CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002700040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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+ FIDENTIAj'
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY N0. 5?
OCI NO.1673/60
21 April 1960
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
9FI ENITIAL,
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal i}se of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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21 April 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Despite the suppression of
large-scale violence by the im-
position of martial law in Seoul
and other major population cen-
ters, there may be further mass
upheavals. The spontaneous
violence that has ripped the
capital and other major popula-
tion centers stems from public
outrage over the Rhee regime's
increasing use of police-state
tactics during the past year,
culminating in the rigged
presidential elections on 15
March. The regime now must de-
cide whether to continue, and
perhaps increase, harsh repres-
sive measures or to make con-
cessions which may endanger
its existence o
At the height of the riot-
ing in Seoul, an estimated
50,000 to 100,000 students and
other persons battled police
and attempted to break into the
presidential palace. About 100
were killed and well over 500
wounded by police gunfire. Only
after the arrival of troops
was a semblance of order re-
stored. In South Korea's sec-
ond largest city, Pusan, some
15,000 demonstrators attacked
police.
Following the brutal police
suppression of opposition dem-
onstrators, including a great
many students, in the southern
port city of Masan on election
day, Rhee accepted the resigna-
tion of the unpopular home
minister and made other token
concessions to public indigna=
tion. As late as 19 April, how-
ever, Rhee gave American Ambas-
sador McConaughy no indication
of recognizing the basic issues
or of making any effective con-
ciliatory moves.
On the contrary, he has
been isolated from the true
state of the crisis by his ad-
visers and seemingly continues
to believe that the mass rioting
during the past month is the
work of a small group of hoodlums
and agitators manipulated by
the Communists.
Rhee on 21 April accepted
the resignation of his cabinet,
thus attempting to place him-
self above the debacle by having
his subordinates take the re-
sponsibility. Reportedly slated
for key positions in the new
cabinet are Yi Pom-sok, former
strong man of the disbanded Na-
tional Youth Corps; Pyon Yang-
tae, a political nonentity who
once served as prime minister
and Ho Chong, a highly competent
politician and former mayor of
Seoul'.and adviser to Rhee who
has been out of favor with the
Presidebt for a number of years.
The inclusion of Yi Pom-sok
lends credibility to a reported
Rhee statement of 20 April that
he did not contemplate any eas-
ing of police-state methods,
and that those who took part in
the demonstrations would be
treated as traitors to their
country.
Leaders of Rhee's Liberal
party have been divided between
the advocates of a harsh policy
and those who propose modera-
tion. Many of the latter, how-
ever, have closely supported the
government's repressive tactics
and are now only maneuvering for
increased power within the party.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1960
The US Embassy in Seoul has pre-
viously noted that many observ-
ers believed the regime was
"deliberately and inexorably"
moving toward absolutism. One
highly placed party member has
stated that the backbone of the
new party structure built for
the elections was patterned on
the Chinese Nationalist Kuomin-
tang.
The resentment which led
to the present violence prob-
ably will remain deep-seated
throughout the nation until
reforms are effected. Ambassador
McConaughy has observed that
nothing short of new, fairly
conducted national elections,
at least for the vice presi-
dency, will cope with the mount-
ing resentment. An American
newsman in Seoul has speculated
that Vice President - elect Yi
Ki-pung might resign.
Motivated by frustration
over their future and outraged
by recent police torturing and
shooting of their companions,
college and high school students
have been in the forefront of
the demonstrations and violence.
The government has announced
that 56 persons seized by the
police in Masan were tortured.
After the proclamation of mar-
tial law on 19 April, Army Chief
of Staff Lt. Gen..Song Yo-thad ad-
mitted receiving reports of
police "reprisals" against the
demonstrators. He stated that
although he ordered such ac-
tivities stopped immediately,
he did not know if his orders
were carried out. He added that
during the rioting, the police
"lost their heads" and "were
in a frenzy."
the troops as protectors--ef-
forts of the troops to maintain
order are less likely to pro-
voke further violence.
In any event, the armed
forces are strong enough to im-
pose the will of the government.
There is a pos-
siblity that in the absence of 25X1
constructive action by Rhee and
with continued unrest, the armed
forces might intervene to es-
tablish a temporary government
acceptable to the people and
to provide eventually for free
elections.
