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September 26, 1957
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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY. SUMMARY COPY NO. 17. OCI NO. 5250/57 26 September 1957 AIM 7o Dk7i`~fiEVI WESis W-XT REVIEW DATE: o DECLASS RE-0 CIASS. ciANGLD TO: DOCUMEN NO. NOCHANGE WC S.S. d CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY I i I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL Ta ~m~R 1125X1 , State Dept., DIA reviews completed Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400080001-9 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF .THE ESP,ONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN 4Y MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared' primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 %WAW CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 September 1957 OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS Saud's Attitude King Saud arrived in Damas- cus on 25 September, apparently intent on fulfilling his self- imposed mission of preserving Arab "unity" despite his avowed distaste for the leaders of the present Syrian regime. He re- portedly plans to make a state visit to Lebanon about 12 Octo- ber. Saud's trip to Damascus, together with the subsequent arrival there of Iraqi Prime Minister All Jawdat, may signal a softening in the attitudes of pro-Western Arab leaders toward the Syrian regime, even though this effect is not intended. Jordan's King Hussayn in partic- ular has voiced his fear that Saud's move will weaken the an- tileftist front, which from Hussayn's standpoint is in spe- cial need of strengthening at this time, since the Jordanian cabinet has decided to convene parliament on 1 October. Al- though the most determined ex- treme nationalist members of parliament are in exile or jail, enough of their sympathizers re- main to embarrass Hussayn's pro- Western government even if they cannot soon overthrow it. T Iraq Ali Jawdat's trip to Da- mascus from Beirut appears to have been decided on the spur of the moment, possibly without consultation with other members of the Iraqi government. As re- cently as 24 September, Iraqi Crown Prince Abd al-Illah was seeking information about the objectives of Saud's trip, and gave no hint that any Iraqi of- ficial would attend. Rumors persist of cabinet changes de- signed to give the Iraqi cabinet more pro-Western backbone. For- mer prime minister Nuri Said is the only political personality in sight who seems capable of doing the job, but he apparently is still opposed by Abd al-Illah, whose influence is decisive. Turkey Turkey does not seem to have become infected with this softening in attitude. The Turkish government has massed enough manpower, weapons, and air strength in southern Turkey for a possible military action against Syria. Approximately 33,000 men--one infantry divi- sion, two infantry regiments, two armored brigades, eight artillery battalions, plus trans- port and engineer units--have been moved or are in position in the Iskenderun-Kirikhan- Gaziantep area. Turkish atti- tudes are not likely to be much CONFIDENTIAL PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 N-we SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 September 1957 ct65 Celibolu. Balikesir P4 n57 TNG n58 TNG n 28(-) 'Adana MIDDLE EAST GROUND ORDER OF BATTLE TURKISH ISRAELI ARAB _v. Deployment in Progress Pipeline Army ? Infantry U Corps ? Airborne Infantry ? Armored Infantry EJ Division Antitank Arty Cavalry EJ Bngade Armored Cavalry ELLLI ELL1 F~l Armored Armored Arty Field Arty 26 SEPTEMBER O NAUTICAL MILES 200 I r 0 STATUTE MILES 200 24685 influenced by shifts of official opinion in the Arab states; the Turks look to the West for ap- proval of their line of action. Syrian Moves The Syrians themselves do not appear to have taken large- FE JORDAN It Gaziantep 12 .i!" 29(MT) 5(MT) 14 1 246 B Kars scale defensive measures against possible Turkish military action, which Syrian Vice Chief of Staff Nafuri said last week he still feared. There are unconfirmed reports of some military move- ments in northern Syria, how- ever, and training of the peo- ple?s resistance:. groups;(futuwa) apparently has been stepped up. Leftist army leaders reportedly SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 September 1957 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 SECRET have sought to force back into active service some of the moderate officers whom they com- pelled to "retire" a few weeks ago. Syria has been and is re- ceiving various types of Soviet bloc arms and equipment as well as economic aid. (See Part III, page 1.) BULGARIA GREECE Hadimkoy. - Garlu '~artl~el ti. il'koy 'lies F-86E m F-84G T811I. - (~ F-84G m F-84G d ew) Bandirma FF-'";? i F-84G RF 84F rvaurte RT-33A Estirnesgut Eskisehir O Esenboga . Ankara mC-47ATURI .E m 47A m F-84G F-84G m C-47A 1 it (N ~C47A Moscow continues to take a serious view of the possibili- ty. ' of Western-backed armed in- tervention in Syria. Foreign Minister Gromyko in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 20 September reiterated Soviet security interest in Syrian Black Sea eo F-86E Merzifon TURKEY 458 JET FIGHTER-BOMBERS 31 JET RECONNAISSANCE 73 PISTON TRANSPORTS . r Trabzon ~:fspatta Konya ao F-84G Adana (Military)? Adana ,(Civil)(jAdana Kars Sarikamis. F-86E F84G Malatya (New)? ml-84G Batman ? Malatya ?Siirt DiyarbakirF-84G Islahive .Gaziantep Iskenderun* . 