CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 CONFIDENTIA CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY z COPY NO. 56 OCI NO. 3531/59 30 July 1959 DAT 77 REVIEWER: NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: R 70.2 G DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: DOCUMENT NO. -11,- NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CONFI DENTIAL Fo- E2= in State Department review completed K uzi i~ L~_ L/ll IMMEDIATELY AFTER USF Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 .1'! ' Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IT" ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a --omplete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RnDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 30 July 1959 The Soviet leaders appear to be less hopeful about draw- ing further concessions from the Western foreign ministers on the issue of the form of all- German negotiations. They may have decided to allow the Ge- neva talks to terminate with- out making any important changes in their position and to press for an early summit conference. In his speech in Dnepro- petrovsk on 28 July,Khrushchev said. the "time has come" for the heads of the government to tackle "complex unsettled inter- national issues." He made a perfunctory call for "fresh ef- forts" by the foreign ministers to reach agreement "on what they can agree upon," but contended that "the other, more difficult matters...will be considered by the heads of government." Khrushchev said the USSR does not share the "unjustifi- ably pessimistic estimates" of prospects at Geneva made by "some Western leaders" and con- tended the foreign ministers have already accomplished some "positive work." He claimed that all "misunderstandings" have been eliminated regarding the "term" of the proposed agreement on Berlin and an all- German committee and stressed again that the time limit is not of "paramount importance." The Soviet premier continued to insist, however, on linking the creation of an all-German com- mittee to an interim settle- ment on Berlin and reiterated previous statements that the USSR will not underwrite any agreement which perpetuates the, occupation regime in West Berlin. The paper Gromyko handed the Western ministers on 28 July contained no important modifica- tions in Soviet proposals on Berlin and all-German talks. It is unlikely that the USSR would agree to an interim Berlin settlement if the West rejects all-German negotia- tions. Gromyko?may propose that the foreign ministers pre- pare a document setting forth their differences and agree-on a date for a summit meeting. Soviet officials continue efforts to enhance East Ger- many's status through a con- tinued role in negotiations. the Soviet leaders probably did not expect any major change in the Western position, they may CqFNI'IAL PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pace 1 of 8 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 consider that the visit has furthered the USSR's posture as advocate of peaceful nego- tiations and advanced prospects for an early summit meeting, and possibly for a Khrushchev visit to the United States. The visit has been accorded'prominent and 'substantial:. Soviet newAs .e o erage. Khrushchev Visit to US In what appears to be a calculated camppaignQ Soviet !of- ficials':and- newsmen, in -seVeral cities:-haye hinted that Khru- shchev would be delighted to receive an invitation to visit the United States. The Soviet chargd d'affaires in Paris on 20 July told an American offi- cial that he very much hopes Vice President Nixon's visit to the USSR may furnish the occasion for an invitation from President Eisenhower to Khru- shchev. He suggested that Nixon might.extend this in*ita- tion when sending thanks for his reception in the USSR and added'that such a visit would be far more profitable than a summit meeting, where the dif- ferent attitudes of the British and French would not contribute to settling problems. "Captive Nations Week" The bloc reaction to the Congressional resoiLutian and the President's proclamation for a week of prayer for the enslaved peoples of Eastern Europe re- flects the Soviet leaders:' ex- treme sensitivity to any offi- cial Western reference to the subjugation of the Communist nations. They exhibited par- ticular irritation over its coincidence with the Nixon visit, Khrushchev set the tone for the reaction in. a speech on his return from Poland in which he termed the American action "direct interference" in Soviet affairs. and an "infamous slan- der." The Polish press voiced regret that circles attempting to sharpen the cold war had drawn the President into the affair. Khrushchev made fre- quent references to the "cap- tive peoples" while touring with the vice president in Mos- cow, and also in his 28 July speech in the Ukraine. Nuclear Talks The Soviet delegation at Geneva continues to press for discussion of. its annual- inspection quota proposal,and is attempting to play down any other East-West differences in the way of a nuclear test cessation agreement. On 24 July the chief Soviet delegate expressed satisfaction with what, he termed a "significant rapprochement of positions" on control-post staffing. Using the figure of 30 specialists at each post given by the West as an example in presenting its new proposal for one third Western, one third Soviet, and one third from nonnuclear countries, he claimed that Moscow could accept the "ten specialists" prom the other side which the West was proposing, and there- fore had brought its position in line with Western desires. He charged, however, that the addition of specialists from nonnuclear countries, which have not even. asked to be rep- resented, would not be in ac- cordance with the principle of "mutual control" by. the three powers. He said that if the West Would drop this part of its proposal., "artificiii.lly introduced. into the conference," Moscow would allow two or three of the ten Western representa- tives to be from nonnuclear SECRET PART I OF'IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 8 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 countries if desired. He also declared that the USSR would "give up"`two-or three of its ten places to representatives of neutral countries. On 28 July the Soviet del- egation promised to study a Western draft for a prepara- tory commission to function until the control commission becomes operative. West German Views Bonn political leaders expect an early climax to the foreign ministers' conference and fear that domestic pres- sures may make it impossible for the Western powers, partic- ularly London, to break off the conference over Moscow's de- mand for an all-German commis- sion. Chancellor Adenauer ada- mantly opposes such a commis- sion, and Bonn plans to fight against acceptance of it, pos- sibly even to the point of re- fusing to participate. Bonn has been. considering a move to counteract continued Soviet propaganda that West Germany is the main obstacle to a settlement. The govern- ment evidently intends to keep alive a plan which Foreign Min- ister Brentano revived at the cabinet meeting on 22 July for Bonn to offer Poland and Czecho- slovakia nonaggression pacts and to renounce the use of force in the settlement of boundary disputes. Brentano argued that although this could lead to diplomatic recognition, Warsaw and Prague, without a specific renunciation of the German east- ern territories, would reject such a move. Although the cab- inet at first rejected the pro- posal on the grounds that Po- land might accept it as a basis for negotiations and later claim Bonn should renounce the ter- ritories as proof of its good faith, government spokesmen have since announced the govern- ment's agreement "in principle." Bonn apparently intends to use hints of such a pact to deter- mine Soviet bloc reaction, while refraining from Making the ac- tual proposal at Geneva. West Berlin political lead- ers are more pessimistic than at any time since the crisis began last November. They are concerned that the Western pow- ers may be forced to make con-cessions at Geneva, and would prefer a complete breakoff in the talks rather than any modi- fication of the Western powers' proposals. They fear new East German harassment of access to the city. Western observers noted a marked decline in pub- lic morale following the confer- ence recess on 20 June, but Secretary Herter's appearance in Berlin on 25 July may have bolstered spitits. British Reaction British press reporting has tended to dwell on the different attitudes of For- eign Secretary Lloyd and his allies at Geneva. Independent and Conservative papers re- ported on 24 July that Lloyd had made clear Britain's satis- faction with Gromyko's assur- ances that no unilateral action would be taken during the period of an interim agreement on Berlin. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 8 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 %We SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 195' French Comment Since the Geneva confer- ence reconvened, the French non-Communist press has been notable for its relatively moderate tone and for the rel- atively limited space devoted to the talks. Emphasis has been on the unity of Allied ranks, and although the men- tion of fissures in the West- ern front is not completely absent, remarks critical of the British have been subdued. Al- though the press has sought out elements in Soviet statements which might provide the basis for hope that the two sides were inching toward each other, the absence of reconciliation between the two sides has been highlighted, and responsibil- ties for the lack of progress has been generally attributed to MOSCOW. (Concurred in by 05I Iraq The Qasim regime has ex- perienced a quiet week, with only minor clashes reported be- tween Communists and anti- Communists since the Kirkuk troubles. Prime Minister Qasim was reported to be resting after his strenuous schedule during the revolution anniver- sary celebrations. However, he held a press conference on 29 July in which he vigorously denounced the "anarchists"-- by implication Communists--who he said had fomented the re- cent disorders in Kirkuk and other provincial towns. He also warned the newspapers to curb their "news" of new plots and to halt their recrimina- tions. Baghdad authorities mean- while continued quietly to take measures which have the effect of limiting Communist influ- ence in the army and bureaucracy while they strengthen top con- trol of the government apparat- us. Major General Abdi, the military governor general who exercises over-all administra- tive authority because the country is still legally under martial law, has banned the Communist-inspired "committees for the defense of the republic" which had acted as unofficial purge committees in various government departments. In his major speech during Egypt's revolution anniversary celebration, Nasir delivered a lengthy apologia regarding his attitude toward Iraq. Although his remarks in general were conciliatory, he still put the blame on Qasim for coolness of VAR-Iraqi relations, and this is said to have ruffled the Iraqi leader again. The UAR President put his main emphasis, however, on two other aspects--one was a lengthy interpretation of the signifi- cance and duties of the Nation- al Union, the regime's mass or- ganization. It appears that the union in Nasir's mind is not a monolithic "party" in the Com- munist or fascist sense but a movement of the whole people which will find its most signif- icant expression in practical SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 8 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 works, such as community de- velopment and agricultural im- provement projects on the vil- lage level, rather than in po- litical activity. Nasir's other theme was the Israeli issue, He claims the UAR is ready for a new Is- raeli attack at any time, and revived the propaganda claims of 1956 that the Egyptian Army was not defeated, but merely withdrew in order to be better able to fight the British and French. The revolutionary celebra- tion and Nasir's speeches fall within a period appointed by Cairo for a "cultural seminar" for UAR students in the Soviet bloc which may be designed to reindoctrinate the students as well as to attempt to determine the extent to which Communist indoctrination has been success- ful. The authorities are not known to have decided yet wheth- er to curtail their program of education in the bloc. Nasir's blasts at Israel last week took the form of replies to a speech by Moshe Dayan, the former commander of the Israeli Army who has en- tered politics under the wing of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. The Dayan thesis appears to be that Israel should adopt a more actively tough policy, re- turning UAR "hostility" in kind. This statement may well have been a trial balloon for some new policy determination by the Israeli Government,since Tel Aviv has officially indi- cated that a "reconsideration" of the UAR position on the Suez Canal issue is under way. While the Israelis had previously in- dicated that the canal itself was not of major economic im- portance to them, they now talk of the delays and inconveniences experienced by their Asian cus- tomers as a result of the UAR's actions and of the more serious effects these actions have on their over-all position. Dayan's speech sounded like a menace to Cairo, and the cur- rent Israeli diplomatic line will probably confirm this im- pression as will indications than Israel intends to launch an international publicity cam- paign to block the UAR from ob- taining a World Bank loan for Suez, Canal development. Israeli Army summer maneu- vers, which reportedly involved some 35,000 men, are scheduled to conclude with an air defense exercise during the first week of August. They involved mo- bilization practices and ground- air cooperation as well as this exercise. Lebanon Public order in Lebanon, which is always somewhat pre- carious, received another blow this week with the assassina- tion of Naim Mughabghab, a top aide of former President Cha- moun The mur er o ug a g a , apparently at the hands of anti-Chamoun Druze, follows a recent increase in the number of incidents of vio- lence in Lebanon, and has set off further shootings and un- rest, particularly in the Chris- tian community, How much political, capi- tal will be made from the affair SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 8 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY: SUMMARY 30 July.. 1959 depends on Chamoun, who has been gathering his forces to attempt a political comeback. So far all political groups, Moslem as well as Christian, have con- demned the killing, and the Lebanese Government is seeking to minimize its impact by cen- sorship of the press and by stringent security measures to prevent revenge missions. in conspiracy against the Ab- boud government has concluded in Khartoum, but no sentences have yet been announced. Polit- ical tension remains fairly high among civilian as well as military groups. Former Premier Azhari has confirmed that plans are being made for a return to ostensi- ble civilian government, pre- sumabl* with the cooperation of the top army command. The commanders would assume the functions of the former Supreme Council of.State, while civil- ians would man the cabinet posts. Such plans do not seem likely to jell, however, at 25X1 least until after Abboud has brought the military under firmer control. The trial of a third high officer accused of participation SITUATION The renewal of Communist partisan attacks on Laotian Army outposts in Sam Neua Prov- ince is designed to create in%- ternational pressures for the return of the Geneva truce com- mission to Laos. The Communists; insist that Laotian neutrality, which they assent was promised by the 1954 Geneva agreements, has been undermined by various acts of the Phoui ':'Sananikone government%' Simultaneous with the partisan attacks, the bloc has unleashed 'a heavy propaganda campaign charging that, the in- troduction of American military training personnel--now artiv- ing in Laos--is a "crude viola- tion" of the Geneva agreements. Both Peiping and Hanoi have accused Vientiane of try- ing to "expand the civil war in Laos" and State that the Lao- tian Government seems willing IN LAOS to allow the country to be trans- formed into a. military base for American aggression. On 27 July the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issued a statement demanding that Vien- tiane expel American military advisers,, return to the five principles of peace and coexist- ence, and allow the return of the International Control Com- mission (ICC) to make an im- partial investigation of the situation--a proposal also urged by Moscow. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST hasp 6 of 8 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Nftpp~ SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 Paratroop and infantry re- inforcements are being rushed to Sam Neua Province, where the government's position has dete- riorated rapidly in the past ten days. The two battalions normally stationed there are widely scattered and many small units apparently have' been: pinned down and isolated by guerrilla forces and several outposts lost. The situation is confused, but a broad are to Skirmishes THAILAND DONE TA r 9 the West of Sam Neua apparently is in enemy hands and the pro- vincial capital itself is re- ported under threat of attack. Loss of the airfield at Sam Neua would cut off the govern- ment's principal means of ac- cess to this remote province. Panic has struck the town and a general exodus of inhabi- tants and government officials is taking place by air and on foot. There are no check points around the town of Sam Neua and Communist partisans reportedly are infiltrating the area. Antigovernment forces in the province number perhaps 1,000. They apparently comprise pro.-Communist local tribesmen, augmented by company-size units of the former Communist Pathet Lao, and possibly some Viet- namese Communist cadres. The rugged terrain favors the enemy, and the nearby frontier facili- tates covert support from North Vietnam. In a 29 July com- mun:Lque, Laos openly charged North Vietnam with complicity in the current fighting. At least two incidents of harassing attacks on army six- man "civic action teams" have occurred in two provinces in central Laos. These may be designed to forestall addition- al reinforcements for the north. The military commander in cen- tral Laos views the situation there as such that he cannot spare any of his troops at present. Laotian officials view the over-all situation as "grave," but do not believe the present fighting heralds full-scale civil war throughout Laos. Premier Phoui believes the enemy's primary purpose is to take possession of Sam Neua, and later Phong Saly Province, both Pathet Lao strongholds prior to the unification settlement with the government in November 1957'. In addition to the in- ternational implications, the attacks may have the aims of forestalling the government's increasing efforts to combat Communist influence at the grass roots and disrupting the army's new training program. The government's announced intention, however, to prosecute SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 7 of 8 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT I! "ELL:I:GENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 19519 the leaders of the Laotian Com- munist-front organization, the Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ), for col- laboration with "foreigners" could trigger a general return to the bush of former members of the Pathet Lao. NLHZ chief Prince Souphannouvong-who to- 'gether with nine other .top SECRET leaders of the party has been arrested in Vientiane--ear- lier this month threatened a resumption of civil war unless the government ceased its persecution of the NIILZ, which he stressed enjoyed "solid foreign" support. PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 8 of 8 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 CDNt JUtt)Jt1KL UGA"Op CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS TOP CHINESE LEADERS MAY BE REV][EWING BASIC POLICY Only five members of Com- munist China's 26-man party politburo have been reported in Peiping during the