CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002400020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 13, 1959
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 5`
OCI NO.4062/59
13 August 1959
O'A
7 is J.?, i '... ,~ "'_ -.--- - Y i
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
EN iAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EST'IOTTAGE LAWS.
TITLE 13, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 'i91, T11L TN,rj,NSM1S-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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13 August 1959
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST--WEST NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
While denying that Khrushchev will try to "divide the
world" with the United States during his forthcoming visit
to Washington, Soviet propaganda continues to keynote the
responsibility of the "two great powers" for relaxing
international tensions. In Western Europe, speculation
on the possibilities of a Moscow-Washington deal has sub-
sided somewhat with the announcement of the President's
plans for consultations in Europe beginning on 27 August.
Moscow, for the most part, has confined any anti-Western
comments to continued attacks on Adenauer as the princi-
pal opponent of an East-West detente.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The Castro regime in Cuba suppressed a large-scale
conspiracy on 8-9 August, making hundreds of arrests.
Evidence that Dominican agents were involved in the con-
spiracy can be used by Castro to strengthen his case
against his bitter foe, Dominican dictator Trujillo, and
may be used to justify. further attempts to oust Trujillo.
Meanwhile, Cubans have. been identified in the Nicaraguan
rebel groups operating against the Somoza regime from
Honduran and Costa Rican territory. Costa Rican President
Echandi anticipates a new airlift of arms and men from Cuba
to reinforce the Nicaraguan rebel groups now just inside
the Costa Rican border.
SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . , , . . Page 6
The past week's lull in the fighting and a letup in
monsoon rains have apparently permitted the government to
reestablish control over a number of outposts in northern
Laos. The army's generally poor performance, however, may
have further undermined the government's tenuous authority
in the affected areas. The defection of some troops of
the recently integrated former Pathet Lao battalion will
further reduce the army's prestige and probably embolden
Communist partisans to risk new acts of violence.
The bloc propaganda campaign is continuing at a
high pitch, Statements from Hanoi strongly imply that the
"armed popular uprising" in Laos will soon increase in
scope and intensity. A Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry
spokesman has said that "all activities of the US Govern-
ment" menacing the security of Communist China would be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 August 1959
PART I (continued)
"firmly opposed." Both Peiping and Hanoi have taken the
position that the Laotian crisis cannot be resolved by
the UN, as the Geneva agreements are not UN sponsored.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Qasim regime in Iraq has further restricted the
Communists' opportunities for wielding popular influence,
by such measures as giving a more moderate tone to Bagh-
dad radio. However, Qasim continues to take action only
against individuals, rather than against the Communist
party as a whole, An Arab League experts'meeting, includ-
ing representation from Iraq for the first time in recent
months, has rejected UN Secretary General Hammarskqjold's
proposals for continued international support for the
Palestine Arab refugees.
AFRICAN CONFERENCE AT MONROVIA . .
. . . 4 . . . . . . Page 2
The conference of nine independent African states
and the Algerian provisional government, held in Monrovia
early this month, adopted generally moderate resolutions
on the Algerian situation. The involvement of African
states in the Algerian problem is likely to deepen, how-
ever, and to cause serious difficulties with France. The
success of the delegates in achieving general agreement
suggests that this meeting--one of several recent African
diplomatic and nationalist gatherings--will give impetus
to developing African unity and be reflected in coordinated
efforts in the UN this autumn.
FRANCE'S ALGERIAN POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The French Government is likely to become increas-
ingly touchy regarding foreign pressure for a solution to
the Algerian problem as the UN General Assembly session
draws near and the results of the highly publicized Challe
Plan for a military cleanup appear more and more incon-
clusive, De Gaulle's prospective trip to Algeria from 27
to 30 August re-emphasizes France's preoccupation with
the problem but is unlikely to signal any change in his
plan for the gradual emergence of a French Algeria with
a large measure of local autonomy.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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PART II (continued)
SPANISH-MOROCCAN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Last April's improvement in Spanish-Moroccan relations
may be impaired by Rabat's apparent determination to harass
the Spaniards into accelerating their troop withdrawals
from northern Morocco. Madrid recently agreed to make a
sizable reduction in its troop strength there. This agree-
ment is likely to increase irritation among those Spanish
military leaders who view any military withdrawals from
the area as an indication that General Franco no longer
considers their special interests of prime importance.
The Kenya Government's authorization of nationwide
political parties in late July has stimulated political
activity in the British colony. Two new parties formed
from the ranks of African legislators are pressing for
constitutional changes in anticipation of the constitu-
tional conference to be held in London early next year.
