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October 8, 1959
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Approved Fo lease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AD02400100001-6 %W W CONFIDENTIAL COPY NO. OCI NO. 5012/59 8 October 1959 00c, *ACN, NBC tit CI.AS~- i~Q FiE-V ~// /~ Q'~~ 0 ~ GYIANGE:O TU: T9 `6/i i) Au-vv". o` REVtcW OPT%:0l" CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE C`1~^f'1f T 25X1 25X1 ,SECRET--- I INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY State Department review completed CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 er' Approved For,flease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00922400100001-6 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 Approved Fo lease 2005/0W, 9P?9'-'00927A 02400100001-6 flENT lAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLYSUMMARY OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PEIPING'S TENTH ANNIVERSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 Developments in connection with Khrushchev's visit to Peiping for the tenth anniversary of the Chinese regime suggest that differences in views on foreign policy tac- tics and ideological matters remain as irritants in the Sino-Soviet relationship. The Chinese have publicly hailed Khrushchev's visit to the United States and his disarmament proposals. However, they apparently have reservations about the longterm effects of the USSR's present posture toward the United States. The Chinese also strongly reaffirm Peiping's position that the commune will be China's basic social unit after "entering Commu- nism," despite the Soviet statement that the commune is "impossible" in the future Communist society. Present Chinese propaganda acknowledging dependence on the Sino- Soviet alliance, however, reflects Peiping's desire to avoid a showdown with Moscow. SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3 The situation in Laos continues to be characterized by skirmishes at widely scattered points throughout the country and by Communist propaganda and recruitment activ- ities in the hinterland. Such activity may increase, as the monsoon rains now are subsiding. Most delegates of the UN subcommittee, having completed a limited field survey in northern Laos, are expected to leave shortly, but a few will probably remain to assure a continuing UN MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . Page 4 Increased factional strife and a wave of arrests of members of the several Iraqi groups suspected of plotting against the regime are expected to follow the attempt on 7 October to assassinate Prime Minister Qasim, A new propaganda battle between the UAR and Jordan may cause Xing Husayn to decide against meeting with Nasir at a tripartite conference which King Saud of Saudi Arabia has been trying to arrange. High-level negotiations in Cairo between the UAR and Sudan on sharing the Nile waters are scheduled to begin on 10 October; prospects for agreement are not bright. The Imam of Yemen, who has reestablished his dominant political position, now faces a financial crisis. tau s i %00N Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A 0 199 No _LA L WEEK IN BRIEF Approved Fo lease 2005/0 / 9 : CIA-RDP79-00927 02400100001-6 CRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY NOTES AND COMMENTS EAST GERMANY CELEBRATES TENTH ANNIVERSARY . . . . . . Page 1 The East German regime, celebrating its tenth year in power, is using the occasion to emphasize its claim to status as a full-fledged sovereign state. The Communists, pointing to their equal representation with West Germany at the Geneva conference, contend that a turning point has been reached in the reverse the West's policy of nonrecognition. Soviet Deputy Premier Kozlov declared in a speech that the West German doctrine that no country other than the USSR having diplomatic relations with East Germany shall be recognized by Bonn is beginning to crumble. The East Germans punctuated their claim to sovereignty by unfurling a new national flag over the ele- vated rail installations they control in West Berlin. BRITAIN' RECEPTIVE TO INCREASING EAST GERMAN VISITS . . . . Page 2 London has been generally receptive to the growing number of East German officials visiting the United King- dom to promote the Ulbricht regime's prestige. During the election campaign the British Government was especially sensitive to Allied efforts to discourage such travel. Britain's policy of furthering contacts with East Germany will be an additional factor clouding relations with Bonn. ALGERIA-FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2 A resurgence of extremist activity by European set- tlers in Algiers has followed De Gaulle's proposals for Algerian self-determination. The settlers fear eventual loss of power and reprisals from the Moslem population. Rightist opposition will probably attempt to make itself felt in the French Parliament, which reconvened on 6 October, but no serious threat to the Debra government is likely. In Tunis, Algerian rebel leaders appear to be awaiting world reactions to their reply to De Gaulle and are sensi- tive to any suggestion that their attitude foreshadows a capitulation. FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3 France probably now has all the comnnnentc rennirani for testing a nuclear weapon SECRET ii Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 THE WEEK IN BRIEF 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/ U DP79-00927A 102400100001-6 MW TETe 25X1 DISARMAMENT - 14TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY . . . . . . . . Page 5 With five separate disarmament items on its agenda, the UN General Assembly will give precedence to the new ten-nation disarmament forum. Debate will be long-drawn- out, particularly during assembly discussion of the USSR's call for "complete and general disarmament." The Soviet proposal and the other disarmament items will probably e referred to the ten--nation group for study. BELGIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5 The Belgian Government may be faced with a treasury crisis which could bring down the Social Christian - Lib- eral coalition, While a longterm loan from the Belgian National Bank might stave off the crisis, the bank opposes such a move on the grounds that the solution to periodic budget deficits is higher taxation--?a course strongly op- posed by important elements in the coalition government. NEW HUNGARIAN FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1961--65) . . . . . . . . . . Page 6 Hungary's economic plan for 1961-65 calls for a 65-70 percent increase in industrial output over 1958 and a 30-32 percent rise in agricultural production over the 1954-58 average. A respectable rise in per capita real income is also promised. While targets are generally realistic, not all programs are likely to be completed on schedule because of competition for investment resources, difficulties in raising labor productivity, and problems in meeting agricultural targets. Some revisions of indi- vidual goals probably will prove necessary before the end of the plan period. RELATIONS BETWEEN CAIRO AND PEIPING DETERIORATE . , , . . Page 8 In providing expatriate Syrian Communist leader Khalid Bakdash a forum from which to denounce Nasir, Peiping has shown it will support Mic?d.le Eastern Commu -? nists despite the increased frictions with the UAR such a policy was bound to bring. Nasir has recalled the UAR charge and sent a stiff protest to Peiping. The Chinese, convinced that Nasir is trying to undermine 2eiping's standing with the Afro-Asian neutrals, have not yet re- plied to bitter UAR press attacks. SECRET iii Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 THE WEEK IN BRIEF 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/8$/.?~9RgL1.-RDP79-009 02400100001-6 V#AW CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PART II (continued) TIBETAN BORDER PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 Nepal and Pakistan, as well as India, are showing increasing concern over their border problems with Commu- nist China. Nehru's recent letter to Chou En --lai insisting on Chinese evacuation of Longju and other border outposts probably will result in an impasse in the Sino?-Indian dispute. Nepal has taken the initiative and requested the Chinese to "clarify" their stand on the Nepalese-Ti- betan border. Pakistan has sent troop reinforcements to its frontier areas adjacent to Sinkiang, INDIAN LEADERS PLAN TO SPLIT BOMBAY STATE . . Page 10 Prime Minister Nehru and other Congress party leaders have reversed their stand and now are planning to partition Bombay State, India's largest, probably in April 1960, to forestall an outbreak of violent agitation by linguistic groups which have long advocated partition. Such agitation could seriously threaten the Congress party's control of Bombay, Partition would create many problems, but should enable the Congress to recover some of its strength in Bombay by depriving opposition groups of their most im- portant issue. SUKARNO AND THE INDONESIAN ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12 President Sukarno has recently demonstrated a renewed concern to balance the army's influence in government by making concessions to Communist and other leftist politi- cal forces. Rumors of an impending army cou undoubted) have played a part in Sukarno's uneasiness. MALI FEDERATION MOVING TOWARD INDEPENDENCE . . . . . . . . Page 12 25X1 25X1 25X1 Leaders of the Federation of Mali, made up of the autonomous French Community republics of Senegal and Soudan, have begun to implement their local political commitment to gain juridical independence for Mali at an early date. They intend to keep this West African area within the Paris-subsidized Community, which they hope will be altered so as to include a multinational confeder- ation. De Gaulle, with his recent emphasis on the Com- munity's "evolutional character," seems to have accepted in principle the Mali leaders' cautious approach. 25X1 STATE OF SIEGE ENDS IN BOLIVIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 The recent lifting of the state of siege in Bolivia marks a temporary bridging at least of the sharp division between the moderate and left wings of the government party and suggests that bitter left-wing criticism of the administration's cooperation with the United States may SECRET iv Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2005 RDP79-0092277A002400100001-6 %me CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 October 1959 PART II (continued) decrease. The approach of the party's presidential nomi- nating convention in December appears to be a strong force for party unity. DOMINICAN POLITICAL SITUATION WORSENS . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Repub- lic is facing more internal opposition to his regime than at any time since he came to power in 1930. The Dominican people, who had become accustomed to the prosperity which Trujillo brought them, now are restless under the economic hardships caused by heavy military expenditures during the past year. PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES EXPANSION OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE ANTARCTIC . . . . . Page The USSR, with bloc participation, is stepping up its already extensive operations in the Antarctic. Recent announcements indicate that the fifth Soviet expedition-- which will include East German and possibly Chinese Com- munist personnel--will seek to establish three new tem. porary stations, make another attempt to land a party in western Antarctica, and try to complete a trans-Antarctic glaciological traverse by mid-1960. Long-range Soviet plans for Antarctic activity apparently call for increased whaling operations, the use of the atomic icebreaker Lenin, and the inauguration of nonstop air service from the USSR. ULBRICHT REGIME PLANS TRANSFORMATION OF EAST BERLIN . . . Page 4 In connection with East Germany's tenth anniversary on 7 October, the Ulbricht regime is publicizing ambitious plans to transform East Berlin into a showplace of German "socialist culture" and a suitable "national" capital to rival West Berlin. The program, which forms part of East Germany's Seven-Year Plan for 1959-65, is also designed to demonstrate the regime's determination not to permit East Berlin to become a part of any "free city" of Berlin. Unless East Germany's financial stringencies can be solved and its uninspired building methods improved, however, the new city is likely to be as shoddy as the notorious Stalinallee housing development. SECRET V Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 THE WEEK IN BRIEF 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092002400100001-6 loop, SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PART III (continued) GHANA AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE . . . . . ... . . . . . . . Page 11 Since 6 March 1957, when Ghana became