past month, which suggests that the top leadership has been meeting out- side the capital for a basic policy review. Mao Tse-tung has not been seen since 18 June,, and Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai since 25 June, The request early,inJuly by a Canadian mem- ber of parliament to see Mao, Liu, and Chou was rejected as "inconvenient because they are at a retreat in the mountains@" There has been Some loss of momentum during 1959 in the "giant leap forward" and the commune campaign. The regime seems to be backing away from extravagant 1959 economic tar- gets, especially in agriculture. Also Peiping has had consider- able trouble with the communes and now is emphasizing more material incentives and a less rigidly controlled life for the overworked peasant members. Renewed attention is being given the country's economic difficul- ties. the members were apparently ab- sent from Peiping, One, Li Hsien-nien, has since been re- ported in Shanghai presiding over an agricultural conference. His appearance there suggests that some of the leaders now may be explaining the regime's domestic policies at the region- al level. I A discussion of foreign policy also may be linked to a top-level conference. Peiping's ambassadors to India, Pakistan, Cambodia, Indonesia, and the UAR and its charge in Yemen have been reported returning to China since early June. The Chinese Communist ambassadors to Burma and the USSR are ab- sent from their posts, suggest- ing they too have returned. A recent article by the Kwangtung Province party first secretary appears to be defend- ing Mao against, criticism of his "leap forward" and commune programs. The article states that "greatness" lies not in always being correct--which is impossible--but in continually uncovering new problems and changing policies accordingly. American officials in Hong Kong note that Mao is the only Chi- nese characterized as "great" in the mainland press, A meeting of the politburo could have been held during the last week in June, when all of t Foreign policy talks now would probably seek to apprise Chinese leadership of internal developments in the countries to which the ambassadors are ac- credited and to assess the de- gree of damage done to Peiping's prestige by 1958's truculent policy and by suppression of the Tibetan revolt. 'Last winter, Peiping indicated its basic policy is still to "isolate the United States" and improve Com munist China's international standing, and that a less bel- licose attitude would be adopted toward certain Western nations and the uncommitted Asians. A recent acrimonious note to Pakistan and the recrimina- tions exchanged with India and the UAR suggest, however, that the protection of its own in- terests will not be sacrificed to the pursuit of friendship. While the situation in the Taiwan Strait would almost CONFIDENTIAL Q? PART 11 NOTES AND COMMENTS na m- 1 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 certainly be discussed at any conference of the Chinese leadership, Khrushchev has again ex- pressed disapproval of the commune system despite the Chi- nese Communist regime's con- tinuing commitment to that form of organization and despite the fact that differences on this issue have been an irritant to Sino-Soviet relations in the past. The Soviet premier's latest disparagement, during his recent tour of Poland, was made publicly and has been carried in the Polish and So- viet press, whereas his earlier comments were made in a private interview with Senator Hum- phrey. Addressing a meeting at a collective farm near Poznan on 18 July, Khrushchev recalled that efforts had been made to set up agricultural communes in the Soviet Union in the early 1920s but that "nothing came of many of these communes." Tracing their failure to the absence of the necessary ma- terial and political conditions, Khrushchev concluded that the sponsors of the movement "had a poor understanding of what Communism is and. how it is to be built." In the setting and context, it ie probable that Khrushchev's remarks were in- tended primarily to reassure Polish peasants against hasty socialization of agriculture, but this renewed criticism of the commune is not likely to set well with the Chinese Communists. Khrushchev had expressed himself in similar terms in his meeting with Senator Hum- phrey last December. The Chi- nese communes, Khrushchev said, were "old-fashioned, reaction- ary, and impractical" because they-ignored the principle of incentives as a spur to pro- duction. Following publica- tion of Humphrey's account of the interview, Peiping report- edly protested to Moscow, and at the 21st party congress in January, Khrushchev disavowed his statements, alleging that they had been fabricated. Since late last year, Pei- ping has retreated from its extreme ideological claims. The Chinese "transition to Communism" has been put off; the principle of free supply has been drastically altered in favor of Khrushchev's "ma- terial incentives"; and the assertion that the commune is "the basic form for the future Communist society" is muted. The Chinese have repeatedly stressed, moreover, that their commune is specifically tai- lored to Chinese conditions. Soviet media subsequently car- ried several mildly favorable reports on the communes. How- ever, these have appeared most- ly in media which reach non- blocc audiences, and they have consistently pointed out that the commune's advantages are limited to "Chinese conditions." SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET %W CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 Khrushchev's Poznan speech has not been reported by the Chinese. Peiping's propaganda continues to praise Soviet achievements--from which the "Chinese must earnestly learn" --and to affirm Moscow's lead- ership of the bloc. Peiping has shown that it prefers a picture of Sino-Soviet unity unmarred by public debate on the commune. However, the Chinese leadership is certain to take Khrushchev's Poznan remarks as criticism, which is especially to be re- sented in view of Peiping's ef- forts to accommodate itself to Moscow's disapproval of the communes. Peiping can be ex- pected to renew its protest to Moscow, insisting, at the least, that future criticisms of Chi- nese policies be expressed privately rather than in a public forum YUGOSLAVIA'S DISPUTE'?'wl'rH SOVIET BLOC The dispute between Yugo- slavia and the Soviet bloc has resumed much of its original character despite the tactical maneuvering which followed Khrushchev's visits to Albania and Hungary during late May and early June. Recent unconfirmed reports of a future meeting be- tween Khrushchev and Tito seem unfounded, since neither side is willing to make concessions to achieve a rapprochement or even a stable detente. no change o a u es s i t ly while Khrushchev and Tito are in power. nce Khrushchev's visit to Hungary and Albania, however, the Yugoslavs have attacked the USSR only once-- for misleading press treatment of its agricultural system and production results--in contrast to their daily contention in the press with all the satel- lites except Poland, A change was noted, too, in Yugoslavia's economic re- lations with'the USSR, and early this month Belgrade opened negotiations with Moscow over the developmental credits grant- ed by the USSR in 1956 and suspended in 1958. At the one session to date,' the Yugoslavs presented a claim for damages to their economy caused by the suspension. Officials on both sides doubt that any signifi- cant part of the credits will be rescheduled or that the talks will be continued at a higher level. Belgrade also charged that Moscow has violated its trade agreement by refusing to sell wheat at market prices elgrade expects to be treated on the same favor= able trade terms as bloc mem- bers. The Yugoslavs, for example, sought Russian wheat at the same price set for the Albanians. Moscow apparently does not feel it has to bargain for Yusoslav foreign policy support because Belgrade's "socialist pretensions" already force it SECRET 25X1 25X1 PART I I NOTES AND COMMENTS PaorF? Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 3 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 to assume positions fairly close to those of Mos- cow. Belgrade, on the other hand, holds the Kremlin directly responsible for the satellites' daily at- tacks and publicly pro- claims that this bad faith toward Yugoslavia casts doubt on the USSR's pose as the prime protector of world peace, Belgrade is apparently re- inforced in its intransigence by i1:he belief, t a in- ternational and internal bloc developments are forcing Khru- shcliev closer and closer to Yugoslavia's revisionism, It will probably interpret Khru- shchev's endorsement of Poland's agricultural program as evidence of the accuracy of this belief. 