CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002500030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 5, 1959
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. `- ,
OCI No. 5451/59
5 November 1959
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INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL
C
GE NCE
OFFICE OF CURRENT IN MW
CONFIDENTIAL
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ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
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.L
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 November 1959
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
In his speech to the closing session of the Supreme
Soviet on 31 October, Khrushchev reviewed the principal
themes of his "peaceful coexistence" policy. Taking
a moderate line, he observed that there had been a "notice-
able improvement in the international situation" and reaf-
firmed his desire for an early summit meeting which, he
said, should give top priority to disarmament. The speech
provided further evidence that the Soviet premier is en-
countering difficulty in obtaining unqualified support
from some bloc leaders, especially the Chinese, for his
present foreign policy course. He sought to overcome
reservations and doubts regarding the possible long-term
effects of his peaceful coexistence line and issued a
warning against "adventurism in politics."
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The Iraqi Government is expected to begin this month
the trial of several Baathists and other pro-UAR national-
ists for involvement in the attempt to assassinate Qasim.
Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has publicly warned the
UAR that any attempt to stage an uprising in Iraq would
compel Israel to reserve "freedom of action." Considera-
tion of possible contingency action in connection with the
Iraqi situation presumably also has high priority in cur-
rent meetings. between the Shah of Iran and King Husayn in
Jordan. The UAR and the Sudan have reached an accord on
sharing the Nile waters which may pave the way for the
granting of a World Bank loan to the Sudan for initiation
of its Roseires Dam project; construction of the Soviet-
engineered Aswan High Dam in Egypt is scheduled to begin
next month.
SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Peiping has informed the Indian ambassador that there
can be no question of Chinese withdrawal from disputed
border posts, thus rejecting Nehru's condition for negotia-
tions'. The Chinese leaders probably feel a withdrawal
would be interpreted as bowing to Indian pressure and
would weaken their negotiating position. New Delhi, esti-
mating that the Chinese will try to expand their occupation
of the territory in dispute before agreeing to negotiations,
apparently has decided to counter with the swiftest possi-
ble expansion of "Indian presence" in frontier areas.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 November 1959
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ANTI-US RIOTS IN PANAMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Panamanian politicians seeking to exploit public hos-
tility toward US administration of the Canal Zone were
responsible for the violent anti-US rioting in Panama on
3 November, the 56th anniversary of Panamanian independ-
ence. Further disorders may result from the wounding of
several Panamanian citizens by American troops defending
Zone entrances. The intensification of political maneu-
vering in anticipation of next May's presidential election
is expected to provoke ne expressions of resentment
against the United Statesi
NOTES AND COMMENTS
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SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Only minor skirmishes have been reported in Laos
recently. The Communists continue their efforts to pro-
mote antigovernment sentiment through propaganda and
terrorist attacks on government supporters. The trial
of Prince Souphannouvong and 13 other pro-Communist
leaders has again been postponed. The USSR has brought
into the open its opposition, previously expressed only
in private, to the establishment of a permanent UN mis-
sion in Laos. Secretary General Hammarskjold still be-
lieves, however, that he can find a formula for appointing
a "personal" representative despite Soviet objections.
THAI - NORTH VIETNAMESE REPATRIATION AGREEMENT . . . . . . Page 2
Thailand and North Vietnam are preparing to repatri-
ate, starting in January 1960, those Vietnamese refugees
in Thailand who wish to go to North Vietnam. Most of
the 40,000 to 50,000 Vietnamese in Thailand favor the
Hanoi regime, but it. is not known how many will agree
to be repatriated. The Communists may try to prolong
the repatriation process in order to extend the life and
expand the role of their repatriation mission in Thailand.
Bangkok has looked upon the presence of Vietnamese along
its frontier adjoining Laos as a serious security problem..
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 November 1959
PART II (continued)
INDONESIA DISTURBED OVER ITS RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST
CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The treatment received by Indonesian Foreign Minister
Subandrio during his recent visit to Peiping apparently
left him angered and frightened by Communist China's
aggressiveness and power. Subandrio has told the American
ambassador in Djakarta that while there could be no dras-
tic change in Indonesia's policy of nonalignment there
would probably be some "adjustments." These might include
cautious moves to increase Indonesia's solidarity with its
Southeast Asian ne' means of standing up to
Communist China.
PEIPING AGAIN OPTIMISTIC OVER ECONOMIC PROSPECTS . . . . . Page 5
The Chinese Communist leaders seem to have regained
some of the exuberance they lost during the spring and
summer months. They now predict that the 1959 economic
goals, as revised last August, will be met ahead of sched-
ule. This is possible insofar as industry is concerned,
since the August targets were set deliberately low and
since there has been improvement in the output of key
items in the past two months. The predictions are unreal-
istic for agriculture, however. The extensive summer
drought makes it extremely unlikely that the country can
exceed last year's crops, let alone achieve the scheduled
10-percent increase in grain and cotton.
JAPANESE - NORTH KOREAN REPATRIATION . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Preparations for the repatriation of Korean residents
in Japan to North Korea, scheduled to begin in early
December, are under way following approval by Chosen Soren,
the pro-Communist Korean residents' organization, of modi-
fications in procedures proposed by Tokyo. The lifting
of Chosen Soren's boycott does not ensure smooth operation
of the program, however, as the departure of a disappoint-
ingly small number of repatriates could result in renewed
Communist obstruction. Implementation of the program will
further strain relations between South Korea and Japan and
may influence Rhee to suspend the negotiations for a set-
tlement of outstanding differences--talks which were re-
sumed in Tokyo last August.
INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY FACES CRUCIAL POLICY DECISION . .
The Indian Communist party, facing its most serious
. Page 6
internal crisis in ten years, is scheduled to convene its
national council on 10 November for a showdown on policy
and leadership. The damage to Communist unity and pres-
tige resulting from Sino-Indian border developments and
loss of power in Kerala State has widened the rift between
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 November 1959
PART II (continued)
extremist factions and brought the party to the point
of an open break. The present leadership, which has the
support of Moscow:in its moderate position on internal
and external issues, probably will be able to contain
the di._'idents by making some concessions.
CEYLON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Ceylon's Dahanayake government remains in a vulner-
able position despite its survival of a no-confidence
motion in Parliament on 30 October. Cabinet dissension,
the ruling group's dangerously slim parliamentary major-
ity, and charges implicating leading government officials
in the assassination of Bandaranaike make for instability.
Prime Minister Dahanayake's concern over these factors
probably was responsible for the adjournment of Parlia-
ment until 24 November, after only three days in session.
UNREST INCREASING IN BELGIAN CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Severe rioting in the Belgian Congo interior near
Stanleyville, which cost the lives of about 70 Africans
during the week end of 31 October, marked the first
spread of serious nationalist disorders outside the lower
Congo. The clashes between natives and Belgian troops
followed in the wake of attacks on Belgian policy by sev-
eral nationalist groups. In Brussels the government has
accepted opposition Socialist proposals for round-table
conferences with Congolese leaders in November in an
effort to ensure the holding of the communal and terri-
torial elections in the Congo in December.
FRENCH ALGERIAN PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
In view of the broad public support De Gaulle has
won for his Algerian program, announced on 16 September,
his current "information" campaign appears primarily
designed to overcome army dissatisfaction. He has felt
it necessary to call for "absolute loyalty and discipline"
in carrying out his policies, and the emphasis being placed
by top military and civilian officials on France's long-
term presence in Algeria seems aimed at army extremists
who fear De Gaulle may "abandon" Algeria. This apparent
hardening of the French position has distressed moderates
who had hoped to see early and fruitful negotiations
between Paris and the rebels.
ITALY MAY GRANT TRADE CONCESSIONS TO USSR . .
. Page 11
Pressure by Italian industrialists may lead the Segni
government to grant the USSR substantial additional credits
following the forthcoming Italian-Soviet trade talks in
Rome.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 November 1959
PART II (continued)
RUMANIA ATTEMPTS TO STEP UP ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH
WEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
For the past several months Rumania has been striving
to expand its economic relations with the West and, with a
view to obtaining further Western credits, to build Western
confidence in its financial soundness and international
responsibility. To this end, the Rumanians have indicated
a readiness to discuss settlement of nationalization claims
and to explore possibilities for expanded cultural rela-
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Party instructions for the Czechoslovak Third Five-
Year Plan (1961-65), which in tone and spirit recall
Soviet economic policies of the Stalin era, stipulate a
60-percent rise in output for heavy industry, a 30-per-
cent rise for light industry, and a 21-percent increase
in agricultural production. The new program implies
added strains on investment resources and only marginal
improvements in the consumer's lot. Any serious public
discontent as a result of slowness in improving the
standard of living would probably be met with economic
concessions, however, even if these involved some tempo-
rary decline in the rate of industrial growth.
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EAST GERMAN CHURCH-STATE STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES . . . . . . Page 14
The Ulbricht regime is preparing to sever the East
German Evangelical Church from its leadership in West
Berlin, and there is some evidence that it is winning the
cooperation of some high-ranking clergy in East Germany.
In the event the Communists meet with further success
among the clergy, the regime will probably move to set
up a separate church and thus split one of the few remain-
ing all-German organizations.
THE SITUATION IN CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
In line with its drastic approach to economic reforms,
many of which are badly needed, the Castro government has
passed a new mining law severely restricting private mining
enterprises and has seized the files of foreign oil com-
panies. Castro's erratic conduct, as well as the revival
of the revolutionary tribunals, has led to criticism in
other Latin American countries. Havana may be planning
to resume diplomatic relations with the USSR and open
trade relations with East Germany.
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PART II (continued)
BOLIVIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The presidential ambitions of two leading personali-
ties in Bolivia's ruling party, the MNR, are causing
serious unrest and outbreaks of armed violence. MNR leader
and former President Paz, who apparently has President Siles'
support, and Walter Guevara, leader of the party's right
wing, are mustering armed militia units for a possible
showdown.
BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Since re-election the Macmillan government has given
priority to improving Britain's relations with the six
European Economic Community (EEC) members. By hinting
at greater willingness to participate in regional projects,
London seeks to avert rapid extension of EEC activities
which might further reduce British influence on the conti-
nent. Foreign Secretary Lloyd will promote his plans in
a visit to Paris on 11 and 12 November, and Chancellor
Adenauer and Premier Segni will soon visit London in an
endeavor to strengthen ties.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
FACTORS IN THE PROBLEM OF NORTH AFRICAN UNITY .
The independence secured in 1956 by Morocco and
Tunisia and the struggle for independence under way in
Algeria have led area leaders to serious consideration
of the relations of North African political entities with
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III (continued)
each other and with outside blocs. Some North African
leaders have been seeking to bring about a united "Maghreb
federation" in northwest Africa. Some go further and
envisage an alliance of North African states with France
or association with a European community. Intra-Maghreb
frictions seem to rule out a closely knit federation, but
some form of loose union which would extend North Africa's
traditional ties with Western Europe might be possible
and would provide the diversification of contacts North
Africans seek.
FRENCH COMMUNITY IN EVOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
President de Gaulle is guiding the development of
the French Community toward a more flexible structure
providing for varying degrees of autonomy in an effort
to make the Community acceptable to African nationalism
and possibly to attract new members. Negotiations for
a looser relationship between Paris and the Federation
of Mali--comprising the republics of Soudan and Senegal--
are likely to begin after the next meeting of the Commu-
nity Executive Council, scheduled for December. French
officials may also see the concept of an evolutionary
Community as providing the legal framework for a solution
of the Algerian problem. In view of increasing nation-
alist aspirations throughout France's present and former
possessions, however, it appears doubtful that any French-
proposed association, however liberal, can be attractive
for long.
