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August 29, 1957
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Approved For Release 2007/10/23 :CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ,.. COIVF!_ II CURRENT COPY N0. 18 OC~ N0. 3961/57 29 August 1957 INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ec~cun~l~rst I-I:b. ~Q CHAIJGE .v Cl.A . ^ p i~CIASSI~t~D CLASS. CHhAfGEb TQ~ ~~~"" NEXT REVIEW ~ ATE: - AU'fH:~ ~ 70- CENTRAL INTFI I IC~FNC'F arFNrv OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ~~~~~~~~ p~~l~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~.~ Ua~/ CONFIDENTIAL State Department review completed Approved For Release 2007/10/23 :CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23 :CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/10/23 :CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23 :CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ument Denied Approved For Release 2007/10/23 :CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 _....,~rniTl A{ Approved For Release 2007/10/23_: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ~"' ? CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 August 195? OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST SOVIET MISSILE ANNOUNCEMENT AND DISARMAMENT TACTICS The Soviet press agency TASS on 26 August announced that an intercontinental bal- listic missile (ICBM) had been successfully tested to "a huge distance" in the USSR "in recent days.'` It had been estimated that the USSR would be capable,, in the relatively near future, of launching an ICBM? TASS also called attention to a recent series of nuclear and thermonu- clear explosions in the USSR. The most recent Soviet nuclear test--the first since last April --took place on 22 August. There is no evidence that this explo- sion was associated with the firing of an IGBM. The TASS announcement, to- getheir with Valerian Zorin's subsequent speeches in the United Nations Disarmament Sub- committee in London, seems to foreshadow a major effort. by the USSR in the forthcoming UN General Assembly session to win support for its proposed,suspen-- sion of nuclear weapons tests and agreement not to use nuclear weapons or missiles with nu- clear warheads. The TASS announcement in- cluded the standard charge of Western obstruction of a dis- armament agreement, particularly with respect to cessation of nu- clear tests. The Soviet pro- posals of 30 April and ? June for a partial disarmament agree- ment called for renunciation of the use-for military purposes of both nuclear weapons and missiles of any-range carrying nuclear warheads. Moscow prob- PART I OF ably believes that its announce- ment will increase world-wide support for its proposed bans on testing and use, placing the Western powers in an increasing- ly untenable position. Far these purposes the Soviet Union appears eager to tz?ansfer the discussions from the subcommittee to ..the General Assembly, where it is also like- ly to repeat its proposals of last year for an expansion of the Disarmament Commission and Subcommittee to include coun- tries such as India which are sympathetic to its viewpoint. Zorin's speech of 2? August included a strong attack on the subcommittee, because it was responsive to the demands of NATO but ignored the views of other countries. He called for the inclusion of more states, representing other geographical areas and social systems, in the disarmament talks. Zarin criticized the secrecy under which the subcommittee operates as a Western device to keep public opinion in ignorance and to create the false impression of progress toward agreement. His remarks recalled Khrushchev's criticism of the "NATO subcom- mittee" in July. Zarin also delivered a strong attack on the principle of aerial inspection, which he said could not prevent a sur- prise attack, and the specific zones proposed by the West. He charged that the plan for in- spection of the United States, CQN FI DENTIA~L IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 August 195? Canada, and the USSR was an intelligence-collection scheme to plan for aggressive war while the Arctic inspection plan was useless. He ignored entirely the Western plan for inspection in Europe although the USSR has put same emphasis on inspection in that area Soviet statements on aerial in- spection in the past have alter- nated betweeh counterproposals to Western plans and denuncia- tions of the whole idea. The American delegate in London considered Zorin's speech an indication that the -USSR was preparing further con- cessions to meet the West in a first-step agreement and believed the harsh-tone of-the speech was intended to off- set any impression that these concessions might be a sign of weakness. He considered it possible, however,. that Moseow may be developing a propaganda position ~:y:to be used in the event of~a fail- ure to reement at Landon. (Concurred in by OSI KHRUSHCHEV RESUMES ATTACK ON Publication in the USSR this week of new and more seri- ous charges against Malenkov after a period of relative quiet in the campaign against the "antiparty" group seems to be an attempt to create a new gen- eral-wave of popular indigna- tion. Reports from Moscow in- dicate that the current mood of manq Soviet citizens is one of depression, cynicism, and distrust of present party lead- ers. By linking Malenkov with Beria, Khrushchev prob~.bly hopes to transfer to Malenkov some of the revulsion Soviet citizens still feel toward the executed police chief. The new charges day the groundwork for possible further punitive action against Malenkov and will serve as an additional warning to any who might be less than enthusiastic for Khrushchev's policies. Malenkov is characterized as Beria's ''shadow and tool,," who 'ivery skillfully" took- ad- vantage of Stalin's weaknesses and habits in the last year's of his life. He is charged with having incited Stalin to take action which was deserving of "stern condemnation." This is only a short step from ac- cusing him of responsibility for the worst excesses of the latter part of the .Stalin era. The new attack on Malenkov was contained in an article published in the most recent issue of the ,party journal, Kommunist. The article is based on ~ ree unpublished speeches Khrushchev is reported to have made between Hay and July of this year. The speech in which the charges against Malenkov were made was probably either one he gave to the Moseow city party organization on 2 July or one he gave to the Moscow Oblast party organization on 3 July. At these meetings the "antiparty" activities of the ousted leaders were explained, Malenkov was probably singled out far .attack because he was Khrushchev's leading rival and must dangerous oppo- nent. In the propaganda barrage following the June plenum he was treated as the most degen- erate member of the "antiparty group," being the only member PART I OF IMMEDYATE INTEREST Page 2 of 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 August i95? of the. opposition, for instance, charged with being a chief or- ganizer of the notorious "Len- ingrad affair" far which Abakumov was blamed and executed in 1954. The diversity of treatment thus far accorded the members of the ''antiparty group" sug- gests that eaoh cake is being considered separately and that the fate of the other opponents is not necessarily wrapped up with that of Malenkov. But while the other members of the group have not`been publicly accused of misdeeds as serious as those charged to Malenkov, further action may vet be taken a:gains t them. SYRIAN DEVELOPMENTS Further dismissals of Syrian civilian government of- f icials, especially the key secretaries general of the various ministries, appear im- minent, Akram Iiawrani, Baathist leader, has voiced the opinion that the government departments are "infiltrated" with the "lackeys of imperialism" who must be rooted out. It is re- ported that the Foreign Ministry will be the first affected. Concurrent with the beginnings of the purge, testimony impli- cating dismissed senior army officers in a conspiracy against the state may be released and a series of "treason" trials can be expected soon. While the power relation- ships in Syria remain unclear, preliminary indications are that the recent purge of the neutral and pro-Western officers hasi resulted in a sweeping victory for the leftist, nationalist officer group known as the "Lit- tle Revolutionary Command Coun- cil (RCC)." These officers, who as military caddis witnessed the defeat of the Syrian army by the Israeli ~in 1948, have as their professed goal the res- torationof the army's honor. A necessary requisite far at- tai#~ment of this objective was the elimination from the army of discredited older leaders who the "Little RCC" felt stood 25X1 in the way of effective army reform. The "Little RCC,?' because of its phobia regarding Israel, is basically pro-USSR and anti- Western. It views the USSR as a source of armaments and as an ally in its struggle against Western "imperialism" and Zi~n- ism. Rather than being pro~- Communist domestically the group regards the Communists in much the same light as other Syrian political groups. All such political activities are under army surveillance, and a prema- ture bid for power by the local Communists might be opposed by the RCC group.. Whether the "Little RCC" will be able to cope with Communist infiltration and imperialism will depend on SECRET OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARX 29 August 1957 the extent and manner of the implementation of agreements .with the Soviet bloc and the effectiveness of the local Cam- munist party cadre. The USSR is refraining from any foreign policy initia- tive that would suggest Soviet control. ovex'? Syria and is, don- centrating on propaganda stress- ing charges that the United States attempted a coup d'~etat. It is supporting Syria's claims that the Syrian-Soviet economic agreement is a purely internal affair by leaving official com- meets on the increasingly close economic relationship to Syrian spokesmen. Neighboring Countries' Reaction Reaction in neighboring countries toward events in Syria remains varied; Lebanon and Jordan, the two countries most susceptible to Syrian subver- sion, continue to await further developments apprehensively. Lebanon has tightened border controls and entries from Syria. With Jordan's internal situa- tion precarious, beputy Prime Minister Samir Rifai has stated that he believes a federation of Jordan and Iraq may be the only political move left by which pro-Western Arabs can re- sist the pressure emanating from the consolidation of a leftist regime in Syria. Rifai believes that King Saud's bless- ing would be necessary before such a move could be made. Iraq's palace spokesman, Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah, re- turned to Ba~,ghdad on 26 August from ?Istanbul~ where he had been consulting with Turkish offi- cials. The .Baghdad government's public reaction to Syrian developments has been relative- ly weak, however. Up to the present King Saud has remained publicly silent e s coat nuing to carry out common military plan- ning with Nasr on the Gulf of Aqaba problem. The Turks, while concerned over the pos- sibili~ty of having a Communist neighbor to the south, have maintained a discreet silence but have been carrying on dis- cussions with the ,Iraqis and with King Hussain when he passed tkarough Istanbul on his way to Europe. Although Nasr may well be concerned over the apparent leftward shift within Syria and may be expected to do his utmost to maintain Egyptian influence in Syria, the Syrian situation has not affected the overt Egyp- tian attitude toward the United States. Cairo radio continues to elaborate on charges of Amer- ican intervention in Syria of - fairs. 