25X1 25X1 THE INTER-AMERICAN MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS The foreign ministers of the 21 American republics will convene in Santiago, Chile, on 12 August to discuss threats of war in the Caribbean arising mainly from efforts by Cuba and Venezuela to "liberate" the peoples under dictatorships. This dispute has endangered the effectiveness of the Organiza- tion of American States (OAS) and confidence in its collective security system. The meeting grows out of Dominican dictator Trujillo's complaint against Cuba and Vene- zuela for complicity in three small rebel landings in the Dominican Republic and his re- quest on 2 July that the OAS put into effect the consulta- tions called for under the In- ter-American Treaty of Recipro- cal Assistance, Before the re- quest came to a vote, the vari- ous OAS. delegations made it clear that widespread hatred for Trujillo in their countries would make it impossible to vote for consultations regarding Cuban and Venezuelan interven- tion, regardless of the facts of the matter? Paradoxically, this position is a revereal of the customarily adamant Latin American insistence on the principle of nonintervention. As an alternative, the OAS Council called the meeting in Santiago to consider political tensions in the Caribbean, which threaten such countries as Haiti and Nicaragua, as well as the Dominican Republic. Avoiding specific charges, the brief draft agenda for the meeting emphasizes: 1) consideration of Caribbean tensions in the light of principles and standards which govern the inter-American system, 2) effective observance of the principles of noninter- vention and nonaggression, 3) the effective exercise of rep- resentative democracy and re spent for human rights, and 4) the "perfection" of inter-Ameri- can instruments and procedures to help maintain peace. Several officials have al- ready expressed pessimism about its results. The debate will probably be acrid and complicat- ed by other issues, Cuba, for example, wants to stress econom- ic problems as the Caribbean's worst ill; on 28 July Foreign Minister Roa said Cuba might boycott the meeting if economic problems are not included in the agenda, Venezuela, which en- joys high prestige in the hem- isphere as a genuinely demo- cratic government, is already campaigning for the ouster of the Dominican Republic from the OAS, SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 HEMISPHERE REACTIONS While Fidel Castro's strong hold over the Cuban masses was again demonstrated in the 26 July celebrations in Havana, the overwhelming public approval of him reflected in the press of most Latin American countries when he overthrew the Batista dictatorship last January has gradually turned to disillusion- mento His authoritarian maneuver of 17 July forcing President Urrutia's ouster is regarded by many leading newspapers elsewhere in the hemisphere as a clear in- dication of Castro's dictatorial tendencies? Argentine observers now liken him to former dictator Juan Peron, The important left-of-cen- ter Argentine newspaper Razon, bitterly critical of Cas r s demagoguery and totalitarianism, called him a "great disappoint- ment for the democrats of the continent," Another Argentine paper likened Castro's 17 July resignation maneuver to "Peron's grandiose show of renunciation" in 1955 when he withdrew his "resignation" before a giant labor rally. A Colombian paper called Castro "lord and master of the island which he governs with the methods rejected by Christian peoples," and the Peruvian Gov- ernment paper commented: "This is not the first time that a TO THE CASTRO REGIME liberator... has developed a more oppressive dictatorship than the one deposed." Prominent Brazil- ian and Chilean press organs liken Castro to Dominican dicta- tor Trujillo, Venezuela's ex- Careful old buddy-- the Caribbean is very dangerous... It is infested with dictators. --front Topaze, Santiago de Chile, 22 July 1959, dictator Perez Jimenez, and to Batista and Peron. Mexican and Central American editorial- ists have also been critical of Castro, and their comments ap- pear to reflect a genuine dis- illusionment of many who first SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEE:LY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 looked on Castro's victory over Batista as a great step toward democratic government in the hemisphere. There is also increasing concern in the Latin American press over indications of Com- munist penetration of the Castro government. The hemisphere Communist newspapers are among Castro' s most avid defenders. ARGENTINE MILITARY UNREST SUBSIDES Argentine President Fron- dizi's appointment of Navy Secretary Clement on 26 July ended the near rebellion in the navy and promises to give him some respite from the sharp military pressures of the past two months. As in the case of the new army secretary, Clement has not been involved in the recent service quarrels and was selected by Frondizi to restore discipline and thereby dis- courage military efforts to dictate to Frondizi. Frondizi was finally forced to replace former Secretary Estevez;when top naval officers stated they would no longer follow Estevez' orders because he did not adequately repre- sent navy views. The fleet returned to its main base from maneuvers to reinforce this stand. The majority of top admirals had tendered their resignations but at the same time had told subordinate units that the admirals,. not Esteirez, were in charge of the navy. The new secretary, a re- spected retired'officer, should be acceptable to the navy not only because of his background but also because he has not been involved in the recent service quarrels. He requested retirement in December 1954, participated in the anti-Peron revolution of September 1955, and subsequently served in the provisional government. Estevez' departure has al- ready eased tension and, to- gether with the earlier cabinet and service changes, reduces the area for effective exploi= tatioa by die-hard plotters. Army Secretary Anaya, a retired officer appointed on 1 July, continues to make a good im- pression in his similar prob- lem of restoring discipline. The air force, since its bitter intraservice dispute in Sep- tember 1958, has managed to keep out of the spotlight. Apparently quieted tempo- rarity by the military crises, Peronista and Communist labor leaders now have renewed their agitation for emergency wage increases to offset the rise in living costs, which have about doubled since Frondizi took office on 1 May 1958. The strike called by the , Peronista- dominated metallurgical workers on 2,6 July resulted in running battles with the police and threats to try to promote a general strike. Bombings have also increased, although not necessarily because of the strike. Anti-Peronista labor is also restive, but rejects the defiant and partly politically thd' inspired tactics of SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 6 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 Peronista and Communist labor leaders. The latter announced in mid-June their intention to wage a joint campaign against austerity measures under the US-backed stabilization program. This combination is be- lieved to have contributed to the sharp drop in popular votes received by Frondizi's party-- 63 percent below 1958--in the 12 municipal elections in Santa Fe Province on 26 July. The number of blank ballots--mostly from the Peronistas--was larger than the vote of any single party. Some 10 percent of the tota l'vote was received by the Communist party, which was al- lowed to participate despite 25X1 Frondizi's April decree out- lawing Communist political activities. France apparently expects that its first nuclear weapons test--now anticipated early in 1960--will meet the United States 'legal requirement for "substantial progress" and thereby qualify France for broad American aid on nuclear weapons construction. In this expectation, the French Govern- ment now seems to prefer to work out its first test of a nuclear weapon unaided, and is increasingly inclined to see eventual advantages for France in the idea of limiting the number of nuclear powers. Minister of Armed Forces Guillaumat admitted in June that help from the United States would have been welcome five or six years ago, but he stressed that for France to receive aid now "for the first explosions, which can and will be purely French, would be a grave error of policy." A Foreign Ministry spokesman in- terprets Guillaumat's State- ment to mean that American aid to the French nuclear weapons program now would jeopardize more extensive aid after the first French tests. Some French officials have hinted that be- fore the French tests-are con- ducted, a definite promise-of American aid or perhaps even the establishment of a "work- ing-level" committee to decide the type and extent of aid to be granted would be more wel- come than actual aid in the first tests. The French argue that the Soviet Union already has the information they would receive from the United States, and that with American aid, France would save money which could then be used to meet its NATO commitments. NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak had publicly told the Atlantic congress in June it seemed logical that there should be no secrets between allies. :Presumably because of its growing expectations, Paris no longer rejects out of hand a limitation on the size of the "nuclear club" to as few powers as possible. There is evidence that some French officials be- lieve that ultimately the "prin- ciple"' of :limit ng the club fnaj- 'work to 'French benefit.. They :reason that once France's first weapon is tested without foreign assistance, France would qualify as the fourth nuclear power, and the "principle" would discourage any "fifth power" in the nuclear weapons field. by OS ;I ) (Concurred in 25X1 SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 F SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU]I~AR 30 July 1959 SCANDINAVIAN REACTION TO CANCELLATION OF KHRUSHCHEV VISIT Khrushchev's cancellation of his August visit to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden has occa- sioned surprise, some embarrass- ment, and sharp political con- troversy in Norway and Sweden but no serious alarm regarding relations with the USSR. The Scandinavian govern- ments in their notes to the Soviet Union regretted the "postponement" of the visits, which they had somewhat re- luctantly scheduled in return for the visits of the three Scandinavian premiers to the USSR in 1955 and 1956. How- ever, various officials, par- ticularly members of the for- eign ministries, have indicated they are glad to avoid at this time any discussions with Khru- shchev which might involve them in Soviet propaganda gestures regarding a "Baltic sea of peace" or a Scandinavian zone free of nuclear weapons and missiles. Some concern was suggested by the care taken in the notes to express the hope that the traditional good relations be- tween Scandinavia and the USSR would not be affected. Nor- way's Prime Minister Gerhard- sen in a public statement has severely criticized the opposition parties and the press for irresponsibility' and for influencing Norway's relations with the USSR "in a negative manner'," In both Norway and Sweden, a vitriolic political controversy has flared up between the So- cialist governments and their opposition, with the Social- ist press accusing the op- position of playing domestic politics with the visit. In Finland, which Khru- shchev was to have visited on a less formal basis en route back to the USSR, of- ficials