CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002600020001-2
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2005
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• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.
OCR NO. 0024/60
21 January 1960
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
E
L
25X1
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
The keynote of Khrushchev's
address to the Supreme Soviet
on 14 January was his portrayal
of the growth of Soviet strength.
Khrushchev claimed in effect
that Soviet power, both eco-
nomic and military, has achieved
a "breakthrough"--so strength-
ening the bloc's position vis-
a-vis the non-Communist world
as to permit a one-third re-
duction in Soviet armed forces
--a pronouncement which has ma-
jor implications for East-West
negotiations.
The USSR, he implied, is
so far advanced in rocket weap-
ons that the conventional ground,
air, and surface naval forces
and the military requirements
which necessitated their main-
tenance have lost much of their
earlier significance. He
argued that formidable weapons
the USSR already possesses and
"incredible" weapons to come
permit it to economize in the
military sphere.
While Khrushchev sees war
as marking the end of capital-
ism, he also recognized ex-
plicitly--for the first time--
that neither great power could
attack the other without re-
ceiving devastating retalia-
tion. War thus is no longer a
rational course for either side,
and, in his view, the advance
of Communism is thus facili-
tated, since the West can no
longer resort to arms to stem
the "tide of history."
Troop Reduction
In speaking of a reduction
in the armed forces,Khrushchev
for the first time gave offi-
cial figures on the size of the
Soviet military establishment.
He said the armed forces fell
from 11,400,000 men in 1945 to
3,600,000 at present--about
640,000 less than American esti-
mates. After the new reduc-
tion, he said, the armed forces
would be down to 2,400,000 men.
These figures apparently ex-
clude security troops--believed
to number 350,000 men,
A troop reduction of 1,-
200,000 within the next two
years would be in line with the
decrease in the number of men
reaching conscription age and
with the growing needs of the
economy for labor. The Soviet
premier's references to some
future military training within
territorial units may indicate
a plan to offset the effect of
a reduction in regular forces.
Large numbers of men could be
trained under this supplemen-
tary reserve program without ac-
tually being conscripted into
the armed forces.
Impact on Military Doctrine
The proposed troop reduc-
tion appears to reflect Khru-
shchev's own ideas on modern
warfare--reliance on missiles
as the chief element of offen-
sive and defensive power. He
played down the importance of
surprise attack with modern
weapons as not giving any coun-
try "an advantage for achieving
victory." The Soviet Union,
he implied, is developing a
second strike capability--locat-
ing its "rocket facilities in
such a way as to ensure
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
duplication and triplication...
so that if some of the means
earmarked for a retaliatory
blow were put out of commission
one could always. . .hit targets
from reserve positions."
Khrushchev further asserted
that war would begin, not on
national borders, but in the
heart of warring countries.
"Moreover, there would not be
a single capital, not a single
major industrial or administra-
tive center, not a single stra-
tegic area which would not be
subjected to attack, not only
during the first days, but dur-
ing the first minutes of the
war."
Khrushchev implied that,
after the proposed cuts, there
will be a preponderant emphasis
on a nuclear striking capabil-
ity, although Defense Minister
Malinovsky, who spoke after
Khrushchev at the Supreme So-
viet, clearly reasserted the
need for maintaining a proper
balance among the various arms.
Malinovsky added that the So-
viet Army and Navy now are
training primarily for inflict-
ing a "destructive retaliatory
blow."
Khrushchev implied signif-
icant changes in the employment
of the Soviet armed forces. The
reductions in conventional
forces suggest that mission
priorities and the present dis-
position of these forces may
have been re-examined, and may
perhaps even result in a re-
duction of forces in East Ger-
many. In general, the reduc-
tion in numbers will be offset
somewhat by the continuing em-
phasis on firepower and mobility
--in particular by a further
improvement in Soviet airlift
capabilities.
Evidence is lacking to
support the Soviet leader's
implication of substantial ICBM
capability in being. His ref-
erence to "incredible new weap-
ons" and his missile rattling
seem in considerable part de-
signed to reassure the Soviet
public as well as to warn the
Western powers that the pro-
jected reduction does not en-
danger Soviet security.
Conventional armaments
were again played down by Khru-
shchev. He said the air force
and navy had lost their former
importance in view of the mod-
ern development of military
equipment. Almost the entire
air force, he said, is being
replaced by rocket equipment,
and the USSR will continue to
cut and even discontinue pro-
duction of bombers and other
obsolete equipment.
In the navy, Khrushchev
said, submarines are assuming
great importance but surface
vessels no longer play the part
they once did. He added that
Soviet armed forces to a con-
siderable extent have shifted to
rocket and nuclear arms, that
some artillerymen and airmen
will be used in newly formed
rocket units, and that rocket
and nuclear weapons will con-
tinue to be perfected until
such time as they are banned.
Soviet military production
programs in the recent past
bear out Khrushchev's state-
ments. Of eight plants pro-
ducing bombers in 1955, only
one does so at present. This
plant has been producing
one or two Bison heavy bombers
per month over the past two
years.
The future of Soviet fight-
er aircraft was not so clearly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
1960'
ESTIMATED
FAGOT (MIG-15)
3,100
4,500
3,900
7,700
360
0
0
0
0
0
0
FLORA (YAK-23)
550
370
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
FRESCO (MIG-17)
0
0
400
3.300
3,700
2,900
2,000
11200
0
0
0
FARMER (MIG-19)
0
0
0
0
26
490
1. 120
1,300
190
0
0
FLASHLIGHT (YAK-25)
0
0
0
0
FITTER
63
170
190
FISHPOT
0
59
250
11
190
440
YAK-27%29
49
0
0
Totals
3,650
4,870
4,300
5,000
4,135
3,610
3,400
2, 541
313
419
880
00119 36 Soviets have estimated capacity to produce approximately 2, 500 fighters of the weight and complexity of the Fitter. 21 JANUARY 1960
written off but it has been
placed in question. While de-
sign and production difficul-
ties with new fighter types
may be in large part responsi-
ble for the small numbers pro-
duced in the last year or so,
theymay also reflect some doubt
about the future of the manned
fighter.
Soviet naval shipbuilding
has decreased rapidly after
reaching a peak in 1955-56.
Much experimental work has
been done on new types of
naval vessels, but no deci-
sion is apparent to mass-pro-
duce any of the new types on
the scale of the 1950-55 pro-
grams.
Soviet Economy
In speaking of the Soviet
economy, Khrushchev said the
Seven-Year Plan could be met
with or without the troop.re-
duction and concurrent mone-
tary saving, and that the budg-
et could stand an increase in
expenditures for the armed
forces, if this became neces-
sary, without detriment to the
economic plan. The Soviet Un-
ion is proceeding, he said,not
from budgetary weakness but
from economic strength.
It is believed the USSR
would probably have fulfilled
the industrial targets of the
Seven-Year Plan in any event,
but a troop reduction will in-
crease the possibility of over-
fulfillment. Khrushchev's
speech reflects a Soviet judg-
ment that it is more advantage-
ous to apply resources to ad-
vanced weapons or to economic
growth rather than to large
conventional military forces.
This transfer of resources may
actually have been going on
for some time.
Khrushchev's statement
that the armed forces at present
comprise only 3,600,000 men--as
opposed to 4,300,000 estimated
hefetofore--means that billions
of rubles (some 20-25 billion
rubles for 1960) more than es-
timated have been available an-
nually in recent years for oth-
er military or economic pur-
poses. In the future, after
the additional future troop
cuts, 16-17 billion rubles per
year will be available for
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21 January 1960
whatever use--advanced weapons,
industrial investment, and con-
sumer goods--Khrushchev wishes
to make of them. The resources
in terms of manpower and equip-
ment represented by 16-17 bil-
lion rubles are not, however,
immediately transferable to
these ends.
The possibility that more
resources than estimated have
been used for military hard-
ware for some years and the
prospect that proposed troop
cuts will make more funds avail-
able in the next few years will
not alleviate the physical lim-
itations on providing launching
facilities, missiles, equipment,
and trained operating personnel
involved in attaining a force
of 140 to 200 ICBMs on launcher
by mid-1961. The time required
to provide these after an ini-
tial operating capability has
been achieved--in this case es-
timated to be 1 January 1960--
is relatively fixed, and would
not be altered significantly
by allocating additional funds.
The Soviet premier pointed
up the progress of Soviet in-
dustry in the past year. He
said the growth in value of
gross industrial production
was "more than 11 percent,"
against a planned goal of 7.7
percent. Production of steel,
coal, petroleum, and electric
power was about as planned;
labor productivity and housing
plans were also reported over-
fulfilled.
Political Implications
It was obvious from Khru-
shchev's speech that his pro-
posals met considerable resent-
ment; he went to some lengths
to reassure his military peo-
ple that those affected by the
reductions will be given spe-
cial treatment while adjusting
to civilian life. He also took
great pains to emphasize that
Soviet strength will be in no
way impaired by his proposed
cuts. Khrushchev's proposals
may stem from a fairly recent
decision. Last March at a
press conference, he said, "We
are not going to reduce our
armed forces further," adding
that Western reluctance to
agree to disarmament meant that
the USSR must "keep its powder
dry."
There are no doubt impor-
tant groups in the Soviet
Union which in some degree
opposed the plan to cut the
armed forces. Khrushchev him-
self has admitted from time
to time that his military lead-
ers are a problem because of
their hidebound opposition to
change. At the same time
Khrushchev is quick to empha-
size that he has consulted
with the general staff. Almost
immediately after the speech,
Malinovsky and five others came
to the podium to support
the move. A subsequent rally
at the headquarters of the
Moscow Military District to
support the proposals was at-
tended by no less than five
presidium members. Such rallies
of the military are rare, the
last ones being in 1957 when
Zhukov was removed and in 1953
when Beria was ousted.
An official of the Soviet
State Planning Commission stated
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in a 19 January interview on
the subject of the demobilized
personnel that manpower is in
great demand, particularly in
the northern regions, Siberia,
the Urals, the Far East, and
Kazakhstan, and pointed out
that those who go to the new
lands would receive special
privileges.
Although there has probably
been disagreement with Khru-
shchev over this program, any
active opposition mould have
been expressed at the secret
central committee session last
month. In any case the plan
now will be implemented as the
law of the land, and those still
in opposition will doubtless
remain quiet.
Khrushchev's speech is
the most sweeping Soviet claim
to date that the tide of history
has turned decisively against
the West and that the Western
powers, in the forthcoming
period of high-level negotia-
tions, will have little choice
but to accommodate Soviet views.