During the disturbances
there were no reports indicat-
ing anti-American sentiment,
although the government seeming-
ly had attempted to imply Ameri-
can support for its actions. 'Thee
police announced on 17 April
that the tear-gas bombs used to
restore order in Masan were ob-
tained through the US aid pro-
gram. In a similar maneuver
last year, the authorities based
the closing of the outspoken
pro-opposition Kyonghyang Sinmun,
the country's second IaFg-est
newspaper, on a US military gov-
ernment ordinance rather than
on the then newly revised Na-
tional Security Law. The ad-
ministration had been strongly
condemned for resorting to
force to pass the revised law,
which gave it virtually summary
powers to suppress all criticism
of the government.
Since the populace presum-
ably bears less animosity toward
the military forces than toward
the police--the people of one
Seoul area reportedly look on
Although the authorities--
including President Rhee--have
attempted to attribute the vio-
lence to Communist subversion,
there has been no reliable
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21 April 1960
evidence of Communist involve-
ment. Some American observers,
however, believe that the Com-
munists may soon intervene un-
less the situation improved.
Since the Masan riots,
Pyongyang has concentrated on
reporting and publicizing Sauth
Korean disturbances. Reporting
has been quite factual and
tailor-made to substantiate
North Korean statements that
the Rhee regime is corrupt,
venal, and hated by the popu-
lace. Other Communist powers,
including the USSR, have picked
up South Korean police announce-
ments ,that American Army sup-
plies, particularly tear gas,
were used to quell the rioters
in Seoul. A North Korean broad-
cast stated, "The weapons of
the US imperialists are for sup-
pressing the people." Pyong-
yang's commentary, although
pledging sympathy and support
for the demonstrators, has given
no indication that the riots
were Communist inspired or that
North Korea intends to intervene.
An uneasy surface calm has
been restored in South Africa.
In two weeks of raids on urban
native areas, police have vir-
tually destroyed the overt or-
ganizations of African nation-
alist groups and have arrested
several thousand opponents of
the government. The urban Af-
rican labor force, which chron-
ically lives near the subsist-
ence level, has temporarily ex-
hausted its ability to wage
economic warfare against the
dominant European community.
A work stoppage called by un-
derground remnants of the Af-
rican organizations for the
week of 19 April failed com-
pletely.
Outbreaks nevertheless
are likely to recur as security
forces relax their vigilance
and as Africans regain their
ability for collective action.
The few African extremists still
at large have reportedly allied
with native gangster elements
in an effort to increase their
ability to intimidate the labor
force. Native discontent may e-
rupt in further violence through-
out the country if Albert Luthuli,
a widely respected moderate Af-
rican nationalist, should die
as a result of a stroke report-
edly suffered following harsh
police treatment.
The South African Government
apparently plans to step up the
economic and political develop-
ment of the "Bantustans"--semi-
autonomous native areas in rural
parts of South Africa. The
present national budget allocates
about $3,000,000 for Bantustan
development during 1960, an in-
crease from previous budgets
but still far short of the $30,-
000,000 annual expenditure
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1960
recommended by a government-ap-
pointed commission in 1956. The
Bantustans, overcrowded despite
the fact that only about one
third of the country's 10,000,-
000 Africans live in them, have
little further economic poten-
tial.
At the same time, the gov-
ernment hag indicated that it
may relax some of the immediate
sources of discontent among
urban Africans. Under proposed
reforms, the native pass system
would be less stringently ap-
plied, Africans would be per
mitted to buy hard liquor, and
industry would be urged to pay
higher wages. While these meas-
ures would reduce the restive-
ness of urban Africans to some
extent, discontent is unlikely
to be permanently stifled by
such relatively minor concessions.
UN Secretary General Hammar-
skjold is preparing for a direct
approach to the South African
Government to follow up the Se-
curity Council's resolution of
1 April regarding the Union's
policy of racial discrimination.
Hammarskjold now plans to meet
Foreign Minister Louw in London
at the close of the Commonwealth
prime ministers' meeting on 11
May to discuss arrangements for
a visit to Cape Town in July or
August. He believes this plan
presents an opening for further
negotiations and thus postpones
the need for further UN Security
Council action for the time be-
ing, unless further explosive in-
cidents occur in South Africa.
Moscow last week continued
to criticize the Western powers
for their alleged failure to
undertake specific steps to as-
sure the success of the summit
conference. Commenting on the
meeting of the Western foreign
ministers in Washington, Soviet
propaganda adopted the general
line that the West has limited
itself to words and has failed
to realize that "originality
of views" is the primary prereq-
u sttc . for success at, the summit.
