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March 10, 1960
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Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 CONFI -SECRET COPY NO. 56 OCI NO. 1011/60 10 March 1960 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE !MAC r0CLIMENT NO 9 CHANGE IN CLASS. El State Department review DECLASSIFIED completed CLASS. CHANGED TO NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: FIR 70-2 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0Ufte0919/101146 REVIEWER: 25X1 25)(1 25X1 /990 Approved For elease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092ZA002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 THE WEEK IN BRIEF EAST-WEST RELATIONS PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Moscow has combined expressions of optimism over the summit conference with intensified efforts to increase pressure for Western concessions on Germany and Berlin. Khrushchev said in a speech on 5 March that he will enter the forthcoming negotiations in "full readiness" to find solutions to disputed issues. At the same time, Soviet bloc spokesmen are privately fostering confusion and un- certainty regarding the timing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany if no agreement is reached. Moscow continued its efforts to isolate and discredit Bonn by sending notes on 4 March to West Germany and the three Western powers protesting recent Spanish - West German 25X1 military talks. 25X1 THE DE GAULLE - KHRUSHCHEV TALKS Both De Gaulle and Kbrushchev probably look on their talks beginning 15 March primarily as an opportunity to size each other up and impress the other with his firm adherence to established positions. Both have policy com- mitments which sharply reduce the likelihood of any French- Soviet "deal." De Gaulle, who sees the meeting as an occa- sion to assert France's authority as a European leader, can be expected to maintain his "hard line" on Berlin and Germany, while at the same time probing for opportunities to lessen East-West tensions. Kbrushchev, who has been making a persistent effort to create a favorable atmosphere for his visit, will probably avoid serious bargaining on specific issues, but try to impress De Gaulle with Soviet determination to reach a settlement on Berlin and Germany. MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS The military postures of the UAR and Israel have been further relaxed, but their intensive propaganda war con- tinues, with UAR media making bitter charges of Western complicity with Israel. The UAR and Jordan are engaged in a public quarrel over creation of a Palestine "state" and army; Nasir has called the Jordanian Government a puppet of the "imperialist powers." In Iraq, increased criticism of the Qasim regime by Communist newspapers may lead to further government action to undercut the orthodox faction 25X1 of the party. SECRET Approved For Release 2V13?/01F2F Clik-IRW00927A002600090001-6 Page 1 Page 3 Page 5 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092-7A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 PART I (continued) CARIBBEAN TENSIONS Page 7 Anti-American feeling over the explosion in Havana harbor is being whipped up by Castro and the Cuban press and radio to such a level that even a minor incident now could cause an outbreak of violence against US personnel and property. The US Embassy sees no hope of e tahliqhincr satisfactory relations with a Castro government. In the Dominican Republic, the beleaguered Trujillo regime faces a further deterioration in its relations with the Roman Catholic hierarchy. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS DE GAULLE'S ALGERIAN POLICY Page 1 The amplification of De Gaulle's views on Algeria, made during and after his 3-5 March visit to the area, suggests he has become pessimistic over prospects for an early cease-fire. While he has not significantly altered the self-determination policy, some of his forthright statements have irritated extremists on both sides in France and disturbed many moderates. Among the Algerian rebels, his statements will tend to strengthen the posi- tion of those leaders, particularly among field commanders, who have long questioned his good faith. 25X1 25X1 THE IMPACT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S TRIP TO ASIA Page 1 Khrushchev's trip to India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan, despite the bloc's enthusiastic evaluations, apparently fell short of Soviet expectations, and Khru- shchev's behavior on the journey may have reflected his disappointment with the unenthusiastic public response. Although his aggressive, tactless conduct irritated many neutralist leaders during the trip, Kbrushchev left behind some agreements for new credits and promises of further economic aid. The joint communiqu?signed at each stop supported some of Moscow's propaganda and policy positions and provide some justification for Soviet claims of suc- 25X1 cess. SECRET 11 THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 Approved Fgr, Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927,A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 PART II (continued) EAST GERMAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS Page 3 East Germany has announced that the Guinean ambassa- dor to Moscow on 5 March presented his credentials to President Pieck, an act which would constitute the first legal recognition East Germany has received from a non- Communist country. If Guinea confirms this action, its lead may be followed by other countries unless West Germany deters them. Such recognition would be used by Moscow to support its claim that there are two sovereign German 25X1 states. SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS CONTINUE TO WORSEN The Soviet Union, unsuccessful in its year-old diplo- matic and propaganda pressure campaign to make Iran modify its pro-Western policies, is taking measures to expand its subversive potential inside Iran, and has recently launched increasingly vicious propaganda attacks on the Shah's re- gime. Iranian officials are concerned over these develop- 25X1 ments Officially, rela- tions are at a stanastiii, witn moscow continuing to demand that Iran give a guarantee against foreign military bases of all types, while the Shah refuses to go beyond his offer of a ban on foreign missile bases. 25X1 GOMULKA ADAMANT ON LABOR SPEED-UP Page 5 Party First Secretary Gomulka's speech of 2 March, in a climate of rising discontent among Polish industrial workers, reaffirmed his regime's "tightening up" policy. His explanation of the need for a reform of labor practices probably failed in its purpose of calming the workers, whose hopes for a rising standard of living have been shaken by increasing food prices, layoffs of surplus work- ers, and the prospect of harder work and less pay. Page 6 NEW SOVIET UNIVERSITY FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS The Soviet press is propagandizing Khrushchev's pro- posal for a "Soviet University of People's Friendship" as an example of support for the people of underdeveloped countries. The scheme will provide a focus for propaganda exploitation of the USSR's scholarship program for foreign students and serve to isolate them from the realities of Soviet life, thereby avoiding the unfavorable impression many foreigners now receive at a number of schools through- 25X1 out the USSR. SECRET iii Approved For Release Ti165/OWS: Vik-RIPM-00927A002600090001-6 Page 7 25X1 25X1 Approved Fol. Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092ZA002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 PART II (continued) COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS Page 9 Prospects are generally favorable for a material reduction of the 12- to 15-year transitional period of the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market). EEC officials consider economic conditions propitious for expediting tariff cuts, and they have had considerable support from businessmen and from the French Government, which for political reasons is anxious to consolidate the community. Strongest opposition has come from the low- tariff countries--especially the Netherlands?which are reluctant to accentuate the differences between the EEC and the Outer Seven. 25X1 UAR SEEKS EXPANDED INFLUENCE IN HORN OF AFRICA Page 10 The reported UAR offer of a large annual subsidy to Somalia, if confirmed, could lead to a long period of un- rest and even violence in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's Christian rulers, uncertain of the loyalty of the large Moslem minority, can be expected to react vigorously to any move by the UAR to expand its influence in the Somali- 25X1 lands, which Ethiopia regards as its own preserve. 25X1 POLITICAL UNREST IN UGANDA Page 11 London's endorsement of a moderate increase in African representation in the legislature of its East African pro- tectorate of Uganda has failed to satisfy African nationa- lists and has stimulated apprehension among tribal leaders, who fear any centralization of government which might less- en their own prestige. Some modifications in the announced British program appear likely. GUINEA Guinea's increasing ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc probably reflect President Sekou Tourd's belief that a ?noncommitted" nation can safely have economic and diplo- matic relations with any friendly state. Continuing mis- trust of Paris and inability to reach agreement on techni- cal assistance led to the announcement on 1 March that Guinea would leave the French monetary zone and create both its own currency and national bank. Simultaneously, Guinea signed a technical cooperation agreement with the USSR outlining a three-year aid program within the frame- work of the $35,000,000 credit agreement of last summer. SECRET iv Approved For Release Fli%/C153V1*.Ja-10131W-00927A002600090001-6 Page 12 25X1 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 PART II (continued) AFGHAN-PAKISTANI RELATIONS WORSEN Kabul has recently put Pakistan's diplomatic personnel under surveillance and arrested some of the embassy's local employees, Rawalpindi is countering with harassment of Afghan personnel and with a proposal that Afghan tribesmen be allowed to vote on whether they wish to join Pakistan. If these tactics continue', both countries may withdraw their ambassadors. INDONESIA The Indonesian Parliament adjourned quietly on 7 March following its abrupt "dismissal" by President Sukarno two days earlier. Sukarno has called a 16 March conference to consider plans for a new body which will include the approximately 260 members of the recent parlia- ment and 294 regional and functional representatives, appointed by Sukarno. Sukarno leaves in early April on his annual world tour, which this year will include visits to Iraq and the UAR, Eastern Europe, Africa, Cuba, and unofficial stops in Puerto Rico and San Francisco. 1 Page 13 Page 14 THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION The South Korean Liberal party is using intensified political repression to assure a landslide victory for President Rhee and his running mate Yi Ki-pung on 15 March. Following the election, the government may relax political pressures as a sop to foreign criticism. The Liberals' plans, however, may envisage the destruction of the opposi- tion Democratic party, a move which in the long run would probably force growing antiadministration sentiment into subversive channels. Page 15 JAPANESE-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT Japan and the USSR have concluded a three-year trade agreement calling for an exchange of $210,000,000 worth of commodities each way with the understanding that the USSR can defer payment for some purchases in Japan. The 1960 total trade turnover under the new agreement would double the 1959 figure of approximately $62,400,000 and would constitute about 2 percent of Japan's total trade volume. The large and rapid expansion of Soviet crude- oil marketing in Japan is causing serious concern among American suppliers. SECRET THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 Page 17 Approved For_Release 2005/03/23 : CIA-RDP79-0092ZA002600090001-6 SE,CRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES BU . LGARIA'S "LEAP FORWARD" . Page 1 The extensive Bulgarian administrative reorganization and economic drive, designed to "build socialism" as rap- idly as possible, has resulted in increased production, but at the expense of some dislocations, confusion in the party, and increasing apathy among the people. Failure to reach last year's ambitious economic goals has prompted the formulation of more realistic plans and has stimulated further administrative and personnel changes. There is no indication that the Bulgarian program, drawing from both Soviet and Chinese models, will be scrapped or that 25X1 party leader Zhivkov's position is threatened. 