and the press appear to have maintained their characteristic reserve in making any comments on the Soviet move. One independent newspaper, however, predicted that Khrushchev's decision indicated a "harder and more restricted Soviet foreign policy toward the Scandina- vian countries" and, by im- plication, Finland. BRITISH PARTY CONTROVERSY OVER CENTRAL AFRICAN POLICY Two weeks of House of Com- mons debates have pointed up the dilemma London faces in preparing for next year's re- view of the constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This review was envisaged when the British Gov- ernment granted virtual self- government to the white-settler- controlled federation in 1953, but pledged not to withdraw its protection from the Afri- cans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland without their con- sent. Both British political parties are worried about Af - ricart developments, but they differ sharply over colonial policy; clashes on this sub- ject have been unusually acute. The Macmillan government is principally anxious that the review be accomplished, in such a way a$to bring neither renewed African violence, like that in Nyasaland last winter, nor open thwarting of London by the federation government. The labor party disputes the white minority's insistence on SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 195EI perpetuating its control, and makes a special point of demanding that the British Government honor its'' '1953 pledge. The Labor par- ty's parliamentary attacks are accen- tuated by its search for a popular issue for the general elections expected this fall. Although colonial issues do not normally carry much weight with the British electorate, Labor's failure to attract popular sup- port for its ecoAr nomic program or its proposal for disarma- ment through a "non- nuclear club" makes this issue likely to draw unusually heavy party attention. RHODESIA AND NYASALAND The Labor party is en- couraged by some independent press support for its demands that Colonial Secretary Lennox- Boyd resign, and will probably continue exploiting the find- ings of the independent Devlin Commission that the Macmillan government exaggerated an Af- rican "massacre plot" to justi- fy invoking a state of emergen- cy in Nyasaland last March. Party leader Gaitskell, in raisingfar:-reaching objections to Prime Minister Macmillan's plan to establish a new 26-mem- ber commission drawn from Brit- ain,, Central Africa, and the Commonwealth to prepare for SOUTHERN RHODESIA next year's review, has already laid the groundwork for disso- ciating the Labor party from any commission findings,even if par- ty members participate in the commission's work. The Laborites' present attacks on the government will greatly hamper the constitutional review if they win the British elections and have to deal with the feder- ation's prime minister, Sir Roy Welensky,with whom they have feuded for years. The attacks may also be expected to strengthen most African leaders in their op- 25X1 position to any new arrangements consolidating the white minoritvb control. ETHIOPIA:GAINS SUPPORT AGAINST SOMALI NATIONALISTS Emperor Haile Selassie's recent visits to Cairo and Paris, apparently have devel- oped a measure of international support for Ethiopia's diplo- matic, efforts against the as- pirations of Somali national- ists who seek to deprive SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET Nftftwl CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 Ethiopia of about a third of its territory. The boundary be- tween Ethiopia and Somalia, a UN trust territory administered by Italy'and scheduled for inde- pendence in December 1960, is still undemarcated after eight years of negotiation. Addis Ababa is increasingly concerned over the Greater Somalia move- ment, which proposes to unite 2,500,000 Somali tribesmen scattered through five terri- tories--Somalia, British and French Somaliland, Kenya, and Ethiopia. In Cairo, the Ethiopians reportedly obtained President Nasir's promise to change his attitude '.tdward- ,Addis 'Ababa. In the past, Cairo radio has broadcast anti-Ethiopian prop- agandaain favor of the Moslems, and Egyptian agents have been active among the Moslems of Somalia and to a lesser extent those of Ethiopia. As a result, relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa have been tense; the Emperor had repeatedly put off a visit to Cairo during recent years. Nasir now apparently has agreed to end the press attacks, to support Ethiopia at the United Nations on the Somali boundary issue, and to withdraw support from the Greater Som- alia movement. Nasir's reported,about- face may stem from a desire for an accommodation with his African neighbors. Addis Ababa, suspicious of his motives, plans to test his sincerity by send- ing a delegation to Cairo for talks. SECRET French support of Ethiopia, expected because of Paris' fear of Somali nationalism in the im- portant naval base of Djibouti, was reiterated during the Emper- or's visit to Paris. The reports of diplomatic support for Ethiopia from Cairo and other capitals have aroused fears of Somali leaders that Ethiopia now may adopt a more aggressive attitude in eastern Africa. On 17 July, Somali Pre- mier Issa publicly accused Addis Ababa of seeking foreign support The Horn of Africa Approximate area of proposed Greater Somalia !? / SOMALIA KENYA Mogadisci% permanent secretariat. to threaten Somalia's forth- coming independence. Meanwhile, the Somali nationalist leader of French Somaliland, Mahmoud Harbi, who was forced out of the premiership by Paris late last fall, is reported trying to organize a "'Pan-Somali con- ference" in the hope that it would be able to establish a 25X1 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET 30 July 1959 THE MALAYAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN The decision of the Malay- an Chinese Association (MCA) to remain in Malaya's ruling Alli- ance party has, at least tem- porarily, resolved a serious political crisis and improved the Alliance's prospects of winning a substantial majority of the 104 seats at stake in the 19 August general elections. The compromise settlement re- sulted, however, in the resig- nation of a number of MCA lead- ers and a probable decline in Alliance strength in predomi- nantly Chinese districts. The dispute:also has almost cer- tainly increased racial ten- sions, which could reach; the breaking point during the current campaign. Communal. issues, principal- ly candidate apportionment and the use of the Chinese language in school examinations, were the basis for the MCA rift with the United Malay National Or- ganization (UMNO), the Malay component of the Alliance. The final apportionment of candi- dates resulted in 69 UMNO, 31 MCA, and 4 Indian nominees-- numbers which reflect roughly the relative strengths of the three Alliance partners. Opposition candidates in- clude 58 from the Pan-Malayan Islamic party, 19 from the People's Progressive party, 37 from the Socialist Front, 11 from two smaller parties, and 29 independents, All of these opposition. parties tend to in- cite communal discontent in their campaigns, for virtually all their candidates are play- ing to only one of the two ma- jor racial groups, Malays or Chinese. Recent events in Malaya, including the::state assembly elections and the MCA-UMNO squabble, indicate that there is a continuing trend toward voting along strictly racial lines. In the 11 state asses- bly elections, the vote for the multiracial Alliance totaled approximately 54 percent--a sharp decline from the 80-per- cent total in the last nation- al election in 1955. This de- cline in Alliance strength prob- ably will not be fully reflect- ed in the forthcoming elec- tions, however, ? because of the disunity of the opposition parties and their lack of a nationwide organizational base. SOUTH KOREA'S LEADERSHIP PROBLEM President Rhee may no longer be exercising full con- trol over the operations and decisions of the South Korean SECRET This impression of a grow- ing incapacity to govern has been reinforced by Rhee's stum- bling bling speech before the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League in early June, by his failure to appear at some public func- tions which he formerly attend- ed regularly, and by the in- ability of all but the most im- portant visitors to see the President. The South Korean PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 vice minister of foreign af- fairs told Ambassador Dowling confidentially on 27 July that Rhee was increasingly forget- ful of details. There is some indication that leadership has been as- sumed by-a triumvirate compris- ing Minister of Home Affairs Choe In-kyu, Minister of Jus- tice Hong Chin-ki, and Minis- ter of Finance Song In-song, and by the "hard" faction of Rhee's Liberal party.. The presidential secretariat also appears to exercise consider- able influence over government- al decisions by controlling what and whom the President .sees. Pak Chan-il, the most powerful member of the secre- tariat, is reported to be even more anti-Japanese than Rhee, and he may be encouraging the President in his present nega- tive policies toward Japan. Democratic party. co-leader of the opposition Recent developments illus- trate the ability of Rhee's entourage to isolate the Presi- dent. Those dependent on Rhee for public office--and conse- quently financial privilege-- have a vested interest in pro- longing the illusion of his ability to govern. Given the possibility of Rhee's total incapacity and the lack of a legal basis for removal of an incapacitated president, South Korea could face a protracted period of instability during which public knowledge of his condition would destroy the ability of the government to rule effectively. The most powerful men un- der Rhee have recently sup- ported, if not actually insti- gated, repressive measures against the opposition Demo- cratic party to assure a Lib- era]. party victory in next year's presidential election. The extreme lengths to which these interests are prepared to go to retain power suggest they would strongly resist the orderly constitutional succession to the presidency of Vice President