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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 CONFIDENTIAL COPY NO. 56 OCI NO. 0406/60 25 February 1960 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL' State Department review completed D',-'CLAS$IF!ER 25X1 CLA33. CHANGED TO: TS S /99D p4 XT nizviEw DATE; 7tf~ AUT,H: HR 70-2 PATE: /" REVIEWER: Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Moscow, seeking to keep its own Berlin proposals in the public eye while Western leaders are drafting and con- certing positions for the sum- mit talks in May, on 19 Feb- ruary made public a memorandum sent to the West German Social Democratic party (SPD) on 13 January. Using statements by West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt as the pretext for clarifying the Soviet position, the mem- orandum sets out in detail the Soviet proposal to sign a Ger- man peace treaty and transform West Berlin into a free city. The memo appears designed to re-emphasize for the West the possible "consequences" of a separate peace treaty between the USSR and East Germany and to enhance the attractiveness of an interim Berlin solution as an alternative. It warns that the Soviet Union would proceed with a separate treaty "should it prove impossible" to settle the issue by negotia- tions,and that such action would be irrevocable. flexibility. Although adhering to the basic formula for a free city, the memo suggests Moscow's willingness to consider counter- proposals which could lead to a solution more acceptable to the West. In an attempt to exploit Mayor Brandt's numerous state- ments that the economic ties between Bonn and Berlin were as important as the political bonds,the memo acknowledges that "in practice, West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic will be closer than with any other country." While warning that conclu- sion of a separate treaty would leave the West to deal directly with the East German regimg,the memo also notes that a modus vivendi might be found to over- come the "difficulties" which might result from the Western powers' lack of relations with the East Germans. The memo also states that the establishment of a free city might be approached by stages. This presumably re- fers to the proposals advanced by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 10 June at the Ge- neva foreign ministers' con- ference.when he offered to agree to a provisional status for West Berlin for a speci- fied time period on condition that the two German states es- tablish an all-German committee to discuss a peace treaty. Moscow probably hoped that the delivery of the memo on 13 January would drive a wedge be- tween Mayor Brandt and his. SPA colleagues,: and 'that. The memorandum points out that the access routes to Ber- lin would come under the "full sovereignty" of East Germany, and that "any uncontrolled com- munications" between West Ber- lin and West Germany would cease. The Soviet Union, it says,would carry out its commitments to the East Germans as an ally and provide "all necessary support" to defend East German "sovereign- ty." This blunt language is off- set by a number of hints of SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pate 1 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 this pressure, coupled with an implied offer to consider counterproposals, would compel the SPD to take a more flexible public stand. The display of interparty unity during the 10 February Bundestag debate on foreign policy probably prompt- ed Moscow to try to underscore publicly the consequences of Western refusal to consider the Soviet proposals. As in the memo,an Izvestia article on 18 February present the free-city concept as a con- cession, claiming that the oc- cupation of West Berlin is out- dated and "contrary to interna- tional law." The article as- serts Berlin is legally part of East Germany and should be made such on a de facto basis; but that the USSR has offered to create a free city in an effort to meet the Western powers' re- fusal to act "as required" by international law. Bloc View of President's Trip Peiping and Moscow are giving President Eisenhower's Latin American visit the same divergent propaganda treatment accorded his December trip to Asia. The Chinese are openly hostile. People's Daily on 23 February bitterly c aid that the United States is a "savage aggressor" and that President Eisenhower "is no friend of the Latin American people." Blaming him for the overthrow of the "democratic" government of Guatemala in 1954, the paper warned that "American imperial- ism" is increasing its interven- tion in Havana in order to sub- vert the Cuban revolution and impede the anti-US struggle in Latin America. Moscow has given the trip relatively factual coverage, but has used excerpts from the foreign press to imply that the tour is intended to "soften the anti-American sentiment" in the area. A domestic broadcast on 22 February reported the Presi- dent's television broadcast and quoted him on the purposes of the trip. This was offset by comments purportedly taken from a Senate report on Latin America which Moscow claims is critical of US policy, which is motivated by "egoism" and the "desire to increase profits." The Ameri- can press is quoted as claim- ing that the President is not taking "any concrete proposals" which would help Latin Americans. The Soviet delegation at Geneva has maintained its strong stand against a limited nuclear test ban treaty. Chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkin told Ambas- sador Wadsworth privately on SECRET OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 17 February that nothing less than total test suspension would be agreeable to Moscow. At the same time, he assured the American chief delegate that the USSR would not be the first to break off the conference, "no matter how dim the prospects" for agree- ment. In an effort to support the Soviet contention that small underground tests cannot be separated from other test- ing, Tsarapkin warned that, if the United States resumed its program, the USSR would follow with "testing in every environ- ment it chose." This probably was intended primarily as a warning that if the United States resumes testing,no mat- ter how'limited the basis, it will bear the onus for the re- sumption by the USSR of its testing program, which might include even atmospheric ex- periments. Despite his assur- ance to Wadsworth, Tsarapkin's threat was probably also meant to raise the possibility that a resumption of testing could lead to a termination of the negotiations. The Soviet delegate indi- cated that Moscow might be will- ing to go beyond a provision of its 16 February proposal-- based on a suggestion by the British delegate in January-- for joint research to develop agreement on precisely what instrument readings would give any party to the treaty the right to insist on an immediate on-site inspection. The Soviet leaders may plan to expand their proposal to include West- ern suggestions for joint ex- perimentation to improve methods and instrumentation for detect- ing underground explosions. Thus far, Moscow has repeated- ly rejected the possibility of including supervised under- ground nuclear explosions in any research program. In the plenary sessions, the Soviet delegate, has con- tinued to avoid committing the USSR to an exact number of an- nual on-site inspections, as- serting that the West must first agree in principle to the 16 February Soviet plan which tied acceptance of "temporary" stand- ards for sending out inspection teams to Western acceptance of Khrushchev's proposal for a fixed number of such inspections each year. He also refused to set forth Moscow's position on the course of action to be taken should the proposed two- to three-year period for research and development fail to produce agreement on improved criteria for sending out inspection teams. MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS Egyptian troop movements late last week into the Sinai Peninsula raised total UAR strength there to about 34,000 men, including the en- tire Fourth Armored Division. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February. 1960 Despite Cairo's fears, there is still no evidence in- dicating Israeli preparations for large-scale action. UAR anxiety may also be attributable to reports of im- pending trouble in Iraq, pos- sibly requiring UAR involvement. A coup against Qasim, with Cairo's intervention, would probably draw a reaction from Israel, and the UAR troop move- ments may be designed to meet such a contingency. Nasir in Syria The Israeli border "crisis" has conveniently provided ma- terial for Nasir's speeches in Syria, where he has made a barn- storming effort to whip up the Syrians' lagging enthusiasm for their union with Egypt. Along with the Israeli threat, Nasir has castigated Communism, im- perialism, and Qasim as "enemies of Arab nationalism," working and waiting for an end to the union. Soviet officials, who had expressed satisfaction with So- viet-UAR relations following conclusion of the Aswan High Dam contract last month, now are probably miffed that Nasir's anti-Communism has not been in- hibited by the agreement. Throughout his sojourn, which began on 14 February, Nasir has repeatedly attacked Qasim, usually in the banter of which he is a master. Crowd response reportedly has been enthusiastic. Although the lasting effect of his campaign to inoculate the Syrians against Qasim cannot be measured, Nasir has probably done much to undercut Iraqi propaganda efforts to stir up Syrian resentment against his regime. During Nasir's tour of Syria, the Baghdad radio and press have attacked him for "one-man rule" and for being an enemy of free political life, as well as for betraying the cause of the Palestinian refu- gees. Nasir also is charged with looking at Iraq's oil riches with covetous eyes and with creating a "forged social- ism" in Egypt. Qasim is por- trayed by Baghdad radio as as- piring to become the savior of the Nasir-oppressed Syrian peo- ple. Iraq Following Qasim's dismissal of pro-Communist Minister of Agrarian Reform Ibrahim Kubba last week, Qasim has delivered two telling blows to the as- pirations of the Moscow-favored Iraqi Communists. The first of these was on 23 February when, in a speech to the Communist- dominated Iraqi Teachers' Asso- ciation, Qasim abruptly announced the abolition of the "Iraqi Parti- sans of Peace," an affiliate of the Communist-run World Peace Council. The Peace Partisans have a long history as Iraq's principal Communist front. The next day the "ortho- dox" Communists' second appli- cation for political status was refused on grounds that the Qasim-backed splinter group, led by Daud Sayigh, SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 which was legalized on 10 Feb- ruary as the "Communist Party of Iraq," sufficiently repre- sented the Communist viewpoint. While this group may technical- ly appeal its case to the courts, ijn reality it has little choice but to go under- ground, unless it is able to find an outlet for legal po- litical activity through a front party. Its members might attempt to infiltrate and take over the Sayigh group. The abolition of the Peace Partisans is a severe blow to the Communists, since as late as last summer the Qasim re- gime provided them with funds and supported their demonstra- tions. A demonstration by this group in Mosul last spring sparked the revolt there by anti-Qasim and anti-Communist army elements. Military Governor Abdi in- formed an American official on 18 February following the dis- missal of the pro-Communist minister of agrarian reform that two more cabinet members may be dropped. Likely candidates are Minister of Planning and Acting Minister of Oil Af- fairs Shaybani, an extreme leftist, and the female Min- ister of Municjpalities Nadia Dulaymi, a leader of the Peace Partisans. ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FALLS The resignation of Italian Premier Segni on 24 February increases the pressure on the Christian Democratic party to decide whether to form a right- ist government with heo-Fascists and Monarchists, as was formed in Sicily on 23 February, or a center-left government with Nenni Socialist support, as urged by left-wing Christian Democrats. Another stopgap) minority government could re- sult, and,in any case, negotia- tions will probkbly be protract- ed. With the withdrawal of Liberal party support from his' all-- Christian Democratic cab- 25X1 25X1 it, Segni decided to resign rather than face nationwide spring elections while' relying for support solely on the parties of the extreme right--the neo-. Fascists and Monarchists. Lib- eral party leaders attributed their action to reluctance of their predominantlY.conservative followers to continue parliamen- tary support--without any repre- sentation in the cabinet--of a government "dominated by a de- sire" to collaborate with the Nenni Socialists. They object- ed also to certain pending legislation and to the initia- tive which the Christian Demo- crats have permitted President Gronchi regarding foreign policy. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 The recent formation of a Sicilian government of Chris- tian Democrats and rightists, including neo-Fascists, bears on the national crisis. The national Christian Democratic directorate implicitly approved the new coalition, reversing the position it had taken in the fall, when it urged Sicil- ian Christian Demo- crats to form a gov- ernment with the Nen- ni Socialists in or- der to isolate the Communists. The Com- munists were exploit- ing their associa- tion with the Milazzo government to build up their grass-roots strength. or abstention to accomplish needed reforms and undercut the Communists. The Nenni Socialists, fol- lowed by the Communists, have offered to support a government free from rightist associations. The Christian Democratic right-wing fears such a govern- ITALIAN PARLIAMENT UNITED MOVEMENT OF SOCIALIST INITIATIVE- 5 (MUIS) The left-wing 001063 Christian Democrats, along with the Re- publicans and Social Democrats, oppose any application of the new rightist Sicilian formula at the national level. They believe it would raise the danger of an authoritarian cab- inet under strong Fascist in- fluence, which in turn would lead to a Communist voice in parliament as center-left forces react by moving toward the far left. They refuse to revive the old center coali- tion including Democratic So cialists, Republicans, and Lib- erals, believing that the only viable government would have to include Social Democrats and Republicans and depend on Nenni Socialist parliamentary support :s i[MUARY is60 ment would accomplish domestic reforms they oppose. They as- sert that it would also weaken Italy's pro-Western foreign .policy. Rightist leaders may feel that disunity in the Christian Democratic left would make opportune formation of a Nenni-supported government which would quickly founder and be fol- lowed by a more rightist formula. Meanwhile, if the crisis is protracted, pressure will de- velop for postponement of the local elections, which the right would like to delay. National elections, not due until 1963, might be advanced, but hardly to any date earlier than the spring of 1961. SECRET OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 NOTES.;AND COMMENTS Khrushchev's public recep- tion during his Indonesian tour has not been markedly enthusi- astic except in Jogjakarta, where university students wildly applauded him, and in the Commu- nist stronghold of Surabaya, where he addressed an enthusi- astic mass rally. Elsewhere, despite the fact that the gov- ernment and business employees had been dismissed to assure a large turnout, only medium- sizfd crowds greeted him, end, in the American Embassy's opin- iop, it is doubtful whether the populace is very interested. Khrushchev has been some- what irritable, as he was in India and in Burma. He has been less adroit than usual, with some of his statements and actions bordering on rudeness. His casual habits, his lateness for appointments, and his disre- gard for the usual diplomatic amenities have irritated Presi- dent Sukarno. Khrushchev's invidious com- parison of Indonesian natural rubberwith Soviet-produced s,yn'i::..) thetic rubber obviously nettled Sukarno. Khrushchev belittled the artistic merits of Indo- nesian handicrafts being offered him by Sukarno." While Sukarno's two daughters were dancing for Khrushchev'at a dinner in the palace, Khrushchev turned aside to an aide, who gave him a ten- minute summary of a cable. Khrushchev's behavior may have been the cause of the can- cellation of two events, a scheduled speech to a youth con- gress in B*Aiid -g, called off "for security reasons," and-the planned award of a doctorate by Gadja Mada University. In a speech in Surabaya, Sukarno denied that Communists were devils and, pointing to Khru shchev, he said, "Look at him here before you. He is not tall. He is a little fat. He is quite simple... Khrushchev has avoided any action which could be interpret- ed as support for Peiping in the dispute over Djakarta's treatment of Overseas Chinese. He has gone so far as to ignore completely the Chinese Communist ambassador d?ring.a state affair. He reportedly told Indonesian officials to "do what you think is right and don't worry." Economic aid to Indonesia is probably the main topic of the talks between Sukarno and Khrushchev which began in Bali on 23 February and which may be resumed in Bogor. The Soviet leader probably will encourage more rapid implementation of Moscow's existing aid program to Indonesia. Progress on the proj- ects under the Soviet $100,- 000,000 aid credit of 1958 has thus far been slow, and only about $27,000,000 has actually been drawn. Khrushchev may be willing to supply additional bloc arms by offering to renegotiate the 1958 arms agreements, which Indonesia concluded with Poland and Czechoslovakia, probably under Moscow's sponsorship. Under those agreements, totaling $175,- 000,000, Indonesia did not re- ceive the discounts normally extended by the bloc to arms purchasers. The inclusion in Khrushchev's party of Yeemelyanov,, chairman of the Soviet Atomic Energy Committee for Peaceful Purposes, may foreshadow some SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page l;: of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 token agreement on atomic as- sistance for Indonesia which was specified under the original $100,000,000 Soviet line of credit. Indonesian Army leaders and non-Communist civilian govern- ment elements are hopeful that the apparent lack of rapport between Sukarno and Khrushchev will obviate any large-scale "deal" between the two.F Indonesian cabinet changes announced on 23 February involved no change in the government's present non-Communist complexion. Changes consist merely of upgrad- ing to inner-cabinet status.eight former junior ministers, all of whom retain their present port- folios, and the creation of a new inner-cabinet post, that of legal adviser to the President. The Defense Ministry, now called the Ministry of National Security, is still headed by Army Chief of Staff General Nasution, who ap- pears to retain all the functions of his former office. SOVIET BLOC AID FOR INDIA During Khrushchev's stay in India, an agreement was signed setting forth uses to which the USSR's $375,000*,000 credit will be put during India's Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66). Most of it will be used to en- large projects being constructed under earlier Soviet credits. No new aid was announced during Khrushchev's visit. Total bloc credits thus far extended for Indian develop- ment amount to $775,000,000. Of this total about $550,000,000 --$490,000,000 of it from the USSR--is available for use dur- ing the Third Five-Year Plan. To gain the maximum propa- ganda benefit from its credit programs, the Soviet Union carried out an elaborate series of announcements which often magnify the actual value of the aid. At present, with the begin- ing of India's next plan period more than a year away and with large credits still unused, Moscow probably sees no need to add to its already heavy commit- ments, and new assistance offers may be held back until present projects are further developed. Although the bloc has al- ready staked out a large share for itself in Indian develop- ment plans for the next decade, almost exclusively in the gov- ernment-owned sector, credits used so far total less than $200,000,000. The Bhilai steel plant is the only bloc-assisted project in production, and -only a few others have passed from the planning and survey stage SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET.. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN Coal field Oil drilling Oil refinery Power plant Foundry forge Mechanized farm Optical glass plant Technological institute Mining machinery plant Industrial design institute Heavy machine building plant Heavy electrical machinery plant 90955 Major Bloc Aid Projects in India Bon; nl Baa BIWnPI~ har R.nchi? B es iah.p.t Madhya PradeshK-b..* "yq?~r1 . BhiW;# i to actual construction. In spite of its relatively small size as compared with total Western aid, the Soviet program in India has won wide praise and influence both through skillful promotion and through the concentration of projects in the sectors of primary im- portance to Indian industriali- zation. Soviet projects include iron and steel production, pe- troleum exploration and refin- ing, coal mining, production of heavy machinery, and a variety of light industrial projects. Poland recently joined the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania in the bloc's Indian program by of- fering a $31,500,000 PAKISTAN/ lrir _ BURMA credit for.the construction and equipment of various small in- dustrial enterprises during the Third Five-Year Plan. In addi- tion to formal aid agreements , all the European satellites and the USSR have trade agreements with` India which in effect grant short-term credits by allowing repayments for industrial ex- ports in nonconvertible rupees to be used for the purchase of Indian goods. The first and most spec- tacular Soviet project undertaken Soviet-built steel plant at Bhilai, India. SECRET 25 FEBRUARY 1960 CHINA Page 3 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET 25 February 1960 in India, the Bhilai steel com- plex, has been producing pig iron for one year and began producing steel last October. The final work on the first stage of the plant is expected The attack on a routine Chinese Nationalist patrol by Communist jet fighters over the Taiwan Strait near the mainland on 16 February reflects an in- crease in Chinese Communist confidence since the fall of 1958,. when Communist pilots suf- fered'heavy losses at the hands of the more experienced Chinese Nationalists. to be finished this year. During the'Third Five-Year Plan its annual capacity is to be increased from,l 0 0 000 to 2,590,000 tons. (Prepared by OR SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 Expanding semiofficial contacts between the Scandina- vian countries and East Germany in a number of fields, partic- ularly transportation, are disturbing Bonn and other West- ern governments, which feel that the international standing of the East German regime will thus be enhanced. Bonn is particularly con- cerned about the increasing frequency of direct charter flights of the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) between points in the West and Schoene- feld airfield outside East Berlin. It believes these are no longer "practical commercial ventures between airlines," as argued by the Danes and the Norwegians, but in reality government agreements. There is also evidence that Interflug,; a subsidiary of the East German Lufthansa, wants to start regular flights between Schoenefeld and the Scandinavian capitals. In the past year, Interflug made spe- cial flights to Copenhagen during the Leipzig spring and fall fairs, and now has gained approval for flights from Leipzig to Stockholm. Last year, moreover, repre- sentatives of both the Danish and Swedish state railways held talks with East German officials on steps to facilitate travel by rail, highway, and ferry be- tween their countries. In con- juction with these talks, the East Germans reportedly also pressed for the establishment of travel offices in the Scan- dinavian capitals with the hope of having these offices eventually issue visas.. While there have been no reports of Scandinavian concurrence, the Danes are permitting nationals of East Germany to visit Den- mark without obtaining clear- ance from the Allied Travel Office in West Berlin. East Germany?s campaign for eventual diplomatic recog- nition also tries to exploit established trade ties with the three Scandinavian countries, even though none of the commer- cial agreements is at a govern- ment level. The campaign is SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 access to West Germany, submitted to East German controls. 