4(irikao .Latakia MIDDLE EAST AIR ORDER OF BATTLE ? Turkish Airfield (jrenway 7000 ft. or.over) A Major Arab Airfield A Major Israeli Airfield Squadron -~ Possible Movement of Squadron 14peline 26 SEP'T'EMBER 1957 O NAUTPCAL MILES 200 CYPRUS 106 JET fCHTERS 57 Mrsto a llurajms 2O /Ast.ors 9 PISTON LIGHT BOMBERS 40 PISTON RGHTERS 6 JET FIGHTERS 4 PISTON LIGHT BOMBERS SECRET Aleppo A A SYRIA 51 JET FIGHTERS 30 M IG-17s 6 MIG-15s 15 Meteors PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Vaof SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 September 1957 developments and made a bid for General Assembly approval of Soviet proposals to renounce the use of force and interference in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries. On 17 September, Soviet President Voroshilov sent the Shah of Iran a long note which set forth Moscow's views of So- viet and Western policy in the Middle East, cautioned him against supporting Western mach- inations against Syria, and solicited his influence in pre- venting such action. Moscow propaganda repeat- edly has warned Syria's neigh- bors, as well as Greece and Iran, against participating in any moves against Syria and con- tinues to single out Turkey and Israel as the most likely in- struments of any armed interven- tion in Syria. Bulganin's 10 September warning to Turkey has not yet been followed by a similar note to Israel. The arrival in Latakia harbor of two Soviet warships on 21 September at Syria's re- quest dramatized Soviet "soli- darity" with the present Syrian regime. Presumably to deter Western action, Moscow is again circulat- ing private warnings through Soviet officials that an attack on Syria would precipitate World War III, a tactic it used last November when it apparently be- lieved the Western powers might try to overthrow the leftist regime in Damascus. On the day following Gromyko's 10 September press conference warning to Turkey, a Soviet diplomat in Tehran reportedly stated that World War III was imminent be- cause the USSR would go to war if Turkey invaded Syria. USSR DRAFTING NEW ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1959-1965 A new long-term plan for the Soviet economy to take ef- fect at the end of 1958 appar- ently is to supplant the ambi- tious Sixth Five-Year Plan, originally scheduled to guide the USSR economy through 1960. On 25 September, Moscow radio broadcast a decision of the central committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers which calls for com- pletion by 1 July 1958 of a draft plan for the 1959-1965 period. This joint decision re- iterates the "main economic task" of "catching up" with the West in industrial output, and it reaffirms the "preferential development" of heavy industry and the currently stressed agri- cultural and housing programs. The action not only side-steps the revision of the 1960 goals of the Sixth Five-Year Plan called for by the December 1956 central committee plenum, but in effect postpones for a time the measuring against results of Khrushchev's administrative reorganization and other ele- ments of current policy. Background The decision reflects policy flexibility. For the first time SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SURRARY 26 September 1957- since Soviet planning began, a five-year plan has been aban- doned for evident economic rea- sons. The December central com- mittee plenum, facing shortfalls in important raw materials, ad- mitted "strains" in the rapidly growing economy. It called for thorough review of the draft Sixth Five-Year Plan in order to "make more precise" the ambi- tious 1960 goals previously an- nounced at the 20th party con- gress early in 1956. Pervukhin's modest goals for 1957, released in February, suggested the possibility of significant downward revision of the 1960 targets. Immediate- ly thereafter, Khrushchev's re- organization diverted attention from this important plan review. Abandonment of the task of re- vising the 1960 goals seems to have been decided after the June "purge." USSR Deputy Premier A. I. Mikoyan suggested as much in his recent talk with visiting US Senator Ellender when he indicated that the USSR was on a "Year-to-year" planning basis until formulation of the next long-term plan, then pre- sumed to be a "Seventh Five- Year Plan" for 1961-1965. The present joint announce- ment contends that the Sixth Five-Year Plan tasks "are being implemented successfully" and avoids mention of their revi- sion. Instead, it stresses the new economic conditions arising out of Khrushchev's industrial reorganization and claims that recent discoveries of "large new deposits of various raw materials and sources of power" make possible "creating new enterprises and new