25X1 25X1 25X1 The Israelis are carrying on brigade and division maneuvers in the normal training region west of Lake Tiberias. This serves to guard against untoward developments on the Syrian front, now commanded by Syrian Colonel Akram Dayri, an impetuous of - f icer formerly in -command of the Syrian military police. Dayri has a number of young officers under his command who will be even less restrained from creat- ing incidents than their pred- ecessors. Chief of Staff Bizri has agreed with the United Na- tions Truce Supervisory Organiza- tion to station observers on the Syrian side of the demarca- tion line, and this ma,v help kee t e er calm. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENGE WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 August 195? SOVIET-SYRIAN EGONO~IIG RELATIONS A three-man mission led by the chairman of Syria's eco- nomic development board is in Moscow to negotiate details- of the preliminary Soviet-Syrian economic aid agreement reached in early August. In the earlier Moscow discussions, the Soviet Union made its first firm offer to undertake a long-term eco- nomic development program in a Middle Eastern country. Carrying out of the aid agreement would permit the-USSR to exert substantial influence over the Syrian economy, not only by determining the direc- tion and pace of economic de- velopment through the provision of machinery and Soviet special- ists, but also by requiring Syria to commit a significant share of its exports for along period. In the preliminary aid agreement, Moscow indicated willingness to supply equip- ment and technical assistance for the extension of Latakia harbor, construction of a Euphrates River dam for power acrd irrigation, and of roads and railways, and a build-up of Syrian industries .as soon as preliminary surveys are made. The aid, reportedly amount- ing to well over $100,000,000, is to be repaid over a 12-year period at 2.5-percent interest. To increase the attractiveness of the deal, the USSR has of - fered to purchase 200,000 tons of wheat (worth about $15,000, 000) or other Syrian commodities. Half of the returns from these sales is to be applied as pay- ment under the economic aid agreement and half is to be made in foreign currency. 'phis offer suggests that the USSR, a net exporter of grain, is willing to purchase any Syrian export item, prob- ably on a long-term basis, to convince Syria it can earn suffi- cient credits to meet its pay- ments obligations arising fram the economic aid and earlier arms deals. Without such an agreement Syria would find it financially difficult to com- mit itself to Soviet aid far its economic development plan. An intensified shift away fram Western partners in Syria's trade pattern may have been an additional aim of the Soviet offer. Nearly 50 percent of Syria's mayor export crop, cot- ton, was sold to the bloc dur- ing the last marketing year. During this same period, however, Soviet purchases from Syria were small and accounted for only 3 percent of Syrian cotton ex- ports. The USSR apparently intends to use the Syrian agreement as a basis for promoting further Soviet-sponsored economic de- velopment programs in the Mid- dle East. Moscow has offered within the past week to provide the Sudan with large-scale eco- nomic assistance and to pro- vide Iran with "unlimited cred- it at 2 percent" for heavy in- dustrial development. (Prepared by ORR) SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 t,~$~i~ttJCIV I [I1L CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ~SUMMA~i.Y 29 August 1957 NOTES AND COMMENTS KADAR REGIME UNEASY OVER UN DEBATE On the eve of the United. Nations General Assembly ses-~ sion, the Kadar regime is .renewed efforts to establish firm control in Hungary and dis- pel rumors of a more liberal political line, because con- cessions might encourage dissi- dent domestic elements. Kadar fears Hungarian popular re- action to possible General Assembly condemnation, and the Kremlin is concerned over the effects of such condemnation on its own international prestige. In recent weeks the regime has attempted to reinforce in - ternal stability by mass ar- rests of potential opposition leaders among youths, workers, and the population at large, and has simultaneously conduc~G- ed a widespread purge of work- ers'; organizations--including the trade union council--to eliminate elements identified with the suspect workers' coun- cils. Although the arrest wave ended last week, the re- gime has not yet released any significant number of those arrested and is continuing to mete-out heavy sentences--often death--to persons labeled "counterrevolutionaries," Pre- mier-Kadar himself on 20 Aug- ust defiantly ,justified the arrests with the declaration that some people thought not enough ''enemies" had been arrested. It is likely that Kra:dar? will eventually resign as pre- mier, but will .continue to maintain top authority as par- ty first secretary, thereby conforming to current bloc practice. In this event, his most probable successor would be First Deputy Premier Ferenc Muennich, with Minister of State Gyo~gq Marosan another passibility. Neither would be an improvement over Kadar. Muennich, once considered a distinguished Communist with some reputation for moderation, is associated in his role as minister of armed and security forces with the merciless re- pression of insurgent elements following the uprising. Mar- osan, a former social demo- crat with pronounced demagogic gifts, has shown himself will- ing to defend any cause on be- half of the Kremlin. There appears to be little possibility that Imre Nagy will be rehabilitated as Hungarian premier, despite recent rumors to that effect. He remains a symbol of national resistance to Kremlin domination and his rehabilitation might encour- age-.dangerous anti-Soviet pas- sions among-the populace. The Hungarian regime will use every tactic, possibly in- cluding show trials, to coun- ter the US speCial.eommittee report on Hungary and to sup- port its own contention that -the November uprising was en- gineered by the United States and Britain. This might in- clude a trial of Colonel Pal Maleter, minister of defense during the uprising, who re- portedly has been subjected to interrogation since his arrest by Soviet officials on 3 November. A recent uncon- firmed press report states that Maleter had broken under torture and signed a confes- sion .that he.was'.in.~:coritact with American and British offi- cials during the revolution and specifically that he passed information to the British military attach. CONFIDENTIAL PART II NOTES AND COIIlmtENTS Page '1 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET CURRENm INTELLIGEAiCE WEEKLY t~~J~M~RY ' 29 August 1957 Wh#,le enforcing a rigorous line at home, the Hiungarian re- game is mal~ing a major effort to influence uncommitted coun- tries ~.n ~1s:a anc~ Africa to support its positiob at the General Ass?mbly. A special mission headed by Deputy For- eign Minister Karoly Sxarka is now touring South Asia, where it .has interviewed Prime Min- isters Nehru of Tndia and $an- daranaika of Ceylon with lit- tle success. .When the H-xn- :.garians, :attempted to make propa- ganda capita`1 out of Nehru's statements by claiming he was opposed. ~?,~ UbT discussion of t3~e subject, defense Minister V. K. i~riehna ~ienon made a public-statement to the effect that I~tdia "will not and can- not object" to such a discus- siono In Ceylon--one of the five countries whose represent- atives. prepared the UN report condemning Hungary--Bandaranaike told the 'visitors-that he thought the Hungarians should "welcome",a discussion and re- marked that Hungarian opposi- tion to the debate would prej- udice :warp 'pea'bY~c opioandn against Hungary. BTJLC~ARIA SEEKS RAPPROCHEMENT WITH NEST Recent statements by Bul- garian Premier Anton Yugov and specific actions by his govern- ment indicate that the drive for better relations with the West--initiated in the spring of 1956 but suspended six months later--has been resumed. Probably prompted by the re- emphasis on peaceful coexist- ence in Soviet foreign policy, these renewed overtures may indicate greater willingness than in any previous period to compromise on specific is- sues. that. have.heretaf?re iso- lated Bulgaria from tt~e -free world. Yugov told a leftist Greek parla.amentary deputy on 20 August that Bulgaria has ap- pointed a commission to ne- gotiate a "fina:l solution" of the remaining difficulties ~' with Greece. As evidence of improving relations between the two countries, he painted nut the sharp increase in trade --from $974,000 in 1955 to about $4,000,000 in 1956--and the opening of hn exchange point an the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, all communications and trade having previously gone through Turkey, The major obstacle to improved relations has been the $45,000,000 World War II reparations debt owed Greece. Although the Bul- garians acknowledge this debt, in previous negotiations they have offered only $2,000,000 as an initial payment against a Greek demand fvr $6,000,000. In a move to improve re- lations with I~+rael, the Bul- garian government has offered to day 5I6,4~0 lava ($8,235) to the family of each person killed when Bulgat?ian antiair- craf t guns ~ s~kiot down an Israel i airlins~r in ~tzlp 1955.. The recipents'~vauld include Ameri- can, British, and Austrian na- tiQnals. '$ulg-aria has refused, however,' ty abknowledge re- sponsibility for the incident and has not met the Israeli de- mand that those responsible be punished. In a press interview on 29 July, Yt~g'ov expressed- wi11- ingness to rajestablish diplo- matic relations with the United States, broken off in 1950 at the .height of the cold war as a result of~espionage charges leveled against American Min- ister Heath in connection with the Kastov trial--Bulgaria s "Titoist" affair. The charges SEC'RE~T PART' II NO'TI;S AND Cf~1~MEN'IS Page 2 of 1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ~ SECRET `'~' CURRENT. INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMhARY 29 August 1957 are a d?ad letter in any caste since K?stov was rehabilitated in 19 56. Travel restrictions an Western diplomatic person- nel, the other issue leading to a break in American-Bulgarian relations, were relaxed'some time ago, Yugov stated on 24 August t-hat differences on "some ideological questions" did not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of friendship and collaboration between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav. peoples. Although the party and govern- mental shake-up of 11-12 July in Bulgaria appeared to be a defeat for those elements de- siring closer relations with Yugoslavia, the Bulgarians have since relaxed harder restric- tions on twa separate occasions to permit Yugoslavs to attend. fairs and celebrations in Bul- garia. Continued Bulgarian press polemics, however, demon- strate that Sofia is unlikely to modify its hostile attitude toward Yugoslav ideological pronouncements for the sake of a ranbroehement mith Belgrade. 25X1 25X6 SECRE?' PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 1?' Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY :SU~~Ry 29 August 1957 25X1 25X1 FRANCE`6 PROJECTED Premier Bourges-Maunoury plans to obtain cabinet agree- ment on a new basic statute for Algeria early in September for subsequent presentation to the National Assembly, possibly at a special sessiono As now drafted, the plan, which provides for a federal regime for Algeria, gives primary attention to mol- lifying domestic opposition to Algerian independence and seems only secondarily designed to establish a strong French posi- tion for the UN session this fall. The government seems ready to propose a f ederal plan which would offer a double safeguard for FranceQs position. Algeria would be divided into semi- autonomous terx?itories9 in two of which--Algiers and Oran-- voters of European extraction would be numerous enough to dominate and could be expected to block the emergence of a strong central government in Algeria. Paris would retain control of foreign affairs, military matters, and finances, and would decide disputes be- tween territories. Some provision will prob- ably be made for a central A1- ALGERIAN STATUTE gerian executive and legisla- ture, but with little real authority, A leader of one of the small center parties urges federal powers for such a cen- tral government, but the leader of .the Independent and Peasant party opposes any authoritative all-Algerian governmental bodies because they might generate new pressure for independence. ~dinister for Algeria Robert Lacoste, who has persuaded the cabinet the. settlers might otherwise be pushed to revolt, insists on the necessity for the widest possible decentrali- zation of the machinery of gov- ernment. The French cabinet, which hopes to hammer out a complete plan at a meeting early in September, has reportedly agreed some provision should be offered for subsequent revision, pre- sumably to make the statute mare palatable bath to Algerian na- tionalists and to international opinion. T}~e proposal now un- der consideration would permit each territory to decide after two years on the powers it wishes to delegate to the cen- tral assembly in Algiers. Two years later--a maximum of four years from the setting up of the SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of Y?~ Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ~"'~ SECRET '~ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY'SU1dY 29 August 19 57 territorial assemblies--the federal assembly representing Algeria could ~.wor.k,. out ~a ; .,. permanent statute for Algeria with .the French National As- sembly. The elections setting .the timetable in motion--those for the regional legislatures --will be held only-when and if the areas are officially declared to be a f ed. SPANISH-M?ROCCAN DIFFERENCES OVER IFNI Mounting Moroccan pressure against Spain's Atlantic coast enclave of Ifni h~,s been net with strong Spanish counter- measures in the past three months. In apparent anticipa- tion of an early demand by Rabat for cession of -the ter- ritory, Spain held high-level conversations with France on 24 August to seek a common at- titude on relations with Moroc- co. Moroccan nationalist agita- tion in Ifni has resulted in violence on several occasions since mid-June, and the Moroc- can government Maas protested the countermeasures taken by the Spanish police. Moroccan Foreign Minister Balafre,~ re- portedly introduced the ques- tion of Ifni in midrJune ec6- nomic negotiations in Madrid, and on 'ZO ,:August Rabat recalled its ambassador from Madrid for consultation, possibly with the intention of issuing in- structions tv negotiate for The Ifni garrison, which reportedly numbered 2;500 men in early July, is being rein- forced, and the Spanish embassy in Rabat believes the troops will use force to block possi- ble attempts at infiltration by el?ments of the extralegal ~~ Moroccan Army of Liberation -This reportedly numbers between 2,500 and 3,000 in the southern Morocco area and is said by the Spaniards to be patrolling the border in place of the Moroccan police. Last week end, the Spanish foreign minister and the French under .secretary of state for foreign affairs met at San Sebastian to examine the two countries' common interests in Morocco as well as other parts of North Africa. Immediately prior to the meeting, a Spanish F~eigh Ministry official in- f ormed..the American. embassy that the.. Ifni matter was sure to be a 'ihot potato," and an .officer of~ , the French em- bassy in Madrid told his SECRET PART II NOTES AND CCDII~MENTS Page 5 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 `'""~ SECRET "~ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKL3CSUMbARY 29 August 1957 American colleagues that France would officially support Spain's position on UNREST Small-scale rioting in Ac- cra and turmoil in, newly rode- pendent Ghana's National Assem- bly last week are symptomatic of growing opposition to the government of Prime Minister Nkruxnah and his Convention People's party (CPP). These incidents, occurring against a background of continuing eon- flict between modern and tradi- tional patterns of society, may be followed by further minor violence in the near future. SECRET Ifni to safeguard its own position, in its West African colonies. IN GHANA However, disturbances on a nationwide scale are probably not imminent, and the CPP re- gime, which enjoys,a large and well-disciplined majority in the legislature, appears to be in no danger for the present. Although the specific cause of the recent disorders in Accra is somewhat obscure, widespread disillusionment over the fruits of independence, especially in the economic sphere, is appar- ently fundamental to the present un- easiness in Ghana. Thee also appears to be genuine ,fear in some quarters-- especially among elements. of the op- position National Liberation Movement (NLM)--that the Nkru- mah government is headed toward dicta- torship. Its insist- ence an placing..- Nkrumah"s image on stamps and coins, its alleged unwill= ingness to consult the opposition, and its recent deporta- tion of a prominent anti-Nkrumah journal- ist and two opposi= tion party leaders all point in this direction., in the view of NLM leaders. Their fears were fur- ther aggravated by the government's hasty PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page. 6 of 1? Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 August 195? enactment last week of legis- lation to permit the ogster of the two politicians by mi'niste-~ r is1 arcde~ from which no appeal could be tal~en. Ahtigovernment agitation has also developed among-the Ga tribesmen, who live in the Accra area and formerly support- ed the CPP. Their principal complaint is that the govern- ment is alienating to non-Ga "strangers" tribal lands which they should be reserved for the future use of Ga peo- ple. As yet there is no open connection between the Ga and the NLM but such an alliance may develop soon. Meanwhile, there is evirlenc~e~ s~g~sting~ that the government may have already launched a get-tough policy aimed at crushing the Ga oppositian before such a merger, which could conceiv- ably increase the possibility "of eventual civil war,, can be effected. A head-on clash between the government and Ghana's tribal chiefs is alas an -early passibility. The latter have long been unhappy about the gradual but steady shrinkage of their traditional position of authority. Controversial government bills to establish regional commissioners--who would be powerful agents of the central government in the five regions of Ghana--now being ad- vanced in the assembly are like- ly to provoke strenuous protests both within and outside the leg- islature. Already the council of paramount chiefs in southern Ghapa, a group which has gener- ally supported the government, has passed a resolution of "no confidence" in the minister of local government and invited chiefs in the northern and Ashanti regions to a joint meet- ing to "discuss the preseni: trend of irs." OPPOSITION TO COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN INDIA'S KERALA STATE The Communist government in India's Kerala State was confronted far the first time, between 18 and 26 August, with organized popular oppositian to its policies, Sentiment against actions of the four- manth-old Communist ministry has been building up among several sections of Kerala's populace during recent weeks. Congress party and Catholic leaders exploited this dis- satisfaction to stage large- scale protest demonstrations. Two issues primarily have stimulated opposition protests: the Communists` attempt to ex- tend their governmental control over Kerala's private schools and their apparent condoning of "lawless" activities by labor groups, The education bill now under debate in the state assembly is the most controver- si.a measure introduced by the Communist government. It would give the administration wide powers of supervision ove~~ staite- aided private schools in Kerala, control over the appointment and payment of teachers, and the right to take over the administration of any school it decides is mismanaged. The bill has been widely attacked as a Communist scheme to dis- place the traditional educational system with Marxist indoctrina- tion. The bill is bitterly op- posed by the powerful Catholic elements in Kerala, which own approximately two thirds of the state's unusually well-developed educational facilities. SECRET 25X1 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page '~ of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 .::. ~ ...... ~ .. - . SECRET .. . CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 August 1957 The Communist rega~me has also come under considerable attack both within Kerala and elsewhere in-India for its poli- cy of limiting law enforcement in labor disputes. Wides~laread reports of "terroristic" activi- ties by Communist..-dominated labor groups, particularly directed toward foreign managers of the state's many large plan- tations, have followed the governments order restricting the state police from inter- vening in disputes between labor and management. The much-publicized pro- test march on the state capital staged by Congress party and CatholYc leaders on 26 August T m pp ren y result- ed in only minor incidents which the government forces were able to control without great diffi- culty.. The size and strength of this popular opposition in Kerala has not been reliably reported. The Communist position does not appear to be threatened seriously as yet, although the ministry seems to have been sufficiently impressed with the extent of the protest 25X1 sentiment to make some minor modifications of the education bill prior to the 26 August demonstration. While Communist leaders are unlikely to alter their basic ob,~ectives in Kerala, continuing public op- position may force them to plaice even further emphasis on con- ciliatory tactics rather ..than ~n policies openly designed to ex- tend Communist ontr state . 25X1 President Siles is appar- ently consolidating his recent victories over the leftist group which has opposed Bolivia's~?US- backed economic stabilization program. Both in congress and in the powerful national labor confederation, Siles has de- feated the forces of Juan Ledad.n, long Bolivia's most powerful ? lobar leader. Lechin's attacks on the program last spring apparently impelled Siles to drive for dominance. At a 17 May meeting of the government party's nation- al political committee, Siles, reportedly by threatening to resign, gained party authori- zation to reorganize his cabs- net and the party's national Committee without prior approval SECRET PART II NOTES AND CCIMMENTS Page 8 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ??,~ SECRET ? ~ C~'R?RENT I1~ELLIGENCE WEEKLY E'~F.Y 2J Aug~us+t 1957 of the Bolivian Lobar Central (COB), dominated by Lechin. Silas then instituted an in- tensive program of taking the economic stabilization issue directly to the people. Silas' opposition to the COB call far a general strike on 1 July not only prevented the strike and saved the eco- nomic program but also split the lobar central into pro- Siles and pro-Lechin factions. Consequently, when the nation- al congress opened in early August, new labor adherents of Silas combined with his moder- ate supporters to accept a resignation which leftist Vice President Nuflo Chavez--a Lech- in adherent--had offered in pique and had sought to re- call. The pro-Silas c~ongres-~ siona'l m~josi.