CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Publication Date:
September 26, 1957
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SUMMARY
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY.
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 17.
OCI NO. 5250/57
26 September 1957
AIM 7o
Dk7i`~fiEVI WESis
W-XT REVIEW DATE:
o DECLASS RE-0
CIASS. ciANGLD TO:
DOCUMEN NO.
NOCHANGE WC S.S. d
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I i I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
Ta ~m~R 1125X1 ,
State Dept., DIA reviews completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF .THE ESP,ONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN 4Y MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared'
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 September 1957
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
Saud's Attitude
King Saud arrived in Damas-
cus on 25 September, apparently
intent on fulfilling his self-
imposed mission of preserving
Arab "unity" despite his avowed
distaste for the leaders of the
present Syrian regime. He re-
portedly plans to make a state
visit to Lebanon about 12 Octo-
ber.
Saud's trip to Damascus,
together with the subsequent
arrival there of Iraqi Prime
Minister All Jawdat, may signal
a softening in the attitudes of
pro-Western Arab leaders toward
the Syrian regime, even though
this effect is not intended.
Jordan's King Hussayn in partic-
ular has voiced his fear that
Saud's move will weaken the an-
tileftist front, which from
Hussayn's standpoint is in spe-
cial need of strengthening at
this time, since the Jordanian
cabinet has decided to convene
parliament on 1 October. Al-
though the most determined ex-
treme nationalist members of
parliament are in exile or jail,
enough of their sympathizers re-
main to embarrass Hussayn's pro-
Western government even if they
cannot soon overthrow it. T
Iraq
Ali Jawdat's trip to Da-
mascus from Beirut appears to
have been decided on the spur
of the moment, possibly without
consultation with other members
of the Iraqi government. As re-
cently as 24 September, Iraqi
Crown Prince Abd al-Illah was
seeking information about the
objectives of Saud's trip, and
gave no hint that any Iraqi of-
ficial would attend. Rumors
persist of cabinet changes de-
signed to give the Iraqi cabinet
more pro-Western backbone. For-
mer prime minister Nuri Said is
the only political personality
in sight who seems capable of
doing the job, but he apparently
is still opposed by Abd al-Illah,
whose influence is decisive.
Turkey
Turkey does not seem to
have become infected with this
softening in attitude. The
Turkish government has massed
enough manpower, weapons, and
air strength in southern Turkey
for a possible military action
against Syria. Approximately
33,000 men--one infantry divi-
sion, two infantry regiments,
two armored brigades, eight
artillery battalions, plus trans-
port and engineer units--have
been moved or are in position
in the Iskenderun-Kirikhan-
Gaziantep area. Turkish atti-
tudes are not likely to be much
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N-we
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 September 1957
ct65
Celibolu.
Balikesir
P4
n57 TNG
n58 TNG
n 28(-)
'Adana
MIDDLE EAST
GROUND ORDER OF BATTLE
TURKISH
ISRAELI
ARAB
_v. Deployment in Progress
Pipeline
Army ? Infantry
U Corps
? Airborne Infantry
? Armored Infantry
EJ Division Antitank Arty
Cavalry
EJ Bngade Armored Cavalry
ELLLI
ELL1
F~l
Armored
Armored Arty
Field Arty
26 SEPTEMBER
O NAUTICAL MILES 200
I r
0 STATUTE MILES 200
24685
influenced by shifts of official
opinion in the Arab states; the
Turks look to the West for ap-
proval of their line of action.
Syrian Moves
The Syrians themselves do
not appear to have taken large-
FE
JORDAN
It
Gaziantep
12 .i!"
29(MT)
5(MT)
14 1
246 B
Kars
scale defensive measures against
possible Turkish military action,
which Syrian Vice Chief of Staff
Nafuri said last week he still
feared. There are unconfirmed
reports of some military move-
ments in northern Syria, how-
ever, and training of the peo-
ple?s resistance:. groups;(futuwa)
apparently has been stepped up.