Pravda again used Secre-
tary e rter's 4 April speech
as the basis for detailed criti-
cism of the Western position on
disarmament and Germany, and
Izvestia on 16 April took a sim-
ilar approach by citing a Walter
Lippmann article as indicative
of the official Western inten-
tion to avoid definitive deci-
sions at the heads-of-govern-
ment meeting.
Timed to counter the West-
ern ministers' communiques and
press reports that the West will
propose a German plebiscite on
whether a peace treaty should
be signed with a united Germany
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1960
or separate German states, both
Pravda and Izvestia sharply re
j e cted the p ebis to concept
in either Berlin or Germany.
Both papers also repeated the
USSR's threat to sign a sepa-
rate treaty if it fails to find
understanding from the Western
leaders on the Soviet proposal
for a treaty with both German,
hys. Izvestia added that "no
one shout entertain any illu-
sions" that when such action is
taken, "all rights arising from
the defeat of Germany will lapse
in all territory over which East
Germany has sovereignty."
Pravda on 14 April revived
the proposal for an interim so-
lution to Berlin's status. In
response'to Herter's statement
tying Berlin to German unifica-
tion, Pravda claimed that the
possibfor agreement on
Berlin--"even if provisional
and partial"--became possible
at the Geneva foreign ministers'
conference, but only after the
West had discarded its pack-
age proposals. Posing the ques-
tion as to why the "positive
experience" achieved at Geneva
should be written off, Pravda
asserted that these negotiations
"came quite close" to framing
individual provisions for an
interim agreement.
Moscow's renewed emphasis
on the interim agreement pro-
vided the signal for an East
German initiative on 17 April
in the form of a letter from
Ulbricht to West German workers.
Ulbricht indicated that as a
measure to establish confidence,
East Germany could agree to an
interim solution which would
include a restriction on "hos-
tile" propaganda activity in
West Berlin, a ban on station-
ing atomic weapons in the city,
the gradual reduction of Western
troops, and the step-by-step
abolition of the occupation
status. The Ulbricht proposal
corresponds closely to the terms
for an interim agreement advanced
by Gromyko at the Geneva meeting.
The East German letter
makes no specific link between
an interim solution and the es-
tablishment of an all-German
commission, but in a speech on
the same day, and in a televi-
sion interview on 20 April,Ul-
bricht referred to the possi-
bility of summit agreement to
form such a commission based on
parity of representation.
Although the bloc has con-
centrated over the past several
months on the original Soviet
proposals to convert West Ber-
lin into a free city, the con-
cept of an interim solution was
never dropped completely. The
memorandum delivered in mid-Jan-
uary by Soviet Ambassador Smirnov
to the West German Social Demo-
crats mentioned the development
of a free city by stages, and
the Moscow Declaration of the
Warsaw Pact countries on 4 Feb-
ruary criticized Western attempts
to "cancel" the achievements of
the Geneva negotiations. Again,
in late March, Smirnov publicly
assumed that the summit negotia-
tions would begin at the point
where the Geneva discussions
ended.
East German politburo mem
ber Verner on 27 March asserted
that an interim solution was pos-
sible "on the road to a demil-
itarized free city," adding that
such a solution should include
guarantees against the use of
West Berlin as a center for
propaganda against the "social-
ist states." As the summit ap-
proaches, this proposal will
probably occupy a more prominent
place in Soviet comments on the
Berlin issue.
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21 April 1960
Recent public and private
remarks by members of the Soviet
delegation at the test ban talks
provide further evidence that
the USSR hopes to have major
unresolved issues presented at
the summit for decision. In an
interview with an East German
correspondent, Soviet delegate
Tsarapkin hailed Western "ac-
ceptance in principle" of the
Soviet moratorium proposal of
19 March as a turning point in
the test ban talks, and he
claimed that the conference
was on the threshold of a pe-
riod of intensive negotiations.
Tsarapkin also asserted
that all the delegations had
stated the negotiations should
be speeded up, and he outlined
"an extensive program of work"
to be accomplished during the
next few months. He listed in
this program technical meetings
for spelling out the details of
the research program on-
detect-ing underground tests, "precise
formulation" of the moratorium,
determination of the composition
of all control bodies, and the
fixing of an on-site inspection
quota. He pointed out that the
American delegation's assurance
that all candidates for the
presidency have declared their
agreement with'the moratorium
concept "allows us to hope" that
a "sensible" time limit for it
can be established.