Khrushchev appears to see lit-
tle possibility that he can be
forced to adjust his positions
SOVIET
PRODUCTION
INCREASES
? ACTUAL
PETROLEUM ELECTRIC POWER
MILLION METRIC TONS BILLION KILOWATT HOURS
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
CRUDE STEEL
MILLION METRIC TONS
on any of the major issues that
will be discussed in forthcom-
ing conferences. In Khrushchev's
opinion, "Never before has the
influence of the Soviet Union
in international affairs, its
prestige as a stronghold of
peace, been so great as today.
... We support our proposals
with practical deeds."
The Soviet premier but-
tressed his dramatic appraisal
of the "relation of forces"
in the world arena by depict-
ing the Western coalition in
a state of disarray and alarm.
As in all his major foreign
policy speeches since his visit
to the United States, Khru-
shchev professed to see a
marked shift in the Western,
particularly American, attitude
toward the USSR--a shift to-
ward growing recognition that
a "fundamental shift" in the
East-West balance of power has
occurred. He asserted that
"ossified conceptions" in West-
ern policy are breaking up,
especially in the United States,
and that Western statesmen have
finally come to see that their
"policy of strength" has failed.
With the exception of add-
ing a nuclear test ban to the
COAL
MILLION METRIC TONS
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
I'I Rf I N1ACI INCREASE
list of Soviet agenda
proposals--disarma-
ment, Germany, Berlin,
and other important
issues--the speech
contained no changes
in position or attitude
toward the May summit
meeting. Khrushchev
made it very clear,
however, that he ex-
pects the first meet-
ing "will be followed
by a number of summit
meetings." He con-
tinued to side-step
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21 January 1960
the question of German partici-
pation. His assurance that
the interests of small states
not represented at the summit
will be fully protected ap-
pears to have been addressed
in part to the East Germans.
Khrushchev gave no hint
that he believes his long-range
strategy based on pressure for
a German peace treaty and an
end to the Western "occupation
regime" in West Berlin needs to
be altered in any significant
way in view of developments
since the Geneva foreign minis-
ters' conference. He repeated
his now-standard warning that
if Soviet efforts to conclude
a treaty with both German
states "fail to be crowned
with success after all," the
USSR will sign a separate trea-
ty with East Germany "with all
the consequences proceeding from
this." However, he strongly im-
plied that he foresees an in-
definite period of high-level
negotiations before the day of
decision for unilateral action
arrives.
The mounting discontent
with De Gaulle's leadership,
evident in his dispute with
Finance Minister Pinay and in
army restiveness over Algeria,
spells increasing difficulties
for the French President's poli-
oies and perhaps even for the
continued operation of the par-
liamentary institutions as orig-
inally established by him. De
Gaulle's central problem is to
keep the Algerian issue from
broadening rightist and army
opposition. The Algerian reb-
els continue to keep open the
possibility of cease-fire nego-
tiations, but they probably
view the growing opposition to
De Gaulle as confirmation that
De Gaulle's personal assurance
of eventual self-determination
is insufficient grounds for a
cease-fire.
Pinay's ouster highlighted
economic policy differences and
emphasized the parliament's
long-brewing irritation over
its reduced role and over De
Gaulle's "royal" method of
running the government. It
also reflected a general un-
happiness with De Gaulle's at-
titude toward the Western al-
liance and European integra-
tion. There are strong indi-
cations that the rightist In-
dependent party intends to go
into open opposition to the
government, and party leaders
may try to force a special
parliamentary session before
the regularly scheduled 26
April session to discuss "eco-
nomic policy and possibly Algeria."
De Gaulle has already hinted
that an impasse with parliament
would spur him to "go to the
country" for a referendum on
further constitutional changes.
Article 16 of the constitution
invests him with virtually dic-
tatorial powers in time of "na-
tional crisis," but suspicion
is mounting that he wants a
more outright presidential sys-
tem of government. No improve-
ment in the relationship between
the government and the political
parties seems likely in the near
future.
The recent manifestations
of army discontent over Algerian
policy, climaxed by General
Massu's published criticism of
De Gaulle, seem to have been
timed to take advantage of the
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21 January 1960
political setback given De
Gaulle by Pinay's departure.
A serious threat to the regime
would result from close coopera-
tion between these two currents
of opposition.
The seriousness of the mil-
itary opposition depends on the
extent to which De Gaulle can
continue to convince the bulk
of the army that he will neither
abandon it nor Algeria and that
the French public is behind him.
Despite the army's apparent ac-
ceptance of his assurances last
fall, there have been indications
of smoldering anxiety which has
recently been fanned by fears
that the special session of civil
and military leaders on Algerian
policy he has called for 22 Jan-
uary presages further conces-
sions to the rebels. Recent
signs of De Gaulle's willingness
to bolster NATO may be a gesture
to allay the alarm of pro-NATO
top military leaders in order
to retain their support on his
Algerian program.
His public reaffirmation on
20 January of his Algerian pol-
icy thus challenges the loyalty
of the army, which brought him
to power. He wants to maintain
army unity, however, and to
shore up its prestige. He may
therefore couple a new plea to
the rebels to cease hostilities
with a call to the army to in-
tensify its pacification drive.
Although right-wing settlers
in Algeria have been vocal in
denouncing De Gaulle's self-de-
termination program, their opposi-
tion has suffered from the ab-
sence of active army support.
Since mid-December, however, 26
Europeans have been killed in a
sharp rise in terrorism in Al-
giers Department. Initial settler
criticism of alleged army laxity
in local security has led to new
attacks on De Gaulle's Algerian
policy. Rumors that the President
plans to offer new "concessions"
to the rebels on 22 January has
prompted a declaration by the
mayors of the Algerian Department
that Algerians are determined
to remain French "by taking up
arms if necessary." One settler
leader says 15,000 rightist mil-
itants are ready to take up arms
against De Gaulle at any time.
The new unrest has been in-
tensified by speculation con-
cerning a special meeting of
the Algerian Revolutionary Coun-
cil in Tripoli. On 19 January,
however, the meeting ended amid
indications that it had been de-
voted more to streamlining the
cumbersome rebel governmental
machinery than to new moves in
connection with De Gaulle's self-
determination proposals. A rebel
communique announced a shake-up
of ministerial posts, together
with the formation of a three-
man "war cabinet" to prosecute
the war. In contrast to settler
fears that the rebels might make
new moves toward a cease-fire,
the rebel communique limited
itself to keeping open the
possibility of cease-fire nego-
tiations.
Iraq
Prime Minister Qasim's de-
lay in granting licenses to
groups which have applied for
legal recognition under the po-
litical parties law of 6 January
is increasing the rivalry be-
tween contending factions. The
dissenting Communist splinter
group, led by Daud Sayyigh,
which applied for recognition
appears to have suffered a set-
back by the withdrawal of
six founding members.
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21 January 1960
Although the Communists
remain the best organized party
in Iraq, they appear unsure of
Qasim's attitude toward them,
fearing that his policy is to
keep an equilibrium between
opposing political factions in
the country. Qasim's reported
declaration to Sayyigh on 15
January that there must be only
one Communist party in Iraq has
resulted in an intensified ef-
fort by the "orthodox" Communist
press to discredit factionalism.
The declaration by pro-
Communist People's Court Presi-
dent Colonel Mahdawi that he
will form a"People's party"
with the blessing of Qasim hqs
introduced a new element into
the political scene. This par-
ty could become a Communist
front intended to unite leftist
but non-Communist elements.
Mahdawi intends to form his par-
ty after the termination of the
current trials of Baathists im-
plicated in the assassination
attempt on Qasim about the end
of January.
Jordan-UAR
Jordan's relations with
the UAR, formally re-established
last July, have again deterio-
rated. One issue which has as-
sumed "crisis" proportions with-
in the past week involves the
status of the UAR Consulate
General in Jerusalem, which was
opened on 6 January. The UAR's
request for an exequatur, how-
ever, apparently referred to
the consulate general's intended
jurisdiction merely as terri-
tory "occupied by the Jordanian
Army. " This infuriated Jor-
danian Prime Minister Majali,
since the area concerned was
annexed and formally absorbed
by Jordan in 1950 following the
Arab-Israeli war. The consulate
general now is closed.
On 19 January, Jordan
announced that a "battle plan"
for settling the Palestine
problem would be presented to
the forthcoming meeting of Arab
League foreign ministers.
Majali has been irritated
also by Nasir's pronouncements
on Israeli plans for diverting
Jordan River waters, another
issue which affects Jordan more
than other Arab states.
Earlier this month, Majali
said the UAR had failed 25X1
to live up to the agreement made
when diplomatic relations were
resumed last July: he said the
UAR had put exiled former Chief
of Staff Nuwar, whose leadership
of an abortive coup against
King Husayn led to severed re-
lations in 1957, on Cairo radio
recently and Nuwar had asserted
that Jordan was doing nothing
on the Jordan waters question;
Syrian MIGs fired on Jordanian
aircraft over Jordanian terri-
tory on 12 December; and Nasir,
in a recent speech, had labeled
the short-lived Arab Union of
Jordan and pre-revolutionary
Iraq an "imperialist maneuver."
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21 January 1960
Although the UAR promptly
apologized for the air incident,
claiming the Syrians thought
they were chasing Israeli planes,
Jordan has decided to arm all
of its jets during their flights
and to adopt a more aggressive
defensive attitude toward any
future intrusions. In view of
the other differences between
the two countries, the decision
could lead to air clashes along
the Syrian-Jordanian border as
well as along the Jordanian-
Israeli frontier. In general,
however, Jordanian official
sensitivity to these UAR pin
pricks reflects the continuing
basically uneasy situation of
a Jordanian monarchy nearly
surrounded by politically and
socially revolutionary states.
Israel
The Israeli Government has
decided it must step up its pur-
chases of modern arms and mili-
tary equipment during 1960 in
order to "maintain the balance
of power in the Middle East in
view of the continuous arms
flow to Arab countries." An
Israeli Foreign Ministry source
refused to say what types of
weapons would be sought or
which sources the Israelis con-
sider most promising, but he
indicated Israel would renew
its requests for American arms.
Foreign Minister Meir now is
in Paris, where she may be
seeking new French military aid
commitments.
There has been an increase
in the emigration of Rumanian
Jews to Israel during recent
weeks, apparently involving
mostly elderly persons
and "family reunion cases."
While the Jewish Agency, the
Israeli immigration authority,
does not presently feel the
migration will be as large
as that of late 1958 and
early 1959, it is hoping to
avoid any publicity concern-
ing the new movement, fearing
Arab protests might again
jeopardize the exodus as they
did a year ago.