Leftist army leaders reportedly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 September 1957
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SECRET
have sought to force back into
active service some of the
moderate officers whom they com-
pelled to "retire" a few weeks ago.
Syria has been and is re-
ceiving various types of Soviet
bloc arms and equipment as well
as economic aid. (See Part III,
page 1.)
BULGARIA
GREECE
Hadimkoy. -
Garlu '~artl~el
ti.
il'koy
'lies
F-86E
m F-84G
T811I.
-
(~ F-84G
m F-84G
d
ew)
Bandirma FF-'";? i
F-84G
RF 84F rvaurte
RT-33A
Estirnesgut
Eskisehir
O Esenboga
. Ankara
mC-47ATURI .E
m 47A
m F-84G
F-84G
m C-47A
1
it (N
~C47A
Moscow continues to take
a serious view of the possibili-
ty. ' of Western-backed armed in-
tervention in Syria. Foreign
Minister Gromyko in his speech
to the UN General Assembly on
20 September reiterated Soviet
security interest in Syrian
Black Sea
eo F-86E
Merzifon
TURKEY
458 JET FIGHTER-BOMBERS
31 JET RECONNAISSANCE
73 PISTON TRANSPORTS
. r
Trabzon
~:fspatta Konya
ao F-84G
Adana (Military)?
Adana ,(Civil)(jAdana
Kars
Sarikamis.
F-86E
F84G
Malatya (New)? ml-84G
Batman
? Malatya ?Siirt
DiyarbakirF-84G
Islahive .Gaziantep
Iskenderun* .
4(irikao
.Latakia
MIDDLE EAST
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE
? Turkish Airfield
(jrenway 7000 ft. or.over)
A Major Arab Airfield
A Major Israeli Airfield
Squadron
-~ Possible Movement of Squadron
14peline
26 SEP'T'EMBER 1957
O NAUTPCAL MILES 200
CYPRUS
106 JET fCHTERS
57
Mrsto
a llurajms
2O /Ast.ors
9 PISTON LIGHT
BOMBERS
40 PISTON RGHTERS
6 JET FIGHTERS
4 PISTON LIGHT
BOMBERS
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Aleppo
A
A
SYRIA
51 JET FIGHTERS
30 M IG-17s
6 MIG-15s
15 Meteors
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 September 1957
developments and made a bid for
General Assembly approval of
Soviet proposals to renounce the
use of force and interference
in the internal affairs of the
Middle Eastern countries.
On 17 September, Soviet
President Voroshilov sent the
Shah of Iran a long note which
set forth Moscow's views of So-
viet and Western policy in the
Middle East, cautioned him
against supporting Western mach-
inations against Syria, and
solicited his influence in pre-
venting such action.
Moscow propaganda repeat-
edly has warned Syria's neigh-
bors, as well as Greece and Iran,
against participating in any
moves against Syria and con-
tinues to single out Turkey and
Israel as the most likely in-
struments of any armed interven-
tion in Syria. Bulganin's 10
September warning to Turkey has
not yet been followed by a
similar note to Israel.
The arrival in Latakia
harbor of two Soviet warships
on 21 September at Syria's re-
quest dramatized Soviet "soli-
darity" with the present Syrian
regime.
Presumably to deter Western
action, Moscow is again circulat-
ing private warnings through
Soviet officials that an attack
on Syria would precipitate World
War III, a tactic it used last
November when it apparently be-
lieved the Western powers might
try to overthrow the leftist
regime in Damascus. On the day
following Gromyko's 10 September
press conference warning to
Turkey, a Soviet diplomat in
Tehran reportedly stated that
World War III was imminent be-
cause the USSR would go to war
if Turkey invaded Syria.
USSR DRAFTING NEW ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1959-1965
A new long-term plan for
the Soviet economy to take ef-
fect at the end of 1958 appar-
ently is to supplant the ambi-
tious Sixth Five-Year Plan,
originally scheduled to guide
the USSR economy through 1960.
