE WEEK IN BRIEF V Approved For lease 200,SIJ '-RDP79-009277001200100001-9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 25X1 25X1 DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN SPAIN . . . . Page 3 The severe inflation in Spain is causing increasing dissatisfaction with Franco's regime even among the groups that have supported him in the past. The Falange has been weakened by disaffection within its ranks, and elements of the church are moving to dissociate themselves from the regime. In view of his skill in playing one group against another and his ability to suppress overt opposition, Franco probably is in no immediate danger. However, his position is less secure than in the past. MAO TSE-TUNG'S UNPUBLISHED SPEECHES Mao Tse-tung, in two speeches on :27 February and 12 March, which have not yet been published, stated in Marxist terms that differences or "contradictions" existed in China between the populace and the Communist leaders which might lead to strife if left to be handled by bureaucratic means. He emphasized that these differences were reconcilable and advocated persuasion rather. than force to resolve them. Moscow will find Mao's doctrines generally acceptable, al- though Soviet leaders have some reservations about their application. Polish leader Gomulka has endorsed the doc- trines but has made clear'that he i d mit their appli- cation in Poland. SECRET vi Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 THE WEEK IN BRIEF Page 11 25X1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEE]KLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 THE FRENCH CABINET CRISIS The urgency of the finan- cial question over which Premier Mollet fell on 21 May places the French assembly under con- siderable pressure to approve a new cabinet quickly. Never- theless the complete absence of any clear alternative.to Mollet's 16-month-old minority government may result in a pro- longed cabinet crisis. President Coty's consulta- tions with party leaders for a successor are complicated by the fragmented nature of the National Assembly, which gives Mollet's 100 Socialist deputies virtually a veto power on any new coalition. There are re- ports that the Socialists hope for a long crisis which might facilitate Mollet's eventual Approved For VWleas DAENIS79-00927M1 200100001-9 FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PARTY STRENGTH IN LEGISLATURE PROGRESSIVES (1 VACANCY) return with a broadened coali- tion. The Independent-Peasant bloc heartened by its success in recent by-elections and its improved tactical position in the assembly--has added to the pressure by calling for a non- Communist National Union govern- ment and by claiming that it could block the formation of a new government. France's worsening finan- cial situation and the continu- ing Algerian problem, however, create counterpressures for a speedy solution to the cabinet crisis. The country's liquid assets are almost exhausted, and early assembly approval is needed to release Bank of France gold and dollar reserves. New taxes and budgetary economies SOCIAL REPUBLICANS 74 INDEPENDENTS POPULAR 87 PEASANTS POUJADISTS REPUBLICANS INDEPENDENTS AND SOCIAL 39 UNAFFILIATED ACTION PEASANTS 52 36 $ ENT ~ONFF~L ;i;i1w Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 2 45 13;13 RADICAL SOCIALISTs t 0 f l-- f N 0 O IIUIZ X I-10 IN IH O I I OVERSEAS 25X1 Approved ForIease 2005g;RDP79-009271200100001-9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 are essential, but the assembly will prefer goals limited to getting "France?s house in or- der"' before external aid is re- quested. These pressures could lead the assembly to decide on an interim premier. Outgoing Min- ister of Justice Francois Mit- terrand and ex-premier Rend Pleven, both of the small Re- sistance Union Party, are now spoken of as possible.eariy compromise choices. Their parity has worked with both the Independents and the Socialists, and on the Algerian issue both have adopted a position which could be expected to have broad support. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 2 25X1 Approved For Fase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A 200100001-9 _ Y 0*M?iR Yf T i AL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 NOTES AND COMMENTS' Tension remains high in the non-Javanese provinces of Indonesia, while central gov- ernment officials in Djakarta are sharply and openly divided on how to end provincial dis- affection. In his first appearance before parliament since he as- sumed office in April, Prime Minister Djuanda stated on 17 May that relations with the provinces must be readjusted, and that he intends to meet provincial demands as far as is possible. Having just visited East Indonesia, Djuanda advised against the removal of the area commander, Lt. Col. Samual, as unlikely to improve the situation, j INDOCHINA SOUT SUMATSiA REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA Disaffected provinces Provinces under central government L 24474 Djuanda's deputy prime minister, Hardi of the National Party, declared the same day, however, that he did not favor compromise with the provinces. On 18 May, the army announced the relief of Samual, on orders of Chief of Staff Iasution. Although President Sukarno did not become publicly involved in either issue, he undoubtedly approved the actions of both Hardi and Nasution. Samual is unlikely to obey the order relieving him and re- portedly has stated that he would arrest Nasution if he should come to East Indonesia. More- over, the Nasution-Djuanda dis- pute over Samual will be inter- preted in the provinces as proof CONFIDENTIAL tom' HAI.MAHFRA 1 t EAST INDONESIA Western New Guinea Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 18 Approved For F ase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A 200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 that conciliatory forces in Djakarta are in the minority, and that Djuanda will be over- ruled whenever his policies conflict with -Sukarno's.. In Central Sumatra, a series of public gatherings held to honor several distin- guished visitors--including former vice president Hatta, Masjumi chairman Natsir, and police chief Sukanto--have highlighted regional determina- tion to maintain an autonomous position. The greatest enthu- siasm was noted at a rally honoring Hatta. Hatta strongly supported provincial demands and warned Djakarta that pre- vailing political strife could lead to anarchy. He tempered his support, however, by stating that regional activity was not "separatist" in nature but was a movement aimed at "the development of the whole Indo- The UN Security Council debate on Suez ended on 21 May without any action, but the council remains seized of the question. Israel may soon test canal passage, and could do so with little or no advance.notice. French foreign minister Pineau expressed gratification at the course of the two-day debate on Egypt's canal declara- tion, called at France's re- quest. Without introducing any resolution that might have strained other members' sup- port of France, Pineau gained general reaffirmation of the French view that Egypt's declara- tion is inadequate. The parliamentary defeat of the Mollet government, whose leaders felt committed to main- tain France's intransigent policy toward.. Egypt, may open the way to early French resump- PART II nesiLan archipelago." Hatta's support probably will be used by Sumatran leaders in an ef- fort to promote a return to "federalism. " Meanwhile, the central government's increasing economic difficulties have stimulated rumors of rupiah devaluation. Inflation has been a chronic problem in Indonesia, but has become noticeably worse in re- cent: months, with money in cir- culation having reached the highest recorded level since independence. Contributing to the government's economic woes are decreased revenue resulting from the establishment of di- rect, trade between outlying provinces and foreign ports and a greatly increased budgetary deficit caused by the recent al- location-of funds for economic develo ment in the provinces. tion of use of the canal. Any candidate for premier who an- nounced himself favorable to such a policy would attract sup- port, particularly from the right. Even before Mollet's fall, French shipping companies reportedly were planning on the assumption that the boycott would be rescinded after the Security Council debate. Mollet's defeat appears also to have reduced prospects for all-out French support of any Israeli effort to send a ship through the canal. Britain is following up its agreement with Egypt on payment for use of the canal with wider economic talks be- ginning 23 May--a development which is being exploited by a press-and-wbispering campaign begun in normally anti-Western quarters in Beirut to suggest SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 NOiTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 18. 