25X1 AFGHANISTAN'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION Page 4 Afghan Prime Minister Daud is pressing ahead with the modernization of the army, increasing its size and improv- ing its training and equipment. Determined to develop Afghanistan's economy and introduce social reforms, Daud apparently expects to rely heavily on the army for support against any tribal opposition or conservative religious resistance to his programs. As the army becomes aware of its increasing importance as a means of controlling the country, it could become a threat to the rule of the royal family; at present, Daud is believed to have firm control over the army. SECOND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA . . Page 8 The Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which opens in Geneva on 17 March, will seek international agree- ment on two questions that have occasioned much recent friction among various countries, particularly between Britain and Iceland: the extent of a country's territorial sea and the jurisdiction of coastal states over nearby fishing. The principal objective of Western, and particu- larly NATO, countries is to reach agreement on a narrow territorial sea of not more than six miles. SECRET v Approved For RegiageMPSOM91;416NADP79-00927A002600090001-6 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092-74002600090001-6 SEC,RET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST EAST-WEST RELATIONS Moscow has combined ex- pressions of optimism over the summit conference with efforts to increase pressure for West- ern concessions. Khrushchev, in a speech on 5 March after returning from his Asian trip, said he intends to enter the forthcoming talks in "full readiness to seek out, together with other states, ways to a solution of disputed issues." On 7 March, a Pravda editorial echoed this sentiment by claim- ing that the meeting would be held in a "very favorable at- mosphere" as a result of Khru- shchev's "successful" Asian tour. Soviet bloc officials are attempting privately to create a strong impression that some decisive action may be taken on a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the summit meeting does not produce an agreement. These officials have given Western sources con- flicting versions on the timing of such action in order to ob- scure Soviet intentions and in- crease pressure for Western concessions. The counselor of the So- viet Embassy in Paris assured an American official that the USSR had no intention of sign- ing a separate treaty prior to President Eisenhower's visit in June. His statement implied, however, that the West might ex- pect some action after the visit. A Soviet official in- /if the summit talks failed, the USSR would proceed with a separate treaty and denied that such a course would be postponed until after June.1 \Soviet officials have sought to inten- sify pressure for concessions and stimulate fear of a private understanding between the USSR and the United States. The So- viet ambassador to Bonn warned Free Democratic party leaders that Germany would "disappear entirely" if Bonn persisted in its present hostility to the USSR and obstructionist policy on Berlin. He said the West Germans did not realize that the USSR and the United States had reached a "large measure of agreement through diplomatic channels," and that Bonn would be "well advised" to take this new situation into account. Moscow is stepping up its efforts to portray the Bonn gov- ernment as an increasingly dan- gerous obstacle to an East-West agreement. The Soviet official bS Government fails to realize Ade- nauer is moving to sabotage an East-West agreement by exaggerat- ing such issues as the high-al- titude flights to Berlin and the new documents for Allied Military Liaison missions--docu- ments bearing the name "German Democratic Republic." Moscow climaxed a two-week propaganda campaign against the SECRET PART I Approved For ReIda 211M/t13/126%/PIR:Ria927A0026000903/43/6*-% 1 of 8 Approved For_Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAR1 10 March 1960 West German - Spanish military talks with notes on 4 March to the three Western powers and Bonn protesting the talks as a violation of Allied agreements on Germany. The notes implied that an understanding between the USSR and the three Western powers could be reached, pro- vided Bonn does not disrupt the "certain relaxation of ten- sion" which Moscow claims has taken place. Timing the aotes to secure maximum impact before Khrushchev's visit to France and Adenauer's trip to the United States, Moscow apparently hopes to focus increased atten- tion on the need for a German settlement. The notes will al- so provide a background for Khrushchev to renew appeals for restrictions on German military power during his visit to France. Western Position A high official in the West German Foreign Ministry has privately affirmed that Bonn favors a return to the basic Western plan of 14 May 1959 in order to discourage a disposition in "certain quar- ters" to offer additional com- promises on Berlin. The offi- cial considers the present oc- cupation rights the safest basis for continued Allied presence in the city and fears that an "interim agreement" for Berlin would ultimately undermine the confidence of the city. The official believes that Khrushchev is unwilling to take any steps involving the risk of war and will therefore move cautiously on the question of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. In his opinion, however, the Western powers face a major test in how they react to the Soviet pressures PART I aimed at creating an atmosphere of crisis in order to intimidate and disunite them. Speaking at a party rally in Berlin on 5 March, Social Democratic party (SPD) chairman 011enhauer, replying to recent Soviet propaganda tactics, stated it was time for Moscow to "stop hoping" that the SPD ever would become a promoter of Soviet pol- icies. He added that there was no purpose in considering pro- posals for negotiations emanat- ing from the East German "nominees of Moscow." He did, however, endorse military withdrawal from both parts of Germany as a prop- er approach to the question of German reunification. Nuclear Test Talks The Soviet delegation has moved to increase pressure for agreement in principle to a fixed quota for inspecting pos- sible nuclear explosions. It warned on 2 March that the USSR would revert to its insistence on a veto over inspections if the United States continued its opposition to the quota concept. In response to qualified Western acceptance of the tem- porary standards for identifying and inspecting suspected ex- plosions, as set forth in the Soviet proposal of 16 February, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin re- jected negotiating separate ele- ments in the Soviet plan, in- sisting that it must be regarded as a "unified whole." He stated that the West must accept the other major points of the Soviet plan--a comprehensive treaty banning all tests and the inspec- tions-quota concept. In raising the possibility of returning to a demand for a SECRET OF IMMEDUTE INTEREBT Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00260009FCM C 2 of 8 Approved For,Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 veto and emphasizing that the "real issue" r?ained acceptance of the quota Moscow apparent- ly hopes tz gain Western ac- ceptance,* the quota prin- ciple wythout indicating a spec4tc level of inspections. THE DE GAULLE-- Both De Gaulle and Khru- shchev probably look on their talks beginning 15 March pri- marily as an opportunity to size each other up and impress the other with his firm adher- ence to established positions. Both have policy commitments which sharply reduce the like- lihood of any French-Soviet "deal." De Gaulle will use the visit to further recogni- tion of France as a major power and as the spokesman for West- ern Europe. He can be expected to maintain his "hard line" on Berlin and Germany, while at the same time probing for op- portunities to lessen East-West tensions. Khrushchev, who has been making a persistent effort to create a favorable atmosphere for his visit, will probably avoid serious bargaining on specific issues but try to impress De Gaulle with Soviet determination to reach a settle- ment on Berlin and Germany. Although Moscow's concil- iatory attitude toward French policy in Algeria is frequent- ly tied to De Gaulle's implied recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary in speculation on the possibility of a French-Soviet "deal," it is unlikely that either leader is willing or able to make any significant con- cessions. PART I The USSR claims inspections must be based on a "rational polit- ical compromise," unrelated to the number of estimated seismic events occurring q.nnually. (Concurred in 25X1 by OSI) KHRUSHCHEV TALKS De Gaulle sees no present advantage for France in changing the status quo in Central Europe, and his opposition to disarma- ment proposals which would re- strict France's development as a nuclear power will probably lead him to emphasize the prob- lem of lessening East-West ten- sions, a topic he feels is more "negotiable." De Gaulle is un- likely to agree to anything which would weaken France's close ties with Bonn, ties on which he bases his hope for A strong West European bloc led by France. Khrushchev appears deter- mined to maintain pressure for a German settlement based on a peace treaty with both Ger- man states. He will probably use De Gaulle's remarks on the Oder-Neisse to press for a re- affirmation of this in a joint communiqu?In dealing with Berlin, Khrushchev will attempt to combine a strong stand on the need for revising the city's status with a flexible approach as to the procedure for achiev- ing this. He may, as the Soviet ambassador did on 21 October, assure De Gaulle privately that if the heads of government agreed in principle on Berlin, the question could then be re- ferred to the foreign ministers. Khrushchev probably wi'l also seek confirmation of Foreign SECRET OF IMMEDIATE I aze 3 of 8 ST Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : Clgrak-00927A002600090gur-b Approved Fox-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927-A002600090001-6 SECRET _ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 Minister Couve de Murville's statement last May at Geneva that the government of West Berlin "has no direct link" with that of West Germany, nor is the city part of its ter- ritory. De Gaulle will prob- ably seek to avoid reiteration of Couve de Murville's state- ment and continue to press the established tactical position that Berlin cannot be consid- ered apart from a general Ger- man settlement. While Khrushchev reported- ly hopes to avoid a discussion of Algeria, if De Gaulle agrees to reaffirm his remarks on the Oder-Neisse line the Soviet leader may agree to renew his endorsement of De Gaulle's Al- gerian program and his acknowl- edgment of the historic ties between France and North Africa. The final communiqu?ay thus give the impression of a "deal." De Gaulle is keenly in- terested in encouraging Moscow to cooperate with the West in line with his belief that social changes in the USSR and pres- sures from Communist China will eventually lead to the Soviet Union's "return" to the West. On his recent tour of soutl., rn France, he said a "productive detente" is necessary between East and West leading to "peace within an equilibrium." "We are not there yet," the French President said, but "we have started out on the road to it." De Gaulle is certain to raise his proposals for a joint East- West economic aid program for less developed countries and for agreement on noninterven- tion in the affairs of other countries. Khrushchev's prospective visit to Africa probably height- ens De Gaulle's concern over Communist infiltration in an area he views so vital to France's aspirations as a world power. De Gaulle may hope to get some Soviet acknowledgment of France's pre-eminent position in North and Central Afric.54,--Pikriait, has been perturbed by Peipiitg.tA in- terest in Africa, and De Gaulle may believe he can exploit wt he considers serious differenees growing between Peiping and Mos= co-1 to get a Soviet statement which might curb Peiping. De Gaulle's concern with Africa and the Peiping "threat to white men," including the Russians, may make him suscep- tible to the argument that French recognition and will- ingness to accept Peiping in the United Nations would serve as a form of control. Peiping's recognition of the Algerian rebel government will probably con- tinue, however, to be a decisive obstacle to such a policy in Paris. De Gaulle and Foreign Min- ister Couve de Murville have publicly implied that in the long run France hopes to exert a moderating influence in the Western alliance and that it ex- pects to be able to do so in- creasingly as it acquires a nu- clear weapons capability. De Gaulle's determination to achieve a national nuclear weapons capa- bility has also been suggested as providing an "opening" for Moscow. Former Finance Minis- ter Antoine Pinay said prior to the first French nuclear test that he did not "completely" rule out acceptance by De Gaulle of Soviet aid for France's nu- clear program, although he felt the French President would prefer to have France become a nuclear power by its own efforts. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 8 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 Approved Fo,r_Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092ZA002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 Such Soviet assistance would seriously complicate the USSR's position, both in Africa and Asia as well as with its bloc allies, from whom it is believed thus far to have with- held such weapons. Moscow may, however, be willing to acknowl- edge France's nuclear power -Status by concluding an agree- ment for exchanges of informa- tion on the peaceful applica- tion of atomic energy, and may hold out the possibility of joint projects in this field. The USSR wants to include top- level scientists in Khrushchev's delegation, and plans are being made to step up scientific ex- changes under the French-So- viet cultural agreement. MIDDLE EAST UAR -Israel The possibility of hostil- ities between the UAR and Israel appears to have receded further during the past week, with some major UAR military units re- ported leaving the Sinai Penin- sula. Units of the Syrian Army reportedly have also been with- drawn from the Syrian-Israeli border. An early termination of the UAR military alert seems probable. The Israeli armed forces appear equally relaxed. The intensive propaganda war has not abated, however, and the UAR's press and radio, taking the lead from Nasir's 25X1 The French Communist par- ty (PCF) continues to whip up public enthusiasm for the Khru- shchev visit, but former Premier Edgar Faure--unlike Socialist leader Guy Mollet and French rightists--doubts the visit will significantly redound to the strength of the PCF. Faure believes that curiosity will lead French people to turn out in large numbers to seek Khru- shchev, but their political opinions will remain unaf- fected. He believes the per- sonality of Khrushchev will amuse the average French- man and perhaps attract a certain amount of sympathy, but it will not command respect or admiration. HIGHLIGHTS speeches in Syria, continue to charge the West with complicity with Israel and bitterly attack Israeli Prime Minister Ben- Gurion's visit to the United States. 25X1 Nasir has repeatedly de- nounced the recent Western re- affirmation of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration guaranteeing Israeli and Arab borders. The UAR Pres- ident's most vicious assaults, however, were directed against the Ben-Gurion visit, during which the Israeli prime minis- ter received an honorcl.y law degree from Brandeis University. Speaking in Damascus on 4 March, Nasir stated: "Let them give SECRET PART I Approved For ReleaselOMMITAJARMW27A00260009000E-age 5 of 8 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 the war criminal an honorary degree in laws; this shows us the true value of laws and hu- man rights in America." The Israeli press has openly presented the visit as one of great political importance, probably adding to UAR and gen- eral Arab concern over American intentions in the area. Jordan -UAR Nasir is also joined in a propaganda battle with King Husayn and the Jordanian regime over the Palestine issue. This verbal duel developed in its most recent form following the February meetings in Cairo of the Arab League Council. The league was unable to agree on a UAR proposal for the creation of a Palestine "entity" and army because of Jordanian op- position. Nasir's plan is similar to one by Qasim. Husayn objects to such proposals be- cause they tend to undermine his control over the West Bank area of Jordan, formerly part of Palestine, and promote separatist feelings among the Palestinian two thirds of Jor- dan's population. Husayn struck back in a radio speech on 1 March in which he denounced those "in some Arab quarters" who have at- tempted to exploit the Palestine issue at Jordan's expense, Nasir took the speech as a personal attack and ordered UAR prop- aganda organs to retaliate. He himself asserted in Damascus on 7 March, "The Amman rulers have yielded themselves to American and British imperial- ism to work against the Arab nation." PART I Middle East Drought Severe drought for the third year in succession within the "Fertile Crescent" is threatening the loss of Jordna's entire grain crop and has brought similar, but less crit- ical, crop conditions to Israel. Cumulative rainfall in Jordan is the lowest on record and, with many springs drying up and cisterns and reservoirs far be- low normal, a severe shortage of potable water is imminent. Jordanian Prime Minister Majali on 2 March issued a defense order requisitioning all water re- sources in the Amman area. Water in Amman now is being shut off in the daytime, a practice not made necessary until August of last year. Jordanian officials and the public are becoming panicky. It has been estimated that if no rain falls, perhaps one third of Jordan's 1,500,000 people will be desperately short of water by midsummer. Drought conditions are also prevailing in southern Syria, and over most of Lebanon rain- fall has been less than half of normal. Rainfall in northern Syria is below minimal needs, and in southern Iraq it has been sparse, with water avail- able for irrigation very low. Complicating the drought in the Levant area is the annual locust threat. Although it is too early in the season to esti- mate potential locust damage, large swarms have been observed in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon. Swarms are reported to have flown from Jordan to southern Syria and Israel. SECRET Approved For Releagg 2ININDIATZI41PUM927A0026000900113-ge 6 of 8 Approved For_Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927-A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ,10 March 1960 The locust threat extends as far as Libya; in the province of Fezzan, most crops have al- ready been destroyed. Lesser damage occurred in the coastal regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The Desert Locust Information Center in London states that infestation may spread to Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, and possibly Syria and Turkey. Jordan is likely to ask for emergency aid soon, and re- quests from Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Libya may be forth- coming. Israeli Minister of Agriculture Dayan, who is pres- ently in the United States for an Israeli bond drive, intends to discuss possible drought relief with Secretary of Agri- culture Benson. Iraq The Iraqi political scene during the past week has been characterized by continued and increasingly critical attacks on the government by the Com- munist press. Charges have been leveled that the Qasim regime is ridden with corruption and working against the objectives of the revolution, and that "activities directed against the people...who supported the revolution" are being guided by authorities high in the govern- ment. The Ministry of Interior is accused of keeping "faithful citizens languishing in dun- geons" and, in refusing to li- cense the orthodox Communists, Cuba of violating the law on polit- ical parties. Apparently fearing that the Qasim regime may attempt to lay the blame for poor crops on the Communist-dominated agrarian reform organizations, the party press has begun a cam- paign against "highly placed officials" in charge of the reform. In addition, the Communist press, declaring thaJ, 'combating Communism deo- sti.;:ys the economy," asserts that anti-Communist national- ists are responsible for de- teriorating economic condi- tions. The anniversary of the sup- pression of last year's Mosul revolt has been seized on by the Communists to reiterate de- mands that the Communist-domi- nated Popular Resistance Forces, now dissolved, be reactivated in order to help Qasim "crush more such plots." The orthodox Communists accompanied this press campaign with a direct appeal to Qasim on 8 March to overrule the min- ister of interior and license their party. These aggressive activities may lead to a fur- ther crackdown on them. UAR subversive activities against the Qasim regime are continuing, although there is no indication of an imminent move to unseat Qasim. CARIBBEAN TENSIONS Anti-American feeling is being whipped up to such a frenzy by Castro and the Cuban press and radio that even a minor incident now could cause an outbreak of violence against US personnel and property. The US Embassy sees no hope that the United States will be able to estab- lish a satisfactory relation- ship with a Cuban government dominated by Castro or his close associates. SECRET 25X1 PART I Approved For ReleaftF2COMMUCIAINWORTZD27A0026000900Cliage 7 of 8 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 Even Cubans who previous- ly were cool to Castro's anti- American diatribes seem in- creasingly resentful of the United States. Castro's charge of US complicity in the de- struction on 4 March of the French vessel delivering mili- tary equipment ?to his govern- ment follows months of offi- cially inspired attacks on the United States for the continu- ing airplane raids on Cuban sugar fields. Illustrative of the vit- riol, Radio Mambi, the most vicious of the government-con- trolled stations, commenting on President Eisenhower's trip to South America, claimed its purpose was to form a politi- cal cordon in Latin America to isolate Cuba and called the President "slavery's spokesman, the champion of the threatening atom bomb...who had the effron- 25X1 tery to talk of democracy to exploited peoples...." 25X1 PART I The Dominican Republic In the Dominican Republic, the beleaguered Trujillo regime faces a further deterioration in its relations with the Roman Catholic Church. The local church hierarchy reacted on 7 March to continuing political arrests by issuing the second pastoral letter within five weeks exhorting Trujillo to release prisoners. The second letter called attention to a recent message from Pope John extending moral support to the Dominican bishops for censuring the dictator's violation of human rights. The church has also ex- communicated high officials, including the governor, in the province of La Vega for attempt- ing to interfere with the read- ing of the first letter. The opposition, heartened by the strong church stand, will be further encouraged as news of the incident, unpublished in the country, is passed by word of mouth. There is already a noticeable spread of unrest from upper and professional classes to those of lower so- cial strata. The armed forces still appear to be loyal to Trujillo SECRET Approved For Re!eat 2k1610V2V.IARTFIFARI- 927A002600090010V 8 of 8 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009274002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAW! 10 March 1960 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS DE GAULLE'S ALGERIAN POLICY The amplification of De Gaulle's views on Algeria,made during and after his 3-5 March visit to the area, suggests he has become pessimistic over prospects for an early cease- fire, although he has not sig- nificantly altered his earlier self-determination policy. De Gaulle's remarks to army units in Algeria and the Ministry of Information state- ment on 7 March add up to the view that the French President envisages an autonomous Al- geria with close ties to France as the only sensible solution. He believes Algerians will choose this alternative, but says they can expect to exer- cise their choice only after a long period of pacification. His flat rejection of the rightist concept of a "French Algeria" and his warning that Algerian independence would lead to chaos and partition will irritate extremists on both sides. Many moderates, such as Socialist party leader Mollet, are disturbed by his emphasis on military pacifica- tion. De Gaulle reiterated his offer to negotiate a cease- fire with National Liberation Front (FLN) representatives, but his unwillingness to per- mit rebel forces to retain their arms may have prompted the reported departure of the FLN emissary said to have been in Paris last week. Recent French statements will tend to discredit moderate rebel elements who viewed De Gaulle's self-determination proposals as a possible basis for a settlement, and to strengthen those rebel intran- sigents who have long questioned his good faith. The rebels will probably seek new means to "in- ternationalize" the war and to dramatize their ability to con- tinue the fight. They are likely to use increased terror- ism to remind Algerian Moslems of the danger inherent in any cooperation with De Gaulle. The rebels retain a capability for assassination which may prove an effective deterrent to the emergence of any "third force" in Algeria. De Gaulle's remarks to the army stressed that French offi- cers must realize they have global missions beyond Algeria. By combining apparent conces- sions on the conduct of the Al- gerian war with a promise of re- furbished prestige for the French Army in the future, he evident- ly hopes to align the army solid- 25X1 ly behind his attempts to increase French influence in international affairs. THE IMPACT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S TRIP TO ASIA Khrushchev, in an hour- long speech in Moscow on 5 March covering his trip to India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan,emphasized the "warmth" with which he was re- ceived and the "fruitful dis- cussions" that were held. Never- theless, he seemed to have had some reservations, and mentioned SECRET 1 of 17 PART I lApproved For ReleasKOWOMP: 601446Nno0927A002600090001We Approved ForRelease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092M002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 the rigors and "not infrequent- ly heated disputes" of the journey. While Moscow radio burbled that the trip bad put Khrushchev Lt a position to speak for Asian well as Communist nations at the summit, the trip was not in 7 fact an overwhelming success for the Soviet Union. The over- all public response obviously did not measure up to expecta- tions. Khrushchev received his largest welcome in Kabul, where his public reception in the center of the city was about equal to that accorded Presi- dent Eisenhower. In the out- lying areas, however, the pub- lic was distinctly apathetic, and the attendance and reac- tion at Ghazi Stadium appeared forced and without spontaneity or enthusiasm. In the other countries, the response ranged from cool to moderate, even in Communist strongholds such as Surabaya, Indonesia. Khrushchev was de- scribed on much of the trip as glum, dispirited, and irri- table--apparently reflecting his dissapointment with the reception. Throughout the trip, Khrushchev took a forceful line in both his public and private talks and apparently irritated his hosts