Chang.Myon, SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pare 12 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES THE WAR IN ALGERIA The war in Algeria, now in its fifth year, appears to be entering a crucial phase. The French are increasingly, hope- ful of being able to announce the "pacification" of the rebel- lion before the UN debate on Algeria this fall; leaders of the rebel Army of National Lib- eration (ALN) maintain that the start of the rainy season in October will permit them to re- organize and resupply their forces as they have in the past. Area of Current French Offensive With the French now con- ducting an all-out campaign against rebels in mountainous eastern Algeria, the course of the war in the next few months may determine whether the rebel- lion can be defeated militarily, or whether a settlement can be reached only through negotia- tions. The moderate Algerian leadership---which recognizes that the rebel army cannot force the French out of Algeria--has long favored negotiating with the French, but De Gaulle-has refused to discuss any politi- cal issues, only a cease-fire. He has also insisted that talks must be held in Paris rather than in a neutral country as desired by the rebels. The French are unlikely to modify this stand as long as there is a possibility of a military victory. French.Strategy Under the lead- ership of air force Gen. Maurice Challe, French forces now are putting more pressure on the rebels than at any time in the war. Concurrently, the French are making strenuous efforts to win the allegiance of the uncommitted Mos- lems and to keep the rebels from contact- ing their Moslem sup- porters. Without of- fering independence, De Gaulle has sought to convince the Mos- lems that a French victory will not turn back the clock or re- turn them to the sta- tus of second-class citizens. Militarily, Challe's plan emphasizes the aggressive pur- suit of rebel forces in the field, the garrisoning of "pacified" areas, and the de- nying of supplies to the rebels by the patrolling of electri- fied border barriers. In con- trast to past years, when rela- tively immobile French forces CONFIDENTIAL PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Po' I of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 often lost the initiative to hit-and-run rebel bands, the Challe plan stresses the en- gagement and'destruction of rebel units, as well as the rounding up of escapees. By making effective use of hel- icopters and aerial recon- naissance, Challe's "pursuit commandos" have had consider- able success in keeping rebel bands from escaping into the hills. Rebel Problems To date the rebels have been fskir2y successful in sup- plying and maintaining an army which appears to number between 15,000 and 20,000 effectives, down from a 1956 peak of about 40,000. However, the rebels depend for both supplies and reinforcements on staging areas in Morocco and Tunisia, areas which have been increasingly denied them since the spring of 1959 by French border bar- riers. These barriers, to- gether with some reduction in the support given the rebels by the Moroccan and Tunisian governments, have forced the rebels to depend on supply lines consisting largely of caravans south of the barri- ers, but even these have been subject to interception. In addition to supply dif- ficulties, the rebels have'had problems of morale and disci- pline. Since the death in com- bat of several of the rebels' top field commanders earlier this year, the percentage of prisoners among rebel casual- ties has risen sharply; pris- oners.~ now comprise about a third of total rebel losses. Prospects Faced with the increased effectiveness of the Challe plan, the rebels until recently tended to split into small units to avoid capture and destruction. While this lessened their ef- fectiveness as a fighting force, activity by small groups in- creased their capability for terrorism and for sabotage of French installations. Since the 14 July attack in force on Ain Zana near the Tunisian border, however, the rebels may have become con- vinced that occasional large operations must be launched, if only for propaganda purposes. The rebels also appear to be attempting to provoke incidents between French and Tunisian forces along Tunisia's bor- der in order to enlarge the latter's participation in the war and to direct world attention on Algeria before the UN debate. Good weather now faeili- tateas French pursuit of reb- el bands in the mountains and policing of barriers along the border. The French offensive in the Kabylie mountain area of eastern Algeria appears to be an attempt to end organized rebel resistance prior to the UN debate, and the French may, for diplomatic reasons, announce the defeat of the rebels before the end of the year. Even should the French prove successful in largely eliminating the reb- els' field forces, however, terrorism and activity by small groups probably will go on and will continue to re- gtire the presence in Algeria of large numbers of French troops. Long-term French objectives in Algeria--maintaining polit- ical hegemony and access to SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 15 .~~...,.,, vii.,., triilGSYL'1.11 VL'~ warm :i Of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 PAKISTAN and Amindive Is: The financial problem of finding adequate sums--about $1.25 billion--to compensate the zamindars also impeded the program. Furthermore, the dif- ficulties of compiling land records and setting up a new revenue collecting service made rapid action impossible. It was not until 1955 that the abolition of the zamindars sys- tem was accomplished in West Bengal--the last major state to enforce such legislation. The rights of the former zamindars, most of whom were permitted to retain their home farms, generally accrued to the states, and the only immediate benefit realized by the tenants was the elimination of the bur- densome charges in addition to rentals which the zamindars had customarily imposed. The tenants were usually given the right to become owners, but few could pay the necessary sums, and many came to believe that the reform had been of little CHINA `West Benga Calcutta BURMA benefit. The program did in- crease the revenues of the state governments and help establish a closer state-tenant relation- ship., Much of the new state revenue was used for agricul- tural development programs which aided the tenants. Tenancy Reform The abolition of the zamin- dars system removed only the up- permost layer of the interme- diaries between the state and the tenants. Tenants who held land under the zamindars fre- quently leased it to subtenants. The same situation developed in non-zamindars lands where some landowners had large holdings. Thus much of the land remained cultivated by tenants, and re- forms were necessary to improve the status of the tenant. The tenancy reforms adopted generally fall into three groups: security of tenure, including the question of the landlord's SECRET PART III AFGHANISTAN!' PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 15 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page. 5:f 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 if the government made a major effort to carry out the program. In contrast to the expan- sion of cooperatives, the lim- itation of landholdings would be unlikely to benefit Indian agriculture for some time. If the ceilings on landholdings were low enough to be polit- ically effective in winning peasant support, it would take land away from both the rela- tively large landowners and the smaller ones who produce much of the food that supplies the cities. Therefore, unless adequate consumer goods were made available in the villages to induce the new owners to-.work hander and,exchange.their,p.r.o-J ducts for iconaumerl,goods...it.).yvould become increasingly difficult to:,:supply.the cities with food. Since nearly 300,000,000 persons are now dependent on about 400,000,000 acres of cul- tivable land, only 1.3 acres per capita or about 6.7 acres per family are available. Thus, even if the ceiling for land- holdings,were as low as 25 INDIA: DISTRIBUTION GOWNED AREAS PERCENTAGE OF PERCENTAGE OF SIZEOF AREA HOUSEHOLDS OWNED LAND (ACRES) OWNING PLOTS MADE UP OF PLOTS THIS SIZE THIS SIZE 0 22 0 0 - 1 25 1 1-2.5 14 5 2.5-5 14 10 5-7.5 8 10 7.5-10 5 9 10 -15 5 13 15 -20 3 10 20 - 25 1 5 25-30 1 8 30-50 1 13 OVER 50 1 16 (1956 DATA) 100 100 acres, the amount of land avail- able for redistribution would provide only about three acres per family for those families-- about half of the total--which now have less than three acres of land. Even less realistic is the plan to set up joint farms, which appears to have been adopted without much thought as to how the scheme would work in practice. Few joint farm- ing societies now in existence in India have been successful, and it seems unlikely that the numerous administrative and financial problems involved could be solved, even if the political opposition could be overcome. Nehru apparently believes, however, that such a program would increase crop yields. He probably also feels it would help the Congress party polit- ically by demonstrating its continued ability to think and act dynamically. He may hope they program--in addition to INDIA: CULTIVATED LAND PER CAPITA POPULATION CULTIVATED CULTIVATED CULTIVATED DEPENDENT ON AREA LAND PER LAND PER AGRICULTURE (MILLION CAPITA FAMILY (MILLIONS) ACRES) (ACRES) (ACRES( North India 47 48 1.01 4. 8 East India 68 86 1.25 6. 3 South India 49 57 1.17 5. 7 West India 24 54 2.29 11. 7 Central India 38 99 2.57 11.9 Norttwest India 23 59 2. 59 13. 1 (1951 DATA) 209 403 1.61 7. 