CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001500030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 31, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIA 5~F
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
C) DECIASSWIE1'
CLASS. CHANGED 10j
Pi /
COPY NO. 17
OCI NO. 5255/57
31 October 1957
17
90GUMENT NO. ~----
Nd CHANGE 1N GL.ASS? D
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH;. tjR 70-
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CT AL
25X1
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIC .1TIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
As of 31 October, it ap-
peared that Soviet Marshal
Zhukov had lost a battle and
would be stripped of all effec-
tive political authority.
There was still no official an-
nouncement of the Soviet central
committee's action on Zhukov,
however.
Khrushchev's remarks to
Western newsmen at a Turkish
embassy reception on 29 Octo-
ber, which recall patronizing
references to Malenkov, Molotov,
and Kaganovich at the time of
their defeat in June, suggested
that there only remained to
find a new assignment for Zhukov
"in keeping with his experience
and qualifications." While de-
lay in the issuance of a con-
cluding statement may mean that
the action is not developing
according to plan, it is more
probably due to problems in
drawing up an explanation for
public presentation. Khrushchev
has apparently cleared another
obstacle to one-man control of
the USSR.
All of the evidence indi-
cates that the move against
Zhukov was prepared while he
was touring Yugoslavia and Al-
bania. Zhukov left Moscow for
Belgrade on 4 October, report-
edly stopping along the way to
visit Khrushchev, who was vaca-
tioning at Yalta. Khrushchev
returned to Moscow the next
day, ending a vacation which
had begun in mid-August.
Western correspondents in Mos-
cow have reported that Zhukov
went directly from the airport
to a high-level party meeting.
Perhaps he learned then of his
removal from the defense post
and of an offer of another job
which though relatively impor-
tant ended his control of the
armed forces. How Zhukov might
have reacted in such a situation
can only be conjectured. He
may have balked, whereupon
Khrushchev decided to use the
central committee club again
--as he did last June against
Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaga-
novich.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
From numerous editorials
in the Soviet party and mili-
tary press in the past few days
it is apparent that the issue
of party control of the armed
forces is the tree on which the
regime has tried to hang Zhukov.
But, while there is reason to
believe that Zhukov has long
supported the right of military
leaders to exercise "one-man
command" of troops, with politi-
cal deputies performing mainly
an indoctrination and morale-
building function, this issue
was probably not uppermost in
the conflict. The simple clash
of powerful interests probably
figured more importantly in the
struggle, with Khrushchev see-
ing Zhukov as a potential mili-
tary threat to his power, a
check on his authority, and a
popular figure who detracted
from his prestige.
However, the timing needs
explanation in terms of some
immediate cause, since the ac-
tion came only four months after
Zhukov was brought into the
highest party council, at a
time when international tension
was running high, and only a
few days before the 40th an-
niversary celebrations which
have been set up for a grand
display of Communist solidarity
and prosperity.
Although Zhukov publicly
supported Soviet Middle East-
ern policy during a speech in
Albania, Khrushchev's bluster-
ing diplomacy may have caused
real concern to Zhukov, who
would tend to take a sober view
of Soviet military capabilities.
A professional military leader
of the Zhukov stamp might con-
ceivably also be more inclined
than Khrushchev to place con-
tinued stress on a large con-
ventional military establish-
ment, rather than on recent or
future weapons developments.
If Khrushchev's recent
fable-telling session with a
Western newsman (when he told
the story about the "humble
little Jew, Pinya," who put
the "burly anarchist" to shame
when a real danger developed)
was relevant, then, in Khru-
shchev's view, Zhukov had lost
his nerve when the going was
rough. Turned around, the in-
ference is that Zhukov opposed
Khrushchev in what seemed a
dangerously-reckless undertak-
ing, and, judging from the
"burly anarchist" reference,
he may have done so with con-
siderable force.
There were some other small
pieces of evidence which could
be considered clues to a de-
veloping conflict between the
party chief and the defense
minister. Zhukov's unusually
warm popular reception in Lenin-
grad last July and his speech
at that time which, though only
partially reported by Pravda,
apparently called forlu Ter
review of the Stalin purge
record, may have created ap-
prehension that Zhukov might
have serious political ambi-
tions. During August and Sep-
tember, there were signs that
the rehabilitation of military
leaders purged during the 30's
was being pushed, even though
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
historical revision had other-
wise come to a virtual stand-
still. This possibly signified
that Zhukov was throwing his
weight around in a critical and
difficult political area.
Although recent reports
that Zhukov had obtained con-
trol of the Committee of State
Security in August lack con-
firmation, Zhukov's suspicion
and resentment of the security
apparatus, which has made some
gains in power during the; past
six months, was a possible
source of continuing conflict.
The demotion of Zhukov is
one more step in Khrushchev's
progressive neutralization of
political rivals. He has now
asserted his dominance over the
armed forces, the secret police,
and the economic bureaucracy, as
well as the party machinery it-
self. However, he has not yet
conducted purges much below the
top levels. Although his re-
liance on the support of a well-
packed central committee has so
far stood him in good stead,
there are still deep-rooted
policy conflicts which might
eventually split his presently
loyal political allies.
THE SYRIAN SITUATION
Soviet Moves in the UN
The USSR has found the
Arabs, including Syria, reluc-
tant to press for the fullest
exploitation of charges against
Turkey in the United Nations
and is apparently retreating
from its stiff line rather than
face the prospect of widespread
Arab reaction to its moves.
Moscow had stimulated the Syr-
ian complaint in the UN General
Assembly and strongly supported
Syria's charges, claiming pos-
session of "documentary evi-
dence" of US-Turkish plans for
an attack.
The implicit threats So-
viet officials had been making
against Turkey were missing
from Gromyko's more concilia-
tory speech in the UN on 29 Oc-
tober, and, while he reiterated
Soviet support for Syria, there
are indications that he realizes
Soviet tactics in the United
Nations have backfired. Fol-
lowing a private talk with
Gromyko on 28 October, Secre-
tary General Hammarskjold
stated he was convinced the
Soviet"foreign minister knew
that the "Russian play had not
worked and that he was looking
for the softest way to land."
Hammarskjold noted that
Gromyko had completely changed
his attitude on the secretary
general's possible usefulness
in the Turkish-Syrian situation
from last week, when he report-
edly had denounced Hammarskjold
for interfering and said this
would create a "liability" in
his future relations with the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SIJY/ARY
USSR. Hammarskjold reported
Gromyko now had indicated the
situation was calming down and
that he was no longer opposed
to the secretary general's
playing a mediation role if
both Syria and Turkey agreed.
Hammarskjold's interven-
tion could, however, place him
in a vulnerable position re-
garding his other mediation ef-
forts in the area as a whole.
The Norwegian UN delegate on
25 October emphasized that cau-
tion must be exercized to avoid
causing strong Arab attacks
which would lessen the effec-
tiveness of the secretary gen-
eral in the area. Hammarskjold
is well aware of the risks in-
volved.
Another sign of a possible
Soviet shift on this issue was
Khrushchev's unexpected appear-
ance at the Turkish National
Day celebrations in Moscow on
29 October and his statement
that he thought the Middle East
situation "has gone a little
way toward peace." Furthermore,
the volume of Soviet propaganda
on the Syrian situation has de-
clined during the past week and
its tone has softened. The at-
mosphere of alarm in the Moscow
press has markedly lessened.
Gromyko's latest speech may
presage the abandonment of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
USSR's original tactics, which
were to force a vote on the
Syrian resolution on the assump-
tion that, even though it was
doomed to defeat, other Arab
states would be compelled to
vote with Syria and the Soviet
bloc against the Western powers.
In view of efforts by the Egyp-
tian and other Arab-Asian dele-
gates to dissuade Syria from
pressing for a vote and clear
indications that a vote would
divide the Arab-Asian bloc,
Moscow may have decided to go
along with a compromise which
would endorse mediation efforts
by the secretary general. This
would avoid a formal vote on
the Syrian or Western draft res-
olutions.