25X1 Approved For Lease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0092701200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 that a general British-Egyptian rapprochement is taking place at the expense of the United States and France. British officials in the past week have indicated no hurry to re- establish diplomatic relations with Cairo, and say that London hopes to negotiate a long-term settlement with "an Egyptian government," but not now. The Israelis are continu- ing their psychological war- fare campaign on the Suez is- sue. Although Israeli ambassa- dor Eban last week stated offi- cially that Israel had no present plans for making a test of its right to use the canal, the Israeli embassy in Paris is briefing selected corre ,spondents to tiie effect that a ship is now being readied for such a test. Israel is trying by these means to keep this question of its rights alive, and possibly also to provoke Egypt into making a bellicose gesture or statement which would give the Israelis a dip- lomatic advantage. Israel appears to be pur- suing somewhat similar tactics with regard to a test of the Tiran Strait. and the Gulf of Aqaba. Press reports, origi- nating with Israeli sources, have alleged that the Israeli- flag vessel Atlit, which is en route to Eilat around Africa, left Djibouti in French Somali- land on 20 May. Lloyd's, how- ever, has reported that the ves- sel only left Durban, South Africa, on 18 May, and it is now estimated that the Atlit will not arrive at Eilat until between 7 and 17 June. The Egyptians have made no clear public statement as to what their response to Israeli test attempts would be. Egypt apparently is still relying on the Saudis to meet the Israeli challenge on the Aqaba issue, since no statements on this have appeared. If the Saudis allow an Israeli ship to pass the Tiran Strait, Nasr might seek to use this fact to damage Saud's standing in Aralb eyes. Two weeks after the right- ist defeat in the parliamentary by-elections, political.. events in Syria show further encroach- ment by leftists in the govern- ment and army, the American embassy in Damascus reports. The country remains under a state of limited martial law, and open criticism of the gov- ernment may soon be silenced. Pro-Western and moderate ele- ments are continually losing ground to the leftist Baath and Communist forces. Foreign and domestic policy follow ex- treme leftist lines.,and attacks on the United States are increas- ing in frequency and bitterness. The Soviet Union is constantly being promoted as the protector in military, economic, and polit- ical affairs. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Transfers and proposed trans- fers of army officers, some of 25X1 there for training in Moscow, have increased tension within political and army circles. SECRET Approved For Releas 0 02/14 : C A-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 PART. I I T AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 18 25X Approved For lease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0092701200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 The disorganized but vocal opposition continues its strong criticism of government policy, to':little avail. The conserva- tives have .fallen back on their old tendency to blame their election defeat'on external circumstances rather than their own lack of unity and organiza- tion. The Nationalist Party is split into-rightist and leftist factions and has suffered the loss of several leaders who have resigned from the party in dis- gust. The acceptance of an invitation by Sheik Mustafa Sibai, Moslem Brotherhood lead- er and defeated rightist candi- date, to visit Moscow is an in- dication of Soviet influence. Visits by conservative leaders to Cairo show the extent of 25X1 Egyptian prestige. ADENAUER'S WASHINGTON VISIT Chancellor Adenauer is scheduled to begin his Washing- ton talks on 27 May at a time when West Germany is in the midst of a lively debate over disarmament and European secu- -- rtty arrangements and when many Germans believe American policy toward Europe is undergoing a change. The approaching Bun- destag elections will make Ade- nauer unusually eager to demon- strato an identity of views with American leaders, since the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) would exploit any appearance of differences. The West Germans have been agitated by press reports that Washington plans a demilitarized zone "from France to Estonia" without German unification. These reports moved the SPD to charge that Adenauer's policies were "thoroughly compromised" and would collapse. Even after Secretary Dulles' press state- ment on 14 May opposing any military arrangement in Europe based on Germany?s partition, only Adenauer's Christian Dem- ocratic Union (CDC) was osten- sibly convinced that no Amer- ican policy change.was in pros- pect. While Adenauer and other Bonn officials steadily in- sisted that a general disarma- ment agreement must include provisions for unification, their attitude has not crystal- lized in respect to limited agreement. On 15 May the chan- cellor endorsed the idea of a "test tube" arms inspection area in :Europe, referred to by Pres- ident Eisenhower on 8 May, but emphasized that Soviet forces in :East Germany should come under such inspection. In general, Adenauer evi- dently believes that the West SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 18 25X1 Approved For Fase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A4200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 Germans regard the Soviet po- sition on German matters as so hopeless that they will de- mand no major shift in Western policy. Responding to what seems to be a public demand for "reasonable flexibility, however, Adenauer has twice recently offered to renounce military use of the East .zone upon German unification. German public opinion con- tinues to give Adenauer trouble on the question of nuclear weap- ons for the Bundeswehr. The. latest opinion poll shows that 72 percent of the people are opposed to its having such weapons and 77 percent are op- posed to the stationing of atomic weapons in',the Federal Republic. While in the period before the election the government will emphasize its desire for dis- armament, it probably holds to its public position of early spring that eventually the Bundeswehr must have atomic arms if other "fourth powers" do. SOVIET THREATS AGAINST ATOMIC The USSR's diplomatic warnings to Bonn that grave consequences are inherent in arming West German forces with nuclear weapons apparently are being supplemented by planted reports that Moscow will not tolerate such a move and is prepared to take military action to prevent it. These warnings, taking advantage of the nuclear arms controversy in West Germany, have been accompanied by pri- vate hints that the USSR would make concessions on reunifica- tion if Bonn would withdraw from NATO. The planted reports are intended to reinforce the warn- ings in Moscow's 27 April note to Bonn that arming the BundesL wehr with nuclear weapons would expose West Germany to a "terrible danger," would strike an "irreparable blow" at re- unification prospects, and would trigger an atomic arms race in Europe in which the Soviet bloc would take "appro- priate measures" to strengthen its defenses. These activities are remi- niscent of the Communist decep- tion campaign in late 1954 de- signed to block ratification of the Paris agreements which brought West Germany into NATO. At that time, Moscow sought to SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 18 25X1 25X1 Approved For Fase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A1200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957' arouse public alarm in Western Europe by circulating reports and rumors of imminent Soviet military action and general war. While the immediate aim might be to forestall atomic armament of the new West German forces, the USSR may also seek to exploit both Germany's basic revulsion at the prospect of nuclear warfare and its desire for reunification, to further the standing Soviet objective of increasing popular opposition to German membership in NATO. Moscow has continued to hint that it is preparing new pro- posals which will open the way to reunification. Warsaw pact without demanding dissolution of NATO or the with- drawal of NATO forces from Ger- many, if West Germany would leave NATO and restrict itself to greatly limited forces with only. conventional. weapons. West Germany cou preserve its connections with the West. The USSR, under this plan, would withdraw all but a token force from East Germany and push for German reunification on the basis of the latest East German proposal for a German federation. 