SOVIET REACTION TO THE AMERICAN EXHIBITION IN MOSCOW . . . Page 14
Despite strenuous efforts by the Soviet regime to
undermine the impact of the American exhibition in Moscow,
the fair was the object of intense popular curiosity. Well
over 2,000,000 Soviet citizens attended, which was some-
what more than the number specified in the US-Soviet
exhibition agreement. Their reaction appears to have been
one of general approval, although there was some adverse
comment on certain of the exhibits and on the organization
of the fair. The impact of the fair has apparently been
felt in the highest party circles and may have contributed
to the recent government announcement of a slight increase
in consumer goods production.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 November 1959
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH
Khrushchev's speech to the
closing session of the Supreme
Soviet on 31 October was the
most comprehensive exposition
to date of his policy of "peace-
ful coexistence." Indicating
satisfaction with the "notice-
able improvement in the inter-
national situation," he said
the prospects for strengthen-
ing peace "have become more fa-
vorable."
In his notably moderate
and restrained speech, the Soviet
premier claimed a major shift
had occurred in Western pol-
icy and attitudes toward
the USSR. He attributed this
to a "more sober evaluation"
and "sensible understanding" in
the West of the "position of
forces in the international
area." "Even some of the ac-
tive conductors of the 'posi-
tions of strength' policy see
its futility," he said, and
predicted that this more "sen-
sible understanding" will lead
to the abandonment of "calcu-
lations of using military
forces against the socialist
world."
Khrushchev's discussion
contained no indication of any
important changes in the Soviet
position. He repeated his fa-
vorable assessment of his US
visit and talks with President
Eisenhower and attempted to
convey the impression that he
had reached "mutual understand-
ing" with both the President
and Prime Minister Macmillan on
a summit meeting.
While he avoided direct
criticism of De Gaulle's posi-
tion on the timing of a meeting,
he rejected the view of "some
statesmen in the West" that the
heads of government should meet
only after agreement has been
reached on major questions. He
reaffirmed his preference for
an early summit meeting and pro-
posed an agenda which gave top
priority to disarmament, fol-
lowed by a German peace treaty,
Berlin, and "other internation-
al questions of general inter-
est."
Khrushchev expressed appre-
ciation of the statements by De
Gaulle and Premier Debrg on the
"inviolability" of the Oder-
Neisse frontier. He gave a
cautious endorsement to De
Gaulle's recent statement on
Algeria, probably to appear re-
sponsive to the French cabinet's
communique of 21 October which
stressed the importance an
improvement in the "world
climate" would. play in jus-;
tifying French participation
in a summit conference.
At the same time, however,
Khrushchev repeated the
standard expression of Soviet
sympathy for peoples who are
"struggling for independence and
national liberty."
In Moscow's first authori-
tative response to recent state-
ments by American officials
holding the USSR at least
partially responsible for Pei-
ping's actions, Khrushchev de-
nounced these as a "psychological
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
attack against the Soviet Union"
and accused the US of trying to
distort the character of Sino-
Soviet relations and cast doubt
on Peiping's sovereignty.
He repeated Moscow's view
that the Taiwan question is a
"purely internal affair of
China" and expressed confidence
that "Taiwan and the other is-
lands will be reunited with the
rest of China." Although he
made no mention of the use of
force, Khrushchev renewed So-
viet pledges to support Peiping
"until it has achieved settle-
ment of this question because
the legal and moral right is on
its side."
KhjL?ushchev carefully ad-
hered to his neutral position
on the Sino-Indian border dis-
pute, expressing hope for a
peaceful settlement satisfac-
tory to both sides.
The speech provided further
evidence that Khrushchev is en-
countering difficulties in ob-
taining unqualified support
from some bloc leaders, espec-
ially the Chinese, for his pres-
ent foreign policy course. Ap-
parently in an effort to meet
reservations and doubts about
the long-range effects of his
peaceful coexistence policy,
Khrushchev gave a lengthy ex-
position of the nature and
limits of this concept and
stoutly defended the need for
"flexibility" in foreign policy
without abandoning "principles."
He cited Lenin's teaching that
the "working class, before as
well as after it has gained pow-
er, must be able to pursue a
flexible policy, compromise,
and come to agreement whenever
life and the interests of the
cause demand it,"
He contended that "mutual
concessions" are necessary in
the present state of East-West
relations, but added that "one
must not confuse mutual conces-
sions in the interest of peace-
ful coexistence" with ideologi-
cal concessions, Presumably
in response to unnamed critics,
Khrushchev emphasized "there
cannot be any question of con-
cessions or adaptation" in
matters of ideology.
The gravity of the prob-
lem which apparently has been
created by Peiping's coolness
toward Khrushchev's present
policy was underscored by his
resort to the extraordinary
device of resurrecting the
episode of Trotsky's opposi-
tion to Lenin's decision to
make peace with Germany in
1918 "to ensure for the young
Soviet state the possibility
of peaceful construction of
socialism." Except for passing
references in Khrushchev's
secret speech at the 20th par-
ty congress, this is the first
mention of Trotsky by a
top Soviet leader in many
years.
Khrushchev's denunciation
of Trotsky's "adventurist pol-
icy" of "neither peace nor war"
almost certainly was aimed di-
rectly at the Chinese Commu-
nist leaders. He remarked
pointedly that Trotsky's posi-
tion had "played into the
hands of the German im-
perialists," recalled the dif-
ficulties his policy had
created for the "young so-
cialist state," and conclud- 25X1
ed with the observation that
"such were the fruits of
adventurism in politics!'
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Iraq
Although the situation in
Iraq remains calm outwardly, an
underlying feeling of tension
permeates the country, Nation-
alists and Communists are ap-
parently awaiting the opening
of the trials of those charged
with the assassination attempt
on Premier Qasim--and the pre-
mier's release from the hos-
pital--before making new moves.
Security authorities remain
apprehensive about demonstra-
tions tentatively scheduled
for the day of Qasim's release.
These are likely to lead to
clashes between nationalists
and Communists. The military
governor, General Abdi, is
said to be contemplating the
cancellation of parades on
that day.
Qasim appears to be slow-
ly recovering from his wounds.
He carries on state business
from his hospital room and re-
ceives visitors every day--in-
cluding the Soviet and Turkish
ambassadors on 1-November. His
full recovery may take several
more weeks, and he has stated
that he does not wish to leave
the hospital until he is a
"whole man" unencumbered by
the cast on his left arm.
The expulsion of the sec-
ond secretary of the UAR Em-
bassy in Baghdad on 1 November
for subversive activities was
a further blow to pro-UAR na-
tionalists in Iraq. Mahdawi
is likely to use this incident
to build his charges of UAR im-
plication in the Qasim assas-
sination attempt.
Along the Shatt al Arab
river, the tension which exist-
ed laet:. week over Iran's' cha.l-
iengipg .of the rules of Iraqi -
port:;Authorities:_.has eased. to
some.degrpee :Several ships;-have
made the trip to and from the
Iranian port of Khosroabad with-
out incident, despite the warn-
ing by Iraqi port authorities
that they would take action
against ships using the port
because they consider use of
the port a menace to navigation.
The next sailing from Khosroabad
is scheduled for 8 November.
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The Shah has stated he
will not insist at this time
that ships destined for Ira
nian part s use Iranian pilots
and fly the Iranian flag. Iran,
however, intends to continue
to provide naval escorts for
ships using Khosroabad to en-
sure against interference by
the Iraqis. The Shah has in-
dicated that he is ready at
any time to begin negotiations
with Iraq over questions of
sovereignty and navigation on
the Shatt al Arab.
The Shah's visit to Jor-
dan from 2 to 6 November prob-
ably is causing additional con-
cern in Iraq. The Shah, how-
ever, while discussing contin-
gency plans regarding Iraq
with Jordanian King Husayn, is
probably cautioning him against
intervention at this time in
Iraqi affairs.
The clandestine Soviet
radio "The National Voice of
Iran," located in the Caucasus,
has warned meanwhile that the
Shah's trip--which will be fol-
lowed by visits to Tehran by
Pakistani President Ayub and
Turkish Premier Menderes--in-
dicates that a plot "primarily
directed against Iraq" is being
hatched. The broadcast ad-
vised Iranian Army officers to
show that they will not be used
in the "execution of the Shah's
fabrications."
The main issues in the
long-standing Nile waters dis-
pute between the Sudan and the
UAR have been resolved, accord-
ing to unofficial announcements,
and the negotiators now are
drafting a formal agreement.
President Nasir personally set
the tone for the talks, which
have been under way in Cairo
more than three weeks, and the
UAR made concessions to meet
most of the Sudanese demands.
Egypt is to receive about 75
percent of the usable Nile
flow, and the Sudan about 25
percent.
A difficult issue was the
amount of compensation the UAR
is to pay for Sudanese lands
which will be flooded by the
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5 November 1959
Aswan High Dam. There may be
further wrangling on this
point, but signature of a com-
prehensive agreement is expect-
ed within the next few days.
This will pave the way for the
grant of a $50,000,000-$60,-
000,000 World Bank loan to the
Sudan for its Roseires Dam
project. Construction of the
first stage of the Soviet-engi-
neered Aswan High Dam in Egypt
is scheduled to begin next
month.
The UAR-Sudanese agreement
may cause friction with Ethi-
opia and with the United King-
dom, speaking for Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanganyika. "These:" riparian
states insisted on a voice in any final
allocation of the Nile waters.
The unstable and unpopu-
lar Abboud military government
is gaining new public support
in the Sudan by emphasizing
the favorable terms of the ac-
cord, even though many Sudan-
ese remain suspicious that
somehow the UAR will get the
best of the deal. The govern-
ment urgently needs such sup-
port to contend with coup plot-
ting by disgruntled junior army
officers and with pressures by
political and religious lead-
ers for an early return to ci-
vilian government.
The Israeli elections on
3 November increased the par-
liamentary strength of David
Ben-Gurion's Mapai party, but
the increase was not sufficient
for a majority of the 120 seats
in the Knesset. Another coa-
lition accordingly will be
required to form a government,
and Ben-Gurion, who has long
chafed under coalition re-
strictions, is expected to lead
it again as prime minister.
Mapai apparently will have
47 seats compared with 40 in
the previous Knesset. Its most
serious challenger, the ultra-:
nationalist Herut party, also
obtained an increased percent-
age of the total vote which,
in Israel's involved system of
proportional representation,
will go from 15 to 17 seats.
The conservative General Zion-
ists, the left-wing socialist
Achdut Haavoda party, and the
Communists all received small-
er percentages of the vote.
The votes obtained by the
other established parties were
about equal to their previous
percentages. A plethora of new
parties, five of which hoped to
exploit the grievances of "ori-
ental" Jews, failed to attract
any significant voting support.
The Israelis apparently be-
lieve that UAR intervention in
Iraq would result in widespread
chaos in the area, which could
lead to Nasir's domination of
Jordan..
The latter possibility has
consistently evoked concern in
Istael. In a pre-election
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5 November 1959
interview, Ben-Gurion warned
that any UAR attempt to stage
a coup in Iraq would compel
Israel to "reserve freedom of
action."
The apprehension in Israel
and the UAR led on 4 November
to an air clash along the Israe-
li-Egyptian border. Tel Aviv
radio claims four Egyptian MIG-
17s entered Israeli air space
but were driven off after a
short fight. Cairo radio as-
serts that six Israeli Mysteres
violated Egyptian territory
The Chinese Communists
have recently indicated that
the major stumbling block
to the start of negotiations
with New Delhi on the border
dispute is Nehru's insistence
that Chinese troops must first
be withdrawn from border out-
posts in Indian-claimed terri-
tory. Peiping's Foreign Min-
istry officials told the In-
dian ambassador in late October
that these troops are occupying
China's own territory and there
could be no question of with-
drawing before negotiations.
nese view that there should
be "no prior conditions" for
Mao Tse-tung and Liu
ao-c had stressed the Chi-
negotiations.
25X1 I I "we want" the border
problem to be solved and "we
are ready to solve it at any
moment as soon as possible."