On 25 September, Moscow
radio broadcast a decision of
the central committee of the
CPSU and the USSR Council of
Ministers which calls for com-
pletion by 1 July 1958 of a
draft plan for the 1959-1965
period. This joint decision re-
iterates the "main economic
task" of "catching up" with the
West in industrial output, and
it reaffirms the "preferential
development" of heavy industry
and the currently stressed agri-
cultural and housing programs.
The action not only side-steps
the revision of the 1960 goals
of the Sixth Five-Year Plan
called for by the December 1956
central committee plenum, but
in effect postpones for a time
the measuring against results
of Khrushchev's administrative
reorganization and other ele-
ments of current policy.
Background
The decision reflects policy
flexibility. For the first time
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SURRARY
26 September 1957-
since Soviet planning began, a
five-year plan has been aban-
doned for evident economic rea-
sons.
The December central com-
mittee plenum, facing shortfalls
in important raw materials, ad-
mitted "strains" in the rapidly
growing economy. It called for
thorough review of the draft
Sixth Five-Year Plan in order
to "make more precise" the ambi-
tious 1960 goals previously an-
nounced at the 20th party con-
gress early in 1956.
Pervukhin's modest goals
for 1957, released in February,
suggested the possibility of
significant downward revision
of the 1960 targets. Immediate-
ly thereafter, Khrushchev's re-
organization diverted attention
from this important plan review.
Abandonment of the task of re-
vising the 1960 goals seems to
have been decided after the
June "purge." USSR Deputy
Premier A. I. Mikoyan suggested
as much in his recent talk with
visiting US Senator Ellender
when he indicated that the USSR
was on a "Year-to-year" planning
basis until formulation of the
next long-term plan, then pre-
sumed to be a "Seventh Five-
Year Plan" for 1961-1965.
The present joint announce-
ment contends that the Sixth
Five-Year Plan tasks "are being
implemented successfully" and
avoids mention of their revi-
sion. Instead, it stresses the
new economic conditions arising
out of Khrushchev's industrial
reorganization and claims that
recent discoveries of "large
new deposits of various raw
materials and sources of power"
make possible "creating new
enterprises and new industrial
centers not envisaged in the
directives of the Sixth Five-
Year Plan." Apparently this is
intended to create an impression
that the new plan is to be even
more ambitious than the Sixth
Five-Year Plan.
However, while reaffirming
the long-run Soviet goal of
"catching up" with the West in
economic output, the announce-
ment stresses the continued
need for developing adequate
raw materials and power and for
.technological and scientific
advances as well as increased
initiative necessary for im-
provement of labor productivity.
The decision also reaffirms
the policies for development of
the "eastern regions," reduction
of construction time, concentra-
tion of investment resources,
increased housing construction,
and the agricultural programs
for meat and milk as well as for
the production of other consumer
goods.
The 1959-1965 plan, at
least as presently conceived by
the Soviet leaders, seems not
to portend any imminent major
shifts, since it clearly is in-
tended to embody the economic
programs evolved since the 20th
party congress.
This prior announcement
of planning activity may well
trigger continued discussion
of Soviet economic policy in
spite of the obvious attempt
it makes to reflect some present
agreed solution of the pressing
economic problems facing the
growth-obsessed Soviet economy.
SECRET
(Prepared by 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 September 1957
THE FRENCH POLITICAL SITUATION
.Unrelenting parliamentary
opposition to Premier Bourges-
Maunoury's proposed statute for
Algeria leaves uncertain the
outcome of the confidence vote
expected on 28 September. Hos-
tility to Finance Minister
Gaillard's austerity program
also continues, and s(tepped-
up strike activity is expected
in the next two weeks. The
government, in the end, is more
likely to fall over economic
policy than over Algeria.
Despite the reported agree-
ment reached on Algeria in the
unprecedented round-table dis-
cussions with numerous party
leaders on 20 and 21 September,
the National Assembly's Interior
Committee was unable to come
up with an agreed position prior
to the start of the debate.