by his thoughtlessness, by boasts of Soviet achievements, by blunt sermons on the virtues of Com- munism, and by criticisms of local practices. In India, President Prasad and other leaders were put out by Khru- shchev's preaching to the In- dian Parliament the value of a one-party system and by im- promptu lectures on the superi- ority of Soviet farmingmethods. The biggest clash came in Indonesia, Foreign Minister Subandrio told the American ambassador there was almost constant bickering between President Sukarno and Khru- shchev. He quoted Sukarno as saying, "I didn't invite this man here to be insulted by him." At one point, Sukarno told Subandrio, "You take over, I can't stand another minute of this." When Sukarno ex- pressed no interest in detailed economic figures, Khrushchev told him, "You are no social- ist. Socialism consists of figures, figures, figures." "You are a robot," Sukarno re- torted. In reply to Khrushchev's charge that Indonesia's pur- chase of Lockheed Electras in- stead of Russian Ilyushins did not befit a "socialist," Su- karno countered that he was buying what he considered best suited for Indonesia. Despite these clashes, Sukarno and the Indonesians found Khrushchev impressive and described him as a man of great ability. In Afghanistan, there was reported wrangling over the texts of the agreements that were signed. The signing of the cultural agreement was postponed six times, although the press and photographers were called in each time to re- cord it and Gromyko was on hand four times. The Afghans wanted the accord signed by persons on the Cultural Affairs Ministry level, but Khrushchev inSisted on signing it himself, thus forcing Prime Minister Daud to sign as well. The final joint communique itself was not signed until 10:45 on the night before Khrushchev's departure. At the departure ceremo- nies,Daud appeared distinctly unhappy and somewhat angry,and he stood aloOf from Khrushchev. Khrushchev spoke of nothing but SECRET PART II Approved For Relea s/PIM/094A :c61101Wf9 -0 09 27 A00 260 0 090 a 2 of 17 i 3 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009214002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 the weather, and his parting words to the King were, "Don't be worried; all these diffi- culties will be straightened out. Resentment toward Khru- shchev's conduct, however, did not prevent acceptance of large grants of aid or the signature in each country of joint state- ments supporting Soviet propa- ganda and policy positions. In India, Khrushchev signed the previously worked-out aid agree- ment for $375,000,000 and arranged for Soviet assistance in Indian atomic energy develop- ment, but the only firm new offer of aid was made to Indo- nesia. According to Subandrio, Khrushchev was prepared to give the Indonesians as much as $500,000,000, but Sukarno re- quested only $250,000,000. Agreement on this figure was reached after less than five minutes of discussion. In Afghanistan, Khrushchev promised continued economic aid, and a Soviet gift of 50,000 tons of wheat was announced the day of his departure. The most significant development was the wholehearted endorsement-- both in the communiqu?nd in Khrushchev's speech on his re- turn to Moscow--of the Afghan position on the Pushtoonistan issue. The recent aggressive ac- tivities of the Chinese Commu- nists loomed large in the back- ground of the trip. Subandrio EAST GERMAN noted that while in Indonesia Khrushchev displayed a real fear that, as a result of Chi- nese actions, Indonesia would reject its policy of nonalign- ment. He returned time and again to this theme, attempt- ing to dissuade Indonesian leaders from what in his mind was a decision on their part to swing to the West. Although Khrushchev's fail- ure to discuss the Sino-Indian border dispute publicly while in India caused some dissatis- faction among Indian press and parliamentary leaders, the gov- ernment could not have expected him to support India against his ally. Khrushchev's talks with Nehru apparently were more harmonious than those with other leaders, and he returned to Calcutta en route from Indo- nesia to Afghanistan to hold further talks with him. Peiping, still at odds with Moscow on foreign policy tactics, at first appeared to find no solace in Khrushchev's visit to countries with which it is engaged in disputes. Through- out the trip,Chinese propaganda media were virtually silent. Since its conclusion, however, three editorials have appeared stressing that the trip improved relations between the bloc and these countries, and that it created a favorable atmosphere. The Chinese leaders may hope to be able to exploit this atmos- phere in talks Chou En-lai will hold in India. DIPLOMATIC RELATTONS East Germany has announced that the Guinean ambassador to Moscow on 5 March presented his credentials to President Pieck, an act which would con- stitute the first legal recog- nition East Germany has re- ceived from a non-Communist country. If Guinea confirms this action, its lead may be followed by other countries in Africa, Asia, and even Western Europe, unless West Germany is able to deter them. Further SECRET PART II Approved For ReleasiftetaOtie: eiNallif-00927A0026000900CPftge 3 of 17 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 - UNION OF SOVIET SOCiALMT RKPUML IC* 5X1 CANADA MONGOLIA _ UNITIEDSTATES MEXICO 10 MARCH 1960 CHINA rZ, 30987 ,Kryl/11lLA COLOMBIA BRA.- movcco ALGERIA PAN., A A ? 0 ScE,15 IslkoN Non-Bloc countries which recognize East Germany Non-Bloc countries in which East Germany maintains trade offices * East German Consulate General AUSTRALIA recognition would greatly en- hance East Germany's prestige on the eve of the summit meet- ing and would be used by Mos- cow to support its claim that there are two Germanys. (See item on Guinea on page 12.) Guinea's action will test West Germany's policy of re- fusing to have diplomatic rela- tions with any country other than the USSR which recognizes the East German regime. Bonn has recalled its ambassador to Conakry pending clarification of whether the Guinean envoy's call on Pieck actually con- stituted recognition. If so, Bonn must take some strong ac- tion--a diplomatic break, termi- nation of economic aid, or both --if its policy of "one legiti- mate German government" is not to be undermined. The West German cabinet on 9 March authorized Foreign Minister Von Brentano to break off diplomatic and economic ties with Guinea unless that natior promptly_ indicates that it has not extended diplomatic recognition to the East German regime. West Germany's immedi- ate break in diplomatic rela- tions after Yugoslavia recognized East Germany in 1957 restrained SECRET PART "Approved For ReleasaVANOMP: Iginigin-00927A002600090001-Page 4 of 17 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009274002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 a number of independent, neutral- ist states from following Bel- grade's example at that time. West German public opinion is divided on the issue, however, some elements fearing Bonn's isolation from Africa and the entire neutral bloc. East Ger- man media are playing up the new Guinean ambassador's refer- ences to East German "independ- ence" and Sekou Toure's "pro- found gratitude" for the re- gime's friendship. A high-level East German trade union delega- tion recently arrived in Ghana to open an industrial exhibit, and plans to proceed to Togo. Guinea's move will encour- age East Germany in its campaign for recognition.' /Asian neutralist countries have been reluctant to take steps toward recognizing the Ulbricht regime, attributing this to strong West German counteraction. Foreign Trade Minister Heinrich Rau's conduct in Ran- goon during his recent Far East- ern tour was so tactless that Burma canceled plans to par- ticipate in the Leipzig fair. Indian Prime Minister Nehru has made it clear to East Ger- man representatives that he has no intention of granting rec- ognition before the summit meeting. Nevertheless, there are strong pressures on the Asian neutralists to accord at least de facto recognition. In the Middle East, the UAR last September gave East Germany permission to raise its trade mission to the status of consulate general, but it expressly withheld diplomatic recognition. Encouraged by success in Guinea, the East Germans are likely to make new approaches to Nasir and will probably also pressure Iraq to the same end. In Cuba, the director of the East German State Bank signed a one-year trade agreement on 3 March calling for the establish- ment of commercial representa- tion in both countries. The East Germans are already boast- ing about the impending estab- lishment of the first Latin American trade mission on their territory, the Cuban mission called for by the new agreement. SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS CONTINUE TO WORSEN - The Soviet Union, unsuc- cessful in its year-old cam- paign of diplomatic and prop- aganda pressure to force Iran to modify its pro-Western policies, now is trying to develop a subversive potential SECRET PART II Approved For ReieasM106PID :WINCRI-00927A002600090044e 5 of 17 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927-A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 Mosoow has given its prop- aganda to Iran a new twist through broadcasts designed to arouse the Shah's Suspicion of his close associates in the government and of the sup- port which his regime enjoys from Iran's allies. Radio Moscow on 7 March repeated "foreign press reports" that during President Eisenhower's visit to Turkey in December, President Menderes gave him a list of influential Iranians, including military figures, who are allegedly "preparing a coup d'etat." GOMULKA ADAMANT In a climate of rising dis content among Polish industrial workers, party leader Gomulka tried in a speech on 2 March to calm the workers and make more palatable the reforms of industrial labor practices now under way. The speech probably did neither. Gomulka indicated determination to continue his program, which relies on in- creased labor productivity for almost all the planned increase The broadcast claimed Turkish officials tried to convince the President that the Shah's regime is unstable and that "other persons must in time replace the Shah." Radio Moscow also claimed that leaflets are being dis- tributed in Tehran and other Iranian cities urging Iranian citizens to "overthrow the rotten and perfidious- Pahlavi dynasty." The Soviet clandestine station "National Voice of Iran," in recent broadcasts to Iran, alleged that General Bakhtiar, chief of SAVAK, and General Nasiri, head of the Royal Guard, are engaged in competitive plotting against the Shah, and it accused Bakh- iar of seeking support from the United States. Official relations between Moscow and Tehran remain at a standstill, with the USSR con- tinuing to demand that the Ira- nian Government give a guarantee against the establishment of foreign military bases of all types on its territory, while the Shah refuses to go beyond his offer of a ban on long- and medium-range missile bases. ON LABOR SPEED-UP of 7.5 percent in industrial output for 1960. If the workers had expected that strikes and threats of strikes against cuts in take-home pay would bring about some relaxation of the new hard line, they were dis- appointed. Gomulka acknowledged the hostility of many workers to the program of work-norm revi- sion--in effect since the last SECRET PART IIApproved For Release N6TFP093/ATCOMPKg0927A002600091118M6 6 of 17 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009274002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 quarter of 1959--but he asserted that most workers were backing the regime's measures. He ad- mitted that wages were declin- ing, however, and his remarks indicated that a considerable proportion of the industrial workers had been affected. Workers, Gomulka charged, are lowering productivity in the hope that this will reduce the norms, or at least forestall an increase. He made it clear that in order to maintain even the present wage rates, workers would have to improve their qualifications. "If you know less, you earn less." He then announced that the new price List for piecework in all build- ing enterprises would be intro- duced on 15 April, reducing pay rates by 6 percent. Gomulka accused industry of bribery, fraud, waste, theft, lack of organizational sense, and ill will. He also admitted the op- position of management to the wage reforms, and accused plant administrators of hiding their own dislike by emphasizing worker opposition and of "ap- proaching norm review like a dog approaching a hedgehog." He said that management has been unable to fulfill plans without inflating the wage fund; he held out a gloomy prospect for 1960, inasmuch as the industrial plan is to per- mit no increase in the wage fund during the year. When the regime began to "tighten up" in October by up- ping meat prices and the cost of living, urban workers showed their dismay by brushes with the authorities in Bygoszcz, Chorzow, Gdansk, Olzstyn, Posnan, Szczecin, Walbrzych, and Warsaw. At first these were limited strikes or informal group pro- tests more indicative of the high state of tension than of any organized defiance. In re- action to the increasing regime pressure on the workers, however, strikes have recently been re- ported from Czestochowa, Koszalin, Lodz, and Poznan, and have prob- ably occurred in other areas as well. Such reactions indicate that the regime may have over- estimated the effectiveness of its plan to restore worker dis- cipline by discharging surplus personnel. The expectation had been that