The party led by Tom Mboya will probably emerge as the
primary spokesman for Kenya's Africans.
PEIPING'S INTEREST IN AFRICAN NATIONALISM . . . . . . . . Page 6
e p ng is aiso promoting govern-
ment-to-government contacts with the newly independent
countries of Africa, in the hope of eventually establishing
diplomatic relations. Chinese Communist propaganda to
Africa seeks to form a camaraderie of the "exploited"--
with the implication that Peiping is a model of the appro-
priate path for the underdeveloped areas.
. . Page 5
. Page 7
Peiping is sending a government good-will delegation
to Indonesia as part of its effort to ward off any deteri-
oration of relations with Djakarta. Indonesian officials
have expressed a growing fear of Communist China, and
Peiping has been worried by recent legislation in Indonesia
which discriminates against Overseas Chinese. The leader
of the delegation will probably allude to Communist China's
recent loan as evidence of his country's friendship.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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PART II (continued)
PEIPING CALLS FOR GREATER ECONOMIC EFFORT . . . . . . . . Page 8
The official Peiping People's Daily, apparently
reflecting a recent re-eva uaI tion of economic prospects
by party leaders, says the situation is "extremely favor-
able" to the fulfillment of plans to achieve another
"leap forward" this year. All that is needed, the daily
says, is to overcome the "rightist conservative" tenden-
cies now emerging among party cadres so that the masses
can be "activated" to a new upsurge of effort. The edi-
torials, which appear to be a reaffirmation of Mao Tse-
tung's hurry-up economic policies, are probably the open-
ing gun in an effort to regain some of the recently lost
momentum< F_ I
THE ECONOMY OF EASTERN EUROPE AT MIDYEAR . . . . . . . . . Page 10
High rates of industrial growth during the first
half of 1959 indicate that most of the Eastern European
satellites will probably achieve their uniformly high
production goals for the year. This year's bad weather
will reduce agricultural output, and pressures on the
people to work harder may cause unfavorable popular reac-
tions. However, these and other limiting factors are not
expected to slow the pace of over-all growth substantially.
HUNGARIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICIES CAUSING PARTY
DIFFICULTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Poor organization within newly formed collectives in
Hungary, peasant opposition, and inadequate propaganda
work by the party are further evidence of weaknesses in
the rural party organizations. The situation has prompted
the regime to emphasize "consolidation" of gains already
made rather than formation of new collectives. This shift
in tactics, perhaps abetted by Khrushchev's recent sanction
of a moderate approach to collectivization in Poland, may
cause a renewal of policy controversies in the top party
levels and lead to efforts by moderates to ease unrecon-
structed Stalinists: out of positions of responsibility.
UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE DISARMAMENT
NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Secretary General Hammarskjold anticipates opposition
from most UN members to the Soviet-initiated proposal of
the Geneva foreign ministers' conference for a ten-member
disarmament group--five Western and five Soviet--without
strong ties to the United Nations. He believes the General
Assembly will object to removal of disarmament negotiations
from the jurisdiction of the UN and will discuss the whole
question heatedly at the session opening on15 September. He
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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PART II (continued)
has suggested certain procedural steps designed to give
the UN some role in disarmament talks and thus make the
proposal more palatable to the majority of UN members.
CAMBODIAN - SOUTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Relations between Cambodia and South Vietnam have
taken on an aura of cordiality following the recent
meeting of Premier Sihanouk and President Diem in Saigon.
Agreement has been reached on several issues that have
long caused friction between the two countries. Sihanouk
advocates a "safe" neutrality policy because of his belief
that a Communist victory is inevitable in the East-West
struggle; this remains a basic cause of regional dissen-
SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES '"MALAYANIZATION" PROGRAM . . Page 14
The left-wing government of Singapore has embarked
on a highly publicized program to "Malayanize" Singapore's
predominantly Chinese population in an effort to improve
prospects for an eventual merger with the Federation of
Malaya. A complete overhaul of the educational.system.-is
planned, with the ostensible goal of making Malay the
national language and of "molding a national character."
There probably is little genuine support for the, program
either among Chinese citizens--who constitute more than
75 percent of the opulation--or among political leaders.
PAKISTAN ACTS TO PREVENT DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION . . . . Page 15
The Pakistani military regime's order of 7 August
effectively barring opponents of the regime from public
office illustrates President Ayub's intention to retain
full authority while establishing a facade of constitu-
tional democracy. Local elections are scheduled to begin
in October, but only candidates acceptable to the govern-
ment are likely to be permitted to run. Rumors of personal
rivalries within the military leadership suggest Ayub may
also have to deal with some dissension within the regime.