411011ows ie generai ine taken by Alexandr Alexandrov, first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Bonn, in talks with West German politi- cians last February and March in which he hinted that Moscow might propose that the four powers call on the two German governments to announce their readiness to withdraw from the Warsaw pact and NATO and con- sult on drafting an all-German constitution. GOMULKA GAINS SUPPORT AT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING The Polish Communist cen- tral committee closed its ninth session on 18 May with a resolu- tion reaffirming Gomulka's "October" program and the princi- ples of Polish independence with- in the Soviet bloc enunciated in Gomulka's 15 May.keynote speech. Although the deep factional cleavageswithin`.the party have not been healed, Gomulka's statement of a firm policy, after six months of uncertain- ties and lack of control at the lower party levels, will probably win him substantial support from the broad mass of uncommitted party functionaries. The final resolution, while clearly demanding full respect for Poland's national sovereignty and its own forms of building socialism, specifically renounced "national Communism" and pledged no revival of bourgeois charac- teristics. It also expressly reaffirmed Poland's ties with the Soviet Union and branded as "false pretense" those claiLms voiced by members of the Stalinist Natolin faction that "the policy of the party leads to the weakening of the alliance with the USSR." Although the resolution contained strong denunciation SECRET 25X1 125X1 1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 6 of 18 Approved For Fease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A1200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 of extremist views on both sides, it cited liberal tenden- cies as representing the great- est danger to socialism. Party members guilty of either fac- tionalism or the public expres- sion of opposition to party policies were warned that they could be expelled for such activity. Franciszek Mazur--hitherto regarded as a leader of the Stalinist wing--reportedly pro- vided one of the dramatic mo- ments of the meeting by pro- claiming his loyalty to Gomulka's October program. This move, coupled with broad Soviet public- ity given to Gomulka's keynote speech, suggest Soviet endorse- ment of Gomulka's continued leadership of the Polish party. Mazur's gesture reportedly fol- lowed a bitter factional strug- gle in which Gomulka was sup- ported by former party chief Ochab, and in which virtually every aspect of the October program came under criticism by the Natolinists. Two of Gomulka's closest collaborators, Zenon Kliszko and politburo member Jerzy Morawski, were nominated for secretaryships in the central committee. The Natolin faction apparently did not even attempt a nomination of one of their number. Ochab was relieved from his post as secretary,fr.eeing him to concen- trate his efforts on ;the keSr.tasks of agricultural reforms. His removal does not appear to have been a demotion. A special resolution con- demning past security police activities placed the responsi- bility for them on former politburo member Jakub Berman and former security minister Stanislaw Radkiewicz and ousted both from the party, though it stated that neither of them was aware of these excesses. The real blame was leveled at former Security Ministry officials, including Swiatlo. policies. Gomulka has probably,strength- ened his position by winning broader support from the center" of the party. The extremist wings within the party, however, probably continue strongly to oppose his program. A party congress has been called for December, and Gomulka will probably take strong measures prior to the meeting against anyone who openly opposes his SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 18 25X1 Approved For Fease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A'1200100001-9 SECRET 23 May 1957 The Soviet-Mongolian com- muniqud'`issued in Moscow on 14 May itemizing new Soviet aid to Outer Mongolia marks another. step in Moscow's policy of maintaining a major voice in Mongolian. affairs while avoiding the appearance of direct control typical of the Stalin era. At the same time, it apparently attempts to. bolster Outer Mon- golia's claim to UN membership as a fully sovereign state. Moscow has agreed to turn over control of the petroleum industry and the mineral ex- ploitationcompany and to pro- vide 200,000,000 rubles in financial assistance for Mon- golia's three-year plan, which begins next year. Peiping, which has hailed the agreements as in- dicating the existence ofa "new equality and mutual assistance" between a large and small coun- try, apparently is not contest- ing the continued dependence of Outer Mongolia on Soviet economic assistance. The communique notes that Moscow had already made avail- able to Outer Mongolia 900,000- 000 rubles ($225,000,000 at the official exchange rate) in the past ten years, and had turned over to it control of its bank- ing apparatus and certain rail-. road facilities. Although China in recent years has increased its partici- pation in the development of Outer Mongolia's economy, it has contributed considerably less than the USSR. The only loan Peiping is known to have extended, announced in August 1956, consists of the equivalent of $40,000,000 and covers the years 1956-59. The money is being used to build small in- dustrial plants, and,according to Ulan Bator radio, "thousands of Chinese workers" are giving direct assistance in the de- velopment of industry and agri- culture. Communist China's improved standing in Outer Mongolia is indicated by the recent reshuf- fling of Mongolia's representa- tion in Peiping. The former Mongolian ambassador has been recalled to Ulan Bator to take up the post of vice minister of foreign affairs. The new ambassador is a man of consider- ably more prestige and was previously a vice premier. While there may be some truth in rumors that the Chinese Communist leaders are disturbed over the continued dependence of Outer Mongolia on Soviet economic assistance, Peiping is not in a position to contest Soviet predominance in the coun- try at this time. Actually, Peiping has a genuine interest in seeing economic development take place in Outer Mongolia and has praised Soviet efforts along these lines. The Chinese apparently co-operated with the Russians and Mongolians in planning and achieving the rapid completion of the Trans-Mon- golian Railroad, which has shortened the Moscow-Peiping run by 715 miles, facilitating Sino-Soviet trade. The Chinese Communists continue to support the Kremlin's efforts,to portray Outer Mongolia as a sovereign state. F- I (Con- curred in by ORR) SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART I I NOTES AND COMMENTS. Page 8 of 18 Approved For Rase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A200100001-9 SECRET . CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 NORTH VIETNAM'S LAND REFORM POLICY MISCARRIES The North Vietnam govern- ment's vacillating land reform policy is creating dissatis- faction and confusion among the peasantry. The regime is welshing on its promises to restore to small independent peasants land taken away from them during the land reform cam- paign of 1954-56. Some mem- bers of the party district and village committees have re- signed in protest over this zigzag policy. As a result of popular re- vulsion against the violence and other excesses of party workers in the land reform: campaign, an "error-correction" program was inaugurated last fall. The party workers' bias in favor of the poorest peas- ants.~ during land reform had led to the dispossession not only of the larger landowners but also of many peasants own- ing and tilling small sections of land who were misclassified as landlords. At the same time, estimates of normal crop yields had been set unreason; ably high to increase the-tax burden on the peasants. Many of the party workers themselves became unsympathetic to party directives and were expelled from the party for failing to display the requisite zeal: Hanoi's efforts beginning last fall to correct the situa- tion did not have the desired effect of relaxing tensions in the countryside. The main ob- stacle was resentment on the part of the'poor.peasants' who received land in the original land reform program. The Hanoi party press last month noted that "individuals who were awarded land during agrarian reform" and participated in the denunciation of landholders are afraid that they now must give up part of their property. Faced with the possibil- ity of losing support of the poor, peasants, the Hanoi regime has shifted ground again and has begun to renege on its "error-correction" campaign. In February the restoration of property to former owners was ordered suspended, and today the regime is emphasizing the need to "rely completely on the poor peasants" in determining the reclassification of land- lorcls--a development which will presumably preserve for the poor peasants most of their gains under land reform. This new shift in land policy has evoked renewed crit- icism of the regime from the dispossessed small landowners who had hoped to get their property back. Catholics, a large minority in North Viet- nam, appear to be among the most vocal critics. After several riots occurred last gall, principally instigated by Catholics in rural areas, Hanoi pursued a policy of con- ciliation toward the Catholics. Now, however, individual priests are being denounced in the press, and the church is accused of "engaging in political activi- ties prejudicial to the policy of the state and the laws of the country." Although Hanoi would prob- ably like to scrap its error- correction program entirely, the regime sees a political need to appease small landowners and so is continuing the program in name at least. It is in- 25X1 creasingly nervous, however, about the effect of its Poli- cies on rural morale. 