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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 CONFIDEiJTIAL (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY CENTRAL COPY NO. 54 OCI NO.1681/59 2 April 1959 AUTH: H/~R,470- DATE/t/ REVIEWER: CLASS. CHANGED To~ NEXT RE ViE W DATE: NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 0 DECLASSIRMI) DOCUMENT NO. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE State Department review completed CONFI wag Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 2 April 1959 In agreeing to a foreign ministers' conference on 11 May in Geneva, the Soviet notes re- plying to the Western notes of 26 March sought to strengthen the impression that the three Western powers have already accepted a summit meeting this summer. Khrushchev's decision not to obstruct the convening of the ministerial conference by in- sisting on the participation at the outset of Poland and Czech- oslovakia was evident in Mos- cow's agreement to leave this question for the conference it- self to decide. The Soviet notes, however, leave the USSR free to raise this issue as soon as the meeting convenes. While the Soviet reply indi- cated agreement to Western pro- posals on the date, place, and agenda of the proposed confer- ence, its emphasis on a German peace treaty and Berlin as "con- crete issues.. .long awaiting decisions" suggests that Moscow will insist that substantive discussions be confined to these issues and maintain its refusal to discuss German reunification. Soviet propaganda has as- serted that a summit meeting will be needed regardless of progress made by the ministers and that lack of success at the lower level would make summit talks all the more necessary. Soviet propaganda is charging that the Western position link- ing a summit meeting to progress at the foreign ministers' con- ference reflects either a de- sire to block the path to the summit or to "avoid it alto- gether." his press con- ference. on 19 March assumed that both the foreign ministers and heads of government would meet and said he was certain reason would prevail and they will be able to overcome the obstacles to agreement. CONFIDENTIAL PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 .In line with its professed optimism over the prospects for agreement at the summit on Ber- lin and a German peace treaty, Moscow has made consistent ef- forts since November to reas- sure the Soviet people that no grave risk of war over Berlin exists. While there have been scattered articles in the Soviet press conveying the impression of hysteria and bellicosity in the United States, there has been no campaign charging the existence of an American "war psychosis." The American Embas- sy believes the Soviet public now is more concerned over a war threat than before Khrushchev's Berlin moves, but less than during the Suez and Taiwan Strait crises. There have been no rumors of hoarding which were prevalent during the ear- lier crisis. On the eve of the tenth anniversary meeting of the NATO foreign ministers, Moscow pub- lished its customary diatribe against this Western "instru- ment for aggression." The So- viet Government statement con- trasted NATO's preparations for war with the constant striv- ings of the USSR and the "so- cialist camp" for peace and, in this connection, repeated Soviet proposals for a free city of West Berlin, a German peace treaty, a nonaggression pact, disarmament, and disen- gagement. A TASS statement, three days after De Gaulle's 25 March press conference, reflected Moscow's hope that despite the French leader's firm stand on Berlin, his views on other Ger- man questions could be exploit- ed. There have been indications that the Soviet leaders have been uncertain of De Gaulle's attitude on the German ques- tion. Moscow now may see its first opportunity in the pres- ent crisis to play up the French leader's independent approach to world politics. TASS endorsed De Gaulle's suggestion for in- creased East - West German con- tacts and termed his statement that Germany's present frontiers should not be changed "a cor- rect and realistic approach." Moscow will probably attempt further to exploit these state- ments in its effort to gain Western recognition of East Germany with its eastern fron- tier at the Oder-Neisse. On the other hand, the TASS statement professed "more than amazement" at the "allegation" in the French note of 26 March that the USSR had created the crisis over Berlin and at De Gaulle's declaration of inten- tion to maintain Western access to Berlin--attributing his "bel- licose utterances" to pressure from Washington and Bonn. 'East Germany East Germany is making preparations to send, reported- ly for three or four weeks, a delegation headed by Foreign Minister Lothar Bolz to the min- isterial conference in Geneva. The East Germans are accom- modating themselves with some SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 difficulty to the less strident Soviet line on Berlin, East German spokesmen have performed an about-face on the 27 May "deadline." When asked what will happen on that date, East Berlin party boss Paul Verner replied,"May 27 is followed by May 28, and it has exactly 24 hours," The East Berlin party organization, which has the duty of conducting pro-Ulbricht propaganda in West Berlin, is reportedly experiencing major difficulties in soft-pedaling its former hard-line approach, although the.local party or- ganization was completely shaken up last month in an ef- fort to strengthen its effective- ness. Soviet, troops belonging to the Berlin headquarters at Karls- horst have not been reduced in strength. Corridor Incident Following a high-altitude flight to 'Berlin by an American Air Force transport aircraft on 27 March, the Russians have warned that "complications" might result from a repetition of flights above 10,000 feet by Allied aircraft in the Berlin air corridors. A Soviet offi- cial in East Berlin charged that the United States was attempting to alter unilaterally flight regulations of long standing without negotiating the matter with Soviet authorities. When the plan for the 27 March flight was filed with the Berlin Air Safety Center approx- ihiate ly one hour before the air- craft was scheduled to enter the corridor, the Soviet member re- fused to givee a guarantee of flight safety on the grounds that altitudes above 10,000 feet are reserved for Soviet and East German aircraft, Soviet officials in Berlin promptly protested the flight, and warned that the United States would be responsi- ble for any "undesirable con- sequences." The Allied position is that there is no ceiling for flights in the corridor, even though Allied aircraft have not regularly flown above 10,000 feet, Soviet fighter planes har- assed the American aircraft on both the inbound and outbound flights, times within five to ten feet and making in- tercept passes. Ambassador Bruce in. Bonn filed a protest against the harassment: with So- viet authorities in Berlin, with the request that they take ac- tion to prevent a recurrence of such interference with any fu- ture flights through the cor- ridors under rights established by quadripartite agreements. West. Germany On the eve of the NATO for- eign, ministers' discussions, West German Foreign Minister Brentano took a stronger public stand against possible conces- sions by Bonn on unification and the eastern boundary ques- tion. Ie termed a phased uni- fication plan without prior free SECRET C)p ` 11141VlEDIAT INTEREST Page 3 of 10 PART I Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 elections as "unthinkable" and reiterated Bonn's position that the Polish-German boundary could only be negotiated by an all German government. In private Western discussions, Bonn had previously indicated that the Oder-Neisse boundary might be accepted as part of an effort to normalize relations with War- saw, but only as a last-stage negotiating position. West Ger- man officials had also introduced a phased unification plan which postponed free elections until the final stage, Brentano's renewed empha- sis on free elections may re- flect the government's concern over the increasingly bitter political campaign of the op- position Social Democratic party (SPD). The SPD's unifi- cation and European security proposal is being supported by ?a vigorous propaganda effort along the lines of its 1958 campaign against atomic weap- ons. Some SPD officials are already disenchanted with the party's program, but feel that there is no retreating from it. Brentano's remarks on the Oder-Neisse border are an ob- vious effort to offset De Gaulle's 25 March press con- ference statement favoring German unification within the "present boundaries." This ap- parent acceptance of the Oder- Neisse line was sharply attacked by all political parties as a "rotten Easter egg from Paris," and the opposition has demanded clarification of the government's position and whether or not De Gaulle's remarks were made with Adenauer's approval. Bonn's renewed emphasis on its traditional policies-- unification beginning with free elections and a return to the borders of 1937--coincides with the gradual shift in Ger- man opinion in favor of an isolated Berlin settlement, prob- ably involving some de facto recognition of the East Ger- man Government. The majority opinion, according to Amer- ican observers, now favors some contractual arrangement with Moscow and East Germany regulating access and guar- anteeing the status quo in Berlin, rather than the risk of broad negotiations involv- ing concessions on unifica- tion and European security. West Berlin Deputy Mayor Amrehn told American officials that the Berlin government was grave- ly concerned over what it feels is the developing in- tention in the West to save Berlin at the expense of an all-German settlement, thus creating "three Germanys." Economic indicators avail- able during the past two weeks show a substantial up- turn following the January