ARGENTINE LABOR DIFFICULTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Peronista attempts to promote a general strike in
Argentina on 11 August led to the shutdown of major indus-
tries but failed to gain general support. The anti-
Peronista unions, although also critical of government
labor policies, denounced the strike as politically moti-
vated. Labor is still strongly opposed to the government's
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PART II (continued)
austerity measures, and further strike moves are likely.
The government is seeking legal means of more effectively
curtailing Communist activities.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
DE GAULLE'S VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . Page 1
De Gaulle considers Soviet Communism a transient
phenomenon. He expects that Russia, fearing Chinese.
expansionism and under internal pressures for a higher
standard of living, will eventually cooperate with the
West. He apparently envisages the emergence of four major
power blocs--Sovieet, Chinese, "Anglo-Saxon," and a "Eur-
african" group led by France. While wanting a solid West-
ern stand on such immediate issues as Berlin, he seems
convinced that even at present a Continental European bloc
must exercise a moderating role between the US and the
USSR.
THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAPAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The opposition Socialist party in Japan faces its
annual convention, expected in September, rent by ideo-
logical and factional conflicts. Socialist defeats in
recent local and upper-house elections have brought open
criticism of party leaders by both right- and left-wing
elements and encouraged right-wing leaders to challenge
the leftist trend in party policies. While Socialist
prospects for coming to power remain dim, the leftist-
dominated party is nonetheless capable of seriously har-
assing Japan's present conservative government.
INTERKOLKHOZ ENTERPRISES IN THE USSR . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The Soviet regime is continuing to push the organiza-
tion of interkolkhoz enterprises. These enterprises,
mostly construction units, are joint undertakings of
several collective farms--or kolkhozes--operating with
capital investment contributed by each farm from resources
not subject to distribution among the members. The new
organizations are an excellent device for progressively
blurring the distinction between state property and the
cooperative property of collective farms--thus serving
political as well as economic ends. The regime will
probably elaborate on the role and scope of the interkol-
khoz units at the next party lenum, scheduled for Novem-
ber. F7 -
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13 August 1959
PART III (continued)
REPLACEMENT OF SOVIET AMBASSADORS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The Soviet Government has during the past three
months shifted eight of its 53 ambassadors and has named
an additional deputy foreign minister to serve under
Gromyko. In most cases the shifts apparently were made
to improve relations with the host country, and do not
signal any changes of direction in Soviet foreign policy.
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13 August 1959
Moscow is continuing its
campaign to create a favorable
atmosphere for the forthcoming
Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange
of visits. The volume of So-
viet radio commentaries on the cipal opponent of an East-West
visits last week exceeded that detente.
devoted to the foreign minis-
ters'
conference in every week
except the initial one. Par-
ticular emphasis has been on
creating the impression that
in planning the exchange of
visits the "two great powers"
have recognized their primary
responsibility in bringing
about a relaxation of interna-
tional tensions.
caused a considerable drop on
the New York stock exchange in
the value of shares in companies
"concentrating on the manufac-
ture of arms," anti-Western com-
ments have, for the most part,
been confined to attacks on
Chancellor Adenauer as the prin-
In his press conference in
Moscow on 5 August Khrushchev
said he does not consider the
:meetings with President Eisen-
hower a substitute for a con-
ference of heads of government,
which the USSR still considers
"useful and necessary."
A typical commentary stated
on 10 August that "the whole
world realizes that the thaw in
American-Soviet relations is a
thaw in the entire internation-
al climate," Another stated
that "a safe peace depends chief-
ly on normal and friendly rela-
tions between the Soviet Union
and the United States." soviet
propaganda has asserted further
that "public opinion in all
countries has shown tremendous
interest in the news." Soviet
commentators' emphasis on the
,groundlessness of fears that'
Eisenhower and Khrushchev will
arrive at an agreement against
the interests of the smaller
countries may have been calcu-
lated, in fact, to play on just
such suspicions.
Except for the allegation
that news of the visits has
Mikoyan Visit to Latin America
Moscow has apparently
launched a trial balloon con-
cerning a possible visit by
Mikoyan to Latin America. Un-
confirmed press reports, one
attributed to Radio Moscow,
stated on 11 August that Soviet
Deputy Premier Mikoyan would
visit Latin America "within the
next few months." No informa-
tion is available concerning
any official invitations, and
Western stations monitoring Mos-
cow broadcasts heard no such
announcement. The report coin-
cides with favorable Latin Amer-
ican reaction thus far to the
Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits.