independent, Prime Minister Nkrumah's regime has made considerable prog- ress in consolidating its power at home and in expanding its influence. Domestic opposition has been largely stifled and internal stability secured, the economy has been kept on an even keel, a neutralist course not un- friendly to the West has been charted, and Accra has become a focal point of militant pan-Africanism. The regime has become increasingly more authoritarian, however, and basic weaknesses are already impeding the progress of this "model" new African state. SECRET vi Approved For Release 29O jjjkCh--RQP t O927AO02400100001-6 25X6 Approved FNorr Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-004002400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 October 1959 OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST SINO-SOVIET 'RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT Developments in connec- tion with Khrushchev's visit to Peiping for the tenth anni- versary celebration of the Chinese regime suggest that differences in views on for- eign policy tactics, methods of "socialist construction," and ideological matters remain as irritants in the Sino-So- viet relationship. Mao and Khrushchev, who held several days of well-publicized talks during the visit, failed to issue the customary joint com- muniqud. It seems probable that their views differed so much that compromise language could not be agreed upon. While Peiping is apparent- ly willing to publicly endorse Khrushchev's visit to the US and his disarmament proposals, its foreign and domestic pol- icies apparently require it to maintain that the threat of American "aggression" remains, In contrast to Soviet state- ments, Foreign Minister Chen Yi--in a special article writ- ten for Izvestia for the Chi- nese anniversary--complained that "so far" the United States has not "repudiated its policy of aggression and war," as wit- nessed by its "continuation" of the cold war, continued con- struction of foreign military bases, "active" rearmament of Japan, and "continuing occupa- tion of Taiwan." OF PEIPING'S TENTH ANNIVERSARY The Chinese leaders ap- parcntly view their policy to- ward the United States as re- quiring tactics significantly different from those now being pursued by Khrushchev, That American hostility to the Pei- ping regime must be met with "tension" rather than a dis- play of "weakness" is a car- dinal principle of the Chinese leaders, who have said that the Khrushchev completely dis- sociated the USSR from this line in his statement on leav- ing Peiping, declaring that "Communists of the Soviet Union consider it our sacred duty and primary task" to end the cold war and guarantee the "triumph of the cause of peace." United States will not change its policy toward China "of its own accord." In his Izvestia article, Chen Yi reaffirmed--the central theme of Peiping's tac- tics: "The people of the world still have to wage long-term struggles again and again against SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002400100001-6 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 7 Approved F Release 2005/0 9/, t DP79-00 2 A002400100001-6 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY American imperialism in order to achieve the relaxation of international tension." The Chinese are apprehen- sive that friendlier US-USSR relations will prove detrimen talto their interests, which are opposed to the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East. On the Taiwan and Lao- tian issues, the Chinese have directed their principal in- vective against the United States as the "aggressor," ap- parently in the belief that consistent opposition to Amer- ican policy will eventually lead to a reduction of American influence in the area. This line probably is also useful in Peiping's domestic program, as the Chinese have stated that "face to face with the American aggressor, the Chinese people are forced to intensify their work wnd build economically backward China into an advanced, industrialized, and socialist power." Khrushchev's failure dur- ing the celebrations in Pei- ping to support publicly the Chinese on the specific issue of Taiwan reflects his desire to avoid issues which run counter to his posture of peace- ful coexistence with the United States. This silence, however, does not imply repudiation of Moscow's commitment in September 1958 that any attack on Commu- nist China would be regarded as an attack on the USSR. The Chinese leaders ap- parently felt the need at a major regime celebration to reaffirm their long-term ob- jectives toward the offshore islands and Taiwan. Peiping, however, has shown no disposi- tion to develop the "liberate Taiwan" theme into a major propaganda campaign for the present. Present Chinese statements speak of "liberat- ing" Taiwan "in one way or another," but imply no sense of urgency. Despite the difference in Sino-Soviet views, Chinese statements during Khrushchev's visit suggest that the Chinese are aware of their dependence on the USSR and do not wish to push present differences to the point of impairing the alliance. An editorial in People's Daily on 3 October stated that the Chinese people regard the steady strengthening of their unity with the USSR, "their great ally," as an important guarantee of the "prosperity and strength of their country as well as their sacred inter- national duty." Central committee Secre- tary General Teng Hsiao-ping, in an anniversary article for Pravda, revived Mao's own for- mulation on the leadership po- sition of the Soviet Communist party as well as the Soviet Government. Teng stated that "the unity of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, and the unity of the"in- ternational Communist movement with the Communist party of the Soviet Union at its center, form the core of even more ex- tensive international unity." Khrushchev's failure to endorse the communes and eco- nomic policies connected with Peiping's "leap forward" shows that the two leaders were un- able to find a formula to bridge their differences and that these issues will continue to harass Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet propagandists are still attacking the commune concept, and one -writer has recently SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002400100001-6 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 7 Approved F elease 200eh~G~A-RDP79-009-002400100001-6 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY stated that the commune is "impossible" in the future Com- munist society. The Chinese leaders, how- ever, appear deeply committed to the concept and, in the face of Soviet and domestic opposi- tion, are insisting on the "superiority" of the communes over the former cooperatives, Government chairman Liu Shao- chi and Teng Hsiao-ping have recently stated that the com- mune will be the best form of social organization for the future "gradual transition to the Communist society." As in previous Sino-Soviet ideological differences over the past 10 years, the Chinese are again indicating their de- termination to manipulate ide- ology for domestic purposes and in order to increase their prestige as a "creative" Marx- ist party, Liu Shao-chi stated in his anniversary article for the October issue of the bloc's theoretical journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, that although "revolution and con- struction in China have fea- tures peculiar to this country," it is also "possible that some of these important special fea- tures may reappear in some other countries." Liu concluded, "In this sense, Chinese experience is to a certain degree of in- ternational significance." Liu avoided Sa.y ,ng . that the communes and the "leap for- ward" policy were what he had in mind, but he apparently felt that his readers could easily draw their own conclusions. I I SITUATION IN LAOS The situation in Laos con- tinues to be characterized by small-scale skirmishes at wide- ly scattered points throughout the country and by Communist propaganda and recruitment ac- tivities in the hinterland. Such activity may increase, as the monsoon rains are now sub- siding. In Sam Neua Province, the Laotian Army is attempting to retake ground lost in the 30 August Communist attacks on a series of posts along the Nam Ma River, but the extent of its', success is unclear. I capture of two of these pos s--Muong Het and Xieng Kho. However, accord- ing to subsequent press reports, these posts were once more abandoned. Muong Het, at least, is again definitely in enemy hands. In the western corner of the province, a Communist force which for some weeks has been threatening the government posi- tion at Muong Son is reported to have begun an attempt to take the post. In southern Laos, reports persist of the presence there of approximately 300 armed Viet- namese who presumably came from the Communist-dominated Viet- namese refugee communities in northeast Thailand. SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002400100001- PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST age 3 of 7 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 IA-RDP79-009,ag002400100001-6 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 October 1959 the frontier in very small groups. In any event, the Laotian Army is in a poor po- sition to counter the apparently increasing guerrilla activity in the south because the bulk of ;its forces are deployed in the northern provinces. The UN subcom- mittee has completed a limited field sur- vey in Sam Neua and Luang Prabang. Al- though UN Secretary General Hammarskjold expects the subcom- mittee to return soon to New York to draft its report, he will probably advise the delegates' governments to leave a few repre-- sentatives in Vien- tiane in order to as- sure a continuing UN presence. Some del- egates are looking forward to an early departure from Laos, but others are will- ing. to stay on to try to survey the forward areas if heli- /while the refugees have displayed only limited in- terest in joining the Communist insurgents in Laos, as many as 300 may have filtered across copters can be made avail- able. A final decision on these matters will probably be made shortly at UN head- uarters in New York. 25X1 MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS Iraq A wave of arrests of mem- bers of groups suspected of antiregime plotting--pro-UAR Iraqi Baathists, Iraqi national- ist elements, and some anti- Communist army officers--is ex- pected to follow the unsuccess- ful attempt on 7 October to SECRET Approved For Release DIATEIAI-?~~7 Q$927A0024001000 ge 4 of 7 PART I Approved Fc elease 2005/Q PrRDP79-00902400100001-6 assassinate Prime Minister Qasim. Baghdad has remained quiet, with special security precautions quickly taken by the government, army, and police. The assassination attempt was made on -7 October while Qasim was being driven along Rashid Street in down- town Baghdad. The identity of his assailant is unknown; gov- ernment releases have described the attacker only as "a sinful hand" and have not said whether or not he was apprehended. The official medical bul- letins describe Qasim's condi- tion as "good" and calling for "no anxiety." They say he was struck by three bullets in non- vital parts of the body and suf- fered only a flesh wound and a fractured shoulder. Qasim is re- ported to have emerged from the hospital where he was taken for treatment to show himself to Iraqi crowds and reassure them, and, a few hours after the shooting, Radio Baghdad broad- cast a short recorded Qasim speech calling for calm and unity. Qasim, as a martyr who nearly gave his life in "doing his duty for the Iraqi people," appealed for support from all Iraqis. Military Governor and Army Chief of Staff Abdi, as issued the government's bulletins on the prime minister's condi- tion and the decrees establish- ing a curfew in Baghdad and its suburbs and prohibiting any gatherings or demonstrations anywhere in Iraq. At the moment, with Qasim partially incapacitat- ed, Abdi appears to be the key figure in the Iraqi Government. The assassination attempt has increased the possibility of major factional strife in- side the country. Since the expected roundup of antiregime elements will focus on members of pro-UAR and anti-Communist nationalist groups, the Iraqi Communist party is likely to gain new strength and influence within the government. The Communists have already rallied to Qasim's support, and crowds are reported to have chanted, "Long live Qasim; death to Nasir." If Qasim remains in- capacitated for any considerable length of time, clashes between the various internal factions are likely, and a breakdown in public order and control is a possibility. A semiofficial Cairo news- paper has declared that it was the Iraqi Government's "import of alien policies" which led to the attempt on Qasim's life. The Cairo press alleges that Baghdad lived through a subse- quent night of terror, with Com- munist-controlled Popular