Despite the apparent soften-
ing of the Soviet line in the
United Nations, Moscow may still
feel that a dramatic move such
as the publication of "documen-
tary evidence" purporting to
prove the existence of a US-
Turkish plan to attack Syria is
necessary to maintain the mo-
mentum of its campaign against
American diplomatic moves in the
Middle East, and to attempt to
allay widespread suspicion of
Soviet motives in the General
Assembly.
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Syria, demanding a seven-
member UN commission, has con-
tinued to fend off King Saud's
offer to mediate. Both Cairo
and Damascus are embarrassed
by Saud's persistence. The
Turks clearly scored a propa-
ganda victory even with the
relatively innocuous Saudi-
Turkish communique issued after
the conclusion of the talks in
Dammam last week. Propaganda
to support Syrian charges in
the UN has continued to be a
major Syrian concern; Damascus,
Aleppo, and other cities have
named next week "fortification
week" and adopted appropriate
slogans. The Aleppans alleged-
ly are comparing their situa-
tion to those of the citizens
of Stalingrad and Port Said.
The more serious aspects
of the situation are underlined
by the military exercises which
Turkey presumably still intends
to conduct in early November in
the vicinity of the Syrian bor-
der, and by an Iraqi joint army-
air exercise now reported set
to take place between 7 and 10
November. Most Iraqi air units,
including all operational jet
aircraft, are now in northern
Iraq. Turkish army strength in
southern Turkey remains un-
changed.
Lake Hula Drainage
Israel's final move to
drain Lake Hula, scheduled for
the morning of 31 October, prob-
ably will not provoke any sig-
nificant reaction from Syria.
The Syrians in the past have
protested strongly that the
project involves violations of
Channel
Channel to be enlarged
- Road
--- Trail
B ridge
- Causeway
30 OCTOBER
24658
L.~
I SR A E/L
Tel A ~) ((1
Hulata"" 41
ISRAEL Neew Bailey Bridge
.'?`d` - Banat Yaacov bridge
SYRIA
the Israeli-Syrian armistice
agreement but are now preoc-
cupied with their relations
with Turkey. The Israeli gov-
ernment, in an effort to avoid
arousing the Syrians, has not
permitted advance release of
information about the opera-
tion, although it has invited
press representatives to the
ceremony. The Israelis
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apparently do not expect any re-
action since they have taken no
unusual precautionary measures.
The Hula drainage project,
begun in 1950, is aimed at re-
claiming 15,000 acres of po-
tentially rich farm land from
Lake Hula and adjacent marshes,
to prevent seasonal flooding of
another 17,000 acres, and to
eliminate malaria. A series
of canals have been constructed
which will channel the Jordan
and its tributaries through the
dry lake bed. Syria has argued
that by reclaiming the area Is-
rael would derive a military
advantage and that the work
was proceeding on Arab-owned
lands.
USSR-Syria Economic Pact
A Soviet-Syrian economic
development pact was concluded
on 28 October. It covers the
construction of four hydroelec-
tric power stations, 400 miles
of rail lines connecting the
port of Latakia with Syria's
eastern agricultural provinces,
.several irrigation projects,
storage facilities at Latakia,
a fertilizer plant, an agri-
cultural research station, and
a geological survey of oil and
other mineral resources.
These projects are to be
completed during the next seven
years with Soviet financial
and technical assistance. The
USSR also agreed to train
Syrian personnel, both locally
and in the USSR to operate and
maintain these projects. The
USSR will provide the neces-
sary credits at 2.5 percent
interest to be repaid by Syria
over a 12-year period with
either commodities or hard
currencies. The communique
did not state the size of the
credits to be extended--estimat-
ed at over $100,000,000--but
revealed that Syria will assume
repayment obligations only
after specific projects are
undertaken.
Apparently in an effort to
indicate the ease with which
Syria's obligations under this
pact may be met, the USSR pur-
chased 10,000 tons of Syrian
cotton, worth about $7,000,000,
on the day following conclusion
of the development pact. By
July of this year, the bloc
already was taking about 22
percent of Syria's exports.
Syria, however, is al-
ready in considerable debt to
the Soviet bloc for military
equipment. Although Damascus
found it necessary to seek
postponement of installments
on its $40,000,000 arms debt
to Czechoslovakia, it has,
during the past year, purchased
an additional $50,000,000 worth
of arms from the USSR.
Contributions by ORR)
Radical Socialist Felix
Gaillard, finance minister in
the Bourges-Maunoury cabinet,
faces considerable difficulty
in overcoming interparty hos-
tility in his bid to form a
new French government. The
increasing gravity of France's
financial crisis may oblige
the assembly to come to a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
decision soon, however, and
Gaillard might well be an ac-
ceptable dark-horse candidate.
Gaillard says he will seek
assembly approval on 5 November
only if he can-count on some
support from both Socialists
and Independents. Both the
Independents.and the Popular
Republicans have offered him
conditional support. While
some Independents may accept
his economic approach, their
peasant and small-business sup-
port sparked the opposition to
Gaillard's austerity program
in the previous cabinet. More-
over many Independents now ap-
parently believe a continued
crisis will lead to a disso-
lution of the present assembly
and to new elections in which
they would be the chief victors.
The Socialists have decided
to support Gaillard but have not
yet agreed on participating in
his government. The Socialist
attitude may prejudice the Inde-
pendents against Gaillard.
The gravity of France's
financial problems, emphasized
by the special session of the
caretaker Bourges-Maunoury cab-
inet this week to obtain an-
other advance from the Bank of
France, may work in Gaillard's
favor. He has won considerable
public attention for his espou-
sal of an austerity program,
and he will benefit from the
growing sentiment for a compro-
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mise cabinet based largely
on the minor center parties,
with a limited program to meet
France's economic problems.
He probably hopes to take ad-
vantage of the long holiday
week end to give party antago-
nisms time to cool and to per-
mit the deputies to revise
their nonchalant attitude to-
ward the economic crisis.
France's convertible cur-
rencies in the Exchange Stabil-
ization Fund will be virtually
exhausted after October payments
to the European Payments Union.
Moreover, unless substantial
external aid is available in
December, the last $500,000,000
in the gold reserve held by the
Bank of France will have to be
tapped or payments for imports
postponed. There is some
speculation that the govern-
ment may even have to resort
to printing more money.
The 26 October extension
of de facto devaluation of the
franc to all trade transactions
may help the balance-of-pay-
ments situation temporarily,
but it is also expected to have
an inflationary effect. The
cost of living has jumped 4
percent since July, and organ- -
ized labor is convinced that
substantial new wage rises are
in order. New strikes have
already been threatened at the
first sign that the new govern-
ment is ignoring "labor's
plight."
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Tie re-election of the
Democratic regime in Turkey on
27 October is being considered
by Prime Minister Menderes as
a mandate to carry on his basic
policies, despite the fact
that his party received less
than half the popular vote.
The Democrats claim nearly 70
percent of the assembly seats--
425 out of 610--however, thus
assuring them control of the
Turkish parliament.
For the first time since
the Democrats won their first
election in 1950, they will be
faced with a distinct and
highly vocal opposition. Un-
official returns give the
Republican People's party 170
seats and the Freedom party
and conservative Republican
National party four seats each.
There will be seven vacancies
when the assembly convenes on
1 November.
Menderes is unlikely to
make any significant changes
in basic policies, such as
the Western-oriented foreign
policy, the overambitious and
economically unsound industrial
expansion and internal develop-
ment, economic concessions to
the politically powerful agri-
cultural areas, nor in his
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generally repressive approach
to criticism and opposition.
Menderes tends to regard him-
self as possessing the dynamic
authoritarian qualities of
Ataturk, founder of the Turk-
ish Republic and national hero.
Many Turks, however, apparently
believe that four more years
of Democratic rule could mean
the end of democracy in Turkey.
During the past year, especial-
ly, the Menderes regime has
displayed an inclination to
reverse the trend toward democ-
ratization- expressed in
Turkey's first free election
in 1950.
Demonstrations and riot-
ing reported from widely scat-
tered parts of Turkey, are
partially the result of con-
tinuing opposition charges
of election irregularities.
Security forces should be able
to restore order with rela-
tively little difficulty, but
there will be an indeterminate
period of latent, if not actual,
instability, at least until
the new government is organ
i:zed 'and its ' program. approved.