The Chinese leaders will
probably stand firm on this po-
sition. They apparently believe
that acceptance of Nehru's re-
and that in the ensuing battle
one Israeli plane was hit.
One or both of the forma-
tions probably engaged in a
reconnaissance of the border
areas.
quest for withdrawals would
be interpreted as bowing to
Indian pressure. Peiping seems
particularly concerned that
withdrawal of its forces from
the Ladakh area would preju-
dice its claims to this area
in future negotiations with
New Delhi.
Despite their firmness
on the issue of troop with-
drawals, the Chinese apparent-
ly do not wish to appear ob-
structionist in the matter of
negotiations.
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k R~";firCoad constructed by
1 y r # Chinese in 1957
(., sin dis,! )
~JCEASE-FigF tIN?E ..^.
Srinagar
EASTERN LADAKH AREA
(Clash 21 October 1959)
Selected road
25X1 ---Selected trail
a
25X1
25X1
New Delhi's increasingly
firm attitude was indicated by
its strongly worded reply on
4 November to Peiping's state-
ment of 26 October. The note
denied China's claims to Indian
territory and demanded the Chi-
nese quit Indian soil, "va-
cating their aggression" both
in Ladakh and at the Lon>.iu
25X1
on 5 November, Nehru emphasized
his desire for a peaceful solu-
tion of the border dispute but
did not rule out use of force
to recover Indian territory
under Chinese occupation.
New Delhi now estimates
I
Lake
Nyak
McMAHON LINE
Shillong- `j
that although Peiping does not
intend to commit itself to
large-scale military action
against Indian territory it
hopes to secure control of as
much of the disputed Tibetan
border areas as it can. Be-
lieving that the Chinese will
try to expand their occupation
of the territory in dispute be-
fore agreeing to negotiations,
New Delhi apparently has de-
cided on a policy of counter-
ing Peiping's moves with the
swiftest possible expansion of
"Indian presence" in frontier
areas.
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The violent demonstrations
of 3 November against the Canal
Zone and other US installations
in Panama were touched off by
nationalistic politicians seek-
ing to exploit_Panamanian re-
sentment of US policies in the
Zone. The wounding of several
demonstrators by US forces de-
fending entrances to the Zone
may provide extremists with a
popular cause that could re-
sult in fresh disorders. The
Panamanian National Guard did
little to prevent or control
rioting and incursions into the
Zone.
Former Foreign Minister
Aquilino Boyd, a presidential
hopeful and an opposition dep-
uty in the legislature, issued
a call in July for the "peaceful
occupation" of the Canal Zone
by Panamanians bearing flags on
3 November, the 56th anniversary
of Panamanian independence. He
was supported by rabidly anti-
US university professor Ernesto
Castillero, who urged massive
participation in a Gandhi-type
civil resistance march into the
Zone.
Boyd and Castillero re-
mained adamant in spite of pres-
sure from government officials
urging that the scheme be aban-
doned or its scope reduced to
that of a symbolic gesture.
Student groups reportedly failed
to endorse the demonstration
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5 November 1959
proposal because it was viewed
as a political maneuver de-
signed to win support for Boyd
in his presidential campaign.
Panamanians have continual-
ly demanded their country re-
ceive a greater share of canal
revenues and be recognized as
retaining sovereignty over the
territory of the Canal Zone.
They also charge that the US
has failed to live up to its
commitments under the 1955
treaty governing the adminis-
tration of the Zone. Specific
Panamanian complaints are that
Panamanian workers in the Zone
receive lower wages than Amer-
icans performing identical tasks
there and that US agencies in
the Zone purchase products from
foreign countries which, under
terms of the treaty, should be
purchased from Panama.
Foreign Minister Miguel
Moreno won enthusiastic Pana-
manian approval when he un-
SECRET
expectedly voiced these complaints
at the August foreign ministers'
meeting in Santiago and again
at the opening session of the
UN General Assembly in September.
He repeated his accusations in
a speech last week in Bogota.
Elements of the corrupt
ruling oligarchy find it con-
venient to use anti-US senti-
ments to distract popular at-
tention from deep-seated eco-
nomic and social discontent
among Panama's lower income
groups. An intensification of
pre-election political ac-
tivity prior to the national
presidential election in May
1960 is expected to result
in a more emphatic campaign
for added canal benefits.
Further, political exploitation
of emotionally charged canal
issues may lead to additional
disorders similar to those
of 3 November.
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5 November 1959
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SITUATION IN LAOS
Only minor skirmishing has
been reported in Laos in the
last few days, but the Communist
dissidents continue their ef-
forts to promote antigovernment
sentiment through a combination
of propaganda and terrorist at-
tacks on supporters of the Phoui
regime. Laotian Army elements
advancing in the Ma River area
of northeastern Sam Neua
Province are encountering lit-
tle resistance, but this lack
of opposition probably re-
flects a deliberate attempt by
the dissidents to save their
strength and is not due to any
diminution of their capa-
bilities in this area.
The death of King Sisavong
Vong caused Phoui and his par-
ty to cut short their visit to
Washington and New York and pre-
vented the premier from keep-
ing a previously arranged ap-
pointment with UN Secretary Gen-
eral Hammarskjold. Prince Re-
gent Savang, who was proclaimed
the new King on 1 November, is
likely to play a more active
role in government affairs than
his father. Savang is strongly
anti-Communist and a supporter
of the Committee for the Defense
of National Interests (CDNI),
which is in an uneasy coalition
with Phoui's Rally of the Lao
People (RLP).
The government has again
postponed the trial of Prince
Souphannouvong and- 13 other
pro-Communist leaders of the
Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ), this
time until after 13 November;
inadequacy of security arrange-
ments was the reason given.
Hanoi, and to a lesser de-
gree Peiping and Moscow, con-
tinue to protest against a trial.
On 31 October and 2 November
respectively, the foreign min-
isters of North Vietnam and Com-
munist China addressed formal
protests to the British foreign
secretary and to the Soviet for-
eign minister as cochairmen of
the Geneva Conference, calling
for "urgent measures" to prevent
the trial on the ground that it
would violate the Geneva agree-
ments of 1954 and the Vientiane
agreements of 1957.and block a
peaceful solution. The Chinese
letter reiterated Peiping's
view that the dispute should be
settled through broad negotia-
tions.
On 30 October the USSR
publicized its opposition to any
action in the UN which would set
up a-permanent mission in Laos.
Soviet UN delegation press re-
lease stated that there can be
"no question of the Soviet Union
supporting or even tacitly agree-
ing to use the name of ;the :United
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Nations to cover up such unlaw-
ful actions." The Soviet Un-
C H I N A
SALY
LUANG PRABANG
uang Prabann
SAYABOURY
S
MALAYA
1\ o
N ~.S~NGAPCR
XIENG
KHOUANG
AL
VIENTIANE
W*IANE
NORTH
VIETNAM
ion's opposition had previous-
ly been expressed in strong
Pakse
?
CHAMPASSAK
rn
-a
z
D
terms through private
diplomatic discus-
sions. Its present
action, forcing deli-
cate behind-the-scenes
negotiations into the
open, is probably in-
tended to disabuse
those who believe that
the USSR will consent
to make easy a smooth
transition from the
subcommittee to an-
other, more permanent,
UN presence.
Hammarskj old still
believes, however, that
he can find a basis
for his actions which
will enable him to ap-
point a "personal"
representative despite
Soviet objections. He
now plans to leave for
Vientiane on about 10
November. Meanwhile,
the subcommittee has
completed the report
of its mission to Laos,
but the date of formal
presentation to the
Security Council is
still uncertain and
may be deferred.
Bangkok and Hanoi have an-
nounced preparations to imple-
ment the agreement reached last
August providing for repatria-
tion of those Vietnamese refu-
gees in Thailand who wish to
go to North Vietnam. Thai Gov-
ernment and Red Cross officials
have set up provincial commit-
tees to process repatriates,
and registration will take place
between 2 and 20 November. In-
cluded in the first contingent
will be some 280 Vietnamese who
have been detained by the
Thai Government as suspected
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pro-Communists, but who had
been released recently so that
they might dispose of their
property. The first refugees
are to be returned by ship in
January 1960.
Most of these. refugees
fled to Thailand when the French
resumed control of Indochina
after World War II, and an es-
timated 90 percent of them fa-
vor North Vietnam. The Thai
Government has long sought to
effect at least a partial solu-
tion to the serious internal
security problem posed by their
presence along the strategic
northeast frontier adjoining
Laos. Recent reports indicate
that several hundred may have
crossed the border to join
rebel forces in southern Laos.
North Vietnam has estab-
lished an Overseas Vietnamese
service to study repatriation
policies, and the minister of
interior recently led a two-day
conference to discuss resettle-
ment measures. These measures
are intended to provide for re-
patriates from New Caledonia
and French Guiana, as well as
those from Thailand. There
are about 5,000 Vietnamese con-
tract laborers in New Caledonia
and 300 Vietnamese in French
Guiana who were formerly politi-
cal prisoners.
The two North Vietnamese
Red Cross representatives who
will serve as "advisers" to the
Thai Red Cross in connection
with the repatriation sought
but were refused permission to
set up their mission in Bangkok
in October, instead of early No-
vember as scheduled. They left
Hanoi on 24 October, however,
and proceeded to Rangoon, where
they remained until admitted to
Thailand on 2 November. Hanoi
will probably attempt to magni-
fy the importance of the mission,
in line with North Vietnam's
policy of promoting official
and semiofficial contacts with
nonbloc nations.
Although Hanoi is active-
ly publicizing preparations to
receive repatriates, it is un-
certain how many of the 40,000
to 50,000 Vietnamese in Thai-
land will actually agree to
move. 25X1
the refu-
gees have not disposed of prop-
erty in anticipation of repatri-
ation. 25X1
Hanoi has
instructed the refugees to de-
lay repatriation. North Viet-
nam may wish to draw out the
repatriation process in order to
extend the life and possibly ex-
pand the role of its mission in
Bangkok. Such action would also
prolong the presence of a poten-
tial fifth column in Thailand.
25X1
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5 November 1959
INDONESIA DISTURBED OVER ITS RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA
The experience of Indone-
sian Foreign Minister Subandrio
during his recent four-day
visit to Peiping apparently left
him angered and terrified by the
revelation of Communist China's
aggressiveness and power. In a
conversation with the American
ambassador in Djakarta, Suband-
rio stated that his eyes had
been opened to China's expan-
sionist aims and, that,while
there could be no drastic change
in Indonesia's independent for-
eign policy, "adjustments in
degree and attitude" would cer-
tainly take place.
Subandrio's visit was
prompted by strong Chinese Com-
munist protests over an Indo-
nesian Government decree re-
quiring the withdrawal of alien
retail merchants from rural
areas by the beginning of 1960.
Most of these merchants are
Overseas Chinese. He reported
that Chinese officials in dis-
cussions-with the Indonesians
were arrogant, patronizing, and
abusive. They charged that
harassment of the Overseas Chi-
nese was American inspired, and,
in an effort to force repeal or
substantial modification of the
ban, threatened economic retali-
ation and other unspecified
Subandrio, who has long
been a supporter of Indonesia's
policy of nonalignment, told
Ambassador Jones he would like
to review Indonesia's policy,
but that there could be no dras-
tic change because Communist
China is a close and powerful
neighbor. He further implied
that Indonesia could not afford
to alienate Sino-Soviet bloc
support for its claim to West
Irian (Netherlands New Guinea).
He asserted, however, that the
Indonesian Government would not
back down in implementing the
ban on alien retailers and that
his position had the full sup-
port of President Sukarno. He
pleaded for continued American
support in the face of expected
further Chinese pressures.