~y had previously ousted Lechin as president of the Senate, in which office he was legally next in line of succession to the presidency. They elected moderate Federico Alvarez Plata to the post. Opposition activity in Cuba has subsided since the failure of a general strike attempt early this month, and President Batista has moved to tighten his hold over the island. The tenuous ,nat~~are=of his position is underscored, however, by? continuing political tension and rumors of increasing subver- sion within the armed farces;" " Sabotage activities a+re likely to increase with the anticipated restoration of con- stitutional guarantees an or be- fore 15 September. In the COB itself, where a Lechin slate had won virtually every post in elections last June, the pro-Silas opposition gained sufficient strength by 23 August to force the resig- nation of all officials except Lechin, The recent record of the successful group suggests that a reconstituted COB will provide Silas with effective cooperation, at least 'tempo- ra~'11y:. Silas, however, has de- pended to a considerable ex- tent for each of these major victories an Juan Sanjines, formerly known as a Communist and now as a Communist sympa- thizer. Sanjines, as leader of the key railway federation, was the most important single la- bor leader opposing the 1 July general strike and probably the chief figure in the drive to re- and congressional. constitute the COB. His power in congress was shown by his recent election as president of the lower house, Should he turn against Silas, it would endanger the latter'?s support, both labor A high-level shake-up of the military command in Oriente Province preceded a new drive against Fidel Castro's rebels in 'the Sierra ~aestra. The government has clamped e~en- sarship on accounts of the ac- tion. Despite claims that the army, which reportedly is try- ing aerial-bombardment, will shortly wipe put the rebel men- ace, it is doubtful that the current campaign will be any more successful than previous SECRET PART II _ NOT$S AND; Cb~lMENTS Page 9 of :17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET ..:QURR~~1'I' INTELLIGENCE WEET~LY'SiTM1~ARI' 29 August .195? all-out extermination drives. Government efforts to woo the largely antiadministration pop- ulace of Oriente have failed to halt the moral and l~igistic support for the rebels. The government coalition has continued preparations for presidential elections in June 1958, and an electoral la.w, which has passed both houses of congress, is: awaiting exebuti~e approval.. Opposition groups SOVIET LAWS TO COMBAT The RSFSR, the_largest:ot; the'.Soviet`..republics,. lished for discussion a draft law against "antisocial and parasitical elements," First proposed this spring in the Baltic republics, the decree has since been suggested with only minor variations in all the other republics except the Ukraine, , and Mol- davia. Uzbekistan and Turk- menistan have already put such a law into effect. The law empowers general meetings of citizens of oil-~ loges or city blocks to sentence to a term of exile of two to five-years "-able-bodied adults who lead an antisocial, para- sitical life, who maliciously evade socially useful works or who live on unearned income." The draft legislation specifies that a simple majority vote is required to adopt a sentence of exile. The decision must then be submitted for confirmation to the executive committee of the district or city soviet of working people's deputies. The punishment specified is defined as "obligatory engagement in work at a place of exile," with unauthorized departure punish- able under the existing crim-~ inal codes. appear to be preparing to boy- cott the elections, but so far have failed to .agree on a com- mon course of action. Some basis for political stability is provided by Cuba's record-breaking economic pros- perity, by Batista's strong hold over the powerful labor movement, and by the continued lovalty e~ tnr~ mi l i +ary figures. "PARASITICAL ELEMENTS" The use of citizens' as- semblies to pass sentences is apparently an attempt to en- courage public condemnation of persons who-avoid productive work or who support themselves through shady dealings such as speculation. One of the great stumbling blocks in combating .such problems in the past has been public apathy. Many Soviet citizens-have apparently been struck by the decree's complete disregard of the judicial process. In public discussion, the law has met with an unusual amount of criticism and suggestions for changes. One of .the most often reiterated suggestions is that the citizens' assemblies should be empowered merely to ferret out and discuss cases of parasitical behavior in their midst and that their findings should then be turned over to the courts for handling. It has also been pointed out that the law is too vague, does not provide for appeal, and con- f licts with existing criminal codes. One person dismissed it summarily as being completely unconstitutional. In the two republics where it has been passed, however, no change has been made from the original draft version. SECRET PART II -NOTES .AND ,COMMENTS Page l0 of 1'? Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 v SECRET" CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 August 195? While it is probable that the decree is viewed primarily as a deterrent and a means to stir up public censure, its potential for causing the per- secution of a great nt~m~er of individuals seems greats One Soviet citizen commented in a published letter that the law could be usefully applied a? gainst school graduates who wait for over three months to get a 3 ob. Only a few cases of the law's application have been reported thus far. In one in- stance a collective farmer was exiled for five years because he had "avoided communal labor for a lang time." Another farmer "who had not earned a single workday in a year and a half" requested a light sen- tence on the grounds that he was willing to reform, so the collective gave him a one-year trial period. The latter case appears to be an illustration of what the regime hopes the plish. FURTHER EXPANSION OF NEW LANDS IN THE USSR PROPOSED Soviet party secretary and presidium member Belyayev in a full-page Pravda article on 24 August at a~`cke3 Malenkov's views on the grain program and --obviously speaking on behalf of Khrushchev--suggested the possibility of reclaiming an additional 30,000,000 to 37,- 000,000-acres of new land in the-RSFSR in the next. two years. This expansion would double the new lands area in the RSFSR, which contains about 40 percent of the 89,000,000 acres re- claimed thus far in the new lands program. With the grain crap this year in danger of falling 10- 15 percent below last year's, Khrushchev apparently considers a good offensive his best de- fense against possible charges that his agricultural policies have failed. He apparently is willing to take the risks in- volved in a further expansion of grain production into virgin lands to bolster prospects for realizing his goals of catching up with the United States in per capita production of meat, but- ter, and milk. An expansion of the magnitude suggested would contribute toward these goals but would fall short of enabling the livestock goals to be met. Nevertheless, this proposal is the first which could contrib- ute~ significantly toward achieving these goals. Belyayev suggested that the yearly grain production from the new areas would amount to about 10,000,000 to 15,000,- 000 tons, which would be roughly 10 percent higher than the long- run average to be expected from the present grain area. The yield possibilities suggested SECRET FART II NOTES AND COMMENTS page 11 of 1? Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23 :CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ~.? SECRET ~, CURRENT INTELLICsEN'f;E WEEKLY S~TM~IARY 29 August 1957 by Belyayev ar? somewhat aaDOre atnodest ttnan thos? predicted by Khr~astnckne~r for the anew lauds, but a~?e still ~a~ceroptiim$stic for tlne ~irea in tine long rann. The pr~eliaaninary mature of Belyayev ? s pmoposal is am~,de clear by his statement that according to "tentative ?stim i~~,tes of local orgaaniz~,tioans" it is possible to reclaiun this aa~caunt o? land in the Urals and Siberia. Belyayev said that Siberia is a particanlan?ly desirable aat??a ian which to easpaand agri- cul.tural prodanction -since it has la~?~e a~aoaunts of easily re? claimed lands is less sub,~ect to drought than other is ne~~? large irndnastrial cenm tars;;?vhas relatively good trans? portation facilitiesg arad has amachinery sand eacperienced cadres available? NEW LANDS, 1956 Main area ~ Secondary areas - Selected railroad The yields in the Siberian portioaa of ttn? new lands are on the average thigher than in Kazakhstane and tine haraeaful ef? f acts of rainy weather during harvestirng array b? somewhat al? leviated by the tw??stage ~aethod of h~.rvestixng suggested by Belyayev? On the other hand9 it is probable that any-land reclaimed in tine future would be of poorer quality than that b~?ought into cultivation in these areas in tine initial new lands programs On b~ilancee it is probable that the long~r~an yields in the p~?oposed a~?e~, of recla~aation will approxiamate ttnose estia~mated for th? original new lands ~.~?eas9 rime to tern- bushels of grain per acre. Tine country-wide average is approxi~uatel 12 bushels per ac~?e ? l~u?epared by 25X1 ORR) SECRET PART lI NOTES AND OOI1dMENTS Page 12 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23 :CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WTEKLX S.UM~:~,R;'Y 29 August 195? USSR EXPECTS TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT IN INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS Nerov diamond discoveries in the Yakutsk ASSR allegedly make it "quite feasible" for the USSR to become self-sufficient in industrial diamonds possibly during the Sixth Five-Year Plan. According to an article in the June issue of Voprosy Ekonomiki, Soviet annual iamon require- ments will reach six million carats in 1960,. with the rest of the "socialist camp"_requir- ing an additional one to three million carats, all of which will presumably be available in the USSR. Production sufficient to meet such requirements would be equal to about half the 1956 world output. The wide publicity in 1956 accorded the extensive diamond discoveries in the Yakutsk ASSR indicated that the USSR hoped eventually to be able to dis- pense with imports of African diamonds obtained in circumven- tion of Western strategic trade controls. The 1956 publicity, however, indicated that Industrial Diamond Production in the USSR Placer deposit * Nimberlite deposit (Based on a map from the Soviet magazine PRIRODA) total production of 7,000,000 to 9,000,000 carats seems to be based bn the assump- tion that the other reported. kimberlite deposits will actually prove to contain suf- ficient quantities of bort, gemstone, or industrial diamonds to warrant serious exploitation. In addition to problems of location and climate in exploit- ing the Yakutsk diamond fields, the deposits are so far removed from civilization as to re- quire the establishment of settlements before extensive prospecting can be undertaken. SEc~~~~`, development of these diamond fields was not scheduled to begin until late in the Sixth Five-Yeat Plan in view of dif- ficulties of climate and ter- rain. Apparently not foresee- ing the