9 90720A 30JIJLV 1959 being the Indian answer to Com- munist China's communes--would undercut the appeal of the Com- munist party in India in rural areas, just as the Congress party's adoption in 1955 of the policy of promoting a "socialist pattern of society" undercut the appeal of the leftist opposition parties. To date the program--except for the expansion of service co- operatives--has already aroused considerable political opposi- tion from a large section of the Indian public, including many members of the Congress party. Despite Nehru's assurance that joint farming would be instituted on a voluntary basis, many feel such a move would be a step to- ward totalitarianism, and a new conservative party--the Swatantra --has been formed chiefly to op- pose the new agricultural program. Many observers, including high Indian officials, believe the joint farming program will never be implemented. It has al- ready cost the Congress party support among both large and medium landowners, without yet winning it additional support 25X1 from the peasants, who remain unaware or skeptical of the ben- efits they would receive, SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pso' 6 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 vsvoffl~ SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 THE EAST GERMAN REFUGEE The continued flight of several hundred refugees from East Germany each day, follow- ing the more than 3,000,000 who have fled to the West since World War II, indicates that 14 years of Communist rule have failed to inculcate a universal belief in Communist ideology or satisfaction in Communist achievements. Discontent and a hope for a better life lead the refugee to take serious risks, leave his possessions, and seek an uncertain future in West Germany. Some become disillusioned and return to East Germany to face possible imprisonment. Who Is the Refugee? Most of the refugees are workmen, housewives, or clerks, but nearly every occupation has been represented, includ- ing police and the military. Most refugees have been adults aged 25 to 66 and children from 7,, to.. l4,years old. The most significant refu- gee today--because East Germany can ill afford to spare him--is the professional man, a doctor or teacher from a university or lower school. Because great numbers in this category have fled, the East German regime is suffering serious manpower shortages, especially in the medical field, but also in the dental, pharmaceutic, engineer- ing, and technical fields. Motivation In general, the refugee flees because of personal griev- ances against the Communist system. He may be a farmer un- able to meet impos- sibly high delivery quotas. He may be a small businessman faced with national- ization of his shop, or a worker fleeing constantly increas- ing work norms. The refugee might:. be a UELZENV,- 24% 12 WEST GERMAN 37 % STATES 19~%/ GIESSEN Ls youth escaping military service or the girl friend who follows him. He may be an intellectual subjected to increasing pres- sures to compromise his pro- fessional standards, or a Christian escaping the, in- creasing atheistic pressures? He may simply have responded to the strong attraction of a prosperous West Germany. In the case of the refugee intellectual, there is often no single clear-cut motivation. A new development or changed cir- cumstance probably provides the immediate stimulus to flight. He may receive a summons to ap- pear before a party or govern- ment functionary to explain some previous statement or ac- tion. Recent moves to Commu- nize educational institutions in line with the regime's ''poly- technical education" program may depress. him. He may be physically or mentally exhausted by overwork or psychological harassment. A party member with limited professional qual- ifications may be promoted over him. Probably more important than any other reason is. the regime's deliberate and sys- tematic discrimination against his children in education. Escape Procedure The refugee can travel freely anywhere in East Germany except in the restricted zones on the western border, but he FLOW OF EAST GERMAN REFUGEES (APPROX. PERCENTAGES 1958-59) SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 15 record, or is otherwise under suspicion, he will not obtain an exit permit. Without an exit permit, the refugee's next best course Li an. .q,. YV aaiN a.a.. el i..VV +V~ If he is rejected for security reasons or for a criminal rec- ord--which does not happen often--he has numerous op- portunities to appeal his case, SECRET ;20% PRISON EMPLOYMENT PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 To be eligible for screen- ing through the emergency ad- mission procedure provided by West German law, the refugee has to leave East Germany per- manently and stay in the Fed- eral Republic or West Berlin. He is accepted as a "recognized" refugee if : a) his life was endangered because he engaged in political activities in East Germany; b) he wants to be re- united with his family; or c) he can prove there is a job for him in the West so he will not become a public burden. If.:he.,does, trot meet',these requirements, he is a "nonrec- ognized" refugee who may re- main in the West but will not get the assistance given recog- nized refugees. However, the refugee authorities might grant him recognized status, if its denial would mean an extraordi- nary hardship to him. "The reu::gn: zed:;ref- ugee is usually flown to West Germany, at no expense to himself, and treated like any, other German citizen. He is given a resi- dence permit, permis- sion to work, or pos- sibly a pension, an- nuity, or social re- lief. He may also stay in West Berlin, which takes 10 per- cent of the recog- nized refugees as its quota. The., -nenrecog- nized escapee is merely given refuge under the provisions of the West German public welfare laws which guarantee a minimum sub- sistence to each person in need. He is given food and lodging, medical service, and, if urgent- ly necessary, clothing or other items; if he is accommodated in a camp, he gets some spend- ing money. Under no circum- stances is he compelled to return to East Germany. While at Marienfelde, the refugee is interrogated by the three Western powers and by West Berlin authorities for se- curity and intelligence infor- mation. Refugees in Berlin In addition to its 10-per- cent quota of recognized refu- gees, West Berlin is also re- sponsible for all nonrecognized refugees. Furthermore, any refugee who elects to remain in Berlin may do so, regardless of his status. The nonrecognized refugee is a serious burden on Berlin. Privileges accorded to recog- nized refugees but denied to him include the right to ?vote, permission to hold a job, as- sistance in finding housing, Reception center in Berlin. and free transportation by air for resettling in West Germany. The nonrecognized refugee there- fore must decide whether to re- turn to the East, go to West Germany on his own responsibility and expense, or remain in West Berlin. He may return to East Ger- many; it is less likely that he will try to go on to West Germany. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Paee 9 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 If the nonrecognized refu- gee chooses to remain in West Berlin, he is permitted to live and eat without charge in per- manent camps and to receive one dollar per month. Legally he cannot hold a job, but the la- bor market has been invaded by nonrecognized refugees on an unofficial basis. Since he cannot apply through the labor office for a job, he works be- low the legal minimum rate. The effect is not as great as might be expected, however, be- cause many such workers hold jobs in small Plants which sur- vive only because they can se- cure help at lower than the legal minimum. Many of the nonrecognized refugee workers are domestic servants employdd by people who would dispense with this luxury if required to pay the legal rate. The refugee, whether he remains in Berlin permanently or temporarily, is probably housed in a camp. He may go for two or three weeks to a transit camp where persons live during the screening process. His camp may be a former fac- tory, hastily improvised as an emergency shelter. Or the refugee may go to a permanent camp, a smaller installation holding from 70 to 800 people, with somewhat primitive condi- tions. The refugee may live with relatives or friends, or, if lucky, be placed in an apart- ment. Life in a camp inevita- bly causes lower morale, so the government is attempting to settle families in apartment buildings. Refugees in West Germany To cut down the process- ing in Berlin, the refugee may be flown to a camp in Giessen or Uelzen in West Germany where he completes his processing and is assigned a permanent loca- tion. He may also be flown to a camp in whichever West German state has accepted him under a quota system. Since West German law ap- plies to East German citizens who come to Berlin or the Fed- era]'. Republic, the refugee may go directly to friends or rela- tives without registering in a camp. He thus avoids the long stay in various camps and pos- sible assignment to undesirable locations and employment. He may fly from Berlin to West Germany at his own expense; he might at a later date report to Giessen or Uelzen and be record- ed there. The principal problems for the refugee in West Germany are housing and employment, for which the state governments are responsible, but with help from the federal authorities. In general, the refugee will have little difficulty being resettled in West Germany, although in some states he will find housing inadequate and might have to remain in a camp for as long as two years or wait in Berlin to be flown to West; Germany. The refugee will have little trouble finding a job in West Germany--on 30 June job openings there exceeded the number of unemployed per- sons. He may, however, have difficulty in finding a job commensurate with his training or previous experience,and be- come! discontented. Moreover, he may expect to improve his lot in West Germany without having a skill or training to offer. Private organizations, particularly professional . groups, will assist the govern- ment; in placing him in his pro- fession if he is qualified. Sometimes the refugee de- cides to go back to East Ger- many. The reasons for such de- cisions are many and complex, but generally they add up to dissatisfaot'ion with conditions in the West or some compelling personal condition. The returnee may fall into the large group of adventurers who move back and forth across the border. Possibly he com- mitted a criminal offense in SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 10 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 THE BLOC'S FOREIGN MILITARY