In public statements since
his visit, Subandrio has main-
tained a cautious appearance of
friendly relations with Communist
China. During a Manila stopover
after his Peiping trip, he/
publicly
stressed Indonesia s desire for
closer ties with its Southeast
Asian neighbors. Subandrio in-
sisted to Ambassador Jones, how-
ever, that his remarks in the
Philippines were intended to
stress the need for solidarity
in standing up to Communist
China, and he may hope to move
cautiously in this direction
within the framework of Indo-
nesia's "nonalignment " policy.
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In the past few months the
Chinese Communist leaders seem
to have recovered some of the
exuberance which had earlier
characterized their approach to
the "great leap forward." Party
and government spokesmen are
painting a picture of China's
economic prospects for this
year and next, which is brighter
than that presented to the pub-
lic last August, when sharp cuts
had to be made in the targets
for 1959.
These spokesmen say that
the party-initiated work drive
led to a marked upswing in pro-
duction during September and
October, at least in industrial
production and construction ac-
tivity. Steel production, for
example, is said to have jumped
20 percent in September and
another 14 percent in October.
Heartened by figures such
as these, the leaders now con-
fidently predict that most in-
dustries will fulfill their re-
vised 1959 goals some 10-15
days ahead of schedule, thus
opening the way for a further
"leap forward" during 1960.
While fluctuations in the
tone of public discussion of
economic matters in Communist
China have typically been great-
er than the fluctuations in
actual performance, an improve-
ment does indeed appear to have
taken place. This has been due
only partly to the party's drive
to revitalize the "leap." Sea-
sonal and long-term factors--
including the normal increase
in production which takes place
in the second half of the year
and the coming into production
of new plant capacity--also con-
tributed to the stepped up pace.
The suspicion is strong, how-
ever, that the Chinese leaders
chose to ignore these factors
so as to make the response to
their call for harder work ap-
pear more impressive.
Peiping has in fact been
using the recent upswing as ev-
idence of the indispensability
of the mass campaign to bring
about such upsurges in produc-
tion. It has engaged in a truc-
ulent defense of this mechanism
for extracting more work from
the Chinese people in the face
of attacks by critics who have
labeled certain past campaigns
"horrible disasters." The party
is readying a massive rural work
campaign for the coming winter
which may approach in intensity
the massive drive in the winter
of 1957-58 which kicked off the
"leap forward."
The improvement in outlook
thus far is largely confined to
industry and does not extend to
agriculture, although the re-
gime's farm procurement programs
show some improvement over last
year. There is good reason to
regard with considerable reserve
the regime's professed belief
that a 10-percent increase will
be achieved in this year's out-
put of grain and cotton. This
claim is being advanced in the
teeth of what one agricultural
leader in Peiping has described
as the worst natural calamities
since the regime came to power
ten years ago.
Information from independent
sources on weather in China con-
firms there was a serious drought
in key farm areas and suggests
it covered a sufficiently large
area and lasted long enough to
make it doubtful that China can
equal last year's actual pro-
duction. In any case, the
revised goals of 275,000,000
tons of grain and 2,300,000
tons of cotton remain well
out of Peiping's reach, al=
though the leaders will
probably end by.claiming
that the goals were met.
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Preparations for the re-
patriation to North Korea of
Korean residents in Japan sched-
uled to begin early in December
are under way following approval
by Chosen Soren, the pro-Commu-
nist Korean residents' organi-
zation, of modifications in
procedures proposed by Tokyo.
The lifting of Chosen Soren's
boycott does not ensure smooth
operation of the program, how-
ever, as the departure of a dis-
appointingly small number of
repatriates could result in
renewed Communist obstruction.
Implementation of the program
will further strain relations
between South Korea and Japan.
The revised procedures will
permit limited, controlled con-
tacts between the repatriates
and their relatives at railroad
stations and at Niigata, the
port of embarkation. Final
interviews at Niigata to estab-
lish the voluntary intentions
of the repatriates will be con-
ducted with families, rather
than with individuals, in the
presence of the International
Committee of the Red Cross'
(ICRC) representative.
Although these procedures
would seem to give Chosen Soren
additional opportunities to
exert pressure on unwilling or
wavering individuals, Tokyo
claims they do not substantively
affect the repatriates' "free-
dom of choice." The ICRC
probably will cooperate in the
program, unless Chosen Soren
creates an incident which
flagrantly violates the prin-
ciples the international body
has established for guarantee-
ing the Koreans voluntary
choice of residence.
The registration of pro-
spective repatriates between
4 and 6 November should indi-
cate roughly how many of the
approximately 700,000 Korean
residents in Japan desire to
go to North Korea. 25X1
Chosen Soren 25X1
will select the repatriates and
screen them for political re-
liability, presumably to satisfy
North Korean requirements. While
Pyongyang apparently wants re-
patriation to proceed, it is
likely to continue harassment
of the Japanese by charging in-
fractions of the agreement.
Although announcement of
the agreement with Chosen Soren
prompted South Korean threats
to break off talks now under way
in Tokyo for a settlement of
outstanding problems, this has
not yet occurred and some re-
sponsible officials hope the
discussions will continue. The
negotiations have made little
substantive progress to date,
largely because Seoul has not
developed any positive policies.
25X1
The Indian Communist party,
facing its most serious internal
crisis in ten years, is sched-
uled to convene its national
council on 10 November for a
showdown on policy and leadef-
ship. The damage to Communist
unity and prestige.in India re-
sulting from recent Sino-Indian
border developments--coming
on top of the Communist set-
back in Kerala State--has
widened the rift between extrem-
ist leaders on the right and
left and brought the party fac-
tions to the point of an open
break.
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Chinese Communist action
along the Tibetan frontier has
highlighted divisions in the
Indian party along "nationalist"
and "internationalist" lines,
while the failure of the "Kerala
experiment" emphasized the con-
flict between proponents of a
"peaceful, parliamentary" ap-
proach to power and those advo-
cating more aggressive tactics.
Party Secretary Ajoy Ghosh,
caught in the middle, leads a
faction favoring a policy which
in effect compromises differences
between the extreme positions
on both internal and external
questions.
The increasing isolation
of the Communist party in In-
dia, due to its inability to
take an unequivocal stand for
or against Peiping's actions,
has caused a greater upheaval
in Communist ranks than any
previous issue. Alarmed over
the prospect of losing much
popular support, certain "na-
tionalist" Communists, notably
parliamentary party leader
S. A. Dange, were impelled to
side with the general Indian
reaction against China and pub-
licly air their disagreement
with the official party position.
The moderate leadership
probably will manage to contain
the extremists by making some
concessions to their demands.
The recent renewal of Sino-
Indian border clashes in Ladakh
has left the moderates with no
alternative but to take a more
critical stand against Peiping,
thus narrowing the gap between
them and the "nationalists."
On internal policy, the moderate
leadership probably will appease
the proponents of aggressive
tactics by allowing them to or-
ganize a more extensive under-
ground apparatus in case of future
need, while outwardly the party
maintains the parliamentary ap-
proach.
The present leadership will
be aided in its efforts to keep
the party on a moderate course
by the numerous expressions of
support Ghosh has recently re-
ceived from top Soviet party lead-
ers. Moscow apparently feels
that Communist interests in In-
dia--at least while Nehru is in
power--will be best served by 25X1
avoiding either the "nationalist"
or. 'Internationalist" extremes.
The Ceylonese Government
is in a vulnerable position de-
spite the defeat on 30 October
of a no-confidence motion by
48 to 43 votes. Serious cabinet
dissension, the ruling party's
dangerously slim parliamentary
majority, and rumors implicating
leading government officials in
the assassination of Prime Min-
ister Randaranaike cast doubt on
Dahanayake's Ability to maintain
the government in power through
the remaining 18 months of its term.
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During the vote the gov-
ernment rallied its maximum
strength, which had been...re-
duced shortly beforehand by
the dismissal of a cabinet' min-
ister indirectly: implicated
in the ..assassination and.-by
the resignation of .- a ..gov-
ernment Worker.., Two;oppbsition
members were absent, and two
abstained. The ruling group's
success thus depended on the
continued reluctance of a few
opposition elements td'-force
early elections and--for the
first time since the present
government was elected under
Bandaranaike in April 1956--
on the votes of six nonelected
appointees.
Public awareness of
charges implicating top govern-
ment officials in Bandaranaike's
assassination probably has in-
creased considerably since the
relaxation of press censorship
on 20 October. The press has
heaped ridicule and criticism
on Dahanayake and the cabinet,
and has supported opposition
demands that Finance Minister
De Zoysa.resign because of his
association with one of several
suspects and the rumored in-
volvement of his two brothers.
One government member during
the no-confidence debate advo-
cated De Zoysa's expulsion. At
least six cabinet members also
favor such a move, and it seems
unlikely that the government
can avoid dismissing or at least
suspending him pending the out-
come of the investigations.
Dahanayake's concern over
his government's position prob-
ably was responsible for the
adjournment of Parliament un-
til 24 November, after only a
three-day session. In the in-
terim, Dahanayake presumably
will try to consolidate his
position as leader of the rul-
ing party, to mend or at least
suppress the government's rifts,
and possibly to increase his
parliamentary majority by bar-
gaining with moderate opposi-
tion elements. To accomplish
this he would have to prove as
able a tactician as Bandara-
naike and possibly to improve
on Bandaranaike's efforts to
cope with the island's long-
standing economic and communal
problems.
UNREST INCREASING IN BELGIAN CONGO
Severe rioting in the in-
terior of the Belgian Congo
near Stanleyville, which cost
the lives of about 70 Africans
during the week end of 31 Oc-
tober, marked the first spread
of serious nationalist dis-
orders outside the lower Con-
go. The clashes between na-
tives and Belgian troops, in
the wake of attacks on Belgian
policy by several nationalist
groups, suggest that nation-
alist -,extremism may. have
reached proportions which will
jeopardize territorial and
communal elections scheduled
for December.
The Stanleyville disturb-
ances were triggered by a.meet-
ing of the Congo National Move-
ment (MNC) independence group,
at which Patrice Lumumba, lead-
er of one of its factions,
called for a campaign of civil
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A NAG 0 LEA
AREA) MID - OCTOBER
TRIBAL DISTURBANCES;
disobedience and attacked Brus-
sels' program for Congolese in-
dependence in about four years.
In rejecting the Belgian plan,
the MNC followed the example
of the Abako, the leading na-
tionalist organization in the
politically volatile lower
Congo. The American Embassy
in Brussels reports that the
Abako's rejection of Congo Min-
ister de Schrijver's four-year
program was received with "gen-
uine surprise" by Belgian offi-
cials.
In the absence of respon-
sible nationalist leadership
in the Congo, Brussels has
sought to develop political
stability through the support
of certain tribal leaders.
Prospects for such stability,
however, have diminished late-
ly as a result of a sharpening
of tribal rivalries in several
areas. In Elisabethville, con-
cern over a possible national-
ist boycott of European goods
has been heightened by instances
of increased friction among lo-
cal African groups, and the
American consul believes tension
in the area to be higher than at
any time since the Leopoldville
riots of last January.
Prior to the Stanleyville
disturbances, Lumumba reported-
ly demanded immediate Congolese
independence, or his group
would "face Belgium with a fait
accompli." On 3 November,
Brussels announced that a round-
table conference would be held
with Congo leaders in late No-
vember, presumably to clarify
Brussels' program for gradual
independence. Such a conference
may serve to mollify some Congo
leaders, several of whom have
complained that the De Schrij-
ver program was adopted without
consultation with the Congolese.
The seriousness of the cur-
rent situation has apparently
caused the Belgian Government
and the opposition Socialists
to close ranks in an attempt
to re-establish a common front
on Congo policy. The scheduled
round-table conference is in
accordance with Socialist de-
mands that Belgian officials
negotiate directly with the
Congolese leaders in an effort
to assure that the December
elections will be held.