Menderes'determination to sus-
tain his personal power and
that of his party will prompt
him to take whatever measures
he regards as necessary to
maintain control and to assure
the unobstructed implementation
of his policies.
An explosive initial ses-
sion of the new assembly has
been predicted when it convenes
ular demonstrations.
on 1 November under the chair-
manship of Ismet Inonu, leader
of the major opposition party
and senior member of the as-
sembly. He will chair the
assembly until its president
is elected. Inonu is expected
to repeat his charges of elec-
toral irregularities 'and: violent 25X1
postelection repression.. of pop-
President Eisenhower's
announcement that he will at-
tend the North Atlantic Council
session in mid-December has
raised European hopes that
significant progress will be
made toward meeting the chal-
lenge of Soviet scientific
competition and other out-
standing problems. There has
also been a favorable reaction,
although tinged with some
skepticism, to the American-
British announcement, issued
at the conclusion of Prime
Minister Macmillan's Washing-
ton visit, regarding a new
NATO-wide effort to pool scien-
tific manpower.
The American embassy in
London notes that even those
Conservative papers most hostile
to the United States over Suez
are enthusiastic over the re-
sults of Macmillan's visit and
show virtually no trace of
their former recrimination.
Many papers support the in-
dependent Chronicle's asser-
tion that the Unit ed States
and Britain are "going back
into business on the old tried
and trusted basis of World War
II."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
Some tendency to reserve
judgment is nevertheless evi-
dent. Several papers reflect
a general doubt that the Ameri-
can Congress will approve
liberalization of the atomic
energy act; the influential
Manchester Guardian also won-
ders whether the-council meet-
ing will fulfill the promise
of October. The Labor party's.
criticism has centered on the
failure of the Eisenhower-
Macmillan talks to pave the
way for a big-three summit
meeting with the Soviet Union
on the Middle East situation.
French reaction has been
limited by the preoccupation
with the government crisis,
but persistence of concern
about being overshadowed by an
Anglo-American partnership is
evident. In France and else-
where, the prospect of a scien-
tific manpower pool--a "com-
munity cf brains" as the French
put it--has received especially
DISARMAMENT SITUATION IN
Support for the Western
UN disarmament resolution is
believed by the American UN
delegation to have lessened
considerably because of the
growing feeling that General
Assembly endorsement of the
West's position would only
harden the disarmament dead-
lock. A compromise proposal
recently introduced by Yugo-
slavia has attracted favorable
comment from many UN members
who believe that this year,
"when disarmament is more vital
than ever," the assembly must
come up with some new and
positive approach.
The Yugoslav proposal
meets this demand in that it
provides for the good offices
of the secretary general in
favorable notice. Luxembourg's
Prime Minister Bech, whose
turn it will be to chair the
council meeting in December,
says he will push this subject.
The Europeans' applause has been
muffled, nevertheless, by a
widespread assertion that re-
cent Soviet achievements forced
Washington to see a "need" to
draw closer to its allies.
The general outlook for
the December meeting had al-
ready been improved by the
North Atlantic Council session
on 22 October, at which there
appeared general gratification
with General Norstad's approach
to the long-vexing problems
of the balance between conven-
tional and modern weapons and
forces, and the possession of
nuclear weapons by NATO members.
British plans to withdraw more
forces from Germany might still
result in some acrimonious
argument among NATO members in
the coming weeks.
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
the disarmament negotiations
and suggests the advisability
of a special General Assembly
session on disarmament. How-
ever, it also calls for a sepa-
rate nuclear test ban and an
unconditional pledge not to
transfer nuclear weapons to
other countries--both condi-
tions unacceptable to the 24
sponsors of the Western pro-
posal. Its provision for the
cessation of production of
fissionable materials for weap-
ons purposes would probably
be unacceptable to the USSR.
In addition to the Western
resolution, the assembly has
before it three Soviet resolu-
tions calling for a test ban,
a pledge not to use nuclear
weapons, and an 82-nation
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUWARY
permanent "Disarmament Commis-
sion"; the Japanese resolution
calling for a temporary sus-
pension of testing; various
Indian plans incorporating
several of these ideas; and a
Belgian proposal for a UN-
sponsored publicity campaign
against nuclear warfare.
The West intends to ask
for priority in voting for its
resolution although the 24-
power draft was almost the
next week.
last one to be introduced.
The 28 October Soviet proposal
for enlargement of the Disarm-
ament Commission is the last
proposal submitted. Japan in-
tends to insist that its 23
September resolution be voted
on first. Assembly rules re-
quire that resolutions be voted
on in order of their submission
unless a majority of members
decides otherwise. Voting in
the assembly's political com-
mittee is expected to begin
Soviet and East German
Communists are again bringing
pressure to bear on the West-
ern positi nx in Berlin, ap-
parently with the objective
of strengthening East German
claims to sovereignty and
weakening Western influence
in the . divided city. Bar-
rii. a shift in over-all So-
viet policy, the USSR will prob-
ably restrain the East Ger
mans from taking any extreme
actions to isolate Berlin.
At the same time, both the
Russians and East Germans will
continue their pressure.
East Germany's increased
self-assurance, resulting in
tougher domestic policies and
a more aggressive attitude to-
ward the West, appears to be
a direct consequence of Khru-
shchev's strong endorsement
of the Ulbricht leadership
last August and the recent
Yugoslav diplomatic recogni-
tion. While the most recent
harassment affects primarily
West German rather than Allied
interests, it is likely that
Allied rights in Berlin will
be increasingly challenged as
the Communists continue to
probe for weaknesses.
Recent East German actions
include the exercise of greater
control over interzonal rail
and highway traffic. West
German mail and freight cars
have been detained and some
shipments confiscated, and
trucks and passenger cars, as
well as passengers, have been
subjected to intensive searches
and delays of up to 12 hours
at border checkpoints. Dis-
regarding the quadripartite
status of Berlin, the East
Germans have imposed stringent
controls on traffic crossing
the East-West Berlin border
and have threatened to compel
all Berliners to work in the
same sector of the city in
which they live.
An East German plan to
seal the intersector borders
last week end reportedly was
rejected by the East German
party central committee be-
cause it feared such action
would disrupt interzonal trade
which is vital to the shaky
East German economy. In ad-
dition., the East German regime
has threatened to assume con-
trol over the air corridors
from West Germany to Berlin
on the grounds that a sovereign
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
state has the right
to control its air
space.
Soviet inter-
ference with Allied
traffic remains
sporadic and incon-
sistent. The Rus-
sians for some time
have complained
about German mail
cars on Allied mili-
tary trains, threat-
ening on several
occasions to send
a train back to its
point of origin un-
less the mail car
was detached. F_
MAIN COMMUNICATION ROUTES
WEST GERMANY-BERLIN
Negotiations
between Soviet and
Allied officials
over new documentation pro-
cedures for Berlin travel have
been under way for some time.
While agreement "in principle"
has been reached on most points
at issue, the Russians none-
theless continued to raise
objections on various pretexts.
The turn of events suggests
that the Russians and East Ger-
mans have divided their respon-
sibilities, with the Russians har-
assing the Western Allies, and,
their East German. puppets concen-
trating on interfering with the
West Germans and residents of
West Berlin.
EAST GERMANS CUT BACK FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN
The goals of the East Ger-
man Five-Year Economic Plan
(1955-60) for industrial pro-
duction have been reduced from
a planned increase of 55 percent
by 1960 to one of 34 percent.
Even with this reduction, ne-
cessitated by an unrealistically
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the 40-percent increase sched-
uled earlier. It is also prob-
able, that more consumer goods
will be exported during the
remainder of the five-year plan
period than anticipated. Con-
centration on heavy industrial
goods is to continue and foreign
trade is:to double by 1960.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
high original plan, the new
goals can be achieved only if
the Soviet Union continues to
supply substantial aid.