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 18 Approved For Fase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 LAOS The preponderance of evi- dence indicates that there will be no early government crisis in Laos and.that Premier Souvan- na Phouma will be given afresh opportunity to settle the Pathbt is Lao problem, This development is due primarily to the fact that no Other Laotian political leader is capable of mustering sufficient support in the Na- tional Assembly to replace Souvanna: Souvanna, who is display- ing renewed confidence, is pre- paring to reveal to thbe. recently reconvened'National Assembly.a "new" plan for a "final" round of negotiations aimed at a settlement with the Pathet Lao. He has indicated that hbc~in- tends to make a "take-it-or- leave-it" offer of a coalition government in return for firm guarantees of Pathet submission to central authority. The prospects are that the assembly, anxious for peace and unity, will,support Souvanna's "new" approach.. The deputies, however, seem to be increasingly aware of the- Communist-orienta-tion of the Pathet ' Lao and prob- ably will resist beingrstaLmpeddd into a "give-away."settlement., The Pathets are likely to seize on any offer from Souvanna as an opportunity to prolong negotiations' and to further their subversive activities. They are most unlikely to give the guarantees demanded by Vientiane, unless they can negotiate a substitution of language sufficiently vague to satisfy the form but not the substance of the government's demands. They may, however, abandon their insistence that Laos immediately accept Chinese Communist aid as evidence of the royal government's neu- trality. Meanwhile, the Pathets, backed by Peiping. and Hanoi broadcasts, have opened a strong propaganda campaign to shift blame for the continued divi- sioix )6f t'the'couhtrr)on" American interference. Pathet Lao lead- er Prince Souphannouvong, in a recent interview in Vientiane, justified Pathet demands for far-reaching concessions by the government on the grounds that American domination of Laos .is s6 strong that protective ara s ire essent 1. A military government seized power in Haiti on 21 May but may have difficulty main- taining control, Despite an early announcement that tl~be Barmy unanimously supports chief of staff Brigadier General Leon Cantave, who engineered the bloodless coup, the American embassy in Port-au-Prince re- ports that a serious rift may exist in the general staff. When Cantave issued his com- muni,qud dissolving the governing executive council, most senior colonels failed to sign the document, and a group of young officers armed with tommyguns reportedly intimidated them with a show of strength. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART I I NOTES AND COMMENTS Page: 10 of 18 25X1 Approved For Rase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A200100001-9 SECRET . CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 In a conversation with US ambassador Drew on 22 May, Cantave claimed that the failure of the senior colonels to sign the communique and their sub- sequent resignation from the army resulted from the fact that they are mulattoes in,a predominantly Negro army. Another threat is a pos- sible general strike. Many HAITI Atlantic Ocean NAHAMA as saA1os shops closed in Port-au-Prince on 21 May, and an unconfirmed report states that shops may also be closed in the provinces. Louis Dejoie and Daniel Fignole, presidential candidates who were the real powers behind the executive council, may have iii-- stigated the strike. Both have'': been instrumental in calling successful general strikes in ARGENTINA CONCERNED OVER PERON'S ACTIVITIES 25X1 blacks, i'ncludi'ng the army, and the mulatto minority. F7 I Argentina's provisional government believes that former dictator Juan Peron is a threat to its stability as long as he remains in the hemisphere, but efforts to have him ousted from the Americas have failed. Ar- gentina's cool treatment of the past. An apparently spon-, taneous strike against Cantave occurred early in May. Cantave has proclaimed that the army will enforce military rule until a provisional presi- dent is chosen who can guarantee "free and honest" elections. If -elections are held--they have been postponed three times-- they will probably be neither free nor honest. Both .., ~9 Cantave and Clement Jumelle, the presi- Hart, dential candidate he Gonaives St. Marc ',. DOMINICAN seems to favor, are believed to have ac- quired considerable wealth during the re- gime of ex-president Paul E. Magloire and to be interested in controlling Haiti's 25X1 government to protect their fortunes. Despite the threats to his posi- tion, Cantave is re ported in control of Port-au-Prince. His soldiers are patrolling the streets enforcing a curfew and maintaining order, and the city is reported quiet. Ambassador Drew reports, however, that Cantave is in an emotional state and appears scared,. Cantave predicted to Ambassador Drew that if a general strike forces his ouster, Haiti will be thrown into a civil war between the Venezuela, now host to Peron, has contributed to this failure. The regime has also failed to persuade foreign governments to turn over to it Peron's assets abroad, which can be used to finance revolutionary planning and activities. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 NOTES AND COMMENT'S Page 11 of 18' Approved For Walapte 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927/00100001-9 I 1? 1. .. ... . SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMRV. 23 May 1957 Peron apparently has large sums of money available.for propaganda and subversive.ac- tivities, and he reportedly: f eels confident of returning to Argentina. Pedro Estrada, chief of Venezuela's... security, told Ambassador McIntosh.on 23.April that Peron is still a powerful individual and has under his control a "tremendous organiza- tion," adding that more,news- papers throughout Latin America were "controlled by or favorable to Peron than one would imagine." After a recent talk with Peron, Est.rada,told McIntosh that he was convinced the Aram- buru government would fall and that Peron, even if he does not return to Argentina himself, will be successful in. putting a man of his selection in the presidency. This opinion,.. plus Peron's financial resources may account in part for Venzuela's refusal to oust him. 25X1 25X1 In the five countries bor- dering Argentina, Peronista exiles are engaged in various types of activity aimed at under- mining the Arambur' regime. This includes operating clan- destine radios as well as ship-,.._ ping propaganda. materials into Argentina. thus suggesting- 1F- I Peronistas in Chile have been urging Peron, , to visit there, I I"something 25X1 big was hatching" among the exiles in. Chile. President Ihn.riez, having granted temporary asylum to Six prominent Peronistas who: escaped from an Argentine prison.last March, told Ambas- srdcor Lyon on 6 May that the question of . Pe.ron's entry had ari sen, but said he hoped to .avoid admitting him. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 18 25X1 25X1 Approved Fotse 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0092p200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 19 57 Meanwhile, in a separate development, a new upsurge in army dissension has been high- lighted by the replacement of the war minister and the arrest on 22 May of the army commander in chief and some 20 other of- ficers. Major points of army dissension reportedly include the man chosen as the new war minister, the program for re- organization of the army, and the plans for holding elections to a constituent assembly prior to national elections. The air minister issued on 22 May a strongly ;worded order of the day ordering air force members to tend to their jobs and .stay out of politics. The navy is reported quietly back- ing Aramburu, but trying to ap- pear completely removed from the army quarrel in an effort to prevent it from deteriorating in- to open revolt. BURMESE GOVERNMENT MAY NEGOTIATE WITH INSURGENT COMMUNISTS Despite continued official insistence on unconditional sur- render of the insurgent Burma Communist Party (BCP), the Bur- inese government is reportedly divided on the question of a settlement. Over the past six months, insurgent Communist Party chair- man Thakin Than Tun has sent a number of widely publicized letters to key government fig- ures, urging an end to the "civil war" so that "progres- sive" forces could work to- gether to promote Burma's de-. velopment. Earlier letters in the series, while couched in conciliatory terms, sought to create the'impression that the BCP was dealing from a position of strength, and implicitly, placed the onus for continua- tion of the conflict on the government. In the most recent letter, dated 10 May and addressed to the home minister, the BCP lowered the price for a settle- ment, suggesting that peace could be achieved if the govern- rent dropped the word "surrender" and replaced it with the word "amnesty." Other Communist groups have given support to the BCP's peace campaign through the medium of the Internal Peace Organization, a front group apparently created to propa- gandize insurgent peace feelers. It is- .headed by Thakin Kodaw Hmai:ng, a recipient of the Stalin "peace" prize who, as Burma's "grand old man of letteers, " has frequently served the Communists well as a front. Large crowds at many of the In- ternal Peace Organization's rallies.attest to growing pop- ular discontent over the lack .of any real security in all but the tew largest towns in Burma. The principal opposition to the government in parliament-- members of the Communist-domi- h ated National United Front-- is danducting a well-organized campaign to publicize the issue and bring popular opinion