The government and the So-
cialists also agree on the ne-
cessity of extensive Belgian eco-
nomic aid to the Congo, and
plans call for the creation of
a "development company" and
for Belgian support of the Con-
golese franc. The Socialists,
however, differ with the gov-
ernment on how to finance the
additional costs involved, be-
lieving that the large Congo
companies should be made to as-
sume a greater responsibility.
It is not yet clear whether the
Liberals in the government, who
are always difficult on finan-
cial questions, are in complete 25X1
agreement with their cabi-
net colleagues on these
latest proposals,
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5 November 1959
FRENCH ALGERIAN PROGRAM
In view of the broad pub-
lic support De Gaulle has won
for his Algerian program an-
nounced on 16 September, his
current "information" campaign
appears primarily designed to
overcome army dissatisfaction.
He has felt obliged to call for
"absolute loyalty and disci-
pline" in carrying out his
policies, and the emphasis being
placed by,top military and ci-
vilian officials on France's
long-term presence in Algeria
seems aimed at army extremists
who fear De Gaulle may "abandon"
Algeria. This apparent harden-
ing of the French position has
distressed moderates who had
hoped to see early and fruit-
ful negotiations between Paris
and the rebels.
Delegate General in Algeria
Delouvrier's public explanation
of the terms of the proposed
two-stage referendum on Alge-
ria's future has disturbed many
Frenchmen and such interested
foreigners as Tunisian Presi-
dent Bourguiba, who had been
hopeful of an early liberal
solution. With army dissatis-
faction increasingly apparent,
Delouvrier's assurance that an.
initial vote will be--as in
1958--on whether any tie should
be maintained with France seems
aimed at appeasing De Gaulle's
rightist critics rather than
merely elaborating on the de-
tails pf a referendum which
will probably not take place
for several years. The second
stage would permit a choice
between autonomy and integra-
tion with France.
Military uneasiness ap-
pears focused on whether the
army will continue to play a
major role in the administration
of Algeria, whether the rebels
will be granted a cease-fire
on terms short of surrender, and
whether the army will "lose face" 25X1
with the Moslems because of the
government's "soft" program.
On 28 October,
De Gaulle
declare d that France's policy
is to pacify Algeria "completely
and humanely," to assure its
development, and to give the
Algerians every reason to de-
sire unity with France.
25X1
Official concern over the
army attitude is apparent in the
manner in which Marshal Juin,
France's highest military of-
ficer, was censured by the
minister-of the army for pub-
licly charging on 26 October
that De Gaulle's Algerian pol-
icy would encourage the rebels.
He was told that "it is the
desire of the government that
military chiefs remain entirely
aside from political discus-
sion."
gerian issue.
25X1
the center-left in case of a
rightist rebellion on the Al-
The French Communist party
now has come out in favor of
De Gaulle's Algerian program.
This about-face probably re-
flects Moscow's current inter-
est in a French-Soviet detente,
but it also gives the party a
chance to avoid isolation from
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5 November 1959
The forthcoming Italian-
Soviet trade talks in Rome will
provide an opportunity for the
USSR to secure additional cred-
its in Western Europe.
On 9 November, an Italian-
Soviet commission is to meet in
Rome to draw up commodity lists
for 1960 under the four-year
trade agreement of December
1957. According to press re-.
ports, the new protocol will
set a goal of $192,000,000 for
total trade next year, as com-
pared with a 1959 target of
$160,000,000, which is not
likely to be reached.
The commission is also
scheduled to examine the possi-
bility of allowing the USSR to
benefit, more extensively under
existing legislation which
permits four-year state guar-
antees of up to 85 percent of
the credit extended by Italian
exporters.
During the past year at
least $35,000,000 worth of
private short-term credits, some
guaranteed by the Italian Gov-
ernment, were extended. A high
official in the Italian Foreign
Ministry told the American Em-
bassy late. in October: that Italian
press reports that $100,000,000
had been requested were com-
pletely without foundation.
Since last spring, Soviet trade
officials have asked Italian
firms for substantial credits
for purchases of chemical plants
and equipment, threatening, if
refused, to give the orders to
other Western European firms.
Italian Government offi-
cials allege they are opposed
to guaranteeing deals of private
firms with the USSR and prefer
to utilize the government's
limited export credit resources
to finance projects in under-
developed areas. They fear,
however, that domestic firms
will overextend themselves in
granting credits to the USSR,
since other European traders
continue to grant credits, fre-
quently with government guaran-
tees. Italian legislation is
still pending to raise the
ceiling on state guarantees
for export credits on the
grounds that Italian exporters
must be aided to compete with
more extensive export credit
systems existing in other West-
ern countries.
(Concurred in by ORR
RUMANIA ATTEMPTS TO STEP UP ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH WEST
For the past several months
Rumania has been striving to
expand its economic relations
with the West and--with'a view
to obtaining further Western
credits--to build Western confi-
dence in its financial sound-
ness and international respon-
sibility. To this end, the
Rumanians have indicated a
readiness to discuss settlement
of nationalization claims and to
explore possibilities for ex-
panded cultural relations.
US-Rumanian negotiations
on war damages and nationaliza-
tion claims will reopen in Wash-
ington on 16 November. Similar
meetings between British and
Rumanian representatives are
scheduled to start soon in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 November 1959
Bucharest. A mixed Greek-Ruman-
ian commission has been evaluat-
ing claims since March. France
agreed to a claims settlement
on 9 February; this was followed
by an expansion of cultural and
economic relations.
Pointing to the French set-
tlement as an example, Bucharest
is pushing for expanded trade
with Sweden, Greece, Britain,
Italy, and. the. US. . Sweden
signed a trade agreement with
Rumania in August on the assur-
ance that claims negotiations
would be completed within a
year.
By holding out the pros-
pect of settling claims, Bucha-
rest. has been-endeavoring to
obtain more Western credits for
purchases of heavy machinery,
complete factories, machine
tools, and other technical
equipment needed to help meet
its capital requirements under
the forthcoming Six-Year Plan
(1960-1965). High-ranking Ru-
manian economic officials made
semiofficial visits this summer
to Britain, France, the Benelux
countries, Switzerland, Italy,
and Greece to pave the way for
expanded trade based on credit.
The Rumanian policy of
detente toward Western nations
has so far had little substance
outside the economic sphere.
The possibility of increased
cultural relations is held out
by Bucharest as a consequence
of the new "thaw" in East-West
relations, but French, Swedish,
and American experiences strong-
ly suggest that cultural rela-
tions will be stepped up only
after trade has been substan-
tially expanded.
Surveillance and strict
controls continue to be
maintained over Western diplo-
matic personnel stationed in
Bucharest. The suddenly friend-
ly official attitude toward
American representatives in
the Rumanian capital contrasts
sharply with Bucharest's propa-
ganda attacks on the US and its
allies--attacks which follow
thp Snylpt land in every case.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN
As recently outlined by
planning chief Simunek, direc-
tives for drafting the Czecho-
slovak Third Five-Year Plan
(1961-65) express President
Novotny's determination to con-
tinue the rapid build-up of
heavy industry, recalling in
many respects' Soviet plans of
the Stalin era. Rapid increas-
es in industrial growth during
the last three years have prompt-
ed the regime to revise upward
the preliminary estimate of
over-all industrial possibili-
ties made public at last year's
11th party congress.
Under the new directives,
industrial production in 1965
is to double the 1957 level.
Czechoslovakia's advanced en-
gineering industry is to expand
twice as fast as originally con-
templated, and higher targets
are specified for commodities
basic to industry: steels, fuels,
electric power, and building
materials. While output of
producer goods is to rise 60
percent between 1961 and 1965,
that of consumer goods will'in-
crease only 30 percent.
The annual rate of indus-
trial growth during the five-
year plan period will be 8.5
percent, compared with 10.2
percent during 1958-60, because
of more extensive investment in
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ACTUAL AND PLANNED PRODUCTION
OF SELECTED BASIC COMMODITIES
(MILLION METRIC TONS EXCEPT WHERE NOTED)
COMMODITY
1958 LEVEL
1965
PRELIMINARY
TARGET
Electric Power
(BILLION KWH)
19.6
37.7
Hard Coal
25.8
35.5
Brown Coal
54, 3
73.2
Coke
7.4
11.6
Pig Iron
3.8
7.6
Crude Steel
5.5
10.5
Cement
4.1
8.6
Synthetic Fibers
(THOUSAND METRIC TONS)
55.0
105.6
Meat
(THOUSAND METRIC TONS)
415.0
583.1
Footwear
(MILLION PAIRS)
68.0
101.0
91103 3
large-scale, long-term proj-
ects whose full effect on pro-
duction levels will not be felt:
until after 1965. Investment
will continue to account for a
high share in the distribution
of national income, while in-
dustry's portion of total in-
vestment will grow considerably.
Great capital outlays will
be tied up in vast new construc-
tion projects for the metal.lur
gicaland chemical industries,
most notably in a giant metal-
lurgical combine near Kosice in
eastern Slovakia. This combine
replaces the former "Huko" proj-
ect initiated in 1950 and a-
bandoned two years later as
economically unsound.
Planned industrial expan-
sion relies'not only on this
greater investment, but also
on even larger ncreases in
labor productivity than sched-
uled under previous plans and
seldom attained. Yet if labor
productivity develops unsatis-
factorily, as seems likely, the
regime could resort, as in the
past, to above-plan allocations
of manpower to industry. These
could, in turn, be damaging to
the agricultural sector, which
will probably need more labor
and capital than the plan now
provides in order to meet its
production target of a 40-percent
increase over 1957.
Although the plan stipu-
lates a 5.3-percent annual in-
crease in personal consumption
during 1961-65, it is doubtful
the regime can fulfill this
promise because it depends on
success in the agricultural pro-
gram. The determination with
which the regime enforces heavy
industrial priorities may lead
to further stinting on invest-
ment allocations for consumer-
oriented sectors--including
housing, where plans vastly
more ambitious than in the past
require large investment. The
outlook for the consumer is
now one of~harder work and slow
gains in real wages.
Czechoslovak economic pol
icy, perhaps the Soviet bloc's
most "orthodox" and hard-line,
may promote industrial growth
at the price of increasing
consumer dissatisfaction. Any
serious public discontent as a
result of slowness in improving
the level of living would prob-
ably be met with economic con-
cessions, however, even if these
involved some temporary decline
in the rate of industrial
growth. Pre-
pared by ORR)
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The Ulbricht regime is pre- , off travel by East German Prot-
paring to sever the East Ger-
man church from its leadership
in West Berlin.
Bishop Dibelius,. 79-year-
old president of the Council
of the Evangelical Church in
Germany and head of the Ber-
lin-Brandenburg Diocese in East
Germany, recently asserted in
an open letter that a Chris-
tian is not obliged to obey any
laws of a totalitarian state--
including even such ordinances
as traffic regulations on the
Berlin autobahn, since they.
might be intended for evil pur-
poses such as starving out West
Berlin.
In consequence, he was
summoned from his residence in
West Berlin to an interview on
28 October with the acting may-
or of East Berlin, Waldemar
Schmidt. According to East
Berlin newspapers, Schmidt
charged Dibelius with seeking
to undermine the legal order
in East Berlin and stated that
the bishop had "deprived him-
self of grounds for further
activity" in the Soviet sector
of Berlin.
The Evangelical Church
leadership in Berlin-Brandenburg
now is under heavy pressure to
condemn Dibelius, and an East
German broadcast of 23 October
construed an equivocal state-
ment by this group to mean that
East German churchmen have pub-
licly dissociated themselves
from their bishop. In an effort
to enlist sympathy from believ-
ers in East Germany, the Commu-
nists are accenting the tra-
ditional Lutheran view that
the "state is an expression of
the will of God" and thus must
not be resisted.