Re- sistance Forces out shooting in the streets, large numbers of na- tionalists being arrested, and "fresh massacres of nationalists" soon to be expected. Direct military intervention by the UAR in Iraq is unlikely unless the Iraqi Government loses control and major faction- al strife takes place, The recent trend toward a detente between the UAR and Jordan has been arrested by a new propaganda battle between the two countries. On 30 Sep- tember, at a time when Cairo was trying to enlist the sup- port of other Arab nations for its new campaign against the aggressive policies of "imperi- alist.Red China," an Amman radio commentary charged that SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 7 Approved Fgelease 2005/03/,2t:,QA,,RDP79-0092002400100001-6 it was the UAR which had "opened the door" to Communism in the Middle East in the first place. Cairo's Voice of the Arabs has subsequently attacked Jordan as "an opportunist" following "the orders of imperialists," who are aligned with Communists against Arab nationalism. As a result of the propa- ganda controversy, Jordan's King Husayn may decide against meeting with UAR President Nasir at a tripartite conference which King Saud of Saudi Arabia has been trying to arrange since his early September talks with Nasir in Cairo. New high-level negotiations' between the United Arab Republic and the Sudan on sharing the Nile waters are scheduled to begin in Cairo on 10 October. While the chances that agree- ment will be reached are small, they appear somewhat better now than during the past two years, when each round of discussions ended with very wide differences between the two countries' posi- tions. Negotiation of a solu- tion is further complicated by the insistence of the other riparian states--Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, for whom Brit- ain is spokesman, and particu- larly Ethiopia--that they should have a voice in any settlement. The need for a Nile waters agreement has been dramatized by Soviet engineers' preparations to begin construction of the UAR's Aswan High Dam and by the Sudanese Government's public commitment to proceed with its Roseires Dam project as soon as the needed credit can be ob- tained. The World Bank has de- layed consideration of a $100,- 000,000 loan for the Roseires Dam pending Sudanese-UAR agree- ment on distribution of the Nile waters. With or without this dam, the Sudan's program for cotton-acreage expansion requires a steady increase in the amount of water diverted within Sudanese territory for irrigation purposes. Completion of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt would create a huge reservoir extending up- river into Sudanese territory and displacing large numbers of Sudanese from their homes in the Wadi Halfa district. Failure to reach accord and consequent re- liance on' the 'principle' of SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY UAR I (EGYPT) Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 7 Approved For elease 2005/03~?9tR DP79-0092,x002400100001-6 dividing the Nile waters by uni- lateral grab would quickly strain UAR-Sudanese relations to the breaking point. For months, the UAR has of- fered blandishment in an effort to persuade the Sudan to under- take high-level negotiations and to convince the Sudanese public that the Nasir government is ready and eager to end all UAR- Sudanese disagreements. The un- stable Sudanese military govern- ment, however, remains suspic1E of Cairo's intentions, fearing that the UAR will try to blame it for any failure in negotia- tions. Already faced with strong internal political pressures for a return to civilian government and with new plotting by dis- sident elements in the army of- ficer corps, the Abboud govern- ment is anxious to avoid a de- terioration of relations with the UAR. Nevertheless, a UAR propaganda barrage in the wake of unsuccessful talks would probably impel Abboud to reply in kind, in an effort to rally anti-Egyptian Sudanese public opinion behind him, Yemen The Imam, having re-estab- lished his personal political dominance in Yemen, is now threatened by a growing financial crisis. The government financial shortages, which have become apparent in the lack of pay for government officials and the army, are almost certain to arouse public resentment against the Imam, The American charge, re- porting the consensus of his Western colleagues in Yemen, says the Imam needs some $3,000,- 000 to $5,000,000 to "tide him over." The director general of the Foreign Ministry is sched- uled to visit Moscow sometime this month, at which time the USSR might seek to improve its position in Yemen by granting the Imam some assistance. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 7 of 7 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092002400100001-6 SECRET The East German rulers are using a two-week celebration, built around the tenth anniver- sary in power on 7 October, to point up what they consider their country's enhanced inter- national position. This cele- bration climaxes a persistent propaganda campaign designed to show that East Germany is grad- ually being accepted by the West as a sovereign state, and that his development is "in- evitable," despite West German efforts to oppose it. The Ulbricht regime looks on this occasion as the turning point in East Germany's progress from the position of a virtual pariah among nations to that of a full- fledged sovereign state. Soviet First Deputy Pre- mier Kozlov asserted in a speech on 6 October that West Ger- many's "notorious Hallstein doctrine"--that no country ex- cept the USSR having diplomatic relations with East Germany shall be recognized by Bonn-- is beginning to crumble, He said Bonn's efforts to pre- serve "the international iso- lation of East Germany" have been in vain. He pointed to East Germany's participation in the Geneva conference on an equal footing with the Bonn republic as evidence that even the Western powers have had to recognize the Communist regime's existence. Several speakers casti- gated West Germany in the usual vituperative terms, but none- theless called on Bonn to nego- tiate with the East Germans the formation of a committee or confederation as the first step to reunification. No new proposals were made in the speeches, which dwelt monoto- nously on East Germany's eco- nomic achievements during the ten-year period~.and the over- whelming popular support en- joyed by the Communist pro- grams. In another move to point up East Germany's sovereignty, the new East German flag, the West German tricolor with a hammer and compass insignia superimposed on it, was un- furled on 6 October over the West Berlin elevated rail in- stallations, which remain under East German control, When West Berlin police sought to remove the flags, several clashes occurred between them and Communist "workers," the most serious of which was a pitched battle between about 80 rail employees and a small police force at the elevated repair shops in Gruenewaldo On 7 October, some 60 East German flags were still flying over elevated installations in West Berlin. The West Berlin authorities deferred further action, but an uneasy situation prevails, exemplified by a West Berlin trade union leader's assertion that he may not be able to restrain the workers from taking action to remove the flags. The East Germans have sent members of the work- ers' militia to guard at least some of the elevated installa- tions in West Berlin. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pate 1 of 15 25X1 Approved Fc elease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009 }002400100001-6 SECRET BRITAIN RECEPTIVE TO INCREASING EAST GERMAN VISITS London has been generally receptive to the growing number of East German officials visit- ing the United Kingdom to pro- mote the prestige of the U1- bricht regime. The policy of furthering exchanges with East Germany will be an additional factor clouding re- lations with Bonn. The Ulbricht regime is ex- ploiting its tenth anniversary celebration on 7 October with a special exhibit which opened in London on 29 September and will tour 18 British cities. The East Berlin symphony orchestra is appearing in London's Royal Festival Hall. A special dele- gation from Dresden is visiting "sister city" Coventry on in- vitation of the Laborite lord mayor. Although on occasion the Foreign Office has shown annoy- ance at Home Office action in issuing visas, certain Foreign Office officials have strongly objected to further Allied ef- forts to exclude Wieland and the Dresden delegation in the elec- tion campaign period. As a gen- eral principle, the British con- sider the expansion of trade and personal contacts compatible with Western objectives of break- ing down East-West barriers. On 1 October the Foreign Office agreed to discuss with the United States and France "prin- ciples and categories" of East German travel. Knowing Bonn's hostility toward any seeming enhancement of East Germany's status, the British prefer to postpone discussion with the Federal Republic. Visas were also granted to Deba Wieland, the Russian-born director of the East German news agency ADN, to accept an invi- tation from Reuters, which opened an East Berlin office last May, and to Arthur Pieck, director of the regime's civil airlines, to attend the annual Farnborough air show staged by British plane manufacturers in September. Pieck is the son of the East German President. De- lays by the Allied Travel Office in West Berlin in granting the necessary authorization prevent- 6d Pieck's attendance. Rightist European settlers are fearful that exercise of Algerian self-determination as proposed by President de Gaulle would leave them at the mercy of a vengeful Moslem majority, and this concern has led to a resurgence of extremist activity In any event, Britain's willingness to countenance con- tinued visits by East Germans is bound to hamper its already strained relations with Bonn. The Labor party is more inclined than the Conservatives to dis- regard the Federal Republic and therefore more favorable to pro- moting East German contacts. "Shadow cabinet" members Aneurin Bevan and George Brown have told the American Embassy they advo- cate Western dealings with the Ulbricht re ime on a de facto basis. in Algiers. 25X1 25X1 SECRET PART I Iqpproved For Release ? pg/? CI~6M7 %0927A002400100001 P6 age 2 of 15 Approved FoOelease 2005/0 / t Ay.RDP79-009 002400100001-6 'CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY In France the rightist op- ponents of De Gaulle's program will attempt to make themselves heard in Parliament, which re- convened on 6 October, but no serious threat to the Debre gov- ernment from this quarter seems likely. This belief is borne out by Debre's decision to per- mit the National Assembly to debate the Algerian proposals following his general policy statement on 13 October. Indi- cations of a large assembly ma- jority may also have influenced the government's decision to per- mit the assembly to vote follow- ing the debate--this would be the first vote allowed in this body on a major policy--since De Gaulle seems anxious to dem- onstrate general support for his proposals in order to strengthen his hand in dealing with the rebels and to isolate his rightist critics. An attempt by two extreme rightist deputies to organize a motion of censure failed be- cause many opposed to the De Gaulle proposals were unwilling to sign the motion as required by the new constitution. Right- ist hopes of again rallying military support may have been revived as a result of a meet- ing of 700 army reserve officers in Paris on 27 September. This meeting passed a resolution flatly endorsing retention of "French Algeria," pointed- ly omitting any reference to De Gaulle, and declaring solidarity with the army in Algeria. In Tunis, a leading member 25X1 of the Algerian provisional gov- sa a re e s prefer to wait for the development of foreign reaction to.their reply to De Gaulle before opening conversa- tions. He alleged that opinion in France was developing in fa- vor of the Algerians. 25X1 The Algerian rebels remain sensitive to any suggestion that their attitude foreshadows a capitulation.. Although the official. rebel newspaper edito- rially described De Gaulle's Al- gerian program as having "cor- rected the disgraces of the past and opened the door to.Al- gerian reality," a subsequent communique stated that while the rebels were prepared to negotiate "from strength," the rebel army 25X1 must "harass the enemy and remain rises." firm ...until.the sun of liberty FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM France probably now has all the components required for testing a nuclear weapon) The French Govern- ment s a stress, however, 25X1 25Xa on possession of a nuclear weap- on as an important prestige fac- tor vis-a-vis the other members 25X1 of the French Community. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 16 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00+A002400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 October 1959 France will ace a - ficult debate when the UN Gen- eral Assembly, possibly by late October, discusses the Moroccan item opposing the French tests. Morocco has the support of Af- rican states bordering the Sahara and other UN members con- cerned over the fall-out hazard. 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 15 Approved ,59lease 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-0092,'02400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY DISARMAMENT - 14TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY UN members' preoccupation with disarmament and nuclear testing is highlighted by the fact that this assembly session has five separate disarmament items on its agenda. The as- sembly's political committee begins debate next week with the Soviet proposal for "com- plete and general disarmament" as its first item. The chief Soviet UN delegate has predicted that this debate would take up a "month and a half of the 14th General Assembly's time." Nevertheless the assembly will probably refer the Soviet pro- posal to the recently formed ten-nation,-disarmament forum for study. Although the assembly will endorse the formation of the ten-nation disarmament forum of five Western and five Soviet- bloc countries organized by the Big Four, some Latin American members will be critical because of the lack of an effective link with the UN. The USSR has al- ready begun to exploit this feeling and the resentment of other UN members at their ex- clusion from disarmament negotiations. Soviet dele- gates are assiduously spreading the story that the United States wanted the new forum to have no ties with the UN and that it was only after the USSR's "heroic work" that the Big Four's com- munique provided for any UN connection. Soviet 'representatives are also claiming that Moscow wanted "neutrals" in the new group but that the United States insisted on the "five-five" arrangement. India again this year has called for a UN ban on nuclear testing. Although New Delhi's proposal will probably be re- ferred to the ten-nation forum for consideration, India may during the course of the debate request a report from the Geneva nuclear test conference partici- pants on the status of the talks, the progress made, and the re- maining issues. Morocco has raised the question of proposed French nuclear tests in the Sahara in an effort to have the UN call on France to desist. Although Rabat wants its item handled separately from other disarma- ment issues, the assembly will probably refer the problem to the new forum also. Ireland, working closely with British and American dele- gates, has agreed to refer its proposal to prevent wider dis- semination of nuclear weapons to the ten-nation forum. The Irish want those powers, including France, producing nuclear weapons to refrain from handing, ~ over the control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them. Powers not now possessing nuclear weapons,.: under the Irish proposal, would refrain from manufacturing them. BELGIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS The Belgian Government is heading for a financial crisis which could bring down the Social Christian - Liberal coalition of Prime Minister Eyskens. While a long-term loan from the Belgian National Bank might stave off a crisis, the bank opposes such a move on the grounds that the solution to SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 15 Approved Foclease 2005/03/C`T P79-009202400100001-6 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Belgium's periodic budget defi- cits is higher taxation. Such a step, however, is opposed by Liberal party leaders--who have threatened to leave the government rather than vote for a tax increase--and by the con- servative wing of Eyskens' own party. The $180,000,000-$220,000,- 000 deficit is partly a re- flection of the weak state of the country's economy. Recovery from the 1958 recession has been relatively slower and more limited in Belgium than elsewhere in Europe. The economy is beset with several problems, including high production costs in manu- facturing and a serious overpro- duction crisis in the coal industry. The situation created by in- adequate revenues has been ag- gravated by the expensive pro- grams to which the Eyskens gov- ernment is committed, such as subsidization of the coal in- dustry, a school-building pro- gram, and gradual extension of a voluntary recruitment plan in the defense forces. Moreover, Brussels seems likely for the first time to have to subsidize the Congo budget. Temporary measures to cover the deficit have been resorted to in the past and could be again. The uneasy relationship between the coalition partners and the powerful position of the Socialist opposition, however, has made it difficult to pare major expenditure items. The one exception to this may be defense, which has tended to be a politidAl football. During his recent visit to Washington, Defense Minister Gilson announced an increase in defense expendi- tures, but Finance Minister van Houtte has stated on several oc- casions that Gilson's sights are too high. Over the longer term, the only answer to the government's financial problems would appear to be a new cabinet and higher taxation. The Social Christians and the Liberals are funda- mentally at odds on economic issues, as were the Socialists and the Liberals in the 1954- 1958 coalition. The Social Christians and the Socialists, however, might be able to come to terms on a more real- istic tax program. The So- cialists have been gearing their new program with a view toward possible par- ticipation in the next coal- ition government. It is doubt- ful, however, that this could be achieved without new elections. NEW HUNGARIAN FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1961-65) The Hungarian economic plan for 1961-65, to be approved at the November party congress, is generally realistic. Not all goals are likely to be achieved, however, because of probable difficulties in stretching in- vestments, raising labor produc- tivity, and fulfilling the agri- cultural production target. Plans include the near-completion of,. . agricultural :collectiviz .tion, . r which was advanced so rapidly during the first part of this year, and promise about a 3.5- percent annual rise in per capita real income during this and the next six years. The increase in total in- dustrial production planned for 1965 over the 1958 level--that is, a seven-year period--is 65- 70 percent, or 10 percent higher SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 6 o 15 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY HUNGARY INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION GOALS FOR 1965 ACTUAL 1958 EI I PLANNED 1965 ELECTRIC POWER BILLION KWH Approved Font (ease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00902400100001-6 SECRET ........................... .............. 27-29 F"I COAL MILLION METRIC TONS CRUDE STEEL MILLION METRIC TONS than indicated during prelim- inary discussion of the plan. In both 1958 and 1959 the growth of industry has been greater than the annual average neces- sary to achieve this higher target. Within industry, out- put of capital goods is to in- crease about a third faster than that of consumer goods. Several programs are mapped out for industry. In addition to developing industrially back- ward areas, altering still fur- ther the composition of indus trial output, and expanding the raw material and power base, a reorganization of management is planned. This reorganization, an extension of gradual changes in recent years, is designed to eliminate superfluous positions and enlarge the operational con- trol of lower level officials. The program will apparently be similar to that intro- duced in Czechoslovakia last year. F i CRUDE OIL MILLION METRIC TONS In agriculture, the use of artificial fertilizers,is to be increased to three times the present volume, and the trac- tor pool is to be ex- panded by 150 percent. Other programs, such as improving irrigation and crop rotation, will also be stepped up with a view to achieving during the 1961-65 period an aver- age agricultural pro- duction 30-32 percent above the 1954-58 average. While plans do appear to provide resources for expand- ing output, the sched- uled increase is am- bitious, in view of the difficulties in accelerating the growth df the agricultural sector and the push for collectivization --now being met with peasant hostility. To implement plans for in- dustrial and agricultural ex- pansion, investment during the 1961-65 period is to be at least 50 percent higher than during 1956-60. Actual investment fig- ures appear to provide for a much larger increase because of price changes on 1 January 1959 which raised the average value of capital goods 68 percent. The planned rise is substantial, however, especially as part of the national income must be al- located to the payment of for- eign debts, and as the regime promises to raise per capita real income 26-29 percent by 1965. Higher national income is also expected to permit an increase in material and foreign exchange reserves. It is doubtful that even a 50-percent rise in investments can be stretched to cover all the programs planned for industry, SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7) of 1.6 Approved For?Rjlease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009202400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT-INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY agriculture, and construction. The reliance on a 37-40 percent rise in labor productivity for fulfilling output plans and allowing wage increases also seems optimistic. The regime will probably make various re- visions of individual goals in this plan before the end of 1965. 25X1 RELATIONS BETWEEN CAIRO AND PEIPING DETERIORATE In providing expatriate Syrian Communist leader Khalid Bakdash a forum from which to criticize*Nasir, Peiping has shown it will support Middle Eastern Communists despite'the increased frictions with the UAR such a policy was bound to bring. Nasir has recalled the UAR charge, who had walked out of the Chinese Communist tenth anniversary celebration where Bakdash spoke on 28 September. A stiff formal protest was sent to the Chinese Communist Embassy in Cairo after Ambas- sador Chen Chia-kang refused to accept it personally on the grounds he had no instructions from Peiping. The UAR also in- structed its officials to boy- cott all of Communist China's anniversary programs,and, in Damascus, resorted to cordoning off the reception given by the Chinese Communist consul, Closure of'the consular post in Damascus has been sug- gested in the UAR press, which has carried a series of biting editorials since 29 September charging Peiping with "political provocations" against Cairo and with a "policy of invasion and domination" aimed at all "hon- est" neutrals. Citing Peiping's feuds with Yugoslavia and India as examples of this "aggres- sive intent," UAR propaganda is calling on Afro-Asian nations to rally behind Cairo and "stand up against this Chinese trend." This emphasis supports a recent report that Nasir, while genuine- ly irritated with Peiping's sponsorship of Bakdash, also feels the incident gives him an opportunity to strengthen his position among the neutrals. Nasir thus is viewed by Peiping as a threat not only to Middle Eastern Communism but to the bloc position among the Afro-Asian nations--more specif- ically to Communist China's own standing in that group. Peiping has broadcast Bakdash's speech in Arabic but has not yet replied directly to Cairo's propaganda. This suggests a reluctance to become embroiled in an acrimonious exchange be- fore an international audience rather than any desire to pla- cote Nasir. If the UAR attacks continue, however, the Chinese may feel compelled to meet Nasir's challenge with equally abusive counterpropaganda, SECRET Approved For Release 0 /03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART II O AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 15 Approved For lease 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-0092 002400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Diplomatically,the Chinese may withdraw their own ambassa- dor until the situation im- proves. Peiping could also enforce its recent demand that the UAR eliminate its chronic trade deficit. Peiping could threaten to reduce its purchases of Egyptian cotton,which amount- ed to $35,000,000 last year. Peiping's disenchantment with Nasir probably began with what it considered his lukewarm support for Communist China's 1958 action in the Taiwan Strait, especially in view of its own strong political support for Cairo during the 1956 Suez cri- sis. Chinese suspicion that Nasir's professed friendship was at best unreliable probably became conviction in late 1958 when he began his domestic anti- Communist