Libya
Results of the 17 January
elections to the Libyan House
of Deputies point up the in-
creasing popular dissatisfaction
in Tripolitania Province over
the policies of--and the wide-
spread corruption within--the
federal government. Only 12
of the 25 incumbents in the
province who were running for
re-election won, and several
who spent large sums campaign-
ing were defeated by young po-
litical unknowns. The govern-
ment may no longer be able to
count on support of a majority
of Tripolitania's 35 deputies,
even though the greater success
of progovernment candidates
in Cyrenaica and the Fezzan
should provide the government
with majority support in the
House of Deputies as a whole.
In spite of its limited
and circumscribed powers, the
new House of Deputies is like-
ly to become a sounding board
for more and stronger criticism
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
of governmental policy. Major
changes in the Council of Min-
isters are likely.
The Lebanese parliament
was enlarged last week from
66 to 99 seats as a prelude to
parliamentary elections which
probably will be held this year.
While President Shihab admits
that a 99-seat parliament is
absurd for a country the size
of Lebanon, he feels that the
move will tend to avert "dan-
gerous" competition between
various local leaders for seats.
Shihab also believes that
elections this year would ease
political pressures remaining
in the country as an aftermath
of the Lebanese civil strife
of 1958. However, his inten-
tion to make a radical change
in the Lebanese voting system
by introducing the secret bal-
lot, as well as carrying out a
reapportionment of election
districts, is sure to arouse
violent objections from Lebanese
political bosses.
Foreign Minister Uwayni,
who has made himself the mouth-
piece of the Arab League on
the question of diverting Jor-
dan waters, announced on 15
January that Lebanon will divert
the Hasbani River as part of
the league's scheme to harass
Israeli plans to irrigate the
Negev desert. The Karami re-
gime will request a parliamen-
tary appropriation of $3,165,-
000 to carry out the project.
Israeli reaction will probably
be cautious, at least for the
time being.
The Castro regime has re-
acted angrily to the US note
of 11 January protesting the
illegality of the seizure of
American-owned properties in
Cuba by the agrarian reform
institute (INRA). Castro him-
self publicly attacked Ambas-
sador Bonsal and called the
note "threatening." The sei-
zure of lands has been stepped
up, and the government is ap-
parently drafting a drastic
urban reform law. The Cuban
press is under mounting pres-
sure to conform to the govern-
ment line, and on 18 January
one of Havana's leading inde-
pendent newspapers was taken
over by its employees when its
management abandoned efforts
to resist government-supported
efforts by the workers to
"clarify" anti-Castro stories
in the paper.
After eight months of ex-
tralegal takeovers of private
lands, a Castro government of-
ficial announced on 17 January
that the INRA will start hun-
dreds of court actions to ex-
propriate Cuban as well as
foreign-owned properties. The
institute is already seizing
significant acreages of sugar
land, with this year's sugar
harvest barely under way. Its
executive director, suspected
Communist Antonio Nunez Jimenez,
declared on 12 January that "all
large cattle ranches in Cuba
now... belong to INRA, and in a
few days all large sugar
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
plantations will also come
under INRA's control."
The government is planning
to establish a National Insti-
tute of Urban Reform early next
25X1 it
may parallel, in the urban
real estate field, the methods
and principles of the agrarian
reform law.
The tendency of Cubans to
invest their savings in highly
profitable urban real estate
has led in Cuba, as elsewhere
in Latin America, to inflated
real estate values and chronic
housing shortages for lower
income groups. The new insti-
tute will probably be used
further to curry favor with the
masses at the expense of middle-
and upper-income groups and will
further increase the regime's
already extensive controls over
the country's economic and po-
litical life.
The American ambassador in Mexico
reports close liaison there be-
tween the Soviet and Cuban embas-
sies, with renewal of diplomatic
relations a possible early ob-
jective.
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21 January 1960
In his address to the Su-
preme Soviet on 14 January,
Khrushchev exuded confidence
that he can afford to stand
firm on his present position
at the nuclear test cessation
talks in Geneva. He gave noti-
fication that such moves as
the recent US announcement re-
serving the right to resume
testing, "designed to bring
pressure on the USSR," will be
of no avail. While conceding
that existing technical equip-
ment "cannot provide absolute
certainty" that underground
nuclear explosions can be de-
tected, he contended that vio-
lators "would cover themselves
with shame, and they would be
condemned by the peoples of
the world."
Khrushchev appears to be
playing for time on the assump-
tion that the USSR, capitaliz-
ing in part on the British dis-
position for compromise, can
extract further concessions
from the United States on the
nuclear test cessation issue.
The Soviet delegates at
Geneva continue to avoid any
further discussion of the dif-
ficulties in detecting under-
ground tests, arguing that once
a "fixed" quota of annual on-
site inspections is agreed on,
the reasons for the clash be-
tween American and Soviet ex-
perts on this question will
disappear. The Soviet delega-
tion is attempting to encour-
age the British to promote a
compromise between the Ameri-
can and Soviet positions on
the deadlocked technical issue.
Soviet delegate Tsarapkin
asserted that British remarks'
on 15 January could "possibly"
provide the way for resolving
the technical impasse. The
British delegate had asked
whether the Soviet Union could
agree to "temporary" control
measures while the control sys-
tem is being installed, if the
West were to accept the on-site
inspections quota proposal. The
Soviet delegate said the Brit-
ish questions deserved "careful
attention" and that he would
reply shortly.
Moscow may calculate that
British willingness to discuss
any compromise which would as-
sume settlement of the quota
issue prior to final determina-
tion of the criteria to be used
to send out inspection teams
presents an opportunity for ma-
jor inroads on the formal West-
ern position that a technically
reliable control system must
be agreed on before agreement
on a comprehensive test ban.
Moscow probably also as-
sumes that the British line of
questioning implies agreement
to a moratorium on underground
tests during the time the perma-
ent control system is being set
up. The Soviet delegate indi-
cated privately last November
that in event of disagreement
in the technical talks, the
USSR might consider a phased
treaty, but stressed that the
"crux of the matter" must be an
obligation to halt all tests at
the outset, regardless of the
temporary nature of a ban on
underground tests. Moscow may
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
believe that the British sug-
gestion could lead to a formula
to ban all testing "temporarily"
until a satisfactory system
for detection and identifica-
tion of small underground ex-
plosions is developed, after
which the ban would become
permanent.
(Concurred in by-OS-I)
KHRUSHCHEV'S LATEST STATEMENT ON SOVIET MISSILE CAPABILITIES
Soviet Premier Khrushchev's
most recent statement on Soviet
missile capabilities, made on
14 January at the opening of
the USSR Supreme Soviet, is the
most comprehensive official ex-
pression to date of the coming
dominance of missile armaments
in the Soviet military estab-
lishment. The speech gives his
view that these new weapons are
replacing more conventional
ones.
Khrushchev said, "We al-
ready have so many nuclear
weapons, both atomic and hydro-
gen, and the necessary rockets
for delivering these weapons...
that...we would be able literal-
ly to wipe the country or coun-
tries which attack us off the
face of the earth." At the
Hungarian party congress in
Budapest on 31 November, Khru-
shchev said the Soviet Union
had a stockpile of rockets with
nuclear warheads sufficient
"to raze to the ground all our
potential enemies:'
Both these statements are
general and give no indication
of the quantities that might be
involved. There is a great
difference between the smaller
stockpile of missiles required
to destroy the major cities of
the West and the greater quan-
tity necessary to attack effec-
tively and destroy Western re-
taliatory forces.
One of the few statements
permitting a rough numerical
estimate of Soviet intentions
shifting from conventional arma-
ments to long-range missiles
had been estimated by his mili-
tary advisers to be 30 billion
rubles. It is probable that
expenditure of the 30 billion
rubles, if indeed this were an
approved program, would be made
over a period of some five or
six years, or to the end of the
Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965).
Such an expenditure might en-
able the USSR to produce and
have on launcher by that time
some 300 to 400 ICBMs and some
200 to 300 IRBMs (with ranges
of 700 and 1,100 nautical
miles).
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
Over the past year Khru-
shchev has made a series of
statements designed to create
in Western eyes the impression
of a rapid growth of Soviet
military might in the missile
field. In November 1958 he
claimed in his "Theses on the
Seven-Year Plan" that the "pro-
duction of intercontinental
ballistic missiles has been
set up successfully." This im-
plied that initial tooling of
ICBM production facilities had
recently been completed, that
the technology of production
was considered mastered and
probably had been demonstrated,
and that initial delivery of
stockpile ICBMs was about to
begin.
If it was an accurate rep-
resentation of the status of
the program at that time, this
statement would have indicated
a capability to begin deliver-
ies of such missiles early in
1959, a development implied by
Khrushchev's second major re-
mark on ICBM production, made
at the 21st party congress in
January 1959. He then stated
that serial production of inter-
continental ballistic rockets
had been organized.
According to a 1957 So-
viet text on aircraft produc-
tion, there are three stages
involved in putting a new item
into serial production: prep-
aration for production; mastery
of the processes of manufactur-
ing by the production line;
and serial production and mas-
tery of modifications. Khru-
shchev's claim in November 1958
would imply that the second
stage had been achieved, and
the statement in January 1959
would suggest that all prep-
arations for the third stage
had been completed.
Even if serial production
were successfully organized at
the beginning of 1959, as Khru-
shchev wished to imply, initial
rates of production would be
low and production would in-
crease gradually during the year.
The USSR, therefore, could not
yet have been able to achieve
production and deployment of
large numbers of ICBMs.
However, a small stockpile
of perhaps ten ICBMs--that is,
enough to attack several key US
urban areas--is believed to
exist. Moreover, Khrushchev's
recent statement, implying a
large current missile capabil-
ity, cannot be wholly discred=
ited, in that the USSR probably
has had sufficient time to
possess significant numbers of
700-nautical-mile missiles and
some 1,100-nautical-mile mis-
siles capable of reaching tar-
gets in Western Europe and other
peripheral areas.
On 14 November 1959, in a
speech to Soviet journalists
which cannot logically be re-
lated to his previous ICBM state-
ment, Khrushchev said, "In one
year, 250 missiles with hydrogen
warheads came off the assembly
line in the factory we visited."
Available evidence suggests a-
gain that, among the longer
range missiles, only the 700-
nautical-mile weapon has been
in production long enough to
permit achievement of such a
production rate. Khrushchev's
statement also could be true if 25X1
it referred to the combined pro-
duction of several missile types
(Prepared by ORR; concurred in by
I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
The firing of party presid-
ium member Nikolay Belyayev on
19 January from his post as par-
ty chief in Kazakhstan is the
latest of a number of recent
signs of stresses and strains
in the party presidium which
probably indicate that a signif-
icant reshuffling of Khrushchev's
top command is under way.