This may mirror a deep split in
the assembly over the proposed
statute--particularly on deseg-
regated elections and the feder-
al institutions issues. This
SECRET
split permits the Communists
to find allies in their drive
to extend the debate over from
the special session into the
regular assembly session be-
ginning on 1 October. If the
Communists are successful, op-
ponents of the government may
attempt to topple the cabinet
on 3 October by using the cen-
sure motions on economic policy
which have already been filed
during the special session.
Meanwhile, despite Gail-
lard's concessions to the farm-
ers, mass rallies, threats to
suspend milk and meat deliveries,
and resignations of rural mayors
continue to plague the govern-
ment. The threat of widespread
labor agitation is growing as
the union leadership continues
to balk at the government's
wage program. Transportation
and industrial stoppages are
proposed for early October if 25X1
tude this month.
the government fails to demon-
strate a more conciliatory atti-
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4 -
w
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S yj 'jy
26 September 1957
The consolidation of Field
Marshal Sarit's successful coup
on 16 September has been virtu-
ally completed by the formation
of a
provisional cabinet
under
Pote
Sarasin. Sarit has
packed
the
provisional national
assem-
bly
with his followers,
has
placed men loyal to him in key
command positions in the armed
forces and the police, and has
given the military a dominant
voice in the new cabinet.
Of the 29 posts in the new
government, 15 have been allo-
cated to Sarit's military back-
ers. His two closest followers,
The most prominent civil-
ians are Premier Pote and
Prince Wan, whose redesignation
as foreign minister is intended
to give added emphasis to the
new regime's claim that Thai-
land's foreign policy is un-
changed. In addition to the
premiership, Pote will also
hold the finance portfolio.
The new ruling clique probably
wanted a man whose personal
reputation is clean in this post
as a precaution against antici-
pated opposition charges during
the impending election campaign
that Sarit and his military co-
horts overthrew the Phibun regime
merely to gain added opportuni-
ties for graft.
The provisional government
will probably make no major
policy changes, but will be
largely preoccupied with prepara-
tions for the parliamentary
elections to be held in December.
The campaign may be of critical
importance for Thailand's polit-
ical evolution.
Generals Thanom and Prapat, have
taken over the key Ministries of
Defense and Interior respective-
ly. In staying out of the cabinet
himself, Sarit is maintaining
his public pose as a "simple
soldier" who is not interested
in politics. He is, however,
planning shortly to assume the
position of "supreme commander."
Civilians in the cabinet include
in approximately equal propor-
tions nonpolitical careerists,
royalists, and members of the
Unionist Party, organized last
June with Sarit's backing.
Thailand's 29-year-old King
Phumiphon evidently played an
active role in the events lead-
ing to and subsequent to the
army coup. In a long talk with
Ambassador Bishop after the coup,
he virtually admitted as much,
but stated he intended to with-
draw from the political arena
after the new government is
firmly established. Insofar as
he hoped for governmental reform
in Thailand, the King may quickly
become disillusioned. On the
basis of past performance, there
is little reason to believe that
Thailand's new military masters
will be any less restrained in
grabbing the spoils of power than
the group they removed. Further-
more, they may not be prepared 25X1
tions in December.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S thiARY
26 September 1957
Indonesia's disaffected
regional leaders doubt that an
effective rapprochement with
Djakarta will grow out of the
recent national round-table
conference. Despite official
government claims of the "psy-
chological success" of the
meeting, dissident leaders in
the outlying provinces apparent-
ly have little faith in Djakar-
ta's promises of reforms and
greater cooperation since they
realize the extent to which
Djakarta depends on revenues
from their areas.
Provincial representatives
reportedly made a show of amity
during the meeting only because
of the pressure of public opin-
ion for a settlement and fear
of arrest by the central gov-
ernment if the conference failed.
Lt. Col. Hussein of Central
Sumatra has, in fact, stated
that the conference pledge of
cooperation between Sukarno and
Hatta was simply "show."
Regional leaders are re-
ported continuing to insist
that the National Council be
made a senate with strong re-
gional representation, that
Communist influence in the gov-
ernment be removed, and that
army chief Nasution be replaced.