campaign. Along with the USSR and other members of the bloc, Peiping criticized Cairo and began to side open- ly with Iraq. Communist China's attitude apparently helped stimulate Cairo's attacks on Peiping dur- ing its suppression of the Tibetan revolt. Chinese propa- ,ganda responded until May, when Peiping attempted to end the public squabble with India and the UAR. Cairo has contin- ued intermittent criticism of Peiping, however, and since mid- July the Chinese have replied periodically. In early Septem- ber the UAR member of the Afro- Asian Solidarity Council's Per- manent Secretariat reportedly took issue with his Chinese counterpart over the Sino-In- dian border controversy. This move probably was assessed by Peiping as a deliberate UAR ef- 25X1 fort to embarrass Communist China and undermine its pres- tige. TIBETAN BORDER PROBLEMS Nepal and Pakistan,as well as India,are showing increasing concern over their border prob- lems with Communist China and are making efforts to secure their interests in the Himh.lay- an mountain range. Indian Prime Minister Nehru on 26 September replied in firm language to Chou En-lai's let- ter of 8 September. Rejecting Chinese charges and standing fast on his previously announced position, Nehru said that "no discussion can be fruitful un- less the outposts now held by Chinese forces on the Indian side of the traditional fron- tier are first evacuated by them and further threats and intimidation cease." In a press conference on 8 October,Nehru added that his government would not undertake any military operations to re- cover the outposts "at this stage," while efforts were un- der way on the political level. New Delhi's insistence on Chi- nese withdrawal would seem to leave the situation deadlocked unless Peiping takes the un- likely step of evacuating its troops from Longju outpost in Assam, which it occupied fore-- ibly on 26 August. Peiping will probably re- ply in terms which would not compromise its claims to terri- tory in Ladakh and Assam. It is likely, however, to reiterate its willingness to negotiate. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 15 Approved For R (ease 2005103/2 ;,CJrA=.RDP79-0092 02400100001-6 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY INDIA 8 A Y O F 8 E N G A L on "small isolated places along the border. With both sides still committed to pre- vious stands, the possibility of bilateral negotiations being arranged in the near fu- ture seems remote. B. P. Koirala, prime min- ister of Nepal, stated on 26 September that he had no illu- sions about China's intentions toward Nepal but that he thought his country has a two-year grace period before the. Commu- nists begin exerting real pres- sure. Koirala remarked there had been some discussion as to whether Nepal should take the initiative in defining the Nepalese-Tibetan border more closely or whether to let well enough alone. Recognizing, however, that China would do What it pleased, regardiess of Nepalese,actions, . the Katmandu government now. feels there is Pakistan's concern over Chinese expansionism, most for- cibly publicized when President Ayub suggested to Nehru in early September that India join Pakistan in defense of the subcontinent against China, has apparently been heightened re- cently.. Chinese military pa~- trols.have been reported by Pakistani officials?since 1950 as crossing from Sinkiang into the Gilgit Agency in north- ernmost West Pakistan and oc-- casionally exchanging shots with Pakistani patrols. The Pakistanis in the past,treated these incursions as routine ' matter. Within the last month, however, Karachi has sent North- er i Scouts units .to, Gilgit to strengthen its dontrol over the border area. INDIAN LEADERS PLAN TO SPLIT BOMBAY STATE The recent decision by India's top Congress party lead- ers to reverse the stand they previously had taken against partitioning Bombay State along linguistic lines apparently was prompted by concern that the Congress' control of Bombay- India's largest and most ad- vanced state--would be serious- ly threatened by the the near future of popular SECRET A. R. little to lose in forcing the issue. ndian Border Whether Peiping accepts the present boundary, refuses to 30714 recognize it, or stalls, the Chinese. A intentions would be clarified. Nepalese delegates to the 1 C:.etober celebrations in Peiping have been ~y instructed to press MCA 'V TAIWAN the matter. Peiping ~k KONG as yet has made no large claim to Nepal- ese 1 ., ese territory, but may not wish to com- mit itself irrevocably to recog- nition of the traditional fron- tier. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page .10 of 115 Approved Fort elease 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00911 -002400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY agitation on this issue. By re- opening the explosive question of Bombay's status, New Delhi probably hopes to avert a cam- paign of violence patterned aft- er the agitation in Kerala and to improve the party's position for the 1962 elections. Congress leaders are delay- ing a formal decision to divide the state, pending consultation with provincial party chiefs, but reliable reports indicate that the reorganization will take effect next April. Two new states--which will probably be called United Maharashtra and Mahagujarat--will be formed out of the areas of Bombay where Ma- rathi and Gujarati, respective- ly, are the dominant languages. There seems to be agreement that Bombay city, the disposi- tion of which was the main stumbling block in previous re- organization plans, will go to Maharashtra. First press reports sever- al weeks ago of the shift in the Congress position apparent- ly came as a complete surprise to local politicians. Most Con- gress party elements in the state welcomed the reversal of policy, although they expressed some misgivings about the dif- ficult problems posed by reor- ganization. Strong opposition was voiced, however, by certain Con- gress leaders in Vidarbha, the central Indian Marathi-speaking area which was integrated into eastern Bombay in 1956. This group has long promoted its own separatist movement and resists inclusion in any "United Maha- rashtra." The majority of Con- gress members from Vidarbha in the national Parliament, how- ever, has issued a statbment'.sup- porting a single Marathi-speak- ing state, thus increasing the likelihood that New Delhi will succeed in dissuading the region- alists from pressing their de- mands. Non-Congress elements, which in both parts of Bombay are united in powerful linguis tic-front organizations, out- wardly endorsed the concession I4adhy = F,cdesh (P?`t'~ DANA United Maharr shtra (Port. -.3. C., -- ...~:~ nomoaY Arabian Sea -:.y (Mara thi-speaking)` to their position but indicated some discomfort over the loss of the Issue.. which. they. have ex- ploited for years. The Commu- nist party will be hardest hit, since the gains it has made in Bombay have resulted primarily from manipulation of the lin- guistic fronts. In addition to the demands of Vidarbha, the Congress ex- ecutive will face many oth- er problems in splitting the huge state. Considerable eco- nomic and administrative dislo- cation will exist for some time after the reorganization, which is likely to retard de- velopment programs. The new policy, however, probably will win back many former Congress supporters and. ...should - bid- able the -:,party to :recover Some ,Of ,, !its strength in Bombay State. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 15 25X1 25X1 Approved For lease 2005/03/ ,.Kf 1 P79-00927002400100001-6 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ' WEEKLY SUMMARY SUKARNO AND THE INDONESIAN ARMY Although President Sukarno continues to support the Indo- nesian Army, he has recently demonstrated a renewed concern to balance the army's influence in government by making conces- sions to leftist political for- ces. These include his decision to speak at the Communist par- ty's sixth national congress on 16 September, despite the army's attempts to minimize publicity given the meeting. Sukarno has also established a West Irian Committee weighted with extreme nationalists and leftists, which is likely to obstruct the army's anti-Communist efforts, An impending reorganization of administrative machinery gov- erning the implementation of prevailing martial law seems likely to decrease the powers of General Nasution, army chief of staff and defense minister In promoting these devel- opments, Sukarno apparently is motivated by fear that the army may become, if it is not al- ready, sufficiently powerful to overshadow him or to challenge his own position. Rumors of an impending army coup, which have circulated in Djakarta in re- cent weeks, almost certainly have played a part in making Sukarno uneasy. The rumors ap- pear to have arisen from gener- al apprehension over army in- fluence in government, but they may also have been-promoted by the Indonesian Communist party, which has consistently tried to create dissension between Sukarno and the army. An army coup directed at replacing President Sukarno or reducing his power appears un- likely at this time, however, unless there is extreme provo- cation. The army itself would be sharply divided on action a- gainst Sukarno, and army lead- ers in Djakarta are aware that an unsuccessful coup might cause Sukarno to turn almost exclusive- ly toward the Communists for support. Surrounding the uneasy re- lations between Sukarno and the army is a growing atmosphere of pessimism in government circles. The return to the 1945 constitu- tion last July has not facili tated solutions to the nation's problems to the extent Sukarno and others had hoped. The con- stitutional change has not satis- fied the demands of Sumatran and North Celebes dissidents, and the financial drain imposed by suppression of guerrilla warfare continues. In addition, the 43-member cabinet is not operating smooth- ly and appears to have produced new administrative delays and frustrations. A change in regional government precipitated by the constitution has brought considerable criticism, and efforts to restrict Chinese retail trade have run into far more resistance than the government had anticipated. MALI FEDERATION MOVING TOWARD INDEPENDENCE Leaders of the Federation of Mali, made up of the auton- omous French Community repub- lics of Senegal and Soudan, have begun to implement their local political commitment to gain ju- ridical independence for Mali at an early date. They intend to keep this West African area within the Paris-subsidized SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12-of 15 Approved For,,Release 2005/03/ ~;~P79-0092WO2400100001-6 'CURRENT -INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Community, which they hope will be altered so as to include a multinational confederation. Mali leaders have publicly announced and formally commu- nicated to President de Gaulle their intention to seek inde- pendence by invoking an article of the French constitution per- mitting a negotiated transfer to individual Community members of powers vested in the organi- zation as a whole. At present the Community--which in effect means Paris--is responsible for foreign policy, defense, econom- ic and financial policy, justice, and higher education. Some younger, radical Sou- danese elements within the fed- eration's dominant party have favored use of the constitu- tion's more dramatic referendum procedure to gain Mali's inde- pendence. The moderate leaders have declared, however, that this course, which would presum- ably lead to Mali's abrupt de- parture f rom'.'the Community, would be considered only if the contemplated negotiations with France fail. De Gaulle, with his recent emphasis on the Com- munity's "evolutional character," seems to have accepted in princi- ple the Mali leaders' cautious approach. Mali assembly President Leo- pold Senghor has told the Ameri- can Consulate General in Dakar that the negotiations with France will probably begin soon after the meeting of the Community's Executive Council scheduled for 11 December. New bilateral a- greements are to be concluded with France following the proc- lamation of Mali's independence --probably during 1960, when the West African states of Cameroun, Togo, and Nigeria all are due to.evolve to sovereign status. Mali's leaders apparently en- visage that these agreements will authorize Paris to assume specif- ic responsibilities for Mali in such fields as defense, diplomacy, and higher education. Senghor indicated, however, that Mali intends to seek inter- national recognition--including separate UN membership--and to SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 15 Approved For RRrelease 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-0092JV02400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMA.'Ry open embassies of its own in France, the United States, Brit- ain, neighboring African states, and, after "a couple of