fear of dismissal would discourage any recalcitrance on the part of the remaining workers who were not laid off. The regime may in fact have stand-by plans for some easing of pressure on the workers if it feels that the reaction is getting out of hand. If so, timing could be crucial. Indications so far this year are that 1960 is to be the most difficult year for Poland and Gomulka since his return to power in 1956. (Prepared by 25X1 NEW SOVIET UNIVERSITY FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS The Soviet press has de- scribed in glowing detail the government's plan to establish a University of People's Friend- ship for foreign students. First announced by Khrushchev on 21 February, the scheme is extolled as another example of the con- cern of the Soviet people for "their brothers" in underdeveloped areas and as an example of "the systematic support by the USSR SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 12 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 25X1 Approved For_Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 for all those struggling for freedom and national independ- ence." The university apparently is to be established primarily for students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America and will accept students sent by their own governments as well as re- cipients of Soviet scholarships. About 500 are to be admitted in 1960, but the USSR, it is said, is preparing eventually to ac- cept from 3,000 to 4,000 annual- ly. The course of study will be from four to five years, but a preliminary course of one to three years will also be offered for the benefit of able but poorly prepared students. This preparatory course, unlike anything offered in the West, should have considerable appeal in areas lacking an extensive formal educational system. Soviet scholarships, moreover, are generous, covering not only all expenses for the four to five years, but also the cost of travel to and from the USSR. The university will have the advantage for propaganda of consolidating and highlight- ing the hitherto haphazard So- viet scholarship program for underdeveloped countries. So- viet educational aid offers to Asian and African countries for the most part have been unilat- eral, one-time offers at irreg- ular intervals. Some have been made under the terms of official agreements; others, such as the 25 scholarships offered in Jan- uary to African youths, have been sponsored by various Soviet "friendship" societies. Approx- imately 800 students from Asia and Africa are believed to be studying in the USSR, although not all are on Soviet scholar- ships. The regime probably is also interested in isolating foreign students from the realities of Soviet life, hoping thereby to enhance their vulnerability to indoctrination. Apparently in recognition of the difficulties encountered by foreign students in adjusting to the Soviet scene, Moscow University last September established special courses for "orientation in the Soviet cul- ture and way of life," as well as for Russian-language training for foreign students of all nationalities, including those from other bloc countries. The further separation of foreign students in a special univer- sity and the extension of these special courses to a full four= to five-year program will add to their isolation. African and Asian students have already expressed resent- ment of the security restrictions and the paucity of contacts with the public while attending Soviet universities. According to the American Embassy in Moscow, the announcement of the new university has already produced some un- favorable reactions. Students from Africa and the Near East and some Asian diplomats are reported to regard it as a form of further discrimination against them. Some Latin Americans are also said to question the Soviet decision to group them with the Asians and Africans. (Concurred in by 051) SECRET PART II Approved For Release 20RENty9m0Aeolf1j4927A00260009000116age 8 of 17 25X1 Approved For_Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927-4002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 COMMON MARKET Despite the delicate po- litical and economic issues in- volved, prospests are general- ly favorable PJr a major reduc- tiP,Ai'timetable of the Fx:opean Economic Community !EEC or Common Market). Under the schedule set forth in the 1957 Rome treaty, the customs and economic union of the six member countries is to be ac- complished in three four-year stages--which could be pro- longed to a total of 15 years. This maximum transitional pe- riod may ultimately be cut in half, however, if measures now under consideration are adopted. EEC officials, impressed by the ease with which the in- itial 10-percent tariff cut and quota adjustments have been absorbed by the mem- ber countries, want to take advantage of the present prosper- 25X1 ity to hasten the dismantling of eco- nomic boundaries. They are supported by the traditionally "pro-European" cir- cles, who are hope- ful of attaining a "point of no return" in the integration process, and by a surprising number of businessmen who have discovered that the larger market of the EEC is a challenge rather than a ca- tastrophe. Under the plan announced by the EEC Commission on 3 March, the EEC countries would double the 10- percent tariff re- ductions they are scheduled to grant each other next July DEVELOPMENTS and in December 1961--thus ef- fecting a 50-percent reduction in internal EEC tariffs by the end of the first four-year stage. To facilitate the ear- lier introduction of the pro- jected common tariff against nonmembers, the proposed ex- ternal tariffs would be reduced provisionally by 20 percent, and the first moves toward put- ting them into effect would be taken in July. Other aspects of the Com- mon Market--such as the aboli- tion of industrial quotas and the coordination of trade, so- cial, and agricultural policies --would also be accelerated, and proposals would be considered at a later date for shortening the EEC's second and third stages. TIMETABLE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (COMMON MARKET) DATE TARIFF CUTS l PERCENT) QUOTA ENLARGEMENTS (PERCENT) TOTAL MINIMUM EACH PRODUCT TOTAL MINIMUM EACH PRODUCT 1959 JAN 1 10 10 20 10 1960 JAN 1 ? _ 20 10 JUL 1 10 5 _ ? 1961 JAN 1 ? ? 20 10 DEC 31 10 5 _ ? STAGE BY END OF STAGE 1: Total tariff cuts by product must be at 1 least 25%; export duties and export quotas must be abolished within the Community; common external tariff to be applied in those cases where existing duty is no more thari 15% higher or lower than common tariff. This stage may be prolonged if the EEC Council does not unanimously decide to end it. 1962 JAN 1 ? ? 20 10 1963 JAN 1 ? ? , 20 10 JUL 1 10 5 1964 JAN 1 ? ? 20 10 STAGE DEC 31 10 5 ? ? 2 1965 JAN 1 ? _ 20 10 DEC 31 10 5 _ ? BY END OF STAGE 2: Total tariff cu s by product must be at least 5(. This stage may be prolonged only by unanimous vote of the Council. 1966 JAN 1 20 10 1967 JAN 1 (ACTING ON COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL, 20 10 DEC 31 COUNCIL FIXES RATE OF REMAINING TARIFF CUTS DURING STAGE 3) IALL QUOTAS BOX Of PRODUCTION) AT LEAST 1968 JAN 1 20 1 10 STAGE 1969 JAN 1 ? _ 20 10 3 DEC 31 TO ZERO TO ZERO ABOLITION Of QUOTA RESTRICTIONS BY END OF STAGE 3: All internal tariff and quota restrictions Co free movement of goods, men, services, and capital to be removed. Common external tariff to be applied. This stage may be prolonged only by unanimous vote of the Council; total transition period may not be prolonged by more than three years. 002093 SECRET 10 MARCH 1960 PART I I Approved For ReleaVCREIDS/ON99 :0E0/9/1111139-00927A0026000900Bage 9 of 17 Approved For !Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET .CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 MarCh 1960 The commission's plan will probably encounter reservations, particularly from low-tariff nations like the Netherlands, which have been loath to ap- prove an early introduction of the EEC's common external tar- iff lest this increase Dutch production costs and aggravate the competition between the EEC and the Outer Seven. Paris, however, has seemed for politi- cal reasons increasingly anx- iousto consolidate the EEC as a unit and regards the imposi- tion of the common tariff as an essential part of the process. The commission's proposals go some way to meet the French thesis, but also offer the Dutch the more liberal and outward- looking Common Market for which they have been pressing. UAR SEEKS EXPANDED INFLUENCE IN HORN OF AFRICA The UAR has offered the Italian trust territory of Somalia an annual subsidy of about $7,000,000 as well as a gift of arms I So- malia, which is scheduled to achieve independence on 1 July, probably would accept such an offer, because Western sources have not promised all the for- eign financial assistance it needs for both budgetary and developmental requirements. Somalia's aggressive neighbor, Ethiopia, regards the Horn of East Africa as its own preserve; it can be expected to react vigorously when it learns of UAR assistance to the UN trust territory. Heretofore, Cairo has sup- ported Somali opposition groups and frequently called govern- ment party leaders "lackeys" of the Italian colonial administra- tion. Cairo, despite the prob- able damage to its relations with Ethiopia, now apparently hopes to ingratiate itself with the present Somali Government, which announced plans last month to establish a 5,000-man army. Prime Minister Issa, in a recent conversation which ap- parently was intended to reach the American consul general in Mogadiscio, stated that he had deferred a reply to Cairo's offer of last July to train and equip a Somali army but that the time "has now come" to accept the offer. Ethiopia's ruling Amharic clique, which is Christian, has long viewed with suspicion the numerous Moslem peoples who nearly surround the empire. Addis Ababa, uncertain of the loyalty of its own large Moslem minority, regards as a direct threat to its territorial integ- rity any plan which might en- courage unification of the di- verse Moslem Somali tribesmen under a "Greater Somali" state or which might strengthen one of the existing Somaliland territories. Moreover, Ethiopia is dis- turbed over recent developments in the British Somaliland pro- tectorate. London permitted the Somalis in its protectorate last month to form a native- controlled government following the territory's first general elections. The protectorate's extreme nationalist, Cairo- supported, coalition group, which SECRET 10 of 17 PART I I Approved For Relea/WM/QUM PORMNIFfle-oo927Aoo260009o0116) Approved For_Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927-A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 won a landslide victory, is expected to demand immediate independence and press for early talks with representatives from Somalia regarding a unification agreement. This action, which will further embitter relations along the largely undemarcated frontiers separating Ethiopia from the Somalilands, probably will prompt Addis Ababa to renew its charge made a year ago that London is conspiring with Somalia to establish a "Greater Somalia" in the Commonwealth. 25X1 SUDAN FR. SO LAND Gulf of Aden Pout Ads Ababa* ETHIOPIA ?." Lake AM malitand SOMALIA. Mogadiscio MeNDA- URiTNIN Us hm f TANGANYIKA 30993 Chisimelo 10 MARCH 1960 POLITICAL UNREST IN UGANDA London's endorsement of a moderate increase in African representation in the legisla- ture of its East African pro- tectorate of Uganda has failed to satisfy African nationalists and tribal leaders. National- ists are incensed that the British program does not pro- vide for responsible govern- ment and an African prime min- ister. Tribal rulers, on the C2:7 Bender Beila /AIWA (,)CE,4 other hand, fear that the trend in Uganda is toward a strong central government which will involve a reduction in their own status. The present foment stems in part from publication of the report of the Wild Committee, a group formed in 1958 to make recommendations concerning the future political structure of SECRET PART I1pproved For ReleaseNINES3AND 0140NIORITE00927A00260009000P16ge 11 of 17 25X1 25X1 Approved For...Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00922A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAR1 10 March 1960 Tiganda. The committee endorsed the concept of early independ- ence, and called for legisla- tive elections by universal suffrage and the creation of a cabinet with an African prime minister. Its recommendations, if adopted, would have inaugu- rated in Uganda a program even more liberal than that imple- mented in Tanganyika, where, unlike Uganda, African senti- ment is largely unified behind a single independence group. The committee's recommen- dations were opposed by Uganda' feudalistic local rulers, led by the king of the protector- ate's most important province, 3aganda. While the king has indicated that he no longer anticipates independence apart from the remainder of the pro- tectorate, and that he would settle for a high degree of autonomy within an independent Uganda, he continues to boycott the protectorate's legislature. The attitude of such tradi- tional rulers appears to have contributed to the announcement on 22 February of a program for Uganda considerably less sweep- ing than that endorsed by the Wild Committee. Nationalists strongly attacked the program, particularly those provisions which delay legislative elec- tions until 1961 and stipulate that cabinet ministers will not have to be chosen from the African-dominated legislature. One nationalist spokesman ob- served that since Britain "has not respected African opinion," Uganda nationalists have no obligation to settle for less than full independence. Na- tionalists and tribal leaders are attempting to submerge their differences whenever pos- sible, however, and British of- ficials have emphasized that the Uganda program is subject to revision. Political problems in Uganda are heightened by ten- sions stemming from sociologi- cal factors. A year-old Afri- can boycott of non-African goods continues, and has brought a worsening of relations between the African and Asian communi- ties. African protests against tribal tax levies in the Bukedi District cost at least 15 lives during January and February, and British authorities still regard the district as a "dis- turbed area." GUINEA Guinea's increasing ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc-- closer than those of any other tropical African nation--have been emphasized by Conakry's abrupt severance of ties with the French monetary zone, by its adoption of a development plan aimed at a state-con- trolled economy, andby its agree- ment with Moscow to begin using the $35,000,000 Soviet line of credit extended last August. Conakry's ambassador to Moscow has been conferring with the East German regime, and the bloc claims that dip- lomatic relations have been established. Guinea is also apparently considering accredi- tation of an ambassador to North Vietnam. (See item on East Germany on page 3.) These actions probably re- flect President Sekou Tour6's belief that a "noncommitted" nation can safely have economic SECRET PP7T II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 25X1 25X1 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927-A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 1.0 March 1960 and diplomatic relations with any friendly state. Continuing mistrust of Paris and inability aftera year of fitful negotiations to reach agreement on French technical assistance led Conakry to an- nounce on I March that it would leave the French monetary zone and create both its own currency and national bank. The unbacked currency is likely to have little appeal to Western in- vestors and traders; as a re- sult, Guinea may seek still closer ties with the bloc. Toure has assured the largest Western enterprise in Guinea-- the US-controlled Fria alumina combine--that its European em- ployees can send their savings back to France. Fria's finan- cial experts nevertheless are deeply concerned over the long- er range situation. Guinea on 1 March signed a technical cooperation agree- ment with the Soviet Union out- lining a three-year program of aid within the framework of the $35,000,000 credit agree- ment. Most of the projects are of a showy nature--a 25,- 000-seat stadium, a 1,500-stu- dent polytechnical institute, AFGHAN-PAKISTANI Afghan-Pakistani relations have deteriorated markedly since Pakistan decided in mid- January to intensify its re- plies to Afghanistan's strong- ly worded propaganda attacks in the Pushtoonistan dispute. Rawalpindi apparently has con- cluded that if it is not to appear weak in the eyes of its own Pushtoon citizens--a minor- ity of approximately one tenth of its 85,000,000 people--and if it is to persuade Kabul to adopt a more conciliatory line, it must make a show of "firm- ness" while holding out the alternative of friendly coop- eration. a cement factory, and several factories for the processing of raw materials. In addition, Soviet technicians will aid in the reconstruction of Guinea's main railroad and airport, in geological exploration, and in agricultural improvements-- such as mechanization and the creation of a state rice farm as a pilot project. In the 17 months since Guinea became independent, the Sino-Soviet bloc has achieved significant influence there. Seven Communist nations, in- cluding Peiping, are represented at Conakry, or are about to be. Cultural ties have been strength- ened through exchange visits by officials and the presence of 100 Guinean students behind the iron curtain. Barter agreements with the bloc account for almost 60 per- cent of Guinea's trade. In ad- dition, Czechs, East Germans, and Poles are active in many fields--agriculture, communi- cations, construction, and transportation. There are al- ready at least 100 bloc advisers in Guinea, and Peiping report- edly may soon send 400 techni- cians and laborers to aid in agricultural projects. RELATIONS WORSEN 25X1 Pakistan's radio counter- attacks have accused the "Af- ghan rulers" of "flattering their Communist masters" and of "sucking the blood of Push- toons," who number about 5,000,- 000 of Afghanistan's 10,0000000- 12,000,000 population. Foreign Minister Qadir has also an- nounced that Pakistan would now demand a plebiscite to de- termine whether Pushtoon tribes- men living in Afghanistan wish to join Pakistan. The members of the Afghan royal family are taking these attacks personally and are re- acting strongly. Kabul recently SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 put Pakistan's diplomatic person- nel under surveillance and ar- rested some of the em:y's local employees. Rawalpindi is countering with a campaign of its own against the two Afghan consulates in Pakistan; it in- tends to begin harassing the Afghan Embassy shortly unless Kabul calls off its campaign. If these tactics continue, both countries may withdraw their ambassadors and reduce their embassy staffs to the caretaker level. Afghanistan has also threat- ened that if Pakistani aircraft continue to fly over "occupied Pushtoonistan"--that is Pushtoon tribal territory within Pakistan-- Kabul will be forced to act and Rawalpindi will have to suffer the consequences. In the joint Afghan-Soviet communique issued on 5 March at the end of Khrushchev's four- day visit to Kabul, the Soviet premier endorsed the Afghan position that the Pushtoons should enjoy "self-determina- tion" under the terms of the United Nations Charter. In the most explicit support by the USSR to date, Khrushchev public- ly declared on his return to Moscow that "our sympathies in this question are...on the side of Afghanistan." An Afghan- Soviet cultural agreement and a Soviet gift of 50,000 tons of wheat, announced on 4 and 5 March, are also probably in- tended as timely indications of Soviet support. Meanwhile, the Afghan Gov- ernment is adopting a cooler at- titude toward the West, apparent- ly reflecting the opinion in Kabul that the United States in particular should be able to exercise some control over Pak- istani propaganda. Foreign Min- ister Naim recently complained in a press interview that Presi- dent Eisenhower's visit to Kabul last December had not resulted in any greater understanding by the West of Afghan problems. Radio Kabul's propaganda has be- gun to attack CENTO and SEATO, through which Pakistan is allied to the West. INDONESIA President Sukarno's abrupt dissolution of the Indonesian Parliament on 5 March, "in the interests of guided democracy," apparently resulted from his ir- ritation over the legislature's efforts to preserve its former power and his apprehension over possible parliamentary actions during his world tour, which SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 14 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 25X1 25X1 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMABY -10 March 1960 begins in early April. Apparent- ly Sukarno was specifically con- cerned over parliamentary criti- cism of the 1960 budget and the strong possibility that the leg- islature would insist,on,clitting' it. SukarWs action is pre- sumed to htve had the strong support of the army, whose share of the budget amounts to almost 40 percent. Parliament did not resist the President's action, and held only a token session before finally adjourning on 7 March. At the same time that he dismissed Parliament, Sukarno promised its "recomposition in the near future" within the terms of the reinstituted 1945 constitution, which considerably strengthens executive powers at the expense of the Parliament. According to a presidential de- cree issued in January, the next Parliament--or Provisional People's Congress--will be com- posed of the approximately 260 members of the recent body plus 294 regional and functional representatives appointed by Sukarno. Sukarno has already invited nationalist, Communist, and MoS-.. lem party leaders to a conference? beginning 16 March, apparently to discuss the apportionment of the appointed members of the new body, First Minister Djuanda, however, has stated that he does not know whether the new Parlia- ment can be established before Sukarno leaves on his trip. Sukarno's annual tour takes him this year to Iraq, Yugosla- via, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Austria, Egypt, Guinea, Tunisia, Morocco, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the United States, with possible visits to the USSR, Japan, and Hong Kong. The visits to Puerto Rico and San Francisco will be unofficial. Sukarno had hoped to visit Ghana, but.villInot do so, inasmuCh ,as Prime Minister Nkrumah will be engaged on the dates convenient to Sukarno. The five-day stay in Cuba will be the longest of those definitely scheduled during his trip. THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Intensified political re- pression is the principal means by which the South Korean Lib- eral party is planning to assure a landslide victory for Presi- dent Rhee and his running mate Yi Ki-pun g in the 15 March elec- tion. Rhee's age--84--and the poor health of Yi--who can stand unassisted for only a few minutes and speaks with great difficulty--prevents any exten- sive campaigning by either candi- date, The death of Democratic presidential candidate Cho Pyong- ok at Walter Reed Hospital on 15 February left Rhee unopposed for the presidency. To be legal- ly elected, however, he must re- ceive at least one third--about 3,470,000--of the registered vote. Cho's name, which will SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 15 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 25X1 Approved FocRelease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092.74002600090001-6 SECRET 4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY -10 March 1960 remain on the ballot, might attract a large sympathy vote. The real contest is be- tween Yi Ki-pung and Democratic leader Chang Myon, who defeated Yi for the vice presidency in 1956. Two pro-Rhee vice-presi- dential candidates from minor parties appear unlikely to af- fect the election outcome ap- preciably. Beginning with repressive legislation forced through the National Assembly on 24 Decem- ber 1958 by Rhee's majority Liberal party, the administra- tion has pursued a policy of extending government control down to the lowest village level. Recent by-elections for the national legislature have provided a preview of govern- ment rigging tactics. Local Liberal officials marched voters to the polls, organized the voting by groups of three or more voters at one time, and "encouraged" the display of marked ballots. Large num- bers of police and persons wearing Liberal party arm bands were stationed outside the poll- PART II ing places to intimidate the voters. 25X1 Following the election, the government may plan a relaxa- tion of repressive pressures as a sop to foreign criticism. Pre as licenses may be abolished, and the Kyonghyang Sinmum-- South Korea's second largest newspaper, which was suppressed last April for criticizing the government--may be permitted to resume publication. Administration strategy,how- ever,appears to be largely con- trolled by the powerful Liberal "hard faction." This group's long- range plans may envisage destruc- tion of the Democratic party, a realignment of political forces, and the creation of a subsidized opposition. Over the long run, the opposition, if denied normal channels for expressing growing ant iadministration sentiment, would probably be forced into sub- versive activityj 25X1 SECRET Approved For ReleasgSNOW EVIER-00927A0026000900Age 16 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 JAPANESE-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT Japan and,the USSR haVe con- cluded a three-year trade agree- nent which provides for an ex- change of $210,000,000 worth of commodities each way and incor- .76 3. JAPANESE TRADE WITH 1956 9(2 MILLION DOLLARS t3 12.3 23.0 274 (3.0) 22.1 62.5 40.2(4.0) 39.4 62.4)16.4) ED MMUS IAMOITS RED FIGURES INDICATE DEFICIT 62.5 terms similar to those granted Moscow by Western European countries, a further agreement on detailed arrangements may prove difficult to reach. THE USSR porates a scheme for deferring Soviet payment, up to an unspeci- fied amount, for purchases in Japan. The agreement supplants the annual pacts under which the two countries have traded since December 1956. The trade target is not binding on either country, and in the case of Japan the actual transactions must be negotiated by industrial companies and trading firms on a commercial basis. The established target for 1960--a total turnover of $125,000,000--doubles the 1959 performance. It would consti- tute about 2 percent of Japan's total trade volume. Despite balanced trade pro- visions in previous agreements, Japan has not reached its ex- port goals and has experienced a growing deficit. Tokyo hopes that the deferred-payments schemes, to be financed by the government- sponsored Export-Import Bank, will rectify the imbalance. Although Tokyo has agreed in principle to extend credit on 125.0)0) 10 MARCH 1160 Fulfillment of the new trade agree- ment would result in large increases in Soviet exports of crude oil, timber, coal, and potash and would expand Japanese