Others in addition to Bel-
yayev have suffered a sharp loss
in standing, with the result that
the number of top leaders around
Khrushchev has become smaller
than at any time since he con-
solidated his power. There now
are several presidium members
who are probably members in
name only. While this situa-
tion could remain until the next
party congress, scheduled to
be held in 1961, Khrushchev may
soon find it desirable to adjust
the composition of the presidium
to correspond with the actual
political situation.
Belyayev's removal from his
Kazakh post appears to be a
direct consequence of the
scathing criticism of agriculture
in Kazakhstan which Khrushchev
made at the party central com-
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Page 4 of 20
mittee meeting in December. Khru-
shchev accused Belyayev of poor
leadership in organizing the har-
vest and of "lacking the courage"
to admit his errors. There is
some evidence, however, that fac-
tional infighting may have been
involved.
Nikolay Rodionov, former
party chief in Leningrad and a
protege of presidium member and
First Deputy Premier Frol Kozlov,
was named second secretary in the
Kazakh party shuffle, suggest-
ing that Kozlov had a hand in
Belyayev's downfall, Dinmuk-
hamed Kunayev, Kazakh premier,
replaced Belyayev as party first
secretary. The Soviet announce-
ment made no mention of a new
post for Belyayev, probably in-
dicating that he is not to be
given an important job.
Presidium member Aleksey
Kirichenko, demoted last week,
was given the job of party
chief in Rostov Oblast, but he
has clearly lost the influence
with Khrushchev which had made
him the second-in-command in
the professional party machine.
He is still formally a member
of the party secretariat but
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
J
is obviously precluded from
its activities by the Rostov
assignment. At the Supreme
Soviet session last week Kiri-
chenko filed in with the
presidium members but sat
apart. Throughout the session,
he appeared glum and dejected.
The demotion of Belyayev
and Kirichenko obviously up-
sets the balance of forces on
the presidium, but Kirichenko's
will probably have the more
serious repercussions. Belyayev's
seat at the presidium table
could be left vacant, but whether
or not Khrushchev revamps the
presidium completely,'the gap
Kirichenko leaves will have to
be filled, in view of the im-
portant role he played in su-
pervising party operations for
Khrushchev, and it is doubtful
that any arrangement can be
found which will be satisfac-
tory to all members of the
presidium. A new period of
maneuvering, among Khrushchev's
lieutenants, therefore, is like-
ly to ensue.
Events of the past few
weeks have not reflected ad-
versely on other members of
the presidium, but Nikolay
Shvernik, 72, who is frequently
sick, and Otto Kuusinen, 78,
have apparently had little real
influence for some time. Can-
didate member Yan Kalnberzin's
transfer in November 1959 from
Latvian party chief to the
ceremonial post of chairman
of the Presidium of the Latvian
Supreme Soviet indicated his
loss of stature.
On the other hand, Presidium
member Averky Aristov, who is
also a member of the secretariat
and Khrushchev's deputy on the
bureau for the RSFSR, has become
increasingly prominent. For ex-
ample, he was present at the Rostov
party meeting which installed
Kirichenko as first secretary.
Although undoubtedly performing
this and similar tasks as a rep-
resentative of the presidium, to
the party faithful he must in-
creasingly appear as one of the
inner circle.
When Khrushchev does get a-
round to revamping the presidium,
the two candidate members who
appear most likely to be promoted
to full members are Deputy Pre-
mier and Gosplan Chief Aleksey
Kosygin and RSFSR Premier Dmitry
Polyansky, both of whom are key 25X1
figures in the economic drive
for Khrushchev's Seven-Year
Plan.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
POLISH ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 1960
The moderate increase in
industrial output planned for
1960 offers little prospect of
gain for the Polish consumer.
Output is to rise 7.6 percent
over last year, a slight de-
cline from the 1959 rate. A
large share of the increase in
national income this year is
to be directed toward a reduc-
tion of the trade deficit.
This deficit increased
almost 60 percent in 1959. to
$265,000,000. Fodder imports
had to be increased to prevent
a further decline in hog pro-
duction--pork comprises about
80 percent of Polish
meat consumption--
and emergency imports
of meat were neces-
sary. Another ma-
jor cause of the
trade imbalance was
the continued depres-
sion of hard-currency
prices for coal, Po-
land's largest export
item.
In 1960, there-
fore, a smaller share
than last year of
the increase in na-
tional income is to
be allocated for con-
sumption and invest-
ment. The increases
pay. These measures will fur-
ther alienate the workers from
the regime.
Such reforms have been
made in recent years in other
satellites without major out-
breaks, but with much opposi-
tion. How they are received
in Poland will be determined
to some extent by the way they
are put into effect. Official
statements claim that the pro-
gram is to be gradual, and
that the present level of aver-
age wages" is to be main-.
tained. In practice, however,
the reduction of surplus labor
POLISH INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
OFFICIAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES
OVER PRECEDING YEAR
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960(EST)
has been abrupt, and many letters
from Poland reveal that workers
are being laid off throughout
the country, causing a high de-
gree of worker demoralization,
although many alternative and
less desirable jobs are avail-
able. The number of workers
who have lost their jobs may
not be high, but one regime of-
ficial stated that as many as
100,000 had been laid off by
late November and dismissals
seem to be continuing.
over 1959 will be 2.8 and 6
percent, respectively, compared
with about 5 and 14 percent
last year.
One of the major goals
of economic policy during the
year is to bring about an in-
crease of some 7 percent in
labor productivity and a re-
duction in production costs.
Work norms are to be revised
upward for a part of the in-
dustrial labor force but are
not likely to be accompanied
by proportionate increases in
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21 January 1960
The outlook for Polish
agriculture is unpromising.
Because of the drought, less
acreage was sown in winter
grain. Furthermore, the snow
cover for winter crops has
been inadequate to date, caus-
ing speculation that 1960 pro-
duction of bread grain--con-
stituting the bulk of Poland's
grain output--will be consid-
erably smaller than the pre-
ceding year. To help tide
them over until the coming
harvest and perhaps provide
some backlog for next year,
Polish officials have asked
the United States for another
600,000 tons of wheat--in
addition to the 200,000 tons
of grain sold to Poland in
November.
Developments in the econ-
omy point to a year of in-
creased tension between the re-
gime and the people. The peas-
ant--already subject to new
disciplines such as linking
his coal supply to produce de-
liveries to the state--will
probably be further alienated
by attempts to collect arrears
in taxes, by strong propaganda
urging him to join agricultural
"circles"--cooperative associa-
tions--and by related fears of
a resumption of the program to
collectivize private farmland.
Only 13 percent of Poland's
agricultural land now is under
state control.
Shortages of meat, butter,
and milk--but no actual hunger--
and a failure to make tangible
improvements in other aspects
of his living standard will de-
press the urban worker, as
will the labor speed-up. He
will probably also be embittered
by insecurit .over possible
layoffs . (Pre- 25X1
pared by ORR)
A reorganization of North
Vietnam's security forces--
with the possible transfer of
former regular army border se-
curity battalions to a new
Armed Public Security Force--
has become apparent from pub-
lic statements in the North
Vietnamese press. The new
organization will probably be
similar to Peiping's military
public security apparatus.
An article in Nhan Dan on
13 September described-ti new
security arm as "an armed force
of the party and the revolution-
ary government, and an armed
organ of the security branch."
According to the paper, the
new organization is in charge
of guarding the borders, the
coastline, the economic.and
cultural institutions of the
country, the "peaceful labor
of the people, and the peace
and security of all."
An article on 12 December
in People's Army elaborates
somewhat by stating that the
Armed Public Security Force
"will fight side by side with
the People's Army to check im-
perialist aggression from out-
side." Internal security and
counterespionage functions are
implied by the statement that
this will "also curb the activi-
ties of spies and reactionaries
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
in the service of the
enemies inside and
outside the country."
An article in
Nhan Dan on 1 Sep-
tem6eFT959 announced
ranks and insignia
for officers paral-
leling those of the
regular army. The
organization appears
to be directly under
the control of the
Ministry of Defense
general headquarterg
although it may be
nominally under the
Ministry of Public
Security. In any
case, its mission is
distinct from that
of the regular army
and the police mis-
sions of the Ministry
of Public Security.
The reorganization
probably began dur-
ing the summer of
1959.
Chinese agriculture in
1959 was afflicted with a wide
range of unfavorable weather.
According to preliminkry West-
ern estimates, total grain pro-
duction probably did not exceed
200,000,000 tons, as against
185,000,000 tons in 1957 and
some 210,000,000 to 215;000,000
tons in 1958. Cotton produc-
tion was possibly in the range
of 1,500,000 to 1,750,000 tons,
as compared with 1,640,000 tons
in 1957 and 2, 100, 000 tons in 1958.
Spokesmen, for the Peiping
regime take a considerably more
optimistic view. They argue
that the superiority of the
communes and the inspiration
provided by the campaign a-
gainst rightists enabled the
farmers to overcome the worst
weather in decades and to in-
crease output. They assert
that grain production reached
270, 000, 000 tons, as against the
250, 000, 000 tons claimed for 1968
and that cotton output jumped from
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21 January 1960
(MILLION METRIC TONS)
2,100,000 tons in 1958 to
2,410,000 tons last year.
Since the "leap forward"
began, however, Peiping's
agricultural statistics have
proved unreliable. The regime
acknowledged, when it lopped
125,000,000 tons off its orig-
inal grain figure for 1958,
that "inexperience" hampered
compilation of farm figures.
1956 1957 1958 `1959
28 JANUARY 1960
Information from independ-
ent sources confirms Peiping's
assertion that "natural calam-
ities" were widespread. The
extended drought which centered
in the important farm belt of
central and north-central China
covered approximately one third
of the total cultivated acreage
and lasted for over 100 days in
some areas. Extreme heat, with
high rates of evaporation,
aggravated the dry spell.
Irrigation installations,
many of them constructed during
the "leap forward" labor drives,
presumably lessened the damage,
but many irrigation canals and
storage ponds apparently ran
dry. Most of the available
water probably was given to
rice and cotton crops at the
expense of coarse grains and
sweet potatoes.
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Peiping's ac-
tions do not bear
out its claims of
an increase over the
1958 crop, which it
called the finest
harvest in China's
history. It contin-
ues a relentless
campaign, stepped up
last August, for
austerity in food
consumption, explaining that it
is necessary in bumper years to
save for possible lean years.
The regime insisted on great
care in reaping the harvest,
pointing approvingly to communes
where fields were combed four
or five times to save every
kernel.
