CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001700090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 8, 1958
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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~ONfIDENTIAL.
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
NG CHANGE IN CLASS. C1
C SS HANGED TO:
CONFIDENTIAL
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.b/rte
COPY NO. 50
OCI NO. 1788/58
8 May 1958
OATE REVIEWER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 1958
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
YUGOSLAVS BRANDED ANTI - MARXIST-LENINIST . . . . . . . .
Moscow republished on 6 May in Pravda the savage
condemnation the Chinese Communists hurled at the Yugo-
slavs two days earlier, indicating that the USSR has
decided the Yugoslav ideology can no longer be toler-
ated in the Communist world on any terms acceptable to
Belgrade. Soviet attempts through "comradely" exchanges
to have the Yugoslav party's controversial program re-
vised apparently have been abandoned, and the Yugoslav
leaders are being branded as "out-and-out revisionists"
and "anti-Marxists." The Chinese Communists have. made
it clear to Belgrade that Peiping entirely disapproves
of "national Communism," and at the same time have dis-
pelled any hopes among Eastern European leaders that
Peiping would support their efforts to attain freedom
. Pa ge 1
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SOVIET SUMMIT TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
The aide-memoire Foreign Minister Gromyko presented
to the three Western ambassadors on 5 May clears the way
for separate negotiations with them. Gromyko is likely
to argue that the extensive agenda proposals the USSR
has made in the series of notes sent since December should
be used as a basis for negotiations leading to an early
foreign ministers' meeting. 'Moscow apparently is still
concentrating its efforts on a parity plan that would in-
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also.
FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS . . . . . p r . . . . Page 3
The new breakdown in Rene Pleven's efforts to form
a French government underscores the continuing difficulty
of resolving non-Communist party differences over the Al-
gerian issue. Meanwhile, France's economic and social
problems show new signs of worsening, and critics of the
regime, who so far in the 23-day-old crisis:have been rel-
atively quiet, may renew their attack on the weakness of
the Fourth Republic.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 1958
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PART I (continued)
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Military operations by North Celebes dissidents
against government targets in East Indonesia are con
tinuing. \
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Djakarta, meanwhile, is pushing s
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MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Political tension remains high in Lebanon
es
dent Nasir's visit in the Soviet Union.
find it necessary to strike at Yemen itself to obtain
surcease. Factionalism is coming to the surface in the
Syrian region of the United Arab Republic during Presi-
seems certain to run again. Internal subversion
in the Aden area now appears to be as serious a problem
as the border incursions from Yemen, and the British may
NASIR' S VISIT TO USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
an easing of payment terms.
UAR President Nasir is making a 10-day, 5,000-mile
sightseeing tour of the USSR carefully tailored to his
immediate interests and his Moslem background. Moscow
has given the visit top press and radio coverage, with
an especially large volume of reporting and commentary
directed to Arab audiences. The official communiqud on
15 May probably will announce merging of the Soviet
loans previously made separately to Egypt and Syria and
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8 May 1958
PART II (continued)
MAY DAY CELEBRATIONS IN THE SINCE-SOVIET BLOC . . . . . . . Page 4
The peaceful coexistence theme at the May Day
celebration in Moscow set the tone for the occasion
elsewhere in the bloc, and the traditional parades
were much less spectacular than in other years. A
protest against flights of American aircraft over
the Arctic was echoed in other bloc capitals and
the rearmament of West Germany was denounced in East
Germany and Prague. Only East Germany among the
European satellites included military participation
in its parade. Although the armed forces took part
in the festivities in North Vietnam, the military
theme was generally played down in the Far East.