Moscow may actually be try-
ing to ascertain Latin views on
such a visit by Mikoyan, and to
elicit invitations from the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Latin American governments. The
action would be in line with
bloc activity in recent months
aimed at increasing trade and
economic ties with Latin Ameri-
ca and undermining US prestige
and policy in the area. Mikoy-
an could visit unofficially
those countries with which the
USSR maintains diplomatic re-
lations--Argentina, Mexico, and
Uruguay.
Western Europe
Western European atten-
tion has turned toward Presi-
dent Eisenhower's forthcoming
visits _to Bonn, London, and
Paris and their significance
in relation to the Khrushchev
trip to the United States.
West German officials, al--
though preferring aWestern sum-
mit meeting, showed great re-
lief at the President's decision
to include Bonn in his itiner-
ary. The semiofficial Diploma-
tische Korres pondenz observed
that the visit should silence
all talk about the beginning oi.'
West Germany's "isolation."
Bonn officials feel the visit
will reaffirm the ties binding
West Germany to the Western al-
liance and demonstrate to the
USSR Western unity on Berlin
and the German question.
Various government and
Christian Democratic Union of-
ficials nevertheless continue
to fear possible American con-
cessions detrimental to German
interests. Bundestag Foreign
Affairs Committee Chairman Fur-
ler has warned that talks in-
volving only the two great pow-
ers inevitably entail some risk
to those not participating.
Initially heavy French
press discussion of a possible
Moscow-Washington deal at the
expense of Western Europe has
fallen off. A government state-
ment on 12 August that Paris
considered that only Soviet-
American relations could be
dealt with in the Eisenhower-
Khrushchev talks nevertheless
underscores French official sen-
sitivity regarding any sugges-
tion that Eisenhower has a man-
date to speak for Paris. Ital-
ian Premier Segni's ire over
the possibility that the Presi-
dent would "snub" Italy while
going to Bonn and Paris has
been soothed by the President's
plan to see Segni in Paris.
Several other NATO delega-
tions have indicated displeasure
over the planned meetings as
well as hope that Secretary
Herter will meet with the NAC
before the Khrushchev visit.
In London there has been
virtually no indication of dis-
trust or feeling that the United
States might negotiate behind
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Britain's back. Opposition
leader Gaitskell, while noting
that Labor's "shadow" foreign
secretary, Aneurin Bevan, had
privately raised such a question,
told the American Embassy that
few Labor supporters would share
Bevan's doubts. Announcement of
the Eisenhower-Khrushchev ex-
change has eased pressures in
Britain for an immediate four-
power East-West summit meeting,
The American Embassy antici-
pates, however, that as the
time approaches for general elec-
tions--probably this fall--
Prime Minister Macmillan will
revive the summit issue. Even
after the elections, British
public opinion and Macmillan's
personal conviction can be ex-
pected to keep the subject a-
live.
Test Ban Talks
Moscow's announcement on
10 August, officially accepting
the 10 July report of the tech-
nical working group on the de-
tection of high-altitude nuclear
explosions, was probably de-
signed to create the impression
of progress at the test ban
talks during the hiatus in
broader East-West negotiations.
Khrushchev's reply, pub-
lished on 10 August, to a letter
from the European Federation
Against Atomic Armaments stated
that the Soviet Union "is ready
to accept the most solemn obli-?
gation not to be the first to
conduct any further tests of
nuclear weapons." This state-
ment was probably calculated to
gain the maximum propaganda ad-
vantage from talk in the United
States of resuming testing after
31 October. Soviet propaganda
has called Senator Anderson's
admonition--that Soviet inflexi-
bility at Geneva might force the
US to resume testing--an example
of the "increasing evidence"
that the United States is pre-
paring to renew its test program
in spite of the negotiations in
Geneva. Khrushchev's letter
further claimed: "Unfortunately,
I do not see any reason to be-
lieve that at this time the
Western powers will show more
readiness to put an end to nu-
clear tests."
In a less critical reply,
published on 12 August, to a
memorandum from the World Feder-
ation of Scientific Workers,
Khrushchev declared that the
United States and Britain must
show the same "desire to co-
operate and aspiration to attain
the goals of the conference" as
the Soviet Union has demonstrated,
if agreement is to be reached.
An article in Izvestia on 12
August charged that Anderson
statement is related to efforts
to poison the international
atmosphere and counteract "warm-
ing currents" inspired by the
announcement of the Eisenhower-
Khrushchev visits.
The Soviet delegation at
Geneva has continued to insist
on its proposal for an annual
quota for on-site inspections
which would give the USSR a two-
to-one advantage over the United
States and Great Britain. Its
position on staffing of the con-
trol posts has remained unchanged.