They now are thinking of chang-
ing their chief demand for a
Sukarno-Hatta partnership to
insistence on a Hatta govern-
ment. Serious planning along
this line, however, will have
to be delayed until Hatta re-
turns from an extended tour of
Communist China.
In a speech in Peiping, on
24 September, Hatta noted cer-
tain similarities in the his-
tories and political and eco-
nomic goals of the two coun-
tries, but made clear his reser-
vations about the ideological
path Communist China had chosen
to accomplish them.
The disaffected leaders
on the Island of. Sumatra,
reportedly feel the next two
to three months will be the
critical period in determining
ultimate relations between the
defiant provinces and Djakarta.
Indicative of these Sumatrans'
determination to achieve greater
economic and political autonomy
is their recent hint to Ameri-
can officials that they are
considering sending an emis-
sary to make a direct approach
to the United States for as-
sistance.
The Communist party of In-
donesia, whose interests are
best served by preventing a
Sukarno-Hatta rapprochement, has
switched from earlier criticism
of the conference to qualified
support of its results. They
have hailed the conference as
a "victory" but are pressing
the line that the meeting's
accomplishments constitute a
mandate for abolishing the "il-
legal" regional councils and
returning the disaffected prov-
inces to Djakarta's economic and
political control. This quick
switch in tactics is obviously
designed to maintain the Commu-
nists' good rapport with Sukarno.
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 September 1957
PARIS AND MOSCOW RENEW CULTURAL EXCHANGE TALKS
Some softening of French
policy toward the USSR is indi-
cated by the French government's
approach to the bilateral cul-
tural relations talks which are
scheduled to begin in Paris on
30 September and which will be
unaffected by the present parlia-
mentary crisis. The French gov-
ernment claims it will try to
limit the scope of the talks,
but has permitted publicity con-
cerning them and may accede to
Moscow's apparent desire for a
formal cultural convention.
The Foreign Ministry pro-
posed the conversations appar-
ently with the primary intention
of getting more control over the
activities of Soviet individuals
and delegations, many of whom
have arrived unexpectedly under
auspices of the France-USSR
Friendship Society. Paris had
in mind technical arrangements
with the Soviet embassy, but its
willingness to accept Moscow's
decision to send a high-level
delegation including N. N.
Danilov, deputy minister of
culture, suggests broader dis-
cussions will be undertaken.
A French Foreign Ministry spokes-
man says Paris will concentrate
on establishing an exchange pro-
gram for 1958, but the USSR may
seek all-inclusive talks on
cultural relations aimed at
conclusion of a formal cultural
convention.
Paris has tended to aim its
cultural drive to such members
of the bloc as Poland, which it
considered potentially most re-
ceptive. When cultural ex-
changes with the USSR were dis-
rupted by the Hungarian and
Suez developments in 1956, French
spectacular" basis.
officials assured American rep-
resentatives that officially
sponsored contacts would be re-
newed only on a "discreet, non-
EHRENBURG CRITICIZES SOVIET CULTURAL POLICY
Ranking Soviet author
Ehrenburg's bitter allegorical
attack on the Soviet system
published in the June issue of
Foreign Literature has thus far
received My one mild official
criticism.
Ehrenburg's essay, "The
Lessons of Stendha]," used a tra-
ditional Russian literary device:
ostensibly laying bare the op-
pressive social and political
system of 19th century France
which troubled the French novel-
ist Stendhal, Ehrenburg skill-
fully juxtaposed quotations from
Stendhal and a discussion of his
ideals with short, furtive ref-
erences to the present Soviet
scene to produce a devastating
critique of Soviet society to-
day.
The following points emerge
clearly from this indirect ap-
proach: despotic government, no
matter how well-intentioned, in-
evitably cripples art; the sole
purpose of art is to tell the
truth, and only in art, not in
ideology, can one find truth;
Soviet writers must not write
otherwise than their conscience
demands or alter their work under
the influence of critical arti-
cles; a novel is a "mirror of a
great road" which reflects both
the azure sky and the dirt, and
the man who has the "mirror"--
the "dissident" Soviet writer--
is not immoral but rather
the "road"--Soviet society.