The use of substitutes for
grain has been urged on the
people. The market has been
flooded with Chinese cabbage,
however, following a regime-
sponsored campaign, and fears
have been expressed that much
of it may spoil before it is
eaten or stored, as was the
case with sweet potatoes a year
ago. Peiping has also tried to
impose an over-all reduction in
state sales of grain at a time
when intensified state crop pro-
curement has netted larger a-
mounts than in the same period
last year.
It is likely that the total
food available for consumption
until the early harvest next
June will be slightly less than
a year ago. However, the re
gime's strenuous efforts to
1 stretch out supplies will prob-
ably forestall a critical na-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
MOSCOW REINFORCES ECONOMIC TIES WITH CAIRO
The Soviet Union, in order
to strengthen its economic ties
with the UAR, has agreed to fi-
nance the construction of the
second stage of the Aswan Dam.
This stage involves primarily
construction of the permanent
High Dam structure itself.
Moscow, which has de-
scribed Soviet aid to the UAR
for the first stage of the dam
as a first-round victory over
the West in "the competition...
for the right to design and
build the Aswan Dam," appar-
ently feels that the new com-
mitment will greatly limit the
prospect of Western participa-
tion in the later hydroelectric
and irrigation phases of the
High Dam project. The addi-
tional aid, granted despite
intermittent frictions with
Cairo, will also serve to bol-
ster Moscow's claim that Soviet
aid is granted on the principle
of "nonintervention in internal
affairs."
In November 1958 the USSR
extended a long-term, low-in-
terest $100,000,000 credit to
the UAR to cover the foreign
exchange costs incurred for the
first phase of the Aswan High
Dam. Soviet engineers revised
the original plans for the dam
to conform more closely to So-
viet construction methods. The
revisions will result in a sav-
ing of time and money to the
UAR. The Soviet Union is com-
mitted under this first agree-
ment to build the coffer dams
to the north and south of the
site for the main dam and to
dig the diversion channels on
the east bank.
Under the new agreement--
which was formally reached
through an exchange of letters
between Khrushchev and Nasir--
the USSR will assist in the con-
struction of the project's sec-
ond phase on the same terms
as for the first stage. Moscow,
therefore, apparently will ex-
tend another large, long-term,
low-interest credit to cover
purchases of additional Pnuin-
Soviet engineers in Moscow study model
of Aswan High Dam.
ment and materials and to pay
for further Soviet technical
assistance.
While no figure has been
announced, it is estimated that
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21 January 1960
this stage of the dam's con-
struction will require more
foreign exchange than the
first stage. A study made in
1955 by the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment estimated the cost of the
entire project at about $1,300,-
000,000, and foreign exchange
costs at approximately $400,-
000,000.
The announcement o
f the
new
Soviet-UAR agreemen
t was
made
on 18 January, jus
t nine
days
after the official
start
of construction on the
first
phase of the project.
The
ceremonies were attended by
two high Soviet officials, and
the Soviet press and radio
gave the event extensive cov-
erage. Emphasizing the "self-
lessness" of the USSR's aid,
Soviet propaganda portrayed
Soviet.UAR relations in a more
friendly light than has been
observed in recent months.
Differences between British
and Greek Cypriot negotiators
over the size of the military
bases to remain under British
sovereignty after Cyprus be-
comes independent prevented
agreement at the London con-
ference held from 16 to 18 Jan-
uary. It became apparent dur-
ing the conference that Britain
is prepared to give up any part
of the areas it now demands only
if the Cypriots offer other fa-
cilities.
After the conference, at-
tended by the foreign ministers
of Britain, Greece, and Turkey
plus Archbishop Makarios and
Turkish Cypriot leader Fazil
Kutchuk, informal discussions
continued between Foreign Sec-
retary Lloyd and the two Cypriot
leaders. Independence, sched-
The agreement does not
appear to reflect any shift in
UAR policy. Political differ-
ences during the past year have
not interfered with close eco-
nomic relations.
uled for 19 February, has been
postponed for one month.
Lloyd took a firm position
at the conference, warning that
failure to meet British demands
could lead to cancellation of
the Cyprus agreements of last
February. These agreements pro-
vided for Cypriot independence
but with two military base
areas to be retained under full
British sovereignty. Britain
was also to be granted certain
rights, such as the use of
ports, roads, and some small
installations. The two bases:,
while described in general
terms in the agreement, were
not specifically delineated in
the settlement.
British military leaders
consider that to be effective
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21 January 1960
the base areas must include
about 120 square miles under
British sovereignty, Makarios
has insisted on restricting
this area to about one third
of that figure, At the con-
ference, Lloyd offered a few
concessions regarding agricul-
tural lands near the bases and
provision for resettlement of
additional Cypriots now living
within the area of the bases,
A possible solution could
limit the British sovereign
area in return for long leases
on additional sections of the
existing military bases, Arrange-
ments for payment for facilities
used by the British would make
a settlement easier for Makarios
to accept, An eventual com-
promise is probable because of
recognition on both sides of
the need for agreement and the
relatively cordial atmosphere
whicl3 has thus far surrounded
the discussions,
Makarios, however, would
lose considerable prestige and
political support if he were
forced to retreat from his pres-
ent position, His enemies on
Cyprus, both Communists and'.
extreme nationalists, are ous
to reap political profit from
any concessions he makes to the
British. In Athens, General
Grivas has publicly proclaimed
his opposition to any conces-
sions beyond 36 square miles,
One possible advantage to
Cyprus which appears to have
developed from the present sit-
uation is increased collabora-
tion between Makarios and the
Turkish Cypriot leaders. Any
further delay in proclaiming
Cypriot independence, however,
could seriously increase Cypriot
distrust of British motives as
well as mutual mistrust on the
part of the two communities on
the island,
THE SECOND ALL-AFRICAN PEOPLE'S CONFERENCE
The second plenary meet-
ing of the nongovernmental All-
African People's Conference
(AAPC), which convenes in Tunis
from 25 to 29 January, will pro-
vide nationalists from both
sovereign and dependent Afri-
can countries with another op-
portunity to join in demands
for African independence and
solidarity,
Underlying friction be-
tween relatively moderate and
more radical tendencies within
the movement,however, exempli-
fied by the split between Kenya's
Tom Mboya and Ghana's Prime
Minister Nkrumah,appears like-
ly to be even stronger than at
the inaugural meeting in De-
cember 1958 in Pccra, This
friction could lead, now or
later, to a schism which would
further impair the movement's
already limited effectiveness.
The gathering's Tunisian
organizers expect about 150
delegates representing all
major African nationalist or-
ganizations and trade unions,
Already concerned about keep-
ing the meeting on an essential-
ly moderate course, the Tuni-
sians claim to have eliminated
"some more Communist organiza-
tions" from the original invi-
tation list.
This had been prepared by
the AAPC's Communist-oriented
Secretary General Abdoulaye
Diallo, Guinea's representative
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CUPdt 1NT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAR
21 January 1960
in Ghana, who has developed
close ties with Moroccan left-
ists as well as with the in-
creasingly militant Nkrumah.
Nevertheless, the radicals may
succeed in dominating next
week's proceedings, especial-
ly if moderate African leaders
from French Communi-
ty states and other
areas fail to attend
and if Mboya finds
it impossible to
leave the round-
table talks on Kenya's
constitution now in
progress in London.
Observers from
Sino-Soviet bloc
countries--a number
of whom were present
at the 1958 meeting
--can again be ex-
pected to attend and
to lobby, directly
and through such Com-
munist-influenced
groups as Felix
Moumie's terrorist
wing of the Union of
the Cameroons Popula-
tion (UPC), for ex-
treme resolutions.
Nasir's representa-
tives, on the other
hand, while likely
to give general sup-
port to the radicals, are re-
ported planning to play a less
aggressive role than they did
at Accra and may even strive
to offset the effect of Commu-
nist tactics.
The conference can prob-
ably agree easily on general
positions on such items as
"the independence of Africa"
and "economic and social de-
velopment." Serious discord
may develop, however, over
specifics, such as the atti-
tude to be adopted toward the
French-sponsored Ahidjo regime
in now-independent Cameroun
which UPC extremists--hereto-
fore backed up the AAPC--are
still trying to bring down by
UAR
IEGPYT)
AOMAL
'.. BRSOM AL
ETHIOPIA
\C A 1\I, PAY) WEST BECHU ANALANO
(U ufn. @41c.1 AFRICA
OF RASITOLANI,
SOUTH AFRICA
The French Community and
the continued adherence of
many African labor leaders,
including Mboya, to the
Western-oriented Internation-
al Confederation of Free
Trade Unions--alike condemned
by the radicals as unaccept-
able compromises with "im-
perialism"--also seem likely
to provoke acrimonious wran-
gling.
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LEOMB IVORY GHANA
consr;
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CU ENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
INDIAN CONGRESS PARTY'S ANNUAL CONVENTION
The 65th annual convention
of India's ruling Congress party,
a lackluster affair held in
Bangalore from 12 to 17 January,
reflected both the country's
distraction over events on its
frontier bordering Communist
China and the party's waning
ability to inspire either its
members or the public at
large.
The usual resolutions
drafted by the Congress' high
command on international affairs
and on economic matters con-
tained only minor variations on
themes which have become famil-
iar in recent months. After
provoking desultory and quickly
stifled criticism from a few of
the delegates, the resolutions
were passed unanimously,
Speeches lacked the spark evi-
dent at last year's session, and
the public turnout fell far
short of normal.
The resolution on inter-
national affairs restated
India's adherence to a policy
of nonalignment with either
of the two big-power blocs.
Prime Minister Nehru insisted
this policy had been proved
right and remained the only
course India should follow. He
rejected vehemently suggestions
that the door be kept open for
military assistance in the event
of an emergency,
A special resolution on
the frontier question covered
much of the same ground as have
recent government statements,
its impact being lessened by the
fact that several months of pub-
lic debate on the Sino-Indian
dispute have all but exhausted
the subject.
The high command steered
clear of any radical proposals
in the economic sphere such as
last year's controversial pro-
gram for reorganizing the rural
economy along cooperative lines,
Although it reaffirmed the
party's support for the coopera-
tive system, its resolution tac-
itly conceded the strength of
the opposition and in effect
retreated from the original
program, The 1960 resolution
stressed primarily the need for
overhauling the government ad-
ministration to ensure faster
implementation of five-year-
plan programs.
Perhaps the most signifi-
cant event of the convention
was the induction of Sanjiva
Reddy, 46-year-old former chief
minister of the southern state
of Andhra Pradesh, who succeeds
Indira Gandhi as president of
the Congress party. Reddy's
two-year term will be crucial,
for it will be his responsibil-
ity to prepare the party organ-
ization for the national elec-
tions in 1962. While his youth
and apparent political acumen
may bring new vigor to the high
command, his lack of national
stature probably will limit his
ability to enforce party disci-
pline in the dominant northern
states,
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CU.d'U NT II ';TL LLIG'SNC:E WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
Relations between Pakistan
and India have improved marked-
ly since Pakistan's military
government came to power,
especially since the increase
in Chinese Communist pressure
on the Himalayan border area.