Concurred in by 25X1
OS I)
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THE CARIBBEAN SITUATION
A large-scale conspiracy
against the Castro government
was suppressed with hundreds of
arrests on 8 and 9 August. Evi-
dence that Dominican agents were
involved in the conspiracy can
be used by Castro to strenghthen
his case against his bitter foe,
Dominican dictator Trujillo,
and may be used to justify fur-
ther attempts to oust Trujillo.
Meanwhile Cubans have been
identified in the rebel groups
operating against the Somoza
The Caribbean Area
BAHAMA
Havana ISLANDS
q~ fj ..
~-Gqrt'e..Ia onduras
.. _* Tumirrn
Cuba,-''-, 'Dominican
JAMAICA H
Trujillo eico ANTIGUA
p?GUADELOUPE
MARTINIQUE
o yBARBADOS
25X1
25X1
regime of Nicaragua from Hon-
duran and Costa Rican. territory.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 August'1959
The arrests of suspected
plotters in Cuba have reached
more than a 'thousand, accord-
ing to unofficial Cuban sources.
At first the arrests were
chiefly of armed forces per-
sonnel who had been held over
from the Batista regime and of
large landowners who'had active-
ly.opposed Ca stro'.s.agrarian re-
formrprogram. Later arrests
probably included other groups.
Castro probably still
feels committed to force the
ouster of Trujillo,and evi-
dence of Dominican implication
in the Cuban conspiracy will
strengthen the Cuban case
against Trujillo at the inter-
American foreign ministers'
conference.
Attempts Against Nicaragua
Cubans have been identi-
fied among the rebels that have
been trying without success to
mount a revolt against the
Somoza regime. in Nicaragua,
and some of the rebel g.'oups
are believed to have been sup-
plied with weapons from Cuba.
Costa Rican President
Echandi is making every effort,
within his country's limited
military capacity, to enforce
Costa Rica's neutrality,which
is compromised by the presence
of an estimated 200 anti-So-
moza rebels just inside the
border. These rebels made
a foray into Nicaragua on 3
August and threaten further
incursions. They are being
supported by influential Costa
Rican political figures of
the opposition.
On 10 August Echandi or-
dered an estimated 180-man
Costa Rican military force in
the border area to disperse
the rebels, returning their
fire if necessary. Echandi
informed the American Embassy
on 11 August that two Costa
Rican legislators and two
pilots are in Cuba organizing
an airlift of men and arms
to reinforce the Nicaraguan
rebels. He asked Guatemala
for two fighter planes to
help prevent any aircraft
used for this purpose from
landing in Costa Rica, but
this request was declined by
the Guatemalan Government.
the rebel cause.
The small rebel group
that entered Nicaragua from
Honduras early this month has
been almost completely wiped
out by the Nicaraguan. armed
forces, and there is no
indication that the public
agitation over recent student
killings in Nicaragua has
led to popular support for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 August 1959
The Laotian Army claims to
have reoccupied several posts
in northeastern Laos taken by
the Communists in the initial
phase of the fighting, and a
break in the monsoon rains has
permitted the airlift of sup=
plies to troops and civilians.
However, the US army attache,
who visited Sam Neua on 9 Au-
gust, says that the airfield is
rapidly becoming unusable be-
cause of the continued heavy
rains and lack of proper main-
tenance. Loss of the field
would leave the province depend-
ent on air drops and movement
over jungle tracks.
. The army's poor performance
during the initial
phase of the upheaval
may have further un-
dermined the govern-
ment's tenuous au-
thority in the af-
fected areas.
Commu-
nist subversive ef-
forts in the two
provinces had al-
ready met with con-
siderable success be-
fore the insurgency
began.
The Laotian
Army's already di-
minished prestige
will further dwindle
when it is becomes
known that 114 men
out of a total of
about 750 in the re-
cently integrated
former Pathet Lao
battalion escaped on 8 August
from their encampment near Luang
Prabang and are heading toward
Sam Neua Province. This latest
evidence of army ineptitude, which
Laotian officials are attempting
to keep secret, will probably
embolden Communist cadres to
risk new acts of violence against
the regime.
There is as yet no firm
evidence that any of the ap-
proximately 25,000 North Viet-
namese troops deployed along
the Laotian border are directly
involved in the conflict 25X1
ere have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 August 1959
been reports that troops are
being flown from Hanoi to Dien
jtne transport
o small numbers of troops
would not necessarily be un-
usual, although it is possible
that this activity may be con-
nected with the situation in
Laos. It is likely that the
North Vietnamese are limiting
their aid to the insurgents to
logistical support and clandes-
tine direction at this time,
although their 270,000-man army
gives them the capability to
intervene actively and in force
at any time.