industrial centers not envisaged in the directives of the Sixth Five- Year Plan." Apparently this is intended to create an impression that the new plan is to be even more ambitious than the Sixth Five-Year Plan. However, while reaffirming the long-run Soviet goal of "catching up" with the West in economic output, the announce- ment stresses the continued need for developing adequate raw materials and power and for .technological and scientific advances as well as increased initiative necessary for im- provement of labor productivity. The decision also reaffirms the policies for development of the "eastern regions," reduction of construction time, concentra- tion of investment resources, increased housing construction, and the agricultural programs for meat and milk as well as for the production of other consumer goods. The 1959-1965 plan, at least as presently conceived by the Soviet leaders, seems not to portend any imminent major shifts, since it clearly is in- tended to embody the economic programs evolved since the 20th party congress. This prior announcement of planning activity may well trigger continued discussion of Soviet economic policy in spite of the obvious attempt it makes to reflect some present agreed solution of the pressing economic problems facing the growth-obsessed Soviet economy. SECRET (Prepared by 25X1 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 September 1957 THE FRENCH POLITICAL SITUATION .Unrelenting parliamentary opposition to Premier Bourges- Maunoury's proposed statute for Algeria leaves uncertain the outcome of the confidence vote expected on 28 September. Hos- tility to Finance Minister Gaillard's austerity program also continues, and s(tepped- up strike activity is expected in the next two weeks. The government, in the end, is more likely to fall over economic policy than over Algeria. Despite the reported agree- ment reached on Algeria in the unprecedented round-table dis- cussions with numerous party leaders on 20 and 21 September, the National Assembly's Interior Committee was unable to come up with an agreed position prior to the start of the debate. This may mirror a deep split in the assembly over the proposed statute--particularly on deseg- regated elections and the feder- al institutions issues. This SECRET split permits the Communists to find allies in their drive to extend the debate over from the special session into the regular assembly session be- ginning on 1 October. If the Communists are successful, op- ponents of the government may attempt to topple the cabinet on 3 October by using the cen- sure motions on economic policy which have already been filed during the special session. Meanwhile, despite Gail- lard's concessions to the farm- ers, mass rallies, threats to suspend milk and meat deliveries, and resignations of rural mayors continue to plague the govern- ment. The threat of widespread labor agitation is growing as the union leadership continues to balk at the government's wage program. Transportation and industrial stoppages are proposed for early October if 25X1 tude this month. the government fails to demon- strate a more conciliatory atti- PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 4 - w CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S yj 'jy 26 September 1957 The consolidation of Field Marshal Sarit's successful coup on 16 September has been virtu- ally completed by the formation of a provisional cabinet under Pote Sarasin. Sarit has packed the provisional national assem- bly with his followers, has placed men loyal to him in key command positions in the armed forces and the police, and has given the military a dominant voice in the new cabinet. Of the 29 posts in the new government, 15 have been allo- cated to Sarit's military back- ers. His two closest followers, The most prominent civil- ians are Premier Pote and Prince Wan, whose redesignation as foreign minister is intended to give added emphasis to the new regime's claim that Thai- land's foreign policy is un- changed. In addition to the premiership, Pote will also hold the finance portfolio. The new ruling clique probably wanted a man whose personal reputation is clean in this post as a precaution against antici- pated opposition charges during the impending election campaign that Sarit and his military co- horts overthrew the Phibun regime merely to gain added opportuni- ties for graft. The provisional government will probably make no major policy changes, but will be largely preoccupied with prepara- tions for the parliamentary elections to be held in December. The campaign may be of critical importance for Thailand's polit- ical evolution. Generals Thanom and Prapat, have taken over the key Ministries of Defense and Interior respective- ly. In staying out of the cabinet himself, Sarit is maintaining his public pose as a "simple soldier" who is not interested in politics. He is, however, planning shortly to assume the position of "supreme commander." Civilians in the cabinet include in approximately equal propor- tions nonpolitical careerists, royalists, and members of the Unionist