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NEW EAST GERMAN ECONOMIC MEASURES TO BE ANNOUNCED . . . . Page 5
The end of food rationing and the introduction of
a new wage system, possibly accompanied by increased
work norms, may be announced at the fifth congress of
the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) party in
July. The measures are likely to cause a rise in food
prices and a reduction in wages, thus lowering the
standard of living and adding to the general antipathy
of the workers toward the Ulbricht regime 25X1
SOVIET DIPLOMATIC TACTICS IN NORTH AFRICA . . . . . . . Page 6
Moscow has recently sharpened its public criti-
cism of French actions in Algeria. Concurrently Soviet
diplomats in Paris have maintained their campaign to
increase French suspicion of American policy in North
Africa, and are privately expressing support, particularly
to right-wing elements, for France's continued presence in
the area. These tactics appear designed to prolong the
Algerian conflict, which Moscow is ex ploitin for long-
term strategic advantages.
EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE GROWING IN LIBYA 4 . . . . .. . Page 7
Egypt's anti-Nestern campaign in Libya appears to
be gaining momentum. Libyan newspapers and schoolteachers
and pro-Egyptian elements in the Libyan Government have
joined Cairo radio in aiming an almost constant barrage
of criticism at the pro-Western stand of., the government.
In particular, they are attacking the American aid pro-
gram and the presence of American military installations
in the country. Partly in response, the cabinet may de-
mand renegotiation. of the base agreement,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 1958
PART II (continued)
GREEK ELECTIONS . . . . . ?
The attempt by the USSR to influence the Greek elec-
tions of 11 May with its promises of economic aid and
threats of possible atomic destruction if missile bases
are located in Greece is not expected to have a signif-
icant effect on the electorate. As the relatively quiet
campaign draws to a close, most observers believe the
right-center party of"former Premier Karamanlis will re-
ceive a large plurality--and possibly a strong working
majority--in the new parliament. The..Communist-front
United Democratic Left probably will finish behind both
Karamanlis' party and another pro-Western center party,
the Liberals.
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NORTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONCLUDES SESSION . . . Page 9
The recent session of the North Vietnamese assembly
elevated to top government positions individuals favor-
ing"hardline" policies. The assembly also enacted
measures to tighten Hanoi's grip over the provincial
administrations and strengthen its hand in economic af-
fairs. Details of the Three-Year Economic Plan (1958-
60) presented to the assembly have not been released,
but earlier statements indicate that expansion of food
production will be stressed and that there will be strong
d
pressures to step up collectivization of agriculture an
socialization of industry.
. Page 9
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PEIPING'S TRADE WITH FREE WORLD CONTINUES UPWARD TREND Page 10
Although Communist China continues to rely on im-
ports of bloc equipment for its major industrial under-
takings, it is turning to non-Communist sources to fill
its growing requirements for machinery. Communist China's
total foreign trade in 1957 was less than in 1956, but
its trade with the free world last year apparently in-
creased slightly over the $1.09 billion estimated for 1956. 25X1
JAPANESE NATIONAL ELECTIONS. .
. 0 ,0 . Page 11
The Socialists are expected to make some gains in
the Japanese general elections on 22 May, but not
enough to endanger conservative control of the lower
house. A Socialist advance of more than 20 seats, how-
ever, could lead eventually to the replacement of Prime
Minister Kishi as government and party leader, and
stimulate a trend toward nPufralism and o er relations
with the Communist bloc.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 1958
PART II (continued)
BURMESE GOVERNMENT SPLIT OVER PERSONAL RIVALRIES . . . Page 12
The long-smoldering personal antagonism between
Burmese Prime Minister U Nu and Deputy Prime Minister
Kyaw Nyein has resulted in an open split in the gov-
ernment Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. Parlia-
ment is to meet in special session on 5 June to debate
a no-confidence motion brought against U Nu by Kyaw
Nyein. Unless the breach is healed, Burma will be
threatened by intensified political instability-as
the resulting government, whether formed by Kyaw Nyein
or U Nu, would be either a minority government or a
coalition including elements of the present opposition,
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JAGAN EXTENDS COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN BRITISH GUIANA . . . Page 13
Since his electoral victory of last August, Cheddi
Jagan, long-time Communist leader of the People's Pro-
gressive party in British Guiana, has followed moderate
policies as leader of the colonial government
FH_ long-range trouble-
making potential is enhanced by recent overtures made
to him by rival political groups of the new West Indies
Federation, each of which hopes it may secure his sup-
port if he brings the colony into the federation.