Laotian officials have re-
jected Britain's proposal that
the UK and the USSR, as cochair-
men of the 1954 Geneva agree-
ments, request the secretary
general of the United Nations
to sent a "fact finder - media-
tor"'to Laos. They are opposed
to UN mediation of the current
crisis, but appear to be con-
sidering a request for a UN ob-
server in order to demonstrate
that they do not fear an on-the-
spot investigation.
The Communist bloc con-
tinues strongly to attack the
US as the power behind the
scenes in Laos. Both Hanoi
and Peiping profess to see the
aim of US activities, particu-
larly the introduction of a mil-
itary training mission, as a
"plot" to bring Laos into SEATO,
which they term a "threat to
China and Vietnam." On 8 Au-
gust the North Vietnamese vice
minister of national defense
stated that Hanoi would regard
military intervention in Laos
by any foreign country as a "di-
rect threat to the security"
of North Vietnam, to which it
could not "remain indifferent."
The Chinese Foreign Ministry
has also stated that "all ac-
tivities of the US Government
and the Laotian authorities vio-
lating the Geneva agreements
and creating tension in Indo-
china and further to menace the
security of China will certain-
ly be opposed by the Chinese
government and poeple,"
In discussing measures to
reduce tension in the area, both
Peiping and Hanoi have taken the
position that the United Nations
lacks the competence to settle
the issue, as the Geneva agree-
ments were not UN sponsored. The
Chinese Foreign Ministry state-
ment of 12 August goes so far
as to state that to bring the
Laotian "question" before the
UN would in itself be a viola-
tion of the Geneva agreements.
As an alternative, Peiping as-
serts that tension in Laos can
only be reduced by the withdraw-
al of all American military per-
sonnel and arms, the abolition
of all "US military bases," the
return of the International Con-
trol Commission (ICC), and the
correct implementation of the
Geneva and Vientiane agreements.
Although Moscow has not giv-
en the Laotian situation as much
publicity as either Hanoi or
Peiping, it continues radio and
press support to Communist
claims, with particular emphasis
on demands for reactivation of
the ICC in broadcasts to South
Asian listeners. On 7 August
Izvestia described events in
Laos as "fraught with the dan-
ger of grave military clashes"
which might spread to "a whole
line of Southeast Asian coun-
tries." Soviet broadcasts have
maintained pressure on London
stating that Britain, as co-
chairman of the Geneva agree-
ments, must participate if a
"peaceful settlement" of the
Laotian problem is to be achieved.
I 25X1
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13 August 1959
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS
Iraq
The Qasim regime does not
appear to have slackened its
determination to punish and con-
trol Communist elements which
have encouraged internal dis-
order. The American Embassy in
Baghdad believes Qasim has been
so alarmed and angered by the
Communists that he now will
not only check their further
attempts to increase their power
but will also take concrete
steps to reduce present Commu-
nist influence. Baghdad radio
on 10 August attacked the for-
eign policy attitude of the
Communist party press, stating
that the Communists' articles
do not reflect the foreign
policy of the regime and hint-
ing broadly that if the press
persists'too strongly in its
line, it could be suppressed
for harming Iraq's relations
with other states.
The tone of the "national-
ist" press in Baghdad reflects
steadily growing confidence
on the part of the anti-Commu-
nists, who have even criti-
cized Baghdad radio for giving
too much Communist-slanted news.
However, the normally televised
activities of Colonel Mahdawi's
"people's court," which it was
hoped might soon cease, appar-
ently will be given a new fillip
by the trial of Brigadier Tabaq-
chali, commander of the army's
Second Division at the time of
the Mosul rising last March.
Mahdawi, who still acts as a
Communist tool although he is
Qasim's brother-in-law, aids the
Communist cause by distracting
public attention to alleged "im-
perialist" or Nasirist plots and
the evils of the Nuri regime.
The American Embassy warns
that Qasim apparently is still
unconvinced that Communist
ideology threatens Iraq's future
in any way which he, as a popular
leader, cannot meet and overcome.
Qasim continues to assert that
he will never act against "par-
ties," but only against individ-
uals.
Arabs and Palestine
One of the first steps to-
ward bringing Iraq back into the
Arab community was taken when
an Iraqi representative joined
"experts" from the other Arab
states in Beirut to consider UN
Secretary General Hammarskjold's
report, issued last June, on
future support for the Pales-
tine Arab refugees. The sec-
retary general, faced with the
termination in 1960 of the oper-
ating charter of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine.(UNRWA), has urged
that UNRWA be continued within
the context of the economic
development of the Near East as
a whole, and has suggested
that the relief and rehabilita-
tion funds, the bulk of which
have been contributed by the
United States, be channeled
through-the governments of those
Arab states where the refugees
are now residing.