Taking the same optimistic
line on the chances for an early
agreement, another member of
the Soviet delegation said pri=
vately that the main outstanding
issues must be settled at the
summit level, He listed all
the points set out by Tsarapkin,
with the exception of the prob-
lem of spelling out the details
of the research program, as
falling within these main is-
sues. He added that if they
could be resolved by the heads
of government, the conference
could then quickly settle other
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1960
questions and prepare a treaty
for signature by August. He re-
acted favorably, nevertheless,
to a suggestion that these
problems be discussed at pri-
vate informal meetings of the
three delegations.
The delegate declined to
set forth Moscow's view on the
number of annual inspections
and contended that this ques-
tion should be left to the heads
of government. He stressed the
expense that would be involved
in each inspection, however,
and said he doubted that Moscow
would agree to as many as 20
inspections each year in the
USSR. He indicated that the
quota should apply to inspec-
tions for small tests covered
by a moratorium as well as to
the larger ones banned perma-
nently by the treaty.
At the final meeting of the
conference before the recess,
Tsarapkin agreed to forming an
ad hoc technical group for dis-
cussing the research and devel-
Fidel Castro is evidently
worried over his inability to
eliminate the guerrilla bands
operating in the rugged Sierra
Maestra of eastern Cuba. The
government is trying to belittle
the affair, but Castro himself
spent more than a week in the
area; reportedly personally
leading operations--apparently
without success. Although out-
law bands have long roamed the
Sierra Maestra, continuation
of the present activity could
be important as a possible
rallying point for anti-Castro
elements. It is also likely
to be a test of the support
Castro retains among the peas-
ants of the area--whom Castro
claims to be the chief bene-
ficiaries of his revolution.
Guerrilla bands could not exist
for long in the mountains with-
out 'the support of the
peasants.
On returning from the
area, Castro told newsmen he
will have "important disclo-
sures" for the Cuban people when
he addresses them on May Day.
He hinted that this might in-
volve charges that the United
States is supporting the guer-
rillas.
The Cuban leader, angered
by recent decisions by the Su-
preme Court favoring owners of
expropriated or government-op-
erated private properties, prob-
ably plans drastic action to
bring the court into line. He
may be planning to name compli-
ant President Dorticos to head
the court. There are reports
that Foreign Minister Roa, under
SECRET
ment program. While stating
that he was without instructions
on whether to accept 11 May as
the starting date for the group,
he urged the Western delegations
to proceed under the assumption
that it would be acceptable to
Moscow.
Disarmament Talks
The bloc delegations to
the general disarmament talks
appear to be marking time,
awaiting the recess on 29 April.
Soviet delegate Zorin has con-
tinued to urge the West to fol-
low the Soviet lead and use
the remaining time to find a
platform for recommendations
to the summit conference. He
stressed that the principles
proposed by the Soviet delegation,
including the four-year time lim-
it, were subject to negotiation.
The bloc delegates also offered
to consider any Western amend-
ments, additions, or deletions,
provided they were in the con-
text of general principles.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1960
fire from extremists in the
government and discouraged by
Latin American criticism of
Cuban policies, may resign or
be retired to the presidency.
Armando Hart, present minister
of education, is rumored to be
slated to,.replace Roa in the
Foreign Ministry. Hart would
be susceptible to domination
by pro-Communists influential
in Cuban foreign affairs.
Castro seems intent on
making the "mammoth" May-Day
rally in Havana a demonstra-
tion of strong support for his
regime, not only by the Cuban
masses but also by groups
throughout the hemisphere. Evi-
dently aware of the cool atti-
tude of most Latin American
governments, he is trying to
show hemispheric. support by"in-
viting numerous political fig-
ures who, although out of of-
fice, retain reputations as
liberal or "anti-imperialist"
leaders.
They are to attend a "con-
ference of democratic, politi-
cal, and intellectual leaders"
of Latin America which is to
open on 30 April in Havana.
Leftist and pro-Communist ele-
ments in a number of Latin .
American countries have been
invited on expense-free visits
to Cuba to attend this "confer-
ence" and an "Assembly of Soli-
darity with Cuba."
The Cuban Communist party
is taking a leading part in
preparations for the May Day
rally and is using them in an
effort to resolve in its favor
the bitter internal rivalries
with non-Communist factions in
the powerful Cuban Labor Con-
federation.
abused,
In the Dominican Republic,
the Trujillo regime continues
to be in a precarious position.