possibilities for de- velopment of the Yakutsk dia- mond industry, the USSR had in 1955 subsidized the Indian Parana diamond mines,. from which it evidently-expected to obtain up to 25 percent of its require- ments. Soviet diamond output at present is based largely on placer deposits in Nyurba Raion and on the "Mir" kimberlite diamond deposit. Although five other deposits are known to exist, only the "Mir" is known to be under de~relopment, and is believed to be the only one which has been sufficiently prospected to permit a reason- ably accurate estimate of the industrial diamond content. Soviet expectation of a PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of lfi Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 "'~' SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU~[1~ARY 29 August 1957 The "Udachnaya" deposit is somewhat over 1,000 kilometers from river ports and in the tundra beyond the polar circle where. the ground is frozen the year round, The "Mir" deposit and placer mines, where the only known attempt at mining diamonds on a commercial scale has been made, are in a some- what more favorable location. A settlement has been built about one and a half kilometers from the diamond deposit near Nyurba, and construction of a 40,000-50,000-kilowatt thermal electric over station has been proposed (Prepared 25X1 by ORR) PEIPING TIGHTENS SQUEEZE ON CONSUMER Peiping's decision on 16 August to reduce the cotton textile ration for the next ration year (September 1957 to August 1958) by more than one third is the most severe of several recent steps designed to impose increased austerity on the Chinese consumer. In addition to the ration cut, the authorities have launched an intensive effort to convince both the rural and-urban popu- lace of the necessity- for further reductions in food consumption and have sharply narrowed the permissible scope of the "free markets," These measures indicate that Peiping is prepared to de- press consumer welfare below current low levels in order to fulfill plans which call for a slight increase in investment in 1958. The authorities are apparently convinced that they can-keep. any resultant discon- tent within manageable limits. In the ration year begin- ning 1 September, the Chinese consumer will receive only 19-21 feet of cotton cloth, the most important textile in China. This is only slightly over half the amount available to the Indian consumer. When the pre- vious ration year began last September, the Chinese consumer wa.s promised an average of 29 feet, but a disappointing cot- ton crop in 1956 forced the regime to cut back the ration for the second part of the ra- tion year by 50 percent. The result was that an average of only 24 feet was actually issued during-the -year. Certain special privileges given under the past ration COTTON CLOTH FOR CIVILIAN USE IN COMMUNIST CHINA ..........~ .,~ e,.._~ 149 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 IESTIMATEI systems have also been reduced or eliminated. The differen- tial in the ration between large cities and the countryside-is to be reduced, while the prefer- - ential ration accorded students, workers and party and government cadres is to be eliminated. Army SECRET PART II N?TES AND COMMRNTS Page 14 of 1? Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECR:~T CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ~UM~1RY 29 August 1957 officers, however, retain their favored position. Peiping bases its new ra- tion on the hope that an "av- erage" cotton crop between 1,- 350,000 and 1,500,-000 tans will be harvested this-year. How- ever,-the total acreage planted to cotton this year is some one million acres less than in 1956, and a half million more acres have reportedly been abandoned because of "excessive rainfall and floods." Thus, the out- look for a crop equal to last 'year's is bleak, and the ra- tion may have to be cut even further, Actually, the cotton textile outlook over the next few years is almost as bleak, and Peiping now says that it will place new emphasis on the creation of a synthetic-fiber industry beginning in 1958. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Food has said that the food rationing system must be tight- ened further, and the official People's Daily has flatly de- c a-T r~~ha~'rgrain sales can be reduced." This drive to scale down the amount of food consumed while insisting on in- creased deliveries of food by the peasants is an attempt to build up reserves which were badly run down last year and to improve the regime's shaky financial position. Moreover, the scope of "free markets," instituted less., than a pear ago with a view to simplifying the market by mak- ing it easier for producers of selected commodities to reach their consumers, has been severe- ly curtailed. A State Council directive of 17 August pro- hibits a wide range of products defined as coming under the state's centralized purchasing program from entering the "free markets" until all the state's demands have been met. Only minor products such as poultry, fresh eggs, spices, a few marine products, and some relatively unimportant native medicines can henceforth be handled, un- der strict state supervision, in the remaining "free markets," and any of these products may ortages develop. Prepared by ORR) 25X1 REPORTS ON MAO TSE-TUNG'S POSSIBLE RETIREMENT There have been unconfirmed reports in recent weeks that some Chinese Communist leaders are in disagreement with poli- cies imposed by Mao Tse-tong, and a rumor that Mao himself wishes to retire to a-scholarly life.. However, most of Mao~s lieutenants would probably op- pose his withdrawal during the present "time of troubles:'' Mao is vulnerable to the charge of having acted impetu- ously in the socialization of agriculture in 1955-56, in the "liberalization" campaign of 1956-57, and possibly in eco- nomic planning for 1956. He personally reversed the party's cautious course on socializa- tion, was clearly the sponsor of the "hundred flowers" policy, and may have insisted on more ambitious economic planning than his more conservative econ- omists advised. These decisions contributed heavily to the seri- ous eCOriom1C and political prob- lem now confronting the regime. The Chinese Communist press has recently been quoting un- favorable remarks about Mao by SECRET PART II NOTES~AND COMMENTS Page 15 of 1? Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 _`~ SECRET` 29 August 195? "rightist" figures. One non- communist is said to have de- scribed Mao as "impetuous" and "not thoughtful." A long-time .Communist party member is quoted as advising Mao not to "assume-the air of a benevolent god," and as declaring that he had "begun to doubt that Chair- man Mao had made no mistakes." Although the aim in publishing such remarks-was presumably to emphasize .the. depratrity of tie rightists, many party members may regard these views as hav- ing some merit. Moreover, these views may reflect some comments made at ar near the top of the party. There is a rumor current that Mao has expressed a wish to resign in the near future in order to work aut a design for the development of China over the next century, Regarding himself as a philosopher and -poet, Mao, who will be 64 in December, may indeed desire a less demanding role in public life. If he actually has ex- pressed a wish to retire, party 'leaders who want him to with- draw may encourage him to do so, an action-they would otherwise probably not. dare to take. The party constitution adopted last fall-authorizes the party cenw tral committee to appoint "one honorary chairman"--clearly a. provision for Mao. However, the gravity of the regime's current problems makes it seem improbable that Mao will step down at this time. Most of his lieutenants would probably calculate that his resignation during a ".time of troubles''' would considerably increase those troubles. The party membership and the popu- lace in general have long been encouraged to believe that only Mao's leadership could have brought the party through its problems to its triumphs of the past decade. A declining emphasis on the need for Mao's personal leadership would be expected to precede his retire- ment. PLANS FOR NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN INDONESIA Indonesian Prime Minister D~uanda has called a national round-table conference to be held in Djakarta from 10 to 15 September to resolve outstand- ing issues between the central government and the dissident. provinces. It is not yet cer- twin, however, whether all im- portant dissident leaders will attend. Although Sumatran leaders have approved the idea, they have stated they would prefer that the conference be held in "neutral territory" such as Borneo. The success or failure of the conference may well deter- mine whether Indonesian unity s~cREr PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 16 of 1? Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 29 August 1957 is to be restored or whether the current trend toward frag- mentation will be accelerated, The agenda apparently will cover all matters in dispute between the provinces and the central government. Taking priority will be a discussion of the restoration of the Sukarno-Hatter partnership, which in Djuanda?s opinion is the greatest single need of the country, He has told the American ambassador he believes that if this discus= s ior~ fails , the conference wi 11 have failed and the nation?s situation will speedily become more critical. Djuaa~da is encouraged by the fact that both Hatter, who is popular in the provinces, and President Sukarno ?have agreed to attend the conferr~,ce SECRET as "supreme advisers." Hatter is postponing his departure for Communist China until 19 Septem- ber in order to participate. Despite his willingness to be present, Sukarno in a 24 Au- gust address?demonstrated again that he still stands at cross purposes with Hatter and with provincial leaders .in their de- mands for greater political and economic regional-autonomy. He spelled out the aims of his con- cept of "guided democracy" as the establishment of a "free, independent, fully united, uni- tary Indonesian Republic" and the realization of "a society ~~' ~~a~tice aaa4~ prosperity, in other words, socialism." He also lass recently reiterated his denunciation of provincial leaders as "selfish adven? r- ors . " 25X1 PART II NnTES AID COMI~E~('I'S Page 17 of 1? Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ~~~ e~~ ~~ a~r~T~~~ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Aug~s:t~,19~7 PATTERNS .AND PERSPECTIVES The Soviet stand at the London disarmament talks this year has been characterized, as Secretary Dulles has said, by ''somewhat more realism and less bombast" than in the past. The USSR has made a number of im- portant concessions in the talks, but the tactics of the Soviet negotiators and a number of statements by Khrushchev suggest that Moscow does not expect any disarmament agreement to be con- cluded in the near future and that many of its proposals and statements are designed mainly for immediate propaganda ad- vantage. During the Stalin era the Soviet leadership did not seem to appreciate the full implica- tions of the atomic age, but did recognize that as long as the -USSR lacked atomic weapons it was in an unequal bargaining position with the West, and it studiously avoided serious nego- tiations on disarmament. The Soviet stand from 1945 until 1954 was shrewdly conceived as propaganda to prevent the United States from using its atomic bombs as an instrument of the cold war. Moscow consistently demanded the immddiate prohibi- tion and destruction of atomic weapons, offered only vague sug- gestions for control measures to enforce this,-and proposed a flat one-third cut in all armed forces without revealing the size of its own. Since 1954 the Soviet Un- ion apparently has felt close enough to atomic equality to enter the disarmament negotia- tions with proposals increasing- ly.