slump. Berlin business circles now feel that although new orders had been declining, SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 1p Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 the situation now has taken a more favorable turn, Indus- trial production indices for February show a strong rebound from January, except for ma- chinery production. Berlin stock market prices have risen, with some shares gaining 5 to 8 points. MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS Situation in Baghdad The situation in Iraq con- tinues to develop favorably for the expansion of Communist in- fluence. The American Embassy in Baghdad has concluded that the Communists have achieved such dominance In the propaganda field and are penetrating the bureaucracy and army to such an extent that Prime Minister Qasim might not be able to turn against them successfully even if he wished to do so. The embassy believes it is the "year of the bear" in Iraq, and the atmos- phere in Baghdad, it says, is reminiscent of that in the European satellites. Qasim last week forecast that another "big new revolu- tion" in Iraq would occur this month. Qasim's previous "revo- lutions" have turned out to be major policy announcements,such as the withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact and the announce- ment of Soviet economic aid; The new "revolution" is the subject of widespread specula- tion--it may turn out to be a constitutional change or a shift in large-scale develop- ment plans, or even some move to nationalize the oil industry. A regime spokesman this week said political parties would "soon" be permitted to function, although he qualified the statement by saying that " f course" those which sought 0 This presumably excludes the pro--UAR "nationalist" groups, -like the Baath, which have been accused of sympathizing with the Mosul revolt. Executions Resumed The first official execu- tions since the July revolution also occurred in Baghdad last week, when four air force offi- cers who had participated in the Mosul revolt were shot. Two senior officers under arrest for plotting--although they did not join the revolt--are reported to have attempted suicide. Bagh- dad radio has been broadcasting lookout notices for other sus- pects, including a chief of the Shammar tribe. 25X1 25X1 British Withdrawal London, meanwhile, has agreed to withdraw the remaining 300-odd British military person- nel from the Habbaniya air base. The British have not decided whether to accept Qasim's offer to retain limited staging rights at the base or to seek full fa- cilities elsewhere. Cairo has already sought to portray this as an indication of British "im- perialist" support for Qasim. The final withdrawal from Habani- ya involves a large quantity of equipment and may take as long as four months. to use arms to enforce their Arab League Meeting views would not be'permitted. The UAR-Iraq dispute was to be the main item on the SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY'SUMM!1RY 2 April 1959 agenda of the Arab League foreign ministers' meeting held in Bei- rut on 2 April. None of the participants appears to have believed that much good could come of the meeting, which re- sulted from the desire of the Sudanese and others to make some gesture toward restoring Arab unity. Diplomatic Efforts Communist bloc diplomats for their part are continuing efforts to smooth over bloc dif- ferences with Nasir and tone down the UAR-Iraq dispute. The Chinese Communist ambassador in Cairo is said to have made representations along this line, and Peiping's vice foreign min- ister may have made a similar approach during his recent visit to Egypt. Peiping has taken much the same propaganda posi- tion toward Nasir as has Moscow, although its press attacks have been less frequent and no Chinese leader has publicly criticized the UAR. Nasir Responds Nevertheless, Nasir on 30 March broke a week-long silence and again strongly criticized the USSR for its interference in Arab affairs. The Soviet press and radio have in the past been unwilling to let Nasir'$ public charges go unanswered. Bloc Propaganda Soviet propaganda media, while continuing to describe the UAR-.Iraqi dispute as harm- ful to both peoples, earlier refuted at length Nasir's charges that he received no effective support from the USSR during the Suez crisis. A Pravda article on 30 March contrasted the "rapid improvement" in the Iraqi living standard with "in- ternal difficulties" in the UAR. Pravda criticized "some leaders the Near East" for attempting to use Arab nation- alism as a means of uniting "all Arab states with one of them,, irrespective of whether they wish it or not." UAR Communists Act In addition to propaganda ripostes from Moscow, there is some evidence of local Egyptian Communist efforts to campaign against Nasir. Antiregime slo- gans are appearing on walls in Cairo, Communist anti-Nasir tracts are again reported circulat- ing, and demonstrations led by Communist-infiltrated labor ele- ments on 26 March resulted in some property. damage; the police finally had to intervene. More Communists have been arrested in Egypt Israeli Reserve Call-up The Israeli radiobroadcast on 1 April calling up reserves for three units created nervous- ness and apprehension not only in the UAR, which ordered the reserves of the First (Syrian) Army called up on 2 April, but inside Israel as well. The of- ficial Israeli explanation has been that the call-up was for routine training. However, the procedure used was new, and the phrasing of the first Israeli announcement suggested the pos- sibility that "all" reserves, rather than a limited number, were being mobilized. SECRET 25X1 25X1 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 Opposition political groups in Israel will probably seek to make capital out of the govern- ment's "mistake" in making the call-up in this way, and the move was quickly criticized by a Progressive party member of the Mapai-dominated cabinet as merely another instance of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's failure to consult his colleagues. The actual motives behind the move-- if indeed it does go beyond training--remain unclear, but its is possible that the Israe- li wished by this device to call attention to their security situation in the midst of po- tentially disturbing develop- ments in UAR-Iraqi relations, in Jordan, or elsewhere on their borders. TIBETAN REVOLT STRAINS SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS The Tibetan revolt has put new strains on Sino-Indian re- lations and is damaging Peiping's prestige among the Afro-Asian countries, where Communist China and India are competing for influence. Peiping is well aware that the official Indian statements on the revolt and Nehru's willingness to permit extensive reporting by foreign press services have contributed directly to the damage to its reputation. While Prime Min- ister Nehru has adhered official- ly to his general policy of non- interference, he has publicly expressed sympathy for the Ti- betan rebels. Peiping's strong irrita- tion and its intention to keep the Indians on the defensive were conveyed in the first of- ficial Chinese communique on 28 March. Tlie commentary stated that Kalimpong in the Indian state of West Bengal was the "central headquarters" for the revolt, thereby suggesting Indian connivance. The commen- tary also implied further dis- cussion of Tibet in the Indian Parliament would be "impolite and improper." Should Nehru make represen- tations on behalf of the Ti- betans, the Chinese will prob- ably reply that Tibet is con- sidered "autonomous" and empha- size that the matter is con- sidered "internal." But the Chinese, however.strong their public and private reaction to Indian "interference," do not wish a serious rift in relations with the Asian power which had previously supported them on certain international issues. That Peiping now seems to be treating Indian sensitivities with more regard is suggested in the 31 March editorial in People's Daily which, although Contains the Kalimpong charge, avoids mention of what the In- dian Parliament may or may not discuss. Peiping's handling of the Tibetan developments has caused SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 7 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 LOCATIONS WHERE PEIPING CLAIMS TO BE IN FIRM CONTROL SHOWN IN RED. AREAS CURRENTLY UNDER REBEL CONTROL SHOWN IN GREEN. considerable irritation in In- dian official quarters, thus making it increasingly diffi- cult for New Delhi to maintain its conciliatory position. More- over, public pressure on the government to take a less equiv- ocal stand against Chinese re- pression in Tibet has sharply intensified following Peiping's charges against India. Various opposition groups have added to the agitation in the press by, staging anti-Chinese demonstra- tions in several Indian cities. Nehru in his statement before a tense Parliament on 30 March sharply rejected Pei- ping's complaints, commenting that his government would not "submit to any kind of dicta- SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION T I B El Nagchhu bzong i i~D nc gp Tanghswng sTaichpo tion from any country, however great or big it may be.,, His statement was balanced, however, with a plea for restraint and a reaffirmation of friendship for China. Peiping's repeti- tion, of charges that Kalimpong is a rebel base provoked further uproars in Parliament on 1 and 2 April, causing Nehru and his deputy external affairs minis- ter to criticize Peiping for mak- ing improper allegations. The Indian prime minister reluctantly agreed to meet a large delegation of Tibetan leaders led by a former prime minister of Tibet. Nehru pub- licly expressed his sympathy, but pointed out that India was not in a position to intervene and counseled patience. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 8 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLICENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 The Dalai Lama, who fled southward from Lhasa on 17 March, arrived in India on the 31st. Peiping, still claiming he is held under "duress" by the rebels, probably will de- mand his return. New Delhi probably will try to ease the diplomatic problem posed by the Dalai Lama's presence by restricting--at least overtly --Tibetan activities to non- political affairs. The Indians may also withhold permission for the Tibetans to establish a government-in-exile. Reaction Elsewhere in Asia The Tibetan revolt has em- barrassed the Chinese National- ists, who are pledged to aid any large-scale uprising on the China mainland but have no ca- pability to give effective sup- port to the Tibetans. The Na- tionalists may, however, at- tempt to develop a capability for token support by means of air drops staged through north- ern Burma and for smuggling small arms through India. Pres- ident Chiang Kai-shek probably has gone as far as he can to- ward encouraging the Tibetans by promising them future '`self- determination" if the National- ists recover the mainland. The strongest Asian react - tian outside India has come from Malaya, where the foreign minister officially condemned the Chinese use of force in Tibet and likened it to Soviet repression in Hungary. Similar protests have been voiced by sections of the press in Indo- nesia, Burma, Pakistan, the Philippines, Japan, and the United Arab Republic. Situation Inside Tibet Peiping admits that rebel forces numbering "only about 20,000" continue to occupy parts of southern Tibet and other ''very remote places,,. in Tibet and west- ern China. The actual strength of the rebels probably exceeds Peiping's estimate, but except for the Khamba tribesmen these forces appear scattered and largely undirected. No serious unrest has been reported since Chinese Communist forces drove the Tibetan rebels out of Lhasa on 22 March after two days of intense fighting. The battle for Lhasa resulted in considerable damage to mon- asteries, the Dalai Lama's palace and summer home, public buildings, and power lines. Pei- ping claims that 4,000 rebels were taken prisoner during the fighting and that large amounts of arms and ammunition were captured. The Chinese say that order is rapidly being restored in Lhasa. Peiping's recent statements indicate that the regime has abandoned its cautious policy in Tibet in favor of force to assimilate the Tibetans. Pre- mier Chou En-lei's 28 March order enjoins the Chinese and SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 9 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET 2 April 1959 armed forces in Tibet to "thor- oughly stamp out" the rebellion and in affect places Tibet under martial law. Although the re- gime has dealt sternly with out- breaks of unrest in the past, it has never before attempted all-out suppression. Such an effort will be long and costly for the Chinese, since it is likely that small guerrilla bands will continue to operate successfully for some time in the rough terrain of Tibet and western China, The Chinese Communist de- cree of 28 March dissolves the local Tibetan government and replaces it with the Communist- sponsored Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region which was set up in April 1956 but never accepted by the Tibet- ans. It reverses Peiping's policy since 1951 which has been to move slowly in Tibet, delaying reforms, and working as much as possible through local institutions while at- tempting to undermine their au- thority and gradually replace them with Chinese Communist or- ganizations. Chinese statements now indicate that Tibet will "carry out reform early and take the socialist road. The 28 March order names Peiping's puppet, the Panchen Lama, acting chairman of the preparatory committee in place of the Dalai Lama "during the SECRET OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 10 of 10 time" the latter is "held by the rebels." The Chinese have been grooming the Panchen Lama for just such a role in the event the ])alai Lama refused to co- operate with them. By having the :Panchen Lama act four the Dalai Lama on an ostensibly temporary basis, the Chinese are evidently hoping to make him more acceptable to the Tibetans. It seems likely that the Com- munists will continue to use the Panchen Lama for the time being but will increase their efforts to destroy Lamaism in Tibet. The Dalai Lama is spiritual head of the Lamaistic branch of Buddhism and receives allegiance from Nepal, Bhutan, parts of northern India, northwest China, and Mongolia. Non-Lamaistic Buddhists:in Burma, India, Cey- long;, Thailand, and Japan will be stirred by the fate of their co-,religionists in Tibet. The Communists, :apparent- ly anxious to keep the door open for future use of the Dalai Lama as a puppet, are claiming that his attitude con- tinues to favor Peiping against Tibetan "reactionaries.'" On 29 March, Peiping radio broad- cast the text of letters alleg- edly exchanged between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese po- litical commissar in Tibet sup- porting this theme and attempt- "provocations . "" ink; to document Chinese re- straint in the face of rebel Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 25X6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 MAJOR SHAKE-UP IN MONGOLIAN COMMUNIST PARTY At a central committee ple- num on 30 March, four of the nine members of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary (Commu- nist) party politburo, includ- ing former party First Secre- tary D. Damba, were removed from their posts on charges of misconduct. The shake-up, which has also had repercussions in the cabinet structure, appears to be a victory for Premier Tsedenbal in his dispute with Damba. The rivalry between the two dates back at least to 1954, when Tsedenbal relinquished the top party position to Damba in a show of "collective leader- ship." Last November Tsedenbal replaced Damba, who was demoted to second secretary. The number of individuals involved in the purge, which included two candidate members of the politburo and the chair- man of the party control com- mission, suggests that Tseden- bal's leadership has been under sharp attack and may even indi- cate an attempted coup on the part of the defeated faction. The central committee com- munique announcing the changes accused Damba of "profound ideo- logical and political backward- ness, conservatism, per:.onal conceit, lack of principles, in- sincerity, distortion of party policies," and other offenses. The emphasis in the communique on "political backwardness" TSEDENSAL suggests that the politburo may have been split on policy, per- haps over the recent drive for rapid collectivization of live- stock herders--a program which the Communist regime had hesi- tated to push "since the"failure of a similar campaign in 1931. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 Tsedenbal has placed his strongest supporter, L. Tsende, in the secretariat post vacated by Damba, and promoted the head of the party research institute, Tumir-Ochir, to full politburo membership. Tsende has resigned as first deputy premier and as chairman of the State Planning Commission in order to devote full time to party affairs. Re- cent reports have spoken of a '.'Tsedenbal-Tsende" team, which now seems to be emerging. First Deputy Premier Surenjab, ex- pelled after 12 years, of serv- ice on the politburo, has also lost his position as chairman of the Mongolian legislature. In announcing the plenum's decision to reduce the size of the politburo from nine to seven full members and from five to two alternates, Tsedenbal is probably hoping to create a body which is easier to control. The move may also indicate a lack of competent top-level leaders in the party as a result of the present purge. Tsedenbal, a doctrinaire and strongly pro-Soviet Commu- nist, has been opposed by more nationalistic party circles in Mongolia? His marriage to a Russian national reportedly has caused considerable grum- bling, but he now has consoli- dated his position as top leader. To date there has been no ques- tion of a pro - Chinese Commu- nist bias within the top leader- ship of the Mongolian party, and it appears that the recent changes in Moscow's oldest sat- ellite will reinforce its con- tinued pro-Soviet orientation. USSR ATTEMPTING TO PURCHASE EMBARGOED COMMUNICATIONS CABLE The USSR is seeking to purchase from six countries outside the bloc a large amount of shielded multiple-conductor cable for delivery between May and August 1959,. This type of cable, which is on the COCOM em- bargo list,. is said by Moscow to be needed on the Trans- Siberian Railway between Moscow and Vladivostok to overcome in- terference to existing landline communications resulting from electrification of the railroad. A little over one third of the railway is already electrified. The specified capacity of the cable far exceeds the needs of all Trans-Siberian Railroad operations and would probably PAST II be used for civil and military communications as well. This would greatly improve existing communications facilities be- tween, the Urals and the Pacific, which are inadequate and lack security. The entire bloc is generally short of multicon- ductor cable, however, and the USSR may actually plan to use the cable elsewhere, The USSR requested bids for a total of some 3,725 miles of cable from Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Britain, and West Germany. It may be, however, that the actual amount of cable the USSR intends to buy is con- siderably less, since tenders are not firm contracts. France SECRET NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 decided in late February to sell and contended at a COCOM meeting in Paris on 23 March that the cable is not covered under the embargo list on the grounds that it is merely rail- road-signaling equipment. The other countries involved feel they must either get France to reverse