exports of chemical plants, ships, rolling stock, and other in- dustrial equipment. The large and rapid expansion of Soviet crude-oil marketing in Japan, which began in late 1958, is causing concern among American suppliers, who fear that their own sales may be affected ad- versely. There is some basis for such concern. Japanese Govern- ment officials have acknowl- edged that one million tons of Soviet crude oil, mostly from the Black Sea area and competi- tively priced, will be purchased in 1960. This is a tenfold in- crease over 1959. Thus.far, at least one Japanese petroleum firm has signed a long-term pur- chase agreement with the USSR. Moreover, the Japanese hope ulti- mately to reduce foreign exchange expenditures for petroleum by exploiting their concession in the Persian Gulf, where a large oil deposit recently was tapped, and through a prospective agree- ment with Indonesia for develop- ing and sharing oil resources in Sumatra. (Concurred in by ORB) SECRET PART "Approved For ReleasiztiMibARD: CIONSPRO-00927A00260009000Rage 17 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092W02600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 aufth,1960 PAW" rrr PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES BULGARIA'S "LEAP 'FORWARD" The political and economic administration that has emerged in Bulgaria over the past year has drawn primarily on Soviet expe'rience?but has also bor- rowed heavily from the spirit and elan of the Chinese Commu- nist "leap forward." The Bulgarian leap forward is more than just a program for rapid economic development. The effort has involved a de- centralization of the party and government apparatuses and numerous reforms and re- organizations which have, at least in theory, reflected the country's "socialist base." The most important polit- ico-administrative units es- tablished by the Bulgarian pro- gram are the 30 okrugs (dis- tricts), which resemble the Soviet sovnarkhozy in their control over most industries. But these districts also have --as the sovnarkhozy do not-- responsibility over all "po- litical, cultural, and eco- nomic life"--including agri- culture--within their juris- dictions. The basic agricul- tural unit is the collective farm, which in Bulgaria, through amalgamation, is con- siderably larger than the average size of collectives elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The decision to embark on such an ambitious program-- probably made between June and September 1958--was based on several considerations. As a reflection of their Stalinist background, Bulgarian leaders were perhaps overly anxious to emulate the Soviet drive to "build socialism and Communism. Sofia was also aware that Com- munist China had embarked on an extremely ambitious plan of its own. There is also evi- ft deuce that, through decentral- ization and a reduction in the size of the bureaucracy, the regime hoped to alleviate criticism of the bureaucracy by the party's rank and file. Major Features of the Leap The Bulgarian leap called for overly ambitious economic targets for 1959-65. The plan for 1959 called for a 34-per- cent increase in national in- come over 1958, about a 50- percent increase in capital in- Bulgaripa Exhor ation on "Great Leap Forward" "Hurry, my allotted time has been shortene Sturshel (Sofia) vestment, a 27.8-percent in- crease in industrial production, and a 73.9-percent increase in ag- riculture--a downgrading of the original goal ofa 100-percent increase proposed by party First Secretary Zhivkov in November 1958. Another feature has been the merging of collective farms into larger units, ostensibly to provide more efficient use of new agricultural machinery. The "voluntary" merger of ap- proximately 3,400 farms began in October 1958 and was com- pleted by mid-December when SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pare 1 of 9 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00921Z002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 the number of amalgamated collectives totaled only 625. Almost immediately thereafter, however, a limited reversal was ordered. By March 1959 the largest and most unwieldy collectives had been broken into smaller units, and the total number of collectives increased to 975. This re- versal may have been designed not only to correct the inevi- table "excesses" but to dis- avow any intent of copying the Chinese "communalization" of agriculture. Between January and March 1959, the state's system of ad- ministrative and economic man- agement was reorganized. The country's 12 districts plus Sofia City and 113 okoliyas (counties) were abolished, and 30 "administrative-economic" districts were created. The basic administrative units under the district became the opshtinas, areas which general- ly coincide territorially with the merged collective farms. Most of the "economic" minis- tries were dissolved, with many of their functions going to the district people's councils. A small number of committees and commissions, which were to exercise certain of the planning and supervisory duties of the dissolved ministries, were set up in the Council of Ministers. The economic program was to be accomplished primarily by the use of existing "inter- nalreserves," including full- scale mobilization of labor. One aim of the reorganization of the administrative apparatus was to release white-collar workers for "productive" jobs. More intense utilization of plants and equipment was intro- duced by establishing 24-hour shifts in industry. Collectiv- ized peasants were organized for off-season mass-labor proj- ects, such as land reclamation and irrigation. The Record most part, below plan and hardly constituted a "leap forward," there is no doubt significant economic achievements were at- tained. Gross industrial pro- duction rose about 25 percent, investment about 50 percent, and additions to industrial em- ployment were double those of 1958. The most drastic under- fulfillment of plan goals oc- curred in agricultural produc- tion, which increased only 10- 20 percent over the previous year, compared with the goal of 73.9 percent. Improvements were recorded, however, includ- ing stepped-up programs in irri- gation and reclamation and much greater supplies of fertilizers and machinery. These accomplish- ments, which probably would not have occurred without the pres- sures of the "leap," will aid future advances. A serious problem has been the failure of the reor- ganized state and administrative bodies to live up to expecta- tions. This resulted in part from the great pressures placed on them by the regime to meet economic goals, and in part from the confusion and dislocation arising out of the reorganiza- tion itself. These weaknesses have been continuously criticized by the regime, and several na- tional conferences have been held to discuss shortcomings and make recommendations and limited personnel changes. Internal distribution has been one of the greatest head- aches for the state adminis- tration. A major portion of the responsibility for this under the reorganization falls to the district trading enter- prises, which are subordinate to the people's councils. Fail- ures by several industrial enter- prises have been attributed to bottlenecks in supplying raw and semifinished materials. Distribution of consumer goods, particularly food, has also failed on several occasions, with severe shortages resulting. While the economic accom- Perhaps the most important plishmentsof 1959 were, for the shortcoming has been the failure SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pace 2 of 9 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927-A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10.March.1960 of the party and government apparatus to maintain the high level of popular enthusiasm necessary to meet the economic targets. Although local party and government bodies suc- ceeded in supplying enough peasants to meet 1959 irriga- tion and reclamation targets, this year's work reportedly is behind schedule, largely be- cause of the failure of the local bodies to overcome in- creasing peasant apathy. Only a small number of the peasants available were reported at such work during December and January. Sofia apparently did not succeed in convincing the peasants that the mergers of late 1958 were either desirable or necessary. The regime is still faced with opposition from members of the wealthier collectives who are opposed to mergers with poorer farms, fearing a lowering of their income. In the industrial sector, a revision of the norm and wage scale which is slated to begin this summer has caused concern among workers, who fear higher norms and reduced take-home pay. Party Problems The party apparatus is viewed as the key to the suc- cess of the leap, inasmuch as the lower party organs--specif- ically the district and area committees--are charged with directing the daily work of the economic and state bodies on these levels. Party leader Zhivkov's criticisms of these organs at the 12 January con- ference on local party problems attest to the difficulties en- countered in making the adjust- ment to greater local party responsibilities. Zhivkov revealed that qualified officials often were transferred through jealousy, that continuity of leadership was frequently lacking in the districts, and that the problems of nepotism, embezzlement, and theft still existed. He re- buked those officials who, look- ing back to an earlier system, shun responsibility and rely excessively on the next higher body for direction, and he de- nounced others for creating small administrative empires or bureaucracies--the very evils supposedly to be elimi- nated by the reforms. Another important problem facing the leadership is the need to win a greater degree of acceptance for the leap from the party's rank and file. Many party officials in the winter of 1958-59 felt that the reorganizations did not go far enough, and A few may have de- sired to establish Chinese-type communes. These officials were quickly reined in, although some such sentiment probably still exists. Far more dangerous, because it was more widespread, was the feeling that the leap--in its economic terms--was unfeasible for Bulgaria's capabilities. Zhivkov warned against this at- titude in a speech in November 1958 and in his "theses" of January 1959. In March, Minis- ter of Trade Boris Taskov was ousted from the politburo and central committee for "doubt- ing." The July issue Of the central committee's theoretical monthly Novo Vreme fulminated against doubters andviolations of collectivity, but no purge ensued. The campaign in the first half of 1959 may thus have been in the nature of a program to discourage those of little faith and to prevent them from mounting an organized, effec- tive opposition within the par- ty to Zhivkov's leap. While the regime apparently has been successful to that extent, many party members very likely continue to harbor doubts and may feel their views justified by the shortcomings of the leap last year. Future Trends Current developments in- dicate that economic acceleration SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 ? CIA:RDPIa-AW002600090001z6 PART III PATTERNS ANDPERSPECTI Page 3 of 9 Approved For...Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00922A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 is to continue during 1960 but on a more realistic scale than in 1959. Gross industrial production, for example, is slated to rise about 15 percent, capital investment about 24 percent, and agriculture 32 percent, Internal propaganda during recent months, contrary to that of a year ago, has not stressed the phrase "leap for- ward." The regime evidently plans to maintain the organizational structures established during the past year, but both economic and organizational weaknesses will continue to require re- assessment and refinement of the program. Underfulfillment of the 1959 plan evidently did not no- tably affect the stability of the regime or Zhivkov's position. Since the fulfillment of the 1960 agricultural plan is pos- sible only with optimum weather conditions, and other goals are ambitious, the regime may have difficulty in achieving some of its 1960 targets. Failure to realize economic goals for the second year may lead the regime to seek political scape- goats and to make additional changes. Although elements in the party have resisted Zhivkov's call for a "great leap," the Bulgarian leader benefits from Khrushchev's personal endorsement, and a crystallization of opposi- tion elements seems unlikely. (Jointly prepared with ORR) AFGHANISTAN'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION Afghan Prime Minister Daud is pressing ahead with the mod- ernization of the army, increas- ing its size and improving its training and equipment. Deter- mined to develop Afghanistan's economy and introduce social reforms, Daud apparently expects to rely heavily on the army for support against any tribal op- position or conservative reli- gious resistance to his programs. As the army becomes aware of its increasing importance as a means of controlling the country, it could become the chief threat to the rule of the royal family. At present Daud apparently has firm control over the army, although his direct contacts with mili- tary personnel probably have de- creased since he became prime minister. Need for Stronger Army Daud is determined to mod- ernize his country, apparently believing national progress is vital for the maintenance of independence. He apparently fears that if he allowed Afghan- istan to progress at the slow rate acceptable to the power- ful tribal and conservative