25 February 1960 being pushed with the aid of ambitious industrial and trade fairs, increased tourism, ex- tensive information programs, and propaganda attempts to arouse latent suspicions con- cerning West Germany. Next sum- mer, an East German cruise ship carrying vacationing work- ers will call at Scandinavian ports, enabling it to show the regime's' flag and publicize The MLMs have not had the same access rights as the Allied garrisons in Berlin,which are NEW RESTRICTION ON WESTERN MISSIONS IN EAST GERMANY Moscow has taken one more step to force the Western powers implicitly to recognize the East German regime. A new Soviet map delineating restrict- ed areas in East Germany--re- ceived on 27 January by the Western mili- tary liaison missions (MLMs) accredited to the Soviet forces-- leaves open to the mis- sions only two check- points on the West German border, both manned only by East German border police. The Soviet checkpoint at Marienborn on the main access route to Berlin now is denied them. The two check- points for MLM use are at Selmsdorf, in the north on the coastal highway between Lue- beck in West Germany and Rostock on the East German coast, and at Wartha in the southwest on the autobahn to Frankfurt. Restriction to these two checkpoints would not seriously affect the operation of the MLMs, but a principle would be sacrificed if the missions, other- wise denied surface PART II w ~ DENMARK East Germany's "socialist achieve- ments." Official and public opinion in Scandinavia remains opposed to diplomatic recognition of East Germany, but such opposition may gradually diminish as these various "practical" contacts in- crease and existing economic and cultural relations are broadened. GERMANY \ MarienbornHannover ?(checkpoint closed suhi SECRET L r-3 A Checkpoints on the East-West German SECRET Border open to MLMs Page 6 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SIIARY 25 February 1960 specifically allowed to use the Helmstedt autobahn under Soviet rather than East German control. The agreement of 5 April 1947 establishing the MLMs provides that "couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the head- quarters of the mission and headquarters of their respective commanders in chief" and "will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic cour- iers." This agreement does not specifically preclude East Ger- man authority over these "cour- iers" at checkpoints as long as the diplomatic immunity is respected, nor does it specify Helmstedt as one access route. Although this new Soviet move is not of itself a chal- lenge to Allied rights of access to Berlin, acceptance of East German controls in this case could be cited as a precedent by the USSR in any subsequent move to impose East German au- thority on the access route to Berlin. The missions for the time being, under instructions from their own governments, have sus- pended all travel to avoid use of the new Soviet passes with wording which implies recogni- tion of East Germany. Hungary's latest collec- tivization drive, which began shortly before the party con- gress last December, was ended formally on 12 February by a plenum of the central committee. The plenum, which heard reports by party First Secretary Janos Kadar and his top agricultural adviser, politburo member and secretary Lajos Feher, apparent- ly decided to halt the drive in order to "consolidate" the farms which have been organized during the past two and a half months. Both Kadar and Feher attended the recent bloc meetings in Mos- cow. To further the consolidaticn and achieve an over-all increase in agricultural production dur- ing the coming year, the regime has earmarked a record 7 billion forints (about $300,000,000 at the most realistic official rate), a substantial increase over last year, for agricultural investments. More than half of this amount will be used to purchase 10,000 tractors, 4,000 mechanical planters, 1,400 com- bines, 2,400 grass scythes, and 3,500 fertilizer sprayers. The bulk of this machinery will be added to the existing motor stock of the machine-tractor stations, inasmuch as the Kadar regime is reluctant to allocate to the collective farms the more ad- vanced or expensive types of machinery. In the past two years, the proportion of Hungary's arable land cultivated by state farms, collectives, and cooperatives has risen from 29 to 70 percent, an increase achieved principally by intensive agitation-propagan- da work among the peasants. Some 870,000 individuals are en- rolled in collective farms, and six counties are described as on a fully cooperative farming basis. The resolution of the 12 February plenum calls for an increase of 4.9 percent in over-all agricultural produc- tion in 1960. It lays particular SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET 25 February 1960 stress on the formation of basic party units in the new farms and demands widespread preparations for spring sowing--probably as a consequence of last fall's unfavorable weather conditions. Last, year many of the peasants were permitted to farm their plots individually even after their land had been formally collectivized, but ILF:avy invest- ments, availability of more machinery, and actiwo organiza- tional Work suggest that the re- gime plans to get rang of the newly formed units Lnto operation before spring sowing. POLAND CRITICIZED FOR SLOW PROGRESS IN AGRICULTURAL SOCIALIZATION Poland reportedly came;. under fire at the recent bloc agricultural conference in Moscow for its slow progress toward-collectivization and the low level of its farm pro duction. The Poles oun it difficult to efen their collectivization policies, es- pecially the development of the "agricultural circles"-- organizations providing co- operative marketing and pur- chasing and common ownership of agricultural machinery and storage facilities. Although the Soviet dele- gates reportedly did not attempt to pressure the Poles directly, they appeared to be taking issue with Warsaw's policy in their statements that the cir- cles should soon begin to dem- onstrate "socialist content" and show that socialization can be achieved through such forms. The Russians and rep- resentatives of other bloc coun- tries pointed out that if the Polish circles do not make more rapid progress toward socializa- tion, Poland will find itself with more than 3,000,000 inef?- ficientsmall farms at a time when its neighbors have virtual- ly completed collectivization. Asa result, Warsaw will prob- ably increase efforts to de- velop the circles in 1960. The Poles are reported, however, to have held their own THE SOCIALIZED SECTOR OF AGRICULTURE IN' EASTERN EUROPE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FARM LAND 25X1 1 25X1 F7 1956 1958 1959' 1956 1958 1959' 1956 1958 1959 1956 1958 1959 ALBANIA BULGARIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA EAST GERMANY 'BREAKDOWN NOT AVAILABLE SECRET 1956 1958 1959 1956 1958 1959 1956 1958 1959 HUNGARY RUMANIA POLAND PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 at the conference discussion on agricultural production, owing largely,to a poor showing last year in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Party First Secretary Gomulka permitted Polish col- lective farms to disband in late 1956 and early 1957 to the point that the country today has fewer such farms than it had in 1950, but he has never abandoned the aim of ultimate collectivization. He realizes that peasant resist- ance would make a complete fias- co of any attempts to collectiv- ize forcibly and would probably result in severe .food shortages. He has stated on many occasions that collectivization must be voluntary, and that once peas- ants are convinced of the ad- vantages of collective farming they will join of their own accord. The regime has been en- couraging the formation of the circles since early 1957. The peasants, however, have shied away from them because of a deep-seated suspicion of the regime's'motives, despite the incentives of substantial finan- cial and technical assistance offered by the government. The experience of a party activist who failed after two days of discussion to convince members of'a circle to build a common storage place for ap- ples is typical of the diffi- culties encountered by the re- gime. Reasons given by peasants for not building the storage facility included: too much paper work; it would only be another Object for the state to tax; the state would soon enact a law placing it under control of some other organization; its construc- tion would be a step toward the hated collectivization; and the Russians were pushing the idea. LATVIAN NATIONALISM STILL CONCERNS MOSCOW The latest move aimed at checking the currents of na- tionalism and " firmity" in the Soviet Baltic republic of Latvia has-brought a new shake-up in the top party command within the republic. Reports on the proceedings of a recent party plenum reveal that at least two members--in addition to first secretary Yan Kalnberzin, removed last Novem- ber--of the five-member secre- tariat have been replaced. Many of the non-Russian republics have witnessed tap-level shifts during the last year, but in none has the charge of nation- alism been raised as frequently and explicitly as in Latvia. The party has indicated it feels that the solution of such related prob- lems as economic performance and ideological discipline hinges largely on its success in uproot- ing what it.chooses to describe as "harmful ideas which come from abroad." Particular concern has been shown for the attitudes of Latvian youths. The continuing political charges and the ac- companying propaganda drumfire indicate that Moscow, after nearly SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 1.8 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUYIARY 25 February 1960 20 years of control of the Bal- tic republic, is still contend- ing with what it considers an unhealthy degree of nationalist spirit. The issue was first aired publicly last August, soon after the dismissal of Eduard Berklav as deputy chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers. The chair- man of the council at that time charged that Berklav had argued for increased investments in Latvian "light industry and food industry, the products of which must be consumed largely within the republic." Berklav was guilty of other, similar ecor nomic heresies which, it was charged, "signified nothing but a desire for autarky.natiOflal exclusiveness,,and isolation." Arvid Pelshe, installed in Kalnberzin's post as party chief in last November's sweeping reorganization of top posts, has subsequently reinforced the indictment of Berklav, al- leging in Pravda on 27 January that the ousted official--and others--had "started to slip away from the party's class posi- tion and allowed distortions of Lenin's nationality policy." Pelshe also revealed some con- cern about the orientation of the upcoming generation. "It is no secret," he wrote, "that the upbringing of the future man takes place during a difficult and sharp struggle against the influence of the decaying bour- geois morals and ideology, as well as against the harmful ideas which come from abroad." Pelshe indicated that a shake-up of editorial staffs would be one means of,dealing with ideological softness, and the editor of the leading Latvian-language newspaper has since been fired. The appoint- ment in January of a new party .secretary, whose specialty has been party organizational af- fairs, may also mean that a careful scrutiny of lower party officials is in the offing. . SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH The death of Cardinal Stepinac on 10 February removed one of the major obstacles to a formal improvement of rela- tions between the Vatican and the Tito regime. Stepinac had been convicted in 1946 of col- laboration during World War II with the pro-Nazi Tistashi pup- pet state of Croatia. His ap- pointment as cardinal in 1952, while he was still imprisoned on this charge, led Belgrade to break off diplomatic rela- tions with the Vatican. During the past year Bel- grade's attitude toward the church has been more concilia- tory. The regime officially congratulated Anton Vovk on his appointment as resident bishop of Ljubljana and al- lowed him--as well as other churchmen--to go to Rome, and has permitted Communists to have their children baptized. To these gestures is added the decision to allow Stepinac's burial services to take place in Zagreb Cat1edial--the seat of his diocese--rather than in Krasic, his native village. This act has been termed a "post-mortem amnesty" by a Yugoslav official in Zagreb. Several difficult problems remain, however, including the questions of religious educa- tion for Catholic children and of the clergy's rights in car- rying out its work. The ed- ucation issue is particularly difficult, as the same problem exists in relation to ali'reli- gious and ethnic groups in Yugo- slavia, particularly in the Orthodox and Islamic centers in the southern parts oi''thecountry. There have been limited improvements in church-state relations during the past year. Vladimir Bakaric, Communist President of Croatia, in com- menting on 16 February on the recent trials in Croatia in- volving the clergy, stated that the regime was "not conduct- ing antireligious propaganda," but only keeping "politics out of the church." The day before Stepinac died, 80-year-old Archbishop Ujcic of Belgrade was award- ed the "Order for Services to the People, First Class" for his efforts to define the position of the church in its relations with the The elimination of church- state irritants would enhance Belgrade's standing in Catholic Latin America and the Islamic Middle East. The reported release by the Vatican on 22 February of Cardinal Stepinac's 1957 last testament, which is highly critical of Communism in Yugoslavia, may prove, how- ever, to be an obstacle to an improvement in relations be- tween the Vatican and Tito's regime. In view of Tito's gen- eral interest in winning sup- port in these areas, there is considerable inducement for him to effect a settlement with the Vatican. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 18 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Feburary 1960 THE PRESIDENTIAL OUTLOOK IN BOLIVIA Bolivia's governing party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR)--whose firm con- trol virtually guarantees the outcome of the elections to be held next May or June--has chosen former President Victor Paz Estenssoro as its candidate for president and key labor leader Juan Lechin as his run- ning mate. The nominating con- vention chose the left-wing leader Lechin despite strong opposition from Paz, who appar- ently saw this choice as a blow to his plans to act as mediator between the left and right wings of the party. Paz's term as president from 1952 to 1956 was marked by sweeping reforms--extension of suffrage to the illiterate Indian majority, nationalization of the tin mines, and a radical agrarian reform decree. His greatest achievement was devel- opment of petroleum resources through a government oil company, and the resultant change of Bolivia's position from a net importer to an ex1m ter of oil. During this period Paz was regarded as the one man who could maintain a balance between the two wings of the MNR--the right wing headed by incumbent President Hernan Siles and the left wing headed by Juan Lechin. His future efforts in this di- rection, however, will be hampered by the choice of Lechin for the vice presidency and by the weakness of the party's right wing. With Lechin as vice president, Paz will have trouble avoiding total aliena- tion of the middle-class ele- ments of the party. Intraparty ri?v tries; may lead to new outbreaks of vio- lence in'the next few weeks, since most political leaders in Bolivia are backed by groups of armed civilians. Serious violence in recent months, both in the mining areas and in the agricultural section near Bolivia's second largest city, Cochabamba, has threatened civil war. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 The arrival of Julian Amery as a British negotiator in Nicosia on 23 February has revived speculation among Cyp- riots that Britian is about to offer new concessions in an ef- fort to resolve the dispute over the size of British mili- tary bases. In'London, however, a Foreign Office official says Amery's objective is merely to confirm agreements already reached with Archbishop Makarids on other points at issue, such as problems regarding civil administration within the bases and potential British financial aid to Cyprus. Following this, the British official says, London will make a "superhuman" effort to see if anything more can be done to end the dispute over the size of the bases. He states, however, that any "adjustments" in size would be small anti would not live up to the optimistic spec- ulation in the Cypriot press. There are ominous indica- tions that the recent close collaboration between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders may be weakening. Turkish Cypriot leader Kuchuk, in particular, has collaborated closely with Makarios on the issue of the bases, and has demonstrated con- siderable initiative in attempt- ing to find a compromise solu- tion. It now appears that Ku- chuk has incurred the displeas- ure of leaders in Ankara who regard the British bases on Cyp- rus as vital to Turkey's secu- rity. A change in Kuchuk's stand would be a serious blow t+b Ma- karios and would tend to revive the latent distrust between the two communities on Cyprus. Within his own community, the archbishop can retain his pres- tige only by securing some fur they concessions from Britian. Any indication that he is weak- ening in the controversy with London would bring down immedi- ate:.attacks on him from extrem- .ists of both the right and left. Cyprus. While Makarios would probably survive such attacks, his, own influence and that of his mod- erate, pro-Western advisers could be diminished, to the detriment of the new Cypriot government's stability and pos- sibly also to the detriment of long-range Western interests on NEW GOVERNMENT FORMED IN INDIA'S KERALA STATE Kerala's non-Communist po- litical leaders resumed control of the state government on 22 February after nearly three years out of power. Formation of a coalition government by the Congress and Praja Socialist parties climaxed the drive be- gun last summer which led to SECRET the ouster of the Communist re- gime and the victory of the anti-Communist united front in a special state election on 1 February. Congress and Social- ist candidates, together with those of the Moslem League, won 75 percent of the state assembly seats. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET 25 February 1960 Dissension among the vic- torious coalition parties at first threatened to block for- mation of a new government. Intensive negotiations during the first three weeks of Feb- ruary became deadlocked over the question of the Moslem League's participation. The league's demand for one min- istry, which was strongly sup- ported by the Praja Socialists, was unacceptable to the domi- nant Congress party. Resist- ance to the inclusion of the Moslems came primarily from the national Congress leaders, who regard the league as an alien communal organization and who feared that Hindu-Mos- lem cooperation in Kerala would provide Hindu extremist elements in northern India with an opportunity to stir up communal antagonisms. The Moslem League eventual- ly withdrew its demand, ena- blingthe Congress and Socialist leaders to work out a two-par- ty coalition, which the Moslems promised to support in the as- sembly. The Congress party agreed to let Praja Socialist leader Pattom Thanu Pillai head the government, while reserving for Congress politicians eight of the other ten cabinet seats. Pillai, a 75-year-old former Congress leader who has served as chief minister twice pre- viously, is considered to have greater prestige in Kerala than any of the Congress leaders. The personal rivalries and communal differences which de- layed the formation of the new cabinet probably will also ham- per the non-Communist parties in establishing a stable and effective government. Pillai's tendency to run a one-man show may antagonize his coalition partners. The Congress party's preponderant strength in both the cabinet and the assembly, however, will help its leaders keep Pillai in line and main- tain unity. In addition, the considerable mass support re- tained by the Communists in Kerala and their capability for exploiting any government short- comings will give the anti-Com- munist parties a strong incen- tive to maintain their coopera- tion. PAKISTANI PRESIDENT MOVES TO RESTORE "CONSTITUTIONAL" GOVERNMENT Pakistani President Ayub is continuing his efforts to give his regime the appearance of representative government, but apparently intends to keep control in his own hands. His prestige seems to have reached the highest level since the first days following the army takeover in October 1958. His regime has given Pakistan a stronger and more stable gov- ernment, strengthened the coun- try's economy, and raised its international reputation. In addition, Ayub in his recent successful tours of West and East Pakistan demonstrated increasing confidence and skill as a politician. Ayub arranged a "vote of confidence" on 14 February, ob- taining favorable votes from about 95 percent of the 80,000 newly elected members of the recently established local coun- cils. This vote constitutes his election as president for the first term of office under the proposed new constitution. Ayub took a new oath of office on 17 February. Cabinet members submitted pro forma resigna- tions, and were immediately reappointed. SECRET NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 14 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET 25 February 1960 On the same day, the Pres- ident appointed a commission to prepare proposals for a new constitution which will pro- bably follow the lines he has already described in public. The draft is expected to be completed by next fall. Ayub apparently wants to use repre- sentative institutions such as the local councils to gain support for the government, but he does not want these institu- tions to interfere with the centralized authority which he believes to be necessary for a competent administration. He also advocates a strong executive, dominated by the president and not subject to recall by the legislature. Ayub apparently will ask for some system of checks to prevent po- litical parties from harming the national interest, as he believes happened before the 1958 army takeover. During the coming months Ayub will probably have his hands full making an effective instrument of government out of the newly elected local coun- cils. These councils are to be given major responsibilities in carrying out national develop- ment programs at the local level. A large proportion of the mem- bers are without previous gov- ernment or administrative ex- perience. Many who do have such experience probably have ties with the ousted political parties and may resent the re- gime. Even if the regime se- cures the wholehearted coopera- tion of these new councils, it would have a major job educatin them to their tasks. Communist propaganda in the Congo and efforts to pene- trate nationalist groups appear to be increasing with the pros- pect of independence on 30 June. Congolese delegates at the round-table talks in Brussels were contacted by various Sovi- et bloc trade representatives, who reportedly outlined attrac- tive barter proposals to be implemented following Congolese independence. Communist activity in the Congo during the past year in- volved primarily the introduc- tion of propaganda material and the granting of scholarships for study in the bloc. The Czechoslovak Consulate, the only official bloc mission in Leopoldville, is believed to have supported these efforts as well as penetration opera- tions aimed at nationalist groups. Among the Belgian Com- munists there have been some indications of dissatisfaction with what they believe to be the low level of Communist ac- tivity in the Congo. The Communists may recent- ly have increased their influ- ence within two of the most important African groups, the Abako and the Congo National Movement (MNC). Propaganda organs of the Abako have lately taken on pro-Communist and anti- American overtones, while of- ficials of the MNC wing led by Patrice Lumumba are believed to have been in frequent con- tact with Belgian Communists. SECRET Page 15 of 18 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET 25 February 1960 Communist penetration ef- forts have been aided consider- ably by the Congo's accelerated rush toward independence, which has prompted numerous, Congolese politicians to seek foreign financial support for legisla tive elections, some of which are scheduled assearly as April. Delegates to the round-table talks in Brussels are known to have made side trips to the bloc and elsewhere. Congolese delegates were "constantly contacted" by bloc representatives with offers of economic assistance. In some instances, however, the Congolese appear to have sought aid from non-Communist sources. Communist influence was not apparent during the actual nego- tiations in Brussels, where Afri- can delegates of various politi- cal shadings were largely united in their efforts to wrest maxi- mum concessions from the Bel- gians. The conference ended