Party, organized last June with Sarit's backing. Thailand's 29-year-old King Phumiphon evidently played an active role in the events lead- ing to and subsequent to the army coup. In a long talk with Ambassador Bishop after the coup, he virtually admitted as much, but stated he intended to with- draw from the political arena after the new government is firmly established. Insofar as he hoped for governmental reform in Thailand, the King may quickly become disillusioned. On the basis of past performance, there is little reason to believe that Thailand's new military masters will be any less restrained in grabbing the spoils of power than the group they removed. Further- more, they may not be prepared 25X1 tions in December. CONFIDENTIAL PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400080001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S thiARY 26 September 1957 Indonesia's disaffected regional leaders doubt that an effective rapprochement with Djakarta will grow out of the recent national round-table conference. Despite official government claims of the "psy- chological success" of the meeting, dissident leaders in the outlying provinces apparent- ly have little faith in Djakar- ta's promises of reforms and greater cooperation since they realize the extent to which Djakarta depends on revenues from their areas. Provincial representatives reportedly made a show of amity during the meeting only because of the pressure of public opin- ion for a settlement and fear of arrest by the central gov- ernment if the conference failed. Lt. Col. Hussein of Central Sumatra has, in fact, stated that the conference pledge of cooperation between Sukarno and Hatta was simply "show." Regional leaders are re- ported continuing to insist that the National Council be made a senate with strong re- gional representation, that Communist influence in the gov- ernment be removed, and that army chief Nasution be replaced. They now are thinking of chang- ing their chief demand for a Sukarno-Hatta partnership to insistence on a Hatta govern- ment. Serious planning along this line, however, will have to be delayed until Hatta re- turns from an extended tour of Communist China. In a speech in Peiping, on 24 September, Hatta noted cer- tain similarities in the his- tories and political and eco- nomic goals of the two coun- tries, but made clear his reser- vations about the ideological path Communist China had chosen to accomplish them. The disaffected leaders on the Island of. Sumatra, reportedly feel the next two to three months will be the critical period in determining ultimate relations between the defiant provinces and Djakarta. Indicative of these Sumatrans' determination to achieve greater economic and political autonomy is their recent hint to Ameri- can officials that they are considering sending an emis- sary to make a direct approach to the United States for as- sistance. The Communist party of In- donesia, whose interests are best served by preventing a Sukarno-Hatta rapprochement, has switched from earlier criticism of the conference to qualified support of its results. They have hailed the conference as a "victory" but are pressing the line that the meeting's accomplishments constitute a mandate for abolishing the "il- legal" regional councils and returning the disaffected prov- inces to Djakarta's economic and political control. This quick switch in tactics is obviously designed to maintain the Commu- nists' good rapport with Sukarno. 25X1 SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 SECRET v CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 September 1957 PARIS AND MOSCOW RENEW CULTURAL EXCHANGE TALKS Some softening of French policy toward the USSR is indi- cated by the French government's approach to the bilateral cul- tural relations talks which are scheduled to begin in Paris on 30 September and which will be unaffected by the present parlia- mentary crisis. The French gov- ernment claims it will try to limit the scope of the talks, but has permitted publicity con- cerning them and may accede to Moscow's apparent desire for a formal cultural convention. The Foreign Ministry pro- posed the conversations appar- ently with the primary intention of getting more control over the activities of Soviet individuals and delegations, many of whom have arrived unexpectedly under auspices of the France-USSR Friendship Society. Paris had in mind technical arrangements with the Soviet embassy, but its willingness to accept Moscow's decision to send a high-level delegation including N. N. Danilov, deputy minister of culture, suggests broader dis- cussions will be undertaken. A French Foreign Ministry spokes- man says Paris will concentrate on establishing an exchange pro- gram for 1958, but the USSR may seek all-inclusive talks on cultural relations aimed at conclusion of a formal cultural convention. Paris has tended to aim its cultural drive to such members of the bloc as Poland, which it considered potentially most re- ceptive. When cultural ex- changes with the USSR were dis- rupted by the Hungarian and Suez