The regime has also in-
tensified its efforts to cut
estants to West German church
functions. It allowed only
2,000 persons to attend the Evan-
gelical conference (Kirchentag)
held in Munich in August, in
contrast with the many thousands
who were permitted to go in
past years. The Communists are
also promoting closer ties be-
tween certain selected East Ger-
man Protestant church leaders--
notably Bishop Moritz Mitzenheim
of Thuringia--and Orthodox Church
leaders in the USSR. Mitzenheim
and other high churchmen visited
Moscow in September, and Patri-
arch Aleksey of Moscow is slated
to come to East Berlin next East-
er.
In expectation of continued
Communist efforts to divide the
church, the Berlin-Brandenburg
Synod last spring--with Dibelius'
acquiescence--adopted an "empow-
ering clause" designed to enable
the church leadership in East
Germany to issue emergency de-
crees if its communications with
Bishop Dibelius' office in West
Berlin were cut off. The East German
press hailed the move as recog-
nition of East German sovereignty;
West Berlin church officials said
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
many synod members opposed the
step because it served to under-
mine one of the few remaining
vestiges of German unity.
Under steady regime pres-
sure, East German Christians are
having difficulty maintaining
their opposition to the Com-
munists. Enrollment for the
Jugendweihe--the regime's athe-
ist youth indoctrination pro-
gram--has grown to include a
large proportion of teen-age
youth. Commenting on declining
church membership, an East Ger-
man attending the recent Kirch-
entag in Munich declared: "Peo-
ple are falling away like with-
ered leaves."
In the event the regime
meets with further significant
success in gaining the coopera-
tion of the local clergy, it can 25X1
be expected to take steps to
establish a separate church in
East Germany.
The Castro government's
new mining law and its seizure
of oil companies' files are
additional evidence of its dras-
tic approach to economic reforms,
many of which are badly needed.
Most of the large and un-
exploited petroleum and miner-
al concessions, as well as the
mining industry in general, are
controlled by American interests
which Cubans feel have not de-
veloped their holdings rapidly
enough to benefit the economy.
Alienation of these private
investors who have been consid-
ered the only source of suffi-
cient capital for developing
the.subsoil resources, and in-
creased government control over
the economy will probably be
accompanied by an intensified
search for European--and pos-
sibly Soviet bloc--technical
and financial assistance.
Cuba may be planning to
resume diplomatic relations with
the USSR and open trade rela-
tions with East Germany. On
3 November the semiofficial
daily Revolucion urged that
Soviet First Deputy Premier
Mikoyan, who will inaugurate
the Soviet exhibition in Mexico
on 22 November, be invited to
visit Cuba as the first step
toward renewed relations and
further trade with the USSR.
Ambassador Bonsai in Havana
has reported that East German
economic officials are expected
in Cuba soon, and he considers
it quite likely that some rap-
prochement may be contemplated.
Castro's revival on 29
October of the revolutionary
tribunals and the reintroduction
of the death penalty are again
arousing unfavorable comment
in Latin America. Hemisphere
leaders and newspapers sympa-
thetic to Castro's planned re-
forms and. aspirations for Cuba 25X1
have been increasingly critical
of his expa,-Laive and irrational
actions.
The conflicting presiden-
tial ambitions of former Presi-
dent Victor Paz Estenssoro and
Walter Guevara Arze, right-wing
leader of the ruling Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement (MNR),
are causing serious unrest in
Bolivia. Moderate President
Siles has apparently swung his
support from Guevara to Paz;
this is likely to give the
June 1960 presidential election
to Paz and the left wing. Left-
wing leaders are frequently
critical of the United States,
although a recent oil discovery
by a US-financed company in Bo-
livia has apparently moderated
some of their anti-US atti-
tudes.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Paz has hinted
that he will choose
leftist labor lead-
er Juan Lechin--key
opponent of the US-
backed economic sta-
bilization program--
as his running mate
at the presidential
nominating convention
of the government
party scheduled to
open in late December
or early January.
Right-wing elements
probably feel that
a Paz-Lechin ticket
will imply a more
leftist administra-
tion than Bolivia has ever had.
Right-wingers in desperation
could resort to an abortive
coup attempt. Moreover, armed
violence may break out because
the police and the civilian
militia are divided in loyalty.
In an apparent move to
placate right-wing elements,
Siles in late October demanded
that leftist Jose.Rojas, a
principal leader of the rural
militia, resign from the cabi-
net. The threatened dismissal.
of Rojas has provoked outbreaks
of militia violence. Certain
Since re-election the Mac-
millan government has given
priority to improving Britain's
relations with the six European
Economic Community (EEC) members.
Foreign Secretary Lloyd will try
to promote his plans in a visit
to Paris on 11-12 November.
Visits to London are planned by
West German Chancellor Adenauer
on 17-18 November and Italian
Premier Segni on 1-3 December.
London is apprehensive lest
the continued strengthening of
Rojas units have been surrounded
by opposing forces under a right-
wing rural leader. Each leader
has the loyalty of 3,000 men.
The basic militia unit consists
of a company of about 100 men
armed with rifles, submachine
guns, a mortar, and a heavy-
machine-gun section.
Bolivian Army strength varies
seasonally between 7,000 and
12,000. The army tends to be
loyal to the Sue ; - ?overnment
but would be unable to quell
widespread outbreaks of militia
violence.
the EEC group further reduces
British influence on the con-
tinent. Lloyd wants to try to
"bridge the gap" between the EEC
and the proposed little free-
trade area (Outer Seven) which
the UK promotes, rather than
wait several years as many ob-
servers, including some of his
own advisers, believe necessary.
From London's viewpoint,
the EEC Council of Ministers'
decision in mid-October to pro-
ceed with periodic political
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
consultations on a six-nation
basis carries the threat to
British interests one step fur-
ther. Lloyd has suggested-
sev-eral projects which would tend.
to increase British partici-
pation f
in European endeavors
short of making supranational
commitments. His expressed de-
sire for closer political coor-
dination and for improved coor-
dination of weapons development
suggests that he may try to re-
vive the Western European Union,
the only European organization
composed of the six EEC coun-
tries plus Britain,.
Lloyd also advocates con-
centrating European institutions
in one city, but this suggestion
will be no more welcome now than
SECRET
it was three years ago when
Europeans suspected that it cloaked
a scheme,to disrupt progress
on integration.
The atmosphere for the
coming visits nevertheless seems
improved. In a recent Parlia-
mentary debate Lloyd went out
of his way to kill one source
of French and German suspicions
by heaping scorn upon European
"disengagement." Macmillan's
cordial response to Adenauer's
message of congratulations on
the Conservatives' election
victory greatly pleased the
chancellor. De Gaulle, for his
part, has agreed to pay a state
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visit to the United Kingdom in
early April.
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The independence secured
in 1956 by Morocco and Tunisia
and the struggle for independ-
ence under way in Algeria are
leading to serious considera-
tion of the nature of the re-
lations of North African polit-
ical entities with each other
and with outside blocs. Some
North African leaders, recall-
ing the medieval Maghreb em-
pires--the Arab "western land"
consisting of the larger part
of northwest Africa--have been
seeking to create a united and
powerful "Maghreb federation."
Some of these North Africans
go further. Recognizing the
dependence of North Africa on
France, they envisage an al-
liance between a confederation
of North African states and
France, or association with a
Western European community.
North Africans planning
for a Maghreb federation must
consider a variety of forces,
attitudes,and traditions which,
while partially favorable to
unity, contain elements making
for disunion. The major inter-
national forces influencing
such a development would seem
to be the heritage of French
control and the continuing
French economic dominance
throughout the area, the attrac-
tions and distractions provided
by Middle Eastern Arab influences,
and the vogue for neutralism and
its concomitant tendency toward a
relationship with the Soviet bloc.
Within the Maghreb coun-
tries, the principal currents
affecting unity seem to stem
from the appeal of the idea of
"the Maghreb" as against dis-
parate policies of the individ-
ual North African governments,
each of which is developing its
own view of what its relations
with other states ought to be.
France--whose military con-
quest of the Maghreb began in
Algeria in 1830 and was not con-
cluded until a century later in
Morocco--imposed its language
and to some extent its culture
along the coastal areas. The
French administrators who fol-
lowed the army and colonists
superimposed a Western veneer
on the local subsistence econ-
omies, built European cities
outside the native quarters,and
developed the whole area primar-
ily as a source of raw materials
and markets for France's industries.
The European residents of
North Africa--who numbered about
TUNISIA
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GUAR
(SYRIA)
S U D A N
Khp,wua,
SAUDI
ARABIA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUNKARY
1,500,000 in early 1956--con-
trolled the most fertile land
and held all but the lowliest
government jobs. While excel-
lent educational facilities
were developed for Europeans,
only a relatively few Moslems
had access to such facilities.
Although some North Afri-
can Moslems adopted European
customs, the mode of living of
the average North African re-
mained largely untouched by
Western customs or thought un-
til World War I, when North
African recruits mingled with
Western soldiers on European
battlefields. About the same
time, a few North African na-
tionalists gained hope from
the concept of self-determina-
tion embodied in President
Wilson's Fourteen Points. There-
after, the concept of self-
rule and independence snowballed,
particularly in the early 1930s
among the handful of North Af-
rican students in Paris.
trained in Europe and Indo-
china.
The North African govern-
ments retain strong ties to
France in that their administra-
tive structures are modeled af-
ter that of France and to a
large extent are staffed by
French nationals. Their armies
have been organized, officered,
and trained by the French.
French financial and technical
investment still dominates the
local economies. North African
leaders, with few exceptions,
conduct their business in French
and wear Western dress. Their
wives are fast becoming emanci-
pated and are participating in
public life, even in politics.
By preference, Western modes
of life--including television--
are becoming the norm, at least
for the educated North African
elite.
Middle Eastern Influence
The Arab invaders who over-
ran the area in the seventh and
eighth centuries quickly imposed
their language and religion on
the urbanized residents of the
Maghreb. The common bond of
blood, religion, and language
between Maghrebian and Middle
Eastern Arabs, however, now
appears more imaginary than
real. A North African Arab con-
siders himself essentially a
Moroccan, Algerian, or Tunisian
and usually adopts a supercil-
ious attitude toward an eastern
Arab. Tunisians in particular
consider themselves superior to
all other Arabs.
25X1
These former students are
today the governmental and po-
litical leaders in Morocco and
Tunisia and to a lesser extent
are influential in the Algerian
National Liberation Front. More-
over, the military leaders of
the Algerian rebellion arelarge-
ly former noncommissioned offi-
cers of the French Army, battle
e iortla r cans rate e r
religious universities at Fez
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and Kairouan higher than A1-
Azhar in Cairo.
The North African version
of spoken Arabic is virtually
unintelligible to a Middle
Eastern Arab, but classical
Arabic is taught in the sbhools
and is the language of govern-
mental documents in independent
Tunisia and Morocco and of the
Arabic-language press. Only a
handful of the present Maghreb-
ian leaders were educated in
the Middle East. Many of this
group may maintain ties and
some degree of affinity toward
their seat of learning, but
others--notably Morocco's Allal
E1-Fassi--have broken with Cairo.
A greater number of North Afri-
can youths may now be enrolled
in Middle East universities
than heretofore, but the Paris-
or Western-trained youth still
is the preferred employee.
The young liberals in Mo-
rocco and Tunisia are pushing
their governments for closer
relations with the Arab states.
These efforts seem designed to
broaden their countries' con-
tacts and may also stem from
their intense interest in Mid-
dle Eastern socialistic experi-
ments. One result of these ef-
forts--and those of then Xt'agi
Foreign Minister Jamali-was
that in 1958 both Morocco and
Tunisia joined the Arab League.
Since then Morocco'has
participated in most league ac-
tivities and, in fact,was host
to the league's most recent
regular meeting early in Sep-
tember. Morocco may also be
taking the lead in an effort
to increase the influence of
non-UAR states in the league.
Nevertheless, Moroccan leaders
remain principally preoccupied
with local problems.