its position or else permit their own companies to sell. The request is for 61-wire cable, which could carry over 3,000 telegraph circuits of 60 words per minute, or over 200 two-way telephone conversations, or various combinations of the two. This is over 30 times the capacity of cables used for Ametican railway communications. The cable would be suitable for use in Soviet air-defense systems, such as a digital data- 25X1 transmission system, and for use with a railway-based mobile missile system. (Prepared by ORR-, in by OS I ) NEW SOVIET LABOR BRIGADE MOVEMENT FACES DIFFICULTIES Recent criticism. by a sec- retary.of the all-union Komso- mol gives the impresoion that the labor , brigade. movement, only 'recently launched, encoun- tered difficulties almostfrom its outset., The movement?said to have originated among young workers in a Moscow factory, was given strong. official : back- ing in No and quick- ly promoted thr6ughout,the USSR. Basically. it 'entails a.l::l the workers in ,,a given shop 'car work unit collectively, taking a pledge to "work and live in a Communist, mahner"and compet- ing with other brigades for, the title of "C6mmutltgt Labor grid Bade.'' Designed pkimarily to spur maximum productivity:for fulfilitne.ilt of the Seven-rear Plan, the movement differs from its predecessor., Q'socialist competition," in that it stress- es.: exemplary personal behavior and a "socialist outlook" as well as.labor productivity. The brigades have been, referred to as "cells of the future Com- munist society" and every ef- fort has been made to give the movement idealistic appeal by presenting it as a link with the coming Communist utopia. The criticism appearing in Komsomol.skaya Pravda indicates thaETie spontaneity'.and lofty ideals which were supposed to give the movement its momentum have quickly been subverted by a formalistic approach and an obsession for overfulfillment. The author complains that in some cases Komsomol committees juggle the members of shops or work units and thus artificial- ly create "show" brigades. In other instances "privileged con- ditions" are created for the competing brigades. The title of "Communist Brigade" is fre- quently awarded almost automat- ically to certain groups of 25X1 workers whether they have lived up to their lofty pledges or not. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 April 1959 EAST GERMANY PLANS LABOR SPEED-UP Under the pressure of an accelerated economic program, the East German regime is once again taking cautious steps to raise the work norms of indus- trial laborers. Wage increases recently granted to miners and employees of the chemical, food, and paper industries are being accompanied by a reclassifica- tion of industrial jobs requir- ing higher qualifications and increased performance. The introduction of the Seifert method--a form of in- dustrial speed-up--into a num- ber of plants such as the Elec- tra-chemical Combine in Bitter- fold is regarded by the workers as a means of increasing output to demonstrate the feasibility of an increase in norms. This method is used to promote "so- cialist competition" and to fix wages pegged to work norms. The workers realize this and, according to the East German press,"...the Seifert method is meeting great difficulty at the Maxhuette foundry and has de- veloped very slowly at the Wema plant." Moves to increase work norms were defeated by the worker re- volts of June 1953 and by the outspoken hostility of the work- ers in mid-1958. The East Ger- man workers are particularly sensitive to this type of ex- ploitation. Party First Secretary Ui- bricht retreated in a public speech in July when he called for an increase in labor pro- ductivity by use of the brigade system, a method which relies most heavily on the party faith- ful among the workers, as an interim means of increasing la- bor productivity. His cautious tactics are a recognition of the fact that he is steering a difficult course between the needs for increased productivity imposed by his regime's ambi- tious economic goals and the re- sentment of East German workers. (Prepared by ORR) NORTH AFRICA The Algerian rebels, work-- ing in concert with the Tunisian and Moroccan governments, hope to exact a compromise from French President de Gaulle for a settlement of the Algerian rebellion. At Tunisian Presi- dent Bourguiba's initiative, the North Africans may propose that an independent Maghrebian federation, including Algeria, associate with the French Com- munity, guarantee the rights of the French minority, and adopt a favorable attitude toward foreign military bases. At the same t-'.me, the Algerians are contirr?, their efforts to es- tablish discreet contacts direct- ly with the French. While De Gaulle in turn has been -reported still seeking contacts with the rebels, he has not moved appreciably from his public offer made last fall for a safe-conduct to rebel lead- ers to come to Paris to arrange a cease-fire. Meanwhile, the French press is playing up the defection of a minor rebel lead- er and the reported death in am- bush of two commanders of the Algerian Army of Liberation in an effort to prove that the back of the rebellion is broken. SECREET- PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pace 5 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 ~Wilil CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 Should the diplomatic gam- bit fail, Tunisia and Morocco may be prepared to insist on the early and complete evacuation of all foreign troops. The Al- gerians apparently hope Morocco can persuade the United States-- by holding out the prospect of an agreement on the five Ameri- can air bases--to use its in- fluence on behalf of the Al.- gerians for a settlement with Paris. Despite their preference for a compromise settlement with France and close ties with the West, the Algerians are pursuing their contacts with the Sirio- Soviet bloc. An Algerian mili- UNREST IN FRENCH TROPICAL AFRICA Political tension will probably increase and may be- come critical within the next few months in:several of the autonomous republics of the former federations of French West and Equatorial Africa. FRENCH TROPICAL AFRICA SPANISH SAHARA COAST 0 Proposed Federation of Mali ......???.? Republic boundary 2 APRIL 1959 tary group is in Peiping Rebel Premier Abbas is visiting Asian'and Middle Eastern capitals. Tunisia is seeking Amer- ican military equipment to mod- ernize and strengthen its armed forces. It is prompted in this effort in part by fear of French incursion into its territory if no agreement is reached with Paris, as well as by the po- tential threat to its internal stability of a more powerful bloc.supported Algerian rebel army. Pro-federation leaders from five of the seven West Af- rican republics met in Dakar on 24 March and formed the African Federal party to support the Mali Federation--a proposed new grouping of territories of the CONGO GABON ~S ??'??:9rezzaville~ Le apoldviii, SECRET UGANDA Entebbe 25X1 25X1 25X1 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 6 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Aww; SECRET 2 April 1959 former federation of French West Africa. They elected Leo- pold Senghor, political boss of Senegal, president. The party leaders, who consider the Mali Federation a first stage in cre- ating a federal republic of West Africa, reportedly envisage in- dependence from France as a long-range goal. Formation of this party may end some of the political confusion arising from the splits within the two leading regional parties on the federa- tion issue. However, active agitation may result in con- siderable tension and bloodshed when entrenched pro-French na- tive leaders like Houphouet- Boigny in the Ivory Coast react to this new challenge. The federalists have de- cided to proceed with the Mali Federation, which Paris views unsympathetically and which is supported only by Senegal and Soudan, following the defection of the Voltaic Republic and Da- homey. It will be formed on 4 April and will seek to join the French Community as a single entity. In three of the four auton- omous; republics of former French Equatorial Africa--Congo, Chad, and Central Africa--po- litical tension may soon become critical because of their basic instability and lack of readi- ness for self-government. In the Congo, politicalop- position to Fulbert Youlou de- generated to savage tribal war- fare in February; the situation remains tense in anticipation of a referendum and new elections. In the Chad, four govern- ments have held power since Oc- tober; because of the republic's socio-racial make-up--Arabic north and Negroid south--insta- bili7ty is likely to increase. The Central African Repub- lic, which had been politically stable under the leadership of federalist Barthelemy Boganda, 25X1 may face a political crisis fol- lowing his death in a plane accident on 30 March. THAILAND PRESSING FOR SOLUTION Thailand, apparently aban- doning as infeasible plans to relocate some 50,000 Vietnamese refugees residing in the north- eastern frontier provinces, is redoubling efforts to arrange for their mass repatriation. The Sarit government has sent a new note to South Vietnam asking its reasons for refusiig to accept the 10,000 refugees. the Thais estimate would choose to go there. The note pointed in contrast to Communist North Vietnam's long-standing "agree- ment in principle" to accept those refugees, estimated to number at least 40,000, who would opt for the north if forced to leave Thailand. Bangkok has also formally called the refugee, problem to the attention of its SEATO part- ners, asking them at least to be prepared to help with funds and transportation if Thailand can arrange for repatriation. The ideal solution in Thai eyes would be the mass transfer of refugees to South Vietnam. However, Saigon has consistent- ly refused to take more than a token number 'of carefully screened families, and is un- willing to become party to forced