developments in 1956, French spectacular" basis. officials assured American rep- resentatives that officially sponsored contacts would be re- newed only on a "discreet, non- EHRENBURG CRITICIZES SOVIET CULTURAL POLICY Ranking Soviet author Ehrenburg's bitter allegorical attack on the Soviet system published in the June issue of Foreign Literature has thus far received My one mild official criticism. Ehrenburg's essay, "The Lessons of Stendha]," used a tra- ditional Russian literary device: ostensibly laying bare the op- pressive social and political system of 19th century France which troubled the French novel- ist Stendhal, Ehrenburg skill- fully juxtaposed quotations from Stendhal and a discussion of his ideals with short, furtive ref- erences to the present Soviet scene to produce a devastating critique of Soviet society to- day. The following points emerge clearly from this indirect ap- proach: despotic government, no matter how well-intentioned, in- evitably cripples art; the sole purpose of art is to tell the truth, and only in art, not in ideology, can one find truth; Soviet writers must not write otherwise than their conscience demands or alter their work under the influence of critical arti- cles; a novel is a "mirror of a great road" which reflects both the azure sky and the dirt, and the man who has the "mirror"-- the "dissident" Soviet writer-- is not immoral but rather the "road"--Soviet society. Ehrenburg implied that not Stalin's personality but the Soviet system caused the evils of "Stalinism"; he quoted SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400080001-9 SECRET 26 September 1957 Stendhal as saying, "The impor- tant thing is not the personality of a tyrant but the essence of tyranny." Ehrenburg may have written his essay in an attempt to test the limits of Moscow's policy as. set down by Khrushchev in speeches on ideology and litera- -- Even if a king be an angel, his government destroys art--not in that it forbids a subject for a picture, but lh that it crushes the souls of artists,--Stendhal ,,.A tyrant can be intelligent or stupid, goodorbad-- 7all the sane he is both omnipotent andpowerless; they frighten him with conspiracies they flatter him, they deceive him; the prisons are filled, the cowardly hypo- crites whisper, and a silence hardens, asilenca from which the heart is ready to stop.--Stendhal it would not hurt some author to think about the lessons of Stendhal--those who, undar the influence of ~ tlt~cal articles, are too quickto sit down to alter their 1iovel , forgetting that man is not a snake and it is not given to him to throw off his skin.--Ehrenberg ture. The speeches appeared in print later than Ehrenburg's article, but Ehrenburg certainly knew their contents since two of them were delivered in May. The only official criticism of the essay--a mild article in Literaturnaya Gazeta of 22 August--centered around Ehren- burg's alleged faulty scholar- ship and misrepresentation of the facts of Stendhal's life and ideas. The fact that this criticism was not from a promi- nent critic and that it did not attack Ehrenburg's character or motives suggests that the regime is treading softly because of Ehrenburg's prestige and its averred policy of "comradely persuasion" of erring intel- lectuals. Moscow is undoubt- edly anxious to prevent the essay from becoming a cause celebre like Dudintsev's novel Not By Bread Alone and perhaps for this reason has avoided public denunciation of Ehren- burg in favor of trying to con- vince him of his "errors" pri- vately. The relatively gentle treatment of Ehrenburg does not appear to,presage a softer cul- tural policy. As recently as 21 September, the regime took harsh administrative measures by announcing that the secre- tariat of the Union of Soviet Writers had fired the director of the magazine Soviet Music, G. Khubov, and other sstaff members for having "deviated from the party line and for having failed to observe Lenin- ist principles in the field of art," publishing "conclusions discrediting the party's leader- ship in the field of the arts in general," Evidently Khubov had failed to recant the speech he made at the Second Congress of Composers last March which aroused official criticism in July as a "mistaken attempt to re-evaluate the fundamental ideological values of our theory and creative work." ANTI-SLAV SENTIMENT IN THE KAZAKH REPUBLIC Resentment of Slavic in- fluence in Kazakhstan which came to the surface late in 1956 appears to oe continuing unabated in Kazakh intellectual circles this year despite official censure and the gen- eral hardening of the regime's attitude toward any form of criticism. At the root of the anti-Slav feeling has been real concern over the rapidly SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5, of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400080001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 September 1957 deteriorating position of Kazakh nationals within their own re- public as a consequence of the influx of Slavs connected with the recent industrial and agri- cultural expansion. The