Ehrenburg implied that not
Stalin's personality but the
Soviet system caused the evils
of "Stalinism"; he quoted
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26 September 1957
Stendhal as saying, "The impor-
tant thing is not the personality
of a tyrant but the essence of
tyranny."
Ehrenburg may have written
his essay in an attempt to test
the limits of Moscow's policy
as. set down by Khrushchev in
speeches on ideology and litera-
-- Even if a king be an angel, his government destroys
art--not in that it forbids a subject for a picture, but
lh that it crushes the souls of artists,--Stendhal
,,.A tyrant can be intelligent or stupid, goodorbad--
7all the sane he is both omnipotent andpowerless; they
frighten him with conspiracies they flatter him, they
deceive him; the prisons are filled, the cowardly hypo-
crites whisper, and a silence hardens, asilenca from
which the heart is ready to stop.--Stendhal
it would not hurt some author to think about the
lessons of Stendhal--those who, undar the influence of
~ tlt~cal articles, are too quickto sit down to alter their
1iovel , forgetting that man is not a snake and it is not
given to him to throw off his skin.--Ehrenberg
ture. The speeches appeared in
print later than Ehrenburg's
article, but Ehrenburg certainly
knew their contents since two
of them were delivered in May.
The only official criticism
of the essay--a mild article in
Literaturnaya Gazeta of 22
August--centered around Ehren-
burg's alleged faulty scholar-
ship and misrepresentation of
the facts of Stendhal's life
and ideas. The fact that this
criticism was not from a promi-
nent critic and that it did not
attack Ehrenburg's character or
motives suggests that the regime
is treading softly because of
Ehrenburg's prestige and its
averred policy of "comradely
persuasion" of erring intel-
lectuals. Moscow is undoubt-
edly anxious to prevent the
essay from becoming a cause
celebre like Dudintsev's novel
Not By Bread Alone and perhaps
for this reason has avoided
public denunciation of Ehren-
burg in favor of trying to con-
vince him of his "errors" pri-
vately.
The relatively gentle
treatment of Ehrenburg does not
appear to,presage a softer cul-
tural policy. As recently as
21 September, the regime took
harsh administrative measures
by announcing that the secre-
tariat of the Union of Soviet
Writers had fired the director
of the magazine Soviet Music,
G. Khubov, and other sstaff
members for having "deviated
from the party line and for
having failed to observe Lenin-
ist principles in the field of
art," publishing "conclusions
discrediting the party's leader-
ship in the field of the arts
in general," Evidently Khubov
had failed to recant the speech
he made at the Second Congress
of Composers last March which
aroused official criticism in
July as a "mistaken attempt to
re-evaluate the fundamental
ideological values of our
theory and creative work."
ANTI-SLAV SENTIMENT IN THE KAZAKH REPUBLIC
Resentment of Slavic in-
fluence in Kazakhstan which
came to the surface late in
1956 appears to oe continuing
unabated in Kazakh intellectual
circles this year despite
official censure and the gen-
eral hardening of the regime's
attitude toward any form of
criticism. At the root of the
anti-Slav feeling has been real
concern over the rapidly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 September 1957
deteriorating position of Kazakh
nationals within their own re-
public as a consequence of the
influx of Slavs connected with
the recent industrial and agri-
cultural expansion.
The de-Stalinization cam-
paign, and specifically refer-
ences to Stalin's violations
of "Lenin's nationality policy,"
apparently encouraged Kazakh
intellectuals to air their
grievances. In an article in
the latest issue of the Kazakh
theoretical journal, Kommunist
Kazakhstana, N. Dzhandildjn, as
secretary of the Kazakh party,
states that "provocative rumors,
gossip, and anonymous letters
are being spread to cast evil
slander on the Communist party,
on its nationality policy, and
on honorable party workers."