GUATEMALANS DISILLUSIONED WITH NEW PRESIDENT . . . . a . Page 15
The Guatemalan public is becoming disillusioned with
President Ydigoras, hardly two months after his inaugura-
tion. He has not provided the able leadership expected
and has yet to tackle any major economic or political
problem. His campaign for the "return" of British Hon-
duras is purely diversionary. While no immediate threat
to the regime is apparent, continuation of the present
drifting would further enhance growing leftist strength
and seriously imperil Ydigoras' chances of serving his
full six-year, term.
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8 May 1958
PART II (continued)
FRONDIZI'S FIRST MOVES IN ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Frondizi used both his 1 May inaugural address and
his first act as President to underline the seriousness
of Argentina's economic situation. The USSR's visiting
delegation reportedly urged that Argentina "follow the
example of Egypt and India," apparently a reference to
Soviet credits for basic industries on easy terms. Fron-
dizi, however, hopes to receive American assistance; he
expressed to Vice President Nixon his desire for prompt
US government credits as a means of encouraging private
investment.
THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND LATIN AMERICA . . . ... . . Page 16
The recent offer of the six members of the Euro-
pean Common Market to set up permanent consultative
machinery with various Latin American countries seems
to be an effort to mitigate the fears of underdeveloped
countries generally that their exports to Europe will be
curtailed. When the tariff provisions of the Common
Market take effect next January, these countries will be
competing with colonial territories in Africa which are
included in the new trading area.
HAMMARSKJOLD'S INTERVENTION IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL .
The UN secretary general's statement on 29 April
on behalf of the American-proposed Arctic inspection
plan is unlikely to affect in the long run, his stand,..
ing as an independent and impartial negotiator in world
affairs. Although his. action has been described as an
unprecedented break in his impartiality, most observers
now probably agree that the "calculated risk" he took
was in keeping with his mandate under the UN Charter--a
mandate he has interpreted liberally in the past.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
. Page 18
MIDDLE EAST MENACED BY DROUGHT AND LOCUSTS . . . . . . . . Page 1
The worst drought in over 20 years, accompanied by
the heaviest locust infestation in over a decade, threat-
ens to bring near-famine conditions in some countries
of the Middle East this summer. Most seriously affected
are Jordan, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Crop
failures will bring economic and political problems in their
wake. especially in the UAR and Jordan.
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8 May 1958
PART III (continued)
ITALY'S NATIONAL ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Italy's national elections on 25 and 26 May are ex-
-pected to produce no major shifts in the voting strengths
of the principal parties. There seems little doubt that
the Christian Democratic party, though remaining the lead-
ing party, will still be unable to form a majority gov-
ernment by itself, and that the Communists and Nenni So-
cialists will together retain the support of about a third
of the electorate. Party alliances have loosened since
1953, however, and factions within parties differ consider-
ably on the forming of new party ties. The relative showing
of these factions, therefore, ma si nal long-term chap es
in the Italian political scene.
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1. 'CONHHDLNTIAL _
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 19 58
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
YUGOSLAVS BRANDED ANTI - MARXIST-LENINIST
Moscow repub ished on 6
May in Pravda the savage con-
demnation the Chinese Commu-
nists hurled at the Yugoslavs
two days earlier, indicating.
that the USSR has decided that
the Yugoslav ideology can no
longer be tolerated in the
Communist world on any terms
acceptable to Belgrade. Soviet
attempts through "comradely"
exchanges to have the Yugoslav
party's controversial program
revised apparently have been
abandoned, and the Yugoslav
leaders now are being branded
as "out-and-out revisionists"
and "anti-Marxists."