de-Stalinization cam- paign, and specifically refer- ences to Stalin's violations of "Lenin's nationality policy," apparently encouraged Kazakh intellectuals to air their grievances. In an article in the latest issue of the Kazakh theoretical journal, Kommunist Kazakhstana, N. Dzhandildjn, as secretary of the Kazakh party, states that "provocative rumors, gossip, and anonymous letters are being spread to cast evil slander on the Communist party, on its nationality policy, and on honorable party workers." "These harmful views," he ad- mits, are supported by some of the most eminent members of the Kazakh intelligentsia. These "malcontents" are accused of having demanded that more Kazakhs be given key posts, that only persons able to speak the Kazakh language be assigned important jobs, and that the Kazakh language be cleansed of words and expressions of Russian origin. Similar expressions of anti- Slav feeling were condemned in the Kazakh press last January. Certain intellectuals were crit- icized for.. complaining that entrance examinations for all Kazakh higher educational in- stitutions were given only in the Russian language, thus pre- venting many native youths from gaining admission. Slavic colonization in Kazakhstan has been officially encouraged for many years. Even before the launching of the "new lands" program in 1954, Kazakh nationals had lost the preponderance they had held in their total population up to 1939. Since 1954, over 600,000 people have emigrated to Kazakhstan and the Slavs--Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Belo- russians--now constitute an ever-growing majority of the republic's 8,500,000 people. The Kazakh party organiza- tion had been headed since 1946 by the Kazakh, Zhumabai.Shayakh- metov. In February 1954, SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pace 6 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 vawp~ 1%00 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 September 1957 Shayakhmetov was described by Khrushchev as "a weak leader for such a great republic" and was replaced by all-union party presidium candidate Ponomaren- ko--a Slav, Since then this post has been filled by a suc- cession of other party officials from the outside, Under Ponomarenko, radical reshuffle of the government ad- ministration was begun and the number of Slavs in the local government increased until on the eve of the 1957 government economic reorganization they constituted over half of the members of the Council of Min- isters. Of the nine councils of national economy set up in Kazakhstan this spring, four are headed by Slavs and five by Kazakhs. The key post of republic Gosplan head went to Leonid Melnikov, quondam party boss of the Ukraine. Although Kazakh official spokesmen have admitted that teaching of the Kazakh language and training of Kazakh special- ists must be improved, the in- creasingly important economic role assigned to Kazakhstan and the growing preponderance of the Slavic population there will work against the influence of native Kazakhs and Kazakh culture. USSR EXPANDS ANTARCTIC OPERATIONS The USSR has announced plans to continue extensive scientific operations on the Antarctic continent after the close of the International Geophysi- cal Year (IGY) in 19 58. At the re- cent meeting of the Internation- al Council of Scientific Unions in Stockholm, the USSR announced that six stations with a planned complement of 70 scientists plus support personnel will be main- tained in Antarctica. The an- nouncement coincided with final preparations for the new season of exploration in the area and with the departure of the Soviet expedition's flagship Ob, which will attempt landings at at least two points in the un-' claimed sector of Antarctica, where only the United States has been active to date. By expanding survey work in the area, the Russians in- tend not only to ensure partici- pation in any joint exploration or exploitation activity, but to make sure of a voice in any settlement of sovereignty over the area. V. G. Kort, deputy leader of this year's Soviet expedition, stated in December 1956 that Soviet participation in Antarctic explorations se- cures the right of the Soviet Union, as "discoverer" of the continent, to participate in the settlement of Antarctica's international legal status, Major Soviet scientific efforts in the Antarctic began in January 1956 in preparation for the IGY. Four stations have already been established, and two more are to be set up during the coming season, Thirty- seven scientists are scheduled to remain at Mirnyy, the largest of these bases, after the close of the IGY. Besides the two landings scheduled by the Ob in the un- claimed sector, landings will be made on the coasts of the Australian and New Zealand claims. Operations last year by the Ob and another Soviet ocea- nographic ship, the Lena, re- sulted in a unique hydrographic SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01400080001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 September 1957 140 130 120 110 100 30 90 70 60 50 W ARGENTINA CHILE6 A ANTARCTICA E N ~