To the Arabs, Hammar-
skjold's proposal smacks of an-
other "imperialist-Zionist
plot" to integrate the refugees
into their host countries
rather than maintain them in
a separate status pending the
unlikely event that Tel Aviv
will agree to implement the UN
resolution of 11 December 1948,
which calls for either repatri-
ation or compensation of the
refugees. On opposition to
Hammarskjold's proposal, all
the Arabs can unite, and the
significance of the Beirut
meeting may turn out to be as
much that it provided a forum
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13 August 1959
for Iraqis, Jordanians, the UAR
and other estranged parties
to get together, as that it
summoned the Arabs to close
ranks against the secretary
general's report.
The views of the Arab
"experts" will receive formal
endorsement at a conference of
Arab League foreign ministers,
tentatively scheduled for 1
September in Casablanca. The
Moroccan city was chosen in-
stead of Cairo, the usual meet-
ing place, in an effort to re-
lieve the impression that the
league machinery is dominated
by the UAR and to make it
easier for "dissident" members
--the Jordanians, Iraqis, and
Tunisians--to attend. In the
view of Iraq, however, the
choice of Casablanca is only
slightly less unhappy than
Cairo, since the Iraqis had
extended an early invitation
to have the meeting in Baghdad.
The Israelis have continued
to concentrate most of their
attention on the problem of the
Suez Canal, and have baffled the
Cairo authorities by failing to
take up the UAR's offer to al-
low the impounded Danish vessel
Inge Toft to return to the
Mediterranean with its cargo.
Tel Aviv, which still does not
seem to have made up its mind
whether or how to take the canal
issue to'the United Nations, may
wish to let the matter simmer
rather than compromise its case
by ordering the ship to leave
Port Said.
Foreign Minister Meir re-
ported to the Israeli parlia-
ment's foreign affairs commit-
tee last week that recourse
to the UN seemed the only avenue
left to the government. Mean-
while Prime Minister Ben-Gurion
is taking another vacation, offi-
cially announced as a rest in
a hospital but possibly a
Mediterranean cruise.
There has been no perceptible
shift meanwhile in Iran's stand
against the Soviet propaganda
campaign.
Yemen
the Imam,'s absence.
The Imam of Yemen arrived
back in his'country on 10 August,
following an apparently incon-
sequential shipboard meeting
with Nasirs His return was ac-
companied by a denunciation by
the Yemeni radio of "imperialist
rumormongers" who had spread re-
ports that there would be dis-
agreements between the Imam and 25X1
Crown Prince Badr, who has head-
ed a "reform" administration in
The second conference of
independent African states--the
first was at Accra in April
1958--was held in Monrovia,
Liberia, from 4 to 8 August.
The primary topic of discussion
was the Algerian situation. Al-
though the resolutions passed
were generally moderate in tone,
the sympathy demonstrated for
the rebels suggests the African
nations will become increasing-
ly involved in the Algerian
problem. Such involvement would
severely strain their relations
with France, which has already
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13 August 1959
indicated it intends to sever
diplomatic ties with nations
recognizing the Algerian pro-
visional government.
The increasing frequency
of African meetings--particu-
larly where both Arab and tropi-
cal African states are repre-
sented, as at Monrovia--suggests
that African unity is develop-
ing and will be reflected in
the United Nations by a more
influential bloc, united by
its opposition to Western co-
lonialism,
The representatives at
Monrovia--generally of minis-
terial rank--from nine inde-
pendent African states and the
Algerian provisional govern-
ment resolved that France
should recognize the right of
the Algerian people to self-
determination leading to in-
dependence. They called on
Paris to end hostilities, with-
draw its troops from Algeria,
and enter into negotiations
with the rebel government. The
individual African states were
asked to prepare for the forth-
coming debate in the United Na-
tions, to continue diplomatic
action in behalf of the rebels,
and to give material aid to
the Algerian nationalists.
The anticipated increase
in ties between the African
states and the Algerian rebels
is likely to cause serious dif-
ficulties with France. French-
Ghanaian relations are already
tense following Accra's recog-
nition of the rebels in July.
The Guinean delegation to the
conference announced that Con-
akry would consider an exchange
of diplomatic representatives
with the Algerian government.
Liberia, resentful of consider-
able French diplomatic pressure
and subjected to strong demands
at the conference, reportedly
will announce recognition in
several weeks. Ethiopia, which
values French support in the
Somali problem, is likely to
be the only African state that
does not intend to recognize
the Algerian rebels, but Addis
Ababa will probably support the
Asian-African bloc in the UN
debate this autumn.