Ignoring the reasons for
the reduction in plan goals,
Ulbricht, in his recent speech
at the 33rd plenum of the cen-
tral committee of the Social-
ist. Unity (Communist) party,
listed the main tasks of the
economic program as the devel-
opment of basic industries,
especially coal, power, and
chemicals; the expansion of
raw material output; and an
increase in agricultural pro-
duction to permit the end of
food rationing by 1958. The
investment goal--originally
The revision of the five-
year plan resulted from a num-
ber of factors limiting in-
dustrial expansion such as a
general lack of raw materials,
shortages of food, fuel, and
manpower, and too little capi-
tal. Because of these factors,
the five-year plan goals for
.industrial production have not
been met since the inception
of the plan in 1956.
In addition to the
fact that plan goals
were set beyond East
German capabilities,
an unusually severe
winter in 1956 cut
back coal production
and reduced imports
of Polish coal, while
the Hungarian, Polish,
and Suez crises caused
further disruptions
in the economy.
EAST GERMAN
GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
(ANNOUNCED PERCENTAGE INCREASE OVER
PREVIOUS YEAR)
set at 87 percent above the
preceding five-year plan--is
also to be reduced, but not by
nearly as much as the planned
increase in industrial output.
Ulbricht also maintained
that the urban worker would
receive a substantially better
deal even though the scheduled
increase in consumer goods was
reduced. Production of con-
sumer goods is to increase less
than 30 percent, compared with
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By reducing the
plan goals of indus-
trial production, the
regime has scheduled
a rate of growth which
%o, can be achieved and
has apparently re-
solved a policy dis-
ute in the politburo
in favor of the economic "real-
ists." However, the Soviet
Union must supply a portion of
the planned investments since
the investment figure seems too
large to be met from the inter-
nal resources of the East German
economy. The Soviet Union has
already granted credits total-
ing $785,000,000 since 1953, in-
cluding a freely convertible
currency credit of $75,000,000
in September 1957.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
THE POLISH. CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM
The tenth central committee
plenum of the Polish United
Workers' party held from 25 to
27 October was devoted prima-
rily to a call for drastic ac-
tion to restore party unity,
to establish stronger party con-
trol over the country, and to
stimulate greater activity
among party members. Party
Secretary Gomulka admitted that
he had not been able to accom-
plish these tasks and therefore
requested that the party con-
gress he had expected to call
for this December be postponed.
He made clear his determina-
tion to revitalize the party,
even at the cost of massive ex-
pulsions. In contrast to the
two other plenums held in the
past year, no opposition was
reported to Gomulka's sugges-
tions.
The plenum recommended the
postponement of the party con-
gress from December to the
middle of next year and ap-
proved Gomulka's request that
"verification" of all party
members be undertaken with a
view to removing elements with-
in the party who are undermin-
ing its progress. These, Go-
mulka said, include Stalinists,
revisionists, and apathetic
members. He said the expul-
sions might amount to a purge
of half the party members. The
final resolution outlined a
set of principles for party
membership and review proce-
dures which the party will find
extremely difficult to uphold.
This program may serve as a
shock treatment inspiring many
uncommitted party members to
give greater support to Gomulka.
Gomulka faces a serious
dilemma in his program to win
active support from the cen-
trists of the party and elimi-
nate the extremes which he has
balanced against each other
thus far. The opportunists and
apathetic members who joined
the party for nonideological
reasons are the largest of the
groups to be eliminated. These
are asked to leave voluntarily
or be expelled. More difficult
is the task of eliminating the
Stalinists, who have opposed
the policies of the eighth and
ninth central committee plenums;
many of them are the bureau-
crats on whom Gomulka depends
for organizational work within
the party.
The liberal revisionists
constitute a small but highly
vocal group within the party
demanding greater democratiza-
tion of the country and criti-
cizing its relations with the
USSR. Gomulka has already
moved against this group with
his recent crackdown on the
student weekly Po Prostu. and
the expulsion from party
of its staff members.
The plenum reaffirmed the
party's adherence to the spirit
and letter of the "broad demo-
cratic liberties" and "national
and individual freedoms" granted
since last October, promising
that there will be no return
to the restraints of the pre-
vious period. Gomulka assured
the press of its continued priv-
ilege. of criticism of Polish
life as long as it is "construc-
tive." He warned, however, that
the party would tolerate neither
criticism aimed at socialism
nor the expression of anti-
Soviet attitudes. The public
expression by party members of
views opposed to the party was
also expressly forbidden.
While Gomulka's program is
designed primarily to consoli-
date the party, another reason
for his insistence on high moral
and ethical standards among
party members is to achieve
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
popular respect for a party
completely discredited among
the Polish population. The
public may regard Gomulka's
speech as a promise to get rid
of the party hacks whom it con-
siders symbols of the evils of
Communism. However, consider-
able disappointment might de-
velop over the party's failure
to take dramatic action on the
economic problem, one far closer
than political matters to the
heart of the average Pole.
Constitutional government
was at least temporarily re-
stored to Guatemala on 26 Octo-
ber, but Communists may bene-
fit from the bitter divisions
revealed in the preceding week
of political violence. The
middle-of-the-road political
coalition of the late president
Castillo Armas has been dis-
credited, while the army, since
1954 the bulwark against the
extremes of right and left, is
now divided by factionalism.
The military junta, which
had seized power two days ear-
lier, resigned on 26 October
and congress named Guillermo
Flores Avendano interim presi-
dent until a permanent presi-
dent can be installed after
new elections promised for the
"near future." Flores was
second presidential designate
under Castillo and hence the
constitutional successor to Cas-
tillo's first presidential des-
ignate, Luis Arturo Gonzalez,
who was ousted by the junta on
24 October after rioting over
the disputed and now annulled
election of 20 October.
Flores' installation was
the result of an agreement be-
tween the beleaguered junta and
Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, whose
followers had nearly succeeded
by mob action in forcing the
junta to relinquish power di-
rectly to him. Ydigoras seems
confident of winning the new
election, but will probably
not win as many votes in new
elections as he did on 20 Octo-
ber, when he received many pro-
test and leftist votes. The
62-year-old Ydigoras, who has
the support of Guatemala's re-
actionary landowning aristoc-
racy, still, however, personi-
fies to many Guatemalans of all
classes the caudillo who can
bring strong stable government
to the country.
Guatemalan Communists are
"delighted" with recent develop-
ments and now are operating
openly and without restraint.
They have only an estimated 300
to 500 party members but have
infiltrated the leftist Revolu-
tionary party. This party,
which was denied participation
in the 20 October election, has
emerged from the recent disturb-
ances as perhaps the country's
strongest single political group.
It is already reported organiz-
ing the decisive rural vote in
anticipation of the promised
presidential and congressional
elections, and many observers
believe it will win these.
There are genuine liberals in
the party who are now trying to
purge the organization of Com-
munists, but there are others
who worked with the Communists
during the pro-Communist Arbenz
regime.
backing.
The 8,000-man army, formerly
a decisive power in Guatemala,
has virtually no Communists in
its ranks, but is now so ridden
with factionalism and lacking in
effective leadership that the
American embassy doubts that the
government could rely on army
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FRENCH-ISRAELI RELATIONS
Close relations between
Israel and France apparently
will continue, based on a mutual
concern over growing Arab na-
tionalism, although factions
in both countries seem reluc-
tant to give wide publicity
to their cooperation. The in-
terest Israel has in maintain-
ing the flow of arms aid from
France--its chief source of
such aid since before the
Sinai campaign--is increased
by concern over Soviet arms
shipments to Syria and Egypt.
Recent developments con-
firm the continuing military
collaboration between the two
countries. At present, French
Air Force Chief of Staff Gen-
eral Bailly is visiting in Is-
rael, ostensibly for an unof-
ficial vacation. Two other
French generals are also in Is-
rael, possibly in connection
with arms aid from France to
Israel. Col. Weizmann, number-
two man in the Israeli air
force, has stated that Israel
expects soon to acquire a squad-
ron of new Vautour twin-jet air-
craft from France. These air-
craft, presumably the intercep-
tor version, probably will be
equipped for fighter-bomber-
reconnaissance use and will
substantially improve Israel's
weak all-weather defensive
capability,
This cooperation also ex-
tends to atomic energy research.