Tunisian President Bour-
guiba apparently joined the
league mainly as a gesture of.
solidarity with Morocco. He
immediately challenged Nasir's
dominance over the league, how-
ever, and when his maneuver was
censured by the organization,
used his long-standing quarrel
with Nasir as an excuse to walk
out. Bourguiba shows no indi-
cations either of desiring to
cooperate closely with other
Arab states or of improving re-
lations with Cairo.
HABIB BOURGHISA
The Algerian rebels, mean-
while, have depended largely on
the eastern Arab states for fi-
nancial and material support in
their struggle for independence.
Like the Moroccans and Tunisians,
however, the Algerians look a-
skance at what they consider the
more backward Arabs and espouse
Western concepts and admire West-
ern techniques.
Maghrebian Neutralism
The Moroccan and Tunisian
governments and the Algerian
rebels have adopted neutralist
foreign policies. Morocco,
taking the lead in establishing
diplomatic relations with the
Sino-Soviet bloc last fall,says
it has a policy of nondependence
or nonalignment. It recently
confirmed the imminent exchange
of ambassadors with Hungary,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia,
raising the number of bloc es-
tablishments in Rabat to five.
Despite increasing exchanges of
visits with the bloc and a fas-
cination with economic developments
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in Communist China, which many
Moroccans seek to emulate, Mo-
rocco's contacts are still pre-
dominantly with the West.
Tunisia, on the other
hand, adopted a policy of non-
engagement after President
Bourguiba had repeatedly de-
clared himself on the side of
the West. Bourguiba persisted
in this policy long after the
"young Turks" in his entourage
had pointed out the advantages
of playing East against West
to gain essential economic de-
velopment assistance. He di-
rectly tied his policy shift
to prolonged difficulties with
France, most of which evolved
from Tunisia's support of the
Algerian rebellion.
Thus far Tunisia has per-
mitted only the establishment
of a Czech Embassy, with a non-
resident ambassador. There are
indications, however, that it
may soon accept a Soviet ambas-
sador. Earlier this year two
Tunisian secretaries of state
visited the Soviet Union. Bour-
guiba considers these moves
merely demonstrations of his
independence from Western con-
trols, however, and he probably
will continue to go slow in
contacts with the bloc.
Both Morocco and Tunisia
have substantially increased
their foreign trade with the
bloc. Nonetheless, this ex-
panded exchange of commodities
still remains a small fraction
of the countries' foreign. trade.
The Algerian rebels, whose
provisional government has been
recognized by Communist China
and the Asian satellites: but not
by the-Soviet bloc, maintain.-
contacts with the bloc. The
present moderate rebel leaders
justify their acceptance of bloc
training, relief supplies, and
possibly some materiel as es-
sential'.to continu&ng their
struggle, in view of the lack
of Western support.
Prospects for Federation
Common bonds of geographic
proximity, language, religion, SE
and experience as French col-
lonial areas have been forces
for cohesion in the Maghreb.
The leaders, who initially
shared classrooms and dormi-
tories in Paris, have long
plotted together to achieve
their objectives.
In 1958, two years after
Morocco and Tunisia achieved
independence, a conference of
North African political lead-
ers at Tangier created an em-
bryo Maghreb federation and
established a permanent secre-
tariat in an effort to lay the
foundations for intra-Maghre-
bian collaboration. Although
the unity given expression at
Tangier has not been maintained,
and although serious rivalries
and dissensions have developed
which impede the development of
a strong and unified Maghreb
federation, North African poli-
ticians not infrequently extol
Maghreb solidarity.
The King and those who
seek to develop a constitution-
al monarchy in Morocco fear
that antimonarchist forces in
Morocco were encouraged by the
abolition of the Tunisian mon-
archy in 1957. They regard
with suspicion all efforts by
Bourguiba to expand his influ-
ence within the Maghreb or to
pose as the principal North
African spokesman. The Tuni-
sians, on the other hand, re-
gard with dismay the disunity
among Moroccan political groups.
The Tunisians see the forces
for instability in Morocco as
an invitation for the extension
of Communist influence.
Both governments are also
jealously watchful of each
other's relations with France.
Mohamed V, maintaining a more
harmonious relationship with
Paris than the outspoken Bour-
guiba, was notably piqued last
year when Tunisia obtained a
commitment from France to evacu-
ate all its bases in Tunisia
save Bizerte. French troops
remain scattered throughout
Morocco, and Rabat still
presses for total evacua-
tion.
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The Moroccans and partic-
ularly the Tunisians--despite
massive assistance to the Al-
gerian rebels--fear the crea-
tion of a powerful, indepen-
dent Algeria which might seek
to dominate its neighbors.
For that reason Bourguiba has
pressed the rebels to follow
his example in accepting less
than total independence and in
keeping close ties with France.
The Algerians, for their
part, are irritated by Bour-
guiba's pressures, his unso-
licited advice, and the fact
that he has occasionally been
swayed by Tunisia's national
interests to take steps con-
trary to their interests. They
have not forgiven his agree-
nment giving a French company
transit rights for a pipeline
transporting Saharan oil, and
they resent Tunisian and Mo-
roccan pretensions to portions
of the Sahara.
In light of these consid-
erations, therefore, the fed-
eration set up 18 months ago
in Tangier seems unlikely to
iievelop soon into a meaningful
boc' Y. Its existence, however,
has a symbolic utility which
may on occasion be exploited
,y Maghreb politicians.
A united Maghreb, closely
tied to Parts, has a certain
appeal to French officials
groping for a solution to the,
Algerian problem and desiring
to retain France's dominant
role in Morocco and Tunisia.
A. union would also complete
the north-south axis between
the African members of the
French Community and continent-
al France and would round out a
large sphere of French culture
and economic leadership. Regard-
less of these potential bene-
fits, Paris does not appear. to
be pushing for a united Maghreb,
French relations with Morocco
and Tunisia have improved some-
what from their recent low
points, but mutual distrust is
still strong.
Before he came to power,
De Gaulle was believed to fa-
vor the establishment of a
North African federation linked
to France in a manner that
would permit French control of
the federation's military and
foreign policies. He has not
pushed this idea, and his pro-
gram of 16 September for Al-
geria-seems to point toward a
separate identity outside the
Maghreb for the Algerian de-
partments--possibly in associa-
tion with the French Community
or conceivably even as an in-
dependent state.- The possi-
bility remains, however, that
the question of Maghreb soli-
darity may be reconsidered by
the French after the promised
Algerian referendum.
North African leaders,
recognizing their indebtness
to and dependence on France,
have also envisioned a loose
union with France. President
Bourguiba, with doubtful sin-
cerity, has even gone one step
further and offered to relin-
quish some of Tunisia's sover-
eignty if France would recog-
nize an independent Algeria
within a Maghreb federation
allied with France.
The North Africans' sensi-
tivities to anything remotely
resembling a negation of their
sovereignty and independence,
however, probably would inhibit
an alliance with France alone.
The Moroccans and Tunisians,
in applying for affiliation
with the Organization for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation and
the Common Market, have indi-
cated a desire to diversify
their contacts by dealing with
all the West. Both Morocco and
Tunisia have strongly resented
French financial and military
pressures and seek to thwart
the continuance of France's
strangle over their economies and
armies by diversification of
their independence among, main-
ly, all Western sources. Any
new kind of relationship would
seem to be for the more distant
rather than the immediate fu-
ture.
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5 November 1959
THE FRENCH COMMUNITY IN EVOLUTION
The French Community, just
over a year old, seems about
to undergo far-reaching struc-
tural changes which the French
hope Will encourage present
members to remain and perhaps
will even attract new ones. In
the face of rising African
nationalism, Paris has recent-
ly officially accepted the con-
cept of an evolving Community
in which powers now exercised
by France through the Community
machinery will eventually be
turned over to the individual
member states.
A Community of
states with varying
degrees of autonomy
but oriented toward
France and the West
may ultimately pro-
vide a legal frame-
work for solving the
problem of Algeria
if De Gaulle's pre-
ference for a loose
French-Algerian as-
sociation is real-
ized. Prospects
for lasting politi-
cal ties in the Com-
munity are not good,
however.
Even before
coming to power,
De Gaulle charac-
terized his colonial
views as "midway
In the official communique
following the last Community
Executive Council meeting on 10
and 11 September, however,
De Gaulle underlined the "evo-
lutionary character" of the Com-
munity, noting that the develop-
ment of the structure of the
states would determine the evo-
lution. This publicly confirmed
a new tack in French official
thinking since the previous
council meeting in July, when
leaders of the Mal. Federa-
tion--comprising the republics
of Senegal and Soudan--began
Leaders of some autonomous republics with President de Gaulle at September
1959 meeting of the Executive Council of the French Community: (left to
right) Tombalbaye (Chad), Youlou (Congo), Maga (Dahomey), French Minis-
ter of State Jacquinot, Mba (Gabon), French Premier Debre, De Gaulle,
Tsiranana (Malgache Republic), Keita (Soudan), Houphouet - Boigny (Ivory
Coast), and Dia (Niger).
between those who want to change
nothing and those who want to
abandon everything," and his
original concept of the French
Community--which has replaced
the old French Union--was de-
signed to embody this. Never-
theless, De Gaulle's initial
preoccupation with Community
institutions and his reportedly
highhanded brushing aside of
African nationalist leaders
who publicly advocated a more
flexible organization seemed
designed to freeze the Commu-
nity's original structure for
an indefinite period.
pressing for independence but
found De Gaulle unwilling even
to discuss the possibility of
the Community's evolution.
The fact that the sharp
cleavages among West-African
Community leaders earlier in the
summer now have been smoothed
over is the best evidence that
a top-level decision has been
made in Paris on the evolution
of the Community. Senegal Pre-
r:ier Mamadou Dia set the new
tone in an article in the in-
fluential Paris daily Le Monde,
and his moderate program was
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
accepted by the more
nationalistic Modibo
Keita, who is both
premier of Soudan
and President of
Mali. Even Ivory
Coast Premier Hou
phouet-Boigny,orig-
inally the leading
African advocate of
a strong federal
community, stated
after the September
meeting: "If certain
states consider them-
selves able to assume
responsibility for
common affairs, that
is their business."
Nat,-are of Evolved
Community
Although many
of the details of
how a community of
states enjoying
differing relations
with France could
function have prob-
ably not yet receiv-
Autonomous Republic
(French Community)
overseas territory
ed high-level consideration,
the broad lines of development
are already apparent. In the
Community as now constituted,
all the West African states
and Madagascar (the Malgache
Republic)are alike in respect
to their own powers and those--
notably in the fields of for-
eign policy, defense, and
economic and financial policy--
reserved to the Community and
in practice exercised by
Paris.
The French apparently
envisage granting certain of
the Community powers to the
member states on an individ-
ual basis under Article 78 of
the French Constitution, which
provides that "special agree-
ments may create other common
jurisdictions or regulate any
transfer of jurisdiction from
the Community to one of its
members."
This experiment will
probably first be tried fol-
lowing the 11 December Execu-
tive Council meeting in Sene-
gal, when powers now exercised
by the Community, including
control of foreign affairs,
may be transferred to Senegal
and Soudan and, by them, to
the Mali Federation. Other
Community members, particularly
the more developed states of
West Africa, will probably
soon be under native national-
ist pressure to seek similar
accommodations with France.
New Members
The constitution also
provides for new Community
members. Among the most likely
prospects would be the French
trust territories of Togo and
Cameroun, which are scheduled
to gain their independence in
1960. There is also evidence
that France may hope ultimately
to attract Morocco and Tunisia.
In these cases, however, the
ties would probably amount
to little more than economic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
agreements or a more formal-
ized membership in the franc
zone.