religious elements, the country would be unable to resist the encroachments of its more pro- gressive neighbors. In addition, Daud probably believes that the position of the royal family within Afghani- stan can be preserved only if the family takes the lead in in- troducing improved standards of living. As the strongest SECRET PART IIIApproved For RenlernasNOW: 9hg90-9912poo260009oove e 4 of 9 25X1 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009214002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY! SUMMARY 10 March 1960 personality within the family, Daud is determined to remain in the vanguard of Afghanistan's intelligentsia in the apparent hope that he can divert the forces which have ousted other monarchies in Asia. Daud be- came prime minister in 1953 and embarked on a program of econom- ic and social development under his strengthened authoritarian government. During the first years of his regime, however, Daud did not have the power to override strong opposition and had to proceed cautiously, withdrawing a new tax when it was strongly resisted, or slowing down his efforts to abolish the veil for women when resentment began to mount. The prime minister, however, now apparently feels strong enough to sup- press such resistance. This was demonstrated last December in the Kandahar riots against more liberal treatment for women. when he crushed the dissidence with tanks and troops. While Daud may postpone his reform timetable for certain areas so as to prevent the rise of too much resistance at any one time, he has moved more troops into troubled areas and they have been ordered to make periodic displays of strength. The prime minister probably feels that any marked retreat from his position would be taken as a sign of weakness. The government is building roads into tribal territory to strengthen its authority there. SECRET PART III Approved For Rilmsfiagg/020 MAWR-9M 7A0026000900D1-6 Page 5 of 9 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 It also apparently intends to extend conscription to tribes which have hitherto been exempt. These programs may particularly arouse the Pushtoon tribes liv- ing near the Pakistani border and put Daud's government and army to more severe tests than in the recent past. Army Enlarged From a total strength of about 44,000 officers and men in 1957, the army has been in- creased to about 54,000. The training of officers has been accelerated; the number of tem- porary officers is being in- Improved Training Afghan Army officers appar- ently feel they are making prog- ress on the principal need at the present time--improving the quality of the army forces. They believe more up-to-date methods are being taught by the Soviet instructors in Afghan military schoole than by the Turkish military mission that had-been the chief source of foreign military training in the coun- try before 1956. A training program in moun- tain warfare has been established to meet the requirements imposed by the rugged terrain. Some esprit de corps is apparent for the first time,and troops now march smartly and handle tracked and wheeled vehicles com- petently. creased by assigning tenth- grade students from civilian schools to officer-training schools; and the terms of non- commissioned officers have been extended to an 11-year minimum. Enlisted personnel originally drafted for a two-year period are not being released--at least until the present tribal trou- bles have subsided. The size of the annual class of new draftees has apparently been increased. Considerable pressure is likely to be felt over the next decade for a still larger army because relations with Pakistan are likely to remain strained over the Pushtoonistan problem, local resistance to governmental authority will probably remain a major problem, and the army itself is likely to become more influential in government policy making. The extension of terms of service for noncommissioned offi- cers and drafted per- sonnel points up the increasing need for more highly trained men to serve for long periods of time to make good use of the modern weapons received under the 1956 Afghan-Soviet military assistance agreement. The next step may be officially to extend the terms of service required of conscripted soldiers or possibly to replace the conscription sys- tem with a professional army. The establishment of a professional army, which re- lies on volunteers, probably will have to await a further increase in the military's prestige. The army has had difficulty getting high-cali- ber officer material. En- listed personnel have been con- scripted mainly from the less mar- tial ethnic groups--Hazaras, Tad- jiks,and Uzbeks--rather than from the more pugnacious Pushtoon SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 9 Approved For.Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009274002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 tribesmen. Traditionally poorly trained, poorly disciplined, and poorly paid, they have enjoyed little esteem in the public eye. The army's prestige is likely to rise as it learns to use its new weapons, continues to look disciplined and smart, and dem- onstrates its improved fighting qualities against rioters and recalcitrant tribes. Potential Threat As the army gains strength, it may acquire new importance in the internal power structure of Afghanistan. In the past, a few powerful Pushtoon tribes could prevent the army from taking over and running the government. The relative strength of the tribes is de- clining as the army's grows. Daud, by increasing his depend- ence on army support, becomes more vulnerable to any army attempt to dislodge or dominate him. At present Daud's firm control of the army appears to be based largely on his knowl- edge of the officer corps, with which he tries to maintain con- tacts. With the apparatus of a police state at his disposal, Daud is prepared to move firmly at the first si of dan er Nevertheless, Daud, a for- merarmy officer, probably has been unable to maintain as close contact with his officers since he became prime minister. Many may have more extensive contacts with Soviet military assistance personnel than Daud is aware of. The apparently proper be- havior of Soviet military in- structors and technicians work- ing in Afghanistan may also have led Daud to become overconfident with regard to the danger of Soviet military influence in the Afghan Army. Such overcon- fidence--in addition to Afghan dependence on the USSR for spare parts, ammunition, fuel supplies, and additional weapons--could help Moscow increase its influ- ence within the Afghan Army over the next few years. In addition, Daud must be alert to the long-term danger of an alliance between the grow- ing middle class and intelligent- sia and modern-minded officers, produced by the new training programs, who may come to resent the control wielded over the army by an "obsolete" royal family. As more civilian and military people go abroad for training and as education be- comes more commonplace, the intelligentsia will be enlarged. A dictator by temperament, Daud is more likely to try to check any spread of political liberalism by authoritarian methods than he is to accommodate it by giv- ing more power to the govern- mental bodies that already exist under the country's supposedly constitutional monarchy. I SECRET PART IApproved For ReigmergifflOb: piCkg9E11.-2M7A0026000900$66.age 7 of 9 25X1 Approved For-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-0092M002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 SECOND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA The Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which opens in Geneva on 17 March, will seek international agree- ment on two questions that have occasioned much recent friction between Britain and Iceland as well as among other countries: the extent of a country's territorial sea and the jurisdiction of coastal states over nearby fishing. The overriding objective of Western, and particularly NATO, countries to achieve agreement on a narrow territorial sea may force some of them to sac- rifice traditional foreign fishing rights to the juris- diction of the coastal states. 1958 Conference The 1958 Law of the Sea Conference was the first of various meetings in a broad UN program to bring about the codification and development of international law. Agree- ment was reached on four con- ventions which covered a wide range of subjects, including jurisdiction over the terri- torial sea, the high seas, and the continental shelf; the con- servation of living resources of the high seas; and rights of landlocked countries. The conference failed, however, to reach agreement on the extent of the territorial sea and the jurisdiction of coastal states over nearby fishing. A substantial group, consisting chiefly of the So- viet and Arab blocs and cer- tain Latin American states, supported the adoption of a 12-mile territorial sea limit-- in some cases an even wider area. The United States and Britain--which have held to a three-mile limit--broke prece- dent by proposing a six-mile limit, but failed to bring about an agreement. The conference then recom- mended that a second confer- ence be convened devoted ex- clusively to the two remaining issues. The 13th UN General Assembly scheduled the confer- ence for early 1960. Territorial Sea Western, and particularly NATO, countries territorial sea. favor a narrow In recent years, however, almost 40 nations have claimed a territorial sea broader than three miles, some 20 claiming a minimum of 12 miles and others six or four. Some of these claims have been prompted by a desire to show independ- ence of the three-mile concept --which is associated with colonial days--and to assure exclusive control over a broader fishing zone. Arab countries have come to favor a 12-mile limit, hoping to use such a limit to justify closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli use. The Soviet bloc has generally held that for it a 12-mile zone is required but that each nation should itself decide how far its territorial sea should extend up to the 12-mile limit. Fishery Limits The issue of fishery limits is essentially one of SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pace 8 of 9 25X1 25X1 Approved For,Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00924A002600090001-6 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 March 1960 finding a compromise between the legitimate but competing interests of the "coastal" states and the "fishing" states. Within the terri- torial sea itself, whatever its width, the coastal state has exclusive fishing rights. Some coastal states have been pressing for a wider territo- rial sea which would extend their exclusive fishing rights and terminate those of other states. Some fishing states have for generations conducted ex- tensive fishing operations off foreign shores. These states, seeking to continue these op- erations, have supported a narrow territorial sea and have rejected the claims of coastal states to jurisdiction over fishing in zones contigu- ous to the territorial sea. Proposals Before Conference Two proposals recognizing a 12-mile territorial sea are before the conference. One calls outright for a 12-mile territorial sea. The other leaves to the option of a coastal state the breadth of territorial sea it claims up to 12 miles from its coast. Neither proposal seems likely to get the necessary two-thirds majority support. Countries which favor a narrow territorial sea have put forth several proposals which would limit the terri- torial sea to six miles but provide for an additional six miles of fishing rights of varying degrees. A Canadian formula setting a six-mile territorial sea with an additional six miles of ex- clusive fishing rights has con- siderable appeal to states such as Iceland which wish to end foreign fishing near their shores. This six-plus-six for- mula as presented is strongly opposed by Western European and certain other fishing states. Canada has indicated it would modify its proposal to account for traditional fishing patterns by adding that separate bi- lateral agreements could be negotiated between states fish- ing in the same waters. The United States and most Western European states favor a formula of six-plus-six qualified to allow continuation of "historic" fishing at a level not above that prevailing in a preconference base period. This formula would not satisfy the demands of certain Asian- African and Latin American states, and would probably not receive two-thirds support. Since it would be likely to be received more favorably than any of the other proposals, the United States and Britain are prepared to compromise further in an effort to get conference agreement and pre- serve a narrow territorial sea. Their revised formula, in addition to a territorial sea of six miles, would establish a six-mile contiguous fishery zone in which foreign fishing rights would terminate after a number of years--the number to be negotiated and agreed at the conference. During this period foreign fishing could be continued by the same coun- tries, at the same general level, in the same general areas, and for the same gen- eral classes of fish as dur- ing a preconference base period such as 1953 to 1957. This compromise may prove to have the best and possibly only chance for two-thirds approval at the conference. SECRET PART IIPPP roved ForRekmarWRIPali CII?TWeIti9igA00260009000114ge 9 of 9 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A002600090001-6 Approved For Relea3eCONFIDENTWAT927A0026.00090001-6 SECRET -SECRET UMEiT VApproved For Relea / ttP7-00927A002600090001-6