France has provided the Israelis
with information on the process-
ing of raw materials while Isra-
el has sold the French its
patents on a heavy water separa-
tion process developed by Israeli
scientists.
Despite such cooperation,
evidence of doubts respecting
the Israeli-French relationship
has been revealed in both coun-
tries during recent months.
What effect the current
French government crisis may
have on the relationship is not
yet evident. While a formal al-
liance is not known to exist
and may not be desired by either
country, it is apparent that,
for the present, political and
military cooperation is still
regarded by both parties as
mutually advantageous. The
American embassy in Tel Aviv
believes Israel hopes its in-
formal relations with France
may serve as a bridge to stronger
ties with the emerging Western
European economic complex and
a means of gaining access to
European resources for capital
investment.
(Concurred in by OSI
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
Anti-Dutch mob activity
flared up in Djakarta as the
result of Indonesian govern-
ment efforts to whip up popular
sentiment for the "return" of
Netherlands New Guinea and
thereby to bolster Indonesia's
case in the forthcoming UN de-
bate on the issue. A mass rally
on 28 October, at which high
government' officials spoke of
military conquest if necessary,
was followed by a large pro-
cession of youth groups, police
units, and elements of all armed
forces.
The demonstrations degen-
erated into mob activity di-
rected at the Dutch. Dutch
property. was defaced and
painted with anti-Dutch slogans,
there were cries of "kill the
Dutch," and an effigy of a
Netherlander was burned on the
lawn of the Dutch ambassador's
residence. There also have
been demands for breaking off
diplomatic relations with the
Dutch and confiscation of Dutch
interests. Local Communist
youth groups apparently were
responsible for some of the
more excessive activities.
President Sukarno's back-
ing of the West Irian campaign
is also motivated by a desire
to focus Indonesian attention
on a universally popular theme,
thereby temporarily relieving
the government of the constant
pressures from dissatisfied
economic and political groups.
Sukarno's speech to the mass
rally on "national unity" sug-
gests he hopes to utilize the
public enthusiasm generated by
the West Irian movement to give
greater impetus to his "guided
democracy" program. Thus far
there has been no significant
response from the disaffected
provinces outside Java, and it
is unlikely that the New Guinea
issue will indeed serve to draw
dissident regional leaders
closer to the Djakarta govern-
ment.
The Information Ministry
in Djakarta has announced the
formation of an "action commit-
tee for the liberation of West
Irian" to launch large-scale
propaganda efforts and stage
additional demonstrations and
public meetings. The minister
of information has been quoted
as stating that the second stage
in the campaign will begin 10
November and will be "executed
more fiercely."
Although the government in
exploiting the New Guinea is-
sue is confident that it can
control an aroused public, fur-
ther anti-Dutch disturbances
could result in violence and
attacks on other Westerners
who reside on Java.
The last of a series of
local elections in Java are
scheduled to be held in'the
semiautonomous Central Java
Sultanate of Jogjakarta on 7
November. Traditionally this
has been an area of strength
for the Communists, and their
chances are further enhanced by
their vigorous campaign efforts
and the psychological advantage
given their party -by:-gains
achieved earlier this year in
other Java elections. Commu-
nist party chief Aidit, more-
over, has opportunistically
switched his tactics in this
campaign by declaring support
for local autonomy and has
strongly, endorsed a renewed Hatta-
Sukarno partnership.
The National party appears
at last to be awakening to the
danger to its future posed by
recent extensive Communist gains
and is actively'opposing the
Communists for the first time
in several years.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS
With less than two weeks
remaining before elections,
latest reports on the Philippine
political campaign indicate that
both opposition Liberal candi-
date Jose Yulo and the new Pro-
gressive party candidate Manuel
Manahan are narrowing any lead
still held by President Garcia.
The rising popularity of Manahan,
in particular, raises the pos-
sibility of an election upset.
Senator Claro Recto, the other
major candidate, is believed to
be weakening and may place a
poor fourth. In the vice-pres-
idential contest, Nacionalista
candidate, Jose Laurel, Jr., now
seems almost certain to be de-
feated by his Liberal opponent,
Diosdado Macapagal.
President Garcia is still
favored on the strength of the
advantages he holds as incumbent,
but he is not attracting crowds
or gaining the enthusiastic en-
dorsement of provincial party
leaders. Moreover, the Nacional-
ista party continues to suffer
from intense factionalism in
many key areas, and from the
failure of several prominent
leaders to campaign for the tick-
et because of Laurel's candi-
dacy. Only in the southernmost
island of Mindanao does Garcia
appear to face relatively little
threat.
After a slow start, the
Liberals have made great strides
through a well-financed public-
ity, campaign, including exten-
sive use of radio facilities and
psychological warfare tactics.
Crowds are responding, if not
to Yulo himself, to his running
mate, Macapagal, and movie star
Regelio de la Rosa, a senatorial
candidate. Primarily because
of distaste for Laurel, the Ro-
man Catholic hierarchy in the
Philippines has reportedly de-
cided to back the Liberals.
The American embassy in Manila
believes, however, that unless
this suppor-': involves instruc-
tions to parish priests, many
of the latter as well as Cath-
olic action groups will back
Manahan.
Manahan's greatest strength
is in heavily populated central
Luzon. He is believed also to
be making inroads in the Liberal
stronghold of northern Luzon and
to be taking votes from both
Garcia and Yulo in the provinces
around Manila and from Recto in
two southern Luzon provinces.
Even in the Visayan Islands, of
which Garcia is a native son,
Manahan has considerable sup-
port.
In view of the Progressive
party's meager organization and
claimed financial straits, there
remains considerable uncertainty
whether Manahan's surprising pop-
ularity can be translated into
votes. The embassy believes his-
continued gains may be indicative
of growing voter independence
from traditional political ma-
chines. Deteriorating economic
conditions in the provinces, in-
cluding increased prices of basic
commodities, may combine with
social pressures for a "clean
new force," to the advantage of
Manahan.
In the contest for eight
of the 24 Senate seats, the Na-
cionalistas have a strong ticket,
including several incumbents,
but concede that three or four
candidates of the other parties
may be elected. Since the Na-
cionalistas occupied all but
two seats in the last Senate,
they will continue to control
the upper house even with some
election losses or possible de-
fections. In the House of Rep-
resentatives, where administra-
tion party conflicts between in-
cumbents and various Nacional-
ista provincial governors have
been most intense, the opposi-
tion parties could win as many
as 40 or 50 of the 102 seats.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY WORKERS ANTAGONIZE POPULACE
Peiping's decision this
week to send more than 1,000
high-level cadres to key posi-
tions in the educational system
so they can "strengthen party
leadership" appears to be the
first move in a drive for better
performance by middle-and lower-
level officials, whose arrogant
behavior has been responsible
for widespread public grumbling
against the regime. In calling
for tight discipline and self-
less devotion of duty through-
out the party at the recent cen-
tral committee plenum, Party
Secretary General Teng Hsiao-
peng frankly admitted that some
cadres have become infected with
"bourgeois individualism" and
.are bent on the pursuit of "per-
sonal comfort,,fame, and position."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
Since last spring, when
sharp public criticism revealed
deep-seated resentment of minor
Communist officials who adopt
the "airs of a lord," the Chi-
nese Communists have sought to
curb bureaucratic bad manners.
Jmost of the Chinese peo-
ple have a good opinion of Mao
Tse-tung and other top leaders,
whom they regard as honest,
hard-working men. The ire of
the masses has been aroused,
however, by the ostentatious
extravagance and surly behavior
of the petty officials who rep-
resent the regime at the grass-
roots level.
most lower party and government
officials were all but incapable
of abstaining from abuse of the
arbitrary power bestowed on
them under the Communist sys-
tem. the typical
agricultural cooperative leader
as a former poor peasant who
behaves like an energetic little
dictator, smiling obsequiously
to superiors and shouting impe-
rious orders to his underlings.
The regime's campaign for
improved official behavior may
prove temporarily successful.