AID PROGRAM The Sino-Soviet bloc, since the start of its arms aid pro- gram in 1955, has extended more than one billion dollars in mil- itary assistance to underdevel- oped countries, particularly the .UAR, Iraq, Afghanistan,: and In- donesia`. In addition, it has provided arms and materiel to Yemen, Algeria, Guinea, Finland, and Austria, and reportedly agreed recently to supply arms to Ethiopia. Offers have also been made to provide-arms to a number of other countries, in- cluding Tunisia, Burma, and some of the Latin American republics. Military assistance to underdeveloped countries--a major factor in the bloc's pene tration drive--is relatively easy to implement and is of substantial propaganda value to the contributors. Arms aid accounts for about one third of Sino-Soviet bloc aid of all types extended to underde- veloped countries but comprises more than one half of all aid actually delivered. The bloc has been able through its arms deals to con- tribute to its posture as a big-power supporter of nation- alism in the neutralist countries, thus assisting local Communists to attain political influence. Playing on the underdeveloped country's desire for manifesta- tions of independence, the bloc supplies it with symbols of national defense, regardless of the country's ability to fully use the arms. The recipients of this aid become increasingly dependent on the bloc for the continued maintenance of their armed forces, and Moscow hopes they eventually will become more susceptible to bloc political pressures. Meanwhile, the bloc, os- tensibly remaining aloof from internal problems, can pose as the recipient country's best friend and stanchest supporter os Underdevelo ~__. IIII IIIfl~lllll 1111 III I I lIITI III III Il IfII II IIIIIII III IIIII IIIII IITIIIIII IIIIIIII IIlIllTlillI III III IIII(Il fill (ITI II III IIII ~~ SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 12 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 %waftole SECRET facers have been detailed to the armed forces of these nations to provide instruction. on mili- tary tactics as well as to ad- vise at the senior military level. During the first six months of 1959, there were ap- proximately 1,500 bloc military technicians and advisers serv- ing in recipient countries-- mainly in the UAR, Iraq, Afghan- istan, and Indonesia. Since 1955 more than 2,500 nationals from countries that have concluded arms agreements with the bloc have taken mili- tary training in the bloc. Courses of instruction have in- cluded many phases of ground, naval, and air training and were undertaken primarily in CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 of its nationalistic struggle with "the imperialistic and capitalistic West." In negotiating its arms deals, the bloc has displayed a willingness to grant huge discounts--in some instances as much as two thirds of quoted prices. In addition, the bloc accepts partial, if not complete, repayment in surplus commodities rather than demanding full payment in hard currencies. The export of arms is for the bloc a relatively inexpen- sive means of penetration. The continual re-equipping of the bloc's own armed forces with new models of weapons results in a sizable stockpile of ob- solescent items, While Czechoslovakia and Poland have in the past "front- ed" for Moscow, the USSR has in the last year come to deal more directly with the coun- tries receiving bloc arms. It supplies by far the greatest amounts of arms,accounting for more than two thirds of all the bloc arms delivered to the UAR, Iraq, Afghanistan, P .d Indonesia. Communist China now par- ticipates in the bloc's arms aid program and its role prob- ably will increase, particular- ly in Southeast Asia and in Al- geria, where lack of diplomat- ic ties obviates repercussions in relations with Prance. Al- though China's arms aid to Al- geria and Indonesia has been limited, Peiping probably will attempt to increase its stature in Southeast Asia by offering additional aid to Djakarta. Technical Aid and `raining In conjunction With the arms deals, the bloc also pro- vides technical assistance to the countries receiving arms. Bloc personnel, mainly Soviet nationals, are sent to conduct courses in the use and main- tenance of the weapons and equipment supplied. Soviet of- TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER BLOC MILITARY AID PROGRAM BLOC MILITARY SPECIALISTS IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1 JANUARY-JUNE 1959) USSR CZECHO. POLAND TOTAL UAR 680 225 10 915 IRAQ 150 -- -- 150 AFGHANISTAN 150 150 INDONESIA 100 30 20 150 YEMEN 60 15 75 GUINEA 5 5 1,140 275 30 1,445 MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES TRAINED IN THE BLOC (1955-JUNE 1959) OTHER USSR POLAND CZECHO. EUROP. SATELL. TOTAL UA R 740 525 335 50 1 650 IRAQ 90 45 - 135 AFGHANISTAN 50 50 INDONESIAN -_. 500 150 --- 650 the USSR, Poland, and Czecho- slovakia. The Soviet Union has pro- vided, most of the training in land armaments but. has also given flight training courses. In addi- tion,staff and line officers through the rank of general are being trained in the USSR for command assignments in their re- spective armies. Poland has pro- vided facilities for most of the naval training that the bloc has offered:, and Czechoslovakia'has been the major center for flight training. The increased contact be- tween bloc military personnel SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 13 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET lmwmwe CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 July 1959 and members of the armed forces of these underdeveloped coup- tries provides opportunities for ideological indoctrination, es- pecially when such contact takes place inside the bloc. Since the military groups in these underdeveloped countries have been traditional sources of authority, the effect of bloc training on future military leaders may be expected to in- fluence their political orienta- tion. Bloc personnel both at home and abroad, however, ap- pear to have conducted them- selves in such a way as to a- void criticism. The increased contacts with the military per- sonnel of the recipient coun- tries has not yet resulted in any obvious subversive attempts by bloc personnel. The UAR Since 1955 the bloc has provided Egypt and Syria, now the UAR, with arms, equipment, and training amounting to an estimated $700,000,000. The bloc presumably will continue to supply arms and materiel to Since the .`format1,on of th&- UAR in 1958, Cairo has regulated the purchases of bloc arms for both regions, dealing almost exclusively with" the Soviet Union. Moscow in turn has in- creasingly dominated the bloc's military assistance program in the UAR during recent years. Despite the frictions caused by Nasir's anti-Communist campaign in the Middle East, the bloc has continued to pro- vide military aid to the UAR. The technical assistance phase of the bloc military aid pro- gram in the UAR has continued unhampered and appears even to have increased. Moscow appar- ently intends to continue to depend on its economic and par- ticularly its military aid pro- grams in the UAR to maintain the close ties which had been shak- en by the exchange of recrimina- tions between Moscow and Cairo earlier this year. Iraq Iraq, the latest major recipient of bloc military assistance, concluded an arms deal with Moscow in late 1958 The bloc, thus far, is esti- mated to have supplied Iraq with as much as $100,000,000 in arms and materiel since deliver- ies of military equipment began late last year. Additional shipments of materiel probably will continue to be delivered to Iraq throughout the remainder of 1959. Moscow, in its dealings with Iraq, has demonstrated the value the bloc leaders attach to their overseas arms aid program. While the Soviet Union and other members of the bloc were in the process of granting recognition to the new Iraqi regime and also con- cluding trade agreements with it Moscow in November 1958 quickly arranged to provide arms to the Iraqi armed forces. Bloc arms and materiel began arriving immediately and mili- tary technicians and advisers were dispatched to Iraq. It was not until March of this year that Moscow was able to extend a meaningful economic credit to Baghdad. While the SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 14 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SECRET VMVRVI 30 July 1959 USSR is still in the survey stages of its economic aid program, bloc arms in large quantities are con- tinually arriving in Iraq. Afghanistan The bloc, par- ticularly the Soviet Union, has since 1956 supplied Afghanistan with an estimated $75,000,000 in mili- tary assistance. In addition the Soviet Union concluded a new arms agreement with Kabul in June of this year. While the scope of this agree- ment is not yet ap- parent, Moscow pre- sumably will continue to grant substantial discounts to Kabul on its arms purchases. This arrangement probably will per- mit Afghanistan to make mere token payments for the bloc military aid it is receiving while modernizing its armed forces. Other Recipients The bloc has provided Yemen with more than $30,000,- i1 military aid under an agreement concluded in 1956 with Czechoslovakia, but prob- ably financed:by:.Moscow. By early 1958, practically all the arms and equipment arranged for under this deal had been 'de- livered. The bloc made gift ship- ments of obsolete arms to Guinea earlier this year. The value of these arms-- estimated at $500,000--is insignificant in comparison with their psychological im- pact. arms to Algeria via Egypt. The Algerian rebel gov- ern e, earlier this year, was granted an estimated $5,- 000,000 in military aid by Communist China. Peiping's grant was made in response to a visit to Communist China by a rebel mission. A subsequent rebel mission visited China this spring, re- portedly to make arms purchases under Peiping's grant. China presumably will deliver the SET (Prepared by ORR) 25X1 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 15 of 15 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 - 0000" Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5 SF W%' Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02300110001-5