During the Yugoslav party
congress, bloc party spokesmen
clearly indicated they hoped
the Yugoslavs would concede
much of their heretical ideology
for the sake of maintaining a
position within the Communist
world. Poland and subsequently
Hungary, whose party leaders
seem to be sympathetic toward
Yugoslavia's desire to follow
its own "road to socialism,"
made special efforts to effect
changes in the Yugoslav pro-
gram. In view of the obvious
unity of the delegates at the
Yugoslav congress in endorsing
divergencies from Moscow, how-
ever, the parties of the Sino-
Soviet bloc have subsequently.
said little concerning the con-
tinuation of good party or
state relations. While the
Chinese Communist attack still
leaves the door open for Tito
to regain the status of a re-
spectable Communist, it demands
in effect the abandonment of
the entire ideological basis
of the Yugoslav "road to so-
cialism."
In the bloc's sharpest re-
buke to the Yugoslav program,
the Chinese party newspaper on
4 May accused the Yugoslav lead-
ers of speaking "like the re-
actionaries of all countries"
and described their "road to
socialism" as "surrender to
capitalism." In a key passage,
the statement stressed that the
Yugoslav ideas, which are aimed
at undermining bloc "unity,"
must be "openly and uncompro-
misingly criticized." The Pei-
ping party's position, as set
forth in its theoretical jour-
nal, is that allegiance to
the USSR is the "foundation
stone" of bloc unity, and that
demands for "equality must not
be set up against" this unity.
The heretical Yugoslav
draft party program provided
the Chinese Communists with an
opportunity to remove any doubt
in Belgrade that Peiping entire-
ly disapproves of "national
Communism" and to dispel any
hopes among Eastern European
leaders that Peiping would sup-
port their efforts to attain
freedom from Soviet control.
The blunt Chinese statement
was probably also calculated
to convince the Poles that
they cannot expect any support
from Communist China for a
course independent of Moscow.
Peiping for some time has
been careful to avoid encourag-
ing Gomulka and his more radical
supporters who in the past in-
terpreted Chinese statements
and developments as support for
their own views. The Chinese
portray Mao Tse-tung's theoreti-
cal innovations as a continua-
tion rather than refutation of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 1958
Soviet doctrine, and Soviet
experience is extolled in
China. Speakers at the Chi-
nese Communist party congress
now in session are expected
to stress the need for attack-
ing the divisive aspect of
Belgrade's concepts and to de-
fend the indispensability of
Soviet leadership.
While spokesmen for both
the bloc and Yugoslavia may
continue to pay lip service
to the maintenance of correct
state relations, an intense
ideological attack on Tito as
initiated and called for by
the Chinese Communists cannot
help but lead to a marked de-
terioration in Yugoslav-bloc
relations. No specific date
has been announced as yet for
the visit of President Voro-
shilov, who is still expected
in Belgrade before mid-May.
Since this visit is considered
purely a state function, it
may still materialize. In view
of the condemnation of Tito as
an "irreconcilable enemy" of
Marxism-Leninism, however, the
realization of the "party-state"
visit Tito has scheduled for
late May to Warsaw has been
made more difficult. There
now can be little doubt that
Gomulka, touring Eastern Europe
and espousing the unity of
the Communist world, is uneasy
over the prospects of convers-
ing with the heretic Tito.
SOVIET SUMMIT TACTICS
._. The aide-memoire Foreign
Minister Gromyko presented to
the three Western ambassadors
on 5 May clears the way for
separate negotiations with
them. Gromyko is likely to ar-
gue that the extensive agenda
proposals it has made in the
series of notes sent since De-
cember and reportedly summarized
in detail in a separate memoran-
dum given the ambassadors on
5 May should be used as a basis
for negotiations leading to an
early foreign ministers' meeting.
Previous Soviet agenda
proposals have been broad enough
to include virtually all topics
suggested by the West except
Eastern Europe, which the USSR
adamantly refuses to discuss.
While the USSR will not accept
German unification as a separate
agenda item, it anticipates that
the West will discuss this un-
det the German peace treaty topic.
Although the USSR is still
apparently seeking to avoid de-
tailed negotiations at.,the am-
bassAdorial;-level and to expedite
a. foteignministers' meeting and
subsequentiy.,:a, summit conference,
it probably does not expect that
a summit meeting will be arranged
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BUMMARY
8 May 19 58
quickly. A Soviet UN official,
who in late March was urging a
summit meeting before the Amer-
ican elections, now suggests
privately that December is a
suitable date.