But Teng's prescription for
party members--that they must
be "just and selfless, join
the masses, and share the bitter
and sweet in life"--is a rule
of life which runs counter to
the established pattern of Chi-
nese officialdom. Furthermore,
local officials have the unpop-
ular task of carrying out orders
such as implementing the drive
for greater austerity. And
their job will not be made eas-
ier by the regime's policy of
retrenchment in government of-
fices which thus far has forced
more than 300,000 former bu-
reaucrats to "leave for the
countryside..to join the labor
front." These,,Men., smarting
under demotion,.may aggravate
the antagonisms between workers
and cadres on the farm and
in the factory.
CHINESE REVAMP LONG-TERM AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM
The central committee of
the Chinese Communist party has
issued a revised draft of the
12-year (1956-67) program for
agricultural development first
promulgated in early 1956. Al-
though the new draft omits some
of the grandiose goals of the
original and makes a greater
effort to provide a realistic
basis for increasing agricul-
tural output, it is still es-
sentially a "pie-in-the-sky"
plan, the primary intent of
which seems to be to divert the
peasant's attention from his
more immediate troubles.
Unlike the original plan,
which set no goals for chemical
fertilizer production, the cur-
rent draft provides for roughly
a 20-fold increase in the coun-
try's yearly output of chemical
fertilizer over the period of
the plan. The plan envisages
the production of 5,000,000 to
7,000,000 tons in 1962--as
against a maximum of 3,200,000
tons in the original proposals
for the Second Five-Year Plan.
Production in 1967 is scheduled
to reach 15,000,000 tons, an
amount sufficient to increase
output of food crops by as much
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
as 37,500,000 tons if properly
applied.
The state's investment
in this field will have to be
greatly increased in the Second
and Third Five-Year Plans for
these goals to be met. The
only new chemical fertilizer
plant of appreciable importance
established during the First
Five-Year Plan was the one at
Kirin which opened in mid-Octo-
ber.
As further means of rais-
ing production, the plan calls
for sharp increases in irrigated
land, in acreage devoted to
paddy rice, and in the number
of livestock on the nation's
farms. It makes plain, however,
that these increases are to be
achieved largely through money
and brawn supplied by the peas-
ants. In order to limit the
number of new mouths which
agriculture will have to feed,
the draft says that planned
birth control should be promoted
in both urban and rural areas.
The draft now issued, like
its predecessor, is little more
than a vague outline of desir-
able ends. Agricultural plan...
ners at the provincial level
and below are asked to use it
in formulating or revising their
own long-range plans, a device
which will focus peasant atten-
tion on it. Few targets are
mentioned in the plan. The
ambitious goals for raising
yields of various crops in dif-
ferent parts of the country are
retained and the assertion is
made that total agricultural
output and peasant income should
reach the level of the upper-
middle peasant by 1962, defined
earlier as an increase of 20-30
percent. These targets still
appear excessive, and the cen-
tral authorities admit that
further revisions--there have
already been seven--will be
needed.
by ORR)
Renewed discussion of the
plan at this time--after a long
period when it was seldom men-
tioned--attests to the regime's
concern over the rural situa-
tion, particularly the persist-
ent drought which is threatening
winter crops and the peasants'
growing disenchantment with col-
lectivized farming. Peiping's
evident intent is to try to
divert peasant attention from
present difficulties by conjur-
ing up visions of a bright fu-
ture. (Prepared
NORTH KOREAN PARTY ATTACKS CRITICS OF ECONOMIC PROGRAM
North Korean Communist
leaders devoted the October ple-
num of the central committee
almost exclusively to a discus-
sion of shortcomings in ':the
country's construction program.
Party Vice Chairman Pak Kum-chol
delivered a biting attack on
unnamed "renegades" and "anti-
party sectarians" in various
economic ministries who have
distorted party policy--an at-
tack which may presage shifts
in Pyongyang's leadership.
Pak's call for improved organ-
izational work and a mass move-
ment to carry out construction
plans suggests a concerted cam-
paign to increase labor produc-
tivity.
North Korea's construction
problem stems from a shortage
of investment capital. Bloc
aid has fallen from the equiv-
alent of $265,000,000 in 1954
to less than $100,000,000 in
1957, and will apparently be
even more sharply reduced in
coming years. The regime's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
determination to meet the goals
of the First Five-Year Plan
(1957-61) from domestic re-
sources is mirrored in Pak's in-
structions "to stop the import
of equipment and material which
is not urgently needed," and in
his emphasis on cutting con-
struction costs.
Disagreements on the best
way to meet economic problems
have divided the North Korean
Communists for the past year.
Two government reorganizations
in the past nine months, which
placed construction of all types
under the Ministry of Construc-
tion and Building Materials In-
dustry, apparently have not
solved the problem. Opposition
to Kim Il-sung's economic pro-
gram had come out into the open
at the August 1956 plenum, when
several central committee mem-
bers challenged the premier's
policy of giving priority to
heavy industrial construction.
These critics have been
silenced, but Pyongyang con-
tinues to attack the apathetic
handling of the party's politi-
cal work in the economic admin-
istration. Last April, for ex-
ample, the party's theoretical
journal Kulloja severely criti ---
cized the-Tai-flu-re of party or-
ganizations within economic min-
istries-to ensure the imple-
mentation of party policy, and
charged that these organizations
had actually supported antiparty
sectarians. Pak Kum-chol ob-
served in his speech to the
plenum that despite the repeated
instructions of the party, "no
small number" of construction
enterprises and their "leading
workers" have opposed the par_.
ty's policy of introducing pre-
fabrication techniques.
The economic organs which
specifically came under Pak's
fire were: the State Planning
Commission, the Pyongyang Blue-
printing Institute, and the Min-
istries of Machine Industry,
Electric Power, Coal Industry,
Communications and Transport,
and Construction and Building
Materials.
In an attempt to increase
party control over economic min-
istries, the party leadership
has directed cadres not to sep-
arate party organizational work
from economic policy. "Politi-
cally prepared" cadres are to
be recruited for work in eco-
nomic ministries, and executives
in these ministries are to be
subjected to more careful guid-
ance by party personnel to elim-
inate the corrupting influence
of the "antiparty sectarians."
The October plenum "dis-
cussed" calling a party con-
ference which Kim could use to
expel any remaining critics.
A national party conference
would have the legal power to
replace those individuals on the
central committee who have fallen
into disfavor since the April
1956 party congress. A confer-
ence would also provide the re-
gime with an excellent setting
in which to launch a nationwide
organizational and indoctrina-
(Concurred in by ORR)
tion campaign.
The most significant event
of the Kuomintang eighth con-
gress, which met in . Taipei.. from
10 to 23 October, was the selec-
tion by Chiang Kai-shek of Chi-
nese Nationalist Vice President
Chen Cheng to fill the reacti-
vated post of party deputy di-
rector general which had been
vacant since the 1930's. This
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
action places Chen formally in
line to assume leadership of
the Kuomintang when Chiang dies
or decides to relinquish the
top party post. As vice presi-
dent of the Republic of China,
Chen already is in line to suc-
ceed Chiang as chief of state.
Chiang's motive for desig-
nating a successor at this'-time
apparently was to clarify the
succession and,,according to
some observers, to free himself
from some party responsibilities
in order to concentrate on prep-
arations, for a possible return
to the mainland. Chen's `ap-
pointment will probably be con-
strued as a blow to his reported
chief rival, Chiang Ching-kuo,
head of the Nationalist security
forces and elder son of Chiang
Kai-shek.
For the most part, the con-
gress appears to have contented
itself with hearing routine re-
ports and a repetition of the
standard Nationalist propaganda
line. However, the theme of
return to the mainland was heav-
ily stressed, probably for mo-
rale reasons, and President
Chiang asserted that an assault
will be attempted within two or
three years. This marks a re-
turn to his former practice,
abandoned in 1956, of indicat-
ing an invasion timetable.
In line with the party
platform, which was designed
to appeal to as many conflict-
ing interests as possible, the
congress enlarged its supreme
governing body--the central com-
mittee--from 32 to 50 members,
presumably in part to increase
Taiwanese, military, and Over-
seas Chinese representation.
An enlarged standing committee
of the central committee subse-
quently was appointed by Chiang.