on 20 February after Brussels had agreed to virtually everv major Congolese demand. LABOR UNREST IN WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY West Berlin and West Ger- many face the threat of a strike by 1,200,000 public service, transportation, and communica- tion workers. The member un- ions, including those in West Berlin, are scheduled to start voting on 25 February regard ing managementw-'s latest wage offers. Labor leaders, who have been moderate in their demands during the past decade, now argue that rising prices and business profits justify sub- stantial increases and that labor deserves a larger share of national income. This is the first of several demands German labor will make during .1960. The Bonn government, how- ever, wants wage increases lim- ited to hold down inflationary pressures. In the recent round of transport negotiations held in Bad Kreuznach, the labor lead- ers reduced their demands for a wage increase of 15 percent to one of 11 percent, while the management representatives increased their wage and salary offers from 5 percent to maximums of 10.5 and 8.5 per- cent, respectively'. Despite the impression that this nar- rowing would produce a settle- ment, negotiations were broken off by the labor leaders on 17 February after a 22-hour session. Any settlement in West Ger- many would, presumably extend also to West Berlin. The West Berlin union leaders, however, have taken a stronger stand than their more conservative counterparts in West Germany, and have indicated a willingness to strike for "several weeks" if necessary. A strike of long- er than 36 hours would probably cause the city's gas and water pressure to fall to a point where services would cease. In the event of a West Ber- lin strike, the East Germans might take "sympathy" action, as they did during a 24-hour demonstration walkout in 1958, by cutting off elevated S-Bahn train service to West Berlin. Communist agitators are already circulating leaflets in West Ber- lin urging workers to stand firm in their original 15-percent wage demands. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page: 16 of 18 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET 25 February 1960 BRITISH PUBLIC PRESSURES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT The Macmillan government finds itself under slowly in- creasing public pressure to reach a disarmament agreement. Considerations of domestic opinion only partially account for the recurrent efforts of the British delegation at the Geneva test-suspension talks to explore possible compromises be- tween the American and Soviet positions--efforts which the Soviet delegation is seeking to exploit. Testing is prob- ably of decreasing importance to Britain's own defense program in view of the tendency to de-em- phasize the nuclear aspect. British officials consider that world opinion is susceptible to Soviet propaganda blandish- ments on the testing issue. British opinion appears to be the government's greatest concern, however. According to an opinion survey in Novem- ber, almost as many of those polled named the USSR as the US as the country making the more serious effort.--.toward general disarmament. On the test ban issue, the press supports Macmillan's desire for a com- prehensive ban, and has viewed SECRET NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 17 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 favorably Moscow's insistence that any agreement include at least a moratorium on all underground testing. The heavy press play given reports that the United States is pre- ~aring to resume underground tests tends to blame Washington for blocking progress. A skillful pressure group, composed principally of non- Communist intellectuals, which seeks unilateral unclear disarm- ament has played on latent British fears that nuclear war- fare would obliterate civilized life in the United Kingdom. The American Embassy in London believes this group has gained SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS some increased publicity dur- ing the past year, partly through demonstrations at mili- tary installations on news- sparse week ends. Among the group's prominent supporters is Frank Cousins, leader of Brit- ain's largest trade union. Labor party leader Hugh Gaitskell rejects unilateral disarmament for Britain and has agreed to only slight com- promises in his party's stand, but maintains continuing pres- sure in Parliament for the gov- ernment to show progress toward a disarmament agreement start- ing with a suspension of nu- clear tests. Page 18 of 18 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Khrushchev and De Gaulle will each probably use the So- viet leader's visit to France from 15 to 28 March to explore the other's intentions for the summit meeting in May. The invitation stems both from De Gaulle's determination to demonstrate France's status as a great power, and `f-rom his desire to develop a European in- itiative toward furthering an East-West detente. The Kremlin has long considered France a vulnerable link in the Western alliance, and De Gaulle's pol- icies have probably sharpened Moscow's expectations of new op- portunities to exploit possible . ... ............................................... :: ....................................... ........ ...................................................?? :.. ........... . 15 - 28 March 1960 3 days ,n;,'Paris 7 days in provincial cities shown 'I-Ay flight to Saharan oil center of Hassi Messaoud 2 days of talks at Rambouillet SECRET CO French - Proposed Itinerary for Khruschev's PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET 25 February 1960 differences between France and its allies. De Gaulle's appre- hension over Communist advances in Africa and his hope for a Moscow-Peiping'misunderstand- ing may encourage him to ex- plore the possibility of a mu- tual accommodation with the Soviet Union. The French leader appar- ently is convinced that Khru- shchev does not want war 1106- Extreme rightist opponents of the regime are using the visit to characterize De Gaulle as a "man of the left" who is about to sell France out to the Soviet Union. Their plans for anti-Khrushchev demonstrations have probably been stymied, however, by the government's roundups in connection with the Algerian crisis last month. Background of the Invitation De Gaulle made the Khru- shchev visit an "indispensable" condition for French participa- tion in an East-West summit meeting, in view of British Prime Minister Macmillan's trip to Moscow and Khrushchev's trip to the United States in 1959. "SEND FOR PICASSO! " cause the Soviet Union "must reckon with a growing class of technicians and managers who want higher living standards and more security." Moreover, De Gaulle sees the growing strength of Communist China as an additional pressure to "Europeanize" the Soviet Union. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 The USSR and De Gaulle The Soviet attitude toward France was formulated by Khru- shchev shortly before De Gaulle returned to power. In an inter- view with a French paper, the Soviet leader stressed that the USSR had no reason to fear a strong France, because "the more France displays its inde- pendence as a great power, the easier it will be, by joint ef- fort, to achieve a settlement of European and world prob- lems." Khrushchev's remarks underline the Soviet Union's long-standing belief that it can encourage France to move toward an independent position on key East-West issues,.espe- cially the German question. Soviet confidence that an intensified French nationalism can be exploited by dividing France from its allies has probably been reinforced by De Gaulle's actions over the past year and a half. Moscow's policy of re- straint and caution in criti- cizing De Gaulle is a further reflection of the priority which the USSR assigns to gen- erating divisions within the West. De Gaulle's failure to ac- tively oppose Anglo-American policy during the Middle East crisis in 1958 and his subsequent demonstration that-he intended to maintain close ties with Bonn probably led to a downgrading of the Soviet estimate that im- mediate opportunities for Moscow would be developed,by De Gaulle. Khrushchev, however, empha- sized in a Pravda article of 22 September 1s conviction that re-emergence of the histor- ic conflicts between France and Germany was merely-a matter of time. As a corollary to this the- sis, Khrushchev advanced his ap- praisal that traditional French national interests closely coin- cided with the Soviet interest in containing the revival of German military power. During the Berlin crisis Moscow repeat- edly directed warnings to Paris against the danger of a. -revived Germany. The Soviet objective of cultivating De Gaulle personally was clearly evident after the Soviet leader's return from the United States. After Khrushchev had failed to gain agreement on a summit conference before the end of 1959, he conceded that Do Gaulle's desire to exchange views prior to the summit was not "unreasonable and could make for a better understanding" at the East-West meeting. More- over, Khrushchev's moderate handling of De Gaulle's efforts to delay a summit contrasted sharply with his repeated at- tacks on Adenauer for the same reasons. Khrushchev also took pains to respond to French views that some evidence of decreased ten- sions was necessary before agree- ing to meet at the summit. The Soviet leader's cautious endorse- ment of De Gaulle's program for Algeria was an obvious gesture to appear responsive to French conditions for the heads-of-gov- ernment meeting. On Algeria, Moscow has tried to avoid antagonizing De Gaulle, SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 while still maintaining a pub- lic posture as the champion of anticolonialist movements. During the recent crisis in Algeria, Soviet propaganda media firmly endorsed De Gaulle's handling of the situation and lauded his 29 January state- ment on self-determination there. Khrushchev in France During his meetings with De Gaulle, the Soviet premier will probably maintain a re- served and conciliatory atti- tude, most recently evident in his reaction to the French a- tomic test. He is'determined, however, to maintain pressure for a German settlement based on a peace treaty with both German states which would con- firm the postwar division of Europe. Khrushchev's dismissal on 5 August 1959 of the Bonn- Paris axis as a "marriage of convenience" is a reflection of his conviction that growing German military strength pro- vides a field for maneuver in bargaining for French conces- sions on Germany. As Khru- shchev put it in his speech on 14 November to Soviet journal- ists, "De Gaulle understands the danger of a revival of Ger- man revanchism." Khrushchev will also prob- ably tie the dangers of German militarism to the problem of disarmament in Europe. Mindful of De Gaulle'$ preoccupation with "doing something for the Poles," Khrushchev can be ex- pected to press for a favorable consideration of a partial disarmament Cen- tral Europe along the:lines of the Rapacki plan. The main themes which Khru- shchev will develop for French public consumption will be that the balance of power has shifted toward "the socialist camp" and that there is an irreversible trend in the West toward accom- modation with the Soviet posi- tion. He will attempt to make it clear that such an accommo- dation is in the interest of France as a great power, and he probably will suggest that the French should take an active part in promoting a European settlement. An indispensable condition, however, will be his insistence that Paris ac- knowledge the postwar situation in Eastern Europe. As Khrushchev sees it, the interests of France and the USSR do not "objectively collide," and their policies on Germany differ in form but not in sub- stance. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 In this connection, Khru- shchev will explore the possibil- ity of 'a moe,formal endorsement by De Gaulle of the status quo in the East along the lines of the French leader's remarks in March 1959 on the permanency of Germany's postwar boundaries. Shortly after that statement by De Gaulle, Moscow used a.TASS statement-to respond with an expression that "this is a cor- rect, realistic approach," and Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet on 31 October that "we greatly appreciate the realis- tic statement" by De Gaulle and Debrd on the "inviolabil- ity" of the Oder-Neisse fron- tier. De Gaulle on Summit Issues On the issue of Germany, De Gaulle is unlikely to go beyond his suggestion that in- creased political contacts be- tween East and West Germany would be desirable short of recognition of the East German regime. His views were presum- ably reflected in Foreign Min- ister Couve de Murville's ex- pression of doubt in November that the Berlin question is "ripe" for settlement. Couve de Murville said again in De- cember that a summit meeting would be a success if "some practical agreements" were a- chieved on the other two prob- lems; disar~ament and East- West relations. De Gaulle reportedly agrees with Adenauer that the disarmament issue; should be the "acid test" of Soviet inten- tions. Paris would assign first priority to the abolition of all delivery systems for nu- clear weapons and second to the elimination of nuclear weap- onee:. - It'. opposes any agree- ment on nuclear test cessation which does not provide for the destruction of nuclear stocks and for a general disarmament in conventional weapons. The recent Frendli demonstration of approaching nuclear weapons capability is more likely to reinforce than soften this po- sition. African considerations underlie, De Gaulle's insistence that the summit agenda include discussion of his proposals for nonintervention by states in each other's affairs and for a joint East-West aid program for underdeveloped areas. De Gaulle is seeking to bar arms shipments to "neutral" states, and he envisages global apportionment of underdeveloped areas into Eastern and Western spheres of influence--with Africa' witfiin the Western complex. Khrushchev's prospective visit to Africa, particularly Guinea, probably sharpens French apprehension, and De Gaulle is certain to press Khrushchev on these points. Curbs on Peiping De"Gaulle can also be ex- pected to probe for any signs of Soviet willingness to curb Peiping. Although De Gaulle seems increasingly taken up with,the hope of aligning Moscow with the West against Peiping, Paris+;is probably more and more inclined to envisage some formal agreement on disarmament as ul- timately including Peiping. There are some indications that in addition to an expan- sion of trade and cultural SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 5 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 exchanges, an agreement on So- viet-French scientific exchange may be reached. LATIN AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CASTRO REGIME Fidel Castro's regime has lost prestige in other Latin American capitals because of its authoritarian methods at home, its- susceptibility to Communist influence, and its unorthodox behavior in hemi- sphere affairs. Only a few Latin American leaders, however, are prepared to dismiss Castro as a mere radical demagogue who has lost all chance of mak- ing in the long run a positive contribution to Cuba; for many Latin Americans in general, particularly the less sophis- ticated, Castro remains an im- portant political symbol. His proclaimed objectives parallel those of numerous groups through- out the hemisphere, and con- certed Cuban efforts to appeal. to dissatisfied and oppressed groups in many countries may be making headway. Castro's Tactics The Castro regime has rapidly dissipated the consid- erable good will it enjoyed among Latin American leaders when it assumed power in Jan- uary 1959. The authoritarian tactics that belie Castro's proclaimed democratic ideals quickly became apparent and have progressively eroded the Cuban leader's prestige among democratically oriented Latin American governments. President Lopez Mateos of Mexico has publicly expressed regret that the Cuban revolution is not proceeding according to constitutional paths. The re- sponsible press and government officials in Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, Costa Rica, and other countries are showing increasing disgust with the undemocratic attitudes and:aetions of Cuban leaders. Communist Influence The growth of Communist in- fluence in Cuba is another cause for serious concern in Latin Amer- ican capitals. Although few of- ficials consider Fidel Castro a Communist, many are convinced that close Aides such as Che Guevara and Raul Castro are promoting Communist objectives and that the premier himself is in danger of becoming a captive of the Com- munists. The Mikoyan visit this month and the resulting close economic ties seem tto>have,further alarmed Latin American observers. The Liberal party's El Tiempo in Colombia declared that the Mikoyan visit will "fortify the influence, already consider- able, of Communism in the gov- ernment, with all that this sig- nifies." President Betancourt of Venezuela is reported "very dis- turbed" at the implications of the Cuban-Soviet agreement. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 2.960 Unorthodox Diplomacy Castro's diplomatic rep- resentatives, many of them young, inexperienced, and 'im- bued with revolutionary fervor, have irritated a number of Latin American governments by their unorthodox behavior and blatant propaganda activities. His am- bassadors in El Salvador and Venezuela had to be recalled late last year because of their indiscretions. Cuban envoys in Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama have irritated the governments or important polit- ical groups by becoming involved in domestic affairs. The Chil- ean and Venezuelan governments formerly protested the unan- nounced and undocumented arriv- als of Cuban military planes in their countries last summer and fall. Attitude Toward OAS Numerous Latin American leaders fear that the Castro regime's indifferent and occa- sionally hostile attitude toward the Organization of Amer- ican States (OAS) and other inter-American organizations will weaken hemispheric co- operation. Direct Cuban sup- port for revolutionary move- ments opposing the regimes in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua last summer was in defiance of the ardently professed Latin American principle of noninterven- tion. Fidel Castro attacked the meeting of foreign ministers in Santiago de Chile last August as a "farce," and Raul Castro described the OAS as a "worthless organization" unre- sponsive to the real interests of the people. More recently, Cuban officials have ridiculed the new Inter-American Develop- ment Bank as of little use be- cause of its alleged domination by the United States; Cuba is the only Latin American country not to become a member. Latin Americans look a- skance at the Cuban Government's efforts to identify itself with the Asian-African neutralists, and have been definitely cool toward Castro's proposal to hold a world conference of "hungry nations" in Havana late next summer. They doubt Cuban as- surances that the conference is to be purely economic and tech- nical. Cuba has been unable to secure the agreement of any Latin American government to cosponsor the conference, and only Mexico, Venezuela, and pos- sibly Panama have agreed--even conditionally--to send repre- sentatives. Most countries op- pose holding the conference but may feel obliged to attend if many Latin American governments do so. Brazil regards it as a direct threat to the success of Operation Pan America, its plan for strengthening inter-American ties. In another move which threatens hemispheric solidarity, Cuba has been actively campaign- ing in the UN for election to the Security Council, without first asking customary support from the Latin American caucus. Several Latin American countries had al- ready indicated approval of a prior Chilean bid for caucus support, but Cuba's candidacy seems to have elicited some Latin American support too. Cu- ba's move will probably lessen caucus effectiveness on other issues as well. US-Cuban Relations Many leading Latin Amer- icans, including some who have their own strong grievances against US policies, have ex- pressed surprise at the SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 25 February 1960 bitterness of Castro's invec tive against the United States. The Uruguayan newspaper Accion --mouthpiece for the lefTT-sf- politician Luis Batlle Berres, who has beed an especially caustic critic of the United States--warned Castro not to lose contact with his liberal- minded friends in the United The majority of Latin American leaders approve the moderation of President Eisen- hower's 26 January statement on Cuba and have indicated ad- miration and relief that it was basically conciliatory. Chilean President Alessandri and Colombian President Lleras Camargo in January declared they understood the US Govern- ment was under considerable provocation but expressed the belief that any punitive steps or anything resembling force against Castro would strengthen rather than weaken him. They counseled continued moderation and patience. The widely respected Chil- ean diplomat Benjamin Cohen has expressed a viewpoint probably shared by many thoughtful Latin American leaders who believe that Castro has not yet lost all opportunity of making, on balance, a positive contribu- tion to Cuba. Cohen pointed out in mid-February that the Cuban situation must be viewed in the context of a drastic social revolution, with its inevitable violence and disor- ganization, and that the issue of Communism is only inciden- tal to this central fact. The newspaper El Pais, owned by PanamanianPres ent de la Guardia, published some- what similar views: "The bal- ance of history is, up to now, favorable. me, new Cuba shows a a series of victories, which, without doubt, any other Latin American count" oI ld have taken much longerchieve. Every revolution has its--mis- takes--and necessary bloodshed." Appeal in Latin America The general feeling of inferiority in dealing with the United States probably has a large part in the dramatic ap- peal Castro apparently holds for many Latin Americans. In addition, the picture of Castro as a courageous fighter against a corrupt dic- tatorship is still valid for many Latin American people, es- pecially the less sophisticated. Castro's drastic agrarian re- form program and his controls over private capital also evoke a sympathetic response in a continent where abusive social practices by a small wealthy class are frequent. Communists, always quick to exploit Latin American grievances, have be- come, along with such Commu- nist-influenced parties as the Chilean Socialist party, Cas- tro's most uncritical defend- ers in the hemisphere. Although Castro has al- ienated the top leaders of im- portant Latin Awer.i?an SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 leftist-nationalist non-Commu- nist parties such as APRA of Peru, Democratic Action of Ven- ezuela, and National Liberation of Costa Rica, sympathy for Castro remains strong in the lower echelons of these parties. An APRA rally on 7 January re- vealed strong discontent among secondary party leaders, youths, students, and the more radical elements because of the moder- ate policies of the party lead- ership and its refusal to come out strongly in favor of Castro and advocate Castro-type pol- icies for Peru. hopes on him--have tried to dis- tinguish between Castro and the Cuban revolution by continuing to support the revolution while refusing to endorse Castro's methods. This distinction, how- ever, eludes most party members. to appeal to the masses over The Castro regime seems well aware of its large reservoir of sympathy among presently dis- organized and less articulate groups in many countries. Ha- vana's diplomatic representa- tives, Cuban labor groups, and the Castro-subsidized news agency Prensa Latina are em- barked on a concerted campaign the heads of the governments. President Betancourt, head of the Venezuelan party, is faced with a similar dilemma, as is former Costa Rican Pres- ident Figueres, head of the Na- tional Liberation party, who publicly broke with Castro last April. These leaders--who are perhaps more bitterly disillu- sioned with Castro because they once aided him and pinned great STATUS OF OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The status and influence of the approximately 12,000,000 Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia has generally declined over the past decade. Disliked for their cultural separatism, en- vied for their economic prowess, and feared for their subversive potential, they have come under steadily increasing pressures and surveillance by their host governments, except in Singa- pore, where the Chinese control the government, and, to a lesser extent, in the Federation of Malaya, where the Chinese have a voice in the government by virtue of their large numbers and economic dominance. China's emergence as a ma- jor power in the region follow- ing World War II and the decline of the colonial powers in South- east Asia gave