years," the USSR. Closer relations with Guinea are not now contem- plated despite some internal pressures in this direction. Mali's evolution seems cer- tain to prompt other Community members to reappraise their po- sitions vis-a-vis France. The Malgache Republic (Madagascar), in particular, is likely to follow Mali's lead soon. Even the anti-Mali grouping which Premier Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast formed with Volta, Niger, and Dahomey will be sub- ject to new strains. Opposition forces favoring closer align- ment with Mali already are gathering strength at least in Volta and Dahomey, and in Hou- phouet's own camp there appears to be a growing conviction that 25X1 his policy of closer rather than looser ties with France must soon be revised. STATE OF SIEGE ENDS IN BOLIVIA The lifting of the state of siege in Bolivia on 30 Sep- tember suggests that the split between the moderate and left wings of the government party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR),. has been bridged at least temporarily, as polit- ical leaders prepare for the 1960 presidential election cam- paign. Closer cooperation be- tween the two MNR factions is likely to result in less criti- cism by the left wing of the administration's cooperation with the United States. The MNR nominations for president and vice president--which are tantamount to election--will be made at the party convention, now scheduled to open on 10 De- cember. A moderate-left split has been a persistent feature of the MNR's seven-year dominance in Bolivia. In mid-September the long-standing possibility that the MNR might break into two po- litical parties seemed near ful- fillment. About 100 leaders, meeting in La Paz with Minister of Government Guevara, organized a moderate rightist group called the "authentic MNR" and issued formal membership cards. Press revelations of this activity caused the executive secretary of the new group to offer evi- dence that the left wing under labor leader Juan Lechin has also been organized with equal formality. After President Siles had talked with various aspirants for the 1960 election, including former President Paz, however, the MNR's national political com- mittee on 28 September issued a communique dissolving "sectors" and suspending anyone continuing efforts to organize "fractional ist groups." Shortly thereafter, the government signaled the re- laxation of political tension by withdrawing the state of siege, which permits tight control of public assembly and individual travel and which has been a fair- ly normal feature of MNR admin- istrations. The compelling reason for party unity appears to be the presidential elections. In the 1956 and 1958 elections--the only elections held with universal suffrage--the MNF polled 81 per- cent of the total vote. Thus nomination as president or vice president by a united MNR en- sures electoral victory, whereas fragmentation of the party would make the outcome unpredictable. In Bolivia, unlike many Latin American countries, party organ- 25X1 ization is more important for electoral victory than per- sonal leadership. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 14 of 15' 25X1 Approved F rq elease 2005I S-Ct,RC l RDP79-009W002400100001-6 Latin America's toughest and most durable dictator--Gen- eralissimo Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican. Republic--is fac- ing more internal opposition to his regime than at any time . since he came to power in 1930. The Dominican people, who had become accustomed to the pros- perity which Trujillo brought them, now are showing disillu- sionment over the economic hard- ships caused by,heavy military expenditures made during the past year. Dissidents are more active and outspokenly critical of the regime than at any time in the past. Trujillo believes the mil- itary expenditures--estimated to have totaled $50,000,000 since January--are necessitated by the threats of armed inter- vention by his two bitter en- emies, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt. Cuban- or Venezuelan-based rebel invasion attempts do not appear imminent, however. Trujillo probably faces more dangerous opposition from inside the country, where dis- sidence is growing but is still largely unorganized. This op- position is centered in the professional and middle classes, which have been severely af- fected by the economic deterio- ration. Another small but growing group of dissidents con- sists of friends , and relatives of persons liquidated or perse- cuted by the regime and of wom- en victimized by younger mem- bers of the Trujillo entourage closely associated with the dictator's sons. of diplomatic and military de- fections abroad during the past three months are additional in- dicators of Trujillo's falling prestige. Intensive recruiting abroad for a "foreign legion" by Tru- jillo agents suggests that the dictator may doubt the compe- tence of his army, which suf- fered heavy casualties during the. June fighting against in- surgents. However, many of the mercenaries already recruited reportedly are in jail for re- fusing to fight. The economic situation is likely to worsen because of continued military spending, the expected decline in foreign ex- change earnings, and the all- time low in tourist trade. If the economic recession continues to cause more unemployment and economic distress, resentment against Trujillo will increase. A series 25X1 25X1 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 15 of 15 Approved Fo(&Iease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009202400100001-6 SECRET PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES EXPANSION OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN ANTARCTIC Recent Soviet announce- ments indicate not only a note- worthy expansion of the USSR's activities in the Antarctic but a possible broadening of other bloc countries' activities there as well. The Soviet fifth ex- pedition (1959-60) will prob- ably establish three new tempo- rary stations, make the USSR's third attempt to land a party in western Antarctica, and seek to complete a trans-Antarctic glaciological traverse by June 1960. Soviet announcements in- dicate long-range Antarctic scientific planning through 1965 by the presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Soviet Operations The Ob, flagship and four- season veteran of Soviet Antarc- tic operations, will sail early in November. It will be fol- lowed by a passenger-cargo ves- sel scheduled to land nearly 160 personnel with supplies and equipment, including an IL-14 transport, an LI-2 transport, and a MI-4 helicopter. The Ob, 14b 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 R EN T INA,._. SOVIET ANTARCTIC E A ' vFR A ACTIVITIES FG? "` Fo ? Soviet station 150 Proposed station for 1959 60 Q A ? Security Zone of the Inter-American Treaty . _ Sys - 30 ~ of Reciprocal Assistance !` : - . - --- '-?0otnTao 9HEnLAN X19.. / a Glaciological Traverse _ o CIRCLE te h SCUTN Pro osed ro p u U URKNFY ITl# IS , S I5. GEORGIA t~ ~. Alt t t erna e rou e ?ELLr$CSIJCUSE ... 160 '~,f,C%~I~. ~Jl itt "~'` !1 ?, 6o O 20 0 Zevodo k IQ +v1 tit A f o ,~ -. ~' SOUTH ~ ~u .` l \ Vii/ ` ~ dQU I. GANISW CH ~ ^ _ ff 170 \ UNCLAIMED n SECTOR 180 SHEtF~~ SOUTH J DATE LINE is aryev 09003800001 azaryev -- L'TES3r ZEALANI?. 4 yf.-Y- eA~,tFNYO c r'.In ~_r> o. "Pole of ? S me) f!? 170 _ d( 11 ~ Inaccessi ity' -ti sem \ _ 4 10 AuGK$ANU Vostok ~` 1 0, 4 South Geomagnetic: Pole ~ \ f ! 1 Soveatskayo .' . MACpuAF E So Ih < // (In ct'rel -'~., 4 160 ~?. , Magnet c Pole K som Iska a Noe ~a _ __ 4 71 25 Ctkustralia) Mlrnyy ;, ~.. ~ 4Dobrowolskitf= -AD- TASMANIA / (Oasis) ? ~~ 0 8 OCTOBER 1959 ' 150 ~ II ~ / lY "\T -- ', o raises oo. 30 ~VSA ILA 30711 X, 140 130 120 110 100 90 60 70 60 50 40 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 14 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009W002400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY after unloading at Mirnyy and Lazaryev, will proceed to the western Antarctic, in the area of the Bellingshausen Sea, for an attempted landing and geo- logical studies. If the at- tempt by sea should fail, a landing could be made by the Ob's AN-2 biplane, which has the necessary range and cargo- carrying capacity. The total voyage of the Ob is expected to last six to seven months. The three presently func- tioning year-round Soviet sta- tions--Mirnyy, Vostok, and Lazaryev--will continue opera- tions. On 1 October, an LI-2 made the first flight from Mirnyy to Lazaryev. One of the projects of these stations will be the previously announced at- tempt at a trans-Antarctic gla- ciological traverse to be com- pleted in the Antarctic au- tumn .(March-June) of 1960. The last contingent of personnel, equipment, and supplies for this project left Mirnyy on 27 September for Komsomolskaya, a Soviet summer station where the train for the trans-Antarc- tic trek will be organized. The traverse will proceed from Komsomolskaya to Vostok and, if possible, Lazaryev, via the US- operated South Pole Station and the now inactive Soviet station, "Pole of Inaccessibility." From the Lazaryev station, which eventually is to be ex- panded to a complement of 25, the USSR plans "to compile the first geological map of the mountains of Queen Maud Land." Two of the three new sta- tions to be established will be set up as aids in the trans- Antarctic operation, one south of Lazaryev, and the other near the Australian Mawson station. In addition, the Komsomolskaya and Pole of Inaccessibility stations will probably function as auxiliary stations for the trans-Antarctic traverse'if it is able to continue toward Lazaryev. The third new station may be set up in the heretofore in- accessible Bellingshausen area (in the unclaimed sector), an objective announced in 1958. Although this area has to date defied the most powerful Amer- ican icebreakers, the Soviet Union probably feels confident that the establishment of a sta- tion there now is feasible as a result of extensive ice recon- naissance undertaken in the vicinity of the Amundsen and Bellingshausen seas by the Ob in April 1958 and by the 26- vessel Slava whaling fleet in early 1959. Soviet success in this project prior to a renewed American attempt to penetrate the sector--planned for early 1960--would undoubtedly be widely exploited by Soviet prop- aganda. Moreover, establish- ment and maintenance of such a station could ultimately chal- lenge the primacy of American rights in the unclaimed sector and cause concern in Chile and Argentina. It might also cause some concern to all signatory powers of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, since a Soviet station in the unclaimed sector would be near the outer limit of the security zone established by that treaty. Bloc Participation Among the members of the fifth Soviet expedition will be scientists from three other bloc countries, East Germany and possibly Communist China plan to participate for the first time, Czechoslovakia for the second., East German participa- tion may be an attempt to seize bloc initiative in exploiting SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES 'Page 2 of 14 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00WA002400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY German interests built up by prewar German Antarctic activ- ities--the Federal Republic excluded Antarctica from its IGY and subsequent programs, Chinese participation would sug- gest a maneuver to test the sin- cerity of the anticipated US- initiated treaty to assure free- dom of Antarctic research to all countries. Eighteen Poles will travel to Antarctica with the Soviet expedition and 11 will remain for the winter at the former Soviet station, Oazis. Long-Range Plans Announcements of new whal- ing ship construction indicate that the USSR plans to supple- ment its Slava-fleet operations in the Antarctic by adding three new whaling fleets. The Soviet- skaya Ukraina, a 44,000-ton fac- tory ship, will begin operations this season and construction has begun on a sister ship, the Sovetskaya Rossiya, The Yuriy Dolgorukiy, a 40,000-ton factory ship, is being built in East Germany. Thus the USSR may within four to five years have close to 60 whalers and support vessels in Antarctic waters ac- companying these factory ships. This might lead not only to Soviet domination of the indus- try but also to a breakdown in international controls over it. In a TASS broadcast of 13 September, Treshnikov, head of the 1956-57 Antarctic expedi- tion, issued the first public statement that the atomic ice- breaker would be used in the Antarctic as well as in the Arctic, Although probably not intended for use in the coming season, the Lenin could even- tually increase the period of Antarctic operations and would probably increase their capa- bilities. The chairman of the Soviet Antarctic Commission announced in July that "Soviet aircraft will soon make nonstop flights from Moscow to Mirnyy." Soviet