The two candidates for the
central committee receiving the
most votes were Chiang Ching-
kuo and Chen Cheng, with 325
and 299 votes respectively.
Available figures indicate that
22 of the new members support
young Chiang and 11 support Chen
Cheng. Chiang Ching-kuo, how-
ever, does not appear to have
seated enough of his followers
to dominate the committee. Chiang
Kai-shek's usual policy is to
balance cliques against one an-
other, and the appointment of
Chen as deputy director general
may have been intended in part
to offset Chiang Ching-kuo's
strength. Chen's appointment
appears to be a significant
step toward ensuring a peace-
ful and constitutional suc-
cession in the event of Chiang
Kai-shek's death in office.
The special session of the
Japanese Diet which opens on 1
November will probably be the
scene of renewed Socialist at-
tacks on the government's pro-
American policy. Prime Minister
Kishi is expected to respond by
relating his accomplishments
since he assumed office last
February and by using the ses-
sion as a platform to popularize
his forthcoming second tour of
Southeast Asia.
The controversial small-
business organization bill,
which. legalizes association for
the manufacture and sale of
products and collective negotia-
tions with large industries,
will be the main legislation
submitted by the government,
but its outcome is uncertain.
The Socialists called for
the session to demand a report
on the prime minister's trips
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
to Southeast Asia and the Unit-
ed States ana undoubtedly: will
challenge Kishi's foreign pol-
icy, capitalizing on the inter-
national situation created by
the Soviet ICBM and earth sat-
ellite developments. They will
probably attempt to prolong the
session over the five-day limit
in hopes of placing the govern-
ment on the defensive with re-
gard to what they consider its
oppressive. labor policy and to
the shortage of foreign exchange
which has resulted in a tight
money policy.
Prompted by the prospect
of a trade agreement with Com-
munist China, the Socialists,
some conservatives, and trade
and business interests probably
will exert pressure on the gov-
ernment for concessions to Pei-
ping's demands on the size of
Chinese trade missions accept-
able to Japan.
Prime Minister Kishi, ac-
cording to some reports, may
deliver a major policy speech.
In such an address he probably
would cite the agreement on
withdrawal of American ground
forces and the establishment of
the US-Japanese Committee to
study problems relating to the
security treaty as examples of
the equality of relations be-
tween the two countries which
his government has achieved.
He can point to Japan's election
to a seat on the UN Security
Council as demonstrating Japan's
enhanced international prestige
and note that Japan's disarma-
ment resolution in the United
Nations is evidence of his ef-
forts to abolish nuclear weapons
testing.
However, Foreign Minister
Fujiyama in a conversation with
Mr. Stassen asserted that Japan
wishes to have its resolution
voted on and defeated in order
that Kishi may go before the
people and say that world opin-
ion does not support the Japa-
nese view on nuclear weapons.
The government probably
chose to hold the special ses-
sion at this time, rather than
Just prior to the regular Diet
session in early December, be-
cause of Kishi's commitment to
visit Southeast Asian countries
from 18 November to 8 December.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU NKARY
31 October 1957
CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS IN KENYA FAIL
Discussions on new consti-
tutional provisions for Kenya
between British Colonial Secre-
tary Lennox-Boyd and represent-
atives of the various racial
groups have failed because of
disagreement over the size of
African legislative representa-
tion and over guarantees for
the European minority. The.pres-
entimpasse has not seriously
affected the government's effi-
ciency, although the lack of
African participation handicaps
Britain's plan for a multiracial
state.
All of the eight African
nationalist legislative repre-
sentatives who were elected in
PART II
March 1957 in the first elec~
tions in Kenya in which Africans
participated have refused to ac-
cept ministerial responsibility
unless the government increases
the number of African seats in
the 60-member Legislative Coun-
cil from 8 to 23. The colonial
secretary failed in his attempt':
to negotiate a settlement by dis-
cussions with each of the main
racial groups--the Europeans,
Africans, and Asians.
The Europeans would concede
the Africans an increase of four,
and perhaps six, seats if the
African leaders were to accept
constitutional provisions pro-
tecting the rights of each
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
racial group and agree that any
self-government in Kenya must
have the support of all races.
For their part, the Africans
would discuss such guarantees
only after first receiving an
increase of representation--
probably a minimum of at least
six seats. Moreover, the Afri-
can nationalists have refused
to participate in a suggested
multiracial committee which
would discuss the issues and
try to reach agreement before
the colonial secretary returns
to Kenya in early November.
The fact that the Kenya
government continues to function
without African participation
is causing some concern that
the Africans may interpret this
situation as a general disregard
for the importance of the Afri-
cans in the political life of
Kenya. Widespread acceptance
of such an idea would intensify
racial distrust and stimulate
extreme nationalism.
Meanwhile, growing disunity
in African ranks is suggested
by the contrasting attitudes of
the group's two chief leaders--
Tom Mboya, who has been willing
to negotiate, and Oginga.Odinga,
who has been completely unco-
operative. The Kenya govern-
ment is unwilling to entrust
Odinga with responsibility and
may offer acceptable conditions
to Mboya to make him actively
cooperate and thus divide the
African group.
Mboya is under considerable
tribal pressure to secure Afri-
can gains following his well-
publicized but unsuccessful trip
to London in September. If he
compromises, the behind-the-
scenes struggle between moder-
ates and extremists within the
African nationalist ranks is
likely to erupt into the open
and cause a temporary loss of
strength for the nationalist
movement.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET OBSERVANCE OF 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION
This year's observance of
the anniversary of the Bolshe-
vik Revolution, the 40th, has
been the center of a major prop-
aganda effort ever since 16
March 1957 when the party cen-
tral committee declared it to
be an extraordinary occasion
and called for elaborate prep-
arations. The propaganda ap-
paratus was mobilized to produce
a full fanfare--lectures, films,
public meetings, editorials, and
documents on appropriate themes.
The propaganda slogans is-
sued annually by the central
committee before the 7 November
celebration have been supple-
mented this year by the more im-
posing "theses," also issued in
the name of the central commit-
tee, which are customarily re-
served for the most solemn oc-
casions. It has also been an-
nounced, as a further part of
the build-up, that the USSR Su-
preme Soviet will meet on 6 No-
vember to hear the anniversary
keynote speech, normally given
before the lesser Moscow Soviet.
Because it is to be marked
as an important milestone in So-
viet history regardless of the-
maneuvering going on in Moscow,
the anniversary provides the
setting for a demonstration of
maximum political and propaganda
impact. Although the advance
propaganda has hewed closely to
the established line on foreign
and domestic policy, the occa-
sion calls for a review of for-
eign policy--particularly in the
Middle East--the ideological
condition of the Soviet bloc,
the June purge, technological
advances,and economic policy
in the wake of industrial re-
organization and planning re-
vision. On any of these points,
statements of considerable in-
terest could emerge.
The Anniversary Eve Speech
The major address is :tr..a
ditionally delivered in the
Bolshoi Theater on the eve of
the anniversary by a leading
figure of the regime. The as-
signment has been rotated in
previous years within the top
leadership and it could go this
year to any one of the full
members of the party presidium.
However, the urge to lend the
greatest possible prestige and
authority to the pronouncement
makes Khrushchev, who has never
done the honors before and has,
besides, more and more assumed
the role of principal regime
spokesman, a likely choice.
Given the build-up which has
gone-on, moreover, a speech
delivered by a lesser figure
would tend to have an anti-
climactic flavor.
Much of what goes into the
speech will, as usual, be res-
olutely unoriginal. Especially
this year, however, the speech
will attempt to stimulate glow-
ing pride in the past and un-
restrained confidence in the
future. The achievements of
four decades of Soviet rule--
the transformation of a backward
agrarian country into an indus-
trial power, the advance of So-
viet science and technology to
be seen in the ICBM and earth
satellite achievements, the for-
mation of a world grouping of
Communist states, and the in-
creased authority of the USSR
in world affairs--will be re-
lated at length as testimony
to the wisdom of the party lead-
ership and the superiority of
the Soviet system.