President Ayub's government
has encouraged negotiations on
the whole range of problems with
India. New Delhi, which con-
sidered Pakistan's parliamen-
tary regimes too unstable to
fulfill any long-term commit-
ments, has apparently decided
that Ayub's offers of friend-
ship present a useful opportuni-
ty to liquidate long-standing
and costly disputes,
On 11 January, Rawalpindi--
the new Pakistani capital--and
New Delhi announced the resolu-
tion of all but one of the bor-
der delineation disputes involv-
ing small areas of Indian and
West Pakistani territory. This
agreement followed exchanges
of disputed territory along the
East Pakistani border. These
steps will probably result in
a sharp reduction in border
incidents.
On 3 January negotiators
from the two countries announced
they had overcome the most dif-
ficult obstacles to a final
settlement of the financial
disputes which arose out of the
1947 partition of British India.
In early December, Rawalpindi
and New Delhi announced a new
payments agreement intended to
increase mutual trade. A fur-
ther improvement in Indo-Paki-
stani economic relations will
probably follow these efforts.
Both governments also hope
to reach an agreement this
spring on the division of waters
in the Indus River basin,
Under the auspices of the World
Bank, a treaty has been drafted
providing for a $1 billion
system of canals to replace
waters which will be diverted
by India from rivers now flow-
ing from Indian-held territory
into Pakistan. New Delhi is to
contribute about $168,000,000,
most of the remainder being
provided by Western sources,
The Pakistani Government's
appointment of A. K. Brohi, an
outstanding legal expert and a
strong advocate of closer ties
with India, as high commissioner
to India has also been received
in New Delhi as evidence of
Pakistan's desire for better
relations. Brohi's chief as-
signment is likely to be to
find a solution to the impasse
on Kashmir. The Ayub govern-
ment apparently hopes that, in
view of the threat from Com-
munist China, New Delhi will
feel it can no longer allow
the bulk of its army to be tied
down defending Kashmir. No
direct effort has yet been made
to initiate negotiations on this
problem, however, and a quick
solution is unlikely,
The political tempo in
Cambodia has picked up with the
return of Premier Sihanouk on
1 January from a two-month visit
to the UAR, Yugoslavia, and
India. Sihanouk has launched
into a full schedule of cabinet
meetings and audiences with ad-
visers, and he intends next
month to tour the country to
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21 January 1960
push basic economic programs.
This activity will culminate in
the semiannual national congress
of Sihanouk's Sangkum movement
in Phnom Penh from 20 to 23
February. These open-forum
reviews of governmental pro-
grams are frequently used by
Sihanouk for major policy pro-
nouncements.
A major determinant in
Sihanouk?s political outlook
continues to be resentment and
fear of the attitude of South
Vietnam and Thailand toward
Cambodia. Basic antagonisms
appear undiminshed despite out-
ward signs of some improvement
in relations; trade and payments
agreements between Cambodia and
South Vietnam were restored last
December, and the press war be-
tween Cambodia and its two
neighbors has eased,
During his recent trip a-
broad, Sihanouk referred fre-
quently to the "aggressive" in-
tentions of South Vietnam and
Thailand and warned that Cam-
bodia would not hesitate to
"go Communist" if it came to a
question of national survival
against pressures from its
neighbors. Such statements tend
in turn to confirm the fears in
Saigon and Bangkok that Cambodia
is headed toward Communism under
Sihanouk's leadership.
Among Sihanouk's earliest
moves on returning to Phnom
Penh were to give a dinner in
honor of Chinese Communist tech-
nicians who recently installed
a radio transmitter, a gift from
Peiping, and to visit a plywood
factory being built under the
Chinese Communist aid program.
Sihanouk apparently thereby
intended to correct any im-
pression that his recent visits
to the UAR, Yugoslavia, and
India imply a change in Cam-
bodia's friendly attitude to-
ward Peiping, or in his deter-
mination to keep strictly to
"independent" neutrality. At
the same time, the Sihanouk
government is adhering to the
tougher line adopted last sum-
mer toward Communist subversion.
trenched power.
While some criticism of the
premier and his policies exists
among various urban groups in
Cambodia, in addition to the
open enmity of the small dissi-
dent movement headed by expatri-
ates Sam Sary and Son Ngoc
Thanh, present opposition to
Sihanouk is no threat to his en-
The new Japanese Democratic
Socialist party (DSP), organized
by former right-wing members of
the Japanese Socialist party
(JSP), will be inaugurated on
24 January, The new party, with
at least 52 seats in the Diet,
while essentially Socialist, has
won strong press endorsement for
its moderate program and has
attracted a greater membership
and support than its leaders
had initially anticipated.
Many observers believe the new
party will halt the trend to-
ward polarization in Japanese
politics, but its ultimate
fortunes will depend on how
much support it attracts out-
side the moderate labor unions.
Suehiro Nishio, who led
the withdrawal from the JSP be-
cause of his opposition to its
Marxist orientation and domina-
tion by the extreme leftist
Sohyo labor federation, is ex-
pected to be named chairman of
the new party.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
The DSP's draft program
recognizes the need for Japa-
nese military forces and for
the security treaty with the
United States but recommends
that the United Nations estab-
lish an international police
force, thus eventually making
the treaty unnecessary. The
party would support the ad-
mission of Communist China to
the UN, but desires a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan issue
and an independent Japanese
foreign policy which is neither
pro- nor anti-American. Its
economic proposals call for a
gradual socialization of the
national economy.
Thus far, one fifth of
the JSP members in the Diet
have joined the new party and
a few more are expected to do
so. The DSP has established
chapters in 35 of Japan's 46 prefec-
tures and has the support of the
800,000-member Zenro labor federation.
Zenro, however, has criticized
the new security treaty and is
calling on the government to
dissolve the Diet and to hold
national elections prior to
seeking Diet ratification.
Although additional labor
support for the DSP can be ex-
pected from Sohyo unions which
are wearying of "political
struggles" which have failed
to attain the wa a increases and
other improvements won by some
Zenro unions by nonpolitical
means, the new party will have
difficulty expanding. Chances
of gaining the support of the
"liberal conservative wing"
are believed slight, but the
DSP's formation may give con-
servatives opposed to Prime
Minister Kishi's leadership of
the ruling Liberal-Democratic
party wider latitude for fac-
tional maneuvering.
Informed observers believe
that not many small-businessmen,
white-collar workers, and older
farmers will change party alle-
giance and that, therefore, the
DSP must attract intellectuals,
students, and young farmers if
it is to become an effective
political organization. -
MOVES TOWARD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
Preliminary discussions
are under way in two widely
separated parts of Latin Ameri-
ca aimed at the development of
free-trade areas. Representa-
tives of seven South American
countries now are meeting on
this subject in Montevideo,
while the presidents of three
Central American republics,
meeting on 9 January, agreed
to negotiations for closer
economic union. These projects
are aimed at speeding
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
f VLNEZUELA
Proposed Participants
ECUADOR 3~rw AM wcui.w
I- , IV
PERU ''7
B R A Z I L
`f 1' '1 Pewe r_rrev
J "
industrialization through ex-
panding regional trade. Both,
however, are threatened by con-
flicting interests and national
rivalries.
The Montevideo conference,
which began on 12 January with
discussion of a payments sys-
tem for a proposed South Ameri-
can free-trade area, was
marked by a clash between rep-
resentatives of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (I.v1F) and
Raul Prebisch, spokesman for
the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America,
who favors development programs
at the expense of
standard financial
principles. Prebisch
recommends that pro-
spective members--Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Bo-
livia, Chile, Para-
guay, Peru, and Uru-
guay--be pressed to
buy as much as they
sell within the pro-
posed area, while IMF
representatives be-
lieve that payments
in the free-trade
zone should be freely
convertible in order
to preserve the bene-
fit of relatively free
trade with countries
such as the United
States.
The conference
plans to recommend to
a foreign ministers'
conference in Monte-
video next month a
payments system to be
adopted in a formal
treaty designating
the free-trade area.
Less ambitious and
binding than the Euro-
pean Common Aarket,the
free-trade area plans
to eliminate all tariff
or exchange hindrances
on most commodities 25X1
traded between members
in four stages over
12 years.
The presidents of Guate-
mala, El Salvador, and Honduras
authorized their ministers of
economy on 9 January to draft
and sign a treaty within 30
days "to establish the means to
achieve a greater integration
of their (countries') economies."
The new treaty will probably be
open to later adherence by
Nicaragua and Costa Rica and
presumably will establish a
shorter timetable than the ten
years allowed in the 1958 treaty
for the establishment of a Cen-
tral American customs union.
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
URUGbAY'%
Latin America
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21 January 1960
DISSENSION IN BOLIVIA'S GOVERNMENT PARTY
Dissension within the gov-
erning Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement (MNR) in Bolivia may
lead to outbreaks of violence
and possibly to a split in the
party prior to the MNR presi-
dential nominating convention
scheduled for 15-21 February.
Foreign Minister Walter Guevara,
the candidate sponsored by the
right wing, now appears to be-
lieve former President Paz
Estenssoro will easily win the
MNR nomination, but Guevara's
supporters bitterly oppose Paz.
Many of Paz' supporters advo-
cate an exchange of diplomatic
missions with the USSR, and Paz
may be more responsive to such
pressures than incumbent Presi-
dent Siles.
The question of Bolivia's
relations with the USSR has been
reopened in the course of the
political struggle. The two
countries did not exchange rep-
resentatives a:'ter relations
were established in 1945, but
Bolivia's Foreign Ministry al-
locations for 1960, reflecting
strong public and congressional
interest, provide funds for a
Moscow mission. Both President
Siles and Guevara apparently
oppose an exchange of missions.
This provision in the budget
may be explained as a move by
Guevara to draw away leftist
support from Paz. Paz has not
expressed himself on the exchange
of missions, but is supported
by the left wing and seems to
favor a more independent line
in relations with the United
States than incumbent President
Siles.
The Siles administration
has achieved a marked improve-
ment in respect for laws con-
cerning persons and property
since its inauguration in 1956.
Virtually every leader in the
government party, however, has
some armed force at his command,
since the party's civilian militia
is organized on both geographic
and trade union lines. Siles
sought to avoid a showdown between
right- and left-wing militia
by swinging his support from
Guevara to Paz last October.