repatriation. The Diem government would clearly prefer' that, 'mass SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 %kv~ 1"0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2'April 1959 Provinces where Vietnamese refugees are concentrated. D .TATUTE M SAKON NAKHON \ l l NAKHON PHANOM1 Moulvrei 1 deportation of the refugees not be attempted at all.,. Since Saigon does not want the refu- gees, it fears their movement to North Vietnam would provide Hanoi with a signal prop- aganda triumph which might undermine Saigon's prestige as claimant to the loyalties of the people in'both South and North Vietnam. In recent months, Hanoi has been stepping up its propa- ganda in support of the refu- gees' cause, protesting against the Sarit regime's arrest of some 260 suspected pro-Commu- nist ringleaders and reaffirm- ing its readiness to negotiate on the refugees' return to North Vietnam. Hanoi insists, however, on direct talks be- tween the Thai and North Viet- namese chapters of the Red Cross, a proposal which the Thais have hitherto rejected because "Thailand does not recog- nize North Vietnam. SINGAPORE ELECTION CAMPAIGN Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock has so far been unsuccess- ful in his. efforts to obtain cooperation among Singapore's moderate parties for the Legis- lative Assembly elections now planned for 30 May. The Brit- ish, who seem reconciled to an election victory by the Communist-infiltrated People.'s Action (PAP) party, appear to be giving little if any support to Lim's Singapore People's Alliance (SPA). They apparently desire to avoid any action which might impair their chances of working with PAP's moderate wing led by Secretary General Lee Kuan Yew. SECRET - THAILAND ~6\07i PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 Last week Lim's govern- ment, in an effort to divert attention from the SPA's 'dif- ficulties and to discredit PAP, took over the administrative functions of the PAP-dominated Singapore city council. The British are fearful that this action, and possibly future provocations against PAP which Lim might plan, could lead to violence by extremist elements, even though PAP is trying to avoid its good election pros- pects. Disorders, which could be blamed on PAP, would provide the Singapore Government with the opportunity to proscribe the party or might force the British to postpone the elec- tions. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET SOCIAL "' DEMOCRATS 2 April 1959 After three months in of- fice, Iceland's minority Social Democratic government has man- aged to halt the inflation which threatened to set off a new round of price and wage in- creases. As part of its stabi- lization program, the government recently secured parliamentary approval of a 5,4-percent roll- back for both prices and wages, but it faces greater difficulty CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY LABOR ALLIANCE CONSERVATIVES (COMMUNISTS) dominated Labor Alli- ance. It remains de- pendent on Conservative parliamentary support, which is conditioned on the understanding that the government will introduce legislation to revise the exist- ing electoral law. The Conservative, Social Democratic, and SECRET NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 in putting through the 1959 state budget, which contemplates a lower level of investment in rural areas, Prime Minister Emil Jons:- son's; government came to power on 23; December after a dispute, over economic stabilization measures had broken up the coali- tion of Social Democrats, Pro- gressives, and the Communist- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 Communist--dominated Labor Al-' li.ance parties all desire a re- determination of constituencies in order to correct the existing overrepresentation of rural areas which gives the Progressive party its strength in Parliament. Such a change requires an amendment to the constitution and two sepa- rate parliamentary elections. One will probably be in late spring and the other in the summer. The Conservatives, al- ready the largest party, are cer- tain to improve their position, although they seem unlikely to gain a majority even under the parliamentary redistricting. The Social Democrats and the Communists also stand to gain. The Communists will be aided in the election through continued control of the labor movement and their probable use of the seven-month-old fishing-limits dispute with Britain as the major campaign issue. British vessels have continued to fish within the 12-mile limit, but except for scattered incidents the situation has been quiet, and the present Icelandic Government apparently wants it to remain so. Electoral considerations, however, will prevent the government from favor- ing any formal agreement that could be attacked as a surrender of Iceland's rights. COMMUNISM, IN CUBA Communists in Cuba continue to operate with little restraint and have succeeded in making in- roads in the organized labor movement, the armed forces, and probably the press. The Popular Socialist (Com- munist) party (PSP), which under Batista had an estimated member- ship of 8,000 to 15,000, has' opened offices in various re- gions and is conducting fund- raising and recruitment drives. It publishes two editions of its daily newspaper,, Hoy, and has sympathizers on tITe staffs of other papers. It reportedly broadcasts daily over a Havana station.. Even more disturbing is the influence of pro-Communists in high official positions. The Argentine-born rebel leader Ernesto "Che" Guevara, placed in charge of the Cabana fortress in Havana, has permitted Commu- nist, activities within his com- mand. The creation of a new section of the General Staff, known as G-6 or "direction of culture," has provided another opening for Communist penetra- tion in the armed forces. Head- ed by the pro-Communist brother of the army chief of staff, G-6 is reportedly engaged in re- writing 'textbooks for military personnel. Raul Castro, com- mander in chief of the armed forces, has shown extreme anti- US sentiments. Although Fidel Castro has stated he will not allow Com- munists to "steal the revolu- tion" from him, the potential for Communist penetration exists, partly because of the Communists`' ski]Ll. at identifying their aspi- rations- with his program. His espousal of a "neutralist" po Sition for Cuba in world affairs and his increasingly anti-Ameri- can statements, as well as his SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 social and economic reform pro- grams, lend themselves to such identification. Communists are believed to control a few unions and to exert influence in others; aside from a move in January to oust them from labor leadership, the government has made no serious effort to proscribe their activi- ties. In Santiago, a group of citizens found it advisable to disband their anti-Communist civic committee, since anti- Communists are being equated with counterrevolutionaries-- who are considered close to being traitors in Cuba today. Ex-President Figueres of Costa Rica returned from his visit to Cuba last week serious- ly disturbed over the extent of Communist influence there and fearful that the United States may eventually be faced with a choice of either intervening outright or else accepting Com- munist domination of the govern- ment. In any event, it seems clear that Castro will probably allow the Communists to continue operating freely as long as they 25X1 do not threaten the dominant position of his "26 of,July" movement. PERONISTA STRIKE PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT The Argentine Government, threatened with a general strike on 3 April, will be under heavy pressure from the Peronistas and Communists during the next few weeks. The Peronistas, in their effort to regain control of organized labor, apparently feel they now have a tactical advantage and are exploiting widespread discontent over the steep price rises since the US-backed austerity plan was begun on 1 January. While living costs have averaged almost 40 percent higher this year, the prices of the two staples in the Ar- gentine diet, bread and meat, have doubled and tripled. The rise in electricity rates aided the Communists' organization of neighborhood protest com- mittees,?whi-ch are urging non- payment of taxes as well as light bills. During March, prices leveled off, but demon- strations and bombings--usually harmless--are daily events. The basically political purpose of the strikes is ap- parent, as it was in the Peron- istas' and Communists' previous major efforts: the petroleum workers' strike which resulted in the government's declaration of a state of siege on 11 No- vember and 'the '.mid-January general strike begun on the eve of President Frondizi's departure for the United States. These strikes. prompted Frondizi to close the Communists' headquar- ters and to modify his previous plan of trying to win over the more moderate Peronista labor leaders. He had also noted that the "hard-line" pro-Peron leaders won a number of the union elec- tions held last year. Peronista labor leaders in- clude in their "minimum demands" the immediate completion of union elections, release of all jailed labor leaders, an end to the state of siege and to mobi- lization of various workers, and the return of union control to "duly elected leaders." These leaders do not appear immediate- ly capable of starting a "civil war" as they threaten, but they can promote costly strikes by SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 exploiting public anger over price rises. The anti-Peronista "32- Group" unions, nominally'as? strong as the Peronista unions, have thus far condemned the Peronista initiatives as po- litically inspired. It is not ITALIAN LABOR ELECTIONS The Communist-dominated Italian General Labor Confed- eration (CGIL) in recent months has gained support in a number of shop steward elections throughout the country, revers- ing the trend of the last few years. With