"These harmful views," he ad-
mits, are supported by some of
the most eminent members of the
Kazakh intelligentsia. These
"malcontents" are accused of
having demanded that more
Kazakhs be given key posts,
that only persons able to speak
the Kazakh language be assigned
important jobs, and that the
Kazakh language be cleansed of
words and expressions of Russian
origin.
Similar expressions of anti-
Slav feeling were condemned in
the Kazakh press last January.
Certain intellectuals were crit-
icized for.. complaining that
entrance examinations for all
Kazakh higher educational in-
stitutions were given only in
the Russian language, thus pre-
venting many native youths from
gaining admission.
Slavic colonization in
Kazakhstan has been officially
encouraged for many years.
Even before the launching of
the "new lands" program in 1954,
Kazakh nationals had lost the
preponderance they had held in
their total population up to
1939. Since 1954, over 600,000
people have emigrated to
Kazakhstan and the Slavs--Great
Russians, Ukrainians, and Belo-
russians--now constitute an
ever-growing majority of the
republic's 8,500,000 people.
The Kazakh party organiza-
tion had been headed since 1946
by the Kazakh, Zhumabai.Shayakh-
metov. In February 1954,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 September 1957
Shayakhmetov was described by
Khrushchev as "a weak leader
for such a great republic" and
was replaced by all-union party
presidium candidate Ponomaren-
ko--a Slav, Since then this
post has been filled by a suc-
cession of other party officials
from the outside,
Under Ponomarenko, radical
reshuffle of the government ad-
ministration was begun and the
number of Slavs in the local
government increased until on
the eve of the 1957 government
economic reorganization they
constituted over half of the
members of the Council of Min-
isters. Of the nine councils of
national economy set up in
Kazakhstan this spring, four
are headed by Slavs and five
by Kazakhs. The key post of
republic Gosplan head went to
Leonid Melnikov, quondam party
boss of the Ukraine.
Although Kazakh official
spokesmen have admitted that
teaching of the Kazakh language
and training of Kazakh special-
ists must be improved, the in-
creasingly important economic
role assigned to Kazakhstan
and the growing preponderance
of the Slavic population there
will work against the influence
of native Kazakhs and Kazakh
culture.
USSR EXPANDS ANTARCTIC OPERATIONS
The USSR has announced
plans to continue extensive
scientific operations on the
Antarctic continent after the
close of the International Geophysi-
cal Year (IGY) in 19 58. At the re-
cent meeting of the Internation-
al Council of Scientific Unions
in Stockholm, the USSR announced
that six stations with a planned
complement of 70 scientists plus
support personnel will be main-
tained in Antarctica. The an-
nouncement coincided with final
preparations for the new season
of exploration in the area and
with the departure of the Soviet
expedition's flagship Ob, which
will attempt landings at at
least two points in the un-'
claimed sector of Antarctica,
where only the United States
has been active to date.
By expanding survey work
in the area, the Russians in-
tend not only to ensure partici-
pation in any joint exploration
or exploitation activity, but
to make sure of a voice in any
settlement of sovereignty over
the area. V. G. Kort, deputy
leader of this year's Soviet
expedition, stated in December
1956 that Soviet participation
in Antarctic explorations se-
cures the right of the Soviet
Union, as "discoverer" of the
continent, to participate in
the settlement of Antarctica's
international legal status,
Major Soviet scientific
efforts in the Antarctic began
in January 1956 in preparation
for the IGY. Four stations
have already been established,
and two more are to be set up
during the coming season, Thirty-
seven scientists are scheduled
to remain at Mirnyy, the largest
of these bases, after the close
of the IGY.
Besides the two landings
scheduled by the Ob in the un-
claimed sector, landings will
be made on the coasts of the
Australian and New Zealand claims.
Operations last year by
the Ob and another Soviet ocea-
nographic ship, the Lena, re-
sulted in a unique hydrographic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 September 1957
140 130 120 110 100 30 90 70
60
50
W
ARGENTINA
CHILE6
A
ANTARCTICA E
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