to bear on the government. The appealing arguments of this group stand in sharp contrast to the government's weak rebut- tals? SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 18 Approved For 1rse 20051?? i~(;.,,~DP79-00927100100001-9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 19 57' government will offer less harsh terms which will be ac- ceptable to the insurgents. The supreme commander of the armed forces is said to be prepared to resign if this should occur. In view of its inability to suppress the in- surrection militarily, the army is in a poor position to argue against peace negotia- tions, and it seems only a question of time before the government consents to sit down with BCP representatives in an effort to devise a formula permitting the insur- gents to surrender with mini- mum loss of face. 25X1 FOOD SHORTAGE POSES THREAT TO EAST PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT Rapidly rising food prices in East Pakistan in recent weeks have endangered the provincial government, which is led by the eastern branch of Prime Min- ister Suhrawardy's Awami League. A similar food shortage in 1956 was an important factor in the downfall of the previous East Pakistan government,. and a repetition could threaten Suhrawardy's central government coalition. The central govern- ment, unlikely to secure the rice it needs from Southeast Asia, may make an urgent re- quest for additional American assistance. While the activities of speculators have contributed to the 30-percent increase since mid-April in the price of rice, the basic cause is the failure to secure adequate imports. The East Pakistan government, lulled by a good winter rice crop, did not ask the central government to pro- CYPRUS Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders, seeking ways to break the stalemate over Cyprus, con- tinue to solicit American in- tervention. Foreign Minister _Averoff told Ambassador Allen on 20 May that Greece and Arch- bishop Makarios could accept vide sufficient imports. The central government has not secured even the inadequate amounts requested,. and although it now claims to have commit- ments for the amounts needed, it is still only negotiating for most of these supplies. .Suhrawardy has charged that rumors spread by, pro-Communists and speculators are behind the price rises and has ordered the central government to send ex- tra shipments to the area. He. has also threatened to have the army patrol the border between East Pakistan and India to re- duce the widespread smuggling of rice to India. Meanwhile, the provincial government has introduced modified rationing. These actions are not likely to halt the rising prices, how- ever, since additional imports of several hundred thousand tons are needed to. meet the minimum requirements. independence for Cyprus guaran- teed by a 20-year international treaty, although such a solu- tion would have to be proposed and supported by "others." Makarios reportedly in- tends to leave Athens soon on SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART I I NOTES ' ,FIND COMMENTS Page 14 of 18 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AQ 00100001-9 . SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 19 57 an "enlightenment!'.'..missioti .)to Scandinavia and then plans to proceed to the United States in time for the opening of the UN General Assembly session next fall. Athens probably hopes that continued peace on Cyprus will lead to an invitation for Makarios to negotiate in Lon- don. However, the British are not likely to receive Makarios except as part of a delegation of representatives of the vari- ous communities on Cyprus-- Greek, Turkish and perhaps Maronite and Armenian. The British Ambassador in Athens told his American colleague on 17 May that his government would not be pleased if Makarios arrived in London uninvited. Nevertheless, he added, it would have to talk to him. Although London has not yet officially indicated any departure from its previous in- tention to retain bases on Cy- prus regardless of its eventual disposition, Governor Harding said on 6 May that Britain is reassessing the strategic value of the island. Britain hopes discussions on the international status of Cyprus will be initiated. within the NATO framework before it begins negotiations with the Cypriots on self-government. NATO's Secretary General Spaak has already begun informal con- sultations with the permanent representatives of Britain, Greece and Turkey. Britain is prepared to.proceed with the partition of the island if Greece and Turkey cannot reach an agree- ment with London on another solu- tion of the problem. According to the British ambassador in Athens, London would prefer that Makarios meanwhile continue to "stew in his own juice in Athens." How- ever, the American ambassador believes any view that Makarios' influence is declining reflects wishful thinking, induced part- ly by Greek opposition politi- cians in contact with the Brit- ish embassy who are disgruntled over their failure to gain Makarios' support for their own ends. The reported "ultimatum" to Britain on 20 May by the polit- ical. arm of EOKA probably rep- resents a Greek Cypriot effort to hasten British action regard- ing new negotiations. It may also foreshadow some kind of civil disobedience cam aign. The Christian Democratic minority government of Adone Zoli may depend on the "benev- olent abstention" of some of the small parties when it seeks parliamentary confirmation on 29 May, but its chances of con- firmation are at present rated fairly good. Zoli reportedly is working out a program that SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 15 of 18 Approved Foi ase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927 Qa#200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 might give his government more than "caretaker" status. Zoli seems to have empha- sized technical competence in making his cabinet choices, in- cluding one nonparliamentary member without any party affil- iation. The appointments show a delicate balance among the factions within the Christian Democratic Party. Zo.li has scheduled his ap- pearance, before parliament for next week, presumably to pro- vide time to resolve internal party disagreements over the government program. He intends to tackle the problems now be- fore parliament as well as others he considers urgent. Re- portedly, however, Zoli has en- countered some opposition to a program which would give his government more than the care- taker functions to which the right wing of his own party would like to limit him. Though the Democratic So- cialists, who precipitated the crisis by withdrawing their 1' votes, have indicated that they will oppose a one-party govern- ment, the American embassy in Rome on 22 May still expected the government to win confirma- tion. Preliminary estimates give Zoli a victory in the Sen- ate,,and 'from 274 to 334 favor- able votes out of a possible 590 in the Chamber of Deputies, with enough abstentions in either case to ensure confirmation. If only the 265 Christian Demo- crats support him, however, the possibility of a new crisis is heightened. The debate is ex- pected to last about a week. 25X1 JAPAN CONSERVATIVES PLAN CRACKDOWN ON LEFTIST LABOR Japan's ruling Liberal- Democratic Party, under the guidance of Prime Minister Ki- shi's cabinet, is planning a new labor program which would curb the political power of. the leftist Japan General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo), but would also include "progressive" features designed to have wide popular appeal. The program provides for strengthening the penalties for illegal activities by Sohyo's 3,000,000 members, particularly strikes by public corporation employees. The government has the support of business, the press, and the general public, all of which resent Sohyo's ability to stage strikes and violent demonstra- tions at will and with virtual impunity. The Liberal-Democratic Party has formed a labor policy com- mittee to draft a program which will be submitted to the Diet for legislative approval next fall. The committee apparently contemplates some curtailment of the checkoff system, under which union dues are deducted in advance from salaries. This has been one of the principal sources of funds used by Sohyo for political struggles in sup- port of the Socialist Party. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 16 of 18 Approved For $QJWase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927 200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 The prospective program also would authorize the levying of fines and jail sentences for leaders of strikes against public corporations. Such strikes are already illegal but punishable only by worker dis- charges, suspensions and repri- mands. The legislation would also make public corporation unions responsible for finan- cial losses caused by their strikes. In the field of "progres- sive" legislation, the Liberal- Democrats are likely to study the implications of minimum wage legislation. This has be- come an important issue in Japan which the Socialists have ex- ploited to some advantage. The conservatives are under pres- sure to take action on the matter, but are opposed by small and medium-size businesses which generally would be unable to absorb the increased cost. Nevertheless, the party feels obliged to make a start in this direction, in principle if not in practice. Sohyo, working through the Socialist Party, can be expected to fight against restrictions of its power and has threatened to follow up its nationwide strikes of ]L1-12 May with further strikes in June. However, the conserva- tive parliamentary majority, the widespread belief that Sohyo is overstepping its bounds, and evidence that leftist labor solidarity is breaking down in the face of government actions and threats, suggest that the cabinet's program can be enacted successfully. President Syngman Rhee an- nounced on 18 May the most sweeping changes yet made in South Korea's armed forces high command. General Paek Son-yop, the commander of the first field army, was appointed chief of staff, and Lt. Gen. Yu Chae-hung, the former vice chief of staff, was assigned to be chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. The latter post is of less importance in the South Korean army estab- lishment. The command of the first army, which includes the bulk of the combat forces sta- tioned along the truce line, went to a relative unknown, Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chang, a former corps commander. Rhee probably had several motives in making the changes, including a desire to stamp out factionalism in the services and to assure his Liberal Party the military vote in the 1958 assem- bly elections. He may also be- lieve that by making room for promotions and introducing new blood into command positions, he can improve morale and efficiency. The president very likely hopes that the removal of Gen- erals Yi Hyong-kun and Chong I1-kwon--the former chief of staff and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff respectively-- will eliminate the bitter rival- ries which have plagued the South SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 17 of 18 Approved For se 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927'00100001-9 SECRET 23 May 1957 Korean armed forces. In the past, cliques have tended to settle around the personalities of these two officers, each of whom. has attempted to place his supporters in key positions and win personal control over the services. Their removal may reduce factionalism only temporarily, however. As First Army commander, Paek ordered his troops to sup- port the Liberal Party ticket during the 1956 presidential elections, and Rhee probably ex- pects him to do the same in 1955. Pae]k will be the only full gen- eral holding a command position, and Rhee may plan to release him following the elections in line with his reported intention to retire all four-star generals. nese Communists. These command changes will probably not affect the combat capability of the armed forces. Paek has been chief of staff before and is considered a compe- tent officer, as are Yu and Song. None of the three is known to be a supporter of Rhee's dream of a unilateral "march north" against the North Korean and Chi- Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 18 of 18 25X1 Approved ForVolaase 20bl M ~~~~p~0092700100001-9 t4411~1~itti- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES "There was a time when it appeared that on- ly one creative mind could solve all the problems for everyone. The col- lective intellect de- prived of trust was at times left unwanted, without work, Very many members of the older gen- eration, alas, forgot what they had once known, while the younger genera- tion could not even be- gin to think independ- ently without hackneyed quotations and parrot- ing. But the time has come to dispense with this sad legacy of our recent past." So stated S. Strumilin, the foremost Soviet economic theoretician, in an article published last December, de- scribing the stultifying ef- fects of Stalinism on the So- viet professions. The creation of a polit- ical and social climate for SOVIET VIEW OF "SELF - CRITICISM" AMONG BUREAUCRATS --FROM KROKODIL, 10 APRIL 1957 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 13 Approved For Q1 se 20 QQ5 ~qQ~RDP79-009271 200100001-9 ~7,G CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 the development of public dis- cussion has been one of the principal domestic goals of the post-Stalin regime, By appealing to reason and re- treating from the arbitrariness of the Stalin era, the Soviet leaders are attempting to en- list active popular support for the solution of complex and pressing domestic problems. Since 1953, when Soviet citizens were officially per- mitted to examine "contradic- tions" in their society, public discussion has been marked by increasing boldness and candor, culminating this year in ex- tremely frank discussions of domestic problems and short- comings in the Soviet Commu- nist Party press. The regime finds it necessary, however, continually to redefine the limits of these.discussions lest they conflict with its interests. Public discussion. under Stalin was stifled by fear of the ubiquitous secret police, particularly after the great purges of the late 30's, and by official insistence on a facade of social harmony and economic prosperity. The live- ly debates of the 20's over serious domestic issues gave Way to stagnant conformism. Following World War II, the Soviet regime, faced with the difficult task of reimpos:- ing the"strict ideological con- trol relaxed during the war, sought to gain support for'its policies by encouraging public discussion. Although conducted within strict limits set by the regime, discussion in this period, both in the party and in the professions, was con- siderably more candid than after mid-1948. Zhdanov, Stalin's spokes- man for ideological pur.ity'in this period, made the unpre- cedented assertion that there was a "conflict of contradic- tions" (a euphemism for impor- tanit unresolved problems) in the USSR and that it could be resolved primarily by "criticism and self-criticism." This, Zhdanov maintained, constituted the principal dynamic element, the "moving force," in Soviet society, distinguishing it from capitalist society in which coercion and "class struggle" were said to prevail. This early postwar campaign to ensure ideological control through discussion and persua- sion failed, however, largely because of passive resistance to the regime's demands for economic austerity and intel- lectual conformity. As a re- sult, from mid-1948 on, Stalin found it necessary to revert increasingly to his traditional policy of terror. After 1948, the purge of "cosmopolitan" intellectuals, the decapita- tion of the Leningrad party organization and the transfer by force of "alien" people from the border areas of the USSR' poisoned the atmosphere of public discussion. During Stalin's last years the Soviet people were in effect officially forbidden to see, hear, or speak evi]L about their domestic life. Since Stalin's death and the purge of secret police chief Beria, the Soviet leaders have attempted to stimulate pub]Lic discussions of important domestic problems, again with- in strict limits defined by the regime. The convocation, on E6 fairly regular basis, of plenary sessions of the party central committee has served not only to reactivate the party as the leading political institution in the Soviet state but also to focus national at- tention on such outstanding problems as agricultural pro dut,tioa, icidustrial moderniza- tion, and, more recently, eco- nomic decentralization. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of .13 Approved For se 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927*48400100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957' The regime has also spon- sored numerous professional meetings, published many new professional journals, and lib- eralized some of the security procedures in the professions. These measures, which have helped to reduce some of the barriers within and between professional groups, were de- signed to elicit professional know-how and public support for the solution of national prob- lems. Since 1954, when Zhdanov's dictum on the role of "criticism and self-criticism" as the "moving force" in Soviet society was revived intact, Soviet in- tellectuals have been examining domestic "contradictions" with increasing boldness and candor. Despite their use of Marxist jargon, these intellectuals have directed fairly pointed criticism at Soviet domestic life, some of them skirting perilously close to heresy. Beginning in the spring of 1955, for example, some Soviet intellectuals intimated that low living standards were an important source of such so- called "survivals of capitalism" in the USSR as the anti-Soviet attitudes of the population. Others have held that differ- ences do exist within and be- tween Soviet social groups, and that, although they are not "antagonistic" nor comparable to the "class struggle" said to exist under capitalism, they can lead to serious conflicts of interest if they are not promptly recognized and dealt with by the party leaders. Although Soviet intellec- tuals have stressed in their public discussions the essen- tial harmony between the Soviet regime and people, they have warned that toleration of "mis- takes" in policy can damage Soviet social stability. The glossing over of real "contra- dictions" in Soviet society in Stalin's time, according to these intellectuals, disarmed Soviet cadres and left them ill- equipped to deal with the