A Place for Algeria
The concept of a Communi-
ty embodying a variety of re-
lationships appeals to some
Frenchmen as a possible way
out of the increasingly harsh
dilemma posed by the Algerian
situation. Having previously
promised Algeria a "choice
place" in the Community, De
Gaulle in his 16 September
proposal of three possible
alternatives included inde-
pendence and integration among
them but laid special emphasis
on a form of French-Algerian
association which could be
adapted to the Community. He
envisaged "a government of Al-
geria by Algerians, bolstered
with French aid and in close
union with France for economic
educational, defense, and for-
eign affairs,"
Under this alternative,
De Gaulle also noted the "ne-
cessity of organizing Algeria
internally along federal lines
"so that the various communi-
ties can have a framework for
cooperation." Such a federal
state within a multirelation-
ship Community would maintain
Algeria as a political entity
while simultaneously providing
the legal framework for firm
French control of certain parts
--e.g,, the coastal cities and
the oil-rich Sahara.
If, however, De Gaulle
moves too rapidly to tie his
preferred Algerian solution to
the Community,it would exacer-
bate long-standing disagree-
ments among the French on the
extent to which native nation-
alist aspirations can be satis-
fied without losing effective
control over the African areas.
Proponents of a place for
Algeria in the Community'would
probably feel this problem ob-
liged them to prove slowly in
implementing the planned trans-
fer of Community powers to the
individual states. Prolonging
this process, however, would
run the risk of irritating the
African member states to the
point that some would decide
on complete withdrawal from the
Community. Furthermore, only a
relatively solid Community,with
safeguards on continued French
control of key areas of Algeria
should it become a member,would
have a chance of gaining accept-
ance of French rightists.
Prospects
Even the French leaders
who favor a loose Community of
varying relationships as the
only means of retaining French
influence in Africa may not be
as sanguine about its dura-
bility as they profess. They
are apparently gambling, how-
ever, that native nationalist
forces will be satisfied with
the new arrangements long
enough to allow the economic
benefits of Community member-
ship to become apparent and
thus engender continued and
willing native participation.
There may also be the hope
that if such future states
as Togo and Cameroun choose
to associate with the French
Community, this will counter-
act some of the other external
African nationalist influences
on the Community states.
Nevertheless, it appears
unlikely that African nation-
alist fervor can be dampened
more than temporarily by any
French-proposed association,
however liberal. Furthermore,
the cost of an economic aid
program sufficient to en-
courage continued membership
in the Community would be
prohibitive for France alone.
With the French budget already
strained to meet present
commitments, Paris can be ex-
pected to look for outside
contributions that would be
channeled through expanded--
and French-controlled--pro--
grams such as the Constan-
tine Plan and the other
African investment programs.
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SOVIET REACTION TO THE AMERICAN EXHIBITION IN MOSCOW
The American exhibition.
which concluded its six-week
showing in Moscow's Sokolniki
Park on 4 September, was the
object of continuous intense
interest and curiosity, despite
strenuous Soviet efforts to
undermine its impact. Well
over two million Soviet citizens
attended. Their reaction ap-
pears to have been one of
general approval, although
there was some disappointment
about the organization of the
fair and the type and quality
of some of the goods displayed.
Those who came, whether or
not they liked all they saw,
by and large went away with a
greater understanding of the
United States. The fair's
success in this respect appears
to have been due as much to the
contacts between American
guides and Soviet visitors as
to the exhibits themselves.
The exhibition was the
most exciting and talked-about
event in Moscow during the sum-
mer. There was an intense de-
sire among all levels of Soviet
society to attend. The people
were proud of having seen it
themselves or of knowing some-
one who had. The US exhibition
lapel pins immediately became
a prestige symbol and are still
frequently worn in public.
Many people were exposed
for the first time to something
other than the propaganda mono-
logue of their own regime. Re-
gardless of whether reactions
were negative or positive, each
visitor carried away an impres-
sion of a different type of
society from his own. Given the
Russians' limitless curiosity
about all things American, it
can be assumed that the fair
whetted their craving for more
information about the United
States and closer contacts with
Americans.
The impact of the fair
was felt throughout the Soviet
Union. Exhibition pins have
been seen in such distant
places as eastern Siberia,
Estonia, and Armenia. There
are also numerous reports that
exhibition pamphlets, frayed
and dog-eared, are being cir-
culated in widely scattered
areas.
The exhibition unquestion-
ably added impetus to the gen-
eral desire of the Soviet public
for more and better consumer
goods. It is widely rumored in
Moscow that the American exhibi-
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tion was responsible
for the recent introduc-
tion of installment
buying in Moscow. It
is said that after the
exhibition opened,
thousands of letters
poured into municipal
offices demanding that
installment buying be
introduced. There is
no basis to this rumor,
since credit buying has
been on its way--by ex-
perimental stages--since
last February; it is in-
teresting, however, that
so many Muscovites are
associating the innova-
tion with the fair.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Demonstrations of Ready Mixes and Frozen Foods.
Official recognition of
the demand for consumer goods
has already been evident in
the sudden, increased attention
given to Western display tech-
niques and American-style ap-
pliances. The recent govern-
ment decree calling for the
improvement and increased pro-
duction of certain consumer
goods seems clearly to carry
the stamp of the fair's influ-
ence.
Efforts to Discredit Fair
The regime's attitude
toward the fair remained of-
fically correct throughout,
but unofficially every effort
was made to discredit it and
divert public atten-
tion. The main at-
tack--waged in the
Soviet press--got
under way well be-
fore the exhibition
opened. Day after
day the press hammered
away at unemployment
and at job, educa-
tion, and race dis-
crimination in the
United States. The
carping tone contin-
ued into the opening
weeks of the fair,
as the press endeav-
ored to "correct"
the "false" picture
presented of life in
the United States.
The announcement
on 3 August of the im-
pending exchange of
visits between Premier
Khrushchev and Presi-
dent Eisenhower marked
a turning point. The
disparagement campaign
slackened in the face
of the effort to em-
phasize the prospects
for improved US-Soviet
relations. Press
criticism continued but
usually was placed in
a setting which stressed
the advantage of in-
creased exchanges.
Criticism of the fair
and harassment of its officials
was carried on inside the fair-
grounds by thousands of party
and Komsomol members who served
as agitators. Apparently they
were instructed to criticize
specific aspects of the exhibi-
tion, express their disappoint-
ment over the lack of technolog-
ical displays, and laugh at the
modern art. More serious, how-
ever, were their efforts to
neutralize the effectiveness
of the Russian-speaking guides
by bombarding them with
provocative questions, tying
them up in involved technical
discussions, and generally con-
founding their work.
Sewing Demonstration.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY"SUU&RY
5 November 1959
During the first few days,,
over half of the visitors ap-
peared to be-agitators. They
were quickly spotted, however,
and the reaction of the other
Soviet visitors more often
than not was hostile toward
them. The number of agitators
soon decreased markedly, prob-
ably due as much'.to the realiza-
tion that their efforts were
backfiring as to the improved
climate of US-Soviet relations.
Competitive Attractions
With the opening of the
exhibition, Moscow blossomed
with new attractions of its
own, designed to distract the
public from the fair. The
Soviet Government apparently
felt it necessary to show that.
it could do as well as.the
Americans.
A Soviet consumer goods
display was opened in an
adjacent section of Sokolniki
Park the day before the US
exhibition opened. The Soviet
counterpart was an obvious and
almost ludicrous copy, complete
with its own aluminum roof and
smiling girls demonstrating
electric stoves and shining
cars. It was so located as
to catch the attention-of those
waiting in line to get tickets
to the US exhibition. A giant
bazaar, where scarce consumer
goods were offered for sale,
was opened in another part of
Moscow at about the same time..
Control of Soviet Visitors
Distribution of tickets
to the fair was tightly con-
trolled by the regime. Initial-
ly, all tickets were distributed
to district party committees,
which in turn allotted them to
the factories and offices under
their jurisdiction. Numerous
reports indicate that the bulk
of tickets went to party mem-
bers and various.other favored
groups. The demand for tickets
far surpassed the supply, and
the discriminatory distribution
policy was a source of frustra-
tion and bitterness to many
Russians.
Some tickets were eventually
put on "public".sale each day
at Sokolniki Park. A person
trying to avail himself to this
service, however, had to line
up for a screening check before
proceeding to -the ticket office.
This procedure could take as
long as five hours, and there
was no guarantee that tickets
would still be available.
Inside the fair a careful
watch was maintained over .
the citizenry. Security of-
ficials circulated among the
crowd, and it was not unusual
to see someone who had been
"indiscreet" tapped on the
shoulder and called aside for
a little "chat."
One of the methods the
regime used to harass visitors
was to prohibit the installation
of any toilet facilities in the
exhibition building.
Effects of These Measures
The opinions of many
visitors were molded by the
line taken in the press, but
there is strong evidence that
the belittling propaganda and
control measures were in many
important respects backfiring.
One-.Soviet citizen remarked
that here was an example of a
high-level decision overzeal-
ously carried out by second-.
level officials.
The campaign helped hold
the ideological line, but it
was not successful in imposing'
a negative image of the United
States upon the Soviet public
at. large. There appears to
have been in some instances a
direct correlation between
press criticism of certain
displays and public interest
in.them. The popularity of the
Family of Man photographic dis--
p a was assured after_Izvestia
ran an article objecting o tsme.
of the photographs.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The constant harping in the
Soviet press on such American
problems as unemployment
prompted Soviet visitors to ask
questions which enabled the
American guides to reply with
the American side of the ques-
tion. An explanation of un-
employment insurance, for in-
stance, took most people by
surprise and probably shook a
few misconceptions.
Popular Reactions
Popular reactions to the
fair varied widely, depending
Shoe Display,
on prior expectations and the
level of education and degree
of knowledge of the West. In
general, the people were im-
pressed but not ecstatic over
what they saw. While numerous
individuals were obviously de-
lighted and amazed, there is
also good evidence that in many
others appreciation was mixed
with disappointment.
Many people had developed
such extravagant expectations
of what the Americans would
show them that the real thing
was bound to fall short. There
was apparently a widespread
craving to see the full panoply
of American luxuries--an element
which was deliberately muted.
Many visitors were heard to com-
plain, "Why haven't you shown
us your best?"
While the constant criticism
of the lack of examples of Ameri-
can technology was in large meas-
ure officially inspired, there
appears to have been some genuine
disappointment. Most visitors
were well aware of American
technological achievements and
had expected to be impressed.
Many visitors were bewildered
by what seemed to be the fair's
lack of direction, focus, and ex-
planation. The Soviet people
are accustomed to hard selling
and heavy-handed exhibitions
where visitors are carefully
herded, told what they are
looking at, why they are looking
at it, and what they should
think about it. Many members
of the Soviet intelligentsia,
however, found the light holiday
mood and freedom to wander and
discover for themselves refresh-
ing and the feature which im-
pressed them most.
Reaction to Specific Displays
The most popular displays
were the automobile, Circarama
--the 360-degree screen tour
of the US, and color television
and the Family of Man. By all
accounts, however, the American
guides ranked as high or even
higher than the exhibits. The
craving of Soviet citizens.for
contact with Americans made the
guides focal points of interest.
Their ability to speak Russian,
their candor and general knowledge
won them unstinting praise.
"Wonderful lads are your guides,"
reads one entry in the remark
book.
There is no question about
the appeal of the American auto-
mobiles. Individuals who could
otherwise find nothing
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 November 1959
complimentary to say about the
fair made an exception in this
case. Among the "technical
marvels" which the average vis-
itor had so hoped to see, Cir-
carama impressed almost every-
one with both its mechanical
perfection and its content, and
color television was a smash hit.
The Family of Man exhibi-
tion may have had the greatest
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impact, particularly with the
better educated. Nearly every-
one was moved by the human
appeal of the photographs,
and there is reason to believe
that this exhibit's message
became associated with US pol-
icy as a whole. Other well-
received exhibits were the mod-
el house, demonstration kitchen,
and book corner,
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