-realistic and flexible. The Soviet leaders also seem to realize the unprecedented devas- tation that would follow a nu- clear war,- and this has height- ened their interest, if not in a general disarmament agreement, then at least in measures to prevent the use of nuclear weap- ons in warfare. Furthermore, the enormous and increasing cost of nuclear weapons and missiles has provided the USSR as well as the West with an incentive to put some- limits on the arms race. About one seventh of the Soviet economy's total output, measured in rubles, is devoted to military purposes. While defense costs will continue to rise, the total economy probably. will grow at about the same rate, so these expenditures need not become an increasingly heavy burden. Nevertheless, Khrut shchev's new commitments to higher living standards and his continued obsession with over- taking the United States in per capita production, plus the dif- faculties encountered in main- taining the growth of raw mate- rials industries in 1956-57, must impress on ..the Soviet lead- ers the desirability, although not-the necessity, of shifting resources from defense to other purposes. The increasing need for civilian labor can be met in part by reductions in military manpower; .cuts in this field do not greatly weaken the USSR's military position relative to the West and therefore can be undertaken unilaterally. Uni- lateral reductions in military production,:, however, if they were big enough to help solve economic problems, could weaken the Soviet position. Diversions of pr?duction from defense to the civilian economy, therefore, depend on an agreement with the West. The technical complexities of the nuclear age are a serious obstacle to a disarmament ac- cord~ since they make control measures difficult and in some ~ONF~a~'~TlAL PART III PATTERNS ANI~ PERSPECTIVES Pale 1 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET WEEKLY ~iTARMARY 29 August 195? t7C~AN `.\~P~, } ~ /x ~ , ,., ~/ The Soviet. leaders appear to believe that some of these goals can be achieved either without a disarmament agreement or with a limited agreement tailored to a considerable ex- tent to conform with Soviet views. Which method Moscow uses depends on the success of Soviet efforts to weaken-the Western defense system without a. dis- armament agreement or on the willingness of the West to meet Soviet terms. The Soviet leaders probably consider, however, that a formal signed agreement has certain ad- vantages~. For example,-it would be the surest way to gain a mutual pledge not to use atomic weapons. The main disadvantage of a formal agreement from Mos- cow's viewpoint is that to gain the limitations on atomic war- fare and elimination of foreign. rwLnN~ For details of fh. proposals coverin sW&~ ~ Europe, see oche map. _ f SECRET cases impossible. The differ- ences between the Soviet and Western blocs in the combination of forces, armaments, bases, and alliances relied on for security have also accentuated disagree- mentin disarmament negotiations. Disarmament In Sovi~'~or~gn Policy The Soviet Union is trying to strengthen its security and increase its influence outside the orbit by seeking the removal of American power and influence - from Europe, the liquidation of foreign bases from the Soviet periphery, and the inhibition of the American nuclear deterrent. Achievement of the last-named goal would lessen the danger that small wars and revolutions, possibly resulting from Soviet maneuvers, might expand into major nuclear wars. AERIAL INSPECTION PROPOSALS I !TRYi::. i~l HINA~ a.,r,.,,C r_~r,r r, (? bases, at least some unwelcome concessions, in the field of in- spection and contro l would be necessary. In the current. London talks., particularly since its 30 April proposal, the Soviet delegation has empha-~- .sized..the advantages of a partial agree- ment, probably con- sidering this the only chance to gain some aims without major concessions to the West. Moscow realizes that the Western gov- ernments are under some popular pressure to come. to an agree- ment but may have over- estimated this pres- sure,- Several re- treats by the Western powers from offers previously made have strengthened recurring Soviet doubts that the Western powers are willing to sign any disarmament agreement. Several times during PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ~ SECRET ~ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEI+CLY SUMMARY. 29 August ].95? the current negot'ia- tion5 Soviet of f icials have expressed con- cern to Americans that France and Brit= ain were blocking are agreement between the United States and the USSR. In May 1956; Khrushehev told French off icials that the Soviet leaders had -come to the conclu- lion that there was no possibility of a disarmament agreement because of the atti- tude of the United States, and that the USSR had decided to proceed unilaterally in the disarmament field with the expee- cation that sooner or 3ater other coun~ -tries would have to fol-low suit. Khrushchev was re- (erring particularly to .Soviet announcements that in 19.55 and 19.56 the iJSSR would reduce .its military. manpower by 1,840,004, a move designed to induce the West-to make even greater cut- backs in-its defense establish menu : ` The -heavy Sav~ie prop- agenda eampagn~against nuclear and thermonuclear tests ~.nd the sharp diplomatic-campaign against _the :setting up :of nuclear- equipped units in; Europe were part of the continuous effort to play up a distinction before world opinion between conven- tional and "inhuman" nuclear weapons. In a broader sense, the entire Soviet peaceful-co- existence policy is designed to persuade the 'West to rious budgetary problems by cutting back defense outlays. The content and. the timing of specific Soviet offers on" disarmament have often appeared to be determined by more my media.ta tactical. interests:, The first sign of Soviet fleai:bility on disarmament in the post,- USSR aerial inspection Proposed zone of US aerial inspection ;a~.,, y SYRI~ bfE!?ITERRANEAN SEA ~ ISAAe 70 ~~ - LIIIYA.,, FC;YPT~~ - - .., Stalin period appeared in a -Sep- tember 1954 proposal, timed to coincide-with the crucial London meeting of the Western foreign: ministers to devise a substitute for the EDC treaty, gust defeated in the French assembly. Soviet e.riclorsement of an aerial inspection plan for Europe was first revealed in a proposal on l7 November 1956, designed to 'show that the Soviet intervention in Hun- gary did not indicate a return tp Stalinist policies: Sov~t disarmament moves often have the tactical aim of placing t2ie blame on the West for .the failure'to data of the negotiations tQ:pro'duce any signed a,greemert. Thus the Soviet emphasis on the simple issue of atomic test suspen- sion is largely du;e to real- i2ation that world opinion favors an end to tests and .the +ealculation that the West is unlikely to agree to a test suspension standing by itself. The Soviet statement on 26 Au- gust claiming that the USSR had SECRET ~' PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES ~ Page 3 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ` Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 4~' .. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUI6~MARY 29 August successfully tested an intercon- tinental missile was probably timed to increase support for -the Soviet nuclear test ban proposal at the forthcoming UN General Assembly session. Aspects of Disarmament The disarmament negotia- tions in the UN subcommittee this year have involved five separate categories of issues-- control of nuclear weapons, prevention of surprise attack, cutting; .conventional forces, eliminating troops and bases on foreign soil, and establishing political preconditions--each of which needs to be examined separately to show the reasons for the Soviet position and the changes in that position during the London talks. In sum,-the Soviet Union has been trying to impose polit- ical and moral limitations on ~Yestern use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent and-to eliminate or reduce Western military.. forces and bases in Europe and elsewhere on the Soviet periph- ery. The- primary Western ob- jective of removing the dangers of surprise attack has been an- swered with reluctant conces- lions and a deep-seated disc trust of the control and inspec- tion measures which the West considers essential both for preventing surprise attack and for ending nuclear tests and future production of nuclear weapons.. Nuclear Weapons: The So- viet n crest n sarmament is centered primarily on the ques- tion of nuclear weapons because they constitute the main deter- rent on which the United States relies. Moscow's foreign policy is considerably inhibited'be,- cause of danger that through' miscalculation, small conf licts might be expanded into a nuclear Armageddon. Through the years the Russians have proposed pro- hibitions on atomic weapons, and the West has suggested systems of inspection and con- trol. Moscow has also shown some concern over the possibil- ity that other nations may de- velop atomic weapons, particular- ly a nation such as West Ger- many, thereby increasing the explosive risks of small wars. For many years Soviet dis- armament proposals centered on a demand for the prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons. Soviet responses to Western de- mands for control mechanisms were vague and feeble. Grad- ually both sides came to real- ize that it was impossible to detect secret stockpiles of nu- clear materials and weapons which had been accumulating in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR; the USSR frankly admitted this in its proposals of 10 May 1955. Al- though Moscow continues to de- scribe its long-range goal as the complete prohibition of nu- clear and thermonuclear .? weapons, with a cessation of their produc- tion and the destruction of stockpiles, its recent proposals for a partial agreement call only for a statement that the parties will seek to achieve this in the _fL`t.ture. Zorin has said privately that he realized the elimination of all nuclear weapons was impossible in a limited agreement. This change in line ref lects a new realism in Soviet negotiations, a real- ization that it is counterpro- ductiveto demand an agreement that cannot be enforced. It also ref lects the continuing fundamental Soviet hostility to those control and inspection measures which might be practical. One step the USSR has long proposed as a means; of deal- ing with this problem is the signing of an unconditional pledge not to use atomic weap- ons. Soviet officials have made it clear they have no illu- sions that such a pledge would prevent their use in an all-out war between the United States and the USSR, but. they believe SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ~r SECRET ~ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU1~~fARH 29 August-195?. it would be effective in pre- venting use of nuclear weapons in a limited war. The USSR also expects it would destroy the confidence of the free world in the military strength of the Western alliance systems. In the current disarmament session, Moscow has been insisting on this pledge as one element in a partial agreement and has re- jected the Western counterpro- posal that such a ban exempt situations of individual or collective self-defense. Since February 1956 the USSR has emphasized the immedi- ate suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests independent of other aspects of the disarma- ment question. Moscow now proposes that it precede even a ,partial agreement in line with Khrushchev's assertion that it is the one question that can be solved even before mutual trust is established-among the great powers. The Soviet Union modified its earlier proposals for a com- plete ban with its 14 June 1957 plan fora two- or three-year suspension of tests,. to be checked by control hosts in the .Soviet Union, Britain, '.the United States, and the Pacific. Ocean area. The .USSR has ob- jected to linking a suspension with other issues, such as the ban on production of f issionable material for weapons purposes proposed by the West. The Russians appear to be trying tv make the test issue the central one in the current negotiations in order to confront the West with a simple, clear-cut, popu- lar offer which it believes will be rejected, with a resulting world-wide. propaganda gain for Moscow. The l4 June Soviet proposal .was not put forward until~So- viet negotiators had ascertained the likelihood of Western re- jection. The advantages to the USSR of concluding an agreement on test suspensi;on, the prevention of ..nuclear weap- ons development by .,-other_ nations, and the official recogni- tion of a distinction between nuclear and conventional weap- ons are offset by the present technical lag of the Soviet. Union behind the United States in nuclear weapons development. Therefore, while the Soviet Un- ion may eventually desire a ba.n on tests, its primary purpose in emphasizing this in the cur- rent negotiations is probably to gain propaganda advantage. The West has proposed, as part of a partial agreement and prerequisite to 'a test suspen- sion, an agreement:~for the cessation of nuclear weapons production inspection system to ensure that future production of fissionable ma- terials would go exclusively for nonweapons purposes. It has also proposed'that subsequently agreed and roughly equal amounts of fissionable materials be transferred by the United States and the USSR (and smaller amounts by Britain) from existing weap- ons to an internationally super - vised.stockple for nonweapons purposes. The Soviet Union has apposed these plans, with . Zorin stating privately that a ban on production must be tied to an unconditional pledge to ban use and to seek complete prohibition-and elimination. The Soviet coolness to that form of control which the West believes is possible to enforce--the ban ~on future pro- duction of nuclear materials for weapons--is a symptom of the long-standing Soviet hostil- ity? to control. recently ~ex- pressed by Khrushchev, Speaking on 13 June in Finland, he said that controls will not prevent a state from preparing for ag- gression. "To advocate control is one thing, but to admit foreign controllers to one's factories and plants and air- fields and arsenals is another." Surprise Attack: The unre- liabi ~.ty . o any possible SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 5 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 .. SECRET CURRENT .INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY 53UAR~ 29 August 1957 inspection procedures to check on existing atomic-weapon stock- piles has led the West to put increasing emphasis on measures to prevent surprise attack. The Western theory is that sur- prise is essential for the suc- cess of aggression today, that effective inspection procedures can largely remove the surprise- element, ~,nd that if this were done both sides could take the risks of major reductions in~ their defense establish menu. 'The West is mare concerned than the USSR about the danger of a surprise attack and the West has a greater interest in sending inspectors into the large forbidden areas of the USSR. The West has taken most of the initiative for adopting measures against surprise at- tack, and the Soviet counter- proposals have been offered to demonstrate Moscow's willing- ness to negotiate., There re- mains considerable doubt that the U5SR would be willing to make the radical changes in its closed society that its own inspection proposals would re- quire. It has put a, greater- emphasis on ground inspection,. .while the West has stressed aerial inspection. The USSR::took the lead in its 10 May 1955 plan in pro- posing the establishment of control posts at large ports rail junctions, major highways, and airf fields to prevent sur- prise attack by reporting on military concentrations. On its latest pr4~osal for :a par- tial agreement., the establish-. went of control posts at airs fields is postponed until the later stages. The inspection area would include Europe, .the eastern border of the United States, and the western fringe of the USSR, and could include areas covered by aerial inspection. The principal difference in Western-ground inspection plans is the inclusion of airf fields in the early stagesiand the additional use of mobile in- spection teams. The more controversial is- sue is the aerial inspection proposed by President'Eisen- howe.r at the summit conference in July;, 1955 and emphasized by the Western powers since then. The Soviet leaders immediately reacted coldly to the proposal publicly and privately, making it clear ?that they felt it was designed for espionage purposes and would contribute nothing to a disarmament solution. ' When the USSR offered its first specific plan for aerial inspection in November 1956, it emphasized that it still con- sidered the step unnecessary.. but was offering a plan to meet Western insistence. Khrushchev said on 13 June of this year, "We have stated from the very beginning that those 'open skies' offer nothing, and that this proposal (President Eisenhower's) can only increase the suspicions felt by one power toward another." This attitude lends an air of unreality and insincerity to the specific aerial. inspection schemes offered by the USSR.. The USSR seems primarily interested in a European zone, while the West, concerned about the political problems in Europe, wants to make a zone there con- ditional on acceptance of one of its other two proposed zones. One of these encompasses all of the USSR, the United States, .Canada, and Alaska; the other is limited to the Arctic, Alaska, and Kamchatka. Outside of Europe the Soviet Union has pro- posed a zone including the eastern part of the USSR and the western United States, areas of roughly equal size but un- equal in industrial and strate- gic importance, Conventional Forces: In the ear y postwar negotiations. the Western powers sought to counter Soviet demands.'for the SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGEDI'CE WEEKLY BUI-~M~R'~ ,~~ August .1957 prohibition of nuclear weapons (a monopoly.. of the West with plans for reductions in man, power (in which the USSR was .predominant), starting with: the provision of accurate informa- tion about the size of all forces . The USSR ?red unreal- istic and. unverifiable ,proposals for an all-round one-third cut in forces. In May 1955, the USSR accepted a British-French pro- posal to set the maximum force level of the United States, the USSR, and China at 1,500,.000 each and of Bri' and France at 650,?00 eacb, with the reduc- tions to be accomplished by stages phased into steps toward nuclear disarmament. In the present circum- stances the .Soviet Union believes that such extensive cuts would greatly weaken the overseas commitments of the Western pow- ers, particularly the United States, The USSR has already announced cuts of 1,840.,000 in its: military forces since Au- gust 1955, and has carried out at least some of them, and it may contemplate further cuts in the future as newer weapons create budgetary problems. Thereforer the So~tiet Uhian would like the Western powers to sign an agreement committing them to make equivalent cuts. In the current negotiations the USSR has accepted a Western compromise 1'or a reduction of forces to 2, 500.,000 each for tlae United States and.-the USSR and 750,000 each for Britain and France in the first stage, with cuts of the great powers to 2,- 180,000 and 1,fiOO,OOO and pro- portionate British and French cuts in the second and third stages. However, the West has made these- further cuts cond3,- tional on progress in the imple- mentation of he wholedisarma- ment agreement and on progress in-the settlement of political issues. Zori~i only recently emphasized that the partial agreement must includ"e firm az~d unconditional grovisions for these further cuts. Tl~e tJS-3R had proposed .that these manpower reductions be accompanied by a 15-percent cut in arma~ents and budgets, while the West graposed 10 percent. During the current negotiations the USSR has stated that it has no objection in principle to an alternative Western plan far an exchange of lists of the arma- ments to be reduced. and their deposit in an internationally supervised stockpile, but the details of-such a scheme have still not been worked out. Troops and-Bases on Foreign 'Soil: A ma or aim o~ oviet policy is to gain the removal o American forces from Europe and other areas peripheral to the USSR. As part of the disarma- ment: negotiations,the USSR has .sought to achieve this by pro- posing not only sharp reduc- tiions in total troop;: strength but also a cut in forces in Germany and all of Europe and an elimination of foreign bases. The West has never accepted the European force cuts and base liquidation as a legitimate par t of a disarmament agreement.. The USSR has made a number of these proposals in the past, each with several variations, designed as part of a European security plan, a disarmament package., or as steps that could be taken independently "to lessen international tension." Khrushchev has several times talked vaguely about the with- drawal of all foreign troops and bases, .particularly from Europe. This area illustrates very well the Soviet technique of seeking the same objectives :both within and outsf de the disarmament negotiations. The current Soviet proposal for a partial disarmament agree- ment proVa:des that an agreement be reached on-the liquidation of s?dme foreign bases wi-thin one SECRET PART III PATTERNS AHLI~;P~RHPECTIVES Page 7 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 3U~ARY 29 August 1957 or two years, that the four powers make a one-third cut in their forces in Germany, that the total military forces of the four powers stationed on the territories of member states of NATO and the Warsaw pact be re- duced, and that the location of atomic weapons on foreign soil, and particularly in Germany, be banned. Zorin recently made it clear that the USSR still in- sists that these provisions be included in a partial agreement. Political Preconditions: The West has emphas ze t at no comprehensive disarmament agreement is possible without political settlements, and as- serted in the Berlin declara- tion of 29 July that this must include German unification. In the current negotiations on a partial agreement it has in- sisted on progress toward polit- ical settlements before the second and third stages of mili- tary force reductions. Although Zorin said private- ly in April that a partial agree- ment including the reduction of troops and bases abroad would ease international tension and be followed by negotiations on political issues, he has re- mained adamant in public and private statements against in- cluding any reference to polit- ical settlements in.a partial disarmament agreement. Fie has continued to question the Western delegates on the pre- cise nature of-the political re demanding. Talks have taken place in land are said to be subject to Europe. during the past few- I adjustment. months between Israeli officials and-representatives