There are probably more politi-
cal prisoners at this time than
in January, when a high Domini-
can official admitted that 1,500
were being held. The church-
state conflict is deepening, and
reports of police atrocities,
and the sadistic acts by mem-
bers of the Trujillo family are
being confirmed almost daily by
defectors and friends of those
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1960
The Venezuelan armed forces
seem to be on'the point of 1.
crushing an uprising by dissi-
dent Venezuelan military lead-
ers who on 20 April gained con-
trol of the garrison in San
Cristobal, a provincial capi-
tal in southwestern Venezuela
bordering on Colombia. This
move climaxed a period of un-
rest in Caracas occasioned pri-
marily by numerous reports of
military plotting and intensi-
fied by unfavorable economic
conditions and strains in Pres-
ident Betancourt's three-party
coalition. Key military, labor,
and political groups have
rallied to Betancourt's support,
and his control apparently is
not threatened for the present,
but a further period of tension
and political maneuvering; is likely.
The principal leader of the
rebels is General Castro Leon, a
72 70 68 66 64 62 60
12
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.
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1(2
Amay
"~
-
Kt, 7:r IN 6P. F~FT. n
,t` TOBAGO
N - improved t.rain-
ing ?of personhd1'71n -logistical
,jobs,?and,raised maintenance
standards,.. , A j dint.: ar,ed forces
committee on construction is
being formed to centralize con-
trol of. construction funds,
materials, and labor.
Navy
The navy has two destroyer
escorts, four patrol escorts,
four escorts,`and numerous..,siaall-
er ships and amphibious craft,
all obtained from the US. The
navy is organized into task
forces which patrol the waters
contiguous to the Demilitarized
Zone to prevent infiltration of
Communist agents and seizure of
South Korean fishermen by North
Korean patrols.
The navy is capable of de-
fending itself against a weak
force such as the North Korean
Navy, but it is incapable of
conducting effective operations
against the stronger Chinese
Communist naval forces. Anti-
submarine, minesweeping, and
escort capabilities are limited
by obsolescent equipment. Fire
support is limited to three-
inch guns on patrol vessels,
and no vessel has fire-control
equipment adequate for accurate
antiaircraft fire against jet
aircraft.
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21 April 1960
The marine crops, consist-
ing of one division, can op-
erate effectively as part of
a larger ground force and has
the capability of conducting
amphibious operations involv-
ing a regimental landing team.
During a recent amphibious ex-.
ercise, the navy and marine
corps displayed a good capa-
bility for planning and execut-
ing operations of regimental
strength against light to
moderate resistance, but seri-
ous deficiencies in logistical
planning were also revealed.
In addition, over-all operation-
al effectiveness is lowered by
obsolete vessels and the com-
plete lack of an air arm to
support naval action.
The air force consists
of five F-86F-fighter-bomber
squadrons, one RF-86F recon-
naissance squadron, one C-46
transport squadron, and one
tactical air controller squadron.
All air force units except the
tactical air controller squad-
ron are combat ready, and the
rate of aircraft in commission
is over 70 percent. The air
force can fly close-support
and interdiction missions and
is qualified to supplement US
units.
The 138 jet fighters of
the South Korean Air Force,
if not destroyed on the ground
in the first hours of combat
by the 600-odd jet fighters
and 100-odd jet bombers based
in North Korea, could be ex-
pected to exist as an effective
force in only the initial phases
of fighting. Fuel supplies
for many units are available
for only seven days. The air
force lacks an all-weather capa-
bility. For defense against
night attack, it must rely on
army-controlled 90- and 40-mm.
antiaircraft guns, which are
ineffective against jets. Lack
of air force - navy coordina-
tion hampers air-supported
amphibious operations.
Political ; Influence
Most top military leaders
are believed to be personally
loyal to President Rhee and
have consistently delivered the
military vote to the adminis-
tration at election time. Rhee
has prevented any possibility
that the military might develop
an effective independent in-
fluence in politics by his
policy of playing off military
leaders against each other and
of retiring or transferring gen-
erals from command positions
before they become entrenched.
He has appointed some to civilian
and diplomatic positions.
While all ranks are seem-
ingly loyal to the republic and
strongly anti-Communist, there
are indications that many junior
officers and enlisted men are
personally opposed to the ruling
Liberal party. This opposition,
however, has failed to find an
effective outlet.
The armed forces will prob-
ably favor a constitutional suc-
cession when Rhee dies. Should
the succession be accompanied
by serious popular unrest be-
yond the control of the civil
authorities, the military prob-
ably would intervene to main-
tain order. In the event of a
complete breakdown of civil
authority, the military might
take over the government until
it could be returned to a
civil administration. In any
event, top military leaders
very likely would be recep-
tive to American influence.
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