the rate'of eco- nomic growth lagging and in- dustry trying to cut produc- tion costs, the CGIL is in a good position to expand Commu- nist influence in Italy. clear, however, how long they can resist their unions' pres- sure for token wage protests. The military not only sup- ports but insists on firm con- trol of labui agitation, but-- as Frondizi has publicly ad- mitted--his popularity is at a low ebb. SHOW PRO-COMMUNIST TREND This upsurge of CGIL strength results primarily from its exploitation of the workers' main grievance--layoffs carried out or threatened in order to cut production costs and put Italian industry on a more com- petitive level as European eco- nomic integration takes effect. In its campaign to publicize both dismissals and civil serv- ants' pay demands, the CGIL has-sponsored a number of pro- test:strikes which the free unions have felt obliged to join. Although these strikes have been.on the whole unsuc- cessful, they have tended to persuade many workers that the CGIL is their only real cham_- pion. Since about 1955, the Christian Democratic - oriented Italian Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CISL) and the Democratic Socialist Italian Labor Union had.,been cutting.. into CGIL strength in the bal- loting for workers' representa- tives. In the past few months, however, the CGIL has registered gains at the expense of the free unions in the Ansaldo shipyards in Genoa, the Michelin (tires) and RIV '(ball-bearing) plants in Turin, and the engineering sector of the huge government- controlled IRI:complex. At the Ravenna rubber plant of. the state hydrocarbons agency IENI, the CGIL last month ran 'for the first time and won 45_?percent of the votes, cutting the CISL from 68 to 35 percent. CGIL prospects for further gains appear good, particularly if the rate of economic growth continues to lag and progress in closing the gap in average income in the north and south remains slow. Unemployment-- still almost one tenth of the total labor force--would become an even more serious issue if business interests induced the government to accelerate the closing of unproductive plants that heretofore survived only by government assistance. SECRET PART IT NOTES,, AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 13 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 sc1Vr CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 COMMUNIST CHINA SET FOR ANOTHER "GIANT LEAP" The stimulus provided last year by the programs associated with the "giant leap forward" in Communist China produced the most rapid annual rate of eco- nomic growth yet achieved by Peiping. This year the regime will concentrate on "four great targets"--18,000,000 tons of steel, 380,000,000 tons of coal, 525,000,000 tons of food grains, and 5,000,000 tons of cotton. The "leap forward" in eco- nomic development last year probably grew out of the re- gime's dissatisfaction--already evident in late 1957--with the rate of growth achieved during the First Five-Year Plan (1953- 57). The regime, believing that heavy concentration on large-scale, modern industry failed to make optimum use of China's resources, especially its huge reservoir of underem- ployed manpower, departed sharp- ly from its previous complete reliance.-on the Soviet model.- In the giant leap, a series of programs designed to bring this manpower into fuller use was launched. These took the form of im- mense corvees in wat- er conservancy and other agricultural projects and the es- tablishment of large numbers of small- and medium-size in- dustrial enterprises. Since labor was the chief ingredient of the leap, it was necessary for the re- gime to whip up pop- ular fervor. All weapons in Peiping's armory of mass per- suasion were brought to bear, and the re- sponse was a testi- monial to the hold the party has over the people's minds and lives. China's labor surplus was not only absorbed, but a manpower shortage devel- oped. As the year wore on, the program gathered steam and the official plan for 1958, which had been set before the public in February, was all but aban- doned. Production targets set under the impetus of the leap spiraled higher and higher. The Leap in 1958 Peiping claims that the 1958 leap was a resounding suc- cess. Published figures main- tain that China doubled its pro- duction of steel, coal, machine tools, grain, and cotton--an achievement without precedent. The stimulus provided by the leap produced the most rap- id annual rate of economic growth yet achieved by the Chi- nese Communists. Production rose to record heights in both industry and agriculture, and efforts to improve techniques and diversify the economy met with considerable success. It COMMUNIST CHINAS SPIRALING'LEAP-FORWARD'TARGETS MILLION TONS CONFIDENTIAL 3801( MAR MAY AUG DEC 1959 RASR TARGET GOAL FDRYRAR__ _ __J OLIRMi 1958 A50F CLAIM CONFIDENTIAL FEB AUG GOAI FOR YEAR 1950 AS Of DEC 1958 CLAIM OWN CLAIM 1959 TARGET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 is likely that the physical vol- ume of industrial output was very close to its alleged level, but that agricultural output probably fell far short of Pei- ping's claims. The regime's statistical services, which until last year had been reasonably accurate in most respects, probably deterio- One writer complained that ex- aggeration "adds a false tint to the fruits of the people's labor and taints the original hue so they cannot tell the genuine from the false." Strains in the Economy Peiping has admitted that there were "defects" in the 1958 EXAMPLE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST "LEAP FORWARD" PLANNING Target: To raise the annual capacity of the No. 1 Automobile Plant in Changchun from 30,000 trucks and cars to 150,000. FORMER BUDGET "LEAP FORWARD" 011DGE11 $ 122,000,000 from government....... COST....... $15,850,000 absorbed by Plant, budget at no cost to government EO1!I PMENT 3,700 pieces of machinery........... TO BE ADDED"'* ......... 800 Pieces of machinery 358,800 square yards ....................FLOOR SPACE 167,640 square yards TO BE ADDED ????????? rated under the tremendous pres- sures to meet the spiraling targets. Peiping insisted that its statistical service play a political role in "stimulating" the leap, a euphonism for en- couraging production by exag- gerating claims of success. In addition, the slapdash. nature of some of the leap's campaigns and the sweeping administrative changes introduced during the year, notably the communes, led to the use of new and untested statistical practices as well as of numbers of inexperienced personnels Reporting, for ex- ample, from the thousands of primitive iron and steel fa- cilities could not have been very accurate.. The Soviet Union appar- ently has found the extrava- gance of the Chinese claims embarrassing--taken at face value they mean that the Chi- nese have outstripped the USSR in rate of growth--and they are seldom aired in the Soviet press. There were signs late last year that Peiping was concerned about statistical "exaggeration" and "concealment of shortcomings," leap, "the time being short, the task urgent, and experience inade- quate." Shortages of raw materials began to be felt early, as users committed to high lev- els of output competed for them. The attend- ant problems were ac- centuated because the transportation system was not equal to the demands put on it. Es- pecially in the second half of the year, con- gestion was pronounced on the na- tion's railroads, in its ports, and along its waterways. Indi- vidual plants had to cut back or suspend operations because of it lack of raw materials. The pursuit of certain pro- grams led inevitably to the ne- glect of others. Heavy emphasis on the fall iron-and-steel drive and the headlong formation of communes for a time "squeezed out" other things such as the production and distribution of secondary farm products? The result was an embarrassing shortage of meat, poultry, fish, eggs,, vegetables, and the like in the cities. The regime's farm procurement programs, geared to unrealistic output figures, have been in trouble, and there have been reports of food shortages in rural areas as well. There was "unevenness" in the iron and steel industry. More pig iron was made than could be turned into steel, and more steel than could be rolled into usable shapes. The labor force, in addi- tion to being taken from its SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page. 2 of 9, Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 normal and necessary pursuits, was badly overworked. For ex- ample, the iron and steel drive occupied some 25 percent of the rural labor force at the height of the fall harvest season. Crops stood unharvested or were harvested hastily and poorly. There were complaints near the end of 1958 that China was failing to meet its export commitments on time or in suf- ficient quantity. These fail- ures reflected transportation and distribution difficulties as well as a rapidly growing domestic demand for items such as cement, iron ore, and in- dustrial chemicals--items China formerly exported with- out strain, Certain agricultural pro- grams were given heavy publicity during last year's leap--more irrigation, deep plowing, close planting, and heavy manuring, There is merit in some of them, but it is likely they were pushed too far and too fast, being adopted for fairly wide use before adequate considera- tion was given to the physical and engineering problems in- volved 4 In any irrigation system, for example, there are consid- erable problems in allocating water, and with silting and drainage; plowing below a depth of one foot in some soils is useless and sometimes harm- ful; the nutrient content of the immense amounts of pond mud and manure used is low. In- creased seeding rates without large increases in fertilizer and water may actually reduce yields. While marked progress was made last year in the regime's continuing efforts to diversify the rural economy, there