press- ing problems of the day. They have candidly asserted that failure to recognize and struggle with existing domestic problems could weaken the USSR. Since De=Stalinization The reaction to de-Stalin- ization by elements within the Soviet party and population, as well as the events in Poland and Hungary last fall, appears further to have brought home to the Soviet leaders some of the glaring inadequacies in their domestic education and indoctrination program. After their initial reaction to the Polish and. Hungarian de- velopments--the tightening of controls, the warnings against subversion, and the increased calls for vigilance--the So- viet leaders seem to have recognized that repressive words and deeds were inadequate to cope with real popular grievances. The more candid and realistic. treatment this year of domestic problems in the Communist Party press in- dicates that the Soviet leaders believe that in the long run they can better control, and even reduce, popular dissatis- faction by'providing a legiti- mate avenue for public expres- sion in the state-controlled organs of public communication. By admitting publicly that the USSR is a good deal less than perfect, the Soviet lead- ers are attempting to identi- fy themselves with the inter- ests and aspirations of the population at large. By per- mittting popular grievances to be aired, as they were at the February Supreme Soviet meeting, the regime hopes to steal the thunder from the so- called "politically immature" or "demagogic" elements in the population and to'convince the masses that it is seriously at- tempting to improve their material welfare. SECRET- Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 13 Approved For`se 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0092710040200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 19 57' The difficulties Soviet leaders face in controlling discussion within the Commu- nist Party itself were re- cently revealed by the party journal Kommunist, which admitted the existence of "contradictions" within the party. Although these "con- tradictions" were said to take the form of "controversies" between "like-minded persons over the best ways and means of solving the tasks facing the party," the brunt of Kommunist's criticism was directed against party mem- bers who had attacked party policies and the party apparatus. By admitting the existence of "contradictions" within the party and by criticizing "po- litically immature" party mem- bers, the regime is attempting to direct discussion within the party along desired lines and warn the "hostile" deviators of the potential dangers of their behavior. The efforts of Stalin's suc- cessors to develop professional and popular support by limiting the role of coercion in Soviet public life derive from a recog- nition that Stalin's methods were both dangerous and unproduc- tive over the long run. Stalin.- ism had produced in the Soviet system a complex of internal disorders, none of which was fatal but which together threat- ened to retard seriously the growth of Soviet national power. The Soviet leaders have had,to appeal in some measure to the public, primarily be- cause their efforts to diagnose the real condition of Soviet society and remedy its disorders have been obscured and hindered by widespread public apathy and inarticulateness. If these measures should fail, the regime would be faced with the prospect of reverting to terrorism ~;with'.all its negative consequences, 25X1 25X6 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART I I I PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4% of 13 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 Approved For use 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927700100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S g 23 May 1957 DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN SPAIN The severe inflation in Spain is causing increasing dis- satisfaction with Franco's re- gime even among the groups that have supported him in the past. The regime is in no immediate danger, but the deterioration in its position seems likely to continue as the cabinet appointed three months ago delays coming to grips with the country's in- creasingly serious economic problems. Economic Difficulties Spain remains in the grip of strong inflationary pressures set off during 1956 by expand- ing bank credit, extensive def- icit financing of industrial development and welfare projects, and substantial wage increases without a corresponding rise in productivity. Unusually severe winter weather which damaged citrus and olive crops BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT MILLIONS OF DOLLARS contributed to the economic difficulties by depriving Spain of approximately $100,000,000 in much-needed foreign exchange. Spain entered 1957 with an estimated dollar reserve of only $20,000,000--less than a fifth of its holdings 14 months before--and the cost of living increased 12.5 percent from November 1956 to March 1957. Within the past few weeks a shortage of wheat has become a serious problem, and the gov- ernment has pressed the United States for emergency shipments of 500,000 metric tons of wheat before 30 June as an alternative to drawing on scarce foreign exchange. The new crop is ex- pected to fall a million tons short of the country's annual consumption, and Spain is seek- ing still more American surplus wheat by mid-1958, to be paid for in pesetas. Nevertheless, 1955 OCT SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 13 Approved For`14 ase 20 A:-CIA-RDP79-00927*09if2OOlOOOOl-9 V&ET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 in a speech on 17 March, Franco referred to the economic crisis as "a small difficulty," and, except for seeking more Ameri- can aid, he has since taken no action suggesting a graver view of the problem. The only important step taken since the cabinet shake- up of 25 February is the re- placement of the multiple for- eign exchange system by a single import-export rate for the peseta in order to increase Spanish exports to dollar markets and reduce the large trade deficit. Various anti-inflationary measures still under discussion include the encouragement of foreign capital participation in Spanish enterprises, the es- tablishment of an interminis- terial committee to examine expenditures, and reductions in the level of new debt issues in Bank of Spain credits to govern- ment organizations and in capi- tal allocated,to government- operated industry. Franco has three possible courses of action. He can elect to do nothing, in which case present inflationary trends will continue; he can introduce a policy of retrenchment to combat inflation, taking the risk of further alienating the still powerful Falange; or he can fol- low a policy of big spending which, while stilling worker discontent temporarily, would ultimately contribute to infla- tion and further estrange labor as well as influential conserva- tive elements of his support. Disaffection in the Falange Franco is reluctant to adopt a policy of retrenchment, chiefly because he does not wish to face a showdown with the Falange--Spain's only legal political party and an important source of the regime's stability. The Falange has long sought-- without much success--to develop strong labor support, and it would suffer a critical blow from a reduction in government spending for social and welfare projects accompanied by rigid wage controls under conditions of rapidly rising prices. As it is, the economic crisis has been responsible for increasing disaffection in the Falange. Franco set the Falange back severely last winter when he rejected drafts of laws which would have ensured its position in Spain's political life. The church, the army, and business and landowning interests have long opposed the Falange's ef- forts to consolidate its posi- tion, and Franco has always been careful to prevent any element of his support from be- coming too powerful. Many Falangists believe that the party, though formally retain- ing its position in the 25 February cabinet reshuffle, ac- tually lost further ground. An internal crisis in the Falange is apparent in the number of resignations tendered by minor party officeholders in recent weeks. Resignations have been noted particularly in Va- lencia, where many Falangists reportedly fear that the long delay in naming a civil governor may mean the army and church have been successful in bring- ing about a separation of the functions of the provincial head of the Falange from those of the civil governor. Franco's reduced support is most apparent among the party "old shirts"-- pre-Civil War members--whose mainstays in the cabinet have been replaced by considerably less important narty fi or?roc Other Falangists, notably the poet Dionisio Ridruejo,have left the movement in the past year or so and are trying to organize opposition parties of the left. The American embassy believes that if Franco gives the "old shirts" further cause SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 13 25X1 Approved Forl4eiedse 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0092749 200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May.1957 to question his intentions, a mass secession from the party may develop. Conservative Discontent The various groups balanced against the Falange in Franco's cabinet fear the Falange's "leftist tendencies" and some of them would be further dis- turbed by a government big- spending program. The economic crisis will also increase their concern over Franco's decreasing popularity and his failure to provide for a successor. Business interests are dissatisfied with rising costs of production, and elements of the church are moving to dis- sociate themselves from the regime. Among the military. IariLes grossly na equate Popular Unrest General unrest over the cost of living was evidenced by the transportation boycotts in January and February following a fare increase in Barcelona and Madrid. Since the cabinet reshuffle, it has been seen in a slowdown strike of coal min- ers in Oviedo in March. Con- tinued restrictions on freedom of expression have intensified 25X1 student hostility and dissatis- faction among intellectuals. their interests. With his long-practiced ski:Ll at playing one group agaiLnst another and his still unquestioned ability to sup- press overt hostility to his regime, Franco is in no im- mediate danger. His position, however, is less secure, and the deteriorating economic situation may spur many who, now support him to look elsewhere for a champion of SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 10 of 13 25X1 Approved Foieioftse 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY 23 May 19 57 MAO TSE-TUNG'S UNPUBLISHED SPEECHES On 27 February Mao Tse- tung delivered an address before the Supreme State Conference on "The Correct Handling of Contradictions Within the Ranks of the People." The Supreme State Conference is a gathering of China's top officials con- vened at irregular intervals to hear Mao set new lines for Peiping's major policies. Fol- lowing the conference, Mao spoke on the same subject at the National Conference on Propaganda Work on 12 March. Mao's remarks have not publish Chinese press is carrying-ex- tensive commentaries on Mao's analysis. From these com- mentaries, the following emerge as Mao's key points: (1) Mao distinguished be- tween two types of contradic- tions, i.e., antagonistic con- tradictions "between us and the enemy" (which are irrec- oncilable) and nonantagonistic contradictions (which are ad- justable). Cautioning that the latter could become an- tagonistic if badly handled, he stressed the need for per- suasion rather than force in mollifying malcontents. He noted that China's present con- tradictions were largely antag- onistic; for example, the con- tradiction between the people's demand for higher incomes and the economic conditions that thwart this demand. There are also contradictions between the military and the populace, between military officers and enlisted men, between peasants and workers, between co-opera- tives and peasants, and between government organs of upper and lower levels. Above all, Mao addressed himself to the con- tradiction between the people and the leaders. (2) In discussing remedies, Mao stressed the urgency of cor- recting bureaucratic methods of leadership. In accordance with his recommendations, the party's central committee has called for a program to rectify bureau- cratic habits among officials, who have been directed to gain new insights into local problems by establishing direct contact with the populace. Party, gov- ernment and military officials have been urged to engage in manual labor "among the masses," adopt a self-critical attitude, and permit the populace to ex- press their opinions "boldly and freely." (3) Mao warned against the errors of dogmatism and doctrinairism and strongly re- affirmed his policy to "let all flowers bloom and diverse schools of thought contend." Mao's remarks on this point were critical of tight Soviet control over the arts, 125X1 25X1 ac :e ao reportedly at- 25X1 a playwright for oppos- ing the "all flowers" concept, observing that the playwright's views had been published by the Russians. "Birds of a feather flock together," Mao is said to have observed wryly. Mao the fol- lowing examples of popular dis- affection, which he interpreted as examples of nonantagonistic contradictions: (1) A planned march on the capital by students dissatisfied with the employment offered them after graduation. They were dissuaded by Mao's offer to re- ceive a delegation in his of- fice. (2) Student strikes at the Universities of Chengtu and Chungking. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 13 25X1 25X1 Approved Fo ase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927W 1200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 (3) A march by dissatisfied cadres from Chengting toward Peiping to present their griev- ances to Mao. They were per- suaded to turn back. The method reportedly recommended by Mao for resolving internal contra- dictions was the method of patient persuasion and ideo- logical re-education rather than crude or "administrative" methods. Mao reportedly analyzed two kinds of democracy, One was "big. democracy," which meant strikes, demonstrations and other strong manifestations of the popular will.. The other was "little democracy," which meant all forms of argument, negotiation and discussion. Within the ranks of the people, "little democracy" was normal- ly correct, but nevertheless there might sometimes be scope and need for "big democracy." The deputy director of the party's propaganda department stated on 7 May that the Chi- nese populace had the "right to demonstrate &Ad strike" and that "no leaders of strikes should be penalized." In Poland, Mao's views have been hailed by the liberal Com- munists as support of their de- mands for complete freedom of discussion and dissent, and the trade union newspaper Glos Pracy keyed Mao's remas on "allflowers" to a denuncia- tion of local "Stalinists;" At the recent Polish party plenum, Gomulka endorsed Mao's doctrines, including the "all flowers" thesis. At the same time, he made clear he would limit the application of this doctrine in Poland when he at- tacked the liberal Communist "revisionists" who endanger the regime by advocating or tolerat- ing_ anti-Communist views. The Soviet leaders will probably react to Mao's speeches with mixed emotions. Part of Mao's thesis, particularly his view on contradictions, is gen- erally in line with long-held Soviet views on this subject (See Part III, p.1), and a key Chinese editorial in Mao's analysis of contradictions was reprinted in Pravda in April. The Soviet leaders appar- ently considered the Chinese editorial in harmony with their own campaign against bureaucrat- ic practices in the Soviet ad- ministrative structure. They may also have intended, in taking note of a major pronounce- ment by Mao, to emphasize the close ties which exist between Moscow and Peiping. Mao's theory of "big democ- racy,"' with its implied accept- ance of the right to strike, however, will probably be dis- tasteful to Moscow at a time it is experiencing troubles with labor unrest. Even more disagreeable to the Kremlin would be Mao's alleged slap at Soviet cultural policy contained in the "birds of a feather" reference. Actually, Mao's thesis of contradictions within a social- ist society is no great de- parture from Soviet theory, which has also drawn a sharp line between "antagonistic" and "nonantagonistic" contradictions. Chinese commentaries ' on the speech do. not support the in- ference made by some Western observers that Mao held the "system" gives rise to insoluble SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 12 of 13 Approved Foase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0092200100001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 May 1957 problems between the party and the populace. Like Soviet the- orists, the Chinese writers insist that the socialist system is "correct." The Chinese, how- ever, have given greater empha- sis than the Russians to the theme that, even with the best "system," all Communist parties are fallible, and all must be vigilant to keep their mistakes from becoming widespread and lasting. Mao's purpose in making the speech is to be found in his apparent determination to apply to Communist China the lessons of unrest in Poland and Hungary. His preoccupation with the contradiction between the people and their leaders sug- gests that he saw some parellels between popular unrest in East- ern Europe and the state of morale in China, and supports other reliable evidence of growing alienation of the Chi- ese populace from the leader- ship. The Communist Party line is a notoriously shifting guide to action, but for the present, Mao's speech would appear to assure a "soft" approach by Peiping's leaders to China's internal problems. With respect to intrabloc relations, Mao's prestige is such that few Com- munist leaders will dismiss lightly his appeal to avoid the use of force except as a measure of last resort. While the USSR is probably annoyed at the anti- Soviet overtones being read in- to Mao's speech, Mao is far from aligning himself With`.. hostile;..oritics of Kremlin.'. policies. When force must be applied, as it had to be in Hun- gary, Mao provides Moscow with a ready rationale in the thesis:: that repressive measures are justified against groups who cause nonantagonistic, contra- dictions to take on an antag- onistic, or "enem " form. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 13 of 13 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01200100001-9