of the Pales- tine- refugees. The Arabs in- volved probably represent a refugee group interested in making a settlement for assets still under Israeli control; Arab governments reportedly have not participated. While such talks have accurred in the past without results of major significance, some refugees and certain Arab officials may be adapting a more flexible attitude than they have main- tained in the past. At present, a United Na- tions group is completing a survey of the lands and pro- perties in Israel formerly held by refugees. Completion of the survey will provide a basis far determining who would be entitled to receive compen- sation and how much. About 642,000 acres of former Arab Integration and Resettlement Some refugees--mostly mem- bers of the professional, land- owning, or skilled-labor classes-- have been integrated into the society and economy of-the Arab states. In Lebanon, substantial numbers of Arab Christian ref- ugees have been absorbed; many of them have found employment in F3eirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. These who have become thus estab- lished are unlikely. to favor re- turning to Israel. Small-scale refugee migra- tions to Iraq have occurred in the past and have lately been reported again. Although Iraq is underpopulated and in need of peasant farm labor, the problems of refugee resettlement there :. are acute. Numerous feudal landlords still control much of the farm lands. A substantial SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 SECRET ~ CURRENT `INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 August 1957 inf iux of Palestinian labor would require a great social, and perhaps political, upheaval ref a scope beyond any now in sight. Moreover, the living standard of the Iraqi .peasant is even lower than that of the Arab refugees, and the younger refugees, who presumably would farm the bulk of potential emi- grants, have not been 'c lose to the soil and are not the hard- working f ellahin of pre~Israel days in Palestine. The Arab governments have opposed any schemes for .reset- tl, on,the grounds that to do so would be a renunciation of repatriation as the ultimate goal. The nearly one million 29 AUGUST 1957 MILES 100 zz4,ooo USX displaced Arabs themselves, for -the most part, are adamant in refusing to consider any solu- tion to the problem other than repatriation. They consider "resettlement" virtually a for- bidden word. As a result, the $200,000,000 resettlement fund of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) remains largely unspent, although UNRWA's man- date expires in 1960 with scant possibility of renewal. This fact may in time prove the most effective stimulus to new plans, since the alternative is for the refugees to become charges of the host governments. scope of the Problem SAUDf ~~ '~ r ~ #.~. 521,000 a6X L~6anR..r!)""'^~-S~ria J"Jordan SECRET Note: Total registered Arab Refugees as of May 1957=949,000 As of 31 May there were 949,407 refugees. registered -with UNRWA. They are distributed geograph- ically among the Gaza strip (224,000), Jor- dan (521,000), Lebanon (109,000), and Syria (95, 000) . Refugees may con- stitute as much as 75 percent of the total population of Gaza; in Jordan they number 36 percent of the people, and in Lebanon and Syria the percent- ages are 7,3 and 2.3 respectively. About 43 percent or '410, 000 of the refugees are from one to 15 years old, and an estimated 225,000 of this number were born as refugees. Each year roughly 25,- 000 more refugee ,births than deaths occur. There are 368,- 394 persons living in UNRWA camps. While considerable housing has been provided, 14,000 tents remain PART III' PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 15 . Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ~ SECRET .CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY`'SUMMAR~ 2~ August. 195? in use.. The vast majority of the 'refugees do not benefit from UNRWA facilities but live in squalor outside the camps. Some still dwell in caves in the hills of Palestine. UNRWA provides food, educa- tion, and medical care to ap- proximately 845,000. Various voluntary agencies, both reli- gious and secular, contribute additional services, mostly supplementing those provided by the UN agency. Assistance toward self-support is also part of the UN relief program. However, work opportunities are especially scarce in Jordan and the Gaza. strip, where most of the refugees live, and most of the available opportunities are skilled fobs for which the majority are unsuited. Although unemployed and living in generally deplorable conditions, the average refugee is provided with-care and serv- ices which In some cases are better than those available to .many nonrefugee Arabs, In spite of this, refugees consider the relief services insufficientt They regard the UN as largely responsible for their plight and the relief measures as a debt owed them by the world at large. Politics and Leadership From the refugee point of view, the problem demands a political rather than an econom- ic solution. Hence,-the refu- gees have rejected all measures for resettlement :~aad ~~~have exerted constant pros-sure on .the host governments toward achieving the-goal of'repatria- tion. On an East-West scale the refugees, far from being neu- tralist, are almost completely -anti-Western. Their antipathy stems from a belief t;~at the West "created" the archenemy Israel which now occupies their former homelands. Such senti- ment in .Jordan, where refugees constitute over one-third of the electorate, kept. that state from ,joining the Baghdad pact in 1955. Before King .Hussain consolidated control last spring, refugee influence was the mayor factor intimidating pro-Western voices and encouraging Jordan's politicians to follow the Egyp- tian and Syrian lead toward closer relations with the Soviet bloc . The frustration of the dis- placed Arabs makes them highly susceptible to exploitation by extremist politicians both in- side and outside their ranks. Indeed, an extremist position has almost been a requirement for achieving leadership among the group. There are known to be some moderates, possibly even a considerable number, but their views, if expressed at all, have so far had little chance of being heard. With leadership in the hands of extremists, no offec- tive organization has developed and no individual leader appears to be o~ more than local si,gnif- iCanc~: Some refugee land- owners have organized, and other groups of limited scope exist. The dispersion of refugees among 58 four countries vir- tually precludes a centralized refugee organization. Even within the states, refugee opinion apparently is exerted most effectively beyond the confines of the camps through nonrefugee politicians. Both Egyptian and Communist influence on the refugees is strong. Many of Egypt's fedayeen commandos have been recruited from the camps in Gaza and Jordan, where Nasr is a hero. .Jordanian elections in October 1956 revealed a definite pro-Egyptian bias on the part of educated Palestinian Arabs. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PEIt9PECTIVES Page 10 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 ~..+~ SECRET CURRENT 'INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ~ RY 29 August 1957 These in turn are leaders of the workers and peasant farmers, the f ellahin. Communism has made most headway among the young. Raised in a camp atmosphex^e free from effective parental control and the inhibitions of a stable village social structure, the young people are ready prey for leftist indoctrination. A group of Communist teachers has operated within- the-camp school system in Jordan . Student strikes there are believed to have been Communist inspired. Mohammedanism reportedly has assumed a radical colora- tion among refugees. pne ob- server believes that-Islam is returning progressively to the fanaticism which characterized it in medieval times. Present Government Attitudes "Justice" for the refugees remains a potent shibboleth around which to rally Arab unity. In the face of recent Egyptian charges that the Jor- danian and Iraqi governments were "betraging" the refugees by allegedly negotiating with Isr~.el, the accused governments found it necessary to reaffirm their opposition to anything but repatriation for the dis- placed Arabs.- Yet,--while of - ficial Arab attitudes toward the problem are. publicly uni- form, deviations occasionally have been indicated,- Iraq considered a suitable area for refugee absorption, at times has seemed inhibited only by Arab League injunctions against refugee emigration. Privately, the Iraqi attitude-has been one of willingness to accept those refugees who might come to Iraq but to resist any forced or imposed resettlement. In Lebanon, any possible integration of refugees is com- plicated by the delicate bal- ante between Moslems and Arab Christians there. In 1955, the Lebanese foreign minister indicated a readiness, within the framework of a peace settle- ment, to accept all of the 16,500 Christian refugees in Lebanon and a proportionately smaller number of Moslems, No Lebanese politician would be willing to espouse this view openly under present conditions. On 19 July, a Syrian of - ficial, summarizing his country's attitude toward the general problem of Palestine, told an American representative that settlement of the Arab refugee problem is dependent on adoption and enforcement of a policy of preventing further Jewish im- migration into Israel. If such immigration is halted, he asserted, Israel will not need to expand to take care of the large future population on which it counts.- The question of the Arab then allegedly could be settled by the Near Eastern countries themselves. These remarks are noteworthy .because of .the acknowledgment of a solution short of total repatriation. Israel itself has revealed an altered attitude toward the refugees. The Israeli minister to 'Washington advised the US State Department on 25 May that Israel's policy was changing in two significant respects: -the Israelis no longer feel it is .essential to bring about a set- tlement through the UN, and they no longer insist that the refu- gee problem has to be resolved as part of an over-all.-peace settlement. However, Israel still does not show any willing- ness to serious com- mitments in resolving the prob-. lem, and there is some question as to how far any Israeli cabi- net could go in the event serious ro osals ld arise. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3 __ V SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ~UMIYIARY 29 August 195? TREND TnWARD POLITICAL CHANGE IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA A fast-growing political ~ the government, it pleased no consciousness among the Afri- cans of British East Africa-- Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar--has .led to demands both for more African participa- tion in present colonial govern- ments and for early self-rule. This trend is ref lected in the attention being given in London to the development of a long-range policy for Africa. The desirability of locating a large military base in Kenya increases the British government's concern for stability in East. Africa. Kenya The problem of nationalist agitation is particularly preset ing in Kenya where it might lead to a new outbreak of racial conflict. Many fac- tors which contrib-. uted to the rise of Mau Mau terrorism in ].952 still. exist: 'the area is still dominated by the small European minor- ity, several tribes which need more land resent the reserva- tion of the White Highlands for Europe- ans, traditional African tribal and social structures have lost much of NYASALAND t