flights to Antarctica, using an unspecified four-engine air- craft, were planned as early as 1955, but subsequent transit rights via the Cocos Islands and Perth, obtained from Aus- tralia by negotiation, were never exercised. Whether the Antarctic landing. facilities can be made adequate for large air- craft is as yet uncertain. Soviet motives for such an undertaking--involving more than 9,000 nautical miles of flight or 7,600 nautical miles by the great circle route, well beyond the estimated commercial range of any known transport--undoubt- edly include a desire to increase the flow of key scientific per- sonnel and supplies to Antarc- tica, although cargo space would be limited because of the fuel requirements of such a long non- stop flight. In addition, Soviet air capabilities would be demon- strated in a spectacular fashion. SECRET 1X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002400100001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 14 Approved For lease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092WO2400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ULBRICHT REGIME PLANS TRANSFORMATION OF EAST BERLIN In connection with the cel- ebration of East Germany's tenth anniversary on 7 October, the Ulbricht regime is publicizing ambitious plans to transform East Berlin into a showplace of German "socialist culture" and a suitable "national" capital to rival West Berlin. The pro- gram, which forms part of East Germany's Seven-Year Plan (1959- 65), is also designed to dem- onstrate the regime's deter- mination nbt'.to permit East Berlin to become a part of any "free city" of Berlin. Character of East Berlin The Soviet sector of Ber- lin presents a sorry contrast to prosperous West Berlin. Gov- ernment buildings are shabby, and the reconstruction of sev- eral years ago along Stalinal- lee not only is ugly but fails to hide the bombed-out quarters behind the new buildings. Traf- fic, away from the main arter- ies, is scanty; streets are badly lighted and in need of general modernization. East Berliners live in cramped apartments, of which there are not enough even for the city's dwindling population of 1,110,- 000. Retail facilities are scarce, badly stocked, and in- efficient. Foodstuffs are often in short supply, East Berlin nevertheless holds a leading place in the country's economic life. Its per capita consumption of es- sential foodstuffs and consum- er goods is considerably in excess of that of East Germany as a whole. Industries in East Berlin provide employment for most of the local labor force of more than 611,000 (as against 8,676,000 for all of 'East Germany) and constitute a major element in the nationalized industry of East Germany. New Government Center To improve the dismal phys- ical features of East Berlin, the Ulbricht regime has consolidated earlier projects for piecemeal improvements there and, under a "great leap forward" slogan, has planned a sweeping transforma- tion aimed at developing the Soviet sector into a rival of West Berlin. Major emphasis is to be given to the complete recon- struction of the city center. The Marx-Engels Platz, now a graveled parade ground, will be the focus of the rebuilt city, with government and party head- quarters located there or near- by. The central committee of the Socialist Unity (Communist) SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 14 Approved Far Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009'94002400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 October 1959 FORMER MINISTRY OF FINANCE 1951 party (SED) and the SED dis- trict organization for East Berlin have recently moved into the newly renovated building formerly occupied by the Min- istry of Finance on the Wer- dersche Markt. There, under heavy guard, all major party functions will be concentrated alongside the center of the government. Underlining East Germany's pretensions to sovereignty, the AAREATER BERLIN STATUTE MILES 8 OCTOBER 1959 Liebenwal,C( s "N Marx-` Humboldf Univarsity Engels Plat. PNetz U'ler aen a"den CENTER, (MITTS) SECRET / JoachhnsthoI Seven-Year Plan calls for converting Unter den Linden into a cen- ter of diplomatic life, as it was before World War II. New build- ings will be construct- ed for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for In- ternal German Trade, adjacent to the Par- iser-Platz,and prac- tically in the shadow of the Brandenburg Gate. Tourist Center Friedrichstrasse, in the city's center, is to be devel- oped as a major tourist center. The East German travel agency, a major hotel, and the East German airlines headquarters will be located there. The regime's program em- phasizes the intention of mak- ing the Schoonefeld airport, located just to the southeast Embassy SED Central Committ s lding -- -~en5nallee" ^Neander -- Quarter 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 5 of 14 Approved For. (ease 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927002400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY of East Berlin, a center of jet service for both East and West Berlin. Plans include construction of an 11, 800-foot runway to accommodate Soviet TU-114s. Construction of the runway was inaugurated on 7 March by Communist youth bri- gades, Construction of the airport's new rapid transit (S-Bahn) connection with East Berlin--scheduled to be com- pleted between 1962 and 1964-- has not begun. New "Socialist" Developments With a view to enlisting popular support, the regime is emphasizing its plans to build extensive housing developments and construct adequate cultural and shopping facilities for East Berliners. Some 77,000 new apartments are promised for the city, to be completed by 1965, at a cost of approximate- ly $400,000,000 with a further $180,000,000 earmarked for re- construction and beautifica- tion. One major redevelopment scheme centers around Alexan- derplatz and Strausberger.platz. This is to include a top-flight movie house, a new concert hall, a "workers" theater, and a so- called All-German Social "Damn it/ I should have taken a second look when I picked this apartment.... I worked on this one myself." Political Center for Popular Education. In the area will be a fashion center--obviously an attempt to compete with West Berlin's status as a major Ger- man center of haute couture. Con- currently, the Leipziger.Strasse area will become the center of the printing and publishing in- dustry. Plans for rebuilding the city include reconstruction of distr. icts near the center--Prenz- lauer Berg and Friedrichshain-- " key is for you, the others are for the repairmen who will probably have to spend some time in your apart- ment next year." SECRET and,southeast of the center, the Neander Quarter is to be pro- vided with apartments for 5,000 persons. Lichtenberg, Weissen- see, and Pankow are also slated for even- tual overhauling, while Treptow and Koepenick will re- ceive more immediate attention. The plan emphasizes the devel- opment of recreational facilities in East Berlin and in the northeastern suburbs of Bernau, Oranienburg, Liebenwalde, Joachims- thai,and Eberswalde. PART I I IApproved For ReIft )3A? : $M% ,gO=A00240010000i-6 VWS age 6 of 14 Approved For'Iease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092702400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 October 1959 The regime has warned East Berliners that progress in re- construction will depend on major progress in the construc- tion industry, which, however, is already in the throes of various difficulties. Suggest- ing that many more pitfalls lie ahead, the East German satiri- cal magazine Eulenspiegel re- cently lampooned East Berlin's chief architect for ferry-build- ing. Keyed to the October cel- ebration, the regime has sched- uled a number of special "vol- untary" workdays to clear away rubble and beautify the city. In Treptow, for example, SED central committee employees and local government officials took up picks and shovels on 12 August to remove debris. Retail Trade Regime media are using all the Communist publicity devices to convince East Berliners that their life will be better in coming years. This campaign is pointed up by SED boss Ulbricht's remarks on 13 August that a number of failures in East Ber- lin city management had been discussed by the SED politburo. Subsequently, a special Neues Deutschland "brigade" published a series of articles pointing out inadequacies in hardware stores, clothing shops, and gro- ceries and featured, as a for- ward step, a self-service gro- cery. Such criticism covers a sharp increase in the tempo of socialization of private retail trade. An East Berlin news- paper reported on 11 September that there had been a 300-per- cent increase. in the number of socialist-type partnership agree- ments between the government and private enterprises signed in the first eight months of 1959 in comparison with 1958. Cultural Plans The regime is making every effort to build up Humboldt University as a rival to the Free University of West Berlin and other West German universi- ties.. Under the plan, some $13,000,000 will be earmarked for reconstruction of its build- ings and construction of new institutes and research facil- ities. Probably in part to counter Western charges that the East German medical profession has been crippled by the flight of hundreds of medical men to the West, the regime is promising improved medical facilities for Humboldt University and various hospitals, including the large Charitg hospital. Industrial Center The investment of over $500,000,000 for expansion of East Berlin's industrial capac- ity constitutes an important part of the seven-year plan to make the city a real competitor with West Berlin. Special em- phasis is placed on increases in key industries, as follows: electro-technical (143 percent), machine building (125 percent), and chemical production (77 per- cent). Certain plants are to be regrouped and reorganized, including the Bergmann Bersig plant, the largest producer of power-generating equipment in East Germany. Some of this construction includes projects for important industrial hous- ing--for example, a whole new area in Friedrichsfelde-Mar- zahn. While emphasizing expan- sion of such key industries, the regime is also underlining improvements in consumer goods producing plants, including a new furniture factory and ex- panded and improved garment factories. SECRET pproved For Re e 0 /2 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART I I N PERSPECTIVES Page. 7 of ' ?14 Approved Forrlease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009202400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 October 1959 Discussion by high regime officials clearly reveals that these plans are designed to overcome serious inddequacies in the city's over-all indus- trial production performance, East Berlin party boss Paul Verner stated in mid-August that there had been serious lags in meeting the plan in the first three months of the year and that the lags had not been made good during the next four months. At the first re- gional conference for East Ber- lin, held in late August, Lord Mayor Friedrich Ebert disclosed that the city is twelfth in plan fulfillment among the 15 East German districts, while the official report for the first six months of 1959 shows that it registered the second lowest increase of all districts. Improved Transportation The seven-year plan for East Berlin calls for three new bridges over the Spree Riv- er, street widening, construc- tion of a new Wilhelm-Pieck- Ring in the city center, and fluorescent lighting of some avenues. Similarly, the whole public transportation system is to be gradually improved. Prospects The regime will make every effort to carry out the main lines of its ambitious program for East Berlin, although it probably will fail in many de- tails. There is no reason to think that--in the absence of far-reaching adversities--East Berlin will not become a more modern and more attractive city during the next seven years. Like all phases of the Sev- en-Year Plan, however, the plan for East Berlin depends on whether the East German economy succeeds in taking the "giant leap forward" that the leader- ship demands. In the event that financial stringencies and un- inspired Communist building methods continue to circumscribe the rebuilding effort, the new city is likely to be character- ized by the same ugly,monotonous, shoddy construction that marked the Stalinallee housing develop- ment. This would be a far cry 25X1 from the well-built,imaginative, and attractive development in West Berlin> 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002400100001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 14 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA SECRET Nor SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Since 6 March 1957, when Ghana became the first tropical African state to evolve from colonial to independent status, Prime