The tensions of the campaign for
the MNR presidential nomination
have nevertheless caused a clash
of opposing militia elements
resulting in about 25 deaths,
the assassination of a former
cabinet minister, and dispersal
of a right-wing rural congress
by left-wing threats of violence.
A separate political party
formed by Guevara's followers
would probably derive some ad-
ditional support from the right-
ist Bolivian Socialist Falange
(FSB). The FSB polled 12 per-
cent of the vote in 1958 national
elections and since the 1952
revolution has been Bolivia's
only other significant political
party. Even if Guevara's fol-
lowers defect from the MNR, Paz
is virtually certain to win the
election next May or June be-
cause of his backing by both
the left wing of the MNR and
moderate President Siles. Gue-
vara's formation of a new polit-
ical party with MNR origins
might, however, provide the
foundation for eventual growth
of a two-party political system
in Bolivia.
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21 January 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
Communist China's leading
economic planners apparently
are confident that a "new stage"
has been reached in Chinese
economic development and that
the nation's industry, after
the rapid expansion of the past
decade, now can provide farmers
with "greatly increased" amounts
of machinery and chemicals and
thus hasten the modernizaton
of China's primitive agricul-
ture. This concept that indus-
try now is or shortly will be
in a position to increase
sharply the supplies of trac-
tors, farm implements, vehicles,
chemical fertilizers, and in-
secticides to the Chinese
countryside was recently de-
scribed by planning chief Li
Fu-chun as a "conspicuous new
thing" in Peiping's economic
planning,
The planners indicate that
heavy industry still enjoys a
"priority" role--thus no radical
shift in economic priorities is
contemplated--but they add that
agriculture now must be regard-
ed as the "foundation to impel
the advance of the various
branches of the national econ-
omy," This formulation moves
agriculture up another notch
in importance.
Peiping's farm moderniza-
tion program is still vague
and generalized, and much de-
tailed planning and careful
preparation remain to be done
before the program can be con-
sidered launched. Present indi-
cations are, however, that the
regime intends to speed up the
process. Where Mao Tse-tung
had earlier said that China
would be doing well to com-
plete the process by 1975, the
planners now are holding out
the prospect that the country-
side will be well along the
road to modernization in ten
years. While their expecta-
tions that the program will
double farm output are very
likely misplaced, their con-
viction that it will not ap-
preciably slow the advance
of heavy industry may be bet-
ter founded.
Concept of Program
Peiping's program is not
designed to bring Chinese agri-
culture near Western technolog-
ical levels. As described by
regime spokesman Po I-po, the
general intent is to replace
manual and animal power with
mechanical and electrical
power and to supply agricul-
ture with abundant quantities
of chemical fertilizer. Spe-
cifically, Po foresaw by 1969
"or thereabouts" the mechanical
cultivation of all land that
is workable by machine, ir-
rigation by machine where nec-
essary, the use of motor ve-
hicles for nearly all rural
transport, mechanical process-
ing of farm produce, and pro-
duction of seven to eight times
as much chemical fertilizer as
presently applied--about 2,-
700,000 tons in 1958.
Whereas the Western concept
of mechanized agriculture is
usually in terms of movable
equipment, the Chinese Commu-
nists classify as farm machinery
both movable and stationary
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
equipment. The former includes
tractors and implements; the
latter, irrigation machinery
and processing equipment. Be-
cause of the mixture of the
two types in Chinese plans,
and because irrigation pumps
constitute much less dramatic
evidence of mechanization than
do tractors, Chinese propagan-
dists tend to slur over the
distinction and issue progress
reports in terms lumping the
various types of machinery.
Topography and cultiva-
tion techniques sharply limit
the amount of land where West-
ern-type mechanization is feas-
ible. One Communist writer
calculates that 140,000,000
acres--slightly over half of
China's total cultivated acre-
age--are in areas where inten-
sive tractor cultivation prob-
ably will prove feasible. This
land is largely in northern
China, Sinkiang, and Manchuria.
On the other hand, official
statements make it clear that
no practical means have yet been
devised for mechanizing the
paddy fields and hilly land of
South China. Mechanization
there will be limited mainly
to off-the-field tasks. There
are plans for supplying large
quantities of irrigation equip-
ment ana processing plants, and
a main source of power will be
small hydroelectric plants to
be built into irrigation sys-
tems. Motorized junks will re-
lieve the peasant of some heavy
rural transport burdens.
Problems
The limited program en-
visaged by Peiping will not
require a significant drop in
the investment priority as-
signed heavy industry. How-
ever, the introduction of the
necessary amounts of major in-
dustrial commodities to agri-
culture during the next decade
will present some difficulties.
The problem of chemical
fertilizer will loom large,
for China's capacity to pro-
duce it is limited. Peiping
has announced plans to step up
investment in fertilizer plants
during the Second Five-Year Plan
(1958-62), and a number of large
plants are under construction.
At the present rate of construc-
tion, however, there seems little
likelihood of reaching Po's tar-
get of roughly 20,000,000 tons
by 1969. Imports will make up
only part of the deficit.
Another major item will be
tractors. Chinese Communist
sources have stated at various
times that 550,000 to 1,500,000
tractor units are needed. (A
standard tractor unit, equiva-
lent to 15 horsepower, is a
statistical device used in the
USSR and Communist China to
convert tractors of various
horsepower into comparable
units.) The acreage estimated
as suitable for tractor culti-
vation in China is less than
half the area cultivated by
tractors in the Soviet Union in
1938 when that country con-
sidered its agriculture basically
mechanized. Assuming China
follows the Soviet example, Pei-
ping should be able to realize
its present program if it is
able to acquire one half the
Soviet vehicle inventory in
1938--or 300,000 tractor units,
77,000 combines, and 100,000
trucks.
The Chinese tractor park now
contains 55,000 tractor units.
If Peiping continues to allocate
investment to tractor factories
and imports at the rate of recent
years, or at a slightly higher
rate, it should be possible
to build up an inventory
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
of 300,000 tractor units
by 1969. China's first
tractor plant has just come
into operation at Loyang. It
was designed to produce 15,000
5.5-ton crawler tractors an-
nually, which is equivalent to
36,000 standard units. Assum-
ing that this factory reaches
capacity production by the
Third Five-Year Plan (1963-67),
China would have more of this
type by 1969 than the Soviet
Union did in 1938. The re-
quired number of combines and
trucks may also be available
from domestic industry in the
next ten years under plans laid
long before the announcement
of the new program.
Judging from Soviet expe-
rience, this number of tractors,
combines, and trucks would con-
sume about 3,000,000 tons of
diesel and other liquid motor
fuels annually by 1969, but
this amount should not be an
insupportable strain on the
petroleum products then avail-
able in China.
A major portion of the ma-
chinery planned for Chinese ag-
riculture is for irrigation and
drainage equipment. It has been
stated that such equipment with
a total capacity of 15,000,000
horsepower will be needed to
bring all farmland under irri-
gation. Some 1,100,000 horse-
power was in use in 1958, and
it is claimed that 2,400,000
horsepower is in use now. The
present level of output would
by 1969 provide enough equip-
ment to meet the estimated re-
quirements.
The Communists have stated
that power-generating units to-
taling 8,000,000 kilowatts must
be turned out to reach the
"first stage" of rural electri-
fication. If vigorously pushed,
this goal could be attained by
1969. The need for a large
maintenance and operating force
and the severe limitation on
generating capacity when water
flow is low will create the
greatest difficulties.
The production of most farm
quipment other than tractors--
both tractor-drawn and simpler
implements--and processing ma-
chinery presents little problem
to the machine-building industry.
It has been stated that about
20,000,000 farm tools and proc-
essing machines have to be pro-
duced for the mechanization pro-
gram, but industry should be
able to manufacture these prod-
ucts as demand develops. Judg-
ing from past experience, the
major problem here will not be
in supplying the equipment but
in perfecting models suited to
local conditions and in per-
suading peasants to use them.
The regime up to now has
had little success in demon-
strating to peasants that it
knows more about farming than
they do. The vaunted two-wheel
double-share plow, manufactured
in large quantities in 1956,
has never been put into general
use. Furthermore, serious in-
adequacies in agronomical re-
search became evident in the
past two years when attempts to
change such farm practices as
depth of planting, amount of
fertilizer applied, closeness
of planting, and extent of ir-
rigation resulted in enormous
expenditure of manpower for less
than proportional returns in in-
creased production.
Some of the greatest prob-
lems facing the regime are de-
signing new and useful types
of tools, developing and pro-
viding improved seed strains,
popularizing these innovations
among a conservative and largely
illiterate peasantry, and devis-
ing a way to finance the purchase
of new tools and equipment by
rural production units. There
are signs that Peiping is becom-
ing more aware of these prob-
lems and is taking steps to
cope with them.
The new farm program
stresses careful preparatory
work and requires that research
and experimentation precede the
large-scale adoption of modern
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
machinery. In this connection,
Peiping has also launched a
campaign "basically" to elimi-
nate illiteracy in the next
two to three years so that
peasants can acquire some tech-
nical knowledge or at least
be able to read instructions.
Steps are also being taken to
set up an agricultural exten-
sion program in rural areas.
Some 600 "agrotechnical re-
search centers" have been set
up under this program so far.
These centers are to conduct
experiments in seed strains,
plowing techniques, and pest
control, and will presumably
be the vehicle for disseminat-
ing the improved cultivation
techniques Peiping hopes to
introduce
The immediate impact of
the mechanization program will
be slight. Po I-po, emphasiz-
ing that it is to be carried
out gradually, anticipated that
the initial foundation would
require four years. At the
outset, priority is being given
to irrigation facilities and
tool improvement.
A main objective of the
program is to raise agricultural
output to levels sufficient
both to feed the rapidly grow-
ing population and to maintain
a high rate of industrial ex-
pansion. The use of tractors
and combines in some areas may
improve farm yields slightly
through more timely and effici-
ent field operations, but
greater increases will come
from the use of more chemical
fertilizer and expanded irriga-
tion The regime's statement
that output will be doubled is
highly doubtful. Japan has
made perhaps the greatest
strides in agriculture of any
country in the Orient, and the
Chinese would have to exceed
by far Japan's best yields to
double their output. However,
steady increases are quite pos-
sible.
Extensive reclamation work
would improve the prospect for
increases. Such work is planned
in the northwest, but it is
doubtful that the regime in-
tends to devote sufficient re-
sources there to bring appreci-
able results in the near future.
Another declared objective
of the farm mechanization pro-
gram is to release farm labor
for other activities. Communist
planners mention figures ranging
into the "hundreds of millions."
It is suspected, however, that
such figures are derived from
simple calculations of the labor-
saving capability of individual
items of machinery and not from
actual expectations. Modern
industry could not absorb any-
where near such numbers. Much
labor replaced by machine will
not, however, be released to
industry but to other rural
tasks.