The conference gave a sym-
pathetic hearing to petitioners
who attacked British rule in
Uganda, the racial. and political
policies of the white-settler
government of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Bel-
gium's denial of rapid political
evolution to its trust territory
of Ruanda-Urundi. In addition,
exiled nationalist extremists
from the French trust territory
of Cameroun received a favorable
reception to their plea for a
rehearing in the UN this autumn.
25X1
The French Government is
likely to become increasingly
touchy regarding foreign pres-
sure for a solution of the Al-
gerian problem as the UN Gen-
eral Assembly session draws
near and the results of the
highly publicized Challe plan
for a military cleanup appear
more and more inconclusive.
De Gaulle's prospective trip
to Algeria from 27 to 30 Au-
gust--his first visit there
since becoming President in
January--re-emphasizes France's
preoccupation with the problem,
but is unlikely to signal any
change in his plan for the grad-
ual emergence of a French Al-
geria with a large measure of
local autonomy.
De Gaulle's policy is based
on the hope that France can win
over the Algerian people so
that they will choose to remain
within the framework of French
political institutions. To do
this, he envisages that mili-
tary pacification of the coun-
try will continue until the
rebels. negotiate a cease-fire
without political conditions or
foreign intermediaries. This
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 August 1959
would permit France to step up
its efforts to attain the rap-
id social and economic devel-
opment of Algeria and to en-
courage the evolution of a
Moslem political elite to carry
on local government and protect
the distinctive culture of the
area.
The French press in late
July termed General Challe's
drive to clear the rebel strong-
hold in the coastal mountain
range east of Algiers a final
great offensive to win the war.
Recent communiques, however,
emphasize that this may take
months to complete. Premier
Debre inspected field opera-
tions during his 6-8 August
trip to Algeria, and De Gaulle
during his own visit probably
will also be concerned with
the progress of this campaign.
It is rumored Paris plans an
announcement of "promising de-
velopments" in an effort to
persuade UN members to postpone
action on Algeria for another
year, and De Gaulle may seek
first-hand information on which
to base such a statement.
Political moderates with-
in the Algerian provisional
government appear to be losing
ground to more militantly anti-
French elements. Premier Fer-
hat Abbas, who has sought a ne-
gotiated solution for the Al-
gerian war which would hold
out the prospect of eventual
independence, is reported vir-
tually without influence in the
rebel movement; the de facto
leader, Deputy Premier and De-
fense Minister Belkacem Krim,
is believed to incline toward
the views of rebel military
commanders who desire to con-
tinue the war at any price
rather than negotiate on terms
favorable to France.
Despite recent rebel mili-
tary difficulties, the cause of
Algerian independence continues
to enjoy wide support within
the Asian-African bloc--as dem-
onstrated at the Monrovia con-
ference of African states--and
any moderate resolution in fa-
vor of Algerian independence
stands a good chance of passage
by the UN General Assembly this
fall. Paris, however, is in-
creasingly insistent that
France's allies oppose any Al-
gerian resolution using the
word "inde endence." 25X1
SPANISH-MOROCCAN RELATIONS
Last April's improvement
in Spanish-Moroccan relations
may be impaired by Rabat's ap-
parent determination to harass
the Spaniards into accelerating
their troop withdrawals from
northern Morocco. Madrid re-
cently agreed to make a sizable
reduction in its troop strength
there..
Moroccan Premier Ibrahim's
visit to Madrid in April result-
ed in the creation of a Spanish-
Moroccan commission to discuss
technical problems between the
two countries. The commission
concluded its second round of
talks on 5 August with an agree-
ment by the Spanish Government
to evacuate its 3,000 troops in
Tetuan in the near future. Ac-
cording to a Spanish Foreign
Ministry official, this deci-
sion has given Rabat "a con-
siderable political plum and
great satisfaction" and yet
does not denote any departure
from Spain's basic policy on
the troops issue--that in recog-
nizing Morocco's independence
in April 1956, Spain acquired
the right to keep troops in the
area during the transitional period.
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13 August 19.59
According to
the Spaniards, the
decision to reduce
their troops in Mo-
rocco from 11,000 to
8,000 elicited a
Moroccan agreement
involving-"certain
cultural concessions"
and the payment of
a consolidated debt
of about $6,000,000
over a 25-year pe--
riod. No decision
was reached on Span-
ish demands for fish-
ing rights in Moroccan
territorial waters,
and the issue of a
complete withdrawal
Gibraltar (UK)
Strait ?o!