prominence to the position of the Overseas Chinese communities. However, postwar political developments have placed them under new na- tionalist governments which are particularly sensitive to the presence of alien communities. With the Communist victory on the mainland, the Overseas Chi- nese have come to be regarded as potential bases of Communist infiltration and subversion. These fears are well grounded. The overwhelming majority of Overseas Chinese, although emotionally attached to their cultural heritage and their an- cestral homes on the mainland, are not ideologically motivated. As in the past, they remain po- litically apathetic and are con- cerned primarily with their per- sonal security and economic op- portunities. They continue to promote these interests direct- ly with local authorities. Except SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 25 February 1960 in Singapore and the Federa- tion of Malaya, they are not in a position to undertake con- certed action against their host governments. Even in Malaya, despite the economic power of the Chinese, such an effort would result in severe governmental reprisals. Nationalist-Communist Rivalry Peiping and Taipei are competing for the loyalty of the Overseas Chinese, and both generally consider ethnic Chi- nese, regardless of place of birth, as Chinese nationals.:.. Both governments allot legisla- tive seats--in Taiwan's Legis- lative Yuan and Peiping's Na- tional People's Congress--to the overseas communities, en- courage visits from overseas OVERSEAS CNN ESE NN SOUTNEAST ASIA (CURRENT ESTIMATES) COUNTRY TOTAL POPULATION CHINESE PERCENTAGE WRMA 19,500,000 150.50,00 2.6 CAMR001A 5,000,000 300,000 6.0 IIM0IMSIA a5,000,000 3,000,11110 3.5 LAOS 2,000,000 30,000 1.5 MALAYA 6,300,000 2,343,60 37.2 MMUPPMIES 22,000,000 330,00 1.5 SINGAPORE 1,105,00 1,550,00 76.5 TNAILAIM 21,000,000 3,171,00 15.1 SOUTH VIETNAM 12,100,800 $30,00 6.9 00]ri 25 FEBRUARY 100 community leaders, and have of- fered scholarships to Overseas Chinese students. The two regimes work prin- cipally through their diplomatic and consular establishments. Thus the Chinese Nationalist Government is more successful in the Philippines, South Vietnam, CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Areas of Origin and Overseas Concentrations A KASHMIR U1, Des GOA-1 (Port.', SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY C H I N A Hakka Other Teochiu-Hokkien OVERSEAS CONCENTRATIONS Ma Other concentration concentration SECRET 41imor TERR. OF NETH. INEW NEW GUINEA (In D,,pum) GUINEA NEW GUI JEA rn ri A PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 10 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 Laos, and Thailand, while the Chinese Communist regime domi- nates where it is represented-- in Burma, Indonesia, and Cam- bodia. In this effort, Communist China in the countries where it is recognized is making effec- tive use of its Bank of China branches as instruments of per- suasion and for the transfer of remittances to the mainland. The Bank of China is an impor- tant instrument in Singapore, and had similar importance in Malaya until the recent closure of its branches there. In Southeast Asia as a whole, the Chinese Communist re- gime has had more appeal than the Chinese Nationalist. It has considerable influence with the majority of Chinese-language publications and schools, as well as Chinese associations. This is attributable more to Peiping's demonstration of mil- itary strength, vitality, and apparent permanence than to its propaganda campaign. Peiping's influence on the Chinese of Southeast Asia has recently been diminished by the generally unfavorable reaction to its suppression of the Ti betan revolt, its commune pro- gram, and by the reports of disillusioned Chinese return- ing from visits to the main- land. The Chinese of Malaya and Singapore were particular- ly disillusioned by the fail- ure of Peiping to produce the goods it offered in its 1958 economic offensive. The Chinese communities of Laos, Malaya, and Singapore, for differing reasons, are the least subject to governmental harassment in Southeast Asia. In Laos, the Chinese community is small--approximately 30,000, or 1.5 percent of the popula- tion--and the Chinese are ac- cepted as an integral part of the heterogeneous society. The Chinese Nationalists opened a consulate last year, but it has SECRET had little impact on the local Chinese. The Laotian Government is preoccupied with the threat of the Communist-dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat, and has neither time nor inclination to inter- fere with the Chinese community. Even the presence of Chinese Nationalist irregulars in the Burmese-Laotian border area-- anathema to Rangoon--is viewed with mild favor by Vientiane. Malaya and Singapore In the Federation of Malaya, terrorist tactics Of the Malayan Communist party, almost exclu- sively Chinese, as well as the demands of the independence movement have forced conserva- tive Chinese community leaders into politics. They are asso- ciated through the Malayan Chi- nese Association with the United Malay National Organization in the government, although only as a junior partner. Both ele- ments support, at least pub- licly, the "Malayanization" of the population. Communal problems generated by the mutual distrust between the Malays (50 percent of the population) and the Chinese (37.2 percent) dominate govern- mental thinking. The political- ly dominant Malays prefer to have the Chinese isolated from the influence of both Chinese regimes. Chinese cultural ties with the mainland are strong, however, and pro-Communist sentiments are particularly evident among Chinese students. The situation in Singapore is unique: a left-wing govern- ment which is dominated by Chi- nese is minimizing Chinese cul- tural ties and is encouraging the development of a "Malayan" society. Some 1,185,000 out of Singapore's 1,550,000 citizens are Chinese, culturally oriented toward the mainland, and much influenced by local pro-Commu- nist leaders. The government, motivated mainly by economic necessity to seek closer ties leading to the long-range goal of merger, is attempting to improve relations with the PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET 25 February 1960 anti-Communist and aloof gov- ernment of Malaya. In Burma and Cambodia, where the Chinese populations are 2.6 and 6 percent respec- tively, the Chinese communities are in relatively good stand- ing. In both countries other alien minorities are more dis- liked by the local populations and governments' than the Chi- nese--the Indians in Burma, and the Vietnamese in Cambodia. Peiping holds a command- ing position in the competition for the loyalties of Burma's Chinese through its geographic location and evident political and economic power. As a re- sult, it has gained control over most Chinese institutions in the country. The pro-Na- tionalist Chinese, hampered by a lack of funds and by the de- predations of the Nationalist irregulars in the northeastern part of the country, appear to be losing ground, and their in- fluence probably will continue to decline in view of the re- cently concluded Sino-Burmese border agreement and nonaggres- sion treaty. There are between 450,000 and 500,000 Chinese residents of Burma, who, unless they have formally declared their Chinese citizenship, are generally ac- corded the privileges of Bur- mese citizenship. Intermar- riage with Burmese is frequent, and the Chinese assimilate eas- ily into Burmese society. Nev- ertheless, most Chinese have retained their cultural identity and are objects of government suspicion. Formal discrimina- tion against Chinese does not exist, but the government's ef- forts to force aliens out of major economic activities has ended the Chinese domination of rice marketing and mining and forced the Chinese into less important commercial fields, where they have little influ- ence with the government. The 300,000 Chinese in Cam- bodia are in a similar position. Through its large embassy, Pei- ping has gained control over most Chinese institutions, and pro-Nationalist Chinese are severely handicapped by lack of funds and the absence of diplo- matic representation. Communist advances have been slowed, how- ever, by the unfavorable reac- tion to developments on the mainland in the past year. Thailand's Chinese The position of Thailand's 3,171,000 Chinese, 15.1 percent of the population, differs from the other Chinese communities in that for more than 50 years they have been under varying degrees of governmental pressure to be- come Thai in citizenship and culture. Many still maintain their cultural identity, despite effective governmental control over their schools--in which the time allowed to Chinese studies is limited and the use of Thai curricula required--economic re- strictions, and limitations on Chinese immigration. Formally, at least, the Over- seas Chinese have maintained loyalty to Nationalist China, in keeping with the Thai Govern- ment's outlook, and Communist China appears to have little overt support from them. The clandestine Chinese Communist party of Thailand may have suc- ceeded, however, in organizing segments of the Chinese popula- tion in Thailand. Vietnam and The Philippines The Chinese communities of South Vietnam and the Philip- pines have been established for centuries and have flourished. However, they are not popular in either country, and neither Peiping nor Taipei appears able to exercise strong influence on their behalf. In South Vietnam, where the estimated 830,000 Chinese (6..9 percent of the population) had SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 12 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 ,been granted a separate cultur- al and political status by the French, the government in 1956 launched a vigorous program of forced "Vietnamization," giving locally born Chinese the choice of accepting Vietnamese citizen- ship, language, and culture, or of being excluded from vital businesses}a'nd professions in which they were active. After two years of re- sistance, the Chinese bowed to government demands and, out- wardly at least, became Viet- namese. They had almost no choice, as little opportunity was provided for them to leave South Vietnam. Despite vague threats to turn to Peiping for assistance when Taiwan's inter- cession on their behalf proved ineffective, the Chinese of Vietnam, following the govern- ment's lead, continue to favor Nationalist China over Peiping. In the Philippines, where friction involving the local Chinese has continually marred relations with Taipei, the outlook for the Chinese commu- nity may be even less promis- ing than in South Vietnam. A growing clamor for social and economic restrictions, like the recent law intended to wrest control of retail trade from Chinese hands and the de- cision to deport "undesirable" Chinese aliens, appears to pre- clude any rapid assimilation of the Chinese community. The Chinese village retailer, how- ever, is still considered an excellent marriage prospect among rural Filipinos. Although a pro-Peiping minority probably exists among the Philippines' 330,000 Chi- nese (1.5 percent of the popu- lation), the community as a whole tends to favor Taiwan, reflecting the government's position, and continues to de- fend its interests, primarily through informal use of its economic power with influential Filipino legislators and offi- cials. Chinese in Indonesia The Chinese community in Indonesia, some three million or 3.5 percent of the total pop- ulation, is probably the least stable in Southeast Asia. Granted a special status some- where between the European and the native in the era of Dutch colonial rule, the Chinese community gained major economic power--and the hearty dislike of Indonesian nationalists. Approximately 25 to 30 percent of the community accepted Indo- nesian citizenship when Chinese were required to register their citizenship in 1951. In the last three years, discriminatory measures have borne heavily, not only on alien Chinese who are loyal to Peiping or Taiwan, but also on uncommitted Chinese and Indones- ian citizens of Chinese ancestry. Pro-Nationalist,Chinese busi- nesses, organizations, schools, and newspapers were either con- fiscated or banned in 1958 when the Indonesian Government charged Taipei with assistance to Indonesian rebels. For a period thereafter, pro-Communist influence was unchallenged. In May 1959, however, the government banned Chinese re- tailers in rural areas and ordered the resettlement of all Chinese from some rural regions to nearby towns and cities. Peiping's remonstrances have been ineffective, and the Chi- nese fear that these restric- tions are but the forerunner to their expulsion from the country. However, the Chinese Communist Government, through its willing- ness to accept Chinese repatriates and to provide transportation to the mainland has remained more attractive than the Chinese Nationalist Government to the Chinese of Indonesia. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 13 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 POLAND LOSING BRIEF CULTURAL FREEDOM Poland's intellectual and cultural life since Gomulka came to power in 1956--once re- garded as a test of whether freedom of expression could be compatible with Communist rule-- is being subjected to ever-in- creasing repression. While there have been few dramatic moves against intellectuals, the margin of freedom permitted them is shrinking gradually but steadily. The party seems determined not only to curtail freedoms, but also to direct the talents of the intelligentsia into what it considers the desirable po- litical and ideological channels and to make Poland's cultural life conform more closely to that in the remainder of the bloc. The increased controls are part of First Secretary Go- mulka's broader campaign to tighten the party's authority over every aspect of Polish life. A major factor in the cul- tural tightening is Gomulka's dislike and distrust of Intel- lectuals generally. He never really favored the freedom en- joyed by Polish writers when he came to power, but his position was not firm enough to enforce his views. Most Polish party leaders look on journalists, writers, and artists as revi- sionists at heart and have long wanted to bring them under party control. generally--but more specifically those in the cultural field. Politburo member Edward Ochab, who now is in charge of cultural matters, probably will attempt to impose a more doctrinaire party line. Education Reforms Increasingly dissatisfied with the poor political indoc- trination provided by Polish universities, the party con- gress in March 1959 laid down the line that the compulsory courses in philosophy "must be conducted exclusively in the spirit of Marxism." There are practical difficulties in teach- ing philosophy with a Marxist slant, however, because few pro- fessors will admit to such views, and many who are qualified find themselves "too busy" to teach these required courses. Professor Adam Schaff, leading party ideologist, stated recently that the party is con- sidering reinstating in the uni- versities compulsory courses in Marxism-Leninism; these had been dropped following Gomulka's re- turn to power. Such a step, Schaff said, is "indispensable" to the strengthening of the Marxist ideological offensive against the pressures of alien ideologies. He admitted, however, that regime efforts to impose compulsory courses in Marxism by "administrative means" have proved self-defeating. Since the third plenum of the party central committee in October 1959, the hard-line ele- ments in the party appear to have been in the ascendant. Zenon Kliszko, a close friend and confidant of Gomulka, has urged him to take sterner action against the intellectuals. The "resignation" of Jerzy Mor- awski from his posts on the party politburo and secretariat apparently resulted from his op- position to greater controls Polish students are not interested in Communist ideol- ogy, and attempts to popularize Marxism would encounter at least indifference and possibly open resistance. There is also a move under way to revise all textbooks and teaching aids in an effort to instill the "proper socialist attitude" in Polish school children. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 14 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 Retreat of the Writers In the long struggle against the reimposition of party con- trols, Polish intellectuals-- especially writers--had given ground only grudgingly until the Writers'. Union Con- gress last December. At the 1958 congress at Wroclaw, for ex- ample, the writers put up such a spirited battle against the government's censor- ship policy that they succeeded in retaining an independent leader- ship under the re- spected non-Communist poet Antoni Slonimski. By 1959, however, most of the writers had been cowed. Party and govern- ment leaders speaking at the December con- gress told the writers that it is not enough for them to refrain from writing in a vein critical of the regime; they must also "make a positive contribution to the building of socialism." All hostility--even by implica- tion--must be eliminated. Deputy Premier Jarosewicz complained that in the past few years Pol- ish literature, hampered by "re- actionary and backward political trends," had failed to meet the needs of the times; he called on the writers to be active allies of the party. Another party spokesman warned that the Writer's Union must again become the ideological stronghold it had been from 1949 to 1956, and that it must give up the purely professional role it has attempted to play since October 1956. Of the 14 men elected to the governing presidium of the Writers' Union at the December 1959 meeting, six are party mem- bers and two or three others have been called "non-card- carrying party members." Only a few of the liberal writers previously elected to union posts in the period since Octo- ber 1956 were named to high posi- tions last December. Jaroslaw Iwaskiewicz, a leading nonparty literary figure who bends with the prevailing political winds was elected president of the union, replacing Slonimski, who consistently opposed party domi- nation of the writers. Important new members of the Writers' Union presidium in- clude candidate member of the party central committee Jerzy Putrament, another opportunist who jumped on the Gomulka band- wagon after October 1956; central committee member Leon Kruczkowski, a Stalinist die-hard who also heads the party's cultural com- mission; and central committee member and former education min- ister Stefan Zolkiewski, who laid down the party line at the congress. Regime Measures The regime is using a number of methods to apply pres- sure: threat of loss of a job; refusal to permit a work to be published;. occasional'Icheck-ups" by the police; and various overt and subtle pressures on families. The party has also appointed special commissions to investi- gate the ideological situation in all areas of cultural life. As a result of these pressures, the intellectuals have become SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 15 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 February 1960 more prudent and passive,,.and less willing to express them- selves. The government has institut- ed a thorough re-examination of publishing policies, with major emphasis on assuring that all materials published are completly acceptable from the ideological point of view. Widespread rumors of drastic editorial and per- sonnel changes and unclear and inconsistent party directives have caused a great deal of un- certainty about publishing plans for 1960. A major effect of the in- creasingly severe control over intellectuals is that novels, stories, articles, and poems can no longer pass censorship if they portray life and conditions as they actually are in Poland today. There is no place for such works of protest as Adam Wazyk's Poem for Adults, Leopold Tyrmand's The Man With the White Eyes, or Marek Hlasko's The Eighth Day of the Week and The Graveyard, a few of the works that once made Polish literature vital and fascinating. The economic pressures are having their effect, and many writers have turned to noncontro- versial subjects such as medieval architecture. Translation of Western books into Polish prob- ably will be reduced, since the party apparently has decided that too much emphasis has been given to pessimistic, avant-garde books --to the neglect of more opti- mistic "socialist" works. While the regime can apply its negative controls and prevent the publi- cation of works it does not ap- prove, there is little evidence that it has succeeded in forcing writers to make a "positive con- tribution to the building of socialism" or to return to pro- ducing works of "socialist real- ism." The Polish film industry, renowned for its imaginative and realistic portrayal of contem- porary life,. has not escaped the heavy hand of censorship. Motion picture producers have been called on the carpet by party functionaries and told that while Polish movies might have won prizes abroad, they did so only because the Western judg- es considered them anti-Commu- nist. Producers were warned that henceforth Polish movies, like Polish literature, would be judged according to whether they aid the party in achieving na- tional goals. Several films al- most completed have been halted in production, others have been heavily censored and revised, and a number of scripts have been re- jected. Jazz and avant-garde music are still being played by orches- tras both in Poland andon tour abroad without interference from the regime. Nevertheless, such music is under a cloud in Poland, and there is considerable specu- lation that the regime might de- cide not to hold the annual au- tumn festival of contemporary music. While there is no firm evidence that the regime is making foreign travel more dif- ficult for Polish intellectuals and artists, few of them are seeking permission to travel. There have been some delays in obtaining passports, and many who have received grants for study and travel abroad and and others, including Antoni Slonimski, who have been ap- proached by American impre- sarios about tours to the United States, consider it wise not to push their applications for pass- ports at this time. Prior to this year, Polish television newscasts were for the most part factual and well balanced, with comparatively unbiased coverage of events in the West through the extensive use of film clips. Since the first of the year, however, SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 16 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLT SUMMARY 25 February 1960 television newscasts have under- gone a change indicating tighter political control of the news and a greater conformity with bloc policies. Not only has there been a significant increase in news and film coverage from bloc countries--especially from the Soviet Union--but there has been a definite trend toward inter- preting the news according to the Communist line through care- ful selection of news items and some slanted editorial commen- taries. Although the United States has not been criticized directly, no opportunity is lost to asso- ciate it with NATO, Chancellor Adenauer, and West Germany-- the thief targets of Poland's Propaganda. The recent newscasts portray the USSR as the leader of the Communist bloc, the pro- tector of Poland's interests, and-.the leader of the forces seeking peace. Soviet Pressures There is considerable de- bate among Polish intellectuals concerning the role played by the Soviet Union in the cultural tightening. Some believe that Soviet criticism of Polish art, music, literature, and films has been largely responsible for the party's sterner action. Others cite the trend toward liberalization in these fields inside the USSR as indicating there is no reason for official pressure from the Kremlin. Nevertheless, Soviet criticism of Polish cultural life has been rather sharp in recent months. Critics in the USSR have reproached the Polish movie makers for "unduly thick- ening the dark colors" and for failing to maintain the proper proportion when dealing with the struggle between the old and the new in Polish life. The Russians have long been crit- ical of Polish art, which has a freshness and vigor found no- where else in the bloc, and have strongly implied that it is having a bad influence on art in other "socialist" coun- tries. The curbs imposed on Po- land's cultural and intellectual life so far have been somewhat arbitrary and inconsistent and often have consisted more of threats of dire things to come than specific restrictive meas- ures. While there is little evidence that the regime will be successful in forcing the intelligentsia to cooperate actively in "building socialism," it seems clear that Poland's literature, art, and culture for some time to come will no longer exhibit the freedom, vitality, and imagination that has charac- terized it ' since the c ber 1956 revolt. F_ 7 SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1.7 of 17 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7 CONFIDENTIAL ccnnc?T CONFIDENTIAC Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02600070001-7