Minister Nkrumah's regime has made considerable progress in consolidating its power at home and in extending its in- fluence abroad. Domestic oppo- sition has been largely stifled, a neutralist course not un- friendly to the West has been charted, the economy has been kept on an even keel, and Accra has become a focal point of mil- itant pan-Africanism. Concepts of Western-style democracy have suffered, however, and basic weaknesses are already impeding the progress of this "model" African state. When Britain's former Gold Coast colony emerged as the sovereign, Commonwealth state of Ghana, the specter of civil war still hung over this West African land of approximately 5,000,000 largely illiterate persons. Although Kwame Nkru- mah's Convention People's party (CPP)--the Gold Coast's first genuine mass movement--had al- ready been in office for six years, tribal leaders and con- servative cocoa farmers, espe- cially in the Ashanti region, were by no means reconciled to the modern, unitary, nation- state which the American-edu" cated Nkrumah was determined to create. Sporadic violence involv- ing armed adherents of the CPP and its traditional opponents-- who sought a federal system with wide regional autonomy--had flared in 1954 and 1955. On the. eve of independence in 1957, the CPP government finally accepted Britain's compromise constitu- tion providing for the future establishment of regional as- semblies and incorporating "en- trenched clauses" designed to safeguard the vital interests of Nkrumah's foes. However, his regime, which had been returned to power in July 1956 with 72 of 104 seats in the legislature, made no secret of its determina- tion to alter at the earliest opportunity the clauses to which it objected. Since gaining full control of Ghana's affairs, Nkrumah and his cohorts have succeeded in radically transforming the un- certain domestic political sit- uation which prevailed 30 months ago. Formerly powerful tribal chiefs, the principal bulwarks of his opposition and the old social order, have been politi- cally neutralized and brought under control. Tribal institu- tions which conflict with the CPP's program to modernize and centralize Ghana are under heavy attack and appear to be weaken- ing. The overt, organized polit- ical opposition--which in 1957 combined in the United party (UP)--seems headed for early extinction; its parliamentary strength has already dwindled, as a result of defections and lost by-elections, from 32 in March 1957 to 18. The "en- trenched clauses" have 'long since been swept away, as have practically all constitutional restraints on the executive au- thority, which can now amend the constitution by a simple SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 14 Approved Forlease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009212400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 October 1959 majority vote in the legislature. Farmers and especially or- ganized labor have been brought under increasingly firm control. Meanwhile, the CPP has increased its legislative strength to 83 seats and ex- tended its influence --once limited large- ly to southern Ghana --throughout the coun- try. To most Ghana- ians the party ap- pears to have become virtually synonymous with the government itself. These develop- ments have been aided by favorable economic conditions, the steady erosion of the tradi- tional social struc- ture, the opposition's inability to develop IVORY COAST VOLTA G HAf1A \Voita (_ PROPOSED DAM~ ? ? Regional boundary Road Railroad 0 .-a effective leaders or frame a program capable of attracting mass support, and the CPP's own popularity, superior resources, and more effective organization. In addition, the regime has not hesitated to capitalize on its ability to allocate development funds nor to harass, intimidate, and coerce its opponents, espe- cially through the use of powers of deportation and preventive detention. The latter measure, enacted in mid-1958, enables the govern- ment to detain without trial for up to five years any citizen suspected of acts prejudicial to the defense or security of Ghana. Within the past year some 40 UP adherents, including two members of the National As- sembly, have been imprisoned un- der this law. The regime has recently enacted still further repressive legislation for deal- ing with its opponents in the name of state security. Such measures, coupled with the government's increasing tendency to equate all opposi- tion with disloyalty, if not treason, endanger the future of Western democratic concepts in Ghana. Nevertheless, Nkrumah has not actually acted uncon- stitutionally and still pro- fesses his determination to maintain free elections. Even the regional assemblies were eventually created--and subse- quently abolished--in accord with the letter if not the spirit of the constitution. Furthermore, evidence is strong that opposition elements have in fact been involved in conspiratorial activity with rev- olutionary overtones. Also, some such coercive measures were probably necessary to hold in check the powerful centrifugal forces inherent in Ghana's still largely tribal society. Economic Developments Thanks largely to the gen- eral buoyancy of the world cocoa market, to which it is the larg- est single contributor, Ghana SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 12 of 14 Approved ForB ease 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-009272400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 October 1959 has managed to maintain intact the stable, Western-oriented economy inherited from Britain. Under Nkrumah it continues to enjoy a balanced budget, a sound currency, one of the highest per.- capita incomes in tropical Af- rica, and--for an underdeveloped country--a remarkably even dis- tribution of wealth. Further- more, its foreign debt is still insignificant and its sterling reserves, while somewhat reduced since independence, amount to ap- proximately $300,000,000. So far, however, Nkrumah has made little real progress toward lessening the economy's dependence on cocoa or toward speeding its slow rate of ex- pansion in recent years. Per- capita output, stalled since 1951, apparently dropped in 1958. Over this period public investment totaled about $350,- 000,000, but was not adequately supplemented by private invest- ment of a productive nature. In this connection, inherent economic limitations on profit opportunities in Ghana have in- hibited the concerted effort made by the theoretically so- cialist Nkrumah government to attract foreign private capital. Domestic private capital avail- able for investment remains a negligible factor. This reticence of. potential foreign investors has so far blocked the proposed $600,000,- 000 Volta River power-aluminum project to which the regime is politically committed. Nkrumah is still hoping':that Western aluminum interests will make the scheme eligible for World Bank support by undertaking to fi- nance a smelter; if such Western financing is not forthcoming, he is likely to look elsewhere. Kaiser Industries now is explor- ing prospects of forming a con- sortium. Meanwhile, the government has ,,barked on an ambitious 3eco, Development Plan which calls for public investment of $390,000,000 on general develop- ment and $280,000,000 on hydro- electric power development over the five-year period which began 1 July. Like the Volta project, its full implementation would require heavy foreign borrowing, Foreign Affairs Nkrumah has gained wide publicity and considerable pres- tige for himself and Ghana through his militant activities on behalf of the "total libera- tion" of Africa and the pan-Af- ricanists' ultimate goal of a United States of Africa. In quick succession last year he promoted the first Independent African States conference, the proclamation of a "union"-- still largely unimplemented-- with the new state of Guinea, and the organization of a non- governmental African "people's" movement with headquarters in Accra. He thus boldly challenged Cairo's pretensions to African leadership. However, neither this rivalry nor Ghana's consid- erable contacts with Israel has precluded the development of friendly personal relations, and, recently, a tactical working al- liance between Nkrumah and UAR President Nasir. More conservatively inclined elements--such as President Tub- man of Liberia and moderate Af- rican leaders in nearby French areas and in soon-to-be-inde- pendent Nigeria--have resented, and endeavored with increasing success to frustrate, Nkrumah's attempts to assert a leadership role in African affairs. Among these elements there was widespread satisfaction when the Ghanaian premier suffered a major setback at the West African "summit" conference attended by Tubman, Nkrumah, and Guinea's 3ekou Tour6 in Liberia last July. Nkrumah's program for an immedi- ate, relatively close union among existing African states, to which others would be invited to ad- here as they became independent, was rejected in favor of the more cautious approach toward a looser association advocated by Tubman. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 13 of 14 Approved For. Release 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927402400100001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 October 1959 On the world stage, Nkru- mah's proclaimed policy of "po- sitive neutralism and nonalign ment" has in practice been gen- erally sympathetic toward the West--especially the United States--and wary of entangle- ments with the bloc. Largely as a result of bloc initiatives, however, Ghana's contacts with Communist countries have been increasing since late 1958. East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslo- vakia now have permanent trade delegations in Accra, and in Au- gust the Soviet Union established the first bloc diplomatic post there. Although Nkrumah has ap- parently not as yet been offered any significant long-term eco- nomic aid by the bloc, Ghana's development plans will provide continuing opportunities for economic penetration--especially if Western financing does not materialize in the amounts antic- ipated. Meanwhile, the growing numbers of bloc personnel in Accra will probably attempt to cultivate indigenous leftists and pro-Communists, some of whom occupy high places in the govern- ment, the CPP, and the labor movement. Despite, and to some ex- tent even because of, its suc- cesses, the Nkrumah regime suf- fers from serious weaknesses and deficiencies which it ap- pears unable or unwilling to remedy. Both in the formation and execution of policy it tends to be indecisive, impulsive, arbitrary, and capricious. There is an increasing tendency to rely on words rather than ac- tions and for prestige consid- erations to become decisive-- as in the decision earlier this year to create a navy and air force and add an armored unit to Ghana's 5,000-man army. Pub- lic morality is undermined by the almost certain involvement of top-echelon officials In large-scale corruption. Administrative efficiency suffers from Nkrumah's growing preference for personal rule, from the politicians' distrust of civil servants, and from overemphasis on political con- siderations. Moreover, there are potentially serious rivalries and frictions within the over- centralized CPP, as well as ac- cumulating evidence that its basic vitality may be ebbing. These and other deficien- cies, aggravated by the removal of all restraints on the execu- tive authority and the contin- ued nonexistence of an informed and energetic public opinion, are already a handicap to the country's progress. In time they seem certain to result, assuming the CPP maintains its unity and monopoly of power, in a slower rate of social and economic development and in decreased prestige and influence abroad. They could contribute eventually to the creation of a powerful new op- position and to a power strug- 25X1 gle which could undermine Ghana's present internal stability SECRET Ghana's African policy has inevitably impaired, in varying degrees, its relationships with the colonial powers, including Britain. Nevertheless, Nkru- mah, who was recently appointed a privy councilor, is expected to keep Ghana within the Com- monwealth when he transforms it from a constitutional monarchy to a republic, probably in the near future. Relations with France have deteriorated espe- cially sharply in recent months, as Accra has intensified its propaganda attacks against the new French Community and the French-supported regime in Cam- eroun, taken a leading role in the widespread African condemna- tion of Paris' plans to test nuclear weapons in the Sahara, and recognized the Algerian rebel government. Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 14 of 14 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6 Approved For RWase 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A 400100001-6 SECRET ~FIDENTt ALI Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO02400100001-6