There will probably not
be an appreciable movement off
the farm until the later stages
of the program. The movement
may then reach as much as half
the natural population increase
in rural areas, causing urban
population to expand from 96,-
000,000 in 1958 to 196,000,000
in 1969. An expansion of this
magnitude could probably be
absorbed by nonagricultural
sectors of the economy and by
industry, which is expected to
quadruple its output during
this periods
By launching such a pro-
gram at this time, Peiping has
acknowledged that agriculture
must receive more substantive
and careful attention than here-
tofore if it is to meet the
heavy demands of the country's
industrialization program.
Past policies, ranging from
consolidation of small individual
farms into larger collective
units to a massive effort at
more intensive cultivation,
have proved only of limited
value. The basic problem re-
mains one of raising crop yields
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
through the use of more chem-
ical fertilizer, irrigation,
and improved seed strains.
The programs now on the agenda
appear to be coming to grips
with this basic problem. Much
will hinge on their imple-
SECRET
mentation, but the possibility
exists that China will by 1969
be on the way to achieving a
more modern agriculture capa-
ble of steady increases in
output . (Pre- 25X1
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21 January 1960
The United Arab Republic
(UAR), which will celebrate
its second anniversary on 21
February, has been compelled
to devote increasing attention
to the difficulties inherent
in the union between Egypt and
Syria. Syria, which urged such
a union on President Nasir, has
in fact become his principal
domestic political problem.
Its stagnating economy and
Nasir's differences with Syrian
politicians, mostly Baathists,
are causing the greatest con-
cerns
Geographic-Cultural Problems
The geographic separation
of the two regions has compli-
cated Nasir's job. Cairo prob-
ably seems to the Syrians to be
farther away than only 400
miles because the enemy state
of Israel lies between. Re-
moteness from the center of
government has contributed to
a Syrian feeling of nonpartici-
pation; the rarity of Nasir's
visits to the northern region--
three times in two years--
strengthens this impression.
The difficulty and ex-
pense of traveling be-
tween the two regions
have hindered the
personal exchanges
that could at least
partially diminish
Syria's feeling of
isolation. In the
last two years,those
Egyptians who have
gone to Syria have
been largely restrici;-
ed to official gov-
ernmental or mili-
tary posts where
their "unlikeness"
to the Syrians is
most easily noted.
Some Syrians feel
AMMAN
SECRET
that the Egyp-
tians intend to be--and some-
times act like--their masters.
The regime has tried to
attack the problem by careful
conduct toward minorities, re-
assurances of its good inten-
tions, and constant propaganda
on the theme of unity. However,
Syrian particularism--with its
concentric arrangement of loyal-
ties to family, tribe, locality,
and religion--is probably one
of the most serious barriers
to real union. Differences
among Christians, Moslems,
Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, Druze,
and Alawites and the divisions
of landlord, peasant, city
bourgeoisie,and proletariat,
all with special interests and
prejudices, plagued the govern-
ments of Syria long before
union with Egypt.
With the union, Nasir in-
herited a melange of Syrian po-
litical parties ranging from
the narrowly nationalistic, re-
ligious Moslem Brotherhood--
long banned in Egypt--to the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
Syrian branch of the Communist
party, the strongest in the
Arab world. In control of
Syria at the time of union,
however, was the Arab Social-
ist Resurrection party, popu-
larly called the Baath. Its
branches throughout the Arab
world were the most vocal and
effective supporters of Nasir's
style of. Arab nationalism. It
was the Baathists,frightened
by the growth of Communist and
pro-Communist strength in
Syria, who played the largest
part in leading Syria into
union with Egypt.
Since union,the Baathists
have had repeated occasions to
repent their haste. Their as-
sumption that, being Syria's
political leaders and strongly
pro-Nasir, they would receive
preferential treatment from
Cairo seemed accurate at first,
when Nasir appointed a Syrian
region executive council domi-
nated by members of their par-
ty. They apparently could not
believe that Nasir's early
edict banning political party
activity, as in Egypt, would
be wholly effective.
The Baathists discovered,
however, when they attempted
to continue their organization,
that Nasir was aligning himself
with old-line,conservative ele-
ments and that these conserva-
tives were favored to defeat
9aathist candidates in elec-
tions to his new, single-party
organization--the National
Union. The Nasir-11aathist feud
culminated in the recent resig-
nation of the remaining influ-
ential Baathist members of the
Syrian regional and UAR central
cabinets.
Nasir's victory over the
Syrian Baathists now appears
complete, but there are indi-
cations l;s aftermath harbors
so-tue danger for the regime .
The possibility of a renewed
alliance between the Communists
and the disgruntled Baathists--
they cooperated frequently be-
fore 1958--has not been over-
looked by the Communists, who
have reportedly already made
new approaches to that end.
The Communists, although dec-
imated and disorganized by
Nasir's campaign last year,
probably still retain some po-
tential for taking advantage
of a troubled situation in
Syria. A Baathist-Communist
coalition, if it could gain
support among dissident mili-
tary elements, might eventual-
ly present a serious challenge
to Nasir.
The conflict with Syria's
radical elements has driven
Nasir to an unforeseen and pure-
ly expedient courtship of the
conservatives. Financiers, mer-
chants, landowners, and many
professional groups, displaced
from their historically dominant
position in Syrian politics by
their own divisions and the
mob appeal of the Baathists,
welcomed the union. They were
later repelled when it began
to seem they were not to be de-
livered from Baathist control.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
During the past few months,
however, Nasir's split with
the F3aathists, his slowdown
of land reform and economic
controls--both Baathist objec-
tives--and the current good-
will mission of Vice President
Amir in Syria have brought at
least temporary relief to the
minds of most conservatives.
As long as the regime
feels the Syrian political and
economic systems require moder-
ate treatment, the Syrian con-
servatives are probably safe,
and there is little likelihood
that Nasir will be strong
enough to push his concept of
a "democratic, socialist, co-
operative society" in Syria
for several years.
Syria-Iraq
The often-mentioned threat
to unity posed by the attrac-
tion of Iraq for some Syrians,
although likely to worry Nasir,
does not appear significant as
long as Iraqi Prime Minister
Qasim's own house is in dis-
order. In fact, Nasir has had
some propaganda success in ex-
p1biting the chaotic political
situation in Iraq, as well as
the bogey of Communism, to
counter any revival of the Fer-
tile Crescent scheme of Iraqi-
Syrian union. The firm es-
tablishment of a radical "Arab
nationalist" government in
Baghdad, however, could change
the picture.
Syrian Army
The Syrian Army is a spe-
cial, and perhaps the most im-
mediately dangerous, problem
for Nasir., For years prior to
the union, the army was com-
pletely involved in politics;
there were five military coups
between 1949 and 1954. The
latest military strong man is
Nasir's present security watchdog
and civilian minister of in-
terior for the Syrian region,
Abd al-Hamid Sarraj.
In league with Sarraj
prior to the union was a power-
ful army clique, including nu-
merous pro-Baathists, Sarraj
was instrumental in helping
Nasir purge both civilian and
military Baathists, but his
reliability is still debatable.
He is believed to have retained
an influential following in
the armed forces, and any re-
surgence of political ambition
and real antiregime feeling a-
mong the military would find
him gauging it carefully be-
fore deciding whether to remain
loyal to Nasir,
Nasir has taken steps to
preclude the army's return to
its former troublesome role in
politics. A few officers,like
Sarraj, have been invited to
give up their uniforms and ac-
cept civilian government posi-
tions. Others have been trans-
ferred, retired, or purged,
with an undetermined degree of
resentment resulting through-
out the rest of the military,
Many key positions have been
assigned to Egyptian personnel
to keep the army neutralized.
Its history of political ac-
tion, however, and its large
complement of officers who
come from the politically con-
scious segments of Syrian so-
ciety, give grounds for believ-
ing that dormancy is not the
army's natural state and sug-
gest that the regime may face
further trouble.
Probably the most urgent
and basic concern of the re-
gime in Syria is the decline
of the Syrian economy since un-
ion. Too rapid land reform,
ill-timed governmental economic
controls, and two successive
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 January 1960
years of drought--a third ap-
pears in the offing--have
stifled Syria's free economy
and aroused apprehension. The
regime is trying now to remedy
the situation by back-tracking
on reforms and relaxing con-
trols, working hard to gain
the trust and cooperation of
Syria's land-owning and com-
mercial groups, and seeking
temporary outside aid, particu-
larly from the United States,
For the long term, the out-
look for Syria--compared with
the rather dark prospects for
Egypt--is bright, especially
in agriculture, More than
three acres of cropped land is
available for every Syrian, and
per capita national income now
is about $160, compared with
0,42 acre and $115 for Egypt.
The region's short-run problems,
however, are likely to be se-
vere, Ominous inflationary
pressures have developed, chief-
ly as a result of ordinary
budget deficits since 1955, and
could well increase if present
development plans are carried
through, as now planned, with-
out compensating reductions in
nondevelopmental expenditures,
Political Outlook
For the political future,
Nasir is counting heavily on
his National Union to develop
a new breed of public servant,
free of factional loyalties
and dedicated to the state.
Election to the National Union
--prerequisite to participa-
tion in political life--begins
on the lowest, popular level,
and advancement from local to
national responsibility comes
through subsequent elections
within the membership.
SECRET
On top of the pyramid thus
constructed is, of course, Nasir
himself. His authority to se-
lect whomever he chooses for
the really important positions
in government is a check on the
rise of any individual or group
out of step with the aims of
the regime, The Syrians, cyni-
cal by nature, are likely to
regard such a system as merely
a facade, even though it may
offer at least limited opportun-
ities for political advancement.
There have been rumors and
speculation that Nasir may
choose to relieve himself of
some of the responsibility--
and blame--for Syrian affairs
by loosening the union into
something closer to a feder-
tion, with greater autonomy
for both regions. Although such
a drastic step appears unlikely
--partly because of the implied
admission of failure--some con-
cessions to the Syrians may be
made with Nasir's scheduled ap-
pointment of a new government
and parliament in February. The
present dominance of Egyptians
in the central UAR cabinet may
be diminished. Proportional rep-
resentation in the parliament
may also salve Syrian pride.
Nasir is unlikely to let
the parliament get out of hand,
and will hand-pick half of the
members, but it may furnish a
forum for the airing of com-
plaints and be something more
than a rubber stamp. Meanwhile,
Nasir will probably continue
relying on his personal popu-
larity in the northern region--
which apparently remains high--
local scapegoats, and a good in-
ternal security apparatus to
keep dissension to a minimum.
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