The speech will trace in
detail the USSR's record in
CONFIDENTI1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
international affairs and its
current position on significant
issues, but it is not likely to
unveil any major changes in for-
eign policy. A central foreign
policy theme will be Moscow's
continued adherence to the pol-
icy of "peaceful coexistence,"
coupled with reminders of the
military might of the Soviet
bloc.
The Soviet spokesman will
probably claim that, as a re-
suit of Soviet scientific and
technological advances, the
balance of world power has
shifted inexorably away from
the West toward the "socialist
camp:." He will probably dwell
on Middle East developments as
defeats for American diplomacy
and signs of the inevitable
collapse of "imperialism." In
line with recent Soviet sugges-
tions for new high-level nego .'_
tiations between East and West,
the spokesman may call for an-
other summit conference between
the USSR and the Western big
three to discuss the Middle
Eastern problem, disarmament,
and ways to reduce tension. In
any event, an appeal will prob-
ably be made for an extension -
of East-West cultural and trade
exchange.
A summons to socialist
forces all over the world to
join with Communists in fight
ing "imperialism" and "coloni-
alism" and to support the USSR
in seeking disarmament will al-
most certainly have a prominent
place in the anniversary speech.
The speech will also call for
new forms of cooperation between
the Soviet party and Western
socialists, for local "common
front" approaches between so-
cialists and Communists, and
for collaboration between "pro-
gressive forces" in the Afro-
Asian world and the Soviet bloc.
An effort will probably be
made to define the USSR's rela-
tions with the states of Eastern
Europe in the aftermath of last
fall's events in Poland and Hun-
gary and the rapprochement which
has developed in Soviet-Yugoslav
relations. Moscow may in the
course of the anniversary ad-
vance an ideological formula,
or a redefinition of existing
formulas which seeks to encom-
pass such diverse Communist re-
gimes as those of China, Yugo-
slavia, Poland, and Bulgaria.
Tito's absence, however, will
make the formulation of a mean-
ingful ideological concept more
difficult, if not impossible.
Domestic Matters
The economic "progress re-
port" will follow the general
lines of the recently published
brochure--"The Achievements of
Soviet Power for Forty Years in
Figures." It will contrast So-
viet growth with capitalist
"crises," noting the increasing
importance of Soviet industrial
outputs within European and
world totals. Claims will also
be made for improvements in So-
viet living standards. These
"victories of socialism" will
be credited to socialist plan"
ping and the prospering of sci-
ence and technology under Soviet
rule.
Basic alteration of exist-
ing economic policy or the in-
troduction of new economic pro-
grams beyond those set forth in
the recent decision to draft a
long-term plan for the 1959-
1965 period is not indicated at
this time.
The speech will hold out
the promise of further economic
victories. It will repeat the
theme of "catching up" with the
US and affirm the continued
priority development of heavy
industry as essential to this
goal.
Massive engineering proj-
ects--for example, the direction
of the flow of the Kama River
is apparently to be reversed--
and practical application of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 October 1957
nuclear power to electrical gen-
eration and transportation may
be discussed in the speech.
To cap the occasion, some
gesture in the area of popular
welfare may be forthcoming. The
Moscow populace, for example,
has been reported as expecting
announcement of a broadly ap-
plicable seven-hour working day.
Other possibilities are price
or wage revisions or fringe
benefits such as increased vaca-
tion time or pensions.
Military Display
This year's celebration
will probably produce an un-
usually large display of new
weapons and equipment, particu-
larly for atomic and missile
warfare. Rehearsals thus far
observed have revealed what ap-
pear to be guided missile trail-
ers and possibly a tactical mis-
sile launcher, and a series of
new rocket launchers, an armored
amphibious carrier, a new heavy
tank, a self-propelled antiair-
craft gun, and other modern
equipment.
The preponderance of-tracked
prime movers and self-propelled
equipment in the rehearsals in-
dicates an improvement in all-
weather cross-country mobility.
medium tank will be shown
for the first time, possibly
with some improvements. The
heavy tank was only recently
photographed in East Germany
and is not believed to be in
general use.
In anniversary celebrations
at naval bases, the USSR may
launch its new atomic-powered
icebreaker, and display sub-
marines equipped with nuclear
propulsion and/or guided mis-
siles. Surface :warships
equipped with guided missiles
could similarly be unveiled.
Although no new aircraft
have been observed as yet, offi-
cial Soviet statements have in-
dicated that an impressive aerial
display is planned, including
the first showing of''the.. "Rossiya"
(TU-14)--believed to be a four-
engined turboprop transport.
Since last summer's Air
Force Day show was canceled, it
is expected that several of the
events planned for that show
will appear on 7 November. The
new aircraft observed in re-
hearsals for that show included
a jet medium bomber--designated
"BACKFIN"--and a vertical take-
off aircraft of the "flying bed-
stead" type developed in the
West. It is also possible that
BISON and BADGER jet bombers
will participate in aerial re-
fueling demonstrations previously
planned for the Air Force Day
show.
The four new transports
unveiled in Moscow in July prob-
ably will appear again in the
aerial parade or on static dis-
play. Two of these were four-
engine turboprop aircraft: the
Ilyushin-designed Moskva (IL-18)
and the Antonov-designed Ukraina.
Also on display were the TU-104A,
a tourist-class version.,of
the twin-jet TU-104,and the TU-
110, a four-engine development
of that aircraft.
As for major scientific
demonstrations, the USSR is prob-
ably capable of launching a
rocket to the moon and of launch-
ing a second, more completely
instrumented earth satellite.
Delivery of a 200-pound payload
to the moon is probably within
existing Soviet capabilities.
The payload might consist of a
substance which could produce a
visible light when impacted on
the moon--in eclipse during..the
celebration.
There have been several
unofficial statements of a
possible satellite launching on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY .SUMMARY
7 November. Such a satellite
might contain more complex in-
strumentation and possibly a
live animal to be returned to
earth in a detachable package.
The Polish army in the last
year accomplished a transition
in which national control large-
ly supplanted Soviet domination.
The personal loyalty to Gomulka
believed to exist among new
appointees is a major factor
in the support the regime re-
ceives from its armed forces.
The army continues to be de-
pendent on the USSR,,however,
for logistic support. The
last year has seen an enhance-
ment of the army's combat ef-
fectiveness due in part to the
acquisition of modern equip-
ment and some improvement in
morale.
Personnel Changes
The first indication that
political developments in Po-
land were to affect the armed
forces was noted in August 1956
when Brig. Gen. Waclaw Komar,
who had been arrested for polit-
ical reasons in 1952 and not
released until early 1956, was
appointed commander of the mili-
tarized security troops.
(Concurred in by ORR 25X1
At about the same time,
120 out of 150 former Soviet
officers were relieved of their
senior command and staff posi-
tions and returned to the USSR.
Some Soviet officers remain
in important staff positions in
the Polish army on the pretext
of being specialists, but all
of those who had been attached
to the militarized security
forces are reported to have been
removed. Gomulka appointed
many formerly deposed military
leaders to positions in the mili-
tary hierarchy to replace the
Soviet officers and therelpy
gained a significant measure
of control over the armed forces.
Maj. Gen. Marian Spychalsky
replaced Rokossovsky as minister
of defense. Like some of the
other older officers among the
new appointees, Spychaisky had
been purged with Gomulka in 1949
and imprisoned until early 1956.
He had been a .deputy minister of
national defense from 1945 to
1949, assigned to political ed-
ucation rather than line matters.
The reduction of the in-
fluence of Soviet officers over
Polish military and national o
affairs began at the top when
the Polish central committee
failed to re-elect Marshal
Rokossovsky to its politburo--
on 21 October 1956. Soon there-
after he was relieved as vice
prime'.minis'ter and.minister of
Many of the new appointees
are not abreast of current devel-
opments in modern warfare, a
fact which temporarily limits
the ability of the Polish army
to conduct extensive combat op-
erations. A new generation.of:'7
officerp is being developed,
however, and Poland is better
able to afford the loss of the
defense and returned to the USSR. i experienced Soviet leadership
SECRET
The USSR on 7 November
might also reveal new evidence
of success in developing eon-
trolled thermonuclear reactions.
and QSI)
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U S S R GROUND FORCES
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