Although Soviet diplomats
have reportedly discussed Turk-
ish participation in a summit
meeting with officials in Ankara, ,
Moscow apparently is still con-
centrating its efforts on a
parity plan that would include
only three states from each side.
Poland and Czechoslovakia remain
the Soviet candidates. The
USSR had given the Western pow-
ers the choice of separate am-
bassadorial meetings or a six-
nation joint meeting, but the
5 May aide-memoire criticized
the West for rejecting Polish
and Czech participation.
The USSR probably still
hopes to include some neutrals
at a summit meeting also. Fol-
lowing his 5 May meeting with
the three ambassadors, Gromyko
met with ambassadors from all
the bloc states and. from Sweden,
India, and Yugoslavia, as he
did following his first meet-
ing with the Western ambassadors
in mid-April. This technique
not only emphasizes the Soviet
claims for parity and neu-
tral representation at the
summit but inhibits the
Western, effort ;.to, conduct
secret negotiations with the
USSR at the ambassadorial
level.
FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
The breakdown in Rene
Pleven's efforts to form a
French government underscores
the continuing difficulty of
resolving non-Communist party
differences over the Algerian
issue, Meanwhile, France's
economic and social problems
show further signs of worsen-
ing, and critics of the present
republican regime, who so far
in the 23-day-old crisis have
been relatively quiet, may re-
new their attack on the
basic weakness of the Fourth
Republic,
The paramountcy of the Al-
gerian issue was clearly evi-
denced as Pleven's effort to
pull together a small center
coalition,,at President Coty's
insistence, ran into serious
difficulty when Pleven tried
to satisfy both left and right
in the selection of his cabinet.
The continuing reluctance of
most major party leaders to
participate in his government
also complicated his task, as
did apparent unwillingness Of
the Socialists to endorse his
expected request for broad
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 19 58
special powers despite their
earlier offer of general sup-
port.
Filling the key posts
of minister for Algeria and
minister of national defense
can be expected to be diffi-
cult for any prospective pre-
mier. The trend in the So-
cialist party toward amore
liberal approach on North Africa
has already aroused the sus-
picion of French residents in
Algeria, and their uneasiness
will probably buttress rightist
and Independent nationalisms
At the same time the Algerian
question emphasizes differences
within the center parties, such
as the Radical Socialists and
Pleven's Democratic Resistance
Union. New military demands
for more funds for Algeria and
for restoration of the arms
production program threaten an
early reopening of the bit-
terly fought defense budget
issued
Meanwhile, the present
French economic and social pic-
ture is worsening as the foreign
exchange balance dwindles again
and as the rising cost of liv-
ing spurs labor union threats
to go all out in strikes for
higher wages this month. The
6 May recommendation of the
National Accounts Committee
that wine, meat, and petroleum
be rationed to ease the balance-
of-payments difficulties fur-
nishes new political ammunition
for the likely clash between
the Socialists and Independents
over social and economic poli-
cies.
Proponents of a move to
replace the Fourth Republic may
seize on Pleven's political dif-
ficulties as typifying the weak-
nesses of the present system.
While President Coty can be ex-
pected to move quickly to get
a new candidate--possibly a
center "dark horse"--to head
off any renewed speculation
on a coup, rumors of the pos-
sible return of General de
Gaulle may again spread in
The dissident radio in
Menado announced an air strike
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8 May 1958
on 7 May, following a brief lull
in air activity, against the
Ambon air base; two government
aircraft and an oil storage
dump were said to have been de-
stroyed. The rebel broadcast
stated that the dissidents'
B-26 did not attack a Garuda
Indonesian Airways plane which
was taking off but warned that
in the future civilian planes
would be hit if they continue
to use airfields which are reb-
el targets.
In the political field, air
attacks have brought strong gov-
ernment accusations that Ameri-
can and Chinese Nationalist
"volunteers" are piloting rebel
planes and supplying the rebels
with arms and funds, Presi-
INDONESIA
KkAYX
? C~