were still "weak spots." Peiping identifies some of them as oil-bearing crops, other in- dustrial crops, and secondary items like meat, poultry, eggs,, fish, and vegetables. There also were "weak spots" in industry. Production of electric power, chemicals, pe- troleum, transportation equip- ment, and certain raw materials did not keep pace with the rapidly expanding demand. Some of the leap programs were not as noteworthy as was the heavily publicized iron and steel drive. Peiping has been relatively quiet on the results of its ef- forts in small-scale production of copper--the announced goal!. at one time was to in- crease production thirtyfold-- aluniinum, chemical fertilizer, and synthetic petroleum. The regime has acknowledged indirectly the impermanence of many of the primitive iron- and steel-making facilities erected during the drive. The process of weeding out the less effi- cient producers had begun by last October, and Peiping now insists that where materials and fuels are difficult to ob- tain, operations should be stopped immediately. The hurry-up programs of the leap often drove one of China's scarcest economic re- sources--its modern industrial plant--at rates or for purposes beyond that for which it was designed, hastening the depre- ciation of the equipment. In addition, Peiping's demands that construction projects be speeded up resulted in instances of corner-cutting and shoddy building. Another Leap for 1959 Despite these nagging prob- lems--which Peiping professes to welcome as tangible evidence of the nation's rapid economic progress--the regime obviously intends to pursue virtually the same economic techniques this year. It argues that the SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT' INTELLIGENCE' WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 Cartoon from Shansi Daily pictures the effect on village life of this year's bumper harvest, advance in rural mechanization, and development of small-scale local industry. economic gains made last year far outweigh the problems, and that the nation began 1959 in a far stronger position mate- rially than it began 1958, that it had a greatly augmented technical force, and that the party had a vastly "enriched" knowledge of how to promote mass labor campaigns. The leap this year will, the regime believes, be "big- ger and better" than last year's, but it will also be "more balanced," To achieve this better balance, Peiping has ordered a number of adjust- ments in its leap programs and further adjustments can be ex- pected. It hopes these will result in a more realistic ap- proach--one which pays closer attention to a national plan and the "objective laws of pro- portionate development." In general the adjustments, striv- ing to avoid last year's shot- gun approach, provide for a greater concentration of forces on key production targets and construction projects. Peiping is still in the process of de- fining these reassessed eco-'' nozt.-ic ` .prior i t i es , Steel is described as the key link in industrialization, and Peiping is directing its ef- forts to improve the relative position within the steel-making industry of iron ore extraction, coke making, and steel rolling. The machinery industry is to speed up the supply of equip- ment to these facilities. Efforts are also being made to step up the production of electric power, chemicals, pe- troleum, and transportation and communication equipment--items which fell short last year. Large-scale heavy industry will probably have first call on scarce materials. In agricul- ture, attention is being shifted from mass irrigation, from deep plowing, and from backyard iron and steel activities to subsid- iary, farm work, fertilizer gathering, and actual field work. More marked adjustments are being made in the construc- tion field, Peiping says that the construction "battlefront must be shortened" by cutting out projects which are adjudged less important for the moment, SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 Money and manpower are to be concentrated on projects near raw materials, fuels, and mar- kets in order to gain the great- est economic results in the shortest time with the smallest investment. This does not mean the program to build small-scale industries is being dropped, however. Chen Yun, a top eco- nomic policy-maker now special- izing in construction matters, has urged that the "greater proportion" of construction ef- forts be directed toward medium- and small-scale industries. Peiping continues to warn against too prodigal a use of intensive labor techniques, and the party central committee has ruled that, in general, farm la- borers should work only eight hours a day, with longer hours permitted during "busy seasons." While recognizing that the suc- cess of the 1959 leap will de- pend largely on a tremendous outpouring of labor similar to that in 1958, the regime evi- dently hopes to increase labor productivity through better tools and equipment and organ- ization, as well as through the effective mass methods used last year. The Leadership and the Leap Chinese Communist leaders, from Chairman Mao down, are deeply committed to the success of the leap. No public voice is raised against it. Through- out the leap, however, there have been frequent references to the existence of a persist- ent group, most likely within the party, which shies away from the hazards involved. This "gloomy clique" was pictured at midyear. as feeling that the year's final statistics would bear out its misgivings. Thus alerted, the leaders at year's end fired a salvo of figures at the doubting elements show- ing how the leap had brought "unprecedented" success. Apparently, however, these unidentified elements are not convinced, Tan Chen-lin, the leading propagandist for the leap;, said in February there were still calloused doubt- ers who felt that the leap pro- grams were "not reliable" and who asked: "Why is there no flour if there was a bumper wheat crop?" and "Why do we have to eat sweet potatoes if grain output increased so much?" Tan predicted that this year's leap would deal a crushing blow to such persons, adding darkly, "If the ideological problems of these comrades are not solved quickly, damage will be done to this year's leap.,, Outlook Peiping gives no hint that it will drop either its highly suspect 1958 production claims or lower its ambitious 1959 tar- gets. The four great targets for steel, coal, grain, and cot- ton Eppear to have been based on the 1.958 figures and are, the regime candidly acknowledges, "by no means easy." Their ful- fillment will require "heroic efforts." The central question facing Peiping at present appears to be whether the working people will put out the "heroic efforts" re- quire!d without roughly commen- surate material rewards. There is some evidence that Peiping has reason to be concerned on this score. The current food shortages, substitute rations, and the tight lid the regime is keeping on all consumption is evidently making it difficult to whip up the desired degree of labor "enthusiasm." It is doubtful that the available de- vices to raise labor productiv- ity will take up all the slack. The strains and difficulties encountered in the leap to date have prodded the regime to make minor adjustments in its leap programs. If the present course is continued, however, these strains and difficulties are apt to break out in a more virulent form. (Prepared 25X1 by ORR) SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 5 of 9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 level of more than 3,000,000 b/d--about 600,000 barrels more than the combined daily output of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the leading Middle Eastern producers. The average throughout the year, however, is likely to be little above 1958's 2,600,000 b/d. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 RECENT PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA Latin America's share of the world's production of crude oil fell from 19.3 percent in 1957 to 18 percent in 1958 and will probably continue falling in 1959, although the amount of oil produced in the area may be somewhat higher than in 1958. A production drop of about 175,- 000 barrels a day (b/d) in 1958 in Venezuela--the world's lead- ing exporter and second-ranking producer after the United States --was only partially offset by gains in Brazil, Mexico, Co- lombia, and Trinidad. The larg- est percentage gain in crude production was registered by Brazil, but Argentina may win this position in 1959 as a result of its re- cent contracts with foreign oil companies for more rapid devel- opment of its oil re- sources. Major Caribbean Producers In view of the present world surplus of oil, the outlook for the petroleum in- dustry in Venezuela, which accounted for about 78 percent of Latin American produc- tion in 1958, depends in part on the effects Last December's retroactive increase in the Venezuelan in- come tax in effect altered the 50-50 profit-sharing arrange- ments between the government and the foreign oil companies to give the government 60 per- cent or more. This change, which in part reflects the ris- ing tide of nationalism in Vene- LATIN AMERICAN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION PRODUCTION CHANGES 1956- 1958 DAILY AVERAGE IN PERCENT) (THOUSAND BARRELS) 1957 1958 OVER 56 1957 1956 1957 1958 EST. 19 SECRET MEXICO COLOMBIA TRINIDAD ARGENTINA PERU BRAZIL CHILE BOLIVIA ECUADOR CUBA TOTAL LATIN AMERICAN PROD'N TOTAL WORLD PRODUCTION LATIN AMERICAN PRODUCTION AS PERCENT OF WORLD TOTAL of the competition from cheaper Middle Eastern oil and in part on the' mandatory oil import control system'adopted by the.. United States in March to replace the "voluntary" program. It is not yet clear how any necessary reductions in oil imports into the United States will be al- located by the large internation- al oil companies between their Venezuelan and their Middle East- ern affiliates, but the immediate Venezuelan political reaction was unusually moderate and re- flected official understanding. Venezuelan production in January 1959 reached a record 257.1 252.6 274.0 - 1.8 8.4 119.7 125.3 130.0 4.7 3.7 79.0 93.3 104.0 18.1 11.4 86.7 92.8 93.6 7.0 .9 50.2 52.7 51.0 4.8 -3.1 11.1 27.7 50.0 149.7 80.5 9.7 11.9 15.5 22.8 30.4 8.7 9.8 9.4 12.2 -4.0 9.3 8.7 9.0 - 5.7 2.9 1.5 1.1 .9 -31.4 - 1.7 3,089.8 3,455.1 3,341.4 11.8 - 3.3 6,671.6 17, 889.8 18,117.4 7.3 1.3 18.5 19.3 18.0 - - zuela, will probably have reper- cussions in other oil areas and may reduce the rate of investment in the Venezuelan oil industry, as well as in other segments of the Venezuelan economy. Mexico, the second largest area producer, averaged 274,000 b/d in 1958, a substantial in- crease over 1957. The national oil monopoly, Pemex, which by the end of 1958 had almost elim- inated the country's need to import refined products, recent- ly obtained about $75,000,000 in loans from private US and European Common Market sources for pipeline construction and SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of `9. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 %we Latin. A CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 PRODUCTION: (barrels per day) over 2,500,000 100,000 to 300,000 50,000 to 100,000 S Venezuela British Guiana French Guiana olombia-- } development of a petrochemical industry. Pemex had not pre- viously been able to obtain sizable credit from official US sources, and Mexico continues to oppose direct foreign par- ticipation in its oil industry. Both Colombia and Trinidad, the third and fourth largest producers in the area, increased production in 1958, continuing their pattern of annual gains in recent years. In Colombia, where increased petroleum ex- ports could eventually reduce the country's heavy dependence on coffee ,ales for foreign ex- change, th~3 government is con- sidering m-difying the oil code to make 40 percent the maximum tax on net company income--a move which would make Colombia more attractive, from a taxation standpoint, for oil investment than Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil The most striking modifi- cation of official oil policy in 1958 occurred in Argentina, the fifth largest producer in Latin America. Emphasizing that accelerated petroleum de- velopment was one of the steps essential to economic and f?i- nancial recovery, President Frondizi announced last July a policy of making oil develop- ment contracts with private firms on a nonconcession basis and under the direction of the State Oil Fields Administration. To assuage nationalistic senti- ment, he has nationalized all petroleum and coal resources not under private concession on 1 May 1958. Contracts totaling more than $500,000,000 have already resulted from this policy and others are under consideration. The contracts vary as to type, size, and duration. Some are to provide only services and equipment on credit, while others require private firms to assume a:large share of the risk. In addition, the USSR, in an agree- ment signed on 27 October, has SECRET SECRET eric Oil-Producing Areas Dominican .r' ritish Honduras' Haig v Guatemala_ r. n El Salvado '? Nicaragua PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 offered to supply Argentina $100,000,000 worth of petroleum equipment--about a third of which reportedly has been or- dered. The government believes that its new petroleum policy will help make Argentina self- sufficient in oil within about three years and may later pro- vide a source of foreign ex- change. Petroleum imports cost Argentina about $271,000,- 000 in 1957, or about one fifth of its total imports, and have been an important factor in its trade deficits over the past decade. Work under contracts already signed may rapidly in- crease last year's average pro- duction of about 93,600 b/d. The Brazilian state oil enterprise, Petrobras, which has a legal monopoly on oil ex- ploitation, has more than quad- rupled production since 1956. Production equals about 20 per- cent of domestic demand, as compared with about 3.5 per- cent in 1955. Brazil's 50,000- b/d production in 1958 was about 80 percent higher than in 1957 and the largest percentage in- crease in the area. Petrobras' increases have had little im- pact on the nation's $250,000,- 000 annual oil deficit, however, and may have been attained through excessive pumping rates. Since no wells were brought in during the year, Brazilian pro- duction may not continue to in- crease at these rates. Although the Brazilian pub- lic displayed considerable in- terest in Argentina's develop- ment contracts with private foreign companies, no influen- tial elements have proposed sim- ilar arrangements for Brazil, and no perceptible change has taken place in nationalistic opposition to foreign participa- tion in the oil industry. More- over, the interest of foreign companies in Brazil seems lim- ited because there are no fully proved, sizable reserves except in areas now being exploited by Petrobras. Any re-examination of Brazil's basic oil policy would have to take into account a number of factors, including possible Ar- gentine success with foreign contracts, Petrobras' demon- strated inability to make in- road;s on the national oil defi- cit, and a change in the strong army backing of Petrobras as an exclusive monopoly. New Concession Areas In areas where new conces- sions have been granted to foreign companies during the past five years--especially Par- aguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guate- mala, Costa Rica, and Panama-- exploratory and exploitation work conducted thus far has either been discouraging or is in a preliminary stage. In Par- aguay, the first two of four exploratory wells planned by the Pure Oil Company on its con- cession have been dry holes.. Gulf Oil Corporation, which has the largest foreign conces- sion in Bolivia, is pessimistic about its general prospects on its holding after spending some $2,500,000 in initial exploration and exploitation. Although an increase in Bolivian production and exports would tend to al- leviate the economic crisis, partly caused by declining rev- enues from foreign sales of tin, such an increase in the near future will depend largely on the state oil enterprise, which controls most of the fields with proved reserves. Bolivian pro- duction in 1958 dropped slightly, to about 9,400 b/d, but drilling activity in 1959 suggests that production may increase substan- tially. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page S of 9. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE wEE:KLY SUMMARY 2 April 1959 Ecuador, where produc- tion during the past three years of increased consumption has remained constant, has be- come a net importer of petro- leum and granted new concessions to US companies in 1958. The controlled, below-cost prices on domestic gasoline sales imposed on certain foreign pro- ducers in both Ecuador and Peru, however, have been seri- ous deterrents to needed ex- pansion of facilities of com- panies in both areas. Neither the Ecuadoran nor the Peruvian government has been willing to face the strong pressures, es- pecially from powerful union groups, against any change in the artificial prices. There were no discoveries in Central America or Panama in 1958. In Guatemala, where some 24 US companies have already invested $18,000,000 in explora- tory work, drilling operations are just beginning. In Costa Rica, the Union Oil Company of California, former principal operator there, has terminated its activity. Although off- shore drilling has been aban- doned in Panama, where a number of foreign oil companies have concessions, other exploratory work is in progress. Bloc Activity in Area The Soviet bloc in 1958 registered some successes in its efforts to exploit trade deficits resulting in part from oil imports from hard-currency areas. Prior to its $100,000,- 000 credit offer to Argentina, the USSR made a successful low bid in June to supply 7,266,000 barrels of crude oil, ~ Brazil has also agreed to barter cacao for Soviet crude oil, although the amount of petroleum involved --1,450,000 barrels--is less than 1 percent of Brazil's total requirements. Rumania emphasized its ability to sup- ply oil equipment during nego- tiations for trade and payments agreements with Argentina and Brazil in 1958, and signed a $4,000,000 contract with Ar- gentina for oil equipment. The Uruguayan Central Bank instructed the state oil monopoly to purchase $10,000,000 worth of crude oil--about 30 percent of Uruguay's annual import needs --from the USSR, thus increas- ing the bloc's already substan- tial percentage of Uruguayan total trade. In addition, the Bolivian state oil enterprise accepted a Czech offer to provide geologists to assist in the development of government-con- trolled oil resources--a decision which, however, has apparently not yet been approved by Presi- dent Siles. Local Communist groups, often supported by nationalistic elements, have increased their efforts to exploit public senti- ment against foreign oil com- panies, particularly in Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Paraguay, and Bolivia. In Colombia, the Communists have recently expanded their influence among the major oil workers' unions and have opened a propaganda campaign calling for nationalization of the foreign companies. A concerted Bolivian Commu- nist propaganda effort, alleging that foreign concessionaires are attempting to destroy the state oil agency, apparently has had considerable success even in top government circles and has rein- forced increasing pressure to re- vise the petroleum code, which is25X1 favorable toward foreign partic-- sources. ipation in Bolivia's oil re- SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02200040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4 tONF1DENT1% Ime. CONFIDENTIA12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002200040001-4